<DOC>
[108th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:89353.wais]
HOMELAND DEFENSE: OLD FORCE STRUCTURES FOR NEW MISSIONS?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 29, 2003
__________
Serial No. 108-48
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
89-353 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2003
____________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DOUG OSE, California DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
RON LEWIS, Kentucky DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
CHRIS CANNON, Utah DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia Maryland
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania Columbia
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas CHRIS BELL, Texas
WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota ------
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
(Independent)
Peter Sirh, Staff Director
Melissa Wojciak, Deputy Staff Director
Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Philip M. Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
DAN BURTON, Indiana DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio TOM LANTOS, California
RON LEWIS, Kentucky BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania Maryland
WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota CHRIS BELL, Texas
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
Ex Officio
TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
R. Nicholas Palarino, Senior Policy Advisor
Robert A. Briggs, Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on April 29, 2003................................... 1
Statement of:
Decker, Raymond, Director, Defense Capabilities Managing
Team, U.S. General Accounting Office; General Dennis J.
Reimer, director, Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute
for the Prevention of Terrorism; Dr. James Jay Carafano,
senior fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments; and Michael Wermuth, senior policy analyst,
Rand Corp.................................................. 67
McHale, Paul, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense; Thomas F. Hall, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Reserve Affairs; and Lieutenant General Edward G. Anderson
III, Deputy Commander, U.S. Northern Command and Aerospace
Defense Command............................................ 5
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Anderson, Lieutenant General Edward G., III, Deputy
Commander, U.S. Northern Command and Aerospace Defense
Command, prepared statement of............................. 33
Carafano, Dr. James Jay, senior fellow, Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments, prepared statement of........... 102
Decker, Raymond, Director, Defense Capabilities Managing
Team, U.S. General Accounting Office, prepared statement of 71
Hall, Thomas F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs, prepared statement of............................. 24
McHale, Paul, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense, prepared statement of............................. 8
Reimer, General Dennis J., director, Oklahoma City National
Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism,
prepared statement of...................................... 92
Ruppersberger, Hon. C.A. Dutch, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Maryland, prepared statement of.......... 64
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............ 3
Wermuth, Michael, senior policy analyst, Rand Corp., prepared
statement of............................................... 114
HOMELAND DEFENSE: OLD FORCE STRUCTURES FOR NEW MISSIONS?
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TUESDAY, APRIL 29, 2003
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats
and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1 p.m., in
room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher
Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Shays, Turner, Murphy, Janklow and
Ruppersberger.
Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and
counsel; R. Nicholas Palarino, PhD, senior policy advisor;
Robert A. Briggs, clerk; Mackenzie Eaglen, intern; David
Rapallo, minority counsel; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant
clerk.
Mr. Shays. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations
hearing entitled, ``Homeland Defense: Old Force Structures for
New Missions,'' is called to order.
We fight abroad to be safe at home. Successful military
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate an unmatched
capacity and a newfound willingness to confront emerging
threats where they nest, before they can migrate to our shores.
But the battle lines in the global war against terrorism reach
far, from Kabul to Cleveland, from Baghdad to Bridgeport. The
threat demands a new military posture on the home front as
well.
Today we examine efforts to reform and restructure
Department of Defense [DOD], capabilities to defend the U.S.
homeland and support civil authorities in the event of
terrorist attacks.
The cold war strategic pillar of containment, deterrence,
reaction and mutually assured destruction crumbled on September
11, 2001. Since then, we have been building a new security
paradigm, a strategy that is proactive, preemptive and, when
necessary, preemptive. Significant strides have been made to
reshape and refocus military capabilities to meet an uncertain
world of lethal intentions and unconventional capabilities
overseas. But at home less has been accomplished to clarify the
structural, legal and fiscal implications of new military
operations within the sovereign borders of the States.
New strategic realities prompted the creation of the
Northern Command, or NORTHCOM, to unify all DOD homeland
defense activities under one military authority; and the
position of Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense was
created to coordinate all DOD civil support functions.
These are important steps toward aligning Pentagon
management with current missions. But below those top-level
structures, particularly in the National Guard and Reserve
units trained in security operations, there has been little
change in what many view as an accelerating, unsustainable
tempo of domestic taskings and foreign deployments. Personnel
and equipment used for homeland defense missions are not
available for war fighting tasks. Reserve and Guard call-ups
draw heavily from local first responder ranks, degrading
domestic readiness.
This apparent conflict between global security and homeland
defense responsibilities strains a total force structure
heavily reliant on seamless integration of Reserve components
and active duty units.
The threat of terrorism demands new tactics abroad and new
modes of military vigilance at home. Missions and skills that
were scattered in secondary considerations in the cold war
strategy must now be as manned and ready as global force
projection packages. To train as they fight, military units
have to practice on our streets alongside civilian first
responders. Equipment inoperability standards and communication
channels have to be established before the next attack is upon
us.
So today we ask how military force structures, doctrine and
training are being transformed to integrate homeland defense
and civil support missions into a unified, sustainable defense
posture. Our witnesses all bring impressive experience and
important insights to our discussion today. We appreciate their
time, we appreciate their devotion to our country, and we look
forward to their testimony.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]
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Mr. Shays. At this time, I would like to call on my
colleague, Mr. Murphy, to see if he has any statement to make.
I note for the record the vice chairman has come in. So let
me just call on the witnesses.
We have two excellent panels. Our first panel is the
Honorable Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense, Department of Defense, former Member of
Congress, a good friend, and I will say one of the best Members
of Congress when he served here. So I think that the Department
of Defense is blessed to have you.
Mr. McHale. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Thomas F. Hall, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Reserve Affairs, Department of Defense; and
Lieutenant General Edward Anderson III, Deputy Commander, U.S.
Northern Command and Northern Aerospace Defense Command.
Gentlemen, as is our custom, we swear our witnesses in, so
I would ask you to rise.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. I will note for the record that all three of our
witnesses and an assistant have responded in the affirmative.
I am going to do our housekeeping part here and ask
unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee be
permitted to place an opening statement in the record and that
the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose. Without
objection, so ordered.
I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be
permitted to include their written statement in the record; and
without objection, so ordered.
We will--this is what we do in this committee. We have the
clock set for 5 minutes. We roll over for another 5, so you
have technically 10 minutes. We would like you to finish
somewhere between that 5 and 10. If you get to 10, all hell
breaks loose.
Then we would--with the number of Members here, we do 10-
minute questioning. We think that gets at--better getting the
information we need. So we will just go in the order that I
introduced you.
Mr. McHale, welcome; you have the floor.
STATEMENTS OF PAUL MCHALE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
HOMELAND DEFENSE; THOMAS F. HALL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS; AND LIEUTENANT GENERAL EDWARD G.
ANDERSON III, DEPUTY COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND
AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
Mr. McHale. Thank you, sir.
Good afternoon. I truly am deeply honored to be here; and I
want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your kind words a few
moments ago.
As noted, Mr. Chairman, I previously submitted my formal
statement for the record. Rather than reading that in terms of
its verbatim text, I will simply submit it for the record.
If I may, sir, with your consent, I will provide a brief
opening comment for the record.
Mr. Shays. Sure.
Mr. McHale. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, President Bush has said that the world changed on
September 11, 2001. We learned that a threat that gathers on
the other side of the Earth can strike our own cities and kill
our own citizens. It is an important lesson, one we must never
forget.
Oceans no longer protect America from the dangers of this
world. We are protected by daily vigilance at home, and we will
be protected by resolute and decisive action against threats
abroad.
Secretary Wolfowitz echoed those comments when he said,
perhaps even more pointedly, ``as terrible as the attacks of
September the 11th were, we now know that terrorists are
plotting still more and greater catastrophes. We know they are
seeking more terrible weapons, chemical, biological and even
nuclear weapons.''
Congressman Shays, in your opening remarks you noted that
we fight abroad to be safe at home, and therefore at the outset
we should recognize that America's first line of domestic
defense really begins overseas and results from the
capabilities of our forward deployed forces. In that sense,
Secretary Rumsfeld has correctly noted that the annual homeland
defense budget of the Department is $380 billion.
After September 11, it was recognized that in order to
ensure the security of the American people it was necessary to
create a new geographic combatant command with the specific
assigned mission of defending the United States, our citizens,
our territory and our freedoms.
The mission of NORTHCOM is, ``United States Northern
Command conducts operations to deter, prevent and defeat
threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its
territories and interests within the assigned areas of
responsibility; as directed by the President or Secretary of
Defense provides military assistance to civil authorities,
including consequence management operations.''
NORTHCOM therefore has a mission statement that can be
separated into two parts. Preceding the semicolon, the mission
statement is one of war fighting. That is to physically defend
the United States of America.
The second part of the mission statement relates to civil
support; and that is, under extraordinary circumstances, when
the Department of Defense has a unique capability or civilian
officials are overwhelmed by the task at hand, to provide to
those civilian agencies, both State and Federal, with the lead
civilian agency establishing the goals and the military
providing the support to assist those civilian agencies in
addressing the mission at hand.
NORTHCOM's force structure is unique among the combatant
commands. Very few forces are permanently assigned, although
appropriate units have been identified for possible mission
employment.
NORTHCOM's Commander is Air Force General Ed Eberhardt. He
is located with his command at headquarters Peterson Air Force
Base.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense is
a position that was newly created by the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2003. I was privileged to be nominated for
that position and 3 months ago confirmed by the U.S. Senate.
During the intervening period of time, I have had the
opportunity to visit virtually every major homeland defense
command within the United States. This is an extraordinary
responsibility. I am the first to fill it. The decisions that
we make I have no doubt will affect the nature of our homeland
defense for many decades to come.
We have, as one of our most important tasks, the
responsibility to establish an effective working relationship
with the newly created Department of Homeland Security. That
relationship will involve close coordination, joint training
and exercises. The Department of Defense and the Department of
Homeland Security have complementary missions and capabilities.
We certainly welcome the new Cabinet department as a full
partner.
As we meet here today, a representative from my office, on
behalf of the Department of Defense, is embedded within the
operations center of the Department of Homeland Security. The
cooperation that we are establishing is close and lasting.
The Department of Defense provides support to civilian
agencies basically under two circumstances: when we have a
unique capability such as with regard to weapons of mass
destruction and the response that we might be compelled to
provide in the event of a terrorist attack that would employ
that kind of capability, and when civilian authorities are
overwhelmed by the magnitude of the task at hand.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me close with a brief reference
to the role of the National Guard. The National Guard is a
balanced force. Historically, the National Guard has been
dedicated primarily to overseas warfighting missions in terms
of their Title 10 responsibilities. In short, the National
Guard has been a very substantial portion of our Nation's
strategic reserve.
We anticipate that in the years ahead that mission, that
overseas warfighting mission, will be retained. But that it
will be enhanced by additional homeland defense missions. Those
missions may well be accomplished in State status, to
potentially in Title 32 status which is when the National Guard
is under the command and control of the Governor but the
expenses are paid by the Department of Defense, or in their
full Title 10 role. They provide geographic dispersion, a rapid
response capability, an ability to defend critical
infrastructure throughout our Nation, and of course they have
been deeply involved in the establishment and the mission
effectiveness of the civil support teams, 32 of which defend
our Nation today.
Abraham Lincoln said, as our cause is new, so must we think
and act anew. The President was right. The world changed on
September 11. The Department of Defense is, for that reason,
transforming its capabilities so that we will have effective
responses to any conceivable attack, first to defeat it, and
then if necessary to remediate it.
Mr. Chairman and Members, I can assure you that today, as
always, America's men and women in uniform stand ready to
defend our Nation against any threat at home or abroad.
Thank you.
Mr. Turner [presiding]. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McHale follows:]
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Mr. Turner. Mr. Hall.
Mr. Hall. Chairman and distinguished Members, before I
start my statement, I would like to enter my written one in the
record.
As a career Naval officer, it is great to be flanked by the
Marine Corps and the Army today at the table. I am delighted to
be here today to report on the progress in integrating the
Reserve components into the Department's overall homeland
defense mission area.
Defense of the homeland is a total force mission, with
important roles for both the Active and Reserve components. In
addressing this mission, the Department must balance
requirements for homeland security with traditional warfighting
requirements. To make the best use of our military
capabilities, Reserve component forces are dual mission, for
both wartime and domestic support missions.
I am pleased to report that, as of March 14, all 32 of our
weapons of mass destruction civil support teams have been
certified as fully mission capable. As you know, these teams
were established to deploy rapidly, to assist local incident
commanders in determining the nature and extent of an incident
involving weapons of mass destruction. These teams will provide
expert technical advance on WMD response operations and will
help identify and support the arrival of follow-on State
response assets. Each team consists of 22 highly skilled, full-
time members of the Army and Air National Guard.
We are making significant progress in other areas. For
example, the Army Reserve has trained and equipped 28 chemical
decontamination and recon elements to act in a civil support
role. We will continue to leverage the wartime capabilities of
our Reserve component forces for domestic missions in support
of the lead Federal agency.
Above all, we must ensure that our domestic civil support
forces, particularly those in the Guard and Reserve, are
readily accessible, properly trained and equipped to perform
this critical mission for our citizens and interoperable within
the Nation's first responder community.
Our goal is to support America's fire, police, and
emergency medical personnel as rapidly as possible with
capabilities and tools that complement and enhance their
response, not duplicate it.
Today, as I left the Pentagon, we have over 223,000
National Guard and Reserve men and women supporting our
operations--Northern Eagle, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.
They are flying air CAPs, performing force protection duties
here in the United States, flying refueling missions over
Central Asia and are on the ground in both Iraq and
Afghanistan.
In addition, the response to Secretary Ridge's request to
the Governors to support Operation Liberty Shield, over 2,700
Army and Air National Guardsmen were activated under State
control to protect critical assets of national significance in
their areas.
On little or no notice, America's National Guard and
Reserve have been ready to roll. To this day, their enthusiasm
for the global war on terrorism remains high. They are in it
for the long haul. The bottom line is they are committed and
capable warriors in this
war on terrorism, and you should be justifiably proud of them.
I know I am.
That concludes my opening statement. Thank you.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]
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Mr. Turner. Mr. Anderson, General.
General Anderson. On behalf of General Eberhart, Commander
of North American Aerospace Defense Command and Commander of
the U.S. Northern Command, we thank you for this opportunity to
represent the outstanding young men and women of NORAD and
USNORTHCOM and to tell you about our efforts to protect and
defend our homeland.
I, too, would like to thank you for the opportunity to
provide a written statement for the record.
While I will devote the majority of my remarks to the U.S.
Northern Command, before I do I would like to take a moment to
just a say a few words about NORAD.
NORAD has proved to be a resilient organization that has
adapted to counter ever-changing threats over the past 45
years. One of the factors contributing to the success has been
our relationship with the Canadian armed forces, which today
has never been stronger. For Operation Noble Eagle, together we
have flown over 29,000 sorties without incident. This includes
fighters as well as airborne early warning and tanker aircraft.
With the Air Guard and Reserves flying over 75 percent of our
fighter and tanker sorties, we simply could not complete our
mission without the men and women of the Reserve component.
NORAD remains ready to defend against any aerospace threat.
USNORTHCOM is a product of transformation. Everything about
us, from our mission, to our organization, to the way we have
members of the National Guard and Coast Guard on our staff,
reflects the way that the Department of Defense is moving
toward countering the threats of the 21st century.
Our missions are homeland defense and military assistance
to civil authorities. While these missions are not new, placing
them under a single command to ensure unity of command and
unity of effort with a unity of purpose is new.
USNORTHCOM is a U.S. unified combatant command. We have all
of the responsibilities and authorities of other combatant
commands when it comes to national defense and protecting the
interests of the United States and her allies in our area of
responsibility.
However, one thing that makes us different from other
combatant commands is that our homeland is in our area of
responsibility. For the first time since George Washington and
the Continental Army, the United States has a military command
that focuses solely on homeland defense in support to homeland
security, USNORTHCOM.
Although we are a small command with very few permanently
assigned forces, we are confident we can get the forces we need
to do our mission. We have combatant command authority over a
standing joint force headquarters with two operational joint
task forces, one to support counterdrug activities and the
other to support civil authorities for weapons of mass
destruction consequence management. However, through well-
established procedures, we can quickly draw upon the total
force to expand our assigned forces to respond to any
contingency within our assigned area of responsibility.
Since our stand-up on October 1, 2002, we have developed
operational plans, exercised our capabilities with over 50
government agencies, and provided real-world assistance to lead
Federal agencies. We have supported the President's attendance
at the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, the D.C.
sniper investigation, the State of the Union Address, and the
Shuttle Columbia recovery operations as well as Operation Noble
Eagle.
As we advance toward full operational capability we will
continue to exercise with first responders, our National Guard
and Reserve forces, and government agencies to ensure our
Nation is ready to respond to any and all threats.
We understand full operational capability is a moving
target. We know the threat and our mission will evolve over
time, and we will never be satisfied. We will always look for
ways to be better prepared to protect our homeland.
We believe a key to homeland defense is actionable
intelligence. We want to work the front end of this problem. We
are sharing intelligence and information with a variety of
organizations to include local, State and Federal law
enforcement organizations. A lot of this is open intelligence
and information that we get from the Internet and other sources
as part of our red teaming efforts. Our challenge is to fuse
this information, as the Secretary of Defense says, to connect
the dots into a threat picture upon which we can act.
Our Combined Intelligence and Fusion Center is doing just
that. They are collating and analyzing data from many different
government agencies and the intelligence community to attempt
to provide us clear situational awareness on the threat so that
we can deter, prevent and defeat attacks against our Nation.
We are grateful for all Congress has done to support us in
this effort. With your continued help, our homeland will be
safer tomorrow than it is today.
As the Secretary says, this is important business. There is
no more important mission than protecting the American people
where they live and work. I can assure you that the men and
women in USNORTHCOM are dedicated to accomplishing that very
important and critical mission. Thank you for your commitment
to a strong defense, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Anderson follows:]
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Mr. Turner. I want to thank each of our panelists and also
acknowledge that Mr. Janklow and Mr. Ruppersberger have joined
us. We will go then to a 5-minute round of questions. We will
begin with our Chairman, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to just start out by trying to visualize
USNORTHCOM. When I think of the other commands, it is easy for
me to envision, obviously, special forces. It is easy for me to
envision a heavy armament. It is easy for me to visualize the
use of our Air Force and so on.
How is USNORTHCOM different? I mean, I kind of--in my own
mind, am I to visualize military--our Army fighting alongside
policemen? I mean, that is kind of where I am trying to set the
stage for me here; and maybe, Lieutenant General, you could
start us out.
General Anderson. OK, sir.
Sir, there are two distinct differences in our command as
you look at the other combatants. One, as we mentioned earlier,
is the area of responsibility; and specifically the difference
there, of course, is the fact that our homeland is here. Now
that sounds kind of superficial, but in fact it is fairly
significant. An example of that is, when we talk about
intelligence, one of the things that we need in terms of
providing situational awareness is the ability to fuse
intelligence and law enforcement information; and then, once we
are able to fuse that, then it is the dissemination of that to
a wide spectrum of users that consist of folks from first
responders all of the way up to the President.
So that is one of the unique things that comes with having
the homeland in your area of responsibility.
But another area that is different for us in comparison
with our other combatant commanders is the fact that, as
Secretary McHale pointed out in his opening remarks, we have as
a mission military assistance to civil authorities, what we
refer to as MACA, that no other command has within its mission
statement. The implications of that extend quite a bit, but one
of the key pieces to it, as you might expect, is the fact that
then necessitates that we must work very, very closely with a
number of folks in the interagency, whether they be other
government agencies or nongovernment organizations, folks that
we, probably, in the military have never had the opportunity to
work with before, and vice versa.
Mr. Shays. Given that I only have 5 minutes this first
round, and given the number of Members here, but--let me--maybe
we are still sorting this out. I don't quite visualize how this
process works in practice. For instance, it is unlikely that
you would see a large number of people assault a community.
They would be much smaller, it strikes me.
But are we going to have our military personnel train side-
by-side with first responders and say we will work with the New
York Police Department and determine how we coordinate
activities? Will we train with them and so on? Maybe I could
come to Secretary McHale as well on that issue. But maybe you
could first respond.
General Anderson. OK. Yes.
The answer to your question is, yes, we will; and we do
that through exercises. As we go through a variety of different
scenarios that we may have, it includes local first responders
from all of the way down from the police and fire all of the
way up to include the National Guard and those kind of folks.
It is necessary. We feel as though we have to do that.
But we will be--our forces will be provided in response to
a request from a lead Federal agency. We will always, in the
context of military assistance to civil authorities, will
always be supporting a lead Federal agency.
And I will offer Secretary McHale a few moments.
Mr. McHale. Thank you, General.
Mr. Chairman, basically, USNORTHCOM's mission is divided
into two component parts. First and foremost, General Eberhart
is a warfighter. With regard to the physical defense of the
United States of America, his protection of the U.S. air space
and his defense against enemy threats within the maritime
approaches to the United States is a mission that is comparable
to any other combatant commander. He will fight in the air to
protect us. He will defend against enemy threats on the high
seas as those threats approach the coast of the United States.
As General Anderson indicated, because the NORTHCOM AOR
includes within its geographic area the Constitutional
framework of the civil government of the United States, it is
really on land that the distinction is drawn between this
combatant command and all other combatant commands. We have a
Constitution. We have a representative republic. We have
civilian institutions of government that make us the kind of
country that we want to be, as opposed to a country in which
the military would be disproportionately influential. We have a
government based on civilian supremacy, and that does come into
play in terms of the constraints on the land activity of
NORTHCOM.
In addition, we have made a policy decision as a Nation
that our border protection on land will be a civilian function,
not a military function. Now we provide military assistance to
civilian authorities as they defend our borders on land, but
the protection of those land borders is not fundamentally a
military mission.
As indicated by the General, we provide civil support to a
lead Federal agency when a request is made. I know that we have
at least one member of this committee who is a former Governor.
If there is a disaster, the Governor in a given State can ask
the President under the Stafford Act to declare a disaster or
an emergency. If that declaration is made, the Department of
Defense may then be instructed by the President and upon order
of the Secretary of Defense will deploy military forces to
support a lead Federal agency, typically the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, now under the Department of Homeland
Security.
So, basically, when it comes to NORTHCOM, we will protect
our Nation in the air and on the seas just like any other
combatant command. But subject to posse comitatus and the
process that is described in the Stafford Act, our activity in
terms of civil support is a supporting role on behalf of a lead
Federal civilian agency.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. First, Mr. Hall, the issue of the
Reservists, as far as their pay, the gap between their military
salary and civilian. In the past, it really hasn't been as much
of a problem, because there haven't been the call-ups that you
have right now. I would think down the road that is going to
create an issue of lack of recruitment if somehow it isn't
dealt with. Of course, cost is an issue, and we have to deal
with the issue of cost, and we understand that.
Do you think that the recent shift in the activation policy
with more reliance on Reservists will affect the recruiting and
morale of where we are now; and, if so, what would you
recommend that we do?
Mr. Hall. Let me address the first part of the pay and then
the second on the recruiting and retention very quickly.
We have been concerned about it, and we have taken a hard
look at the pay issue. We have done two surveys. We have gone
twice, in 2000 and 2002, asked the families: Have you suffered
a pay loss because of being mobilized? In fact, about 30
percent have. It has been a small amount. You read many of the
cases where it might be a high-earning person, but the other 70
percent, in fact, have held even, and about one-third of them
almost in some cases doubled their pay.
So it is a smaller amount. We are concerned about that. We
are doing a pay and compensation study that we are going to
complete in August. We are looking at that as one of the many
issues. But right now we have not seen that as a large problem.
On the second part, I don't think we know. After the Gulf
war, for about 2 or 3 years--at that time I was in command of
the Naval Reserve. We looked at it. We had a dip in recruiting
and retention. After about 3 to 4 years it came back. And I
think the essential issue on recruiting and retention is going
to be if we are mobilizing the same kinds of Reservists year
after year.
Just sort of in closing, if you were in the Guard and
Reserve over the past 13 years, we have had eight
mobilizations. What was your opportunity to be mobilized once?
It was about 56 percent. How about mobilized twice? It is about
4 percent. How about three times? About 1 percent.
But if you are in a specialty like civil affairs, mortuary
affairs, force protection and those, you might have been
mobilized much more than that. So I think we are going to have
problems with employers and the Guardsmen and Reservists if we
continue to mobilize the same group of people. So we have to
look at how we are going to restructure that.
Mr. Ruppersberger. I am not sure if I agree with your first
answer, just based on my district and the complaints that I
receive. Normally, State and local governments are making up
the gap a lot of times, because you have police officers
involved in the military police, or firefighters, but there are
a lot that maybe work for smaller businesses. I think it is
something--I know Congressman Lantos from California has a bill
in to address this issue. But I am--I know the issue is cost,
and you have to look at that.
Mr. Hall. We are looking at that bill and will comment on
that.
Mr. Ruppersberger. I know you have a Governor and a mayor--
and I was a county executive--on this committee right now. The
issue of cooperation between Federal, State and local--before I
ask the question, I think that, from my experience in
government and that we have had probably the best cooperation
between Federal, State and local and military not only with
respect to the war itself but also with intelligence--the
cooperation has been unprecedented. I think that is one reason
why we haven't had another September 11 incident on our shores.
But that doesn't mean that--the interdiction is one of the
most important issues. I am still concerned a little bit about
the cooperation and the ability between, let's say, NORTHCOM
and then a Governor. That is easy for a Governor. You have a
big snowstorm, you can bring--the Governor declares an
emergency, you can deal with some issues.
But you have more with homeland security than meets the
eye, I guess; and the cooperation is what is going to make a
difference. A lot of leads--there is a lot of leads that might
even be relevant because of an intelligence point of view, with
NORTHCOM can come from local government, leads can come from
the street. And where do you see the cooperation between those
State, Federal and local and then----
First, where do you see that cooperation, and then in the
event that something happens, how long will it take to
implement some action when something occurs?
Mr. McHale. That is a very complex question and an
important one.
Mr. Ruppersberger. That is why I asked it.
Mr. McHale. Let me just create a brief scenario how we
would envision forces and military and civilian responding to a
given event.
I, too, come out of local government. First job I ever had
was on the planning commission back in my hometown borough
before I ever ended up here in the Congress of the United
States. If there is a terrorist attack, my expectation is that
the very first responders will likely be volunteers out of our
hometown communities--the volunteer firemen, the EMTs, the
paramedics, perhaps part time police officers in small
communities, perhaps professionals in larger communities. But
these civilians at the local level will be the ones who provide
the immediate response. If it becomes clear that we have, let's
say, a terrorist attack involving a weapon of mass destruction,
I think it is likely at that point that the Governor will ask
for the assistance of the National Guard, probably in State
status, so you will have guardsmen flowing into that area as
well.
If it does involve a chemical, biological or even
radiological contaminant, it is likely that the civil support
teams, the one in that State would likely be deployed to do an
assessment of the nature of the contaminant.
Now I have described civilian capabilities at the local and
State level. I will envision that the State emergency
management personnel in that jurisdiction would also respond.
You are going to go through a lot of layers of civilian and
military personnel in State status before you get to the
Department of Defense.
At that point, if the civilians are overwhelmed or if in
fact the Guard in State status alone cannot handle the mission
at hand, it is likely a disaster would be declared by the
President and likely that the Secretary of Defense, in that
extraordinary circumstance, would order DOD forces to respond.
That means that we would have civilians and military,
local, State and Federal operating within the same area of
responsibility. Coordination is absolutely essential, and one
of our goals within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense is to rigorously exercise, in a
scenario-based setting, as we are doing, for instance, in
Exercise Determined Promise in Clark County, Las Vegas, Nevada,
in August, the colocation, communication and coordination of
all of those capabilities.
Right now, for contingency planning, action officers within
the Department of Defense communicate routinely, often daily,
with civilian counterparts, including those at the Department
of Homeland Security, to make sure that all of those pieces of
the response, in as realistic peacetime training as we can
have, prepare for an actual operational deployment if a
terrorist attack would occur.
Mr. Ruppersberger. The concern, though, in the event there
is an event--you answered it as far as civilians getting
involved, and they need help right away, having to go through
the Governor at all times. When a local mayor or local county
executive needs that help because they are the first
responders, that is what I am really focusing on.
My time is up, so I can't ask any more questions, but you
can answer.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
With regard to the new role, being called upon for
Reservists or really other bases scattered around the country,
I represent an area in the Pittsburgh area where we have an air
refueling wing, we have an Army Reserve base, we have an Air
Guard area. Looking at some of these groups that will be
employed in some homeland defense readiness in any place in the
country, what input are you going to be having on some things
as the BRAC decisions to close some bases, or are you looking
at some input on what is needed around the country so you can
put information on that?
Mr. Hall. I can talk on the Guard and Reserve. I went
through BRAC 1991, 1993 and 1995 as Chief of Naval Reserve. It
is absolutely critical with regard to the Guard and Reserve
that they be considered in the BRAC process.
So when this one started out of my office, I asked that
representatives be on each and every team, so that when we look
at bases, both active and Reserve, around the country we think
about the demographics of Guard members and Reservists who live
there, and if we close a facility that is an active facility
for which you might have Reserve personnel aboard, what is the
effect of that.
So what I can tell you is we are members, part and parcel
of all of teams looking at that, based on my experience.
Mr. Murphy. So even going with the NORTHCOM, you will be
looking at that and having some input on that as well, of what
you need to have in certain regions of the country as well?
Mr. Hall. Yes. And I would turn to my colleagues for that.
But within the Guard and Reserve context, yes.
Mr. Murphy. Agreed?
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
The nature of warfare has changed. I think it is very
clear, and certainly the Secretary of Defense has correctly
stated on any number of occasions, we have excess
infrastructure within the Department of Defense and that the
resources we put into the maintenance of that infrastructure
has a negative effect on our warfighting capabilities and
Defense's capabilities, including homeland defense. We now
recognize that the nature of warfare has changed. And so the
fundamental principle remains true, that is, we have to
decrease the amount of infrastructure we currently possess,
because it is more than we need.
In light of the global war on terrorism and the homeland
defense requirements that have emerged since September 11th,
2001, we have to choose wisely in terms of which portions of
that infrastructure should be privatized, which portions we
should retain. Clearly, the homeland defense mission is
seriously considered when we look at that infrastructure and
determine what to let go and what to keep.
Mr. Murphy. Let me give you a scenario, General. Let's say
there is word that a train has been commandeered by unknown
elements. We believe it is hijacked by some unfriendlies and
they are in a rural area headed toward a city at a high speed,
has several cars on that train that may have various gases
which can be poisonous if they erupt into a populated area.
Walk me through in terms of what happens from the local police
up to where you might be involved in this and noting that it
might only be about 15 minutes to half an hour to take action.
General Anderson. Well, sir, as you correctly point out,
the local responders will be the ones who will be first
informed of this; and, to be perfectly honest with you, our
first information may come to us over CNN or some such means as
that. But as soon as we see that happen and happening, the
first thing we are going to do is call the TAG in your State
and say, what is going on and what is it that--support that you
may need?
At the same time, we will be alerting our Joint Task Force
Civil Support that there is the possibility of this kind of an
event that is going to occur, which may require WMD consequence
management's assistance and the expertise that we have there,
if requested, though.
Mr. Murphy. Let's go through this request, because there
may not be a lot of time. Let's say options are derailing this
train, stopping the engine through other manners, which local
police and firemen don't have the opportunity to do. Would you
see yourself in some situation where you have to start taking
some action or be ready--helicopters in the air, I don't know
what that might be--or will it be set up that you have to
follow this chain each time, because you will have only
minutes?
Mr. Hall. There is an exception that does not require
verbal approval from the Secretary of Defense, and that is an
immediate response action by a local commander. So if there is
a local base in the area or something such as that, he or she,
they do have the authority to be able to respond. If life or
limb is at risk or the safety of DOD or there is a large
calamity that is going to occur, they can respond immediately
under the conditions that are laid out to provide some level of
support now. Whether or not it would be a helicopter to shoot
at a train or something like that more than likely would not
fall into that category.
Mr. Murphy. I think that is essential, that, as you know,
that part of dealing with hijackers is making sure they may not
meet their target and their involvement in secrecy, not letting
people know. It is important to know that you have enough
options in your tool belt that can you take action to be
preemptive when needed to or be prepared to defend at that
particular moment.
Mr. McHale. Congressman, what you are describing is a
domestic counterterrorism responsibility, where the local
police are unable to defeat the threat as it is emerging.
This goes back to the comments that I made to Congressman
Shays a little bit earlier. Because NORTHCOM's land
responsibility is colocated with the civilian government of the
United States of America, the policy decision under the
Constitution has been made that the responsibility to defeat
that threat will rest primarily on the shoulders of a lead
Federal law enforcement agency.
If the local police cannot deal with that train, it will
become clear pretty quickly; and at that point the FBI, not the
Department of Defense, will take on the domestic
counterterrorism role of physically interdicting and defeating
that threat. Consistent with our Constitutional form of
government and the Posse Comitatus Act, we can provide
assistance to the FBI.
But, as you speak today, looking for an assurance that an
enemy threat will be defeated under that circumstance, the lead
in that effort will be taken by the FBI. And I can tell you,
just from personal awareness, the FBI's exceptional
capabilities--the FBI does train to that mission and does have
a rapid response capability that we would support, but they
would lead.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Mr. McHale, looking at your written statement,
on page 10 you talk about six operational goals that U.S.
forces must have in addressing the issue of terrorism; and one
of them interests me. It states, ``Deny enemies sanctuary by
developing capabilities for persistent surveillance, tracking
and rapid engagement.''
Previous to September 11, if we had looked at our military
forces and looked at surveillance, rapid engagement, we might
have looked at things that were traditionally military targets
and--for example, is there a submarine off the coast of the
United States. Now that our potential threats have shifted and
the form in which they may come, in reading a statement like
that you have the issue of balance both of our Constitutional
rights and also making certain that we are not doing the wrong
things, such as searching 85-year-old grandmothers traveling
with their grandchildren about ready to get on a plane.
Can you elaborate some on--I mean, obviously, there has
been some analysis as to what the need is for their
capabilities--what type of surveillance tracking and engagement
is being undertaken in context to what the potential threat is.
Can you give us some background on that?
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir. Surveillance really falls into two
categories, from both a military and a Constitutional
perspective. The defining line is whether that surveillance is
external to the United States or is internal to the United
States.
I don't have a copy of my formal statement in front of me,
but just very briefly let me tell you that the Department of
Defense would take the lead role in terms of continuing
surveillance when that surveillance is external to the United
States and designed to identify, deter, and defeat an act of
foreign aggression or a national security threat. So we are
developing, as rapidly as we can, the capability to establish
platforms for surveillance that, with significant loitering
time, will enable us to literally see threats that are
approaching the United States either on the sea or within the
air.
With regard to surveillance as it may take place lawfully
within the United States, that type of surveillance is subject
to both Constitutional and statutory constraints. The
Department of Defense is subject to the Posse Comitatus Act. So
in terms of surveillance the Department of Defense role, if
any, would be to--lawfully to support a lead Federal law
enforcement agency. Where, for instance, we might make
available to a lead Federal law enforcement agency for the
proper and lawful use of that equipment, DOD property that
would give to, for instance, the FBI, an air platform that
would allow the FBI or perhaps the border patrol to maintain
aerial surveillance for civilian law enforcement purposes of a
particular piece of terrain.
But the Department of Defense would not be engaged in
surveillance of that type in a direct way. We do not have that
authority. We are prohibited from domestic law enforcement by
the Posse Comitatus Act. So once you come ashore, our only
relationship to surveillance is to provide assistance to a lead
Federal law enforcement agency in its lawful activities.
Mr. Turner. General, in your comments on page 6, talking
about intelligence with USNORTHCOM's challenges, you state
that, ``Another shared challenge is to overcome cultural and
procedural differences among the DOD and other Departments for
information that is collected, categorized, classified,
analyzed and disseminated.'' Could you elaborate--because you
don't in your comments--as to what some of these cultural and
procedural differences are?
General Anderson. Well, sir, as I mentioned in my opening
remarks also, the fact is that we are now faced with a
situation where we have to fuse law enforcement information
with intelligence. In the past when we have been associated
with EUCOM or SOCOM or something such as that, we were not
faced with the law enforcement information issue, if you will;
and so, to protect the privacy of citizens and all of that kind
of thing, we have got to make sure that all of our processes
are in place to accommodate that.
What we have done to do that is we do, for example, have a
representative from the FBI on our staff who assists us in
working with the FBI and with the Joint Terrorism Task Force
that they have established there at the FBI. And then we have
an intelligence oversight committee that is embedded within our
intelligence center who is constantly reviewing the information
that we are receiving to make sure that we are not exceeding
any of the laws or regulations that we must abide by.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Janklow.
Mr. Janklow. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
If I could, I would like to preface my question with a
comment. Let's get back on this train that is headed toward the
town. The reality of the situation is, but for someone who just
assumes command on their own, the train is going to go into
town and be blown up. Because people are going to be debating,
is this the sheriff's issue, or is it the police chief's issue?
Is it the highway patrol issue, or is it the State DCI issue?
Is it an FBI question, or is it an ATF question? Do we call the
homeland security? Do we call FEMA? Do we call the White House?
Who in the world do we call?
Meanwhile, the train is rolling down the tracks; and it is,
frankly, not going to be stopped by anybody unless someone--and
I think the reality is there is no base commander in America
that on their own is going to decide this is a military
situation and I am going to rush out there with all of the
people in uniform to deal with it.
Fortunately, we have never had to deal with terrorism in
this country before, and we don't know how to do it, and we are
learning. We can learn from people like the Israelis who have
been subjected to it for a great deal of time. There are other
countries where it has taken place, to lesser extents, on a
continuous basis. But we don't know how to deal with it yet.
The military works because there is one commander in chief.
There was a chain of command all of the way down to me when I
was a private in the Marine Corps. I knew all of the way up and
down the ladder how it worked.
So does everybody in the military. There are 18,000 law
enforcement units in America. It doesn't work. You don't even
have the ability to communicate with them. Some of you are on
high band, some are on low band; some are on UHF. Correct? Some
are on VHF. Some are on 150, some are on 450, some are on 700,
some are on 800, some are on 900, and unless you want to talk
Simplex in most places, you don't even have the ability to talk
to each other because you don't have trunk systems. This is
unbelievable. We don't have homeland security; we have
conversation going on in America. And look, I love you people.
I mean it. You are doing a heck of a job. But what is it that
we can do to facilitate really getting something done to
protect--am I wrong with my scenario? As this train goes down
the track who is in charge? We can't just say civilian
authorities. Who is it? Is it the police chief? Is it the
sheriff? Is it the fire chief? Is it the mayor? Is it the
chairman of the county commissioners? Is it the Governor? Who
is it? Who is it? And we don't know. Do any of you know?
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir, I think we do.
Mr. Janklow. OK. Good. Now, the train's moving, so we've
got to have an answer.
Mr. McHale. Call the FBI.
Mr. Janklow. Pardon?
Mr. McHale. Call the FBI.
Mr. Janklow. And it's 7 o'clock at night in North Dakota
and you get a recording and then someone answers in
Minneapolis. Now what do you do? And they are going to activate
a team from where?
Mr. McHale. And that goes to the heart of your question, we
know who is responsible. The question is, are they
operationally capable to respond; and I'm not prepared to
answer on behalf of the FBI. But I can tell you----
Mr. Janklow. But the train is moving, sir. What do they do
right now, today?
Mr. McHale. Today the response would be provided by the
lead Federal law enforcement agency. That's the FBI. The
Department of Defense would be standing by to provide whatever
support that lead Federal law enforcement agency required to
accomplish its mission. What you describe is a very difficult
circumstance involving a remote area, a rural area that may tax
significantly the operational capabilities of the lead Federal
law enforcement agency. But we have made a decision within our
Nation that law enforcement, including domestic
counterterrorism, is a civilian responsibility.
Mr. Janklow. In light of the existing world today?
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Mr. Janklow. Is that a good decision?
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir, it is.
Mr. Janklow. Do we need to sort out the jurisdiction
better?
Mr. McHale. I think we need to make sure the operational
capabilities match in a proper way the assignment of
responsibilities. We are the kind of nation we are because
civilian law enforcement is carried out by a law enforcement
agency. Our military works extremely well, but we train
primarily to deter and defeat enemy attacks overseas or those
that are approaching the United States.
Just as a quick aside, when I left the Congress for 2 years
I taught the Federalist Papers, and one of the concerns of our
founders, and contrary to my expectation, there was always a
concern about a large standing army.
Mr. Janklow. Agree.
Mr. McHale. I was worried that might be a fear that
military values would be imposed at the point of a bayonet.
That in fact was not the principal concern. The principal
concern was that along the frontier, if the military took the
lead, it would become indispensable to the physical security of
society and that by the embrace of the civilian population the
military as the savior of the civilian population would become
too powerful and that military values would be imposed upon our
Constitutional system of government.
That remains a legitimate concern if we back away from the
founding principle, which is civilian supremacy and civilian
law enforcement.
Mr. Turner. Mr. McHale, we're going to go for a second
round of questions for 5 minutes. We will begin that with our
chairman, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
There is so much we could focus in on. I don't know if I
want to spend time having this be a hearing on the
overutilization of your service, but I want to state what I'm
sensing, that I really never really focused on, but it's
logical to me. I mean, we've basically had law since 1878 that
said the military are prohibited from direct involvement in law
enforcement activities, arrests, searches and seizures, and so
on. We have put exceptions in that in the cases of say drug
interdiction and so on. We are all pretty much united that's
the way we want to continue.
What I'm first trying to get a handle on is, is this
command of USNORTHCOM. Should I view it the same as I would
view any other command in terms of how we train our troops? Not
yet on its mission, but how we train our troops. If you are
stationed at USNORTHCOM, do you still fly a plane the same way?
Do you still--are you still onboard a ship doing the same
things? But then, is it different when it's land based, for
Army in particular, I gather? And then, is the training
different? And then, if someone leaves USNORTHCOM, have they
basically been put down a path that makes them not all that
useful if we need to bring them into Iraq?
So, General, maybe you could start me out.
General Anderson. OK, sir. A couple of things I guess is to
look at it from an operational and a tactical level, if I may.
And if I can start down at the tactical level, boots on ground
kind of a point there. Some of the missions that we have within
USNORTHCOM, and to be more specific the civil disturbance
mission is an example, where we have forces which are earmarked
to perform a civil disturbance mission. Those folks--but that's
not their only mission. They have that mission as well as other
missions. They are on alert to be deployed within a specified
time to any location at the direction of the President. And
they do undergo some specific training associated with that
mission. The same thing with our Quick Reaction Forces and our
Rapid Reaction Forces. But they are basically extensions of
their military skills for the most part. So it's very what we
refer to as situationally dependent, depending upon where it is
they are going. For example, if they have to go to protect some
critical infrastructure, then they have to have the knowledge
of the location and the situation and that kind of thing, but
they are employing basic military skills under a command and
control architecture.
Now, from an operational point of view, at our
headquarters, for example, what we use is we use the same
military planning principles that are used in EUCOM and CENTCOM
and every other command headquarters, because it's proven to be
successful and it has application to the homeland defense
mission area as well.
So if an officer leaves Northern Command and moves to EUCOM
or moves to the Joint Staff in the Pentagon or whatever, there
is no retraining that is going to be necessary for that
individual.
I hope that answers your question, sir.
Mr. Shays. But the enemy is both what we would view
conventional as well as nonconventional. What makes it a little
bit more unique here is the mission that then also, given the
standing practice since 1878, you do have to call the FBI
first. And I would think the answer to your question is, right
now it's not going to be satisfactory; and if you are in a
rural area and you call them, you are not going to get the kind
of response and so on.
Mr. McHale. Mr. Chairman, I would hesitate to say that
because I really don't know how robust the FBI's capabilities
are, and I would not want to assume nor communicate to our
enemies that the FBI might be limited in terms of its reach and
response time because it may well be that the FBI is fully
prepared to respond throughout the United States in a timely
and effective manner.
Mr. Shays. It just sounded, though, if I could, that when
the Governor was asking this question he speaks with some
authority that you might get a recording. And so----
Mr. McHale. Obviously, I'm not in a position to respond to
that. But I do want to be cautious that we not say anything
today that would imply a deficiency in terms of the FBI's
ability to respond.
Mr. Shays. Is this your part of the equation--is this what
you have to verify? Is this what you have to--in your capacity?
So while you don't want to convey that, you can't tell me
candidly with all certainty that we have it all together yet?
Mr. McHale. I can't with regard to crisis management. It's
separated in two parts. The scenario you described is what's
called crisis management, before the device or the explosion
takes place, how fast can we get there to stop it. If it's
domestic counterterrorism, that's the FBI. And I really don't
know enough about the FBI's capabilities nor would it be
appropriate for me to comment on those capabilities. But if,
God forbid, the enemy attack were tactically successful--we
would ultimately defeat that terrorist threat. But if in a
given instance the attack were to be successful, we within the
Department of Defense and NORTHCOM in particular through its
Joint Task Force for Civil Support have substantial robust
capabilities to respond to multiple simultaneous WMD attacks
throughout the entire Nation. And so if it does explode and if
the contaminant is released, we do have the capability within
the military, we train to it, we concentrate the right kinds of
specialties in those units, and we are prepared to respond
nationwide in consequence management, as opposed to crisis
management, which is a civilian law enforcement function.
Mr. Shays. I just would conclude by saying to you that--and
put on the record, this committee is somewhat unique as well as
your command, because while we don't appropriate and we don't
authorize legislative language, we do look at programs and
operations and so on of the Department of Defense, the State
Department, and the Department of Homeland Security. And we are
really the only committee I think of in Congress that has that
jurisdiction, which is a very important jurisdiction because it
is a unified, that we all need to get all of those parts
working together.
So we look forward to working with you, and maybe some of
this will be done off the record or behind closed doors. But I
do think the crisis management is one that we obviously are
concerned with, too.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. You know, this is an evolving progress
and, again, the purpose of the committee to raise the issues.
And hopefully we can recommend or have influence on where we
are going to be. And I want to get back on that train to an
extent, because basically you answered the question about who
is in charge, and you call the FBI. But what really happens in
this crisis situation is that you always need to be prepared.
Well, if you are going to be prepared, you need resources, you
need training, and you need money really to be able to do the
things that we need to do in the event that there is a crisis
like is explained and using the train as an example. So, but
from a local level when this occurs, it can occur at 3 a.m.,
urban, rural, suburban, whatever. The process I think and the
teamwork for all levels--because we are all here as one
country, and we want to make it happen as quickly as we can,
and we don't want to go through the bureaucracy of having the
mayor having to call the Governor and the Governor gets
whatever. And that's where I think the training resources need
to be there, and it really begs the issue. We give resources to
our military to go to war; we need the resources here.
Now, the one area that I'm a little concerned about is the
area of the Coast Guard. And the Coast Guard, who has a lot of
responsibilities, drug interdiction, the inspections and our
waterways, but now they have a larger role in homeland
security. And I'm wondering, what do you feel that the Coast
Guard might need--if you can answer that question--and where do
you see their role, increasing or decreasing in some areas, in
order to be able to fulfill their mission of homeland security?
Who wants to get that one?
Mr. Hall. I can chat a little bit about the Coast Guard
Reserve. I have talked to the Commandant of the Coast Guard,
and as you know, the Coast Guard Reserve was about 12,000, it
was reduced to around 8,000. And with the increased demands
they have on port security units, cargo, boarding ships, it has
been his position that they need to grow. And I think the
current figure is 10,000, and he's been looking at about 1,000
a year or so. It was a view that they needed more end strength,
which they are programming, because they have an increased role
in trying to board and look at the cargo containers, port
security, integrate properly with the Navy and the harbor
defense.
So from my lane, the Coast Guard Reserve portion, that's
what they are growing to, and I think it's currently up from 8
to 10 and possibly growing more.
Mr. Ruppersberger. OK. You're talking manpower now. But how
about their role as far as--and working with I assume in the
event that there is some issues, that they would be dealing a
lot more closely with you?
Mr. McHale. Congressman, I think I can address that. The
first thing we should recognize is that in the absence of a
wartime footing the Coast Guard is an agency that falls under
the Department of Homeland Security, not the Department of
Defense. The traditional relationship----
Mr. Ruppersberger. That might be better off now; they might
get more resources that way.
Mr. McHale. Well, obviously they were never under the
Department of Defense. They went from one civilian agency to
another. However, your basic point is absolutely valid, and
that is in an age of terrorism during an ongoing global war
against terrorism it is vitally important that the Coast Guard
and the Department of Defense be fully integrated to provide an
in-depth, integrated maritime defense for the United States of
America. The Coast Guard is under the Department of Homeland
Security and has police power out to 12 nautical miles. Beyond
12 nautical miles, out to about 24 nautical miles, they have
lesser thwart but still authority that allows them to establish
a maritime homeland security defense in depth. I am convinced,
however, that there is a very significant role for the Navy
Reserve and the Navy to play in defeating the approaching enemy
threat, including an asymmetric terrorist inspired weapon of
mass destruction, well beyond the blue water in which the Coast
Guard traditionally defends the United States. And so the key
is to make sure that the Coast Guard defenses that go out
approximately 12 nautical miles are integrated into a Navy
defense that goes out much further.
Mr. Ruppersberger. There is one other issue, and that's the
issue of intelligence, too.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ruppersberger. I think one of the biggest
responsibilities for the Coast Guard is the ports and the cargo
that's coming in. Now, there's technology out there where you
can inspect, and yet you don't want to slow down the ships or
the ships won't come in with the cargo.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ruppersberger. So there's a lot of issues there. But
it's that sharing of the intelligence at the port where the
cargo starts to come into our country and then the technology
that's needed once it comes into the port.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ruppersberger. How do you see that and sharing of
intelligence?
Mr. McHale. That is vitally important. It is our first line
of defense. And I've had the opportunity to attend General
Eberhart's intelligence briefings out of Colorado Springs, and
I've expressed to the General and to others my belief that
General Eberhart's area of interest in terms of intel is
worldwide. He needs to look out well beyond his own AOR to pick
up information and analysis of raw intel so that he can
anticipate the enemy threat long before it approaches his AOR.
And that intel requirement, as you correctly point out, extends
back into his AOR, not only to the port and the Coast Guard,
but beyond that in terms of the sharing of information with
civilian law enforcement authorities.
Looking at the pipeline from the opposite end, if a weapon
of mass destruction is to be brought by the enemy into the
United States, I think a terrorist organization is likely to
bring to the United States in advance of the weapon itself a
receiving party, a cell, to--to use Marine Corps terminology,
to prep the DLZ. They are not going to bring in a weapon of
mass destruction cold; they are going to have a team of
terrorists in the United States ready to receive that weapon
and operationally deploy it. Therefore, it's entirely possible
that our first indication of a threat from overseas will be
gathered by a civil law enforcement agency in the United States
which becomes aware of that embedded terrorist cell.
And so from an overseas collection analysis to a sharing of
information lawfully with civilian law enforcement agencies, we
have to have a transparency that allows everyone who has an
interest in homeland defense to have legitimate access to the
information they need. And the President's proposed Terrorist
Threat Integration Center [TTIC], as proposed in his State of
the Union Address, will ultimately achieve that purpose.
General Anderson. Sir, I prefer that we don't leave here
with you having the idea that the Navy and the Coast Guard are
not cooperating, because that is not true. The Coast Guard, as
you know, has the lead for port security and if they need
assistance then they come to the Department of Defense and ask
for assistance, as they did for support of Operation Iraq
Freedom. And although I cannot in this venue give you the
operational technicalities of what it was that the Navy
provided them, the Navy provided them support in order to be
able to assist them to do their mission.
At the same time there is currently a Maritime Homeland
Defense Working Group that has been meeting for several months
which is addressing courses of action to be able to develop a
command and control scheme, if you will, to be able to address
that seam that was talked to between the Coast Guard and the
Navy.
Four courses of action have been developed. They are being
war gamed and will be recommended. And then there is also right
at this moment a jointly manned Navy-Coast Guard Maritime
Surveillance Center down in the Norfolk area which is looking
at those things that are coming in and out of here.
Mr. Ruppersberger. I think that cooperation is good. I
didn't mean to say that at all. It is very good. It's just that
the resources aren't there to do as much as we need in the
homeland.
General Anderson. They would like to do more, no question
about it.
Mr. Turner. We will return to our train engineer, Mr.
Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. I'm going to switch to a different mode here.
First, let me ask again about Reservists. As people are
being deployed overseas, tell me how you work now into the mix
of decisions about who remains home, about what kind of
decisions are made. I know when I talk to our local Reservists
and Guard they geared up for Iraq or Kuwait, but not
necessarily for what jobs were needed to do at home. I'm
assuming this is an evolving process, and I wonder if you could
just elaborate on that for a moment, on what evolution is
taking place on their homeland duties for those decisions made
of who goes, who stays.
Mr. Hall. Well, I can talk a bit about the demobilization.
I participated in the mobilization of all of our Reservists for
Iraq, and it was based upon requirements. And when the
combatant commander came in with the requirements for the
forces, those flowed through, and the decision of whether it
would be active or reserve was made and then within the reserve
capabilities that existed which particular type of units. So
the decisions were based upon the capabilities. We also looked
at things like the BIDS group which had particular capabilities
and, should all of those be deployed, what would that leave for
the United States.
So there was a conscious decision throughout to take a look
at both the active and the reserve and the requirements, and,
when you made that decision, what residual amount of capability
did you have left. And, of course, we only touched about 20
percent of our entire guard and reserve in this mobilization.
So there was resident still 80 percent in the United States.
And so we looked at not from each State we took them out of,
but the capability. And that's how we went about in a very
methodical way of that process and each time asked what
capability did that leave us, what have we deployed, and, in
the overall posture, what does that mean.
Mr. Murphy. OK. Good. Now let me turn back to an issue, and
it has particular concern to me because on September 11 the
county executive for Allegheny County in the Pittsburgh region
received a call from the flight tower at Pittsburgh
International Airport, and the conversation went something like
this: We are going to abandon the tower at Pittsburgh Airport.
We have--are radar tracking a plane that's flying erratically.
We don't know what it was. It turned out to be United Flight
93. It is headed this way. You have to make some decisions on
what you need to do to evacuate this county and city
facilities. We will call back if something new develops. That
was the call.
Now, we all know we have come a long way since then. But it
hits us particularly--because I know this plane flew over my
district. And when I hear the conversations that took place
between the emergency responders and others on this, that the
people on board that plane were making conscious decisions not
to do anything yet while it was still over the populated area
in southwestern Pennsylvania. And so the policemen, the
firemen, the EMS, the hospitals in my district oftentimes ask
me, what would we do if something happened again. And I wonder
if you can give me some information whatever can be shared now,
but certainly along the lines of, if not then, perhaps another
time, of helping the local emergency responders to understand
about the communications network and the action network, but
particularly communications. I'm sure you've replayed this
scenario at other times: What would we do if it happened again?
And I wonder if you can give some reassurance to those
emergency responders of the kind of changes that you've made
and what they can anticipate in terms of other training and
facilities in the future.
General Anderson. Sir, if I could, I would like to address
that from a NORAD perspective, because I think that's probably
appropriate. As you might imagine, back on September 11 it was
a different story, but since then certainly it has changed
considerably. And one of the things that has changed has been
our linkage with the FAA. The FAA would immediately be aware of
what that situation is, I would expect, in the tower because of
the communication between those folks and probably even the
President of FAA. They immediately go to Cheyenne Mountain
where we have our command and control apparatus there for air
warning and so on and so forth. And then it goes from there
into the national authorities. And if there is a CAP, a Combat
Air Patrol, that's in the vicinity, we may very well hit--point
him in that direction to wherever that plane is. If there is
not a CAP and it appears as though this aircraft is a hostile
activity or a takeover of some sort, then we will scramble an
aircraft. Whether or not it will be able to get there in time
is a time-distance problem obviously. But to hopefully give
some folks some comfort we exercise this constantly. As a
matter of fact, as recently as last Thursday I was involved
where we actually had aircraft up, simulating hijacked
aircraft, where we actually scrambled fighters, where we were
actually talking to the people on the ground, to the people in
the State Department, so on and so forth. And it was a multiple
scenario issue--in other words, multiple events going on at the
same time--one of which was a hijack. We do this frequently to
make sure that all of the communications, all of the
procedures, and all of that are in place to be able to address
the problem and not let us have a repeat of September 11.
Mr. Murphy. I would hope that those things in the future
could also include--and again I'd like to talk to you about
some things so the local emergency responders are aware, at
what levels they can be made aware. I understand there's other
security issues that are involved here, too. But these are the
folks who come to me frequently who really have a lot of
questions, and I hope you will be able to meet with them
sometime. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Mr. McHale, I want to return back to your six
operational goals for the Department of Defense that you have
identified with the U.S. forces and to this Congress: Deny
enemy sanctuary by developing capabilities for persistent
surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement.
You did an excellent job of describing the differentiation
between external and internal to the United States, and the
limitations and the Constitutional limitations of the
Department of Defense taking any actions internal to the United
States and also making a distinction between foreign aggression
and issues of national security.
And I want to get back to that distinction, because that's
the one that I find really interesting. As we discussed the
issue that, previous to September 11, what we would have looked
at for surveillance and tracking would have been traditionally
military type targets. Now, when you talk about the broader
issue of national security, I would like some additional
discussion as to what you mean by denying enemy sanctuary by
developing capabilities for persistence surveillance, tracking,
and rapid engagement. And focus, if you will, because it seems
to be an area that you are more comfortable with, on the issue
of external to United States because that will have less
Constitutional restrictions.
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir. I'm limited somewhat in terms of the
detail that I can provide in open setting. But with the
extraordinary global tracking capabilities that we now have, it
is possible for the United States to, first, identify a
potential threat, let's say in terms of an aircraft or a ship,
and then maintain real-time continuous surveillance of that
enemy platform over an extended period of time. And so when I
talk about tying enemy sanctuary by developing capabilities for
persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement, I
think it's entirely within the reach of evolving technology
that we could identify a ship associated with a terrorist
organization and maintain worldwide surveillance of that ship
in order to guarantee that it would not pose an immediate
threat to the United States of America.
Additionally, if we were to identify let's say a ship that
might be a threat to the United States, and if through evolving
technology we were to maintain situational awareness of where
it was located all the time, and should it pass into an area
that posed a serious threat to the United States, again,
utilizing foreseeable technology, it might be possible to
deploy and operationally use remote sensing capabilities that
would enable us to determine with a high degree of probability
whether or not that ship had aboard a weapon of mass
destruction. I think there is great potential for the further
development of remote sensing capabilities related to weapons
of mass destruction so that we could in the first instance be
aware of a threat and in the second instance confirm whether or
not that threat involved the likely use of weapons of mass
destruction. I frankly would hope that in the not too distant
future we would be able to deploy sensor rays that would allow
us to detect from varying distances of standoff whether or not
a particular ship approached our coastline with a weapon of
mass destruction.
And so we have to maintain the ability to defeat hostile
nation states and traditional maritime threats, but I think one
of the primary traffics now assigned to NORTHCOM and to my
office in conjunction with many others is to develop the
technology and operationally employ the technology that will
allow us to defeat not only hostile nation states but terrorist
organizations and asymmetric WMD threats.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Janklow.
Mr. Janklow. Thank you very much.
If I could, let's talk about communication for a minute,
the technology itself. The reality of the situation is, is that
given the way spectrums have been allocated in this country,
the existing authorities of the FCC, and some statutes, we have
an incredible hodgepodge. The military used to have that
problem. If I'm remembering the Grenada invasion, there was
actually a captain or major who received an award because he
tried to call in an air strike and couldn't, so he used his
AT&T credit card from a pay telephone, called the 82nd
Airborne, who patched him through to the Pentagon, and put him
through to an AWACS, and he called in a strike.
In Iraq the first time or Kuwait, and this time, all your
military--all our military can talk to each other real-time all
the time. Our civilians don't have this capability. In the
States, the feds are on different frequencies and can't even
always talk to each other, be they the Interior Department
authorities, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the FBI, the Forest
Service, the State authorities can't talk to each other, and
very few of them can communicate real-time all the time with
the feds. What will it take for--is it--what should we do to
fix it? Because, you know, when you talk about after the fact
and crisis management I don't question after the fact we have
phenomenal ability in this country, and you are all going to do
a great job. I mean, because we can bring a lot of resources
together very quickly to fix things. It's the crisis management
I'm worried about. And we can't stop everything. But to the
extent that we can, we have to, or at least have to try to do
it. And communication is a key to this, and it's a big key in
crisis management. I mean, I've been involved in it with a
community that was totally destroyed, and we had to actually go
out and buy a radio system and fly it in and just hand them out
to people so we could all get on the same frequency between the
feds, the States, the locals, and the others so we could
communicate with each other.
The same is true when a forest is on fire. All the Federal
firefighters that fly in can't talk to the State firefighters
because they are on different frequencies.
How do we fix--what is it--I think only Congress can fix
this. What should we do to fix it? Or will it fix itself, or
can you guys fix it without us? And I'm looking at you,
Secretary McHale, but I will ask you all, from you, General, to
all three of you. How do we fix the problem? There can't be a
bigger--I mean, when we were looking for a sniper in America,
or snipers, we didn't know if these were foreign terrorists or
locals. And look at the problems there were with all of those
law enforcement agencies and all the different jurisdictions
and States over who was boss. And the fact that they get
together to collocate, coordinate, and communicate is not
really the way to run a crisis.
Mr. McHale. Sir, I think when you were in the Marine Corps,
and I know when I was in the Marine Corps----
Mr. Janklow. It was so long ago.
Mr. McHale. Within the dim recesses of our memory.
Mr. Shays. A little bonding going on here?
Mr. McHale. A little bit. Semper fi.
You train as you are going to fight, and I believe that we
have to make the training for homeland defense missions as
close to operational reality, as intense, as demanding, as
difficult as we can make it in a training environment. That's--
--
Mr. Janklow. And you're great at that. I mean, when Payne
Stewart's airplane took off from Florida it crashed in my
State. We knew real-time all the time from the FAA, from the
Defense Department, from the Air Traffic Control, all of them
were in sync on it literally as it followed it through the sky.
The Kentucky National Guard, the Iowa National Guard, the North
Dakota National Guard, the Air Force were all with that
airplane all the time trying to determine where it was going to
come down. And, that's great. But what I'm talking about is the
communication side. How do we fix the ability to grab a radio
and talk to each other?
General Anderson. Sir, if I could. I mean, if you look at
the military and where we are today, and you alluded to what it
was in Grenada and now what it is today, and we look to see how
was it that we were able to achieve that, it was through
standards. It was interoperability standards. We didn't go out
and buy everybody the same radio. We took the radios that
existed and made sure that they were compatible and as
technologically available to be done. And I think you will find
in the panel that's after this one General Reimer will talk to
you about that.
Mr. Janklow. General, should we mandate that by law?
General Anderson. Sir, that's an option.
Mr. Janklow. Will that fix the problem?
General Anderson. It may, but it will take time. We're
going to have to be patient. And it will take money.
Mr. McHale. And I would encourage you--4 or 5 years ago I
would have been as deeply concerned as you are. I just met
recently with the Virginia CST, their Civil Support Team, Title
32 status National Guard, and I peppered them with the same
questions that you're presenting to us. Technology now does
empower interoperability of communications. And I said to the
CST, look, when you roll in on a site, and the police and the
firefighters and EMTs and the paramedics and the HAZMAT folks
are already there, are you going to be able to talk to them?
And as best they could explain it to a government major, they
took me into their comm center, and they showed me how they
would be able to communicate with all of those diverse entities
that 5 years ago I would have been very doubtful that they
would be able to do that.
Mr. Janklow. And if they didn't have a comm center, they
couldn't do it?
Mr. McHale. Yes, sir. That's correct.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. For closing comments, we will turn
to our ranking member, Mr. Ruppersberger, and Chairman Shays.
We'll start with Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Just I would like to introduce for the
record a written statement. I'm not going to read it.
Mr. Turner. We'll make certain that it's part of the
record.
[The prepared statement of Hon. C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger
follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9353.035
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9353.036
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9353.037
Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I don't want to get into in any great
depth; I just want to have a sense of it. A chemical or
biological attack--excuse me, a chemical or a nuclear attack,
do the personnel that know how to neutralize these weapons of
mass destruction, do they come out of--General, out of your
operation? Is this a USNORTHCOM operation, or is this something
totally separate that you kind of hire?
General Anderson. Sir, Render Safe is a very, very
classified subject that I would rather talk to you off line on,
if I may, please.
Mr. Shays. Fair enough.
Mr. McHale. Mr. Chairman, I would simply note very quickly
for the record that there are exceptions to the Posse Comitatus
Act with regard to weapons of mass destruction.
Mr. Shays. Fair enough. OK. Thanks.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We want to thank the panelists, and ask if there are any of
them that have any additional statements or any additional
response to a question that you would like to add to the record
at this time. If not, we thank you very much. And we will turn
to our second panel, which includes General Reimer, the
director, Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the
Prevention of Terrorism; Mr. Raymond Decker, Director, Defense
Capabilities Management Team, U.S. General Accounting Office;
and Dr. James Jay Carafano, senior fellow, Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments; Mr. Michael Wermuth, senior policy
analyst, RAND Corp. If you would all come forward.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Turner. Let the record reflect that you all responded
in the affirmative.
We are going to begin by asking each of you to make a 5-
minute statement. And we will begin with Mr. Decker.
STATEMENTS OF RAYMOND DECKER, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES
MANAGING TEAM, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; GENERAL DENNIS
J. REIMER, DIRECTOR, OKLAHOMA CITY NATIONAL MEMORIAL INSTITUTE
FOR THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM; DR. JAMES JAY CARAFANO, SENIOR
FELLOW, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS; AND
MICHAEL WERMUTH, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST, RAND CORP.
Mr. Decker. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I
appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today the
demands being placed on the Department of Defense in a post-
September 11, 2001 environment.
The Department's primary mission is to deter or prevent
aggression abroad and fight to win if these measures fail. This
has been accomplished through military presence and power
projection overseas, and, as we have witnessed recently in Iraq
and Afghanistan, our military forces have conducted major
sustained and successful combat operation. However, since the
events of September 11, 2001, our Federal Government's view of
the defense of the U.S. territory has dramatically changed.
This special emphasis has required the Department of Defense to
adjust its strategic and operational focus to encompass not
only the traditional military concerns posed by hostile states
overseas, but also the asymmetric threats directed at our
homeland by terrorist groups.
Last year at the request of this subcommittee we initiated
a review of the domestic military missions performed by the
Department and their impact on the Department's ability to meet
all of its mission requirements.
We will issue our report to you later this spring. However,
my testimony today is based on our preliminary observations
from this review. I will briefly comment on three key areas:
The primary differences between military and nonmilitary, or
civil, support missions conducted by the Department; whether
current defense organizational structure, plans, and forces are
adequate to support DOD's domestic missions; and the impact of
domestic missions on military personnel tempo.
First, I will cover the military and nonmilitary missions.
In general terms--and I think this was elaborated by
Congressman McHale and General Anderson--the military missions
are those primary warfighting functions DOD performs in defense
of the Nation and at the direction of the Commander in Chief,
the President. Recent combat operations in Iraq are a good
example of the military's primary purpose. Conversely, in
nonmilitary missions or support missions to civil authorities,
DOD provides military forces or capabilities in support of
another agency. For instance, the recovery assistance provided
by the Pentagon at the request of FEMA after a natural crisis
such as a hurricane or flood is a support mission to civil
authorities.
DOD evaluates all requests by U.S. civil authorities for
military assistance against six established criteria, including
legality, lethality, cost, and impact on readiness to base its
decision. During fiscal years 2001 and 2002, the Department
supported over 230 missions requested by civil authorities such
as fighting wildfires in the West, providing post-September 11
recovery assistance to New York and Virginia, and supporting
the last Presidential inauguration.
Although established DOD guidance with a formal
decisionmaking process exists for military support to civil
authorities, the use of military combat forces such as U.S.
fighter aircraft patrolling the skies of America after the
attacks of September 11 leads into my comments on whether DOD
has the organizational structure, plans, and forces to support
the heightened domestic military missions.
As you are aware, DOD has taken two positive steps to
organize its efforts in the homeland defense role within the
larger domain of homeland security. First, the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Mr.
McHale's office, was recently created to provide leadership and
supervision of all DOD's domestic missions. Second, the U.S.
Northern Command located in Colorado Springs was recently
established to provide long-term planning and execution for
domestic air, sea, and land missions. It will be fully
operational the first of October this year. During our official
visit to U.S. Northern Command last week, it was clear that
General Eberhart and his battle staff are dedicated and
committed as they tackle their new duties in homeland defense.
Although these two organizational initiatives are
important, it is premature to evaluate the effectiveness of
these organizations to address their new missions at this time.
We have noted that the U.S. Northern Command completed its
campaign plan in October 2002 for domestic military missions
that will guide the forces performing these missions. However,
the plan was developed prior to the January 2003 issuance of a
Federal Bureau of Investigation national terrorism threat
assessment and may need to be reviewed to ensure all threat
aspects are appropriately considered.
Additionally, there are indications that the U.S. military
forces may not be adequately structured for some current
domestic missions and military readiness may become eroded as a
result. For example, following the September 11, 2001 attacks,
the President deployed fighter aircraft to protect U.S. cities
as well as military police units to enhance installation
security across the Nation under Operation Noble Eagle. While
all units and personnel have performed their homeland defense
duties superbly, in some cases the assigned tasks were not the
primary mission of these affected units or personnel;
therefore, this condition highlights a potential imbalance
between current force structure mix and future requirements.
Although these specifically focused missions were deemed
necessary, the military readiness of the assigned forces over
time may decline due to the limited training value derived from
these missions and the reduced opportunities to conduct other
required combat-oriented training during the period.
My final comments are directed at personnel tempo or the
amount of time a service member spends away from home while
deployed. Clearly, the current overseas and domestic missions
are stressing U.S. military personnel in this area. For
example, from September 2001 through December 2002, the number
of Air Force personnel exceeding the personnel tempo threshold
of 182 days--which is approximately one half a year--away from
home rose from 2,100 to about 8,300. The number of personnel
exceeding the personnel tempo threshold of 220 days away--which
is 60 percent of a year--rose from 1,600 to 22,000. Army data
also revealed a similar serious trend during the same period.
Exceeding the threshold on a sustained basis may indicate
inadequacy in the force structure or mix of forces for the
current level of operations and could lead to retention
problems later if military members leave the service because
personnel tempo was too high. To prevent significant near-term
attrition from the military force DOD has used stop loss
authority to prohibit service members affected by the order
from leaving the service. All four services have stop loss
orders that are currently being used.
Officials from the four services who manage the
implementation of these orders caution that these are for
short-term use and designed to maintain unit level military
readiness for overseas combat and domestic missions. Moreover,
the officials added that the orders are not intended as a long-
term solution to address mismatches or shortfalls in
capabilities or requirements or as a substitute for the routine
recruiting, induction, and training of new members.
In closing, Department of Defense has initiated several
important measures to accomplish its homeland defense mission,
but needs to address concerns over the impact of this emerging
issue on force structure and personnel tempo. Like a baseball
team that is used to playing games at home and then away, the
Pentagon must now balance its ability to play both at home and
away simultaneously, and review its approach to continue
fielding the best team for years to come.
Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Decker follows:]
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Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Decker.
General Reimer.
General Reimer. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Mr. Chairman and
distinguished members of the subcommittee. I have submitted a
statement for the record, and would ask that be accepted. I
would just like to summarize that statement if I could.
I am the director of the Memorial Institute for the
Prevention of Terrorism and have been that since April 2000.
Prior to that, I served 37 years in the U.S. Army and retired
in 1999 as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army.
I would like to talk just a little bit about MIPT in terms
of what we do and then broaden it a little it bit. MIPT is the
third component of the National Memorial in Oklahoma City. And
the family members and survivors felt very strongly about
having an organization that looked to the future to try to
prevent what happened on April 19, 1995 from happening again.
And that is our charter and that is what we do.
Because of that charter, our focus is on the first
responder community. We have been supported by Congress through
four different appropriations, which we deeply appreciate.
Primarily, we concentrate on five different areas. First is a
research program to provide the emergency responders the
technology they need to do their job better. One of our
projects, Project Responder, is very enthusiastically supported
by the Department of Homeland Security and I think has the
potential to be the cornerstone for a research development test
and evaluation program that needs to be established for the
emergency responder community.
We have also been involved in training exercises, have
supported Dark Winter, one of the co-sponsors of Dark Winter.
We took Dark Winter and did a state exercise in Oklahoma called
Sooner Spring, which we distributed to all 50 States under
Governor Keating's signature and we will look at the runaway
train scenario because I think that type of scenario is the
thing policymakers need to think about.
We have an outreach program primarily focused on a library
and a Web page to try and inform the American people of the
complex issues involved with domestic terrorism. We,
unfortunately, in Oklahoma have too many people who have felt
the direct effects of domestic terrorism, but fortunately they
are willing to share their experiences and they were very
helpful in reaching out to the victims in September 11, and I
think that association still remains very strong.
Oklahoma City is a great place for a conference. It's a
neutral forum area. We are located somewhat in the middle of
the United States. But more importantly, as we bring people
together in Oklahoma City and talk about the issues involved
with domestic terrorism, everyone leaves a little stronger,
more committed, more convinced about the importance of the job
they are doing because of the National Memorial.
And then last is what I call flagship program, it's
basically to tie the first responders through the use of the
Internet share best practices and lessons learned. There are a
lot of good best practices that exist out there, but they are
not shared with others, and so information sharing becomes very
important. And the idea, if you can share this best practice
with others, then everybody gets a little bit better.
We can also share lessons learned. We produced a volume
called Oklahoma City: Seven Years Later, which captures the
lessons learned from Oklahoma City many of you have talked
about already, and we will make that available to everybody; in
fact, we have already sent that out to every mayor in the
United States and it has been downloaded 17,000 times from our
Web site, so it is very much available. But we think that by
sharing these lessons learned that everybody will get better,
and I maintain that's the best way for the Nation to get the
best return on our investment.
The issue we are dealing with today is a complex issue. And
just as Secretary McHale said, President Lincoln indicated we
need to do some fresh thinking. The sentence before that, he
said: There are--the occasion is filled with great difficulty,
and we must rise to the occasion. He was absolutely right on
both of those accounts. I think the key to this problem is
partnership. It's a partnership amongst the Federal, State, and
the local levels of government; it's a partnership amongst the
private and the public sector; and it's a partnership between
the military and civilian responder community. And since the
purpose of this committee is looking at the latter, I will
confine most of my remaining remarks to that.
I believe the National Guard is the key in terms of
military support. I think the military does a great job in
terms of military support to civilian authority, but I think in
this particular area we need ``to think anew and act anew'' in
solving this problem. The reason I believe the National Guard
is key is there is a historical precedent. If you go back to
the very beginning in the 1600's, the National Guard was
established to protect the settlers in the communities. They
have had this historical mission of protecting the United
States. They have the flexibility, the flexibility to operate
under Title X in a Federal control status or in a Title 32,
under State controls which gives them an awful lot of
flexibility on issues such as posse comitatus. They also have a
Guard Net 21, which basically ties together through fiberoptics
capabilities most of the United States. And somebody told me
and I believe this to be true, at least probably in the high 90
percentile, every person in the United States lives within 50
miles of an armory. So an armory could become the center of the
activity.
It was already mentioned by Chairman Shays in his opening
remarks we need to train the way we are going to fight. We have
to fight differently in this war against terrorism, and we need
to train differently or else we are not going to be able to
operate effectively when the time comes. So it's very important
we figure out how we are going to provide military support to
civilian authorities when we have a terrorist act. And we know
that any terrorist attack will require military support.
Finally, I would say that there is a group of people
outside of the Beltway that I call the community of the
willing, who are working on this problem. And I think part of
what we need to do is to leverage those efforts, tie them
together in a meaningful way, and see
if we can't pick some low-hanging fruit here which I think can
jumpstart this effort in a very meaningful way.
I thank the committee for the opportunity to testify in
front of you, and I appreciate your interest in this particular
area.
[The prepared statement of General Reimer follows:]
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Mr. Turner. Thank you, General.
Dr. Carafano.
Dr. Carafano. I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
members of the committee for inviting me here to speak today. I
have submitted a statement for the record, and I would just
like to summarize if I may just three points from that. The
first deals from my own experience. I'm trained as a historian,
and I thought it was of great interest when the debate over the
establishment of the Homeland Security Department came up and
the references that were made to the National Security Act of
1947 that created the Defense Department, and I think indeed
that analogy is indeed apt.
But what I think people tend to forget is that the national
security architecture that we used to fight the cold war was
not cut from whole cloth. It really took a decade. I mean, if
you look at between the years 1947 to 1957, the
experimentation, trial and error, get it right, get it wrong,
to really figure out how we were going to fight the cold war. I
mean, that's when all the principle instruments were really
invented, deterrence, NATO, security assistance, and the things
we weren't going to do, like robust civil defense. And so I
think there is a real lesson there, is that we are really at
the beginning of the process. And now is not just the right
time to hold this hearing, but it's the key time because it's--
this is going to be an evolving architecture and now is exactly
the time to get it right, because the architecture that we set
up today will be the one that will exist for generations to
come.
The second point I would like to make is that the questions
that you asked and a lot of the discussions about organization
and force structures and methods, and I think all that is very
important, but what I think is equally important if not more
important is strategy and strategic guidance, because I really
do think that strategy and strategic guidance guide the
Department of Defense, and they're what's required for turning
the ship. In my analysis of this current strategic direction,
it is fine if you think the status quo is adequate. But if you
think the status quo for DOD's current direction is inadequate,
then I think we also need to think in terms of the strategy and
strategic guidance that's required to turn the ship in a
different direction.
The last point I want to make and I think is really the
most important, is that as you look at DOD's role in Homeland
Security, I really think what's most efficient and effective is
if that role is considered and given new direction in a very
holistic way, and in two respects. One is as part of the
overall national response--and I just don't mean Federal
response, because Homeland Security really requires a national
response network that includes the State, local, and Federal
Governments. So the DOD's role needs to be always--when we're
looking forward, needs to be placed in context of what we are
expecting from the rest of the national response system and
also in terms of DOD's overall missions, both offense and
defense. So as we change one part, as we decide what our future
role of the National Guard is going to be in Homeland Security,
we really need to think of that in the context of what do we
want the National Guard to do in all aspects of security as we
think over the long term.
And with those comments, I look forward to your questions,
and again I thank you for inviting me.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Carafano follows:]
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Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Wermuth.
Mr. Wermuth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished
members.
I am going to focus my remarks today primarily on my work
as the executive project director of the Advisory Panel to
Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Mr. Turner. All in one breath.
Mr. Wermuth. All in one breath. Also known as the Gilmore
Commission, a creation of the Congress now in its 5th year,
having submitted four reports to the President and the
Congress, with some major policy recommendations; it will
submit its fifth and presumably final report in December of
this year.
In my testimony, I go into considerable detail about the
catalog of statutory authority for the use of the military
domestically, but it really is important and the previous panel
noted the distinctions between the two principal areas of the
military mission with respect to the homeland, the homeland
defense mission, which really is principally a Department of
Defense responsibility to protect the homeland against
invasion, and the military support to civil authorities. Those
statutes, the authorities that provide that ability of the
military to do that, really are based in the Constitution, as
I've noted in my testimony. Certainly the Stafford Act's
already been mentioned, but of course the insurrection
statutes, the expansion of authorities that were originally
designed for counterdrug activities have now been expended to
include terrorist operations. There is some very special
authority in a couple of statutes that I mentioned in my
testimony, particularly 10 U.S. Code 382, and 18 U.S. Code 831,
that allow the military to be used in some very nontraditional
ways even inside the homeland.
So the issue here is not whether there is sufficient
authority. One of the big issues of course is that authority is
not very well understood generally throughout the country in
what the military can legally do and how posse comitatus still
provides perhaps some measure of a constraint. But the simple
fact is the exceptions that have been provided to posse
comitatus for use of the military inside the homeland have not
made posse comitatus meaningless, as the Congress acknowledged
in the Homeland Security Act last year, but there is certainly
plenty of authority there for using the military in a number of
ways, both for the homeland defense mission, purely military
mission, and for providing military support to civil
authorities.
In that regard, I won't use my time in my opening remarks,
but I would hope to get on Congressman Murphy's train in the
question and answer session and maybe give you a couple of
additional insights or clarifications on that scenario.
Certainly we need to do a better job of educating people
throughout the country on what the military can and can't do,
and particularly how you get to the military. It's important
for all of us to understand that a mayor or a Governor can't
just walk down to the local Title X military installation and
ask the military to do things. There is an appropriate process
to do that. That process is now up through a Governor to the
Secretary of Homeland Security and then over to the Department
of Defense when we are talking about military support to civil
authorities. That process is not necessary in the homeland
defense mission, but there are issues involving structures and
plans and training and exercises that I've talked about at some
length in my written testimony.
Let me echo what others have said before about the National
Guard. The Gilmore Commission in several reports culminating
with recapitulation of those and an expansion of those in its
fourth report has suggested that we really can and should do
more with the National Guard. And you heard the three different
areas for use of the National Guard in its purely State status;
that means no Federal funds, that it is under the authority of
the Governor to do things with the Guard in its State militia
hat, if you will. The Title 32 piece, which is Federal funding,
and those have manifested themselves a couple of times
recently, certainly right after September 11 with security at
the airports and more recently under Liberty Shield for
protection of critical infrastructure for the Federal
Government piece, and then of course bringing them in to a
Title X status to do things under the national command
authority, normal Title X responsibilities.
But the fact is there may very well be some additional
authority. Certainly under Title 32 there are adjutant generals
out there who believe that they don't even have the authority
to use Federal funds to train for certain Homeland Security
missions because they don't see them, or their lawyers don't
see them as being directly related to their potential Title 10
missions for which Title 32 funds are normally provided. So
there certainly ought to be clarification to allow them to do
that.
The Gilmore Commission, as you will see from my testimony,
has proposed perhaps some additional structures and formalizing
relationships that would allow the National Guard to be used
not in the purely command and control sense but in a new
coordination regime that would allow the National Guard to
respond to requests from the Department of Defense through U.S.
Northern Command maybe even on a multi-state basis to provide
assistance when Title X forces may not be indicated or where,
as Dennie Reimer said, the Guard provides some additional
flexibility that the Title 10 component might not provide.
So I've gone through a lot of those in my written
testimony, and would be happy to answer any questions related
to those and other parts of my testimony in the followup
question and answer period.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wermuth follows:]
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Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Wermuth.
We will go then to a round of 5-minute questions, beginning
with our chairman Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Looking, Mr. Decker, at your comments, does the panel all
agree that when we look at this command, that it has the
traditional military role and then the asymmetrical threat of
Homeland Security defense by terrorist groups? Is this the only
command in our government that has this asymmetrical
responsibility?
Dr. Carafano. Congressman.
Mr. Shays. You have a loud voice, but I also want you to
talk through the mic as well.
Dr. Carafano. Right. I actually would argue that is not a
good framework to use. I think actually if you look at the
combatant command responsibilities, we ought to look at the
commonalities as opposed to the differences. Even in Operation
Iraqi Freedom, for example, you saw a commander in a theater
who had critical infrastructure issues, intelligence and early
warning issues, could conceivably have had civilian consequence
management issues. So in actuality I think in the future of
warfare all the combatant commands are going to see similar--
are going to have missions that cut across what we call the
National Homeland Security Strategy, the six major mission
areas. And so I think that we would be better off to move
toward a framework that looked at the military's requirement to
meet each of those mission areas. And, yes, it's going to be
somewhat different for each of the combatant commands, but I
actually think it's going to be a common thread throughout the
regional combatant command.
Mr. Shays. Let me just followup. Does someone else want to
respond to that as well?
General Reimer. Mr. Chairman, I think that it is a command
that has asymmetric responsibilities. I think it is somewhat
similar to SOCOM when we set that up in some ways. But SOCOM
certainly doesn't have the asymmetrical responsibilities that
Northern Command has, plus SOCOM has their own forces assigned.
So there is very much a uniqueness as far as I am concerned
about Northern Command and its mission and its structure.
Mr. Wermuth. I am going to get on Congressman's Murphy's
train here for a minute.
One of the two twists from the previous testimony--and it
is related to this question, perhaps not in 15 minutes, perhaps
not in 30 minutes--but there are some things that this
committee should consider that can't be discussed in this
session that have some asymmetry to them and that fall outside
the purview of the U.S. Northern Command that this committee
and others of the Congress would certainly know about but may
want to consider in this particular context.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Decker, do you want to respond?
Mr. Decker. Sir, I think the only thing unique about the
other combatant commands is, as General Anderson said, the
territory that they are protecting, which is the homeland. But
the issue of traditional versus asymmetric threat, that is
global.
Mr. Shays. OK. I am unclear as to whether there needs to be
a distinction between homeland defense and homeland security.
Tell me why there is a distinction. Is it important?
Mr. Wermuth. The national strategy, in trying to describe
homeland security in the military context, describes the
military role in homeland security at large as two
subcomponents, homeland defense. That is the distinction that
we draw between those terms.
The homeland security term is a broader term. Homeland
defense is a subset of it that is a military mission. Military
support to civil authorities is the other piece of the military
mission. Those two together tend to describe the military's
role in the broader term, homeland security.
Mr. Shays. Someone else want to respond to that? Then I'm
going to followup with a question.
General Reimer. Mr. Chairman, I am with you on this issue.
I don't know that there is a distinction. The people that I
talk to in Oklahoma don't understand the distinction between
homeland security and homeland defense.
Mr. Decker. Mr. Chairman, I guess it was August 2001 Mr.
Wermuth and myself and some others spoke to an audience at the
Army War College--this is pre September 11. There was a debate
at that time about the use of the term homeland security versus
homeland defense. There was a perception that the American
public may not like the use of the term homeland security when
talking about Pentagon activities, and I sensed--and maybe,
Mike, you can comment--that there was a sensitivity from the
military of the perception if homeland security was part of
their mission.
Mr. Wermuth. I think that is exactly right, and Ray and I
have had these exchanges in front of a number of other panels.
Definitions are important. If we are going to make the
distinction, we need to make it clearly; and I happen to think
the national strategy went a long way in trying to draw the
distinction between the two and making the homeland security
term much more broad and encompassing State and local actions,
the role of the private sector, the role of the Federal
Government.
If the appropriate term for that purely military mission is
homeland defense, it's as good a one as I know of. We need to
start using those terms consistently and clearly and not
intertwining them somehow or using them synonymously, because
we are now very careful in the work that we do, and we are
doing some work in this context for the Department of Homeland
Security to keep those terms very, very distinguishable, one
being the larger, one being more just the purely military
mission.
Mr. Shays. I know my time has run out. Dr. Carafano, you
made this in your statement, so maybe you can respond as well.
Dr. Carafano. Yes, Congressman. I do have the subject in my
prepared statement, so I won't repeat what is in there, just to
try to briefly summarize.
I struggle to find the utility of distinguishing between
homeland security and homeland defense. When you will look at
it at the end of the day, homeland defense is responsible for
defending the United States against invasion. Well, what is the
likelihood we are going to be invaded? I mean, other than
missile defense, there is virtually no real threat today that
falls into that category. So in a sense when you look at the
things we are asking the military to do, they are all
essentially homeland security missions.
I don't think the distinction is useful or well understood,
and I go back to my statement that I think that the six
critical functions lined out in the national security strategy
define requirements that need to be met. So I think that it is
a much more constructive way to look at missions because then
you ask the question of what capability does each Federal
entity need to be to satisfy these six mission requirements,
not a question of is this homeland defense or homeland
security?
I think the legal qualifications are really quite clear,
and there is no reason to add terms that essentially obfuscate
the debate. I will agree with Mike that there is a serious
education campaign that needs to be undertaken in the United
States for people to clearly understand what the different
legal issues are, but that is very different from needing to
create a new word which doesn't help you understand them any
better.
Mr. Shays. I wish you guys would agree a little more on
this.
OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Again, we are going through the
exercise, and we just need to pull it all together. That is
what we are here about.
Would you say that coordinating the exercise and training
for the range of activities that really NORTHCOM is going to be
responsible for is going to be the hardest challenge and then
coordinating that with the State and local? We get right back
to the same issue on every question almost. But that is--but
what is the end game? What recommendations will you have, very
simplistic term, to get to where we need to be?
General Reimer. What I would say, Congressman, is my first
recommendation is that we have to go through those exercises.
Those exercises have to be at all levels. They have to deal
with the policy issues so the decisionmakers are exposed to the
scenario you talked about in the first session.
Those are not easy issues. There are not easy answers to
these issues. You have to go through that to learn from that
experience and get a feel for the type of decisions the
decisionmakers are going to have to make.
I remember watching Dark Winter--and we had a pretty good
panel. Senator Nunn played the President. He kept saying,
``tell me the worst case.'' The experts couldn't tell him the
worst case because they didn't know where the smallpox started.
Unless you can tell the point of origin, you can't determine
who has been affected and how fast it is going to spread. So
those are the issues that come out of those particular policy
sessions.
I think the issue now in homeland security is how do we
marry the training capabilities of the military, which I think
are the best in the world, with what we need in the emergency
responder community, which are basically run through the Office
of Domestic Preparedness as a part of the Department of
Homeland Security right now. I think there is a great
opportunity there to use military expertise, primarily the
National Guard, to establish the front-end analysis of this
training program that just has to be.
Policemen are very well trained in being policemen. Firemen
are very well trained in being firemen. But how do we bring
them together and work together in terms of responding to a
terrorist attack where we know that the first few minutes are
going to save lives? That to me is where the military can bring
this together and have an interdepartmental training program
that allows them to do that. I think we have to be able to
leverage what homeland security is going to do with what the
Northern Command and Department of Defense is going to do in
order to get this training program where it needs to be.
Mr. Decker. Sir, if I can comment as well. I believe that
the exercises and training are probably one of the most
important issues that the Northern Command and Mr. McHale have
to address. But I think the primary issue, which is one step
above there, gets back to this issue that was not fully
addressed earlier, and that is information sharing.
Information is the lifeblood of any organization and is the
key element of all decisionmaking, and without that piece being
better addressed through a lot of different approaches your
exercises and your training will be of limited value. The
exercises, as someone said--it should reflect reality. You
should train as hard as you expect a real world situation to
happen.
The information or intelligence that flows through that
condition, that problem set, is key to successful outcomes with
all parties that have to work together. My sense is--and I
think Governor Ridge said it. He said the biggest challenge he
has now as the Secretary of Department of Homeland Security is
breaking this thing called information sharing, which I would
challenge, and we are actually doing work for the committee on
this.
It is really an interesting paradox. Information sharing
versus information superiority and why organizations do not
share is at the root cause of why information does not go
across boundaries to help the common good.
Mr. Ruppersberger. You are right. The need to know.
But terrorism is a different arena. I mean, you are not
talking about corruption. You are not talking about a Mafia--
well, al Qaeda in a worldwide type situation.
But the other issue, too--and I want your opinion on this.
It is not only gaining that information and sharing it, but it
is the analysis.
Mr. Decker. I would say that analysis is probably the most
important--assuming that you have the right data access, part
of the entire process of information handling, processing and
dissemination.
But here is a thought. Admiral Loy, when he was the
Commandant of the Coast Guard, before he left, put out a paper
which we have read and analyzed; and the Office of Naval
Intelligence, in conjunction with the Coast Guard, is actually
doing a test bed on this. It is called maritime domain
awareness.
I would suggest to you that Northern Command, one of the
most important elements that they need, which they do not have,
is this situational awareness of the Federal, State, local, and
perhaps the private sector, but data coming in from government
and nongovernment sources, which gives the command and his
staff a sense of what is happening across the Nation in areas
that perhaps might represent some threatening situations and at
times key submissions from the intelligence and law enforcement
community of known or heightened threat categories. Then from
that quick analysis discerning what does it mean and doing some
quick analysis, as compared to long-term analysis, which other
parts of the government are going to be doing through the TTIC
and the Homeland Security Department, the FBI's
counterterrorism division and others.
So if I were, you know, General Eberhardt, I would
recommend looking at information, situational awareness as
being one of those fundamental enablers that he will use to
make better decisions that then can support real world as well
as exercise scenarios.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Thank you.
Mr. Turner. General Reimer, one of the things that I
appreciate about your comments and your focus, specifically in
raising the issue of Oklahoma, is that it really underscores
your statements about homeland security being a process; and it
is a process that we need to go through, regardless of issues
of foreign threats, because they are the types of things that
we ought to be doing anyway, because there will always be evil
people. There will always be people that could be a threat. In
looking at homeland security, there are some things that it
would behoove us to undertake, regardless of whether or not we
are currently under any specific threat from any foreign group.
Recognizing that we won't always think of everything and
that we won't always be able to prevent everything, I would
love for each of you--and, General Reimer, I am going to start
with you--if you would give us your thought of what you think
is the No. 1 issue of concern to you. What is the No. 1 thing
that is bugging you or in your craw that you know right now we
are not doing well, or that should be done? What is the No. 1
thing that is troubling you?
General Reimer. Well, that is a very good question, Mr.
Chairman. I guess it is a difficult part to say the No. 1
thing. I am probably going to be a little bit all over the map
sheet with my answer. But I think prior to September 11 the
feeling of the average American was that terrorism is something
that happens over there. We are protected by two big oceans and
friendly borders with the north and south, and it is not going
to affect us.
As we get further away from September 11, I am not sure we
are not slipping back into that same mode; and I think really
what we have to do is to change the culture here in American
society to understand that we are under threat and that we are
very vulnerable. The vulnerability is based upon the thing that
makes our country great, the freedoms and the liberties that we
all enjoy. We are a very open society. We have to be. That is
our way of life. That is our economic engine.
So I guess the thing that I worry about most is how do we
get the right balance between protecting the people of the
United States and protecting the liberties and the rights that
have made this country what it is today. If we go too far to
one side, we are going to screw up the other, and it is not
going to be the country that you and I love. So we have to make
sure that we get that right.
I think we have to adjust to the fact that terrorism is
here. It is a long-term effect. It is not something that is
going to be solved tomorrow, this year. It is going to take us
a long time to eradicate terrorism. And I think eradication of
terrorism is the right goal. We can't live with 50 percent,
terrorism reduced by 50 percent, because it still affects the
way of life. So I think we have to go at it and we have to stay
for the long run.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Decker.
Mr. Decker. Sir, based on about 5 years of work that GAO
has done--and a lot of it for this committee and for the House
and Senate Armed Services and others--it is clear to me that
perhaps the support to the first responder community, State and
local level, is not happening the way that I probably would
have thought it would play out after September 11.
I remember testifying before this committee pre-September
11 about the number of Federal agencies involved in combating
terrorism. At that time, it was over 40. The budget was $13
billion. And we were asking, you know, are we better prepared
today than we were a year ago? And this is pre-September 11.
And no one really could tell us on the Executive side if we
were.
Now I see a huge amount of funding going into combating
terrorism, homeland security. And, again, I think there is
concerns about some of the issues that were raised today: Are
the State and local activities at the level of preparedness and
with the commonality of command and control for incident
response? Is the Nation, the populus aware of what their role
and responsibility is should a smallpox Dark Winter scenario
break out?
I mean, I have heard Governor Ridge talk about everyone
should have a little first aid kit prepared, set up, and a
communication, you know, thing within the family and so on.
What I haven't heard happen within the State level
organizations, if Scenario A happens in Richmond, VA, what will
happen as a result of that so that every person within a 50-
mile radius will know what their individual role and
responsibility is and how do you do that responsibly?
This is the part that is missing. I am waiting for message
two--the public announcement that Governor Ridge makes to the
Nation about how to get prepared. I need the next step.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Dr. Carafano. If I was a half-decent terrorist, I would
realize by now that the only way I am going to get America's
attention is to ratchet up the cost. And if I can't get a
nuclear weapon, I can't get a deadly plague, so I would be
thinking about what can I do to either inflict casualties or
psychological damage. I would be looking at things--what I call
weapons of mass destruction, in other words, combining
different kinds of attack in one attack, like a critical
infrastructure, and some other kind of things together, to kind
of ratchet up, maybe doing some several of them simultaneously.
I would look at using new weapons that haven't been used
before like SHORAD weapons, MANPADS, RPG7s and things like
that, looking at threats I could launch off covert maritime
platforms like UAVs or even potentially someday underwater
UAVs. I mean, things that we are not psychologically prepared
for and things--and also critical infrastructure attacks, like
going after chemical plants, things that can either get me a
lot more casualties without having to have a nuke or a deadly
virus or things that can get America's attention by attacking
in some new way. So that is what I would be worried about.
Mr. Wermuth. I would be hard pressed to state the No. 1
problem, but I would suggest that a fundamental problem here is
communications, not communications equipment, but the way we
communicate and what we communicate, how we communicate among
Federal agencies, how we communicate Federal to State to local
and back up that chain and, most importantly, how we
communicate about all of this with the American people.
We are vulnerable. As Denny Reimer has noted, that is what
makes us uniquely American. But we need to talk to the American
people about those issues, that we can't protect them against
everything, and talk as governments across the board about what
we can and can't do.
Denny Reimer used the term ``striking the appropriate
balance.'' What is it we want to communicate to the American
people about what they should be concerned about? You can go
back and look at the anthrax attacks. We had done an abysmal
job of talking to the American people before those attacks
occurred about cause and effect. We really haven't done a good
job of communicating the smallpox threat. All of that was based
on a fear that we would cause panic in the American people if
we did talk to them straightforwardly about what these threats
are.
Some of us believe that is not true, that the American
people can take information and process it and understand it,
and if we talked straight to the American people and suggest
that we will never be able to defend against everything, even
if we spent the entire wealth of the Nation trying to do that,
we probably wouldn't do it.
Look at the Israel example of how much effort and expense
they have put into trying to defend, and it is just not
perfect.
We need to come to that realization, tell the American
people that, tell them what we are doing to try to prevent,
prepare, respond and recover across these four major areas, but
suggest that we can't do everything. But we can do things
better in coordination. We can do things better with the
resources, and it is not--the answer is not always just money,
it really is resources across a broad spectrum.
But start to be straightforward about how we tell this
story and not be reacting or responding to every time somebody
has a fear about something that we go out and buy 350 million
doses of the next vaccines.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
First, Mr. Wermuth, I think I totally agree with you. I
know I totally agree with you, that you tell the American
people the truth and they will have you do the right thing. I
learned that with the Patriot Act. Because all of a sudden
there was real opposition to it. And I thought there wasn't a
sense of why we needed to do it. When I was able to explain why
we needed to do it, I think there was a recognition that there
is logic then. We treat the American people like adults, we
will get adult responses.
I am having a hard time understanding how USNORTHCOM
integrates with the Department of Homeland Security. I would
like you all to tell me what your perception is of how that
happens.
Mr. Wermuth. Again, there is some significant background to
that in my written testimony. But I would suggest to you that
NORTHCOM, in the first instance, does not coordinate directly
with the Department of Homeland Security. You had the person at
the table today as the designated representative of the
Secretary of Defense that really is first and foremost the
connection with the Department of Defense to the Department of
Homeland Security. That is Paul McHale in his new Assistant
Secretary of Defense hat.
As you get down into operational issues, certainly there
will be some coordination and direct exchange of information
and training and exercises and all of those other things. But
if you look at how requests for military support to civil
authorities flows, it is going to come from a locality up
through a State to the Department of a Homeland Security, and
then a request, not an order, comes over to the Department of
Defense for the Secretary's consideration. And that will be
evaluated against criteria that are reflected here in the
written testimony and a determination made about what kind of
support will be given. And then, through the normal process,
those, you know, determinations would be made and orders go out
the way they usually do through the mechanism of the joint
staff to U.S. Northern Command for an execution of a mission.
But the nexus really has to be the direct coordination
between DHS and the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
primarily in the hat of Paul McHale.
Dr. Carafano. Congressman, I share your concern that--I am
not sure what the answer to the question is. I do have some
deep concerns. One is the area of training. There does need to
be some kind of formal training relationship. Because what
homeland security does in terms of multi-echelon training,
NORTHCOM needs to be able to do in multi-echelon training. They
need to be able to walk through that step by step.
In a broader area, I think the research and development
efforts need to be harmonized on a much greater scale and the
joint experimentation efforts, not just in terms of NORTHCOM
requirements but in many areas. For example, the Deepwater
Program and the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship Program. Those
development efforts ought to be hand in hand.
So I think that is an issue that needs to be addressed.
There needs to be some real synergy there, in a more formal way
than there is now.
The one recommendation I have is I think NORTHCOM ought to
be deeply involved in the command and control of the military
support to civilian authority mission. I think logic training
there is that--not necessarily that NORTHCOM needs to do that.
I mean, the Department of the Army has been doing it forever
and doing it just fine. But I think the great advantage to
having NORTHCOM being involved on a day-to-day basis would be--
is that on a day-to-day basis the people of NORTHCOM would work
with the people that they--if something really big happened and
they had to work with the DCOs and State and Federal people,
that they would know those people. They talk to them every day.
So if there was a way in which the kind of the day-to-day
working relationship was there, that would serve them very well
in a crisis thing. It wouldn't be the first time that they ever
talked to the guy on the phone.
So it would make a lot of sense to get NORTHCOM involved in
the military support to civilian authority business on a day-
to-day basis, even though they are really there just to
respond, you know, for the big one.
General Reimer. The formal coordination has already been
discussed on. It really occurs between the Department of
Defense and the Department of Homeland Security; and Northern
Command does not deal directly, at least in my understanding,
with the Department of Homeland Security.
They do participate in training exercises. For example, in
the Top Off series of exercises that is run by the Office of
Domestic Preparedness, NORTHCOM will have elements there as
observers and get the benefit of that.
I know many of the leaders in Northern Command. They are
smart folks; and they will use informal coordination methods to
keep track of large cities--New York City, Washington, DC.
Those that they think are must vulnerable--and establish some
informal coordination methods so if they are called upon to
support them they won't be starting with a blank sheet of
paper.
I would hope that we can find a system, and I think it is
easy to find such system, that would allow us to do a better
coordination job than what I think is being done right now.
Mr. Decker. Chairman, I think the briefing paper I have
seen that the Northern Command uses, I thought was very useful.
It divided the missions that they would respond to into three
categories--I think it is in Mike's paper as well--
extraordinary, emergency and temporary.
Temporary would be your civil support missions. You know,
where they are helping with a forest fire perhaps or an
inauguration. Forest fire maybe more into the emergency, and
you are getting into maybe the support for counternarcotics
missions. Then those really dramatic issues where you might
have a maritime threat that is coming into a harbor, a missile
perhaps, airplane, hostile aircraft would be in your
extraordinary area.
I think the command, my sense, would have to be--they would
have to look at those different types of scenarios and come up
with a scheme because--for coordination. Some things are not
going to bubble up from the local, State level. They are going
to come across the transom from the Federal or national level
or even the international level, yet they have impact on State
and local activities, and vice versa. There are going to be
issues that come within our borders that come up to their
awareness through the Department of Homeland Security and
through all of those pipes that are coming into the command.
Through exercises and training you can really refine the
coordination process and the decision process that has to be
almost second nature to deal with some of these situations.
When Representative Murphy brought up the train scenario,
Mike and I were just kibitzing a little bit earlier; and he
said, well, you know, the Governor could call out the National
Guard, have them drive out an M-1 tank and put it on the track.
That might be a deterrent. It might stop that train if it
is going into a built-up area and has a toxic cargo that could
be very problematic.
I mean, these types of situations, I would submit to you,
should be thought through, so that you could come up with a
solution maybe in 10 minutes, as compared to trying to contact
the FBI and work through a bureaucratic, you know, tree of
phone calls. So perhaps that is part of the challenge Northern
Command would have, is thinking outside of the box when they
think about the full array of capabilities that are inherent in
this country yet still do not violate the laws and the
Constitution.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Keep talking communication. We have a
situation that I think that works right now in law enforcement.
That is the strike force concept and the concept where you
have--there may be different disciplines. You have narcotics
strike forces, you have organized crime, white collar crime
strike forces, different disciplines that are work together.
They develop relationships, and they develop trust.
What is your opinion about that type of concept, about what
we are talking about here? You know, a terrorism strike force?
I like to call it hometown security, because that is what it is
about--homeland, whatever, but hometown security. When you have
the disciplines from the Federal, from NORTHCOM all of the way
to the local level. So in the event that there is a crisis--and
what we are talking about with terrorism is crisis, and how we
are going to stop it, probably more than anything, is
intelligence. And that is all part of the strike force concept,
also.
What is your opinion about that? That works. That has
worked.
General Reimer. I think that concept is a good concept,
Congressman. I think in some States you have a Joint Terrorism
Task Force. In many States I think you have a joint terrorism
task force. I think the problem that you have--or the challenge
that you have, anyway--is that you don't have a lot of extra
policemen or extra firemen to put in that kind of joint task
force. So if you take a cop off the beat and put him in there,
you are paying a price somewhere else.
I think it is a matter of resources. When something
happens, you are going to require many more, and that is the
fundamental training that I am also talking about, is that to
handle a September 11 experience or Murrah Building bombing
experience, it takes the whole police force, the whole fire
force. It takes a lot of outside help. How do we bring them
together as smoothly and efficiently as we possible can?
But I think anything that you can do in terms of planning
to work yourself through some of the tough issues that you have
talked about this afternoon, I think that is something that we
ought to be doing.
Mr. Wermuth. We talked about it a while back, Congressman,
in one of the earlier Gilmore Commission reports. But certainly
the task force or strike force idea is a commendable one.
I would offer to you as a model, within what is now being
referred to as the Los Angeles operational area, that they do
in fact have a group that really is primarily State and local,
but it brings the Feds in as well, the representatives of the
joint terrorism task force. It is a multi-jurisdictional entity
that would form the basis for even launching operations, but
they are a planning and a preparedness and a training and an
exercise group that also can provide the basis for a command
structure and actually be that strike force, if you will, if
there is an event. It is a good model for the rest of the
Nation, and Secretary Ridge visited it last week because he
thought it was important enough to see what they were doing.
Mr. Decker. Sir, let me approach your question just
slightly different. That is, if you look at a spectrum of
threats that are affecting or could potentially affect this
country from a homeland security perspective, that should be
the genesis of, one, your information fusion that has to
happen; and that would be an all-source type fusion. When we
were out at Northern Command last week, we got a brief from the
J2, the intelligence office department; and they showed us a
diagram, an unclassified diagram, in which they are taking
information about--this is part of their mission, the
counternarcotics role that JTF6 down in El Paso is doing and
that piece.
They are also looking at cyber when there is a lot of
unusual activity that is affecting the country. They are
looking at missile launches that may happen overseas that have
impact here. They are looking at a wide range of threats. So
that is going to be accepted universally, that if you are a
Governor, you are a mayor, you are the President, you have to
look at the totality of all of those things that could impact
you.
Now what I do see happening with these joint terrorism
strike forces is that there is a preoccupation with
criminality. They are focused on people that are breaking the
law, narcotics people that are committing crimes that are maybe
involving components of weapons of mass destruction, not
terrorists. There are terrorists and others. There are cyber
people that are doing pernicious things. In that group you
should have your health expert who can perhaps see something
that may have a biological element that is going to be
important.
And what about someone who understands chemical plants and
those issues which you might have an improvised situation,
where it could be either an accident or a man-made, but you
have a detonation at a chemical facility, you don't care really
who did it and how it happened initially, but you have to
respond? I don't see that type of synergism happening across
the government in all of the different areas and layers to then
have a better response capability.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Thank you.
Mr. Turner. I don't have an additional question, but I did
want to make a comment about something that Dr. Carafano said.
You were talking about that once these agencies begin to
communicate and have relationships with each other and a known,
if you will, hierarchy as to how to address these issues that
will also have an additional benefit.
Well, Mr. Ruppersberger had indicated that he was a county
administrator and that we had a mayor and a Governor who were
also serving on this committee.
I was the mayor for the city of Dayton, and we are one of
the few cities that actually had weapons of mass destruction
terrorist attack exercises prior to September 11. Attorney
General John Ashcroft came where we did a mock exercise, as if
a chemical attack had occurred at our basketball arena,
shutting down portions of a major interstate, working together
with the Federal agencies, the county, the State and the city,
including representatives from Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,
which obviously is a significant interest in the community.
When September 11 happened, it was so important that we had
those exercises because we didn't run around as a community
saying to ourselves, who is in charge, or what agency should we
get in touch with. People knew already who was at various
agencies, who was in charge, who was going to be in charge of
what activities, all of the way down to what streets were going
to be closed, what buildings were going to be protected, so
that emergency equipment knew what ways they could or could not
go.
It had a tremendous impact on our community, because it
lowered the stress for everyone as they went about trying to
think what types of responses that we would have to do, as they
also went about the issue that the whole country faced, which
was, what is next. People were able to go about their jobs.
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base and all of the Federal and
local agencies were coordinating.
So, Dr. Carafano, I think you are obviously correct that
getting people to work together on these topics, it is not just
that they might know what they are facing more, but they will
get to know each other and get to know how the agencies work
together.
Dr. Carafano. If I can just comment on that. I think the
biggest bang for the buck--I mean, the real center of gravity
to really making huge steps forward is integrated multi-echelon
training, where local, State and Federal agencies train
together; and it has to be a system which is relatively
turnkey, in other words, that, you know, a mayor can walk out
of his office, do this training and go back.
It is not something that requires a long lead time, a lot
of external stuff. It is something you can roll in, these guys
can plug in, they can do this training. It is something that
has to have a very robust lessons learned and best practices
system, which just doesn't feed back into the communities but
feeds into the research and development and the requirements
process, both in--at the--in some respects with the community
and State level but also at the Federal level, both through the
homeland defense and the Defense Department, so we are buying
the right things and we are fielding the right forces to meet
the gaps that local and State communities have in providing
national security to the people.
So that is where I think the--I mean, if we learned any
lessons from the training renaissance at the military--or the
renaissance of military capabilities that we gained in the
1980's, a lot of that was gained through a multi-echelon
training system, that you not just trained these people but
gave us insights into what our shortfalls were. In some cases,
smart guys came up with patches to make it work in the short
term; in some cases, some scientists went out and created the
widget that solved the problem.
That is why when we went to war in 1991 we were a much
better Army than we were in 1980, because the lessons learned
from that training system were plowed back in to make the
military better to respond to the requirements that we foresaw
down the road.
Mr. Turner. Very good.
Any other comments? Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. When I look back over the last 4 years one of
the most valuable events and even committee hearings that we
had was the tabletop done in Stratford, where we brought in 200
people. I am absolutely convinced, and I think this committee
is going to want to weigh in a bit more, that I think those
tabletops are essential. I know they are not inexpensive, but
you bring 200 people together and they figure out how to
interact with each other.
I guess the one area--I am not going to ask for an answer
to the question, but I don't know how feasible it is for
USNORTHCOM to be training with all of the different levels of
government and all of the different States and all of the
different communities, yet I know that they have to do it.
I guess maybe the tabletop is one of the ways that they can
at least know how they interact. But, you know, visualizing the
Army fighting alongside the police to get into a building, I am
just not sure is--you know, I just don't know. It is going to
be interesting for us to try to sort that out.
General Reimer. Can I comment on that?
Because I think you are absolutely right. I think the
tabletop is the best return on investment that we can get right
now, and giving decisionmakers experience at going through some
of these complex issues and knowing what is involved and the
tradeoffs that are involved is invaluable. I think that they
are relatively inexpensive compared to what we are going to put
into this program. You can run one for less than $100,000, I
think----
Mr. Shays. I think the one in Connecticut was $25,000. It
was tremendous.
General Reimer. And we know how to do that.
I think, as far as NORTHCOM is concerned, one of the things
I would suggest that we look at and why I keep pushing the
National Guard is because I think you can really run an
advisory or coordination system, starting with Northern
Command, through the two CANUSA armies, the Continental U.S.
armies that still exist in the U.S. Army, one on the west, one
on the east. Then they have tentacles down to all 50 States
through the State area command which could then tie this whole
program together where it is not all Northern Command
supervising 50 States as such but you are using a chain of
command that already exists.
That is not entirely clean, because Northern Command does
not have control over the National Guard unless they are in
Title 10, so why I say we have to think anew. We have to think
our way through some of that.
There is also this issue of you have local first responders
who are part of the National Guard units. But at the very
minimum we ought to figure out how not to deploy first
responders to Guard and air bases in Germany when we got a
mission back here in the United States.
So I think there is some fresh thinking that can be done.
There is a little bit of restructuring that probably needs to
be done. But I don't think it is a massive overhaul.
The big issue is a policy issue. What is homeland defense?
What does homeland security really mean? What is the role of
the Department of Defense? That is the tough problem that you
all and others in Washington are going to have to wrestle with.
But that has got to be solved.
Mr. Shays. Is there anyone in the audience still here from
USNORTHCOM? Anyone?
That is too bad.
Mr. Decker. Mr. Chairman, can I make one comment on that? I
think there is one issue that Northern Command could use to its
benefit to help them on this outreach in doing tabletop
exercises; technology.
There are so many interactive capabilities now that with a
module and with certain and very simple technology at these
different States you could do tabletops focussed on command and
control, the decisionmaking part, and replicate it every month
across the Nation and do that with tremendous efficiency and
cost savings.
Kids are playing games in countries now, playing the same
game in different countries at the same time, and I can't
imagine that we as a Nation couldn't figure out how to do that
with 50 States and a couple of territories in a way that would
make sense.
Mr. Shays. Let me ask you this. Right now, would it be more
the responsibility of someone from USNORTHCOM to initiate the
tabletop or someone from the Department of Homeland Security?
Who should be taking the initiative?
I am also beginning to think like we have two different
groups and we have two--you don't have ownership.
General Reimer. For the emergnecy responders, it is the
Department of Homeland Security that has to initiate that; and
Northern Command would be an observer.
Mr. Shays. That makes sense.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate it.
Mr. Turner. We want to thank our panelists and ask if they
have any additional comments or any responses that they want to
provide to questions.
Mr. Wermuth. I have one that might be a suggestion for next
steps for your subcommittee. It was first recognized in the
National Strategy for Homeland Security. It was legislated in
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by the Congress. It has now
been directed, by virtue of Homeland Security Presidential
Directive No. 5, the creation of a national response plan, in
the execution piece of that, the National Incident Management
System. The Department of Homeland Security has the
responsibility to do that, to develop that plan and its related
incident management system--national, not Federal like the old
Federal response plan that FEMA had.
It is going to be much broader. It needs to be all
inclusive. It needs to address some of these issues like
training and exercises and how all of that fits together and
how the States and localities and the private sector and, yes,
even perhaps the media and the American people have a role in
all of that.
That process is unfolding. But in just a few short weeks,
perhaps a couple of months, there will be more clarity about
what the national response plan looks like and what the
framework is for the National Incident Management System.
Mr. Shays. Could the chairman just--are you suggesting that
maybe they are not working as quickly as they should or are you
trying to make the committee aware that this is a work in
process?
Mr. Wermuth. I think they are working fast and furious to
develop both of those pieces. So there is--but it would be--I
would think it would be useful to this committee to bring
representatives of the Department up here perhaps, if not in
the summer certainly in the early fall, and get the full
laydown on how that plan is and the national management
incident system is unfolding.
Mr. Shays. That is a helpful suggestion. Thank you.
Mr. Turner. Any other comments from members of the panel? I
want to thank you for participating in this and also thank
Chairman Shays for his leadership on this topic. Thank you.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]