<DOC>
[108th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:89848.wais]
EMERGING THREATS: ASSESSING NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX FACILITY SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 24, 2003
__________
Serial No. 108-62
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
89-848 WASHINGTON : 2003
_____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DOUG OSE, California DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
RON LEWIS, Kentucky DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
CHRIS CANNON, Utah DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia Maryland
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania Columbia
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas CHRIS BELL, Texas
WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota ------
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
(Independent)
Peter Sirh, Staff Director
Melissa Wojciak, Deputy Staff Director
Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Philip M. Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
DAN BURTON, Indiana DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio TOM LANTOS, California
RON LEWIS, Kentucky BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania Maryland
WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota CHRIS BELL, Texas
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
Ex Officio
TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
Kristine McElroy, Professional Staff Member
Robert A. Briggs, Clerk
Michael Yeager, Minority Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on June 24, 2003.................................... 1
Statement of:
Brian, Danielle, executive director, Project on Government
Oversight; and Ronald E. Timm, president, Reta Security.... 96
Brooks, Linton F., Administrator, National Nuclear Security
Administration, Department of Energy; and Joseph S.
Mahaley, Director, Office of Security, Department of Energy 52
Nazzaro, Robin M., Director, Natural Resources and
Environment, U.S. General Accounting Office, accompanied by
James Noel, Assistant Director, and Jonathan M. Gill,
Evaluator, Natural Resources and Environment; and Glenn S.
Podonsky, Director, Office of Oversight and Performance
Assurance, U.S. Department of Energy....................... 6
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Brian, Danielle, executive director, Project on Government
Oversight:
Report entitled, ``U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Security
at Risk''.............................................. 98
Prepared statement of.................................... 153
Brooks, Linton F., Administrator, National Nuclear Security
Administration, prepared statement of...................... 57
Grassley, Hon. Charles, a Senator in Congress from the State
of Iowa, prepared statement of............................. 77
Mahaley, Joseph S., Director, Office of Security, Department
of Energy, prepared statement of........................... 71
Nazzaro, Robin M., Director, Natural Resources and
Environment, U.S. General Accounting Office, prepared
statement of............................................... 9
Podonsky, Glenn S., Director, Office of Oversight and
Performance Assurance, U.S. Department of Energy, prepared
statement of............................................... 34
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............ 3
Timm, Ronald E., president, Reta Security, prepared statement
of......................................................... 163
EMERGING THREATS: ASSESSING NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX FACILITY SECURITY
----------
TUESDAY, JUNE 24, 2003
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats
and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:07 a.m., in
room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher
Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Shays, Turner, Lewis, Platts,
Duncan, Ruppersberger, and Tierney.
Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and
counsel; J. Vincent Chase, chief investiator; Kristine McElroy,
professional staff member; Michael Yeager, minority deputy
chief counsel; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.
Mr. Shays. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations
hearing, entitled, ``Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear
Weapons Complex Facility Security,'' is called to order.
From its humble beginnings as the Manhattan Project in the
distant New Mexico desert, the Nation's nuclear weapons program
has always posed daunting security challenges. Today, the far-
flung complex of warhead production plants, research
laboratories, test facilities, and former weapons sites stands
as an undeniably attractive target for spies and terrorists
bent on using their own technologies against us.
Even before the attacks of September 11, 2001 forced a
reevaluation of physical security standards and procedures,
serious questions arose concerning lax management and a
stubborn cultural antipathy to protective measures at sites
housing plutonium and highly enriched uranium. In response,
Congress established the National Nuclear Security
Administration [NNSA], as a semi-autonomous agency within the
Department of Energy [DOE], to focus resources and high-level
management attention on security mandates.
However, creation of the NNSA failed to stem persistent
reports of security lapses and inattentiveness to lingering
vulnerabilities throughout the weapons complex. So the
subcommittee asked the General Accounting Office [GAO], to
evaluate DOE and NNSA management of material safeguards and
facility security programs. Of particular interest was how DOE
assures contractor adherence to security policies.
The GAO findings released today lead to this sobering
conclusion: The stern new realities of the post-September 11
world have been far too slow to penetrate the hardened
bureaucratic maze of DOE offices, contractors and sites. It
took 2 years for DOE to update the fundamental assessment
governing nuclear weapons security. The design basis threat
[DBT], formally adopted in May, the new, more stringent DBT
will not be fully reflected in budget plans until 2005. More of
concern, security enhancements demanded by the new DBT will not
be completed before 2009, if then.
Even the process of completing the GAO study under
discussion today was needlessly delayed by DOE refusal to
provide access to drafts of the DBT, drafts openly relied upon
to justify earlier budget submissions. DOE eventually provided
the documents to Congress' audit agency, and we hope that level
of cooperation will continue as we pursue our investigation.
GAO has found a lack of clear roles and responsibilities
among NNSA security offices, inconsistent assessments of
contractor performance, potentially critical staff shortfalls
and a failure to address the root causes of security lapses. As
a result, neither the Department of Energy nor the NNSA can yet
provide reasonable assurance weapons grade material is
protected against a determined, well-trained adversarial force
willing to die in a nuclear detonation or radiological
dispersion of their own making.
This morning, we will hear testimony on the process of
updating and administering security standards at the Nation's
nuclear weapons complex. Classified elements of the security
and safeguards program will be discussed at a closed session
this afternoon.
Our witnesses today all bring impressive experience and
important expertise to our continuing oversight of nuclear
security. They also share a dedication to improve national
security and public safety, and we look forward to a
constructive dialog on these important issues.
Before recognizing Mr. Turner, let me just apologize for
being a little late. I got in to Andrews Air Force Base at
about 2:30 last night.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
again for your efforts and leadership in addressing the issue
of our national security and the threats that are posed by
issues of possible targets of terrorist attacks.
Our national labs and nuclear production facilities are
appealing targets for terrorists. These sites are challenges to
secure, spread over large parcels of land and containing some
of the most deadly materials known to man. Terrorists now use
once unimaginable tactics to cause death and destruction, and
we must now account for the possibility that terrorists will
sacrifice their own lives to carry out their missions. And the
thought of terrorists attempting to steal plutonium or highly
enriched uranium is no longer related to Tom Clancy novels, but
is a real-life threat.
I am particularly interested in hearing how we can make the
NNSA more responsive and flexible to the threats facing our
weapons complexes, and it should not take months and years to
develop security procedures. The real world does not work this
way, terrorists do not work this way, and the ground-level
security personnel do not think this way.
I look forward to hearing our witnesses' testimony.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman, and recognize Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
calling this very important hearing.
I don't have a formal written statement or opening
statement, but I do want to say that I don't represent the
facility at Oak Ridge, TN, but slightly over half of the people
who work there live in my district, and so this is a subject of
great concern to me and my constituents; and I am particularly
interested to know if there are any problems or shortcomings at
the facility at Oak Ridge.
But I will just--I have come here mainly to try to learn
about this, what the problem is and what the extent of it is;
and I thank you for calling this hearing.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman for participating and both
gentlemen's good work on this committee.
Just a few housekeeping before recognizing our panel. I ask
unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee be
permitted to place an opening statement in the record and that
the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose. Without
objection, so ordered.
I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be
permitted to include their written statements in the record,
and without objection, so ordered.
I ask unanimous consent that the subcommittee meet in
closed session at 2 p.m. today to hear testimony on classified
aspects of the issues under discussion today. Without objection
so ordered. We will do that at 2 today.
I am going to call on the first panel, recognize them, and
then have Mr. Turner take over and conduct this hearing.
Our first panel is comprised of Ms. Robin M. Nazzaro,
Director, National Resources and Environment, the U.S. General
Accounting Office, accompanied from the same division by James
Noel, Assistant Director, and also Jonathan M. Gill, Evaluator.
The second testimony from this panel will be from Glenn
Podonsky, Director of Office of Oversight and Performance
Assurance, referred to as ``OA,'' from the Department of
Energy.
If you would please rise, we will swear you in and we will
start the testimony.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. Note for the record, our witnesses have
responded in the affirmative. And we will start with Ms.
Nazzaro.
Ms. Nazzaro. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Let me just say, we have 5 minutes, but we roll
over for another 5 minutes, so you will have, technically, 10
minutes, but we prefer you stop somewhere between the 5 and the
10. It is important that we put your document on the record, so
if you need the full 10, feel free to use it.
Ms. Nazzaro. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
STATEMENTS OF ROBIN M. NAZZARO, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY
JAMES NOEL, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, AND JONATHAN M. GILL,
EVALUATOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT; AND GLENN S.
PODONSKY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT AND PERFORMANCE
ASSURANCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Ms. Nazzaro. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss physical
security of the nuclear weapons complex at the Department of
Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration within
DOE.
Currently, the nuclear complex includes four production
sites, three national laboratories that design nuclear weapons
and a number of former nuclear weapons sites that contain
nuclear weapons materials. To ensure the physical security of
the complex, DOE and NNSA rely on their safeguards and security
program.
A key component of the DOE's protective strategy is the
design basis threat, which identifies the characteristics of
the potential threats to DOE. To implement their safeguards and
security program, DOE and NNSA rely on contractors to conduct
day-to-day security activities subject to DOE and NNSA
oversight.
Over the past decade, we and others have raised concern
about the adequacy of security at nuclear weapons facilities
within the Department and NNSA. In addition, the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, highlighted the importance of
effective physical security in response to a challenging and
well-organized terrorist threat.
In this context, my testimony today focuses on two issues:
first, how NNSA manages its safeguards and security program;
and second, DOE's response to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, we found that NNSA has not been
fully effective in managing its safeguards and security program
in the following four key areas.
First, NNSA had not fully defined clear roles and
responsibilities for its headquarters and site operations.
Since its creation in March 2000, NNSA's management structure
has been in a state of flux. As a result, NNSA site office
officials said that each office is carrying out oversight
activities as it deems appropriate.
Second, as a result of the lack of clarity in NNSA's
management structure, NNSA site offices have not been
consistent in how they assess contractor safeguards and
security activities. Consequently, NNSA cannot be assured that
all facilities are subject to the comprehensive annual
assessment that DOE policy requires.
Third, once problems are identified, NNSA contractors do
not consistently conduct the analysis DOE policy requires in
preparing corrective action plans. The corrective actions are
developed without fully considering the problems' root causes,
the risks posed, or the cost versus benefit of taking
corrective action. Thus, potential opportunities to improve
physical security at the sites are not maximized.
And last, NNSA site offices have shortfalls in the total
number of staff and in the expertise for effectively overseeing
contractors. This could make it more difficult for site offices
to effectively oversee security activities.
Site officials said that they will fill some vacancies
through a virtual organization. However, it will take time to
work through some of the difficulties associated with making
the transition to this approach.
As a result, NNSA cannot be assured that its contractors
are working to a maximum advantage to protect critical
facilities and materials from adversaries seeking to inflict
damage.
In our May report, we made four recommendations to address
these problems, that are designed to improve NNSA's security
management and oversight. Since the issuance of our report,
NNSA has made progress in addressing the problems we
identified, including publishing a Safeguards and Security
Functions, Responsibilities, and Authorities Manual and
developing and issuing guidance for corrective action plans.
Beyond these changes sound safeguards and security management
will have to play a key role in helping DOE and NNSA adjust to
the post-September 11 security environment.
Before I take the second issue on, do you want me to break?
Then, here would be a good place.
Mr. Turner [presiding]. No. Please continue.
Ms. Nazzaro. Continue? OK.
I would now like to discuss DOE and NNSA response to the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In this regard, we
examined three issues: DOE's and NNSA's immediate response to
the attacks, DOE's efforts to develop the design basis threat
document, and the challenges DOE and NNSA face in meeting the
requirements of the new DBT.
DOE and NNSA took immediate steps to improve security in
the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. For
example, DOE and NNSA moved to a higher level of security that
required, among other things, more vehicle inspections and
security patrols. DOE and NNSA also conducted a number of
security-related reviews, studies and analysis and increased
communication with Federal, State and local officials. While
these steps are believed to have improved DOE's and NNSA's
security posture, they have been expensive. These steps have
required extensive overtime, which has had a considerable
negative effect on DOE's and NNSA's protective force through
fatigue, reduced readiness, retention, and reduced training.
Furthermore, until fully evaluated, the effectiveness of these
measures is uncertain.
Based on the number and capabilities of the terrorists
involved in the September 11 attacks, DOE and NNSA officials
realized that the then-current DBT, which was issued in 1999
and based on a 1998 Intelligence Community assessment, was
obsolete. However, formally recognizing these new threats by
updating the DBT has been difficult. DOE's effort to develop
and issue a new DBT took almost 2 years; it was issued just
last month. The effort to develop a new DBT was slowed by,
among other things, disagreements over the size of the
potential terrorist group that might attack a DOE or NNSA
facility and how much it would cost to meet the new threat.
Implementation of the new DBT will be challenging.
Successfully addressing the increased threats will take time
and resources as well as sound management, leadership, and new
ways of doing business. Currently, DOE does not have a reliable
estimate of the cost to fully protect DOE and NNSA facilities
against the new DBT. Further, once funds become available, most
sites estimate that it will take from 2 to 5 years to fully
implement, test, validate, and refine strategies for meeting
the new DBT requirements. Meeting these challenges will require
DOE and NNSA to provide sustained sound management for their
safeguards and security program. Given the materials DOE and
NNSA possess, physical security at DOE and NNSA facilities
cannot fail.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I would be happy
to respond to any questions you or the Members may have.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
[Note.--The GAO report entitled, ``Nuclear Security, NNSA
Needs to Better Manage Its Safeguards and Security Program,''
may be found in subcommittee files.]
[The prepared statement of Ms. Nazarro follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Turner. Mr. Noel. I am sorry. Mr. Podonsky.
Mr. Podonsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to
testify today.
My Office of Independent Oversight and Performance
Assurance is responsible for evaluating the Department's
environment, safety, and health, safeguarding the security and
cyber security programs at the Department. We report directly
to the Secretary of Energy and have no responsibilities for
either managing DOE sites or developing policy. Consequently,
we perform assessments independent of the programs and provide
unbiased information to the Secretary, the NNSA Administrator
and other DOE line managers.
My testimony today will focus on the current status of
security programs at nuclear weapons production sites and the
national weapons laboratories.
It is important to note that some of the current problems
in the DOE security program are driven by events that occurred
in the mid-90's when budgets for security were cut
significantly. These cuts resulted in reductions in protective
forces and decisions not to upgrade or replace security
hardware. In the 1998 timeframe, independent oversight reviews,
and other external assessments revealed that the security cuts
had gone too far at some sites; protection effectiveness was
not where it needed to be. At DOE's direction, sites began
rebuilding their protection programs.
The tragic events of September 11 happened at a time when
DOE was still rebuilding its protection programs. Since then,
DOE has increased security through a number of measures and has
reassessed the design basis threat. However, these represent
only the first steps in enhancing DOE security.
Historically, many roles and responsibilities for security
have been unclear in some areas and too fragmented for
effective operation in others. Secretary Abraham and Ambassador
Brooks are addressing the overall management structure for
security, but much remains to be done before DOE has a coherent
management structure in place to support an effective corporate
approach to security.
Our assessment of the current security posture is based on
inspections we have conducted during the past 2 years, which
include most major NNSA sites and laboratories. Our inspections
include extensive performance testing. For example, we have
been conducting much more aggressive large-scale force-on-force
performance tests of physical security using our own adversary
team for years. The September 11 events prompted us to redouble
our efforts. Since then we have substantially increased the
number of tests we perform and strengthened our adversaries
team by adding real-world experts and rigorous training.
At the direction of Secretary Abraham, we are initiating a
DOE-wide review of protective force operations to assess the
current effectiveness of post-September 11 enhancements. Our
inspections and performance tests have documented some positive
aspects, as well as a number of weaknesses, some of which are
long-standing and require substantially more attention.
On the positive side, many improvements have resulted from
the increased security measures put in place following
September 11. DOE sites have hired more protective force
personnel and increased the number of protective force members
on duty at any given time. They have added additional barriers
and hardened fighting positions. Classified cyber operations
have also been made more secure.
Additionally, Secretary Abraham personally directed that
the design basis threat be further strengthened after it was
submitted for his review. The final design basis threat, which
was issued May 20, provides the basis for establishing and
assessing protection effectiveness at DOE sites.
Notwithstanding these positive aspects, our inspections
have also documented a number of weaknesses. The recent hire of
additional protective force personnel has been responsive to
the heightened security levels. However, DOE sites continue to
rely on the use of overtime until new hires are cleared and
trained to perform their duties. As a result, protective force
personnel testing and training have been reduced or deferred
because existing manpower is stretched to the limit.
DOE sites have primarily responded to the need to enhance
security by using manpower-intensive measures. More effective
solutions can be gained by enhancing the integration of
manpower and technology through increased use of barriers and
force multipliers, consolidating security assets, improving
manpower deployment to protect vital assets, and making greater
use of performance tests.
It is clear that every site has increased its level of
protection in response to the September 11 attacks. However,
few of these enhanced protection schemes have been fully
performance-tested or formally evaluated.
Unclassified cyber security continues to be a challenge for
many sites. There are recurring deficiencies regarding controls
of foreign nationals on DOE computer systems. Additionally,
some sites have not fully recognized or addressed the risk
associated with the proliferation of wireless computer
technology. Weakness in feedback, in improving the process and
clarity of security roles and responsibilities are long-
standing concerns within both the DOE line and contractor
organizations. Progress in these areas has been inconsistent
and sporadic.
The NNSA reorganization places increased responsibility
onsite offices. However, at this time, not all sites have the
staffing and expertise necessary to fully and effectively
discharge their security oversight responsibility. The
Secretary, Deputy Secretary and NNSA Administrator have placed
significant emphasis on reorganizing the management structure
to clarify responsibilities and increase accountability. They
have demonstrated personal involvement in enhancing security
after September 11 and in response to the very recent security
lapses. The current efforts are promising, but need significant
continued attention and evaluation to ensure that the intended
improvements are realized at the field level.
In closing, the Department is making some progress, but
much more work is needed to upgrade and vigorously test site
programs to meet the new design basis threat, to crystallize
security-related roles and responsibilities throughout the
Department, and to apply program and performance feedback in
continuously improving our overall security posture. The strong
and aggressive focus of the Secretary and the NNSA
Administrator must be sustained in order to satisfy the
increasingly complex and continually changing security
challenges that face the DOE and our Nation.
Thank you.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Podonsky follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Turner. I would acknowledge that Mr. Dennis Kucinich
from Ohio and Mr. Ron Lewis from Kentucky have joined us. And
we will begin our questions with the 5-minute round, and our
first questions will be asked by Mr. John Duncan of Tennessee.
Mr. Duncan. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Just a
little less than a month ago, the Knoxville News Sentinel had a
story under the headline DOE ``Again Thumbs Nose at External
Safety Regulation,'' and the story says--this is not a new
story, of course--critics have skewered DOE's self-regulating
status for years, and the GAO has issued regular reports
showing how external regulations would improve safety
accountability and, for God's sake, save money too.
In its newest finding, they said shifting down regulation
could save DOE as much as $41 million annually; and in its
response, the DOE questioned cost estimates and the quality of
GAO's research data.
The GAO counters with this biting conclusion that at this
point, with the analysis undertaken on this issue over the
years, it seems to us that philosophical opposition rather than
data limitations is the main stumbling block to the
Department's shift to external regulation. Indeed, same song,
slightly new verse.
Is that an accurate story, Ms. Nazzaro, and would you care
to comment on that? And then I will ask Mr. Podonsky if he
wants to say something.
Ms. Nazzaro. I would say, yes, it is an accurate story. I
mean, GAO does stand by our analysis as far as the dollar
savings, which was the only thing that was disputed.
Mr. Turner. Ms. Nazzaro, could you please come a little
closer to the mic so we can all hear you.
Ms. Nazzaro. We have reported, as you said, for years on
the benefits of external regulation. We continue to be
supportive of that concept. And this was the first year that we
had done some comparison as far as potential dollar savings,
and have compared it against a pilot project actually that was
done using data from another agency; and we stand by those
numbers.
Mr. Duncan. Mr. Podonsky.
Mr. Podonsky. Congressman, I would have to defer that
answer to the Department for a response. Since we do an
independent oversight of the Department, we have not actually
looked at what the effects would be if there was an external
regulator.
Mr. Duncan. Let me ask you this. The NNSA was created in
March 2000, and that was 1\1/2\ years before the events of
September 11. What was accomplished in that 1\1/2\ years? You
said something about shifting management and so forth. Was
nothing done?
And then this DBT thing, design basis threat. I have to say
whoever came up with that sure came up with a bureaucratic
title. But it took 2 years to issue this DBT. Why did that take
so long? And what were we not doing before in regard to
security that we are doing now?
Can either one of you answer some of these questions?
Ms. Nazzaro.
Ms. Nazzaro. I can start.
There was a previous design basis threat document. This
isn't a new document within the Department. There was a design
basis threat document that was developed in 1999 based on a
1998 assessment. This was an updated one based on the events of
September 11.
DOE decided it needed to update the prior design basis
threat. What it addresses is----
Mr. Duncan. Even though we had a report out in 1999, it
took them 2 years to come up with a report after September 11?
Ms. Nazzaro. Correct. There were disagreements on the
course it was going to take, what level of risk DOE was willing
to take, and what exactly the threat was.
What the new design basis threat document lays out is the
level of risk and the level of threat, what is the threat as
far as an adversary; and there was disagreement within the
Department on what that threat would be.
Mr. Duncan. Well, I know from living near Oak Ridge there
has always been security out there. And what I am wondering
about is, you know, we have this report you said came out, this
DBT report came out in 1999 and then now we have an updated
one.
What I am wondering about is, what are we doing now?
Part of what I am wondering about is, what are we doing now
that we weren't doing before all these reports have come out?
What changes have been made?
Mr. Podonsky. I might be able to answer that, Congressman.
Mr. Duncan. OK, go ahead, Mr. Podonsky.
Mr. Podonsky. The difference between the old design basis
threat [DBT], and the new one, without going into classified,
the numbers have changed, ``numbers'' meaning what the
Department is protecting against, to be more realistic with
real events today. It formalizes the----
Mr. Duncan. When you say ``the numbers have changed,'' are
you talking about the numbers of security personnel?
Mr. Podonsky. No, sir. We are talking about the design
basis threat as a tool by which security is focusing on what it
is protecting against, so how many adversaries do you need to
protect against?
Mr. Duncan. I see.
Mr. Podonsky. Because various threats would require
different numbers. And part of this is truly for economics as
well as security. You can make something so secure that you
don't function any longer.
Mr. Duncan. Right.
Mr. Podonsky. So there has to be a balance between your
mission as well as security. And what the new DBT did, it
formalized increased numbers, considering what we all saw on
September 11; and it also formalized protection requirements
against radiological dispersal as well as dispersal of chemical
agents. So it took a look at other threats that were not
previously considered under old regimens.
Mr. Duncan. All right.
Well, I have some more questions, but my time is up for
this round, so I yield back.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much. I have some questions
for Mr. Podonsky.
According to information from the Department of Energy, the
National Nuclear Security Administration in 2003 estimates that
they will spend $7.9 billion for their work. Is that correct?
Mr. Podonsky. You would have to ask the NNSA. I have no
knowledge of what they would be spending.
Mr. Kucinich. OK. Do you want to tell me about the work of
your department, specifically in relationship to this program?
Mr. Podonsky. My office, Congressman, is responsible to the
Secretary and the NNSA Administrator for evaluating
environment, safety, and health, safeguards and security, the
cyber security, the emergency management programs at the
Department. We evaluate them against their requirements, but we
performance test them to make sure that they are doing what
they are funded to do.
For example, in the security area, we test the security
forces. We look at material control accountability. We look at
classified and unclassified cyber security. We look at
personnel security. We look at all the aspects of the
performance of the DOE and the NNSA. And then we report on that
to both the inside of the Department and also to interested
committees up here on the Hill.
Mr. Kucinich. Now, there are watchdog groups, such as the
Project on Government Oversight, that has alleged that force-
on-force and simulated tests of nuclear facilities are dumbed
down to show that security forces are adequately prepared to
meet the threat. For instance, it's been alleged that security
forces are given the time and, in one reported instance, even
the plan of attack. Attackers are placed under artificial
constraints to slow them down or otherwise limit their
capabilities.
As part of your work on this project or from your
experience doing other work, have you seen this happen?
Mr. Podonsky. The answer to that is, in some cases, yes, we
have seen where it has been questionable--in the past, this
past year--questionable whether scenarios were shared or not
shared. The reality, however, is, today I would say that we
have not seen dumbed-down tests. On the contrary, we have seen
very aggressive, including our own very aggressive force-on-
force exercises.
The thing that is important to realize----
Mr. Kucinich. Can you say when you have seen those? Have
you personally witnessed that or have you personally----
Mr. Podonsky. I have only heard accounts of those back in
the 1997-1998 timeframe.
Mr. Kucinich. So you don't know from your own experience?
Mr. Podonsky. In terms of dumbed-down testing?
Mr. Kucinich. Right.
Mr. Podonsky. No, sir.
Mr. Kucinich. Do you know from your own experience about
the quality of testing right now?
Mr. Podonsky. Yes, I do.
Mr. Kucinich. Do you think the DOE has determined the
design basis threat based on actual threat to the facilities;
or is it influenced by budgetary constraints?
Mr. Podonsky. We believe that the design basis threat today
is a very aggressive, robust threat statement. We do have two
concerns that I will be happy to talk about under closed
classified session. But overall we think, given today's threat
in the world, the DOE has a very high mountain that it has
created, and we think it is very appropriate.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I have here a copy of an attachment that
includes a Department of Energy budget. I think it would be
interesting for the people of this country to know that nearly
$8 billion is estimated to be spent on the National Nuclear
Security Administration, and that environmental management,
which doesn't include a certain amount of cleanup, is scheduled
to be about $7 billion--nuclear waste disposal, about $591
billion--or million.
When you look at this overall budget, Mr. Chairman, there
is a question that just needs to be raised in the context of
this hearing, and that is the policy of our government with
respect to building nuclear weapons in the first place. And
while this is about the threat that derives from having
produced such weapons, it appears that the weapons that we are
producing, far from being a threat to other nations, end up
being a threat to ourselves. Just a little thought for today.
Thank you.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Lewis.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Ms. Nazzaro and Mr.
Podonsky, how adequately staffed are DOE and NNSA for insurance
safeguards and security at the nuclear weapons complex sites?
Ms. Nazzaro. In regards to staffing, the issue we looked at
was staffing as it relates to oversight, and that's where we
found that there was a deficiency as far as capabilities to
conduct oversight of the contractors. DOE's response has been
that it will use this virtual organization whereby they would
use individuals from other locations to conduct oversight.
However, we do have concerns that the staffing certainly is
inadequate, and they do have a number of vacancies that need to
be filled. But we looked at it only in that aspect.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you.
Mr. Podonsky, what are DOE and NNSA doing about the
staffing problem?
Mr. Podonsky. To the NNSA and DOE's credit, they have
increased the personnel in terms of security guard force, which
was very important.
Relative to staffing at the sites for, as Ms. Nazzaro was
talking about the self-assessment oversight, the programmatic
oversight, they are taking a very rigorous approach to try and
find more staff.
We fully agree with the GAO from an independent oversight
perspective, that there is a need, a very serious need, at all
the site offices to beef up the staffing with qualified,
capable folks to oversee the contractors, as well as the
contractors to oversee themselves.
Mr. Lewis. And what's the problem in getting the staffing
up to par, finding qualified people? Or what's the problem?
Mr. Podonsky. Well, you would have to ask the NNSA or DOE
directly. But I would give you our opinion from independent
oversight which is, there are a lot of competing concerns for
security in the country today and it is very difficult. I know
in my own organization to maintain and keep very highly
qualified national-level experts in the security business and
to attract them into government service is quite difficult
because the salaries are not necessarily as attractive as they
are in the private sector.
Mr. Lewis. OK. Thank you.
I yield back my time. Thanks.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. I thank you all for being here. Let me ask you,
Ms. Nazzaro and Mr. Podonsky, how do you define adequate
security? And let me just say, we are talking about security in
our labs, our production facilities, our test sites, and the
closed-down environmental sites.
And how would you define adequate security?
Mr. Podonsky. It's very----
Mr. Shays. And maybe in your answer you can tell me the
different kinds of security we're talking about.
Mr. Podonsky. Well, at the Department of Energy, security
has been a focus through various ebbs and flow in time. Back in
the 1970's, it was heavily focused on security and there were
changes that were made.
In the 1980's, safety was focused on. In the 1990's, more
safety. And then, of course, post-September 11, security was
focused on again.
And I would just tell you that adequate security really
depends on what is being protected. And from our standpoint,
the Department, now more than ever, is focusing on providing
appropriate security while still trying to maintain its
mission.
If you talk to security professionals, they would give you
an answer that may be unacceptable in terms of what type of
budgets would have to be spent to provide the adequate security
that they may need.
It's similar to what TSA is going through at the airports.
How many security screeners do you need? What's appropriate for
what you're trying to do? And the airlines will tell you that
they're trying to make sure the passengers make it to the
airplanes on time.
In the Department of Energy, we have different sites,
different categories of protection, and the security and the
design basis threat that we've talked about here is tailored to
meet those needs. Again, I would say that the adequacy is
difficult to pinpoint because it changes, dependent on what the
target is and what you're trying to protect and what your
mission is.
Ms. Nazzaro. Without getting into any classified
information, what we would look at are two levels: One, there
are a number of assessments that are performed to look at the
adequacy of security, both surveys and surveillance that DOE
uses; and we would expect that those would be clean
assessments, you know, and that any action plans that were
identified as a result would be addressed.
Second, they do identify a level of risk. And DOE does have
various levels of risk, and we would expect those to be at the
lowest level, as set out in DOE's policy.
Mr. Shays. Tell me, if we don't have adequate security,
what are the potentials that could be used by governments,
their spy networks or by terrorists, to--I want to know why
this matters.
It may seem obvious, the question, but I want someone to
articulate it. Why does all this matter?
Ms. Nazzaro. Well, there are certainly a number of
threats--I mean, one being theft of nuclear weapons and/or
materials; also, sabotage at the sites themselves. Certainly,
within a terrorist environment, you've got people who are
willing to die to go and actually detonate these at the sites.
Mr. Shays. But just going from your response, we're talking
about the potential that someone could actually get a nuclear
weapon; is that correct?
Ms. Nazzaro. Correct.
Mr. Shays. We're talking about the fact that they could get
weapons grade material?
Ms. Nazzaro. Correct.
Mr. Shays. We're talking about the fact that they could
come onsite and sabotage the sites?
Ms. Nazzaro. Correct.
Mr. Shays. And we're also talking about the fact that they
could potentially cause a radioactive catastrophe or a nuclear
explosion?
Ms. Nazzaro. At the sites. Correct.
Mr. Shays. Yes. So that's why we care about this?
Ms. Nazzaro. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. We're also concerned with countries, other
countries getting the technology that, in many cases, they may
not have at all, or that they may be 10 or 20 years behind us.
Is that also a factor?
Ms. Nazzaro. Yes.
Mr. Shays. OK.
When you did this report, I was--some of it seems--I don't
want to say ``technical'' in that sense; I want to say that I
was wondering if we were swallowing camels and straining out
gnats. When DOE looks at this, do they--is their response to
you that--you know what? I will come back. After you've had
your round, I'll come back for my round. I want to followup on
this question, and my time is up.
Ms. Nazzaro. OK.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it is very
important that you were asking the question, why does this
matter, because if you look at the report that we have in front
of us, it certainly does not reflect the--I think, what people
in our country would consider the severity of the issue or the
attention level that this deserves not just as a threat to
Americans, but the possibility of the threat to others of
technology, of even other countries being threatened by
materials that we have through individuals that might seek
them.
In looking at Ms. Nazzaro's statement, you have issues,
such as stating that defining clear roles and responsibilities
has not been effectively done; assessing the site security
activities needs to be addressed; overseeing contractors;
corrective actions; allocating staff--all issues or problems.
When you look at issues of our nuclear materials, you would
expect that we would be able to use words such as ``proactive''
and ``advanced.'' What we're clearly seeing in the materials in
front of us are words such as ``slow'' and ``incomplete.''
And I'm just wondering, if you look through there--and
clearly it's unacceptable, so you have to ask yourself, is it
an issue of structure? Is it an issue of people just don't
understand the severity of the issue in front of them? Is it a
performance issues?
So I would like Ms. Nazzaro and Mr. Podonsky to tell us.
I mean, I'm certain that it is not acceptable, that this--
reading this, you agree that this is not where we would want to
be, and this is a concern for all of us.
Where is the problem, other than just saying the problem
needs to be fixed? Is it structure? Is it understanding the
mission? Or is it just a straight-out performance issues and
somebody needs to be held accountable there?
Ms. Nazzaro. The report you have in front of you addressed
management and oversight issues, as far as DOE and NNSA
overseeing the activities of the contractors.
Some of the things that you're getting into would be more
contractor performance issues, which we have not yet addressed;
and that will be the subject of followon work, actually, that
Congressman Shays has asked us to do.
As far as the issues, though, at hand, you're still talking
about safeguarding and protecting the nuclear complex; and
given the kinds of materials that they are in charge of
protecting, you know, this is something that is critical to the
country. I mean, if you don't have adequate management and
oversight of the contractors, you're going to see problems with
the contractors as well. So I don't think it minimizes it by
saying, these are the kinds of problems we're seeing. It
certainly is an overarching issue of whether you're even
overseeing or managing what the contractors are doing.
Mr. Turner. I take it from your answer, in looking at
NNSA's management oversight, it's an agency performance issue
at this point, you believe; or you're indicating that you think
additional information has to be given for you to define why is
this continuing to be a problem.
Ms. Nazzaro. No. As far as DOE, certainly we have seen
ongoing problems for some time, since the creation of NNSA. As
we said, this has been an agency in flux, and we have seen
problems as far as defining roles and responsibilities where
it's not clear who is supposed to do what; and basically what
we have heard from the site offices is that they're all doing
the wrong thing.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Podonsky.
Mr. Podonsky. I would start out by saying, many items in
the GAO report the independent oversight does, in fact, agree
with. However, I think it's important to note that Secretary
Abraham and Ambassador Brooks are aggressively taking steps
that have never been taken before in the Department, as long as
I've been there--which is going on, unfortunately, about 19
years of overseeing this behemoth organization. And the step
that they are taking is, they are--finally, somebody is being
held accountable. We're seeing this at our national
laboratories. We're seeing this at the sites.
If you ask, Congressman, what's the root cause, I would
tell you that--my organization, after observing and writing
reports on these very issues for many years, would tell you
that roles and responsibilities have not always been clear; and
the accountability, which is a critical part, has not always
been taken where people were held accountable for those jobs
that they hold. So it is a performance aspect, as well as
management.
But I would again iterate, the Secretary and the Ambassador
are taking steps which we're seeing firsthand. We have teams
out at some of the NNSA sites right now at the request of the
Ambassador. Now, how that trickles down to the other managers
in the security profession, that's where the rubber meets the
road; and we think that's where further accountability has to
be made.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Going to a second round of questions then, Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Let me just ask this. You know, any time any
government agency--I don't care what department or agency it
is, any time they mess up, they always come in and say it's
because of lack of funding or not enough money. And yet, we've
had 10 or 15 years of very low inflation. In fact, the Federal
Reserve is worried about deflation now. We've probably had 25
or 30 percent inflation over these last 10 years, and yet
whenever you look at these agencies and ask what they're
spending, compared to 10 years ago, they're at 60 and 100
percent over what they were 10 years ago.
I remember when the INS was criticized because they let all
the hijackers in. They said they didn't have enough money, and
we checked and they'd gotten a 250 percent increase in funding
over the previous 8 years, which--I mean, this just boggles my
mind that we hear this over and over again.
Now I hear that the NNSA, which was just started in 2000,
March 2000, has a $7.9 billion budget. And I--you know,
that's--I'm all for saving all the money we can, but you know,
and now we're acting like we're not doing enough in security.
And Mr. Podonsky just said that we're doing far more than
at any time in his 19 years at the Department. And I'm just
wondering--you know, I don't want to scare people and think
that we're not doing enough at these nuclear weapons
facilities, and I'm curious about several things.
I've read several times, I've read different numbers,
when--about the Iraqi war, and that there were 23 or 25
countries that have weapons of mass destruction. Does anybody
on this panel know how many countries have nuclear weapons? How
many countries are there that have nuclear weapons facilities?
Do any of you know that?
Ms. Nazzaro. I wouldn't have a total number, no, sir.
Mr. Podonsky. No, sir.
Mr. Duncan. Well, what I'm getting at, is there any country
in the world that's doing more in regard to nuclear weapons
facilities security than we are? Or any country that's doing
even close to as much as we are? Surely somebody knows that
question.
Mr. Podonsky. I would believe that this country is doing,
probably, the most of any.
Mr. Duncan. Probably by far?
Mr. Podonsky. By far, yes, sir.
Mr. Duncan. And I'm not really clear on this. The NNSA
budget, which is $7.9 billion and is all pertaining,
supposedly, to security--because, I mean, that's what it's set
up for. But how much is the DOE spending on security in
addition to this $7.9 billion? Do you have any idea on that?
Mr. Podonsky. I don't have that figure, no, sir.
Mr. Duncan. But I assume that's a very large figure also.
Mr. Noel. Actually, out of the NNSA budget, $8 billion,
about $580 million is devoted to security. The balance is for
operating the complex, protecting nuclear materials in other
countries like the former Soviet Union, and producing naval
reactors that operate in our ships.
Mr. Duncan. So we're providing the security for other
countries, as well as ours?
Mr. Noel. No, not in this way.
Mr. Duncan. Or just the Soviet Union?
Mr. Noel. We are helping the former Soviet Union secure
plutonium and highly enriched uranium so that terrorist groups
cannot get their hands on it.
But providing the actual physical security or overall
security at the NNSA facilities is about a $580-million-a-year
operation.
Mr. Duncan. One of the things I'm concerned about is that I
remember just a few weeks after the events of September 11,
2001, former Congressman Callahan, who was the senior member of
the Appropriations Committee, said in a meeting that I was in
that he--he said, and very sad about it, I guess--he said that
he estimated roughly that we would spend $1.5 trillion over the
next 5 years on security matters, all throughout the
government, that we wouldn't have spent otherwise.
And the Wall Street Journal had an editorial after we
passed the farm bill that we called the Farm Security Act, and
they said that every department and agency was requesting--was
using the threat of the incidents of September 11 to greatly
increase their funding; and they said, from now on any bill
that has the word ``security'' in it should get four times the
scrutiny.
And, you know, when you think about it, if we go--Mr.
Podonsky hit on this a few minutes ago when he said, we have to
have some sort of balance here between some reasonable
security, but not interfering with the overall mission of the
agency. And I think this was--he may not have meant that to be
one of his key points; but I think it was, because in some
ways, we're going ridiculously overboard on security and
wasting all kinds of money that could be being spent on many
other really good things.
And I just wonder, are we achieving the balance that we
need here?
Ms. Nazzaro. Well, I don't think DOE has gone through that
whole process yet. The design basis threat was the first step
to identify what is the threat.
Mr. Duncan. Well, what's left that we have to do? You said
that there was a Design Basis Report issued in 1999. Then they
spent 2 years on a new design basis threat. I mean, are we just
going to have report after report after report?
Ms. Nazzaro. No. The next step now would be to look at what
it would take. They've raised the bar as to what this threat
is; now they need to look at what it will take, what will be
the cost versus the benefit that they will get from improving
their systems; and there will be a certain level of risk that
they will just accept that cannot be addressed. It may be too
cost prohibitive. But we have identified a number of things
that the agency should be looking at including, you know,
closing public access, either acquiring more land around the
facilities, closing roads, public roads that go into the
facilities.
Another thing they could do is close facilities that are no
longer needed. Certainly there will be the development of new
facilities in the use of new technologies, in some cases which
may be more costly than currently in place. But there are some
other things that can be done that, you know, are more cost
efficient.
Mr. Duncan. Mr. Podonsky did touch on it when he said that,
you know, you can have so much security that you just really
shut down a facility or you stop what's going on. And that--I
mean, I know it's a very difficult question.
Mr. Podonsky, do you have any comments?
Mr. Podonsky. Well, I think you're making the point of what
I was saying in my opening remarks and that is, there has to be
a balance and the Department is going through this assessment.
Now that they have a design basis threat, they know what they
are protecting against. They have the numbers. Now they have
the data with strategies and use of technology, and we would
agree that throwing or putting more money into the system is
not necessarily the only solution to meet the security threats
that you're trying to protect against.
Mr. Duncan. We do have to take security very seriously, and
I want to do that. On the other hand, I read 2 or 3 months ago
an article, or column, that said we have forgotten the fact
that we're wanting to protect so much against terrorism that
people are still 99.99 percent more likely to be killed by
something else like cancer, heart disease, car wrecks, things
like that; and we're spending trillions or hundreds of billions
on security against terrorism to the neglect of things like
more safety on the roads and more research on cancer and heart
disease.
And, I mean, we've got to get a hold of ourselves at some
point.
Ms. Nazzaro. You made a good point, and I think that
supports our finding where we said that the agency has not
addressed the corrective action plans appropriately. They have
not done cost-benefit analysis. They have not, you know,
assessed the risk level. They have just gone forward without,
you know, really looking at what was the root cause of the
problem before they took corrective actions.
Mr. Duncan. Well, we just not only--``balance'' is the key
word, but also common sense is something else that we seem to
be lacking on some of these things.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Lewis, we are going to go to a 10-minute
round of questions so if you'd like to take----
Mr. Lewis. I have no questions.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
I know it's been asked and I know it's been responded to,
but I want the four of you, to tell me why a design basis
threat is an important document.
Mr. Noel. Well, basically the design basis threat sets the
minimum standard to which the facilities have to be protected;
and it lays out----
Mr. Shays. We're talking about all the facilities, the
labs, the environmental cleanup sites, the production sites,
all of them, the test site?
Mr. Noel. Right. It applies to all of the department's
facilities. Now, it will apply in different ways. Clearly, a
facility that has a nuclear weapon or nuclear materials will be
protected to a much higher standard than a facility that is
being cleaned up and just has waste materials there. But it is
the standard by which the facility is going to be evaluated. It
is the standard to which the contractor has to operate. So it
forms the minimum to which these facilities need to be
protected.
Mr. Shays. Plutonium, a weapons grade--enough weapons grade
material of plutonium is the size of a large orange, and if
it's sealed, you can touch it, but it's not all that large.
Highly enriched uranium, I could touch. It is the size of a
large grapefruit, weighs about 30 pounds, but neither give off
any noticeable smell, you know, just dirty radioactive
material, and so we're not talking about a truckload to cause
the damage. We're talking about what someone could basically
carry out. We are talking about facilities that have developed
weapons that enable us to use small amounts of this material
and cause horrific explosions.
We have had testimony in this committee that terrorists
could basically detonate a nuclear weapon, if they didn't mind
going up with it, and not all that sophisticated equipment, a
weapon. So if you were to--and so I'm kind of responding to Mr.
Duncan. I happen to agree that we could protect our citizens on
a whole host of different levels for a whole host of different
things and go bankrupt and have the economy not move forward
and have poverty, not have breakthroughs in medicine and so on,
but when we're talking about these facilities, we're talking
about a potentially catastrophic outcome if terrorists get
weapons grade material, if terrorists get a weapon or if
terrorists actually get into these sites and are able to cause
some real danger.
Did either of you come to any conclusion about which sites
were more vulnerable--the labs, the production facilities, the
test site, the old environmental cleanup sites? Have any of you
tried to assess where we are most vulnerable? And if we have--
and if that is not for public consumption, we can deal with it
later.
Ms. Nazzaro. I would say we would want to discuss that this
afternoon, sir.
Mr. Shays. But this part you can say publicly. Do you all
have a sense of what you consider most vulnerable within those
four categories?
Ms. Nazzaro. I would say we have some examples that we
could provide.
Mr. Podonsky. Congressman, for the Secretary's oversight,
we do know what we believe are the more vulnerable sites and
which are the more protected sites, and we would be happy to
discuss that with you in closed session, but we do have that
information.
Mr. Shays. Now, do each of the sites--can you group the
production sites together and say that you have the same basic
problems in the four--I think we have four sites or the three
labs. If you have a problem with one lab, is it somewhat
consistent with another, or are we going to have testimony
behind closed doors that particular sites may be more
vulnerable?
Mr. Podonsky. From our perspective, each site has its own
unique characteristics.
Mr. Shays. But do they have similarities if they are labs
versus production facilities?
Mr. Podonsky. There are similarities both within the labs
and also crossing over into the production sites. So we may
have a problem that we have identified at a lab and it may also
be a shared problem at a production site, as you refer.
Mr. Noel. Mr. Chairman, it really has to do with the
materials and which facilities have which materials and how
those materials might be used. So it's not a function of
necessarily what the place does but the materials they use.
Mr. Gill. And also, too, how the facility is configured.
Mr. Noel. I think it's important to recognize that this
concern extends beyond NNSA but to the department as a whole,
including some of the facilities in the Office of Environmental
Management.
Mr. Shays. When I go through, I sometimes am told there are
12 sites, there are 11 sites, there are 10 sites, depending on
what document I look at, and so it does get to be a little
frustrating. Why am I given different numbers?
Mr. Noel. Maybe I could help you out with that. In the
NNSA's nuclear weapons complex, there are basically three
design labs and four production plants and the Nevada test
site.
Mr. Shays. OK. So those are the big eight.
Mr. Noel. With their world. In the Office of Environmental
Management, there's roughly about eight large cleanup sites.
For the purpose of our----
Mr. Shays. Let me ask you, are some of those cleanup sites
on any of the eight that you mentioned, or are they eight
additional sites?
Mr. Noel. Unfortunately, they are. The Savannah River site
is both a cleanup site and a weapons production site.
Mr. Shays. So it's a double counting on my----
Mr. Noel. Yes. For the purpose of our analysis, we went to
all DOE sites that have what are called category I special
nuclear materials, and that is basically plutonium and highly
enriched uranium that are the materials of interest that you
were discussing.
Mr. Shays. And in those two instances, none of the cleanup
sites would have those, correct?
Mr. Noel. No, unfortunately, they do. Hanford, Rocky Flats,
Idaho and Savannah River all possess Category I special
materials.
Mr. Gill. And also, too, Mr. Chairman, not all the NNSA
sites possess category I materials. The ones that do have
category I materials: Los Alamos, Sandia, Livermore, Y-12 and
Pantex.
Mr. Shays. The other thing that I was blown away by was
that some of these facilities, they don't have 20 buildings,
but if--I read this when I was in the plane last night at 2:30
at night, but I think I read, 200 buildings, 300 buildings. I
mean, why so many buildings at these sites?
Mr. Noel. Well, these facilities have been built up over a
long period of time; and, you know, if you go to some of them--
the first time I went, somebody said, well, think of like a 50-
year-old factory, and that's what you're going to see, and
that's about what a lot of these places look like. But the
facilities that actually have--within the site, the facilities
actually contain the materials of interest, that is a much
smaller number, and the materials tend to be consolidated in
certain buildings and then----
Mr. Shays. So I shouldn't be exercised by the number of
buildings that----
Mr. Noel. No, I don't think so.
Mr. Shays. But Los Alamos, 43 square miles. The Hanford
Site, 560 square miles. The Savannah River Site, if I'm reading
this correctly, 300 square miles.
Mr. Noel. Yes. The overall site is----
Mr. Shays. Idaho, 888 square miles.
Mr. Noel. Yes. And the issue there--and Mr. Podonsky can
talk about this a little bit--is, you know, that provides an
enlarged area in which an adversary might be able to come
closer to the site and to the actual materials than you would--
of interest to him without potentially being detected till he
was very nearby.
Mr. Shays. Well, let me just ask, do the number of
buildings and the size of these facilities create additional
problems? Obviously, the more buildings you have, that creates
problems, but--in terms of security and so on, but is the size
something that is a benefit because then we can have a no-
man's-land area that--I mean----
Mr. Podonsky. Congressman, it is a double-edged sword. In
some cases, from a security posture, the size is helpful. The
other side is you want to start consolidating the target, the
nuclear materials, and that is what the department and the NNSA
is starting to do.
We saw an example of this, actually--the department doing
this prior to September 11 at the Hanford Site where they
consolidated their--what we call the target to just a few
buildings, and they continue to do that.
The same thing is going--is happening at the Y-12. People
are looking to consolidate and to reduce the exposure, if you
will, to hostile elements.
Mr. Shays. We have some questions that the committee has
written up that we need to ask, too, but maybe--pardon me? OK.
We can submit them.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. I want to thank the panel. I don't have any
other questions. I appreciate your participation today.
We'll move on to our second panel.
Our second panel will consist of Linton Brooks, the
Administrator for the National Nuclear Security Administration,
Department of Energy; and Joseph Mahaley, Director, Office of
Security, Department of Energy.
We're waiting for Mr. Mahaley to join us.
Mr. Shays. We told him 11 o'clock, so he is not technically
late.
Mr. Turner. I'd like to also at this time acknowledge that
Mr. Tierney has joined us, and Mr. Ruppersberger had also
joined us for part of the hearing.
He is here, Mr. Mahaley.
If both of you would please stand, we'll administer the
oath. Please raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Turner. Please note for the record that the witnesses
responded in the affirmative.
Mr. Brooks, Ambassador.
STATEMENTS OF LINTON F. BROOKS, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; AND JOSEPH S.
MAHALEY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, sir. I appreciate the opportunity to
appear today to discuss the NNSA's safeguards and security
program.
Before I move to my remarks, I want to say that, although
I'm the one who is here, Secretary Abraham is deeply committed
and deeply involved in ensuring that we have an effective
safeguards and security program. I meet with him and the Deputy
Secretary on these issues frequently.
What I'd like to do, if I may, sir, is submit my written
statement for the record and proceed with an oral statement.
Mr. Turner. Please.
Mr. Brooks. Mr. Shays was speaking of some of the confusing
aspects of the National Nuclear Security Administration, so let
me clarify what my administration includes and what I'm
responsible for.
We are a separately organized component within the
Department of Energy created by the Congress in response to
security concerns in the nuclear weapons complex. I'm
responsible for the Sandia, Los Alamos and Livermore National
Laboratories; for the production plants at Y-12 in Tennessee;
the Pantex plant in Texas; the Kansas City plant, which does
only nonnuclear work in Kansas City; for the Nevada test site;
and I'm responsible for some portions of the Savannah River
site where we process tritium. I'm also responsible for the
Office of Secure Transportation, which moves all special
nuclear material and all weapons.
I am obviously part of the Department of Energy and bound
by DOE orders, but the law provides that no official of the
Department of Energy other than the Secretary and the Deputy
can give me direction. I operate my own safeguards and security
program following the policy that is developed by the
department, by Mr. Mahaley.
I have eight site offices at the eight facilities I just
mentioned staffed by Federal employees, and they are supported
by a service center which is being consolidated in Albuquerque.
Our fiscal 2004 budget request is $8.8 billion, with over 2,400
Federal employees and about 55,000 contractor employees; and
from that you correctly deduce that most of what we're trying
to do will in practice be done by nongovernment employees. We
are, except for the Office of Secure Transportation, an
oversight organization primarily.
Although we are semiautonomous, we make very effective use
of Mr. Podonsky and the Office of Independent Oversight and
Performance Assurance. One of the good early decisions was not
to try and have my own office like that but to use Mr.
Podonsky. That gives me both the benefits of complete
independence, since he doesn't work for me, and substantial
experience.
I share Mr. Podonsky's general perspective that we have
made very good progress, but there's a good deal more to bring
all elements of the complex to the level of effectiveness we
desire.
In that regard, in recent months we've had a series of
specific problems with security. In each instance, I believe
we've taken immediate and aggressive action. Either I or one of
my top managers has been engaged directly with our site
managers and with the appropriate laboratory director. In some
cases, I've dispatched senior teams to laboratories.
Nonetheless, I am concerned by the pattern. Although one
can look at individual events and reach varying judgments about
their severity, I'm concerned by the pattern, and therefore we
will shortly announce--``shortly'' means sometime in the next 2
days--a series of steps to improve security.
First, we will augment Federal and contractor security
experts to make sure that we are effectively responding to some
of these problems.
Second, we will direct our site managers to increase
surveillance and to provide periodic reports personally to me
to make sure that I understand what they're finding.
Third, we've been the subject of a large number of external
reviews. We think we've implemented most of the
recommendations. We'll go back in a systematic way, look at
every review, look at every recommendation, say did we
implement it and, if we didn't ask, do we want to rethink that?
Fourth and fifth, we will form two groups headed by senior
outside individuals, one to look directly at physical security
and see whether there are patterns to these problems and one to
look at people.
You heard in the last panel concern about staffing. I share
that concern, and I particularly share the concern over the
long term. I have some extremely confident people in safeguards
and security, one of whom's common characteristic is they could
retire very soon, and I need to look at what I do over the long
term to make sure that 10 years from now my successor is not
sitting here having to talk about the same problems.
Retired Admiral Richard Mies will lead the panel that looks
at physical security, and retired Admiral Hank Chiles will lead
the panel that looks at personnel. Both of these retired four-
star officers are respected professionals in the nuclear
business. Both of them have commanded the U.S. Strategic
Command. In addition, Admiral Chiles led a congressionally
mandated commission to look at weapons design personnel, and
I'm looking for him to do the same thing in security personnel.
The Secretary and I are very pleased that they have agreed to
take on this challenge, and we think they will help us make
sure we have the optimum safety and security system for the
21st century.
I'd now like to address the various points that you
specifically asked that we cover in our testimony.
First, you asked what did we do after September 11. Well,
the most obvious things we did immediately were to execute our
predetermined emergency operations plan, stop weapons
shipments, and deploy emergency response assets. Then my
predecessor directed a short 24-hour security review and then a
longer 72-hour review of potential vulnerabilities.
The results are classified, but we have used them to reduce
our vulnerability. For example, in the last panel you heard
comments about closing roads. We've closed roads, and we're in
the process of closing other roads.
And then over a somewhat longer term, we assembled a team
of subject matter experts to look at a whole variety of things,
and once again we are implementing on a systematic basis those
recommendations.
Since September 11th, we've continued to strengthen our
capabilities. As was mentioned in the last panel, we've
increased protective forces. In the year 2000, we had 1,780
protective officers. Now we have 2,160. We've added barriers,
we've closed roads, we've increased security patrols, we've
increased access patrols, and we've increased employee
awareness. And in addition we are, as you heard on the last
panel, continuing to look at how to consolidate materials.
Let me turn now to the report released this morning by the
General Accounting Office on NNSA's Safeguards and Security
Program.
First, I believe that the GAO did concentrate on the right
things. I believe most things in life are a question of
management, and this is clearly a question of management. If we
do not get the management of safeguards and security right, we
will never fix the problem. So I believe the GAO was looking at
the right issues. They made four broad recommendations, three
of which I agreed with.
First, the GAO suggested formalizing roles and
responsibilities. Those on the panel with past experience with
the Department of Energy will know that this has been a
historic problem within the Department, and so I agree we have
to make absolutely clear to headquarters for the field program,
contractor personnel what the responsibilities of each are. To
that end, in December 2002, I implemented a major
reorganization. That reorganization eliminates an entire layer
of management, puts the site office manager as the clear,
responsible and accountable Federal official at each site and
makes that officer report directly to me.
In addition, as GAO recommended, last month we issued a
specific functions responsibilities and authority manual for
safeguards and security to clarify at a working level detail
who does what.
I think these steps address the first of GAO's
recommendations, but I think that it is incumbent upon me and
my subordinates to be vigorous to ensure that the lack of
clarity in roles and responsibilities, that being one reason
they created NNSA, doesn't recur.
In particular, you heard a comment from GAO about site
offices, saying that they all did things differently. The
comment is based on 18-month-old data. I would be delighted
with no advance notice to have anybody call my eight site
office managers now and see if they believe it is still the
case. I do not believe it is still the case.
Second, the GAO suggested that we pay greater attention to
contractor corrective action plans. This is one of those things
that sounds mundane, but it's actually quite important. Finding
problems is appallingly easy. Fixing problems requires
sustained effort. While we may disagree slightly with the
extent of the problem, to the extent that there are problems
with contractor corrective action plans, we will redouble our
efforts, and one of the reasons for trying to bring in
additional personnel is to make sure that we are doing so.
Finally, GAO expressed concern about Federal staffing for
safeguards and security, and I agree that effective Federal
oversight demands not just numbers but quality. We have
reviewed with each of the site managers their allocation for
safeguards and security. All believe that their current
authorized staffing level is sufficient.
One, however, of my site managers, although the authorized
level is sufficient, has been facing severe recruiting
problems, and that is the Los Alamos site. The Los Alamos site
has less than half of the safeguards and security
professionals. I'm looking at what I can do about it. It is an
isolated but high-cost area, which means that recruiting
historically has been difficult there.
We're going to continue to monitor this, obviously, but, in
addition, I believe that the initiatives that I mentioned
earlier will help us understand how to make sure that we have
the adequate work force.
One area in which I disagree with the GAO sounds technical,
but it actually has a fairly strong policy component. The
General Accounting Office recommended that we use a technique
called ``surveys'' rather than a technique called
``surveillance'' in providing our oversight. Surveys involve a
2-week, once-a-year, onsite visit, a very complex, very
formal--there's an entry conference. There's data collection.
There's outbriefings. There's a report. But it only happens
once a year. Under surveillance, we spread out the work and do
periodic surveillance throughout the year. We believe that the
surveillance approach is equally effective.
However, the GAO is correct that the current department
order does not support the approach that we are using. The
current department order does not make surveillance an
acceptable alternative.
Mr. Mahaley and I have discussed that issue. We are both in
agreement that the department order should be changed to
legitimize the practice. The practice is right, but it is very
important in safeguards and security that you're following the
rules, since, after all, that is what you're trying to do, is
make sure the rules are being followed.
Mr. Mahaley will speak this afternoon and briefly today on
the design basis threat. Let me just say one or two words about
it.
As you heard in the last panel, the design basis threat
characterizes potential adversary threats for facilities. A
question was asked about why you need it, and the answer is
simple. Otherwise, you will have eight different people
deciding how much of a threat to guard against; and some of
them will be wasting resources by overguarding; and some of
them will be incurring risk by underguarding. So you need a
standard.
We worked closely with the Office of Security in developing
the document that was produced last month. I believe it
accurately portrays what the intelligence community is telling
us about the threat, the nuclear weapons material and
classified information.
I have heard suggestions that the design basis threat was
tailored to what we believe we can afford. As far as I know,
that's completely untrue. Certainly at no time in NNSA
deliberations was there any suggestion of, well, we can't
accept this because we can't afford it.
I don't know what the new design basis threat is going to
cost. At some of my sites, I think I'm probably already there.
At some of my sites, I'm going to have to spend some more
money. The threat document provides for implementation over a
2-year period, as is appropriate, and I don't fully know what
the cost is, but, whatever it is, we're going to pay for it,
because it's too important not to.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, although I believe that the
security posture of our complex is effective, I don't believe
that we're an attractive target to those who would try to steal
weapons or steal materials or steal classified material. There
continue to be improvements that are required. Secretary
Abraham and I are committed to making those improvements.
Since I assumed this job last July, I've been focusing
personally and have focused the attention of my headquarters
and field officials on insuring that our protection against
theft and diversion of nuclear weapons, classified and
sensitive material is robust and effective. I don't think
there's any room for failure in this program, simply because
the consequences of a terrorist act against one of our nuclear
weapons sites are almost incomprehensible. So I intend to
continue to work this problem vigorously.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I look
forward to your questions.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Ambassador.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brooks follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Turner. Mr. Mahaley.
Mr. Mahaley. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to provide the
committee with information concerning the Department of
Energy's recently completed efforts to update its design basis
threat.
DOE recently revised its design basis threat policy to
reflect changes in perceived threats to U.S. Government assets
and operations. The new design basis threat policy, approved in
May 2003, is designed to reflect the most credible threats to
departmental assets and operations and provide a baseline for
operational and budgetary planning purposes. The DOE design
basis threat policy is derived from and associated with
national intelligence threat information and other government
agencies' threat policy statements.
The 2003 DOE policy is predicated on the information
contained in the Defense Intelligence Agency, Postulated
Threat: to U.S. Nuclear Weapons Facilities and Other Selected
Strategic Facilities, dated January 2003, also referred to as
the Postulated Threat Statement. The Postulated Threat
Statement details relevant threat information about postulated
adversary team sizes, characteristics, capabilities and
applicability to national security assets. The Postulated
Threat Statement is based on intelligence information detailing
actual terrorist attacks and the equipment and tactics utilized
in the attacks, expert judgments regarding stated terrorist
intentions and their ability to execute the stated objectives
and postulated capabilities based on the latest knowledge
concerning terrorist activities.
Prior to September 11, prior to those attacks in New York
and Washington, the Department of Energy in August 2001,
requested that the intelligence community prepare an update to
the 1994 Postulated Threat Statement. Although the 1994
Postulated Threat Statement was designed to be a 10-year
document, we believed at that time the changes in international
politics, emerging technologies and increases in worldwide
terrorism required a reassessment. The National Intelligence
Coordinating Committee assigned the primary responsibility for
updating the Postulated Threat Statement to the Defense
Intelligence Agency.
The events of September 11 delayed the Postulated Threat
Statement update effort due to reallocation of critical assets.
However, the requested Postulated Threat Statement update was
fully underway by January 2002. The primary entities
collaborating on the revision to the Postulated Threat
Statement were the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department
of the Navy, Department of the Army, Department of the Air
Force, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency and the
Department of Energy.
The Department of Energy's Office of Security, which I
direct, began revising the DOE design basis threat policy in
October 2001. Our work on the revised DOE design basis threat
policy was carried out in parallel with the work on the updated
Postulated Threat Statement to reduce the amount of time that
would be required to issue a final DOE design basis threat upon
completion of the Postulated Threat Statement.
After the release of the Postulated Threat Statement in
January of this year, we made final revisions to the
departmental design basis threat policy; and the policy was
then coordinated with the Department of Energy, including what
Mr. Brooks has just pointed out, the National Nuclear Security
Administration; and that revised policy was approved by Deputy
Secretary of Energy Kyle McSlarrow on May 20.
The new design basis threat policy will provide managers an
improved threat policy document to plan, resource and execute
vital safeguards and security programs. In addition to updated
threat information, the revised threat policy includes a
significant enhancement over prior policies. We call it the use
of a ``graded threat concept.'' The graded threat concept
considers and accounts for factors such as the consequences of
a malevolent event, the attractiveness of the assets sought by
the terrorists, the ability of an adversary to accomplish a
given objective with an asset, and the resources required by an
adversary to accomplish a given objective.
The graded threat approach includes the establishment of
threat levels for departmental facilities and associated
protection strategies based on the assets located at a given
facility. The DBT, or design basis threat, policy separates the
threat levels into two distinct categories. One category of
threat levels covers threat, disruption of mission, espionage
and foreign intelligence collection; and the second category of
sabotage threat levels covers radiological, chemical and
biological sabotage.
Five threat levels are established for theft, disruption of
mission and espionage and foreign intelligence. Threat level
one, which is the highest, are used to describe facilities that
receive, use, process or transport or test what we call
category IA assets. Those are nuclear weapons, nuclear test
devices or completed nuclear assemblies.
The threat levels run through threat level 5, which is the
lowest, for facilities that are only required to maintain
minimum safeguards, accountability or security operations; and
that is--an example would be a small office activity, a tenant
in a larger office building or a small isolated research or
test facility, facilities that don't possess quantities of
special nuclear material.
Four sabotage threat levels are established for
radiological, chemical and biological sabotage. Sabotage threat
level 1--that is the highest level--through level 4, the
lowest, are set for those facilities, buildings or operations
that process, store or transport radiological, chemical and
biological materials by the degree to which these materials, if
dispersed, would result in acute dose effects at the site
boundary.
Immediately following the events of September 11, the
Department implemented measures to augment safeguards and
security for the most critical Departmental assets. Ambassador
Brooks described what happened in the NNSA. That was pretty
much mirrored throughout the rest of the Department. Even our
non-NNSA activities are sometimes involved in transporting
nuclear materiel. Those shipments were suspended. We went to
our highest possible security condition, absent--we went to
SECON 2, is what we call it. SECON 1 is reserved for a
situation where an actual attack is directed at a DOE facility.
We went to our highest security levels, suspended shipments,
and that was pretty much uniform throughout the Department.
The revised design basis threat policy is effective
immediately and will be implemented over the next several
years. Actions to augment existing safeguards and security
programs for those facilities and assets that are considered
the highest security priority will be undertaken as soon as
practicable.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared testimony. Thanks
for the opportunity to appear before the committee, and I'll be
happy to answer questions.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Mahaley.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mahaley follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Turner. We want to recognize Mr. Todd Platts from
Pennsylvania has joined us for the hearing, and welcome.
Also, I ask unanimous consent to insert into the hearing
record at this point a statement from Senator Charles Grassley
of Iowa. Senator Grassley is a co-requester with the
subcommittee on related GAO work that will be the subject of a
future hearing.
[The prepared statement of Senator Grassley follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Turner. Mr. Ambassador, I appreciate your comments and
the confidence in which you describe the actions that you're
taking. This is obviously--when you start hearing some of the
testimony about procedures and processes, it certainly loses
some of the excitement I think we all would expect in the
severity of the issue that we're dealing with, which is the
security of our nuclear facilities and really the catastrophic
consequences if you don't succeed.
We've had testimony from the General Accounting Office; and
we know that even the NNSA has indicated that they're--you are
concerned that, at times, that managing the safeguards and the
security programs have not been fully effective and the
concerns as to the security of the complex.
In listening, Ambassador, to the actions that you're
taking, clearly you've acknowledged some problems that have
occurred in the past, that you've not been fully satisfied. I'm
assuming that you're not fully satisfied still as to where you
are as a result of your actions, but I guess the big question
that I have is, you know, what do you need? In addition to the
authority that you have and the actions that you're taking,
what do you see as you survey what the problem is in front of
you that you currently don't have, either in authority or
resources?
Mr. Brooks. I believe that I largely have the authority and
the resources I need.
There are specific, once again, lower-level issues. For
example, we have asked the Congress to change the law to allow
investigations of some of our people to be conducted by the
Office of Personnel Management rather than the FBI. If you
look--we are not able to discern any difference in the quality
of the OPM/FBI investigations, but we have to have them done
before we can give them the appropriate clearance to be in
sensitive facilities, and that includes guard force.
What we are able to discern is that the waiting period for
the FBI is sort of in the mid-200 days, and the waiting period
for OPM investigations is in the range of 180 days. So we have
asked the Congress to give the Secretary the flexibility to
direct our investigations to the OPM.
Now, this sounds like a very technical point, but it's not.
It's not because the first line of defense is the guard force,
but you can only use guards where appropriately cleared, and
nobody wants to change that. And so, as you try to expand your
guard force, you--it is important to be able to move rapidly to
get them cleared. That is particularly true since one of the
problems that we are working on is that our guard forces
generally are doing a lot of overtime.
Now, if you talk privately to the guards, they tend to like
overtime, at least some of it, because they actually base their
standard of living on the assumption that they're going to get
some overtime. But we're doing more of it than we'd like to do.
One problem, for example, has been each time the Nation
goes to Homeland Security level orange, Mr. Mahaley and I tell
the Secretary he should go to SECON 2, and he does. What that
does is put more guards around things; and since there aren't
any more guards, what it means is people work longer hours.
So anything I can do to speed up the process of bringing on
new guards at these plants is a useful thing, but that's not a
very profound thing. It's illustrative in my view of the fact
that security is a whole lot of individually not very glamorous
things carried out day in and day out. But I'm not here saying,
oh, if only the Congress would give me more money. I could
certainly think of things to do with more money. This is not
primarily a money problem. This is a roles-responsibilities-
oversight culture problem that we're trying to solve right now.
Mr. Turner. I take it, though, that you do remain concerned
as to the performance level. The initial question is your level
of satisfaction--you're saying that you have the authority and
the resources, which is a great the-buck-stops-here answer, and
I wanted to get a sense from you that you do have some concern
and that this is not----
Mr. Brooks. I do have some.
Mr. Turner [continuing]. Happening in a timely manner and
it is not happening as effectively as it should.
Mr. Brooks. Sir, we're dealing with nuclear weapons. You've
got to be concerned at anything less than perfection. So of
course I'm concerned.
On the other hand, I think that we are moving in the right
direction. I think that the--as you heard from Mr. Podonsky,
there have been some substantial improvements.
I think that where I have, for example, cultural problems,
cultures don't change overnight. All right? If you have
problems of being lax in enforcing rules, if you have problems
of not being prompt in reporting problems, those are cultural
problems and training problems, and you change them, but it
takes time.
So I don't want to mislead the committee. I think I'm
headed in the right direction. I think I'm seized with a
problem, but I don't think if you invite me back in 2 weeks I'm
going to be able to walk in and say look at the wonderful
things we've done in the last 2 weeks. I don't think that is
the way this problem works.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Ambassador.
Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, Mr.
Mahaley, thanks for joining us.
Mr. Ambassador, I think you were correct in saying that
most of these things go back to management. I know the
Secretary had made a statement that he was going to take the
University of California--the contract, put it up for review.
It expires in 2005. Are you mindful that is the correct way to
proceed? And if you are, should something be done between now
and 2005 to enhance the job that we think they're doing?
Mr. Brooks. Well, since the Secretary made that decision
based on a recommendation from the Deputy Secretary and me, I
certainly support it. We are doing things, not so much pointed
in 2005, because we're doing things to continue to improve. The
problems at Los Alamos that led to that decision did not spill
over into security. They were primarily in business services,
although you've recently seen one example that may spill over
into security. There was what appears to have been a
bookkeeping problem associated with a very small amount of
plutonium. The best I can tell, that problem, which happened 2
years ago but was only recently discovered, is another example
of a general lax approach to business processes and the first
one that actually spills over and has security things.
One of the reasons that we were so concerned was the fear
that poor discipline in processes in one area sooner or later
spreads. So while I don't mean to minimize the importance of
control of term and wise stewardship of the public money, you
want to stomp out the problems in that area before they get to
things like classified material control or physical security.
What is being done in Los Alamos is the new laboratory
director, who was put in with our approval by the University
following the problems, is doing a major top-to-bottom overhaul
of his business processes. So I don't think there's anything
that needs to be done between now and 2005 that is not being
done.
Mr. Tierney. On the oversight issue--either of you
gentlemen or both of you might want to respond to this--the
assertion is made that some of the reviews of the test of the
performance of the security were being dumbed down. Can you
talk about that a little bit, give us some assurances to----
Mr. Brooks. I think you--Mr. Podonsky, in the previous
panel said that he believes that is an accurate description of
the way it was in the 1990's, and he doesn't believe it is an
accurate description of the way it is now.
Mr. Tierney. Are you comfortable that it's not?
Mr. Brooks. I am comfortable with that.
Mr. Tierney. The fact of the matter is that terrorists now
appear ready to give up their own lives in order to accomplish
their purpose. So it becomes pretty important for us not just
to worry about containing them once they get to site but
keeping them out of that site. Are you mindful of the fact or
do you feel confident of the fact that all NNSA facilities are
able to do that at this time?
Mr. Brooks. Yes.
Mr. Tierney. And what do you base that on?
Mr. Brooks. I base that on a series of reviews by Mr.
Podonsky, a series of reviews by me and then an approach that
my predecessor started called ``Iterative Site Analyses,''
which is another way of looking at the design basis threat that
Mr. Mahaley was talking about as the standard against which we
try and make that assessment.
I don't yet know whether or not I can make that statement
about the May 30th design basis threat or what I have to do to
be able to make that statement. I don't mean to get into
details in an open session. At most of my sites, I'm pretty
comfortable that I was ahead of the new design basis threat at.
At one or two sites, there may be one or two things we're going
to need to do; and we're still looking at that.
Mr. Tierney. Well, I'm going to let you go with that,
because my next question I think will take us into the closed
session this afternoon about what level of comfort Americans
should have generally about all of these sites. But given the
fact that the design basis threat is just evolving and you've
got to make some assessments on that, I'll yield back the
balance of my time. Thank you for your answers.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Brooks, I found both your testimonies helpful, but I
was particularly interested in your testimony given that it--
your oral testimony had an action plan that was not part of
your written testimony. I inquired if maybe that was written
down, and it wasn't. Could you go through your action plan.
Mr. Brooks. Sure. I actually had hoped to be able to hand
you a press release today. I actually think I'll now be able to
hand you a press release tomorrow because of a teeny, tiny
internal----
Mr. Shays. It's not a criticism. I'm delighted to----
Mr. Brooks. But what I'm doing first, we are going to
augment drawing from a number of things. We're going to make
use of some of Mr. Mahaley's people. I'm going to make use of
some contractor people. I'm going to make use of other people.
I'm going to at least temporarily beef up the number of people
that I have working on this issue.
Second, I'm going to use those beefed-up people and use my
sites to be more vigorous on safety and--safeguards and
security, but also to be reporting more directly to me. And,
frankly, that's symbolic. I don't want to pretend that I know
as much about safeguards and security as the superb people I
have working for me or the superb people Mr. Mahaley has
working for him, but it is my experience that when you have to
report to the senior person then there could be no question
that this is something that you take seriously.
Third, we have been the subject of a number of external
reviews, most of them critical. By ``we,'' here I mean the
whole Department as well as the NNSA over the past several
years. We're in the process of systematically going through all
of those, looking at their recommendations, seeing whether we
implemented them and then, if we didn't, looking again to see
whether or not we should. I don't want to have a situation in
which people thought that a problem was going to be solved
without X or Y.
And, fourth, I'm asking Admiral Rich Mies to look
specifically at physical security throughout my complex, and
I'm going to--while not limiting him, I'm going to ask him to
be very specific about one or two ideas that periodically
flowed around about better management.
And, finally, as we have in the last month or two been
looking at this problem, I have become concerned about people.
I'm not sure I completely agree with the GAO that I'm short
now, but I'm real sure that if I don't take aggressive action
now, I will be short in terms of quality and experience in the
future. The last time we had that problem was on weapons
designers, and we got Admiral Chiles to run a commission to
look at how we ensured that we had a stable corps of weapons
designers. I'm asking him to do the same thing for safeguards
and security professionals.
So that's the five things I'm doing.
Mr. Shays. I know I'm being redundant, but--before I'm
redundant, let me ask another question. You said you agreed
with all but one of the four major----
Mr. Brooks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays [continuing]. Categories. And the one--defining
clear roles and responsibilities, there was assessment, site
security activities. That is the one you disagreed with.
Mr. Brooks. The method of surveillance versus surveys is
the method--it's actually their second or third. I can't
remember. I'll have to look at the--I don't have the--let me
just look at the----
Mr. Shays. But the other one, overseeing contractor,
corrective actions and the others, allocating staff. But the
thing I thought was interesting, though, was you seem to
disagree with defining clear roles and responsibilities
because----
Mr. Brooks. Well, no, sir. I didn't mean to say that. I'm
sorry. The defining clear roles and responsibilities is the
precursor to everything.
Mr. Shays. I think you jumped in too quick. You may want to
let me finish.
I was very impressed with your testimony, and I was
encouraged by it, but I was--you said you would challenge
anyone to check with people along the chain about their not
knowing what their roles and responsibilities were, and so I
think that's what you said, and that seemed to be suggesting
that you were disagreeing with the GAO's findings that there
wasn't this--so I must have missed something here.
Mr. Brooks. I wasn't precise. Let me try again.
The GAO conducted their audit over a very lengthy period of
time. Many of their interviews with individual sites were
conducted 18 months ago. In response to a question I think from
you, the GAO used the illustration that, when they went to
individual sites, they said we don't quite know who's supposed
to do what, so we're deciding on our own.
I believe that part of the problem I have corrected with
the reorganization announced in December and the promulgation
of formal roles and responsibilities. And I agree completely
with the GAO's assessment that the problem is important. I
believe I have done a great deal to correct it, and I'm going
to continue to push that. That's what I was trying to convey,
sir.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. I'm glad the issue has been raised about
it starts at the top in management; and, again, I was impressed
with where you're going.
Now, the one thing is to have a plan. The other thing is to
implement a plan.
No. 1, how is your relationship and working relationship
with the intelligence agencies--the CIA, FBI, whatever--as it
relates to the security of the plants? I mean, are you working
closely with them? Could you just--what you can say in this
open hearing? Where are you with respect to that relationship?
Because it seems to me one of the--the No. 1 component to deal
with the issue of terrorism is the issue of intelligence.
Mr. Brooks. Sure. The Department of Energy's Office of
Intelligence reports to the Secretary, but I am, if not their
largest customer, certainly their most eager customer. I am
briefed by the intelligence agencies daily. I look at specific
details of threats daily. As you know from the open-source
accounts, there's a lot of chaff in that wheat, but we look
carefully daily. When I see something that I believe requires
us to pay attention, I make sure that it gets to my site
managers and my contractors.
My sites also have field intelligence elements. They focus
in two directions. One is the national labs, actually which is
where a good deal of our technical intelligence on nuclear
weapons is done; but, second, they provide another mechanism
for disseminating things out.
There's probably no area in which I am more comfortable
than that I'm fully plugged into the intelligence community and
getting what I need. The problem of course, as September 11
taught us, is that we cannot depend solely on the hope that the
intelligence community will discover problems.
But I know what the intelligence community knows. I'm fully
comfortable. I suspect that's true for Mr. Mahaley also, but he
should speak on that.
Mr. Mahaley. Sir, I've seen a big change since September
11. DOE's Office of Intelligence has been--in the past--I've
been there awhile. This is my 7th year as head of security, and
the Office of Intelligence was traditionally directed at
nonproliferation, looking at information collected around the
world and advising, sort of being the government's lead
analysis center on that intelligence as it regards
nonproliferation and nuclear weapons development.
Since September 11, the Office of Intelligence has
focused--and it was at my request in terms of I wanted a
counterterrorism focus to try to pull together the information
from all the agencies. Because, you know, we can beat these
people. It's just what we've got to talk to each other and
share the information. So the new director of intelligence has
elevated the counterterrorism section to a division, and the
director of that division reports to me at least once a week
with a detailed analysis of everything he's covered in the
previous week. Some days I get briefed two or three times a
day.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Well, that's good. And the teamwork--I
think if you look at what's happened since September 11, the
teamwork with all of our agencies, which in the past hasn't
been as good, has helped to deter another incident.
Let me get to the issue of your security now with respect
to your contractors. You have a large amount of contractors
that deal with your security. Do you feel secure that your
oversight of these contractors--that they are doing the job,
that they're assessing themselves? I mean, are there any checks
and balances there to make sure that there's consistency
because you have different sites throughout the country? My
concern would be, is--and another issue, you have three
different components, I guess, in your operation. Is that too
much bureaucracy, or would you feel more comfortable probably
not to Federalize as it relates to this entire issue instead of
the contractors that we have right now?
Mr. Brooks. Let me--first, one reason that I'm comfortable
that I know across the organization what is going on is the
ability to use Mr. Podonsky's organization, the Office of
Independent Oversight Performance Assurance. They look at all
the sites, and therefore they are able both in a formal and--
what's even more important--in an informal way to tell me
whether there is consistency in approach.
An example is the Secretary and I have asked him to look at
protective forces throughout the complex, because we've had
problems now at two of our sites in which individual protective
force officers found problems and they weren't promptly
reported. We're trying to understand whether those are unique
problems or broad problems, and so we're going to look at
protective forces throughout the sites.
With regard to Federalization of security, the problem
there is I think manpower and whether or not you are likely to
be able to come up with a sufficient Federal force and have the
needed flexibility. It's one of the things I want these two
groups I've chartered to look at, but my biases are that the
problems that we are having is not because the force is not
Federalized.
Now, there is one component that is. The Office of Secure
Transportation, the people who actually move plutonium from
here to there or weapons from here to there, that's an
entirely--those are all Federal agents.
As far as Federalizing the entire contractor--the force--I
think the country made a decision a long time ago that the
national labs in particular but the plants, too, weren't the
sort of thing that the Federal Government ought to be directly
operating. I tend to agree with that. I can go into more detail
if you need, but I certainly would not think that Federal
control of the internal workings of the labs and plants will
make anything better. Federal control of security is an idea
that comes up and needs to be taken seriously. I personally
think it will just change the problem. I don't think it will
improve it.
Mr. Ruppersberger. All right. Thank you.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Platts.
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I apologize. I need to run off, but I do appreciate your
testimony and the written testimonies you provided.
Just one question before I go is the--appreciating the
focus on the management and the defined roles and increased
security staff numbers, but one of the things that jumps out to
me in the GAO report is that, in relation to the new design
basis threat, that the GAO estimates that it will probably be
the 2006 fiscal year before we really get a full picture of
what the cost of the changes are going to be required in
relation to meeting this new design basis threat and anywhere
from 2 to 5 years till we fully implement and have these new
procedures in place and really do what we want them to do.
My question is, do you agree with this general timeframe
that GAO predicts? And, if so, what is the greatest reason for
that time--that delay, given the seriousness of the threats
we're talking about? This is saying really anywhere from maybe
another 6 to 8 years, and you reference in your opening
statement about not wanting a successor to be sitting here in
10 years having to answer similar questions. My worry is that,
you know, 6 to 8 years from now the threat again will be
different and we'll be always playing catch-up. So do you agree
with it? And why is it going to take so long to get
implemented? What is the greatest challenge in getting this
done?
Mr. Brooks. I agree that we're going to phase things in. I
think the time lines that you cite are probably wrong. I expect
to know what this is going to cost by early fall so that we can
adjust the fiscal year 2005 budget, which is the next one we
get to prepare, as necessary.
The design basis threat document--and we'll have Mr.
Mahaley comment further, if he would--is in fact--if you have
something that you can meet in a day and a half, you haven't
looked rigorously enough. We have looked--Mr. Mahaley in
particular has looked at the changes that we have to think
about because of the changed realization of the degree of
organization that terrorists might have, and so we're basically
taking a step to improve, and that takes time.
I am not quite sure where 6 to 8 years comes from. That's
certainly not my understanding of my guidance from the
Secretary, and I don't believe that's what the promulgation for
the new document says.
Mr. Platts. If you have a good handle on the costs
associated with the changes necessary by this fall, you're into
the beginning of the 2004 although we may not, depending on how
fast the appropriations bill--we may not yet have an 2004
appropriations done.
Is there consideration being given at this point to coming
forward with a supplemental request because of the seriousness
of the issues we're talking about, and that rather than waiting
for the 2005 budget, to get it in there and have to go through
the process, that we look at 2004 and say, here's what we now
know we need; we don't want to wait a year because of the
threat that we're talking about? Is that something under
consideration?
Mr. Brooks. I think it's premature to know the answer to
that. I mean, my initial impression is that I'm not talking--on
my side of the house; I can't speak for the rest of the
Department--that I'm not talking, at most of my sites, about
significant funding and that I--that a supplemental would not
be appropriate. The decision to submit supplementals is not one
that Mr. Mahaley and I get to make.
I will simply say that if----
Mr. Platts. But recommendations as to----
Mr. Brooks. If I believe that I have a problem, the
Secretary has made it fairly clear that he wants to hear about
it. But at the moment I don't know--I do not anticipate that I
will see problems that cannot be dealt with through
reallocation in 2004; but if I do, I'll talk to the Secretary
and he'll talk within the administration, and we'll do what's
right because this is very important to us.
Mr. Platts. And that's my focus, that we don't allow a--you
know, a paper, a bureaucratic timeframe for submitting a budget
request, having to go through the process, being approved; if
it is a serious national security issue, that we look at doing
whatever we need to do immediately, not when the next budget
comes forward.
So I appreciate again your testimonies and your efforts
respectively in your offices.
Mr. Mahaley. Can I add something, Mr. Platts?
Mr. Platts. Yes.
Mr. Mahaley. One thing I notice a lot of concern about, the
timing that people should appreciate--and we'll probably get
into this in more detail this afternoon--that when you issue a
new threat policy, it's essentially a requirements driver. It
is analogous in a very rough way to the Pentagon saying, we are
going to plan to fight 2.4 wars or something, and then the Navy
and the Air Force resource to meet that requirement.
We've raised a new requirement, OK, for our department. We
have superb security police officers deployed throughout the
complex, OK--probably not enough of them because of the
overtime requirements and everything else, but you just don't
snap your fingers and hire those people and do it. It takes a
year.
And I'm not talking about the security clearances to get
these people on board, train them. We have a minimum 320-hour
basic training for our security police officers before they get
the site-specific training, and that's just at the basic level.
When you get up to your, what we would call the SRT, or SWAT-
qualified officers, these are super professionals and it takes
time to build officers for that force.
The other point I want to make is that no responsible
manager out there should just throw troops at this, OK? They're
going to have to take a look and say, I have SNM in that
facility. Does it really need to be there? Do I need all of
these points of access and egress in this facility? How is this
facility designed? Is this facility old?
Are we going to replace it in 2 or 3 years? Build that into
the design. There are so many factors. That's a responsible
period to bring this in.
Mr. Platts. And certainly all valid points. But the fact is
that we are approaching 2 years since September 11 now, and now
we're just saying, all right, now we have a new design basis
threat.
Mr. Brooks. But please, sir, don't believe we've been
sitting around since September 11. I think both of us tried to
make clear we----
Mr. Platts. I don't believe you are. But we still are
almost 2 years since September 11, and that's my point; every
day that passes, there's a terrorist individual or group out
there that's looking for weaknesses.
And I certainly commend your efforts. I know you take them
seriously, your responsibilities and----
Mr. Mahaley. Mr. Platts, we just finalized an effort. We
did issue interim guidance throughout this period. Our people
out in the field have been anticipating this.
Mr. Platts. I know my time is well expired, so thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Platts.
We will go into a second round of questions.
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Right now the law requires surveys or the regulations.
Mr. Mahaley. Regulation. Policy.
Mr. Shays. I'm hearing you, Ambassador Brooks, say you want
surveillance.
Mr. Brooks. Correct.
Mr. Shays. That we're doing surveillance without the policy
saying we are; that's kind of what I'm hearing. So I am a
little confused by that.
Mr. Mahaley, maybe you can tell me how that happens and
whether it should.
Mr. Brooks. That's not a fair question to ask him, sir,
because he's prohibited by law from telling me what to do. I
did it.
Mr. Shays. Why don't we have him tell me that?
Mr. Brooks. I'm sorry, sir.
Mr. Shays. Yes, you have a good nature. You want to protect
everyone.
Mr. Mahaley. Essentially what has happened here is, some
people think they have a good idea in the NNSA. They have
gotten ahead of their headlights, OK? Our policies written in
DOE safeguard and security orders call for surveys.
A survey is essentially a very comprehensive checkoff list
done by the Federal manager, OK? Surveillance is not this once
a year checkoff list; it's a continual monitoring process, if
that's fair to say, that's just not contemplated by our policy
right now. I don't have any problems with it in theory, but we
don't have detailed guidelines for our field offices to use
right now. And that's what Linton is talking about in terms of
us having developed the policy.
Mr. Shays. Right. But intuitively it seems to me it makes
sense that you would do that.
But, Ambassador Brooks, you wanted to say----
Mr. Brooks. I simply wanted to make it clear that if you
disagree with what I'm doing, it's not Joe Mahaley's because--
no, I think what we have here, we've been trying very hard to
move the NNSA in the direction we think it needs to go, and we
have occasionally pushed a little bit ahead of the paperwork.
And I'm trying to fix that and get--for example, I made it
clear to the site managers what they were responsible for last
fall. But we didn't get this formal manual out clarifying that
until last month. So we're trying--we're--we are trying to push
to improve things as fast as we can while still documenting
them accurately.
Mr. Shays. OK. The bottom line is, you think it is a good
idea. You started to act on it. Mr. Mahaley, you would describe
it as getting in front of the headlights. I don't know if I
would describe it that way. But, you know, I'll think about it.
I don't quite understand force-on-force exercises. I was
looking at a picture in the GAO report of the helicopter. I'm
assuming this is, you know, bad guys landing over the line. But
what I don't understand is how you can do them and how they
work. You would want to tell someone that when five helicopters
fly into your site, you don't want to knock them out of the
sky, because they happen to be your people just testing the
concept.
So I'm asking you a question about the value of force-on-
force exercise. How does it work and how do you both respond to
it?
Mr. Mahaley. Well, I actually believe that's a picture of
one of our security helicopters at the Savannah River site,
deploying a special response team. So they're on our side.
Mr. Shays. OK. I have a much greater imagination. I saw
them with masks on. But at any rate, let's just say that
helicopters are flying in. I don't understand how an exercise
works. If you tell people you're going to do it, they're
prepared for it.
Mr. Mahaley. Within programs, they are prepared for it.
Mr. Shays. You just tell them a second before, or 5 minutes
before?
Mr. Mahaley. No, sir. You set it up. You have to set up
safety briefings.
Mr. Shays. Do you tell ground sites?
Mr. Mahaley. Yes, sir. And within--and there's parameters
of when they can attack, what their target is. These are
operational sites, and when you do force-on-force, they have to
be carefully planned and executed and evaluated.
Mr. Shays. OK. So what I'm gathering is, a force-on-force
exercise doesn't indicate whether or not you can defend them.
They are just really a practice that enables them to go through
the process. In other words, you're warning them--let me say it
this way.
It would be wrong--would it be wrong for me to interpret
that a force-on-force exercise will determine the capability to
protect the site? Or are they really nothing more than an
exercise?
Mr. Mahaley. No, I think the--your former summary is
probably more correct. And let me explain the process.
Mr. Shays. I'm forgetting which was my former summary.
Mr. Mahaley. That they do have a bearing in determining
whether or not the site is satisfactorily protected. They're
part of a process that we go through.
Let's look at this this way. We issued a design basis
threat. You really can't get down to brass tacks until you
apply that design basis threat to a given site, all right? Once
you apply that design basis threat, this requirement that the
Secretary has set for the site, they then have to analyze how
they're going to implement that; and this involves
vulnerability assessments of the site, and the goal is going to
be to develop a site safeguard and security plan.
In the course of vulnerability assessments and all the
models and simulation and the other tools we use, there are
going to be hard points that surface. In other words, in some
situations, your security forces are going to prevail. It's
going to be clear there's not going to be any question.
The areas you want to test on force-on-force are those
areas where it's close. And you want to see how your actual
forces perform and see if your assumptions about the reaction
times and their capabilities are borne out in actual testing.
Now, I would never want to suggest, and I think anybody
who's ever seen one or planned one or participated in one would
never suggest, that there aren't artificialities, that, you
know, they don't necessarily represent what's going to happen,
but it's a very effective tool that we use to basically look at
the finer points of that site safeguard and security plan.
Mr. Shays. I have a red light here. I realize it is a finer
tool. I mean, I realize it's a tool to be used. I guess I'm
just trying to determine how much we should, on the outside,
assess, or you on the inside should assess, your capability to
defend. If, in fact, you had to warn people, prepare them,
there's not an element of surprise.
Do you ever do the following? Do you ever, all of us,
announce that in the next month there will be an attempt to
breach the facility and that you will be given a 5-minute
warning and go from there and do that?
Mr. Mahaley. No.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Mahaley. That's a good way to get people killed, Mr.
Chairman. I mean, these are guards who are authorized to use
deadly force and armed very well, very well trained. And that's
just my personal opinion; I don't think that's the right way to
go, not at a nuclear weapons facility.
Mr. Shays. I don't want to get people killed.
Mr. Mahaley. Right, sir.
Mr. Shays. However, I don't want to then say that when you
have an attempt, when everybody has been briefed thoroughly
about it, that it is going to describe to us how easily or well
we'll be able to defend a facility, because it does have clear
limits.
Mr. Mahaley. Well, it answers questions, sir. And I think
you have to kind of take a whole series of these force-on-force
exercises in toto----
Mr. Shays. What I am confused about, I am confused why you
would be disagreeing with me. Not because I am up here and
you're there. It would seem to me the answer would be, yes,
sir, it has its limits.
I mean, tell me if you disagree with this: It is a
wonderful practice. You're going to see where you have
weaknesses, but it isn't going to be able to give us an
assessment that we can protect the facility in the way that we
might think we can. It's not going to provide all the answers,
I guess.
Mr. Mahaley. That's absolutely correct, sir, absolutely
correct.
Mr. Shays. But it is an exercise that is helpful.
Mr. Mahaley. I believe so.
Mr. Shays. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. I have no questions of the witness at this
time.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Yeah, getting back on the oversights,
the contractors and, you know, the--there is a problem
sometimes with inconsistency.
One of my concerns, you have different levels, level 1,
level 2; and could you describe that, please, as far as the
type of facility? And yet, any nuclear components getting in
the hands of terrorists, wherever they may be, will make a
difference. And is there a procedure in place to identify all--
a consistent security procedure for both of your levels of
plants or operations or sites?
Mr. Mahaley. I don't want to get into specifics. I'd like
to hold that for the closed session this afternoon.
Mr. Ruppersberger. OK. That's fine. Let's get on another
issue then.
In order to be able--in management, it starts at the top,
but I think good managers listen to the front line. Has there
been an assessment from people who are working on the front
line that might not have the access to upper-level management,
a plan to make a survey, ask questions on what they feel needs
to be done as it relates to security?
Mr. Mahaley. It's kind of funny you ask that, sir. My
predecessor, General Gene Habiger, who was the security czar in
the last administration, tried to do a survey, and we ran afoul
of the Paperwork Reduction Act and the need to get--you know,
we have this funny relationship where we're a Federal agency
with 14,000 Feds and 130,000 contractors and we were not able
to do that security survey.
But we do get feedback. I get feedback. I just went out to
Albuquerque for a national competition. I met with all the site
safeguard and security directors. I met with probably about 200
officers. I met the Feds and the contractors, and we encourage
that sort of feedback. And by the way, it was a classified
session with the site safeguard and security managers and
contractors, and we discussed the design basis threat
implementation.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Have there been many instances of
whistle-blower cases where frontline individuals were trying to
get information out?
Mr. Mahaley. I'm sure there are, and the Department has
investigated them.
Mr. Ruppersberger. In my opinion, the front line needs to
be heard, to be analyzed to make sure that we are dealing with
this type of security. And it is so important that we--part of
the analysis of your security must be dealing with that front
line.
Mr. Brooks. I'm concerned with that. We also try in
informal ways to sample.
For example, I had some people out looking at an
investigation, but just as they were walking, they would talk
to protective force officers, get their ideas. I meet with the
working level of my site office when I travel; we try and get
that feedback.
With respect to whistle-blowers, I want to be very careful
here. I don't want to suggest that I am discouraging anybody
from communicating with the Congress or the Office of Special
Counsel, or within the limits of security, the press.
I am bothered whenever I see somebody who is apparently
sincere in wanting to fix things and believes he or she has to
go outside the system to do it. There is a cultural--I
mentioned earlier that there are cultural issues.
There's a cultural problem at some of my facilities. It's
not retaliation. It's not even disinterest in the subject. It's
oh, I'm busy, don't bother me. I don't know what it is, but I'm
trying to work on that.
Mr. Ruppersberger. And I'm not trying to go there with
respect to the issues of whistle-blowers. I'm looking at the
total assessment. When you have partnerships between business
and government and you're dealing with national security, there
needs to be an assessment of what's happening. And a lot of
times we, up top at the highest level, don't get the
information. And sometimes the front line gets it.
I just want to make sure, or that's why I'm asking the
questions, the consistency of your security programs,
consistency between level 1 and level 2.
Let me get into another level. We talked about physical
security. How about the computer networks, I mean, which is an
important part also? Where are we with respect to that?
Mr. Brooks. I think I'd refer you to Mr. Podonsky's
prepared statement, and what he will tell you is, we're in good
shape on the classified networks; that we are--we don't have
any--I mean, cyber security is an infinite ladder; you can
always make it better. But we don't have significant problems
on the classified networks.
On the unclassified networks, there are some problems that
have been identified that we're trying to work on. And those
problems are whether or not we are strong enough not just to
defeat the external hacker sitting in a basement somewhere, but
for example, in one of our facilities where we have--because
these are scientific laboratories, we have foreign nationals,
whether we are segmenting the unclassified network as
thoroughly as we might.
We've had another problem recently in which someone was
obtaining salary data on an unclassified network. You're not
supposed to be able to do that.
So I don't think that it is serious in terms of national
security because, by definition, unclassified information is
unclassified. In terms of sound management, we've got a ways to
go on the unclassified side in our cyber security, at least at
my sites.
Mr. Ruppersberger. OK.
Mr. Turner. Gentlemen, I want to thank you for your
testimony here today and certainly for your efforts. As you're
aware and as has been said earlier in the hearing, we're having
a closed session this afternoon so that we can have a greater
discussion of issues surrounding this that are classified; and
in recognition that we have the closed session, I wonder if
either of you have anything else you wanted to add to the
record in this public session.
Mr. Brooks. No.
Mr. Mahaley. No, thank you.
Mr. Turner. OK. Thank you very much.
Mr. Shays. If I could, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Shays. What we'd like you to think about, you have the
prerogative to testify separately when we go into the closed
session. We might be able to cover the issues if we do it in a
larger panel. That'll be your decision.
You can talk to us later, but if you let my staff know
whether you would want to go separately and have to wait, or
whether we all go at once and try to cover it that way, OK?
Thank you. Thank you all very much.
Mr. Mahaley. Thank you sir.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Turning to our third panel, which will include
Danielle Brian, executive director, Project on Government
Oversight, and Ronald Timm, president of RETA Security, if you
would both stand----
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Turner. Please let the record note that the witnesses
responded in the affirmative.
Ms. Brian.
STATEMENTS OF DANIELLE BRIAN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PROJECT ON
GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT; AND RONALD E. TIMM, PRESIDENT, RETA
SECURITY
Ms. Brian. Mr. Chairman, I commend you for holding these
important hearings.
The Project on Government Oversight is an investigative
organization that works with inside sources to improve public
policy. We are a politically independent nonprofit watchdog
that strives to promote a government that's accountable to the
citizenry.
In early 2001, POGO began its investigation into nuclear
security at the Department of Energy after more than a dozen
high-level departmental security experts came forward with
their concerns. We interviewed, after that, current and former
DOE security officials, Special Forces personnel who test
security at nuclear facilities and DOE contractors, such as Mr.
Timm, who coauthored the report. We now have people contacting
us from all over the complex and headquarters.
Just prior to September 11, 2001, POGO issued our report;
and I ask that it be included in the record, but maybe just the
text, because the attachments make it really fat.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Brian. We concluded that the Nation's 10 nuclear
weapons facilities, which house nearly 1,000 tons of weapons-
grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium, regularly fail to
protect this material during mock terrorist attacks. Many of
these sites are located near metropolitan areas, including the
San Francisco Bay area, Denver, Albuquerque and Knoxville.
There are three major threats to these facilities, and only
two were really discussed in the previous testimony--theft,
radiological sabotage, or a dirty bomb, and as Mr. Shays has
made reference to, the possibility of terrorists creating an
improvised nuclear device, a sizable nuclear detonation within
minutes.
In full-scope mock terror attack tests performed by the
government at DOE facilities, half the time mock terrorists are
successful in breaking in, stealing significant quantities of
special nuclear material and leaving the site. Theft, however,
requires that the terrorists get into the facility and back out
with the material. A suicidal terrorist would not have to work
that hard. Instead, a successful suicidal terrorist attack
doesn't require getting out again and could create a dirty bomb
or a sizable nuclear detonation at the facility itself.
For example, in October 2000, there was a mock attack test
of security at technical area 18, a facility at Los Alamos. The
mock terrorists successfully entered the facility and the guard
force could not get them out. The mock terrorists had enough
time to have been able to create a sizable nuclear detonation.
A recent CIA pamphlet summarizing devices of interest to al
Qaeda and other terrorist groups highlighted both dirty bombs
and improvised nuclear devices as two of their greatest
concerns.
We believe the single most important element to improve
security at the nuclear weapons facilities is a realistic
design basis threat. Twenty months after September 11, DOE
finally substantially increased the design basis threat at
level 1 sites. Unfortunately, the upgrades will not be fully
implemented until 2009, which is 8 years after September 11.
The other nuclear weapons sites, however, still have a long
way to go, and the new design basis threat for them is wholly
inadequate. Special operations personnel expect the terrorist
attack on one of these facilities to be with a squad-sized
unit. The Army Special Forces sizes a squad at 12 people and
the Navy SEALS size a squad at 14 attackers. The way we
understand it, even under the new design basis threat for these
level 2 facilities, which have improvised nuclear device
vulnerabilities, DOE will only be protecting against far fewer
attackers.
Currently, DOE is determining its security requirements
based on how much money it is willing to spend on security, and
this is backward. Now, I heard Ambassador Brooks saying that
wasn't true, but I would bring your attention to the testimony
of the GAO on page 14, where they said, ``The DOE and NNSA
officials from all levels told us that concern over resources
played a large role in developing the 2003 DBT, with some
officials calling the DBT the `funding basis threat,' or the
maximum threat the Department could afford. This tension
between threat size and resources is not a new development.''
Hopefully, the committee can encourage DOE to determine its
security needs based on the Intelligence Community's postulated
threat in your closed session.
We keep seeing evidence of security failures even without
an attack on these facilities. All three of the weapons labs
have had serious management and security problems in just the
last few months. Again, Ambassador Brooks suggested these were
not security problems. But let me describe some of them.
Top security officials at both Los Alamos and Livermore
have been replaced. Only 6 months ago what began as a
management scandal involved security issues including over 300
stolen or missing computers that the IG testified before
Congress may have contained classified information. Now we have
missing plutonium there.
At Livermore, a set of keys and a security card to access-
sensitive areas were missing for weeks without being reported.
And that is not a security problem?
In addition, members of the Livermore SWAT team claimed
they could not defend the lab in the event of a terrorist
attack. At Sandia, there has also been a series of security
lapses, including guards sleeping and keys missing that are
being investigated by Senator Grassley. These scandals, I'd
like to point out, have never been discovered by DOE; they've
only been brought forward by outsiders.
And with reference to there not being retaliation, when
you're talking about these particular instances, you can look
at the Los Alamos investigators, who were fired after their
findings were revealed internally, not to the press, as an
example of retaliation that does happen.
The scattering of special nuclear materials across the
country is left over from the cold war.
Now, a number of sites have virtually no national security
mission; however, they continue to store and try to protect
tons of nuclear material at great cost. However, DOE has
resisted many consolidation opportunities, as it would threaten
fiefdoms and potentially even lead to the closing down of
facilities.
In addition to requiring the design basis threat that will
address improvised nuclear device vulnerabilities, POGO makes
the following recommendations.
Consolidation of nuclear materials: The Base Realignment
and Closure Commission should be empowered to recommend closing
the unneeded and redundant DOE sites, as well as those sites
that have no national defense mission. Another solution would
be to consolidate nuclear materials to fewer, more easily
protected sites. These solutions save money and reduce the risk
to the public.
Under Secretary Robert Card himself recently advised that
the first question for a site to consider is ``Is there a way
to reduce the targets by consolidating material or, even
better, exporting material to other more permanent or hardened
sites?'' And I have the letter if you need that. This is
certainly commendable language. However, these same directions
have been issued to the field for more than 20 years with
little or no impact.
A case in point, again, is Los Alamos' technical area 18.
In 2000, Secretary Richardson directed the site to be
deinventoried of its special nuclear materials by 2003. It was
to be moved underground to a currently empty and hardened
underground facility at the Nevada Test Site. Here we are and
not one gram has moved in that direction.
Ambassador Brooks's recent predecessor has also pushed to
expedite moving the materials out of TA 18, apparently to no
avail. I believe Los Alamos is betting on turnover at DOE
headquarters and the inattention of the Congress.
I would also like to challenge earlier testimony that the
security tests are no longer seriously dumbed down. I have
examples from last month. Last month, during a mock theft
scenario, terrorists were not allowed to go out the same hole
in the fence they came in, requiring them to run all the way
around the fence line to leave the facility. If they had been
allowed to use the hole, they would have been able to leave the
facility without even having engaged any of the protective
forces.
In another recent example, the mock terrorists were
required to stay on the road in order to leave the facility.
In addition, as was pointed out, advance warning is given
to sites, often months in advance, that a test is scheduled and
the test, as we've mentioned, follows scripts of what the
terrorists can and can't do.
The three advantages a terrorist has are surprise, speed
and violence of action, elements that are not factors in these
dumbed-down tests. Yet the mock terrorists still accomplish
their mission all too often.
Immobilized excess plutonium: Over 50 tons of our plutonium
have already been declared excess and could be immobilized,
making it less attractive for theft.
One way to counter DOE's antisecurity culture is to move
security oversight out of DOE. One suggestion is to move the
independent oversight office to model something like the
Defense Nuclear Safety Facility Board where he's not having to
report directly to the Secretary. Another option would be to
make security oversight at DOE facilities a DOD responsibility,
perhaps under the Nuclear Command and Control staff.
Increase security funding, but spend resources more
efficiently: The United States spends over $1 billion annually
on security at DOE sites. We are not getting our money's worth.
We are spreading our resources inefficiently by protecting
sites we should not have to protect, either because special
nuclear materials are not needed there or it's not needed there
in massive quantities. Clearly, the new DBT will require more
money, but money should not be thrown at the problem without
evidence that a real plan to implement security upgrades
efficiently is in place.
I'd like to point out that, in the past, DOE security has
hit obstacles obtaining increased budgets from within the
Department, OMB and from Congress, in large part because
they've simply lied about the status of security.
For example, in early 2002, then-NNSA Administrator Gordon
wrote a letter to the Washington Post denying POGO's findings
and assuring the public that security was adequate at the
nuclear sites. One month later DOE was talking out of the other
side of their mouth, begging OMB and the Congress for a half-
billion dollar increase in funding because of dire security
problems.
Finally, more congressional oversight: Without sustained
and intensive scrutiny and oversight, DOE briefings and
testimony will not reveal the actual status of security. It is
ultimately up to Congress to keep at this, and I believe it is
some of the most important work that you'll do.
Here's a suggestion for a next step: In mid-2002, the
Scowcroft Commission finally issued their end-to-end review of
security at DOD and DOE nuclear weapons facilities. We
encourage the committee to obtain copies of the draft of that
report and interview the authors.
If I could--because I am not going to be in the closed
session, if I could just make two more----
Mr. Turner. Your time is running out, so if you could
conclude quickly.
Ms. Brian. Yes, I just wanted to say we already know what's
wrong.
Ambassador Brooks had said we need more review, but the
last administration, for example, created the position of
security czar headed by an Air Force general with no obvious
improvement. I would humbly suggest that roles and
responsibilities are periodically rearranged, but we still
aren't protecting our nuclear materials against the real
terrorist threat; and it is going to take serious congressional
oversight to make sure it happens.
Thank you for your inviting me to testify.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Brian follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Turner. Mr. Timm.
Mr. Timm. Thank you. Good morning Mr. Chairman. I would
like to thank you and the subcommittee for inviting me to give
my professional opinion on the state of security at the nuclear
weapons facilities in the Department of Energy. I look forward
to presenting you to a national security problem that only
Congress can solve and that has potential consequences
equivalent to that of September 11.
I prepared some slides since we were in a different room
before, but you can read along with those, which may be of help
when I go through mine, because there are technical things I'll
refer to.
According to the committee's letter of invitation sent to
me, you said the purpose of the hearing was to determine the
adequacy of security in the Department of Energy. In fact, this
morning a couple of times you've asked the question about
adequate security.
The expression ``adequate'' is a layperson's term. The
Department has very prescriptive definitions of risk, or the
consequence of loss of nuclear materials and risk to the health
and safety of the public. Risk in a vulnerability analysis
report is developed as a quantitative value that has, in turn,
provided adjectival designations of high, moderate or low. When
a site is determined to be at high risk, compensatory measures
must be implemented by orders within 24 hours. A simple red
flag we should look for in a description of risk is
``adequate'' which is in fact an obfuscation of the risk state.
Based on past Department of Energy policy and management
and my current activities in the Department, I fear that we
remain at high risk today. I urge to you look into this
critical concern. I further urge you not to accept the canned
response of ``we fixed it'' without clear verification. In
fact, I heard a typical of that this morning by saying they had
18-month-old data. People who long tolerated and even abetted
the failings in the Department are still there, with no one
else to oversee their action.
You have asked what have the assessments shown. The
assessment, particularly the headquarters quality assurance
team's efforts, documented high risk at certain sites. For
example, from 1997 to 2000, I was principal author of over 200
classified and unclassified letters and reports prepared by the
quality assurance team that identified high risk to three major
DOE facilities with tons of highly enriched uranium and
plutonium holdings. And if you'd look at slide 2, you will see
that QA group was made up of headquarters personnel. It was
made up of senior personnel from my company, the Sandia
National Laboratory simulation personnel and the Army Special
Forces testing people that do force-on-force testing. All
together there were something like 20 people involved with
that.
The assessments included the theft of special nuclear
materials and sabotage resulting in either an improvised
nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device.
At that time, I personally briefed the findings of high
risk to Department of Energy Directors Joe Mahaley and Toby
Johnson. Neither one acted in accordance with Department of
Energy orders. Some of these same issues were briefed to
Secretary Richardson, and they were staffed down to the same
two persons and nothing was done to address the
vulnerabilities.
Members of the quality assurance team surmised that what
happened in these instances was that OSS, now the Office of
Security, voted the issues to the two responsible program
offices, Defense Programs and Environmental Management, where
there was immediate reluctance to address the issue. There was
continuous foot-dragging by each of these programs' offices in
regards to evaluating the consequences of loss of nuclear
materials or the definitions and characteristics of a design
basis threat.
For example, when developing a worse case scenario, the
quality assurance team would often assume to arm the terrorists
with 50-caliber sniper rifles with armor-piercing incendiary
rounds. The program offices argued that this was unfair to the
protective forces. Regularly, the program officer would balk at
the high-risk determination at a site because if they were to
acknowledge the state of risk, they would have to fix it while
immediately instituting compensatory measures that would divert
funds from programmatic efforts.
To paraphrase a recent quote from Steve Wallace at the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board, what seems to have
evolved is that higher-level decisionmakers came to the
conclusion that there isn't a security issue, in part based on
analysis done by analysts who sort of wanted low risk.
How is risk assessed? And this where you are not going to
want to follow me a lot because you have seen an equation on
that one. But, basically, risk is assessed by a simple equation
called R = C x T x (1--PE), and the term ``consequence'' is the
value of the consequence of loss of theft or sabotage of
nuclear materials and danger to the health and safety of the
public.
The ``T'' value is, in fact, the design basis threat and
describes what all the attributes and characteristics of the
terrorists are.
``PE'' is a value that basically is the protection elements
that you're talking about on a site. It's made up of protection
delay and response.
And if you look at that, there are some funny arrows on it.
If you remember from your days back in algebra, when one side
of the equation goes up, the other side of the equation has to
go up in order to remain balanced--with the exception that
``1--PE,'' in order to get better protection to reduce risk,
you have to get better protection coming up. And that's what
we're here talking about, protection adequate to keep the risk
low in the Department.
In and of itself, the equation for risk is algebraically
perhaps deceptively so. For example, in physics the equations
developed by Newton and Einstein, F = ma and E = mc2 are also
simple. However, one determines space flight and one develops
nuclear weapons. The risk equation in the Department of Energy
is used in terms of the protection required for the assets of
societal importance, that is, the theft or sabotage of nuclear
materials from national inventory under the stewardship of the
Department of Energy.
Nineteen months after the September 11 attack, a new design
basis threat was finally issued at the end of May. A draft
version had been circulated on December 31 that included an
increase in the number of terrorists and a lowering of the
numerical value for risk. The draft design basis statements
would have approved one failure in every 20 attacks at the low
risk. That means every time they tried 20 times, they would
have succeeded once and that was the standard they wanted to
move to.
Today's new design basis threat that was approved less than
3 weeks ago has a much higher rate of loss. It is the same rate
of loss used before September 11 attacks. On September 11, the
terrorists succeeded in three out of four attempts. Either an
addition to the number of terrorists or a decrease in the
approved low risk would result in a linear increase in the size
of protective force for a given site. By making just one change
in the design basis threat, the security improvements are
simplified. Even with the new and simple changes to the design
basis threat, the necessary improvements in security are not
required to be completed until 2009, with the actual
improvements to be sometimes later.
Sometimes on physical security you will approve the money
and it will not be turnkeyed until 3 years later. So the
question I was asked before about, are we going to still be
talking about this in 2008 and 2010, there's an extremely high
likelihood, based upon what we've had in past track records.
I have talked about the risk of nuclear weapons complex and
the Department and the risk of health and safety to the public,
as well as the corrective actions for approved design basis
threat. But how do we fix it? There is no quick fix in the
Department that has been dysfunctional as long as this
department has, but there are corrective systems to improve
process, and they are: You must hold senior managers in the
Department accountable for their actions. Many of the current
managers in the Department knew and know about high risk and
nuclear inventory and theft or sabotage, and they were given
thousands of pages of classified reports documenting the high
risk. To date, reorganization of the Department to include NNSA
has only rearranged the deck chairs. We need to replace these
people with qualified personnel.
The bureaucrats in place protect one another. You can't
expect friends to fire one another. In this case, only the
Congress can effect that change.
Top leaders should be held accountable. Their actions
should put their careers on the line. Today, one of the
aforementioned Department of Energy Directors has been given an
award and the other is at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory looking
at a security failure of the lost keys. What we need are
qualified personnel with experience in loss prevention, not
simply retired military personnel whose experience is in
national defense or law enforcement.
In fact, I viewed with some amusement Secretary Brooks
saying that I am bringing in ``admiral this'' and ``admiral
that.'' We have had Air Force generals come in. They are
national defense experts or they are law enforcement experts;
they are not loss prevention experts. And so that in itself--
they have--in fact, we have seen them walk out to the site and
say they've got big guns at this site. You walk out with a
dirt-faced Special Forces guy, and he will show you what a big
gun can do to some of those people that are walking around out
there.
The second recommendation is to consolidate the nuclear
materials, and that was pretty much what Danielle had, and I
agree with that. We have seen plans put in place by the
previous--to have Decision Directives to move materials.
Malicious compliance is being done by the Department that says
we still haven't moved it to date.
The other last item that is most important from your
perspective is providing the line item funding for physical
security at the level of a program office to include the
operating dollars designated for increased protective force
size and capabilities.
Today, the Department of Homeland Security has a budget
greater than $30 billion. However, Department of Energy
management resists spending money on security. If they
establish a new 24/7 post or patrol for the protective force at
any of the 10 Class A sites, this is equal to about five full-
time protective force personnel, which is the same cost as two
or three scientists. Therefore, the scientists must be laid off
to hire the security personnel, not a popular option. The
program offices have an inherent conflict of interest when
deciding to improve security and lower risk or lay off
scientists.
In conclusion, let me summarize my testimony. Many of the
nuclear weapon facilities in the Department of Energy are at
risk, which endangers the health and safety of the public. This
has been documented continuously since March 1997. The security
of the Nation's nuclear stockpile has been mischaracterized as
adequate by senior career personnel within the Department. The
corrections and remedies for the existing problems fall to
Congress for action.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Timm follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Turner. We thank both of you.
We will have a 5-minute round of questions beginning with
Chairman Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
Ms. Brian, I appreciated both your testimonies. I
appreciated your testimony in terms of helping us raise some
questions behind the closed door. Some of them, frankly, could
have been raised not behind closed doors, and we should have
asked about the issue of intimidation and so on. So it will be
on the record behind the closed doors, but it is not really
confidential information.
I wrote down that what I was trying to wrestle with, a
breach in terms of the force-on-force exercise, a breach
success, a facility is vulnerable. We can know that if you are
going to tell them that you're going to attack and you allow
both sides to plan for the offense and defense and you still
succeed in getting through, you've got a big problem.
Ms. Brian. That's how we see it.
Mr. Shays. A nonbreach does not suggest the facility is not
vulnerable because they have been warned. That was kind of what
I was wrestling with and suggesting.
Ms. Brian. I thought that was a great point you were
making, and I thought you----
Mr. Shays. I didn't make it well though.
Ms. Brian. Well, make it again in the closed session. But I
think that actually what you were encountering is important.
You saw the defense of the status quo on the part of Mr.
Mahaley in not wanting to--when you said, ``Why are you
disagreeing with me?'' I mean, I thought that was a very
important dialog that you had with him, that at DOE they don't
want to acknowledge weaknesses in the way the system works.
Mr. Shays. In terms of your information, how many times in
the last few years have we been able to breach a facility?
Ms. Brian. Our understanding is that over 50 percent of the
time the mock terrorists in ``full up''--this means the
independent, full DOE assessments, not the self-assessments
that are done by the labs for themselves, the facilities for
themselves, but in the big, ``full up'' ones--more than 50
percent of the time the mock terrorists are successful at
achieving their mission, whether it be theft or creating, as we
discussed before, you know, the improvised nuclear device,
whatever their mission is.
Mr. Shays. Both of you can respond to this. Based on your
work and research and knowledge, what facilities do you think
are the most vulnerable?
Ms. Brian. I can't know that because I don't have a
clearance. And the only examples that I know of are those that
have been--the security failures that have been fixed, and
that's the way I'm able to know those.
But I can specifically speak to one facility, TA 18, which
has been identified by the last two administrations as being
the most vulnerable. It's at Los Alamos; and as I mentioned,
Secretary Richardson ordered that it be deinventoried of all of
its special nuclear materials by now, and none of it has moved
out yet.
And there's all kinds of excuses coming from Los Alamos--
we're not ready yet. And this administration actually issued a
stern warning that they needed to get the stuff out. It's in a
canyon. So the high ground--the bad guys can have the high
ground and we all know from, you know, cowboys and Indians,
that's not the way you want to be storing special nuclear
materials.
Mr. Timm. In fact, one of the characteristic stories of
that site was the fact that they dumbed down the tests and told
the Special Forces people when they were stealing material--I
think it was in 1997--that they couldn't use a vehicle, and
they went and brought in a garden cart, because that wasn't
prohibited; and then they were able to steal the material. And
they yelled, ``Foul,'' that it was not a reasonable test
because they used a garden cart to drag away the SNM. So that's
some of the artificiality that you see going into those force-
on-force tests.
Force-on-force tests are not cheap, sir. They run anywhere
between $100,000 and a quarter of a million dollars to pull one
up and run it; and labs are very reluctant to go ahead and put
that kind of money into it.
Mr. Shays. I happen to think they are tremendously
important--but not to enable the Department to say that ``We've
done this, so we know this facility is safe.'' It's a wonderful
tool for everyone to know the vulnerabilities and how they can
then try to prevent them in the future.
If you were to ask any of the participants in the closed-
door session a question, give me your top few, both of you.
Ms. Brian. Well, one that I wrote down, that I wish I
could, is when you were asking--I think it was maybe you, Mr.
Tierney, who asked Ambassador Brooks, ``Do you believe that you
have been able to reach denial--in other words, the ability to
stop the terrorists from coming in the site''--and he said,
``Absolutely, yes, we've reached that capacity.'' And you
asked, ``Well, how do you know that?'' And he said, ``Well,
because of this force-on-force test.''
I would encourage you to ask Mr. Podonsky or the GAO
whether force-on-force tests of denial have been run at all of
these facilities and whether it has been successful in
preventing the terrorists from getting in.
I don't believe the answer would support Mr. Brooks's,
Ambassador Brooks's testimony.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Timm.
Mr. Timm. I think I would ask the question about how much
have they actually done, performance testing, against the RDD.
In that when you take a weapon of mass destruction, a truck--
and, in fact, there are trucks--bomb size is classified, but if
you talk to the Technical Security Working Group for the
Department of Defense, they classify it as a 60,000-pound
vehicle. If you parked it next to a building, which we
postulated, outside of Denver and blew that up, you would
basically have taken that plutonium and wafted it over the city
of Denver.
And so the question is, do they really test weapons of mass
destruction to, in fact, implement an RDD at those specific
sites.
We didn't find vehicle barriers along fences, so in fact
the bad guy could cut them without anyone even watching them
and then drive that 18-wheeler right up alongside of a
building. That's all you'd have to----
Mr. Shays. I missed what you said. Please say that more
slowly. You did what?
Mr. Timm. We postulated driving an 18-wheeler right up next
to a building and exploding it with whatever poundage of high
explosives in it, which would then waft the plutonium in this
particular site up into the air and it would have blown over
the city of Denver, and did not test against the RDD, as to my
best knowledge, and I work with the Department actively.
Mr. Shays. We'll check that out as well.
Any other questions that you think would be wise to ask, if
you'd submit them to our staff before 2 today, I think we'll do
that.
Mr. Timm. OK.
Mr. Shays. Thank you both very much. Appreciate your work
and appreciate your testimony, and my only disappointment was
that you pointed out a question, too, that we could have asked
in public that I wish we had.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank both of you for your testimony. My only regret
is that we didn't arrange this testimony differently and have
you folks testify first so that we would have been able to see
the reaction and the commentary from the others in a public
session, at least as much as we could. And I might recommend to
my colleagues on the other side that we all go back and think
about the way we structure these witnesses from time to time,
because that might be helpful; and hopefully that's something
we'll consider.
I get concerned because when we had the hearings on the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the protection of nuclear
power plants, we heard the same stuff--you know, the inadequate
force-to-force test, the inadequate threat design, and it goes
on and on. And I know I get criticized in my area from the
people in the nuclear industry, who keep thinking that we're
being overly aggressive in our research of them, and that they
think they're all safe. But when you visit those plants, you
see all the things that the tests show.
We hear port security commentary. We still haven't even set
the idea of what we need to do to prioritize what can be done,
although we all know from other independents that have done
that, that we could do things. We know, still, that like 42
percent of the cargo in passenger planes is not screened, and--
it's incredible. And we still know that we don't have a proper
communications coordination system going around here with all
those things that are available.
And I know that others, and I, are putting together a
system of where we should be on all of those points at a
certain time; and hopefully, we can hold this administration to
that point, because it really gets to the point of
ridiculousness when we see what's going on.
Ms. Brian, you mentioned that we ought to think possibly
about putting the Department of Defense in charge of security
at these facilities. The current security obviously is private
individuals, and they're either inept or there's some other
explanation for why they're not doing the job.
But is the Department of Defense going to have the kind of
expertise, as Mr. Timm mentioned, that sometimes just bringing
in the brass doesn't resolve it? Or should we go to a wholly
separate group of real specialists and establish them to do it?
Ms. Brian. Well, actually what I was suggesting--and
perhaps I wasn't clear--was not to have the security itself run
by DOD. I think actually NM posse comitatus may prevent us from
doing that. But I meant the oversight of the security.
And one way of doing that is--well, there are parts of DOD,
not just people who have things on their shoulders, but who are
actually trained. And one of the many places that we actually
briefed with our findings was the Nuclear Control and Command
staff, and it struck me that their job is the security and
oversight of the security of the DOD nuclear weapons
themselves, and so they already have that level of training and
expertise.
And they are tremendously critical of DOE, and frankly, I
thought that perhaps by taking advantage to some extent of the
interagency rivalries, if you had someone who really was trying
to find where the problems are, we would actually improve
security.
Mr. Tierney. Is this a question of the Department of Energy
knowing what they should have to do and not being willing to
spend the money or appropriate the resources to it, or is this
just a question of flat-out incompetence?
Ms. Brian. I think maybe it's both of those, plus a level
of bureaucratic inertia that people don't want to change the
way they have done things, and they certainly don't want to
admit that they have been wrong.
You have a lot of the same people in place, as Mr. Timm
mentioned. When the NNSA was created, we actually had as an
attachment to our report the press release announcing the new
NNSA and the people who were going to be in this new job. Well,
they were all the same people who had been at the DOE defense
programs, and they just changed their title. So I think a lot
of it is, frankly, people who are still there and don't want
to--you know, who sort of dig in their heels and say, no, the
outside critics are wrong; we know what we are doing. So I
think that's a lot of it.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, can we have that POGO report made a part of
the record, unanimous consent?
Mr. Turner. Sure, without objection.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
And last, just the design basis threat, Mr. Timm, you
started to talk about that a little bit. Can you give me your
evaluation of that most recent document?
Mr. Timm. I think there was a characterization that it was
what money could buy. The one they had on December 31, the
draft one, in fact, I thought was aggressive. I thought it was
responsive and I thought it did meet the mark on that. And I
was surprised at the robustness of it, because they increased
not only the number of terrorists coming, but also said, we're
going to accept less risk at the site. And that was an
important element that they added to that.
It was going to have--people have to change a lot of ways
they think as with regards to, you can't just throw people at
the problem anymore. You've got to get a lot smarter than what
they do. And so they basically--again, we have beaten to death
the words ``dumbed down,'' but they basically dialed it down to
where it was an acceptable function.
Mr. Tierney. And you think they did that for financial
reasons?
Mr. Timm. Absolutely. Absolutely. It's no question that
they had to because of the amount of manpower you would have to
bring to bear, or even changes in tactics that you would have
had to accomplish within that function.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you both for your testimony. It's
valuable to us.
Ms. Brian. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Turner. Looking at your testimony, Ms. Brian, when you
indicated the options that could be pursued, the one obviously
with the Department of Defense having responsibility is the one
I think that intuitively most people would arrive at, and maybe
even begin there.
If you ask people, who is guarding these facilities, I
think most people's perception would be that the military is
not, and not that we have Department of Energy or even
contractors that are participating in that.
Mr. Timm, in looking at your testimony, you state that one
of the concerns that you have is that what we need are
qualified persons with experience within loss prevention, not
simply retired military personnel whose experience is in
national defense or law enforcement. I mean, that obviously
seems like a conflict, and I would just like you guys to
discuss that for a moment, because it would seem to me, Ms.
Brian, that your statement is one that is--as you went through
what the Department of Defense does in security and other
facilities, it seems like this would be a natural fit--and if
you both would discuss that issue.
Mr. Timm. I don't think we are in disagreement at all. It
may have been the wording that we chose on this.
The Department of Defense, as far as command structure,
ability to train and have people available to do that, is
obviously a ready source of manpower. At Livermore Laboratory
it took them a year and a half to reconstitute their SRT after
they had disbanded it in 1995. And so I don't see a problem
with that.
The problem you have, when I talked about bringing command
structure people in here is, they bring in the military aspect
of how they look at it, and it is a national defense
perspective rather than loss prevention.
I have worked with many competent people out of the Defense
Department that are perfectly capable of doing this within the
construct of what you're trying to put together.
And so I don't believe we are there. It's just a matter of
the devil's in the details as far as pulling these two
together.
Ms. Brian. And I think also the distinction is rather than
having someone at the top who has not had experience actually
protecting assets but has another entirely different--as was
suggested there, admirals who I think have strategic command
experience; it's not the same kind of military experience that
many of the Special Forces--for example, there's a unit out of
Fort Bragg that is trained of special operations--that is
trained specifically as adversaries. And that's what they do.
And they go to different sites and train and try to breach
security.
And those are the kinds of people that we're talking about
being involved rather than people who have a military career
but have nothing to do with actual, you know, entering--being
pretend terrorists, mock terrorists or, you know, protecting
assets.
Mr. Timm. In fact, the experience I had personally was with
a one-star general who was head of MPs, that retired and went
to the Department of Energy at Oak Ridge, and I spent quite
some time explaining our equation to him so that he understood.
We would walk out there and test up. He would say, well, show
me what you mean, Ron, by doing X, Y and Z. We would cross
fence lines and find out that the fence line didn't work the
way it was supposed to, and he would immediately stop and go
into compensatory modes. We one time stole some materiel out.
It was gone over the fence in 34 seconds, but that command
general was capable of dropping back and saying, this is what I
don't know, and this is what I need to know about loss
prevention.
So it's not to say they're dumb at all. It's to say their
experience is not in the area of loss prevention. It's in
national defense.
Mr. Turner. Very good. As you know, we're going to be
adjourning to a closed session at 2 p.m. Do you have anything
else that you would like to add at----
Mr. Timm. No. As far as I understand it, I'm invited to the
2 o'clock session because I have a clearance.
Mr. Turner. Yes. My statement was do you have anything else
that you want to add in this public portion of the hearing.
Mr. Timm. No.
Mr. Turner. I ask for unanimous consent that the
subcommittee meet in closed session at 2 p.m. today to hear
testimony on classified aspects of issues under discussion
today. And, without objection, it is so ordered. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
Closed Session.]
[Additional information submitted for the hearing record
follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
-