<DOC>
[108th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:94774.wais]
NONPROLIFERATION: ASSESSING MISSILE TECHNOLOGY EXPORT CONTROLS
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 9, 2004
__________
Serial No. 108-165
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DOUG OSE, California DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
RON LEWIS, Kentucky DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
CHRIS CANNON, Utah DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan Maryland
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Columbia
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee ------ ------
------ ------ ------
------ ------ BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
(Independent)
Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director
Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
DAN BURTON, Indiana DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio TOM LANTOS, California
RON LEWIS, Kentucky BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania Maryland
------ ------ JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
------ ------
Ex Officio
TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
J. Vincent Chase, Chief Investigator Member
Robert A. Briggs, Clerk
Andrew Su, Minority Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on March 9, 2004.................................... 1
Statement of:
Borman, Matthew S., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce
for Export Administration, Department of Commerce; Robert
W. Maggi, Managing Director of Defense Trade Controls,
Department of State; Lieutenant General Tome H. Walters,
Jr., USAF, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department
of Defense, accompanied by Vann H. Van Diepen, Director,
Office of Chemical, Biological and Missile
Nonproliferation, Department of State; and Lisa Bronson,
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security
Policy and Counterproliferation, Department of Defense..... 97
Feickert, Andrew, Specialist in National Defense,
Congressional Research Service; Joseph A. Christoff,
Director, International Affairs and Trade Team, U.S.
General Accounting Office; and Dennis M. Gormley, senior
fellow, Monterey Institute, Center for Nonproliferation
Studies.................................................... 8
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Borman, Matthew S., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce
for Export Administration, Department of Commerce, prepared
statement of............................................... 100
Bronson, Lisa, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation,
Department of Defense, prepared statement of............... 154
Christoff, Joseph A., Director, International Affairs and
Trade Team, U.S. General Accounting Office, prepared
statement of............................................... 34
Feickert, Andrew, Specialist in National Defense,
Congressional Research Service, prepared statement of...... 11
Gormley, Dennis M., senior fellow, Monterey Institute, Center
for Nonproliferation Studies, prepared statement of........ 52
Maggi, Robert W., Managing Director of Defense Trade
Controls, Department of State, prepared statement of....... 114
Ruppersberger, Hon. C.A. Dutch, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Maryland, prepared statement of.......... 6
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............ 3
Walters, Lieutenant General Tome H., Jr., USAF, Defense
Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense,
prepared statement of...................................... 135
NONPROLIFERATION: ASSESSING MISSILE TECHNOLOGY EXPORT CONTROLS
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TUESDAY, MARCH 9, 2004
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats
and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael Turner
(vice chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Shays, Turner, Burton, Duncan,
Ruppersberger, and Tierney.
Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and
counsel; J. Vincent Chase, chief investigator; Robert A.
Briggs, clerk; Anna Laitin, minority communications and policy
assistant; Earley Green, minority chief clerk; Jean Gosa,
minority assistant clerk; and Andrew Su, minority professional
staff member.
Mr. Turner. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations, entitled, ``Nonproliferation: Assessing Missile
Technology Export Controls,'' is hereby called to order.
Cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles [UAVs], pose a
growing threat to U.S. interests at home and abroad. Available,
affordable and versatile, these technologies offer rogue
nations and sub-state actors access to strategic capabilities
previously beyond their reach. The burgeoning global
marketplace of military and commercial systems means our
battlefield and homeland defenses will face profound challenges
from the thick catalog of pilotless machines some call the poor
man's air force.
According to the Congressional Research Service, as of last
year, 161 UAV production programs operated in 50 nations. The
arsenals of 75 nations currently contain 131 different types of
cruise missiles. By one estimate, an enemy with $50 million to
spend could buy just one or two advanced tactical fighters, 15
ballistic missiles or 100 off-the-shelf, ready-to-fire cruise
missiles, each carrying a substantial conventional payload.
Slower and small UAV systems from model airplanes to GPS-
enabled rotary wing craft can be effective purveyors of
chemical or biological weapons. A standard sized cargo
container on the deck of a freighter approaching our coast
could conceal a cruise missile and launcher.
Numerous commercial UAV applications and the ready
availability of dual-use components like guidance systems make
controlling the spread of sensitive technologies extremely
difficult. Many of the systems sought by proliferators
literally and figuratively fly under the defensive radars
arrayed against them. To prove the point, a New Zealander with
only limited aerospace expertise was able to obtain all of the
components needed to build a homemade cruise missile last year.
He apparently broke no laws while procuring an airframe,
propulsion plant and guidance and control systems for less than
$5,000.
The dimensions of this rapidly emerging threat compel us to
ask, what is being done to keep these lethal technologies from
falling into the wrong hands? Are cold war era
counterproliferation strategies focused on system range and
payload limits relevant against a post-September 11 threat
characterized by rapid technology innovation, miniaturization
and a highly adaptable enemy? Do national and international
export control regimes effectively limit the flow of the most
advanced components that define our current technological
advantage in the cruise missile and UAV fields?
To help us address these issues, we asked the General
Accounting Office to assess international counterproliferation
efforts and evaluate U.S. programs to verify that UAV and
cruise missile technology exports are used as intended. The GAO
findings released last week point to gaps in export license
reviews and post-shipment monitoring. GAO recommends far more
aggressive use of end-use verification and inspections by the
Department of Commerce, Defense and State.
We will hear testimony this afternoon from two panels of
experts. The first will describe the scope of the problem. The
second panel will discuss the complex international and
interagency export control process used to limit the diversion
of critical UAV and cruise missile technologies.
We appreciate the experience and insight of all of our
witnesses and what they bring to our oversight of these issues,
and we look forward to their testimony.
Now I would like to recognize my colleague, Mr.
Ruppersberger.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]
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Mr. Ruppersberger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At the center
of today's discussion is the inherent tension between national
security and commercial concerns. This conflict has always
existed, but a world more complicated by global trade and
terrorism only makes the divide more complicated. Export
controls and the laws created to deal with them, both domestic
and international laws, are based on states dealing with
states. Much of this is based on knowing who our friends are
and who our enemies are. This is the way the world once was,
but it is not that way anymore.
I understand the business concerns. They need to keep
manufacturing lines running and retain highly skilled
employees. International trade has allowed many in this
industry, including the AAI Corp., the developer and
manufacturer of the Shadow UAV located in my district,
Maryland's Second Congressional District, to keep production
going when U.S. purchases have been sporadic. When export
controls are cumbersome or ineffective, U.S. businesses
struggle to remain competitive. At a time when we need to grow
the American economy and create more jobs, I understand the
business perspective well.
But I also understand the national security concerns.
Technology improves every day, and the success found in recent
conflicts make American products attractive to our enemies as
well as our allies. With so many questions about who we are
selling to, how what we sell will be used, and potential dual
uses of this technology, we cannot ignore threats to our
servicemen and women serving abroad or our homeland defense.
My experience on the House Intelligence Committee gives me
another perspective on the national security aspect. It leads
me to question whether the Intelligence Community provides a
satisfactory assessment of the cruise missile and UAV threat to
support export control decisions. It makes me wonder if our
current export control regimes are sufficiently adaptable to
take into account any new threats from cruise missiles or UAVs.
I don't believe GAO included these questions in the scope
of their investigation. However, I believe these questions are
critical to this discussion and hope they will be a part of
today's or future discussions on this topic.
I would like to thank all the witnesses today for their
hard work in this area. I look forward to your testimony.
Continuing these conversations is critical to strike the right
balance between commerce and security. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Hon. C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger
follows:]
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Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Ruppersberger.
I ask unanimous consent that all members of the
subcommittee be permitted to place any opening statement in the
record and that the record remain open for 3 days for that
purpose. Without objection, so ordered.
And I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be
permitted to include their written statements in the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
I'd like to recognize our first panel, which includes Mr.
Andrew Feickert, Specialist in National Defense, Congressional
Research Service; Mr. Joseph A. Christoff, Director of the
International Affairs and Trade Team, U.S. General Accounting
Office; and Mr. Dennis M. Gormley, senior fellow, Monterey
Institute, Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
Gentlemen, we do swear in our witnesses in this committee.
If you wouldn't mind standing, please. Please raise your right
hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Turner. Note for the record that the witnesses
responded in the affirmative.
We're going to begin our testimony with Mr. Feickert. We're
going to ask that your comments be somewhere in the range of 5
to 10 minutes. We do have the light, so we'll show you when the
5-minute period is concluded, and then you'll have additional
time after that to wrap up your comments.
STATEMENTS OF ANDREW FEICKERT, SPECIALIST IN NATIONAL DEFENSE,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE; JOSEPH A. CHRISTOFF, DIRECTOR,
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE TEAM, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE; AND DENNIS M. GORMLEY, SENIOR FELLOW, MONTEREY
INSTITUTE, CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES
Mr. Feickert. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity
to appear before you today to discuss the growing cruise
missile threat as delivery systems for both conventional
weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Cruise missiles and
UAVs are no longer the exclusive domain of a few select
countries. They are widely available throughout the world. At
present there are reportedly about 130 cruise missile types----
Mr. Turner. Mr. Feickert, I appreciate that you've turned
on the microphone. Could you also move it just a little bit
closer, please?
Mr. Feickert. Yes, sir--in the hands of about 75 different
countries. According to experts, there are 161 operational UAV
programs in 50 different countries.
Because pilots and aircraft are not put at risk, cruise
missiles and UAVs are very attractive systems----
Mr. Shays. I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman. Could you just please
move the mic a little closer?
Mr. Feickert. Is that better, sir?
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Mr. Turner. I think it's a little bit directional. Perhaps
if you'd put it in front of you and point it directly out, it
might allow us to all hear better. Thank you.
Mr. Feickert. Because the pilots in aircraft are not put at
risk, cruise missiles and UAVs are very attractive systems,
particularly in countries with small or less than capable air
forces. Some analysts believe that countries with cruise
missiles and UAVs might be more inclined to conduct high-risk
operations against better equipped countries such as the United
States. These systems are easy to build or acquire. One report
predicts that 6,000 to 7,000 land attack cruise missiles could
be sold by the year 2015, excluding United States, Russian and
Chinese sales.
Despite MTCR restrictions, many countries produce cruise
missiles which fall just under the regime's parameters or
modify missiles proscribed by the MTCR to produce a less
capable variant. If acquiring a land attack cruise missile
proves to be too difficult or too expensive, it is possible to
convert an antiship cruise missile such as the SS-N-2, Styx,
which is found in the inventories of more than 20 different
countries.
UAVs, which are also covered under the MTCR, can be
acquired on the international market as complete, ready-to-fly
systems or can be built from scratch or by converting an
existing manned aircraft.
Most experts agree that any country or group with even a
modest aerospace program can readily build UAVs with common
dual-use aviation technologies.
These systems are very affordable. As previously noted, a
country with $50 million to spend by can buy 1 or 2 advanced
tactical fighters, 15 ballistic missiles or 100 cruise
missiles.
The chart before you helps to further illustrate this
point. In addition to being affordable, these systems are
accurate. Cruise missiles with global positioning system or GPS
guidance can strike their targets within a few meters of their
intended aim point. Both cruise missiles and UAVs are
versatile. Cruise missiles can be launched from an aircraft
which can significantly extend the range or they can be
launched from surface ships, submarines or also from ground
positions.
The UAV's versatility as a dual-use system is why many
experts believe that it could be very difficult to regulate
them under nonproliferation or export control regimes. But
unlike the cruise missile, which has little utility outside the
military arena, there are a host of nonmilitary uses for UAVs.
Cruise missiles are very difficult to defend against
because of their small size and their ability to fly
unpredictable routes at low altitudes. Defending against cruise
missiles is further complicated if the cruise missile employs
stealth technologies which are available worldwide and are
being incorporated into a number of new designs.
Cruise missiles also challenge missile defense systems.
According to defense officials, the Patriot system when
currently employed in its ballistic missile defense mode, has
limited ability to detect and engage incoming targets at 100
meters or less.
UAVs offer their own defensive challenges. Smaller
propeller-driven UAVs flying slower and closer to the ground
may escape detection by ground and air based radars. Higher
flying larger UAVs can employ stealth technologies which can
improve their chances of penetrating hostile airspace.
Even though cruise missiles and UAVs offer a variety of
challenges, it is important to note that the majority of these
systems pose only a local or regional threat. Currently only a
few cruise missiles and UAVs have a range of 1,000 kilometers
or more.
A wide variety of conventional munitions have been
developed for cruise missiles. A less extensive array of
warheads is currently available for UAVs. This is due to the
payload capacity of most of today's UAVs, which were originally
intended to serve as information gathering platforms.
United States and foreign efforts to develop unmanned
combat aerial vehicles [UCAVs], will likely expand the
conventional weapons utility of UAVs.
The United States has developed the majority of special
payloads that are currently available for cruise missiles. In
1991, the United States reportedly used Tomahawk cruise
missiles filled with chemically treated carbon graphite
filaments to short out Iraqi electrical transformers and
switching stations. Special payloads under consideration for
UAVs include microwave weapons as well as ballistic missile
defense interceptors. Other nations could also develop special
warheads for their own systems.
Cruise missiles can deliver nuclear weapons. Currently only
the United States and Russia have nuclear cruise missiles,
although China is reportedly developing a new cruise missile
with nuclear potential. Many analysts agree that nuclear cruise
missiles are currently outside the technical range of most
countries, as most Third World nuclear warhead designs are too
large and too heavy for cruise missile use.
UAVs could also be used to deliver a nuclear weapon, but in
addition to size and weight constraints, the UAV's ability to
penetrate air defenses might be somewhat limiting.
Both cruise missiles and UAVs could be effective for
delivering biological agents because of their ability to
dispense payloads at subsonic speeds, thereby ensuring
survivability of the biological agent.
Cruise missiles that use advanced guidance systems and
onboard sensors could alter their flight profiles to respond to
local terrain and weather conditions to provide optimum target
coverage. While this advanced capability may at present be
within the grasp of only a few countries, less sophisticated
attacks with biological agents using cruise missiles and UAVs
are certainly within the capabilities of most countries or
nonstate actors that could produce or gain access to such
weapons.
Cruise missiles and UAVs can also dispense chemical agents.
Chemical agents are generally more survivable than biological
agents, but larger chemical payloads may be required to achieve
the same level of lethality or area of coverage. Most analysts
believe that developing a simple chemical warhead for a cruise
missile or UAV is well within the technical capabilities of
most countries that have these programs and quite possibly
within the capabilities of technically adept nonstate groups.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today, and I welcome any
questions that you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Feickert follows:]
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Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Christoff.
Mr. Christoff. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am
pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's recent report on U.S.
efforts to limit the proliferation of cruise missiles and UAVs.
Last year this committee asked us to assess United States and
international efforts to limit the proliferation of cruise
missiles and UAVs. In a report we released 2 weeks ago, we
addressed three key areas: First, the nature and extent of the
proliferation; second, the tools used to address proliferation
risks; and third, U.S. efforts to verify the end use of these
sensitive technologies.
In summary, we found that nonproliferation tools and end-
use monitoring efforts are not keeping pace with the growing
threat from cruise missiles and UAVs, and let me now summarize
our findings and our recommendations.
First, we found that cruise missiles and UAVs pose a
growing threat to U.S. national security interests. They are
accurate, inexpensive delivery systems for conventional,
chemical and biological weapons. They are difficult to detect,
difficult to defeat and are available worldwide.
For example, at least 70 nations possess about 75,000
cruise missiles, mostly antiship cruise missiles armed with
high explosive warheads. China and Russia have sold cruise
missiles to Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Syria. In
addition, commercial items such as global positioning systems
and lightweight engines are increasingly available worldwide.
These items have allowed countries to expand the range and
accuracy of their cruise missile systems.
The Chinese Silkworm missile you see on your left was found
in Iraq after the first Gulf war. In October 2003 the United
States found 10 additional Silkworm missiles that the Iraqis
had modified to become land attack cruise missiles. As a
result, the range of the missiles increased from 100 to 180
kilometers.
The second picture you see on your left is the U.S.-built
Predator UAV. UAVs are pilotless vehicles that operate like
airplanes. They have primarily been used for reconnaissance.
Countries worldwide are increasingly interested in acquiring
and developing UAV technology; 32 nations are developing or
manufacturing more than 250 models of UAVs.
We also assessed tools the United States uses to reduce the
proliferation of cruise missiles and UAVs. First, multilateral
export control regimes are voluntary arrangements among
supplier countries to restrict exports of sensitive
technologies.
Between 1997 and 2002, the Missile Technology Control
Regime accepted six U.S. proposals to expand the list of cruise
missile and UAV technologies subject to international controls.
Regime members are expected to scrutinize the listed items
before approving an export license.
However, these lists do not preclude countries from
exporting sensitive items. In addition, regime members have
disagreed over the sales of cruise missiles to countries of
concern. For example, the U.S. disagreed with France's 1997
decision to sell its Black Shaheen cruise missile to the United
Arab Emirates.
In addition, nonmembers such as China and Israel continue
to export cruise missiles and UAV technology to countries of
concern. The United States also uses its national export
control laws to address missile proliferation but finds it
difficult to identify and track commercially available items
not covered by control lists.
In addition, a gap in U.S. regulations has allowed nonstate
actors to acquire cruise missile or UAV technology without
violating U.S. laws. This gap is illustrated by the 2003 case
of a New Zealand citizen who illegally obtained U.S. dual-use
items to develop a cruise missile.
Current regulations prohibit the sale of unlisted dual-use
items to 12 missile proliferation projects and 20 countries of
concern. This regulation does not apply to individuals or
nonstate actors.
We recommended that the Secretary of Commerce determine
whether the regulations should be modified to close this gap.
Finally, we review the results of end-use monitoring checks
completed between 1998 and 2002 by the Departments of State,
Defense and Commerce. We found that the departments conducted
few checks to confirm the recipient's cruise missiles and UAVs
complied with U.S. license conditions.
The State Department conducted checks on only 4 of the 786
licenses it issued for cruise missile and UAV-related
technology. The Department of Defense conducted no checks on
the more than 500 cruise missiles and related items transferred
to other countries. And the Department of Commerce conducted
checks on only 29 of nearly 2,500 cruise missile or UAV-related
licenses it approved.
We recommended that the departments conduct a comprehensive
assessment of the nature and extent of compliance with license
conditions on these technologies. This assessment should
include additional end-use checks.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, that concludes my
statement, and I will be happy to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Christoff follows:]
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Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Christoff.
Mr. Gormley.
Mr. Gormley. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I'm
honored to appear before you today to illuminate how cruise
missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles pose a threat that could
affect both U.S. interests and the American homeland. The
timing of this hearing and the release of the GAO report on
improvements needed to better control technology exports could
not come at a more propitious time. We are at a crucial turning
point, in my view, in the proliferation of cruise missiles and
UAVs, one precipitated via events during Operation Iraqi
Freedom as well as by growing evidence of terrorist plans for
using UAVs.
The GAO report interestingly mentioned at least five times
that cruise missiles and UAVs pose an emerging threat to U.S.
interests abroad as well as at home. Permit me in these brief
remarks to illustrate how, and I would ask that my longer
statement and accompanying journal article be placed in the
record.
First, in regard to threats to the U.S. homeland, cruise
missiles or UAVs might be launched from concealed locations at
modest distances from their targets or brought within range and
launched from freighters or commercial container ships; in
effect, two-stage forms of delivery. Al Qaeda is believed to
possess at least 15 freighters. In the aftermath of the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland, key
U.S. decisionmakers began to take such two-stage threats more
seriously.
The 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on the ballistic
missile threat to the United States drew attention to the
covert conversion of a commercial container ship as a launching
pad for a cruise missile. Even a large bulky cruise missile
like the ones Iraq used to fire at coalition forces last year
could be equipped with a small internal erector for launching
and still comfortably be fit within a standard 12-meter
shipping container.
Indeed, the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate argues that
because such a delivery system, among several others, is less
costly, easier to acquire and more reliable than an
intercontinental ballistic missile, a cruise missile attack
against the American homeland is more likely to occur than a
ballistic missile attack.
The notion that a terrorist group might entertain using
UAVs is by no means far-fetched. One recent accounting of
terrorist activity notes 43 recorded cases involving 14
terrorist groups in which remote control delivery systems were
either threatened, developed or actually utilized.
Model airplanes were used or planned for use by al Qaeda to
kill leaders at the 2002 G-8 summit in Genoa, Italy. Moreover,
according to the London Independent newspaper, a British
national held at Camp Delta, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba has confessed
to being part of an al Qaeda plot to acquire a drone to attack
the House of Commons with anthrax.
Let me now turn to threats--conceivable threats that might
affect our regional interests. Operation Iraqi Freedom
demonstrates powerfully how cruise missiles and UAVs might
threaten our overseas interests. Patriot missile batteries
performed immensely better than they did during the first Gulf
war. All nine of Iraq's most threatening ballistic missile
launchers were successfully intercepted and destroyed, but the
second Gulf war saw the first use of enemy land attack cruise
missiles against Patriot in combat.
American and Kuwaiti Patriot batteries failed to detect any
of Iraq's low-flying cruise missiles, one of which came
perilously close to striking a U.S. Marine encampment on the
war's opening day. What's more, at least two Iraqi ultra light
aircraft, which were feared capable of carrying chemical or
biological agents, were detected only after flying over
thousands of U.S. troops, equipment and command facilities
prior to a U.S. Army's divisional advance on Baghdad.
Iraq's use of cruise missiles and slowflying air vehicles,
which were manned but needn't have been, also contributed to
the Patriot's unfortunate series of friendly fire incidents,
two of which led to the loss of two coalition aircraft and the
deaths of three crew members.
America's adversaries are bound to draw important lessons
from the performance of U.S. missile defenses against Iraq.
Referring to Iraq's use of cruise missiles, the Chief of Staff
of the 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command told the New
York Times, ``this was a glimpse of future threats. It is a
poor man's air force; a thinking enemy will use uncommon means
such as cruise missiles and UAVs on multiple fronts.''
At least two reasons account for why we should anticipate
an acceleration of interest in acquiring cruise missiles and
UAVs. First, countries wishing to deter U.S. military
interventions were unlikely to invest heavily in cruise
missiles until American missile defenses performed decisively
better against ballistic missiles than they did during the 1991
Gulf war. Patriot's success against Iraqi ballistic missiles in
2003 coupled with problems coping with cruise missile attacks
increases the incentive to acquire difficult to defend against
cruise missiles and UAVs.
Second, American's adversaries are likely to appreciate the
operational advantages of combining ballistic and cruise
missile launches to maximize the probability of penetrating
even the best American missile defenses. Converting small
airplanes or UAVs into weapons-carrying missiles offers a
particularly attractive poor man's option.
When these in large numbers are combined with more
expensive and sophisticated ballistic and cruise missiles, they
raise the stakes enormously for American missile defenses.
Consider, for example, the dire and unfavorable cost
exchange arithmetic associated with current U.S. missile
defenses and conceivable adversary missile threats. The
guidance upgrade alone on the Patriot PAC-2 guidance enhanced
missile costs $400,000 per missile, and each new PAC-3
interceptor roughly costs $3.5 million dollars per interceptor.
A flock of cruise missiles or converted airplanes, several
orders of magnitude cheaper, could readily saturate most
economically feasible missile defense architectures. Thus,
controlling the quantitative spread of cruise missiles and UAVs
through improved nonproliferation policies is an absolute
necessity
to guarantee confidence in our missile defense expenditures.
Beyond the excellent set of recommendations offered by the
GAO in its report, I would be pleased to discuss additional
proposals during our question and answer time. I thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gormley follows:]
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Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Gormley. We'll move to a series
of question periods of--we'll do 5 minutes and then a rollover
of additional 5 minutes for additional questions, recognizing
Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Sure. OK. Can you tell me how from your
perspective, all three, whoever wants to answer, the authority
agencies involved interact with the intelligence community to
determine who and what the current threats are and how often
are lists of who we sell to and who we will not sell to updated
on this intel data?
Mr. Christoff. The intelligence community and the data is
used in the licensing process. In addition to doing what the
departments refer to as prelicense checks, they look at the
bona fides of the companies or the countries that are--we're
selling our cruise missiles and UAVs to and they also
incorporate intelligence information into the interagency
process.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Do you think it's effective and it's
working, the relationship with getting the data?
Mr. Christoff. We haven't looked in detail about that part
of the licensing process. I don't think I'd want to comment on
that.
Mr. Ruppersberger. OK. The way I see that you've looked at
your report, there are three stages. That's before we sell.
That's the actual transfer. And I think the focus of your
report was more of the end-use compliance. Is that correct?
Mr. Christoff. Correct.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Now, do any of you believe that the
current authority provided to State and subsequently to
Commerce and DOD is adequate and do you think the GAO findings
are the result of--the GAO findings the result of inadequate
authority or failure to exercise authority they already have?
Mr. Christoff. I think it's a failure to exercise existing
authority, because the one main point that we want to make in
our recommendation to do this comprehensive assessment is that
you need better information. If you only have conducted 33
post-shipment verifications out of 4,000 licenses, it's
difficult to really thoroughly assess the risks associated with
not doing more, and therefore by doing more PSVs, you will be
able to determine what the potential risk is and be able to
determine what your priorities are, where you should be placing
your resources and how best to use that information in
prelicensing decisions as well.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Well, then what would you recommend?
Mr. Christoff. Well, the recommendations that we made are
the ones that we made in the report. First is that the paucity
of the number of post-shipment verifications that the three
agencies have done is insufficient. It doesn't give them a
basis for believing, as State does, that there is no problems
that have occurred in the post-shipment verification process.
So doing more, going back to the 4,000 and doing as DOD
suggested to us, a statistically valid random sample, will give
you good information about the problems in the past and then
conducting more PSVs in the future as well and to commit to
that.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Do you think it needs more resources or
money?
Mr. Christoff. It needs more information, No. 1, to then
make decisions about where the priorities and resources should
be targeted.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Where are you going to get the
information?
Mr. Christoff. Going to look at the prior PSVs that have
not been----
Mr. Ruppersberger. And that's the only area you recommend,
looking at the prior from a random point of view?
Mr. Christoff. Looking at that, and also we recommended for
the Commerce Department to look into the existing catchall
regulations to determine whether or not the scope of those
regulations should be broadened.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Sometimes you need one boss, one person
in authority. Do you see any problems between DOD and Commerce
working that through?
Mr. Christoff. We've issued prior reports that have talked
about the interagency process and the need for three
departments to work more closely together to use the
intelligence information that they have available, to make sure
that they are transferring information from one department to
the other. So, yes, the interagency process can always be
improved considerably.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Well, then, the purpose of this hearing
is to find out how and why. How would you improve it? And I'd
like to hear from the other two also on these questions that
I'm asking.
Mr. Gormley. Well, let me make one comment in regard to how
one might improve it. It strikes me that all of the
recommendations are necessary but not sufficient, particularly
with respect to this growing concern about a poor man's air
force. When you look at the necessary elements to put together
a poor man's air force--there is the concern about effects on
commercial enterprise--one can certainly not conceive of
regulations that make it more difficult for people interested
in, for example, recreational aircraft to require a case-by-
case review for that. That's inconceivable, and I couldn't
imagine that occurring.
But when one thinks about the challenges associated with
turning that recreational aircraft requiring a man to fly it
into a fully autonomous cruise missile, there are serious
transformation requirements associated with it, the most
notable being the creation of a fully autonomous flight control
system to guide that system to the intended target without a
man piloting it.
And there are on the marketplace today--and it's a recent
phenomenon over the past 5 years--I would imagine less than 10
companies which are largely spin-offs of the large aerospace
firms that are now producing what are called variable autonomy
flight control systems. They provide the complete flight
management solution for turning a manned aircraft into an
unmanned air vehicle, and it seems to me that the impact on
placing some case-by-case reviews on these UAV flight
management systems would make immense sense in terms of making
that transformation hurdle more difficult for an individual or
a terrorist group who might be interested in turning that
recreational aircraft into a weapon of terror.
There was an attempt in 2003 by the U.S. Government to
introduce an antiterrorism proposal that focused on this
particular poor man's issue of turning airplanes into terror
weapons, and because it was not sufficiently detailed with
respect to precisely what kind of technology should be
controlled, I understand that it was rejected within the
Wassenaar Arrangement where it was introduced.
Now, my recommendation would be to clean up that proposal,
focus specifically on the technologies that ought to receive
case-by-case review and consider it not only within the
Wassenaar Arrangement but within the Missile Technology Control
Regime as well, because they have better, you know, no denial,
no undercut rules that I think would provide for a more
effective basis for monitoring these transfers.
Mr. Ruppersberger. OK. And what I'm trying to get to, and I
think you're answering some of it, and what I'd like to hear
from all three, though, why do you think that there are
problems now? Lack of resources, direct funding or manpower,
time, all of that, or do you believe it's a lack of just
prioritizing? I mean, whenever we have funding issues and
what's going on now, sometimes it's a matter of prioritizing.
Would you expand on that, Mr. Feickert?
Mr. Feickert. I'm really not privy to the interagency
process or what goes on in terms of regulating exports, but one
solution might be examining some of the more critical enabling
technologies that----
Mr. Ruppersberger. Like you referred to, Mr. Gormley?
There's eight groups?
Mr. Feickert. Well, there's present technologies. For
example, your small fuel-efficient gas turbine engines that
have commercial applicability for business jets, guidance
systems, perhaps the seekers, which are the actual guidance
system used in the terminal phases of cruise missile flight.
Some analysts have suggested that looking out into the future,
things like fuel cell technology which could be incorporated
into cruise missiles and UAVs to increase their range might be
something worth considering.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Any other comments on that?
Mr. Gormley. Let me add one additional comment. I haven't
been in government service for over 20 years, so I don't have
direct experience, but I have talked to many people involved--
--
Mr. Ruppersberger. That might make you an expert.
Mr. Gormley [continuing]. In this process.
Mr. Ruppersberger. No offense.
Mr. Gormley [continuing]. And I would say that what I hear
consistently from people who have--or are charged with
responsibility for dealing with this area in the interagency
process is being overwhelmed by largely the issue of
maintaining an awareness of rapid technological change and how
that technological change affects current regimes, and they're
simply understaffed in my view. So it is a matter of staffing
priority from----
Mr. Ruppersberger. That's the point I was trying to get out
of you, that----
Mr. Gormley. And I would also say a matter of priority as
well.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Mr. Christoff, anything further from
your perspective?
Mr. Christoff. I think also focusing on the multilateral
export control regimes. Two years ago when we looked at these
different regimes, specifically the Missile Technology Control
Regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement, we had several
recommendations about how to improve those regimes themselves.
Keep in mind these are voluntary, nonbinding, consensus-based
regimes, and so it's important to try to have some type of
accountability mechanisms put into these different regimes.
Just getting them to share information among countries using an
automated information system so that you have timely reporting
of denials is something that's lacking, for example, on the
MTCR. So the regimes can be--an important focus on the regimes
is trying to strengthen them as well. I think it's important.
Mr. Ruppersberger. I'm sure the State Department--you don't
have to answer the question, but do you see any possibility of
strengthening the regime cooperation? I mean, that seems to be
a huge letdown, and it's just voluntary. And I understand if
one--there's one violation, then everyone should abide and not
deal with that group, and that's not the case and that happens
I'm sure on a regular basis. Do you see that? Do you see any
way we could strengthen the regime issue?
Mr. Christoff. Well, I think in some of the recommendations
we made, just in terms of getting the regimes to be a little
more efficient and effective in sharing information from one
country to another. When it takes anywhere from 3 and 6 months
for one country to send a denial notice to another country in
the MTCR, that's not quick enough. That's important information
that should be transmitted immediately, such as what the
nuclear suppliers group does.
Mr. Ruppersberger. What leverage do we as the United States
have to effectuate that, or would working with other countries
to effectuate that type of situation----
Mr. Christoff. Well, I think the example of the six out of
the eight proposals that the United States pushed through on
the MTCR is an excellent example of how we got more items on
the control list that just occurred in the past few months.
Mr. Ruppersberger. But you don't have China a part of the
group. Right?
Mr. Christoff. No.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Who else? What other major countries are
not part of that, that we need to worry?
Mr. Christoff. Well, China is obviously the most important
nonmember of the MTCR. I mean, they've sold cruise missiles to
Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan. That's a critical secondary
proliferator. That's important. You have other--those
countries, those secondary proliferators are also not members
of the MTCR. So they're important countries that have the
capability and currently manufacture cruise missiles. They're
on the cusp of exporting cruise missiles, and they're not
member of the MTCR.
Mr. Ruppersberger. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. Now to our chairman, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Feickert
and Mr. Christoff and Mr. Gormley, for being here.
First, which is the greater threat to national security,
the UAV or the cruise missiles?
Mr. Gormley. Today I would say that just looking at
Operation Iraqi Freedom, as I mentioned, where a crude first-
generation antiship cruise missile called a Seersucker from the
Silkworm family of antiship cruise missiles was used quite
effectively and undetected by our Patriot batteries and also
created complications by virtue of changing the rules of
engagement so that Patriot radars had to look both for high-
angle ballistic missile--incoming ballistic missiles and low-
flying cruise missiles, which complicates the whole issue of
separating friendly returning aircraft from low-flying cruise
missiles.
So I think that event suggests to me that existing
inventories of cruise missiles, however crude, represent a
serious threat, particularly when they're combined with the use
of ballistic missiles.
Now, UAVs is an interesting and more recent phenomenon, I
think, accelerated by virtue of the very effective use and
prominent use and prominent public display of the effectiveness
of the Predator in Afghanistan, initially after September 11th,
and then its increasing use in other conflicts and the arming
of Predator to demonstrate that what had heretofore been a
seemingly innocent reconnaissance system now had the capacity
to deliver a payload to a rather significant range.
So I think I would argue that existing inventories of
cruise missiles represent the near-term threat and the longer
term threat comes from the UAV and particularly the opportunity
that adversaries have to turn very small manned aircraft into
so-called cruise missiles or UAVs armed with weapons of mass
destruction.
Mr. Shays. Would either of you gentlemen care to add
something?
Mr. Feickert. Yes, sir, I do. I'm going to look at it from
two perspectives, a security threat posed by foreign militaries
and a security threat posed by nonstate actors. I think if you
look at it from the foreign military perspective, I believe
that probably cruise missiles would pose a more immediate
threat. Although they're available and they're relatively
unsophisticated, it still requires an infrastructure, mission
planning and your various mapping technologies. The fact that
they can also penetrate most known air defenses also lends
itself to military use.
In terms of nonstate use, if you look at some of the cruise
missiles--excuse me, UAVs that are available out there,
nonstate groups tend to be a little more unsophisticated.
Perhaps it might be a little easier for them to acquire the UAV
which in some cases can be nothing more than an upscale model
aircraft, radio-controlled aircraft, and perhaps employ either
conventional or weapons of mass destruction with that
particular vehicle.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Christoff.
Mr. Christoff. Just to cap what Dennis and Andy said was
the order of priority would obviously be anticruise ship
missiles. The predominant of the 75,000 cruise missiles out
there, most of them are antiship cruise missiles. The emerging
concern are land attack cruise missiles because of the
capabilities of converting--as Iraq proved, taking an antiship
cruise missile and turning it into a land attack capability.
And then the emerging threat that I would agree is UAVs.
You couple that with nonstate actors, chem/bio concerns, and
you definitely have an emerging threat.
Mr. Shays. You all pretty much agree, it seems to me. I've
been kind of wondering how we respond--tell me the
justification--I mean, I know why we want to do it, but tell me
the justification of a country that has cruise missiles
deciding that no one else can have them. How do we sort out the
logic of that, and how are we able to convince others that
makes sense?
Let me back up and say are we basically saying to those who
have them, you have them, so let's make sure more don't have
them? Is that our logic so we're just arguing to those who
have? Or are we trying to make an argument to the world as well
that it won't be in your best interest to have them because
your neighbor will have it too? Walk me through that kind of
philosophical question.
Mr. Christoff. Well, it's the philosophy of all other
regimes, for example. You know, these regimes that I've been
referring to, the missile technology control regime, Wassenaar,
etc., these are regimes that are supplier based regimes. The
belief that the existing possessors of these missiles, these
dual-use items, these nuclear materials, etc., have an
obligation and a commitment to try to reduce the supply and to
educate those nonmembers about the reasons why it's not in
their best breast to obtain these sensitive technologies.
So it's a two-prong approach of reducing the supply, and
that's the philosophy within all the regimes, and trying to
educate other regime members about the bad effects of having
those types of sensitive technologies.
Mr. Shays. Do either of you care to add anything?
Mr. Feickert. Yes, sir. In this particular case we may be a
victim of our own success. Our research has indicated that a
lot of countries now consider these an integral part of their
national security framework, just as in past generations new
systems like tanks and aircraft carriers developed along those
lines.
There's been some criticism by some countries of the MTCR,
that it is sort of a have and have not situation, where certain
countries are allowed to have missiles and UAVs and other
countries are not.
There's no really easy answer to that. I mean, we certainly
have a vested interest in keeping these systems out of the
hands of people that intend to do us harm, but at the same time
it's very difficult to try to convince these countries, for
example, like India and Pakistan, to become members of the
MTCR. That's been one of the central arguments of those two
countries for a long time as to why they don't want to join
that particular agreement.
Mr. Shays. Because I look at the UAVs and I wonder at the
challenge that's going on in our own air force--and this is
somewhat of an aside, but I'm thinking of Mitchell trying to
convince our military that we should be able to use airplanes
to bomb ships, and what he did was--at least I think I recall
he basically brought his planes in lower and knocked them all
out and was ultimately court-martialed, but there was this
tremendous resistance on the part of the military to use
airplanes in this way.
Do you sense from any of your work that there's a
reluctance on the part of the Air Force to acknowledge that
this type of weapon may in fact make manned flight somewhat
obsolete?
Mr. Gormley. I think that is dissipating very rapidly as a
byproduct of the lessons learned that come from both
Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom, but your point is well
taken. If one simply looks at the development of the Tomahawk
cruise missile, I can recall as a--while I was in government
service in the late 1970's, there was enormous resistance at
first both within the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy to
promoting the Tomahawk for various missions, not least because
the alternative was to deliver munitions by manned aircraft.
The whole development program for the Tomahawk took an enormous
amount of time before it was well accepted that the Tomahawk
could play a dominant role, and indeed not until the 1991
Persian Gulf war where the Tomahawk in the initial attack
demonstrated that it could open up corridors and increase
dramatically the effectiveness of follow-on manned aircraft
attacks, where it truly demonstrated that unmanned cruise
missiles had an enormously important role to play.
Mr. Shays. Let me ask you, from all three of your
testimonies, I am struck by the fact that you are saying to us
that cruise missile and UAV technology is not all that cutting
edge anymore. Is that correct for the most part? So the answer
basically by nodding heads was yes.
And therefore I begin to wonder what about the sharing of
the technology, because basically they're going to be able to
bypass this anyway. In other words, do you get the gist? So
tell me how--so we do a great job. We don't share what we know,
but so what? Respond to that.
Mr. Feickert. In terms of our technology sharing from
just----
Mr. Shays. I'm going to ask you to speak a little louder.
Mr. Feickert. Yes, sir. In terms of technology sharing, to
use cruise missiles for example, there are a number of cruise
missile systems out there that have been developed by more than
one country. Certain countries bring certain expertise. For
example, the Indian-Russian Brahmos, an antiship cruise
missile, a supersonic cruise missile which is going to be
entering service in the near future, capitalized on the
strengths of the Russian propulsion system and India's guidance
system. The French Apache has had various foreign involvement.
Mr. Shays. So what you would be arguing to me would be that
they can have much more sophisticated weapons if they are able
to get the technology of others, but the bottom line is that
they can get the basic concept. So are you saying, in essence,
it would be kind of like a 1934 Ford as opposed to a 2004 Ford?
It would just be that kind of difference? It would still be a
car, but it wouldn't be as good, still be a cruise but not as
good? Is that your point?
Mr. Feickert. Sir, there are varying levels of technology
in cruise missiles. For example, you've got your Silkworm or
your STICs missiles, which are roughly equivalent to a Scud
ballistic missile. I mean, they've been around for a long time.
They were developed in the late 1950's, and they're very
adaptable. They're found in the inventories of many, many Third
World countries.
And then you have some leading-edge cruise missiles like
the French Apache, the South African Torgos cruise missile,
which was supposed to make a debut either in 2004 or 2005, is
very state-of-the-art. Some of these foreign cruise missiles
are in a sense almost as capable as our current Tomahawk cruise
missile.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Chairman, I know I have a red light. Just
let me ask this question if I could. Thank you.
So what am I to infer? Let me ask you this to close. You're
basically saying there are some very sophisticated technologies
in cruise and Predator systems, but can I--and therefore the
sharing of technology there would enable people to advance more
quickly, but can I infer that a fairly simplistic cruise
missile or Predator could still do a hell of a lot of damage?
Mr. Christoff. Yes.
Mr. Feickert. Yes, sir. Absolutely.
Mr. Shays. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Did you want to say
anything, Mr. Gormley?
Mr. Gormley. I would simply add that the qualitative--what
you're referring to is the qualitative spread of cruise missile
and UAV technology, and the interesting way to look at it from
my view is to suggest that the MTCR has been enormously
effective in terms of qualitatively controlling the spread of
ballistic missiles. If it could become as effective in terms of
controlling the qualitative spread of cruise missiles and UAV
technology, it will have done an immense job at achieving a
slow, steady, more controllable environment within which we can
improve our missile defenses to become more effective against
emerging threats.
Mr. Shays. But ultimately these folks are going to get
these weapons?
Mr. Gormley. Well, I would hope, for example, that the case
of the French transfer of the Storm Shadow version of--called
the Black Shaheen--to the United Arab Emirates was an isolated
incident, and that a missile with a radar cross-section like
that missile had would not occur again. Now, that happened
within the existing regime, where France and the UK permitted
that transfer to occur, notwithstanding objections from various
members. If we can prohibit or control those kinds of high
quality transfers, then we'll be doing an important job.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to recognize
Representative Burton from Indiana, Representative Duncan from
Tennessee and Mr. Tierney from Massachusetts, who have joined
us.
Mr. Burton. Do you want to go with Mr. Tierney first, or do
you want me to go ahead?
OK. I just have a couple of questions. You know, nuclear
proliferation that has been taking place over the past couple
of decades scares the pants off everybody. We're worrying about
North Korea right now and others, and after I saw the Hellfire
first missile that was fired from that Predator that took out
some of Osama bin Laden's top people, I think I came to the
realization like a lot of people that this is something--it's a
weapon of the future that could be used for a whole host of
things, and it was something that ought to be looked at with a
jaundiced eye.
And one of the things that concerns me, and you touched on
it a minute ago, was the Chinese and others selling advanced
missile technology, and I don't know about the kind of
technology we have in the UAV, but to a lot of countries that
we might be very concerned about like Iran and others in the
somewhat hostile world.
I don't know if there's anybody in the administration
that's here or not that can give us an idea on what kind of
pressures we could use to bring about some changes in the
policies of these other countries and in particular countries
like China that are selling this technology to our potential
adversaries. What can be done or what is being done to stem the
tide of this technology getting out of hand? I don't think
we're going to see the end of wars in our lifetime, and I'd
like for the United States to be a few jumps ahead of the
potential enemies. And I'd like to know if anybody can answer
what we're doing to try to make sure that the kind of
proliferation we're talking about doesn't continue and what
kind of pressure we can be bringing to bear on our friends like
the Chinese, ``who are selling this technology.'' Any of you
want to take a shot at that? Is there anybody in the State
Department or the administration that might want to take a shot
at that?
Mr. Turner. Mr. Burton, we do have the second panel which
perhaps they should----
Mr. Burton. Should I reserve that question for them?
Mr. Turner. They certainly could respond on behalf of the--
--
Mr. Burton. Well, if you're out there and I have to leave,
I hope you do answer that question. I'll try to stick around.
Mr. Shays. I'll ask it.
Mr. Burton. OK. Thank you. I think that was the only
question I have. I was just listening and I said my gosh, how
do we get a handle on this thing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Tierney. No questions.
Gentlemen, when we're talking about end-use verification
and post-shipment verification, one of the things that strikes
me obviously from your testimony is that we're not doing a good
enough job in those areas and that we can improve it.
Mr. Christoff, you talked about the recommendations that
were made in your report, which included using the existing
authority we have and expanding it on a very limited basis that
we're conducting, what would be prudent or would be necessary.
But in listening to the discussion about that, it strikes me as
it almost seems as if the end use verification process would be
a cradle to grave process, that even if we just look at the
initial transaction that occurs, any verification that occurs
there would not really give us assurances that in the future
that technology is not going to be further transferred.
I'd like each of you to talk about just the process of end
user verification, the post-shipment verification process, how
you can see it can be enhanced and really the issues and
difficulties that we have of being able to have an effective
process.
Mr. Feickert.
Mr. Feickert. Yes, sir. In terms of enhancements, because
there's such a vulnerability in terms of diversion, it would be
very easy the day after a team comes and inspects. Let's say,
for example, gas turbine engines that were destined for
commercial aircraft, it wouldn't be that hard the day after
that team leaves to perhaps divert those or even copy those for
use in cruise missiles, or even UAVs.
Perhaps one approach might be on the intelligence side of
the house is actual--the intent of the customer or the country
or the group, what is the intent? I would imagine they would
sort of have a feel as to whether or not these countries are
even interested at all in cruise missiles or UAVs, or possibly
they want these things for legitimate aerospace use.
So I would suggest the possibility of going a step further
and looking at intent. Is there a possibility that they're
being diverted to a military program or are they going to be
used for peaceful purposes?
Mr. Christoff. I would just reiterate what we found in our
report. We can talk about additional things to do in end-use
monitoring, but I think the first thing is to do it. When you
have done only 4 out of 786 by the State Department, 29 out of
2,490, zero out of 500 for DOD, that suggests that there isn't
much information to even base decisions on about, is this a
problem? Is it a risk?
PSVs are important. They are important because they're the
primary vehicle that you have to check on whether or not an
item is being used as intended after it leaves our shore. It's
important because it's good feedback into the prelicensing
decision. If you know that a country or you know that a company
is not adhering to the license conditions, then that should
feed back into any future decisions about that license or
future exports that you would permit.
Mr. Gormley. I would really defer to Mr. Christoff's
reaction, but it seems to me--in reading the GAO report, I
can't help but think that the issue of staffing and sufficient
moneys to be consistent in end-use assurances is an important
issue; and it seems to me, providing those resources to get
involved in more than the number that have historically been
the case would be a sensible approach. So the resource issue is
something that ought to be looked at closely.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Gormley, when you were talking about the
petition and its limitations and the threat of the cruise
missiles and UAV, I was struck by the fact that we've
undertaken a huge investment in air defenses, antimissile
technology. Can you give us additional thoughts as to what our
current strategies are as we approach these issues and our
design of our current defenses?
Mr. Gormley. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We have a huge investment
that the Department of Defense has made in U.S. air defenses
since the early 1950's. But the advent of the cruise missile
threat largely makes those investments, while necessary, not
nearly sufficient to deal with the emerging cruise missile and
UAV threat, and that is largely because these threats fly low
under the radarscope, so to speak. And not only do they fly
low, but once they reduce their radar cross-section or add
countermeasures, they impose severe difficulties on existing
U.S. missile defenses, as they did in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
And then there's another perverse issue and that is, when
systems fly slow, our modern legacy, airborne and some ground-
based radars actually eliminate slow-flying objects that are
close to the ground in order to permit their signal processing
and display systems to operate more effectively. So there are--
critically, it seems to me--some defense priorities that we
need to turn to, and one is creating a single, integrated air
picture to use and link together in a connected system all of
the radars that are looking at these threats, including
returning friendly aircraft, so that we have coverage, a
common, single view of multiple aspect angles out to a large
geographic region, so that we can be in a better position to
discern friend from foe.
The second area is simply to increase our battle space by
producing better sensors on our airborne platforms and better
missile seekers for our ground-based surface-to-air missile
systems and air-to-air missile systems.
And finally, we need to make cruise missile defenses
cheaper. I referred to the unfortunate arithmetic associated
with the cost of Patriot missiles and even the guidance upgrade
for the PAC 2 system in comparison to the cost of an investment
in a large number of cheap cruise missiles or UAVs; and until
we get the costs of our seekers down, then we are going to have
a difficult time as time passes, as the quantitative threat
emerges, unless we can get the cost of our missile defenses
down. And there are existing programs that are looking at
trying to radically reduce the cost of seekers, which represent
about 65 percent of the cost of an intercepter.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Christoff, you've mentioned the number of
end-use verification inspections that had been conducted,
which, of course, is a quantification. Did you notice anything
about the end-use verification process when an inspection had
been undertaken that related to the quality of the threat? Did
you notice any anticipation of an end user that might represent
a greater threat for proliferation versus nonproliferation?
Mr. Christoff. You mean in terms of whether or not they set
priorities on the few that were done?
Mr. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Christoff. The Commerce Department, for example, does
focus on certain choke-point technologies when it goes out and
tries to determine where it's going to be doing its end use
monitoring, and I think that's good process, good criteria that
they're applying. So I think that's one good example of the 29
that they did do, that does undergo the process of looking at
what are the most important aspects of the technologies or the
technologies that they want to focus on.
Mr. Turner. Very good. Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. One question. Regarding the end-use
monitoring for compliance, I think, Mr. Christoff, you said
that there were only 33 licenses out of 4,000 that were checked
for compliance. Out of those 33, what did you find?
Mr. Christoff. You mean, what did the departments find?
Mr. Ruppersberger. What did the departments find? What did
you find when you investigated the departments----
Mr. Christoff. I'd like to submit for the record all the
details. I can't recall all the details of the 33 licenses, but
in some of them they did find that they were, ``unfavorable
checks'' in a few of the cases. Some of them did result--I
think in two instances it resulted in some criminal penalties
being applied to individuals that had not dealt with the
technology appropriately. There were also ones in which they
had favorable checks in which there were no problems.
Mr. Ruppersberger. What did you find? You're telling me
what was bad or not. What did you actually find from a factual
point of view----
Mr. Christoff. We found that the process--when the process
for end-use monitoring is conducted, the departments do go out
and look thoroughly at the extent to which the end-use efforts
that the departments are doing are accurate. They are looking
at whether or not the item is where it's supposed to be, there
is adequate security, and whether or not the item's being used
as intended. So when the results are applied, they're important
results and they do provide good information back to the
licensing process.
Mr. Ruppersberger. What happens when you find that there
are bad results? What action is taken----
Mr. Christoff. It depends on the actions. Congress can--for
example, can undertake civil penalties against the company that
may be violating some of the terms and conditions of the
license. Others, such as the Customs Department, can engage in
criminal penalties as well.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Do you know if that was done?
Mr. Christoff. Yes.
Mr. Ruppersberger. It was done?
Mr. Christoff. Uh-huh.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Let me ask you this, too. It seems to me
that 33 out of 4,000 is not much, and that is not really a good
sampling of the entire program. Do you think there needs to be
a change in the 33 out of 4,000 as far as the random checking
that is done?
Mr. Christoff. Absolutely. And when we broached our
concerns with the departments, our original recommendation was
go back and do a comprehensive assessment.
Well, we realized that would be difficult to do, going back
to all 4,000, so go back and do a sample, take a statistically
valid sample of those 4,000 and conduct PSVs----
Mr. Ruppersberger. What would that be? What number do you
think that would be?
Mr. Christoff. I don't know.
Mr. Ruppersberger. I'm asking your opinion.
Mr. Christoff. I don't know.
Mr. Ruppersberger. You're not going to talk for Mr.
Gormley. He's telling me he's nongovernment. What do you think?
Mr. Christoff. I know. And here I'm from the accounting
office.
Mr. Ruppersberger. That even makes it worse. Give it a shot
then. We won't hold it against you.
Mr. Christoff. Right. Actually, statisticians will tell you
precisely what is a statistically valid sample based on a
sample size of 4,000, and I don't really know what it is, but
certainly it has to be more than 29 from one department and
four from another department.
Mr. Ruppersberger. What do you feel the reason is that
we're not doing more?
Mr. Christoff. We're not doing more? What the department
stated to us was that, No. 1, the resource constraints in terms
of being able to go out there and do additional ones, and the
priority, it's not as high a priority as let's say Stinger
missiles and AMRAAMs, those kinds of checks as well.
Mr. Ruppersberger. OK. So then it gets down to resources
and priority?
Mr. Christoff. Yes.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Fine. Thank you.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, additional questions?
Mr. Shays. I don't have a lot of questions, but I'd like to
know, why were licenses for cruise missiles and UAV-related
technology issued to non-MTCR members?
Mr. Christoff. That's a good question, I think, to direct
to the next panel; but 15 to 30 percent of those licenses that
we looked at out of 4,000 went to non-MTCR countries.
Mr. Shays. But you don't know why?
Mr. Christoff. No.
Mr. Shays. And there were no arguments presented.
What countries should the United States be most concerned
about regarding cruise missile-UAV proliferation?
Mr. Christoff. China is No. 1. Clearly, China, having sold
cruise missiles to particular countries of concern: Pakistan,
Iran, Iraq, North Korea. And also I think I referred to these
emerging markets where you have certain countries that
currently manufacture cruise missiles, but they're not
exporters and they are also not members of the MTCR such as
Egypt, Israel, Oman, Iran as well, Pakistan.
Mr. Shays. So they're making their own----
Mr. Christoff. Yes.
Mr. Shays. But they're not exporting.
Mr. Christoff. Not yet.
Mr. Shays. But they've probably got technology to enable
them to create their weapons?
Mr. Christoff. Yes.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Do any members of the panel have anything else they wish to
add before we move on to the next panel?
We thank each of you for participating.
Moving on to our second panel, which will include Mr.
Matthew Borman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export
Administration, the Department of Commerce; Mr. Robert Maggi,
Managing Director of Defense Trade Controls, Department of
State, who is accompanied by Mr. Van Diepen, Director, Office
of Chemical, Biological and Missile Nonproliferation,
Department of State; Lieutenant General Walters, U.S. Air
Force, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of
Defense, and Ms. Lisa Bronson, Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Technology Security Policy and
Counterproliferation, Department of Defense.
We appreciate your attendance today, and participation.
Before you all get comfortable, perhaps you would all stand,
please, so we can administer the oath.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Turner. Please note for the record that the witnesses
have responded in the affirmative.
We will begin this panel with the testimony of Mr. Borman.
STATEMENTS OF MATTHEW S. BORMAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
COMMERCE FOR EXPORT ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE;
ROBERT W. MAGGI, MANAGING DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE; LIEUTENANT GENERAL TOME H. WALTERS, JR.,
USAF, DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, ACCOMPANIED BY VANN H. VAN DIEPEN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND MISSILE NONPROLIFERATION, DEPARTMENT
OF STATE; AND LISA BRONSON, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR TECHNOLOGY SECURITY POLICY AND COUNTER-PROLIFERATION,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Borman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Borman, would please move your microphone
in front of you. As we said in the last panel, these do appear
to be directional. So if you have it in front of you, it would
be helpful.
Mr. Borman. How does that sound? Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, and members of the
committee. It's a pleasure to be here to testify before you on
this important topic. I have a short oral statement and ask
that my full written testimony be entered into the record.
The Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and
Security is responsible for administering controls on U.S.
Dual-use exports for reasons of national security, foreign
policy, nonproliferation, and short supply. In this regard, the
Bureau vigorously administers and enforces missile technology
and anti-terrorist controls to stem the proliferation of
systems that can be used to deliver weapons of mass
destruction. We carry out our mission working closely with the
Departments of Defense, State, Energy, Homeland Security, and
Justice, as well as the Intelligence Community.
National security is the primary focus of Commerce's Bureau
of Industry and Security. We are keenly aware that our Nation
faces significant threats both from terrorist groups and from
countries seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction and
the means to deliver them. Although the export controls we
administer cannot solve all of these problems, they do have a
crucial role in denying terrorists and proliferators some of
the tools they need for their hostile operations. As requested,
I will address how the Department of Commerce mitigates the
proliferation risks posed by cruise missile and UAV technology,
paying particular note to the General Accounting Office's
recent report.
We appreciate GAO's work on this issue and note that the
GAO did not conclude that U.S.-origin items are contributing to
the proliferation of cruise missile and UAV technology.
Although we do not believe GAO fully analyzed all of these
issues, we are nonetheless in the process of addressing the two
recommendations in the GAO report.
Export controls are most effective when implemented on a
multilateral basis. The Missile Technology Control Regime
[MTCR], is the primary multilateral organization that addresses
exports of items which can be used in cruise missiles and UAVs.
The MTCR currently has 33 member countries, including many of
the key manufacturers and exporters of cruise missiles and
UAVs.
The MTCR is highly focused on stemming the spread of
missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass
destruction. Important steps the MTCR has recently taken
include amending its guidelines to address concerns regarding
terrorism, adopting new definitions for missile range and
payload to sharpen the regime's focus on missile systems with
WMD delivery capability, expanding controls to include short-
range unmanned aerial vehicles which could have applicability
in spreading chemical and biological agents, and also adopting
catch-all controls.
I also note that two of the other multilateral export
control regimes, the Wassenaar Arrangement, which deals with
conventional arms and dual-use items related to conventional
arms, and the Australia Group, which deals with chemical and
biological weapons, agents and precursors, are undertaking
efforts within their jurisdictions to enhance controls related
to cruise missiles and UAVs.
Continuing to work within the multilateral framework is
essential to the success of our nonproliferation goals,
including stemming the proliferation of cruise missiles and
UAVs that could deliver weapons of mass destruction.
Consistent with our MTCR commitments and nonproliferation
objectives, the United States implements an extensive export
control system intended to stem the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and their delivery systems. The Department of
Commerce has jurisdiction for the export of dual-use items,
items that have civilian and military applications, including
items both enumerated on the Commerce list, as well as
uncontrolled items. Commerce's controls directed to preventing
the proliferation of cruise missile and UAV technology include
inclusion on the Commerce control list of all items on the MTCR
annex that are not covered by the Department of State's
munitions list, additional unilateral antiterrorism controls on
lower-level items that have missile or other weapons
applications, catch-all controls that require exporters to
obtain a license for the export of any item, even an
uncontrolled item, if they know or are informed that the item
will be used in or by certain countries for prohibited weapons
of mass destruction or missile delivery activities.
I would note that these catch-all controls also extend to
nonexport activities, such as contracting, servicing or
financing of U.S. persons anywhere in the world, regardless of
whether any U.S. origin items are involved. And under this
provision, a U.S. person was criminally convicted of violating
the Export Administration regulations by failing to apply for a
Commerce license to broker the transmission of material to be
used as a missile propellant in Iraq; and it is important to
note that in that case the material was of foreign origin and
did not even enter U.S. territory. So the catch-all controls
really have quite an extensive territorial reach.
We also publish the entity list, which is a list that
identifies specific end users in countries throughout the world
that pose a proliferation concern. A license is required for
all exports for most entities on the entity list.
We also prohibit exports and reexports of any U.S.-origin
items to persons designated by the Department of the Treasury
as specially designated global terrorists, specially designated
terrorists or foreign terrorist organizations.
In addition, a critical component of our export control
success is our outreach program to U.S. industry. We have an
extensive outreach program to inform U.S. industry of their
export obligations.
Thus, we have an extensive set of controls to prevent the
proliferation of missile technology, including cruise missiles
and UAVs; and this set of controls covers sensitive items,
sensitive uses of uncontrolled items, weapons of mass
destruction-related activities and terrorists.
Let me now turn to what we are doing to enhance these
already robust controls. We are in the process of reviewing our
existing missile catch-all controls and have identified options
for further enhancement of these controls. The options we have
identified will be submitted for interagency review shortly by
the Department of Commerce.
I would also note in this regard that our engineers, who
have extensive experience and expertise in both commercial and
military aerospace applications, are skeptical that a
functioning cruise missile could be constructed out of
uncontrolled parts and components.
We also will undertake an assessment of dual-use exports
related to cruise missiles and UAVs to determine if U.S.
exporters and foreign end users are complying with license
conditions.
In conclusion, while we have an extensive system of
controls that I think minimizes the likelihood of proliferation
of cruise missiles and UAVs based on U.S.-origin technology,
dual-use technology, we are taking steps to reduce that
likelihood even further.
Thank you for your attention to this important issue, and I
will be pleased to answer any questions you have after the
other witnesses have testified. Thank you.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Borman follows:]
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Mr. Turner. Mr. Maggi.
Mr. Maggi. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Shays, thank you
very much for having us here today. It's a real pleasure to be
here to talk about this very important issue and discuss the
views from our colleagues at the General Accounting Office.
As stewards of this Nation's defense trade controls and
exports, we have no higher priority than ensuring that the
recipients of defense articles and services comply with U.S.
export control laws and regulations. As such, and there's so
much at stake, I actually welcome views and practical
suggestions on how we can be doing a better job. This is real
important to us. I have a prepared statement, and with your
permission, I'd like to have that submitted for the record,
please, sir.
To begin with, there's an awful lot we agree about with the
GAO. They did a lot of hard work and we appreciate their views.
First of all, we're welcoming the attention that they've
put on the issue of post-shipment verifications. That's really
important.
We also share the concern of the report having to do with
proliferation of cruise missiles as well as UAV technologies.
We also agree that the capabilities and the use of cruise
missiles and UAVs have expanded around the world and we need to
be paying attention to it.
Finally, we do agree that we need to be conducting more
end-use checks, and we're on our way to doing that.
But there are other areas where we're not in complete
agreement. I'm not sure that we actually agree with the threat
as presented in the report. I think that was quite a picture
that we just heard from our colleagues on the prior panel, and
that's a very worrisome issue, but I'm not sure that those are
things that have occurred as a result of our system or our
parts or our equipment. The picture was an accurate one, but
I'm not sure it was driven be diversion of U.S. equipment.
Additionally, I think that with regard to concern of the
homeland danger, we'll have to be looking at that as well.
Finally, we certainly don't agree with the views in the
report having to do with the effectiveness of export controls.
I believe that end-use verification is very important, but of
singular impatience is the full range of activities that we
take to make sure that defense goods and services are properly
managed when they leave the United States; and I think it gives
a misimpression of the full degree and the range and depth of
the activities we take to make sure that the right stuff ends
up in the right place.
Mr. Ruppersberger started on a very good point about
balance and tension between two priorities. For us, it's the
tension between making sure that important weapons and
technology stay out of the hands of people we don't want them
to be in, while, at the same time, we help our friends and
allies have in their possession the equipment and the
technology available for them to help share the burden of world
peace. That's real important for us.
Strategic balance and regional stability are our major
concerns. Last year, we adjudicated 55,000 cases worth over $90
billion. We are headed for zero defect. We need to get every
single one of those right the first time, and to do that, we
rely on a full spectrum of tools that go beyond just post-
shipment verification. They include the actual licensing
process, preshipment checks, compliance and enforcement
activities, and very close work with other groups of folks and
other agencies.
The report, I think, could have given a little more credit
to the full range of activities that we take, including how our
registration process works, how our watch list works; how our
flag system draws attention to suspicious activities; the
vetting that we do within the Department of State and with the
Department of Defense and the Department of Commerce; the work
that's done by the Missile Tech Export Committee checking on
whether or not these technologies should be going places. The
idea of establishing and validating the bona fides of the end
user and the confidence that we have in them is important for
us to know to shape our views of who should be getting what
sorts of things.
I would make note that with the exception of six Predator
UAVs for Italy, no complete systems were licensed by the
Department of State, the vast majority of the cases that were
reviewed of that 786 were spare parts for UAVs that were in the
possession of known allies, and that the vast majority of the
cases ended up in well-known programs that had very high levels
of transparency.
I would also make note that one of the things that allows
us to track what the cases look like is a piece of our
automated process called ``commodity codes,'' which we are
updating. So sometimes what looks like the export of an actual
piece of hardware turns out to be a license was for marketing
or a spare part.
To be clear, compliance and enforcement are critical. We've
restructured. We took an organization and made a separate
office just to focus on compliance. We've given them a lot of
resources. We've upped our compliance staff from 3 to 30 people
in the last 15 years. We added 5 in the past year; there will
be 10 more this year. The growth of the people and keeping them
on board will help us with the excellence of the quality of the
cases that we're working on.
We've now got a new automated system, so by doing this,
augmented by computers and, particularly, attaching our
computer work with that of the Customs folks now known as ICE,
we will be able to see what actually leaves each day in a
contemporaneous way and be able to see how we track that
against the use of the end users.
And our work with the other agencies continues to be
important. Our end-use checks benefit from what goes on with,
for example, Customs and Justice. Last year, we had 665 cases
that we cooperated with the Justice Department and Customs on,
for a total of over $100 million in seizures. We assessed over
$63 million in fines to folks that violated the Arms Export
Control Act and the international traffic in arms regulations.
The report, in conclusion, addresses a very valid concern
and we're concerned as well, but I don't think it gave a
complete picture of how we do our business. Almost a third of
my team is either active duty military or veterans. We're
serious about weapons and we're serious about the technologies
surrounding them. Every day we are mindful of our
responsibility not only to the American taxpayer, but to the
world community. We're not complacent.
We also recognize the need to stay ahead of the emerging
threat. While past performance is no guarantee of future
success, it's worth noting that neither we nor the report are
aware of any areas in which our technologies have left and have
presented a threat back to us.
Finally, three points: We pay special attention to cruise
missile and UAV technology transactions. We are increasing the
number and effectiveness of our end-use monitoring checks, and
we are increasing the quality in the way we do our targeting on
UAV and MTCR-related actions.
Thank you for your attention.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Maggi follows:]
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Mr. Turner. General.
Lieutenant General Walters. Mr. Chairman, distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss the Department of Defense's
controls on items that we sell to our friends and allies.
Mr. Chairman, I have a longer written statement that I have
submitted for the record.
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency manages U.S.
foreign military sales. Those are government-to-government
sales, typically, $12 to $13 billion annual. We do that to
achieve very specific goals: to strengthen America's alliances
and partnerships, to help our friends and allies defend
themselves, to build trust and influence with those friends and
allies in peacetime so that we can gain access in times of
crisis and then be interoperable when we fight together.
In all of this, there's a dynamic tension, on the one hand
providing highly capable U.S. equipment to friends and allies,
but at the same time making sure we protect ourselves, our
forces around the world, and America. We fully recognize our
responsibility to make sure the equipment we transfer only goes
to the right hands and is only used for its intended purpose.
We agree with the thrust of the GAO report to make sure
foreign end users are complying with the conditions of the
transfer. We've got an extensive process in the Pentagon to
establish a trustworthiness of the end user before the transfer
decision is made. It's focused on two key questions: Does the
prospective user have the capability to protect our equipment
as we would; and second, does he have the will to do that?
There is no more vigorous debate over arms transfers than the
one that goes on inside the Department of Defense before the
transfer, for one simple reason: If we get it wrong, we're
first in line to deal with the consequences.
The GAO has recommended that we beef up postshipment
verification after transfer, and we will do that.
Now, the drafters of the 1996 amendment to the Arms Export
Control Act chose their words with care when they told us to
establish end-use monitoring programs to the extent practicable
and to provide reasonable assurance that end users are
complying with our requirements to protect the equipment we
transfer. Since the GAO investigator spoke with us a year ago,
we have published specific guidance designating manned portable
air defense system, MANPADS; Javelin attack missiles; advanced
medium-range air-to-air missiles, AMRAAM; night vision devices;
TOW-B antitank and antibunker land attack missiles; and now
cruise missiles and UAVs for increased postshipment
verification. We've gotten Secretary of Defense approval for
four additional manpower billets for this purpose, and we're in
the process of hiring those people now.
We have begun work to create an end-use monitoring data
base application on a Web-based system; and we have reached
agreement with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to support
our efforts in inspection visits with their manpower.
I'll close by noting that the GAO report did not find any
evidence of misuse or diversions of military equipment
transferred through the foreign military sales system. That's a
good sign that our processes are working now. But I do agree
that we can and should do more to raise the end-use monitoring
bar higher to be clear in our own minds that we have that
reasonable assurance that those who receive our equipment are
protecting and using it properly.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to the
questions.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, General.
[The prepared statement of Lietenant General Walters
follows:]
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Mr. Turner. Mr. Van Diepen.
Mr. Van Diepen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I've got no
statement, but I will be prepared to answer questions.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Ms. Bronson.
Ms. Bronson. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss how the
Defense Technology Security Administration [DTSA], formulates
its recommendations to the Departments of State and Commerce in
the development of export control lists to help prevent the
spread of missile technology. I have submitted written
testimony, which I ask be included in the record.
The Defense Technology Security Administration is a defense
field activity of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy. In addition to my position as the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Technology, Security Policy and
Counterproliferation, I serve as the Director of DTSA. DTSA
provides technical assessments of license applications referred
from the Department of State and the Department of Commerce.
DTSA also works closely with these two organizations in the
development of export control regulations and procedures.
During the past 4 years, DOD has undertaken a comprehensive
review of the U.S. munitions list. Two of the categories of the
USML review are relevant to today's discussion. USML Category
IV controls our missiles including cruise missiles. Category
VIII, which controls military aircraft, also controls unmanned
aerial vehicles or UAVs.
The Category IV review began in June 2002, when the DOD
working group for that category first met. Over the next 6
months, a total of seven meetings were held and included
technical experts from DTSA, OSD Acquisition, Army, Navy, Air
Force, the Missile Defense Agency, and the Institute for
Defense Analyses.
This working group closely examined the Category IV
controls for cruise missile systems, components, materials,
test facilities, manufacturing equipment and tooling, and
associated technologies. The working group ultimately
determined that the existing Category IV control is appropriate
and no new control or definition was proposed for cruise
missile systems. However, new control language was proposed for
test equipment and facilities for manufacturing equipment and
tooling specific to cruise missile development and production.
Existing control language on [inaudible] and composite
materials for heat shields or nozzles was also revised to
better describe the items meriting export control.
DTSA submitted the working group draft language for
interagency review in October 2003, and the interagency
agreement was obtained in December 2003.
The Category VIII review was conducted in a similar fashion
beginning in 2000. My written testimony describes the Category
VIII review in detail.
The Defense Technology Security Administration has provided
technical advice in support of the development and modification
of the Missile Technology Control Regime Technical Annex since
1991. As new threats evolve and technologies mature, our
technical exports develop proposals to modify the Technical
Annex and evaluate proposals submitted by other U.S. Government
agencies, as well as by our MTCR partners.
After the September 11 terrorist attacks, the threat from
the use of crop-dusting aircraft or UAVs for spread of chemical
and biological agents was highlighted. In response, DTSA
recommended adding a new control in March 2002 at the U.S.
Interagency Missile Annex Review Committee. A U.S. white paper,
drafted by DTSA, was presented and discussed with our MTCR
partners during the biannual MTCR Technical Experts Meeting in
April 2002.
Following the April Technical Experts Meeting, DTSA
developed a formal USG proposal to control aerosol-dispensing
UAVs and presented this proposal at the September 2002,
multinational Technical Experts Meeting. New controls on UAVs
equipped for aerosol spraying were ultimately adopted into the
multinational Technical Annex in April 2003.
Chairman Turner, in your opening statement, you asked
whether in today's security environment, payload and range
limits continue to make sense. The U.S. proposal to control
aerosol-dispensing UAVs adopted by the multilateral MTCR does
not have a range limitation. This was a significant shift in
thinking for the Missile Technology Control Regime.
The new controls on UAVs equipped for aerosol spraying is
just one example of the improvements made to the Missile
Technology Control Regime Technical Annex over the past 3
years. Other examples are included in my written testimony.
Besides controlling specific hardware, it is important to
control the underlying technology and the know-how that enables
production of UAVs and cruise missiles. To identify future
technologies that may yield military capabilities beyond that
envisioned during the review of the current export controls,
DTSA created an interdisciplinary team to identify emerging
technologies that are likely to result in fundamental
warfighting paradigm shifts. They began their work 6 months
ago.
While I must stress that our review is at the most
preliminary stages, our initial internal review identified
certain enabling technologies related to UAVs for further
examination. Specifically, technologies related to miniature
sensors, advanced data links, and micro-miniature guidance and
navigation components have been identified as key enabling
technologies for UAVs. Although these are only initial results,
I believe that our ongoing review will underscore the
importance of controlling these emerging systems and
capabilities.
Mr. Chairman, I trust my comments have addressed the
specific question raised by your staff, how does DTSA formulate
its recommendations to the Departments of State and Commerce
concerning export control lists? I would be happy to answer any
questions you may have regarding this subject.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Bronson follows:]
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Mr. Turner. Thank you.
We will begin our questions with Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses
for their testimony today.
Let me just start with a rather general question. The
recommendations in the GAO report indicate that a gap in dual-
use export control regulations could enable individuals in most
countries in the world to legally obtain, without any U.S.
Government review, U.S. dual-use items not on the Commerce
control list to help make a cruise missile or UAV.
Mr. Borman, do you accept that statement as accurate or do
you have some issue with that?
Mr. Borman. No. We are working, actually, to draft the
regulatory change to address that, but I would note that the
example that I think gave rise to that recommendation, this
individual in New Zealand who had a Web site who claimed that
he could make a cruise missile based entirely on uncontrolled
parts and components. As I said, our engineers, who have a lot
of experience in both commercial and military applications, are
very skeptical that someone could truly build, in effect, a
cruise missile solely through that method. But, nonetheless, we
are looking to revise our regulations to close out that
potential loophole.
Mr. Tierney. When do you think that revision will be done?
Mr. Borman. I would say within the next 6 weeks.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Maggi.
Mr. Maggi. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tierney. Do you accept that statement as accurate or do
you have contrary feelings and opinions about that?
Mr. Maggi. I'm fine with Mr. Borman's position.
Mr. Tierney. Now, the other statement here that concerns me
is that because the departments have conducted so few PSV
visits to monitor compliance with the U.S. Government export
conditions on transfers of cruise missiles, UAVs and related
dual-use technology, the extent of the compliance problem is
unknown.
If I could just ask each of you, do you think that we have
our hands around what the extent of the problem is, or do you
think that there are large potentials out there for types of
violations that we may not be aware of because there have been
so few PSVs?
Mr. Borman. I guess I can start from the Commerce
perspective; and the first point I'd make is that certainly
I've seen no information that leads me to believe that U.S.-
origin items, at least dual-use items, are being diverted for
cruise missile or UAV proliferation. So that's a starting
point.
Having said that, we are certainly again willing to go
back----
Mr. Tierney. Can I interrupt? I hope you don't mind. Just
that, is it that you have seen no information because we just
haven't done the inquiry or we haven't made the visits or----
Mr. Borman. No. Well, there is information that is made
available to us on a regular basis from the Intelligence
Community that relates to these issues. So the actual checks
are one part of the way we view compliance, but obviously there
is other information that comes in to us that also helps us
evaluate that. I can't say too much more in open session, but
we don't rely solely on the end-use checks to determine whether
particular licenses are being complied with.
Mr. Tierney. With respect to the other means that you use
to monitor the situations, how much after the delivery is made
do they continue? Do they continue ad infinitum or do they stop
for a period of time, so after that we would have a concern?
Mr. Borman. Well, let me put it another way.
Information comes to us on a regular basis not necessarily
on specific transactions, but on actions of foreign parties
that come to the attention of others in the U.S. Government.
Mr. Tierney. So----
Mr. Borman. But let me then come back to also the GAO
point.
I think one of the things that GAO could have explored
further in their report is that, as Mr. Maggi mentioned, in
reviewing a license application, there's a whole range of
things we look at. And so, for example, if the transaction is
going to a foreign party that we have previously done an end-
use check on, even though it otherwise meets the criteria for a
check, we usually don't go ahead and do that again because we
have a high degree of confidence that end user, particularly if
it's a U.S. subsidiary, for example, will comply with the
license conditions.
In some cases, we get government-to-government assurances.
And in some cases, there is technology transferred, and the
technology transfer is obviously much more difficult to do an
end-use check on. It's much easier to check on a thing than it
is on technology.
And so up front in the licensing process is where we really
put a lot of emphasis in determining, is the foreign party
reliable and likely to comply with the license conditions? So
while we take GAO's point that we certainly should look at
doing more of these, we take some issue with their view that so
few of them are done we have no idea whether compliance is
there or not.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
One of the issues that was discussed was concerned the
Missile Technology Control Regime and its restrictions. It
seems as if a lot of the testimony we received indicated that
there needed to be an effort to strengthen or curb
proliferation through increasing the restrictions or at least
the cooperation among the regime.
Could each of you talk a little bit more about that issue,
giving us some information from your perspective on the
operation--the agreement among the regime and also ways in
which you can see that it could be strengthened.
Mr. Van Diepen. If I might start, Mr. Chairman, first of
all, the critical function of the MTCR is to try and put in
place coordinated export controls over the most threatening
pieces of equipment and technology from a missile proliferation
standpoint, and the regime members have put together the so-
called ``annex,'' which is the list of specific equipment and
technologies that all of them have agreed to control according
to the regime's guidelines. The fundamental purpose is to make
sure that these transfers get adequate scrutiny and that they
are looked at to make sure that they don't inadvertently
contribute to proliferation.
So most items are subject simply to a case-by-case check
against agreed nonproliferation factors, the end result being
to try and make sure that they don't contribute to the delivery
of weapons of mass destruction or to the activities of
international terrorists, a new aspect of MTCR controls that's
been added within the past 2 years.
Certain systems and certain technologies are subject to
what's called a ``strong presumption of denial,'' meaning that
they are so sensitive that normally they will not be exported
except on so-called rare occasions that are especially well
justified in terms of the guidelines. And certain cruise
missiles have been controlled by the MTCR from its advent in
1987.
Additional cruise missiles and UAVs were added to control
in 1993; and as Ms. Bronson noted in her testimony, still
further UAVs were added to control within the last 2 years. In
addition, this past year we got agreement that so-called
``catch-all controls'' that control items, including missiles
not on the MTCR Annex when they are destined for WMD delivery,
have now been made an MTCR-wide requirement. So what started as
a U.S. unilateral control is now a multilateralized MTCR
control.
In addition, the MTCR technical experts continue to look
for areas, including in the UAV area and the CBW delivery area
which is related, where we continue to improve the controls.
We're looking at things like, are there additional propulsion
systems, additional guidance systems that should be added to
MTCR control?
And then, finally, there's a great deal of intelligence and
information exchange including on cutting-edge threats such as
cruise missiles and UAVs, including on the progress of missile
programs of proliferation concern, including in the UAV area to
help sensitize all the members to the threat to the methods
that proliferators use to try and get equipment and technology.
Thank you.
Mr. Turner. Ms. Bronson, Mr. Gormley testified that the
United States had unsuccessfully attempted to introduce a
measure of control over additional technology when it
introduced an antiterrorism proposal to the Wassenaar Agreement
in early 2003. He stated, ``expressing concern about the
possible terrorist use of kit airplanes or other manned civil
aircraft'' as a poor man's UAV, the U.S. proposal sought export
control reviews and international notifications for all
equipment systems and specifically designed components that
would enable these planes to be converted into UAVs.'' he goes
on to recommend that the executive branch authority should
redirect their efforts toward accomplishing this and redefining
their proposal. Do you have any comments on his testimony?
Ms. Bronson. He raises an area where we don't have
controls, and the way in which we go ahead and work our process
in the U.S. Government is to attend to get multilateral before
we go ahead and add something to the CCL.
From our perspective, adding the conversion kits for civil
aircraft to the CCL is a desirable thing to do. The specifics
on how we would go about modifying our proposal in the
Wassenaar Arrangement are still under study, but it continues
to be an area of concern, and we will take into account what we
have heard today as we refine that process.
Mr. Turner. Do you think it might be accomplished soon or
are we pretty far away from a resolution of that?
Ms. Bronson. It is very difficult to predict how soon one
can get multinational agreement on a proposal in the Wassenaar
Arrangement, so I wouldn't even attempt to predict whether or
not that agreement could be achieved in a short period of time.
Lieutenant General Walters. Mr. Chairman, if I could add
one more point to that question and answer, it's my
understanding that the components for these so-called
``conversion systems'' are already under control, principally
MTCR-controlled items, and I think the issue we're talking
about here is sort of an additional explicit control that
controls them as conversion kits themselves in addition to the
individual components that go into a conversion kit.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Maggi, you testified that end-user control and end-user
verification, postshipment verification, is a process that you
did agree with in the testimony that you had heard. It was
something that needed to be enhanced, increased, and was
desirable. Would each of you comment about your various
agencies and what you're doing to increase what we might expect
after this hearing in accomplishing both increased end-use
verification and postshipment verification.
Mr. Maggi. Yes, sir. Whether there had been a hearing or
not, we had already been headed for about a 20 to 25 percent
increase in the postshipment verification checks. We've already
discussed that it is just one part of the full range of all of
the activities we do to make sure that we understand how items
are being used after they are transferred.
Earlier, I believe it was mentioned that there was a
thought about a cradle-to-grave requirement to be watching what
was going on. That's a very good point; and part of how that
happens in many areas is because our active duty folks from the
Department of Defense are actually out there engaged with the
folks that are using some of this equipment. So our goal from
the direct licensing perspective is, in fact, looking to go
from about 400 to about 500 postverification checks this year
with actually a desire to go higher than that in the not too
distant future.
You had asked earlier, sir, about the requirement for more
resources. From our perspective, I think we're in pretty good
shape for what we have, but the folks that are actually doing
our end-use postmonitoring checks or postshipment verifications
are the country team people out at the embassies. So this will
make them work a little harder.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Borman.
Mr. Borman. Again, we are in the process of reviewing both
our protocol and--for doing end-use checks particularly on
these types of items; and our records so far--and as I
mentioned, it is important to take into account the other
factors that come into play in doing the postshipment
verifications, the up-front work--who the parties are, what the
transactions that have been previously checked are to the same
end users.
Mr. Turner. Does anyone else want to comment on that?
General, one of the points that our chairman had made is,
regardless of what efforts the United States may undertake in
controls or efforts to limit proliferation, this technology is
technology that is going to at some point become dated and of
age where it would be widely available and less subject to just
our control or the control of those countries who are party
with us currently to agreements.
We heard in testimony from the previous panel about our
efforts for our air defenses, the limitations of the Patriot
missile, and anticipation that our efforts alone might not be
successful in stopping the proliferation of these types of
missiles or UAVs.
What are some of the things that you would recommend that
we look at in increasing--or anticipating a need to increase
our air defenses in this area.
Lieutenant General Walters. That's a very large question
and I don't presume to be the expert in that area. I was at
Asian Aerospace 2 weeks ago, at the Singapore air show. The
first day, they had a UAV conference that was attended by many
countries and hundreds of people. The numbers that we walked
away with, GAO said, 32 countries, 250 UAVs. By our quick math,
I think at that conference we calculated it to be 39 countries
and 425 UAV systems. So UAVs right now are at about the Orville
and Wilbur stage. Every mom-and-pop bicycle shop operated out
there is basically trying to figure out how to put together a
small engine and a set of wings and go fly those things. So
horses are out of the corral when it comes to UAVs.
Now, building one and operationalizing it is an entirely
different matter and something meaningful, particularly
something that's a threat to the U.S. homeland.
The air defenses, to get back to your question specifically
about the air defenses, trying to build--a previous witness
testified to a single integrated air picture. We have spent a
lot of long time doing that in this country, focused originally
at a Soviet threat. I'm not sure that some of that system
hasn't degraded since the fall of the Berlin Wall.
The importance of having an integrated air picture that's
capable of seeing very small cross-section vehicles is
important to the United States. It's important for the
homeland. It's equally or more important for forward deployed
forces in theaters. So that's a body of work that the Pentagon
is very hard at work on. The combined air component commander
has that as a very high, high priority to do that. To give you
a more expert opinion on the whole thrust of air defenses, I
would have to turn to other experts in the Pentagon and ask
them to give you more specific details.
Mr. Turner [presiding]. Thank you, General.
Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Yes. Mr. Maggi, I interpreted from your
testimony that you felt that the GAO focused too heavily on the
compliance process. Could you walk through the compliance
process and tell how it works and also what you would do to
change it?
Mr. Maggi. I certainly am of the opinion that the report
focused on the postshipment verification part of the compliance
process too much. The entire activity that we do with regard to
licensing from my perspective is in fact compliance. Making
sure that in the first step the individual, the entity trying
to export is registered with the Department of State, that's
the first step toward compliance. Do we know who they are, do
we know where they are, do we know the people that run the
company, do we know their background?
The second thing is, have they provided us--with regard to
compliance, have they given us all the data that we need to
know: What is it, where it's going to go, and why is it going
there?
The third part of this is as we're checking into the actual
application, we have a watch list that we run names against.
There's about 50,000 entities in that watch list, and that's
the very first thing that happens before we go any further into
the application process.
Once we get through those parts of making sure that the
application is compliant with law and regulation, we then look
into the actual substance of what is it that they're trying to
transfer, and through about a third of our cases we send them
out to our colleagues in the Department of Defense and other
places inside the State Department to get their views and
recommendations on how that works.
Let me back up. You were asking me about the blue lantern
process and the postshipment verification. Well, as we go
through the beginning and the front end of the checks on this
and we look to see are there any extraordinary things that are
going on, our teams are put together with regard to the
commodities that they manage, so they're generally pretty
familiar with who the people are that are in the industry. They
also try to be pretty familiar with who are the shippers,
because those are people that we're very concerned about: Who
are the people that are actually moving these defense goods or
services? So if a flag comes up or if this is an unknown
entity, then we're very mindful of who those people are.
The GAO folks did a great job in looking at the 786 cases,
and made a good point about they're a very small number at the
State Department that were actually looked at, but in
conjunction to those, there had been in that same timeframe
almost 100 checks that had been done against the same parties
that were in those cases that came under scrutiny.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Well, why wasn't that stated? So you're
saying it's not 33 but it's 100 now?
Mr. Maggi. No. What I'm saying is the words in the GAO
report were absolutely correct. Of the 786 cases that they
looked at, we did 3 special blue lantern, end-use monitoring,
post-verification checks. But in conjunction with those, of the
entities that were associated with those cases, there had
already been another actually 97 checks done on the same
parties in those cases in a timeframe--in that same timeframe.
So we had--Mr. Borman was saying, we had already looked at some
number of those folks in those cases having to do with another
license for another commodity or another product going to the
same end user.
Mr. Ruppersberger. OK.
Mr. Maggi. So you asked me what would I be doing. No. 1,
compliance is life. Trust, yet verify. So we really believe in
this stuff. We're automating. We're coming up with a new system
called T-REX in which we'll be able to keep track of all of the
compliance activities that are going on. It's going to be
connected with our main licensing system called D-Trade which
came online this year in full operation, and we're also
interoperable with the AES, the Automated Export System that
you can get from the Customs folks at Homeland Security. By
seeing what goes out every day through this automated process,
we think we will greatly improve our efficiencies and our
knowledge of what we're doing.
The next thing we'd do is continue to add more folks.
Mr. Ruppersberger. OK. Thank you.
General Walters, in your testimony page 11, you state that
you rely on military departments to determine your priorities.
How does that work with the State Department and the
Intelligence Community?
Lieutenant General Walters. We rely on the military
departments to determine what's really--what are their crown
jewels, what's important to them; what, if it was coming back
in the other direction, would really bother them. We go through
a very complex release process. First, we only sell to our
friends. Kind of an important point to make to begin with. We
look very hard at their capability and their track record and
their will. And it's important to note that the service that's
making the determination to sell something to a country is--
let's take antiship cruise missiles and let's take harpoon
missiles that the United States makes and sells. U.S. Navy are
the people that are deciding whether or not to sell the harpoon
to another country, and they've got a track record with the
countries. They're talking to the intelligence services. The
intelligence agencies get a vote.
If it's a higher-end process system and we go through an
exceptions to national disclosure policy review, joint staff
gets a vote. The U.S. Navy gets a vote. The intelligence
agencies get a vote. State Department gets a vote. So all the
players get a vote, and the most important player is, in the
case of the harpoon missile, the U.S. Navy, which is the
organization that's most concerned with what's going to happen
if it comes back at me. And I can look you in the eye and tell
you with absolute certainty that the U.S. Navy, in dealing with
the cruise missiles, that it has worked with--and those are the
majority of the ones that we're talking about here--is
absolutely certain that it's maintained an edge and is not
threatened by what it sold.
Mr. Ruppersberger. OK. Now, bearing in mind this is an
unclassified session, does the Intelligence Community provide a
satisfactory assessment of the cruise missile and UAV threat to
support export control decisions?
Lieutenant General Walters. To my mind they do. For our
purposes and to my mind, particularly when we're talking about
a military threat back to us, I believe that they do. In terms
of pieces and parts and technology transfer, I'll defer to the
other witnesses.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Well, Mr. Maggi, could you respond to
that? Does the Intelligence Community provide a satisfactory
assessment of the cruise missile and UAV threat to support
export control decisions?
Mr. Maggi. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Could you elaborate?
Mr. Maggi. Well, you may have noticed I was smiling,
because you can never have too much intelligence, and
understanding what all the----
Mr. Ruppersberger. Are you talking about personal
intelligence or--no, I'm kidding.
Mr. Maggi. Well, that was my staff. Having that
intelligence and understanding what it means is often very
difficult, and knowing how to use it, particularly in the
compliance area, is very complicated for us, because it then
gets complicated with regard do what we know, what we can share
with others, how we can go to other governments. We spoke
earlier about how we induce others to do the right thing, and
frequently we aren't able to share that data.
Yes, we get the data we need.
Mr. Ruppersberger. One of the reasons I ask the question,
because there's an ongoing debate within the Intelligence
Community of the volume that we're getting in intelligence that
because of security clearances and issues like that, there's a
lot of information that probably should be maybe unclassified,
it needs to go to different agencies that is not in order for
you to do your job.
Mr. Maggi. Well, I think we get plenty of support at the
classified level. Of course, I don't know what I don't know,
but I think we get a pretty steady stream of data. My larger
concern is not being able to share it with other governments,
to be able to point out to them the shortcomings of people in
their countries.
Mr. Ruppersberger. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I thank the gentlemen and the lady
for being with us.
I would like to first know from each of you the point you
agreed with the most in the first panel and the point you
disagreed the most. And by the way, I appreciate you all being
here for the first panel. That's helpful to us.
Mr. Maggi. May I start, sir?
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Mr. Maggi. The thing I agree with the most is that there's
a threat out there, and we really need to pay attention to it.
The thing I disagree with the most is that we're contributing
to it.
Mr. Shays. ``We'' being?
Mr. Maggi. We, my organization, is contributing to that
threat, the licensing process.
Mr. Shays. Well, weren't they basically saying you're
contributing, but you can take steps to do a better job? You
don't disagree you can do a better job?
Mr. Maggi. Sir, we can definitely do a better job, but I
don't think we're contributing to the threat that we heard
presented by the first panel.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Borman.
Mr. Borman. I have a similar reaction, and that is I
think----
Mr. Shays. Is your mic on?
Mr. Borman. The GAO report perhaps gives the impression
that there are U.S. origin items, either dual use or munitions,
going into this proliferation threat, and I just don't think
there's any evidence for that. But certainly we agree that
there are steps that we can take, both on the regulatory side
and on the compliance side, to look to improve both our
performance in both of those areas.
Mr. Shays. General.
Lieutenant General Walters. GAO does us a great service
when they say they're--when they highlight the threat for both
UAVs and cruise missiles. That's unarguable. And to the extent
that they say you can do better--a better job in postshipment
verification, yeah, we can. And so we'll work on that. But let
me put that in context----
Mr. Shays. That's really not in dispute, is it?
Lieutenant General Walters. No. Let me put it in context.
I'm only focused on government-to-government foreign military
sales. Well, we haven't sold any UAVs through the foreign
military sale system, No. 1, for us, so I don't have anything
to go count in the UAVs that we participated with.
In the cruise missiles, GAO says 500 cruise missiles. Our
best records show between 1998 and 2002, 317, of which 207 have
been delivered. The countries that they've been delivered to
are the United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark and Taiwan. I've got
high trust and confidence in those countries and in our allies.
The countries that we've sold but not delivered to include
Imam and South Korea and the United Arab Emirates. So there's
nothing for me to go count at this point.
What the report doesn't say is that we sold over 3,000
earlier-model cruise missiles, primarily harpoon--simple
model--simpler-model harpoons from many years ago. We did our
first tiger team--we've done three tiger teams. We've done one
to Egypt, and I was quite pleased with what happened. Mr. Leon
Yates here, who was our end-use monitor when he went there,
asked to go take a look at their harpoon missiles that we had
sold. They're not part of this--the GAO's report. And the
Egyptians were quite forthcoming, and they were quite happy
that we were there to visit. They took him to their central
storage facility. He went through all of their records. They
willingly, happily, led him into the facility, and he was so
impressed at the point, that he didn't feel the need to count
serial number by serial number every single weapon that was in
there, you know.
So on the basis of a sample of one, with one country having
gone out there, I've got pretty reasonable assurance that at
least for that customer, that things are not seriously off
track.
We'll do more counting. There's a problem with accounting,
and that is national sovereignty. Some of the--we have a right,
and we make it very clear that we have a right to go in and
count. We ask them to verify to us, and so they do when we sell
some of these cruise missiles, for example, and other systems.
But we tell them very clearly that we reserve the right to come
in. But even so, if I go down to Australia or the U.K. or some
of our friends, they say, come on guys; you know we're fighting
side by side with you, is this really necessary?
So there are some sensitivities out there, and we're going
to have to bruise a few sensitivities and step on a few toes as
we increase our sample size.
UAVs and cruise missiles aren't the biggest problem that I
have, and I don't think that what we, the United States, are
selling in the UAV and cruise missiles are the problem. It's
all those others.
Mr. Shays. The others?
Lieutenant General Walters. It's all the others. It's China
and North Korea, and everybody else who is building other--both
missiles and UAVs. So, yes, we can focus on ours, but it's kind
of like we're looking through a soda straw at a small piece of
the problem, and there's this carrier looming over my shoulder.
And that's everybody else that's selling things out there, in
my view.
The biggest challenge I have in postshipment verification
isn't the UAV and the cruise missile. It's actually my
colleague, Ms. Bronson, who from the Defense Technology
Security Agency, has asked me to go count all night vision
devices. Now, that is a much bigger problem.
Mr. Shays. I was a little confused when you said your
biggest challenge was Ms. Bronson. Maybe we're onto something
here.
Lieutenant General Walters. She's asking me to go count
night vision devices. Now, that's a problem on an order of
magnitude harder.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Van Diepen, do you have any point that you
would strongly disagree or agree with that you wanted to
highlight from the previous panel?
Mr. Van Diepen. I would strongly agree with the first
panel's emphasis on the novel and future aspects of the UAV and
cruise missile threat, the possibility of combined ballistic
missile and cruise missile attacks, the risk of nonstate actors
acquiring.
In terms of disagreement, I think there may be an
overemphasis on export control as a way of dealing with this
problem, particularly the nonstate actor problem, where,
frankly, someone within the United States without exporting
anything or importing anything could acquire the wherewithal to
put together the kinds of rudimentary UAVs the panel was
talking about here and use them to attack us here at home. And
so export controls is only one of a whole series of tools that
one has to use to try to impede the proliferation threat.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Makes you wonder, though, if we need
to be keeping a better track on what's happening here, I mean,
from the point you make.
Ms. Bronson.
Ms. Bronson. I would agree with two things in particular
that I heard. First, I wholeheartedly agree we need to look to
the enabling technologies as we think about what are the newer
controls of the future.
Second, I agree we need to do more postshipment
verifications and end-user checks. I think that there's a bit
of an overstatement of the effectiveness of the Iraqi cruise
missile, and I want to look a little more closely at the data
that informed that judgment.
I'd also point out that the cruise missiles that are most
capable are very, very difficult to build, and we have to be
careful not to lump the ability to build the UAVs and the
ability to lump effective cruise missiles together in the same
category.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
The first panel, as I heard them, said on the short-run
cruise missile, their biggest concern. In the long run it's
UAVs. And I think they said in the long run it's the UAVs for
nongovernment organizations, terrorist organizations. Would you
disagree with that basic position?
How do we measure the success if people are able to get
this stuff outside even the agreements we have?
Mr. Maggi. I think, sir, the people that you're looking at
in front of you, at least myself, we're fighting a holding
action. Over time, technology is going to change. Over time,
technologies will proceed in a way, and our goal is to maximize
it being in the hands of our friends and allies and minimize it
being in the hands of the enemies. And it's a job we work on
every day, and over time it's just going to all change.
Mr. Shays. You have this kind of--giving me this impression
it's kind of like the finger in the dike. Is it that bad?
Mr. Maggi. Well, it's not a finger in the dike. There's a
whole load of people working on this; but over time,
technology--earlier today you mentioned is this a 1938 Ford or
a 2004 Ford. Well, colloquially, if I get hit by either one of
them and get run over, I'm in trouble. So----
Mr. Shays. I hear you. I said I would ask a question--Mr.
Burton's question, but it was really--I just want the record to
note he asked what is being done to limit the proliferation of
cruise. And you were asked, given that we have the multilateral
agreements and we have the export controls and what else, and I
think that question was pretty much answered. So I just want
the record to show that it was answered.
Is there anything that any of you would like to put on the
record before we adjourn this hearing?
Mr. Turner. If not, thank you, Mr. Chairman. We'll be
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:19 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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