

# BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE: RESPONDING TO THE CURRENT BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT

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## HEARING'

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,  
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE  
OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT  
REFORM AND OVERSIGHT  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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# **BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE: RESPONDING TO THE CURRENT BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT**

**THURSDAY, MAY 30, 1996**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,  
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE,  
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT,  
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr., presiding.

Present: Representatives Zeliff, Ehrlich, Mica, Souder, Shadegg, Thurman, Slaughter, Condit, and Spratt.

Staff Present: Robert B. Charles, staff director and chief counsel; Judy McCoy, chief clerk; Ianthe Saylor, clerk; Michele Lang, special counsel; Sean Littlefield, professional staff member; and Cherri Branson, minority professional staff member.

Mr. EHRlich. I would call the subcommittee to order. The Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice shall come to order.

Good morning and welcome. I am Congressman Bob Ehrlich, and I have been asked to Chair today's hearing on Ballistic Missile Defense in the absence of our respected and beloved chairman—right, Karen—Bill Zeliff from New Hampshire. For those of you who don't know, Chairman Zeliff has been a strong advocate of effective Ballistic Missile Defense. In fact, his foresight in advocating for the development of the Patriot missile was, I think, in retrospect, very well placed.

Today, we are here to discuss an immediate threat to our Nation's national security, the proliferation of ballistic missile technology and its ability in wrong hands to pose a personal threat to every American citizen. Several things bring us together at this time. First, there has been mounting evidence of a long- and short-range ballistic missile threat, missiles that could carry conventional chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, over the past several years.

Today, fully 25 countries possess or are actively developing ballistic missiles. Many of these countries are or have been hostile to the United States and some are even on record as having threatened the security of the United States of America. We will hear more about that later today.

Second, recent events should sharpen our focus on this issue. In the past several weeks, we have seen Russia sell SS-18 or heavy ICBM technology to China. This is the same China that visibly threatened Taiwan with a military invasion in March and openly implied that Los Angeles could one day become a target.

Meanwhile, Jordan has seized ballistic missile parts headed for Iraq—specifically gyroscopes and accelerometers, right; and we will hear more about that later today, I am sure—again from Russia. And we have now confirmed that North Korea has a ballistic missile development program. In fact, we heard just this past week, from the pilot who defected, that North Korea has both a plan and the means for overwhelming its southern neighbor.

In black and white, the 1995 CIA National Intelligence Estimate, according to public reports, stated that, “The North Koreans may deploy an ICBM capable of reaching the continental United States within 5 years.”

That observation leads me to the third reason we are here at this hearing today. The 1996 CIA National Intelligence Estimate, as summarized publicly, strangely implies that we should not expect any ballistic missile threat for 15 years. Frankly speaking, this is a matter of grave concern. Not only does that estimate contradict intelligence we have been receiving for some years, including the 1995 National Intelligence Estimate, it seems oddly and conveniently supportive of the Clinton administration’s go-slow approach to deploying a limited national ballistic missile defense.

Today, there is no dispute over certain facts. No one disputes, for example, that every major metropolitan center in the United States is naked of any defense that might stop or even slow a rogue state’s incoming ballistic missile. To those who say that the nuclear material is hard to get, let me say that it may not be as hard to get as we would like to believe. Let me also remind critics that chemical weapons and deadly biological agents are relatively cheap to obtain or create and no less dangerous.

At the same time, no one should dispute that we have interceptor technologies already available or about to become available in the form of Raytheon’s ground-based radars, ground-based and ship-based interceptors and even limited ground-based laser technologies which could easily protect this Nation from a rogue state’s incoming ballistic missile.

Finally, I think it is safe to say that cost-effective technologies already are or should be deployable for defense of our Nation by the year 2003. Even the Congressional Budget Office numbers which, as we shall see today, are all-inclusive and stretch far into the future, embracing things such as space-based interceptors that were never intended to be part of the current Dole and Livingston-Spence-Weldon bills do not undermine the cost-effectiveness of basic ground- or ship-based ballistic missile defenses.

The stark reality is that ballistic missiles are cheap to make and can do serious damage to the United States and our population, even in small numbers. In an era of accelerating ballistic missile development and accelerating international uncertainty, the only responsible course is to act swiftly for the protection of the American people.

This hearing is intended to explore preexisting and new dimensions of the threat posed to all Americans by ballistic missiles. It is also intended to highlight the existing and deployable technologies that should properly address that threat. Finally, it is intended to serve the oversight function of reviewing the 1996 National Intelligence Estimate, as well as our Nation's ballistic missile defense plans, and to assess new efforts in the face of recent information.

Implementing cost-effective ballistic missile defenses are essential for the long-term security of the Nation. We have an excellent opportunity today to assess how to achieve this goal.

It is a pleasure to welcome our witnesses today. In a moment, you will hear from the Honorable Curt Weldon, sponsor of the current Ballistic Missile Defense legislation; the Honorable James Woolsey, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for Mr. Clinton; Mr. James Gaffney, president of the Center for Security Policy; Dr. Keith B. Payne, president of the National Institute for Public Policy; and Dr. Michael Krepon, president of the Henry L. Stimson Center.

First, let me say it is an honor to share the top shelf here with the Honorable Karen Thurman of Florida, the ranking member of the subcommittee, who normally sits opposite our chairman, Mr. Zeff. And I now recognize her for her opening statement.

Mrs. THURMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That has a nice ring to it.

Mr. Chairman, I also would like to welcome the witnesses, and I certainly am glad to have Mr. Weldon here, but I would like to take my time and yield it to Mr. Spratt. And I want to thank the chairman for allowing Mr. Spratt to participate in these hearings. I think that he and Mr. Weldon probably have had the most experience with the committees on which they serve on, and it's my understanding they have been through some of the closed hearings with Intelligence, as well as several hearings Mr. Weldon has held in his committee.

So with that, I would like to yield my time to Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. I thank the gentlelady for yielding. Let me say briefly that I am a supporter of Ballistic Missile Defense. Twice, when Democrats controlled the House in recent years, when our committee reduced the request for Ballistic Missile Defense, I went to the House floor with amendments that carried plusing up the accounts. But I think we have to be budget realists about the defense budget.

This year, we are adding \$12 billion to \$13 billion, which is the last of the big plus-ups of the Defense budget. If you look at both the Republicans' planned and programmed budget from now until 2003 and the Democrats', in no year does the Defense budget in the outyears increase by more than \$2 to \$3 billion, 1 percent. It is going to be very difficult to accommodate substantial programming increases for any program and also accommodate the programs that will be entering production, like the V-22 and the F-22 in this Defense budget. It is a very tight budget.

CBO came out with a realistic estimate of what it will cost to put a Ballistic Missile Defense system worthy of the name in place. Now, it is quite possible to do it for less, a lot less. The Army and the Air Force, all of the services, are competing for the role and

mission of taking on Ballistic Missile Defense, and they have come up with estimates that range from \$2.4 billion to about \$7 billion over and above what's already in the future years' defense plan.

These costs, it should be noted, are based on a very, very limited program. The \$2 to \$5 billion will buy you 20 interceptors based at Grand Forks; it will buy you four test shots to prove the efficacy of those interceptors, and it will buy two ground-based radars.

Twenty interceptors, according to the study done by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization on July 31, 1995, page 3, will address a threat of four warheads. That's \$5 to \$7 billion. Obviously, we want more protection than that, and I don't think a system worthy of the name is anything less than 100 ground-based interceptors with two ground-based radars at one site.

That will buy you protection against 20 warheads. That cost is substantially more than the \$5 to \$7 billion we are talking about. If it works, I would say we should go to multiple sites, one on the West Coast, one on the East Coast, one at Grand Forks; and we would want to put the ground-based radar in both of those coastal locations. That, too, increases the cost substantially. At 300 GBIs, three sites, the warhead threat level of protection according to BMDO is 50 warheads, 50 re-entry vehicles.

So what I am saying is that for a substantial sum of money, you get very limited protection. I am for doing it, because I think we should move in the direction of defensive systems to augment and eventually, hopefully, replace the old system of mutually assured destruction upon which our strategic security is based. But everybody should understand that even after spending these substantial sums, we do not have a complete panoply of Ballistic Missile Defenses erected over this country. It is not a leak-proof system by any means. Deterrence is still a very major factor in protecting this country for many years to come, whether it's against Russia or rogue leaders in countries like North Korea.

Now, obviously once we have deployed the ground-based interceptors, we will want to see to it that the detectability of incoming targets is expanded beyond the horizon and the GBRs, or ground-based radars, are limited to the horizon; so we want to deploy a constellation of satellites once known as Brilliant Eyes, now known as SMTS, Space and Missile Tracking System. That will cost several billions more.

Some of it is programmed into the budget now, but the bill that was to have come before us last week, as the Defense Conference Report last year called for, mandated an IOC, an initial operational capability, in the year 2003. The Air Force says that acceleration alone will cost \$2 billion more.

Once you have deployed these things, you then begin to realize that we are protecting ourselves against 50, 60, 70 warheads. If it works, maybe we want more.

The bill that was to have come up last week envisioned the possibility of having a space-based layering, specifically enumerated that. Rather than keeping Ballistic Missile Defense for the near term focused on ground-based treaty compliance systems, it opened up as candidate possibilities both sea-based and space-based system; and so CBO said, if you want that, and you probably need it to provide you anything like the leak-proof or adequate protection



worthy of the name ballistic missile defense, the cost begins to go up substantially, astronomically.

A space-based system, according to BMDO last year, would cost \$40 billion. This study, published in July, says the minimum it will cost is around \$20 billion. And once again, that is a system that gives you limited protection. This takes you back to the old "G-pals," days of the Bush administration. We still depend upon deterrence, we still do not have a leak-proof defense, and those who would suggest that in the near term we can erect defenses over this country that will give us complete assurance are misleading the public.

They are also misleading the public in another respect. We are spending very substantial sums on Ballistic Missile Defense. We have spent substantial sums on Ballistic Missile Defense, \$35 billion since Ronald Reagan's speech in 1983. Nothing fielded yet. Primarily, we have not fielded anything yet, not for lack of funding—\$35 billion is a lot of money in anybody's book—it's for lack of focus.

The problem with last week's bill was, it sent the Pentagon off in pursuit of multiple systems rather than focusing in on near-term-attainable systems like the ground-based treaty compliant interceptors based at Grand Forks.

In addition, all of this argument about national missile defense obscures the fact that we are spending substantial sums on theater missile defense, and that, by everybody's common consent, is the most pressing threat. That is the threat that our troops will face almost anywhere in the world if we are deployed.

And right now, we are improving the PAC 2. We are bringing on line the extended-range interceptor known as the PAC 3. We are stepping up and bringing on line the production of the THAAD, the Theater High Altitude Air Defense system, and we are also, through Congress, pumping more money into the so-called Upper Tier System, which the Navy will field aboard its ships. Four systems right now in advanced development and nearing production and testing, which will deal with the theater threat.

My good friend, Mr. Woolsey, recently wrote an article, an op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal, in which he decried the fact that if the Chinese were to attack Taiwan that they would probably use ballistic missiles. But if they used ballistic missiles, they would probably use them in a theater mode; they would probably not need anything like an ICBM. They don't have that many ICBMs anyway. They would use theater ballistic missiles, and we are developing four systems that would address that particular threat in an area as narrow as the Formosa Straits.

Mr. EHRLICH. I would ask the gentleman to finish.

Mr. SPRATT. OK. The final point is, we need to depoliticize this issue and have some sensible debate about it.

I commend my colleague, Mr. Weldon, this year for "plusing-up" the budget and for making the President's "three plus three" proposal a credible proposal, because I think that puts us on the track to a deployable system within the timeframe we are all talking about.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EHRLICH. I thank the gentleman.

In the interests of time, the Chair would ask other Members to place their opening statements in the record. Without objection, so ordered.

Pursuant to committee rules, the Chair notes that we will be operating under the 5-minute rule. I would like to assure all Members that we will proceed with as many rounds of questioning as are necessary to accommodate Members' individual concerns or inquiries.

With that, I would like to introduce our first panelist, our friend the Honorable Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania and sponsor of a measure currently before the Congress relating to Ballistic Missile Defense. Congressman Weldon is a member of the National Security Committee and also chairs the Subcommittee on Military Research and Development. He is also a member of the Military Readiness Subcommittee and the Congressional Military Defense Caucus.

For the record, he is also a recipient of many awards for his public policy work, including the Taxpayers Hero Award from Citizens Against Government Waste, the Watchdog of the Treasury Award, the Sound Dollar Award from the Free Congress Foundation, and the Citizens for a Sound Economy's Jefferson Award, as well as the American Security Council's National Security Leadership Award.

In short, he is a national security expert, with the taxpayers' interests never far from his mind.

Curt, welcome.

**STATEMENT OF HON. CURT WELDON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA**

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank all the members of the subcommittee for allowing me this opportunity and thank the subcommittee for their foresight in holding this very timely hearing, one that I think will help continue to provoke the national mindset in terms of what should be our posture as it relates to the vulnerability of this country from the threat of a rogue missile attack or the threat of an attack.

Let me say, Mr. Chairman, you highlighted my purpose here as being the chairman of the Research and Development Subcommittee, which it is, but I also take great pride in spending an equal amount of time on Russian-American relations. Since my undergraduate degree in Russian studies, I have traveled to the Soviet Union, and now Russia, perhaps 10 times, most recently twice this year. I take great pride in co-chairing three major congressional efforts with the Russia Duma members in the energy area, the environment area. And I have just recently been asked by Speaker Gingrich to lead an effort where our Congress for the first time will have a direct dialog with members of the Russian Duma. In fact, I just received my third letter from Mr. Selesnev, the Speaker of the Russian Duma, accepting our proposal for the first joint exchanges of Duma members with our Congress to build better understanding and relationships that will occur before the end of this year.

So, I am here not as someone who wants to stick it in the eye, as some would like to portray conservatives who in the past supported missile defense, but as someone who understands the reality that while we have a Russia that is certainly different from what

the Soviet Union was 5 to 7 years ago, the military leadership in that country is in fact the same.

The mindset of the military structure is very similar to what it was under Soviet leadership. And when we have had perestroika and glasnost throughout the economy of Russia and while we want to support the efforts of Boris Yeltsin and the reformers, we must also understand and never look away from the reality of what's occurring within the Russian military. And that requires us to take a different look from that of this administration.

In my opinion, this administration still operates in a 1960's, put your arm around them mentality, where we will do anything and ignore anything just to make sure that Boris Yeltsin's election is successful next month. And while I want Boris Yeltsin to succeed, I am one that at every possible opportunity wants to be candid and above board with the Russians. They respect that. That's why they respected Ronald Reagan. And when we appear as though we are dish rags and as though we are not going to call the Russians on treaty violations, as this administration has done repeatedly, and when we back away from the effort to protect our people, even when the Russians have an operational ABM system protecting 80 percent of their population, I think they misjudge us, and I think they also, the Russian people, see that as a weakness.

Let me start off by saying, Mr. Chairman, I would like to comment on an article that was prepared last year by Bruce Blair from the Brookings Institute, who is a senior policy leader, who's not someone who normally comes in and testifies before the Congress in support of Republican or conservative initiatives. Bruce Blair's in-depth analysis of the status of Russian nuclear security, I think, summed it up best. He makes the point in his article, which I will be happy to provide for any of our colleagues, that today Russia is more destabilized than at any point in time in the last 30 years when it comes to nuclear materials or nuclear weapons or nuclear forces.

In fact, I will quote from Mr. Blair's article, "From the standpoint of operational safety, Russia's nuclear posture is more dangerous today than it was during the cold war." Yet all around the country we are hearing this misconception that somehow all is well and that there is no problem.

In fact, Mr. Chairman, if we look at what occurred January 25, 1995, when the Norwegian Government launched a weather rocket into their own territory for the purposes of assessing weather conditions, they had notified Russia in advance of this rocket launch. But because the status of the Russian military, in my mind, is more paranoid than ever, they activated the attache case controlled by Boris Yeltsin for the first time in the history of Boris Yeltsin's leadership.

As a matter of fact, the missile flew from northern Norway to Spitsbergen on January 25th. Norway had given advance notice but yet the Russian military put its defenses on to full alert up to the level of President Yeltsin. In fact, the next day President Yeltsin was quoted as saying, "Yesterday, I used my attache case for the first time." He was clearly referring to the black box. "I called the Defense Minister and the relevant services and asked them what kind of missile it was and where did it come from."

In fact, beyond what Boris Yeltsin says, the Chief of the General Staff for Russia, General Klanesnikov claimed that the Norwegian science rocket could be a new type of military missile. And then further on, we had the chairman of the Military Committee in the Russian Duma, Shrijushenkov, who warned that such actions as the Norwegian missile launch, and I quote, "could lead to nuclear war being triggered in the event of an accident."

Now, Mr. Chairman, these aren't rash statements by conservative Republicans. This is the mindset of the people inside of Russia's military who led their country up to the point of a possible offensive attack or a launch of strategic missiles. That would have been cataclysmic for the world, not just for Norway and not just for Russia. In fact, they were within minutes—if not seconds, within minutes of launching one of their strategic missiles, and that's because of the same insecurity outlined by Bruce Blair in his Brookings report last year.

But let's look beyond that one incident. And that's not the only one, I might add. On December 8 of last year, Mr. Chairman, the Washington Post reported—despite what the administration claims was inherent in bringing Russia into the missile control technology regime and assuring us that there will be no technology transfer, the Washington Post reported that they had intercepted with Jordanian and Israeli intelligence a shipment of advanced accelerometers and gyroscopes that can only be used for long-range ICBMs. These advanced accelerometers and gyroscopes were coming from Russia and they were going to Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, this was not an isolated instance. Our security agencies have these materials in their hands today. Any Member can request a classified briefing and get the latest information on this technology, and they can also find out that we have other instances, there were other similar materials found in the Tigris River basin that also were coming from Russia and going to Iraq.

The significance of this is twofold. First of all, it means that Iraq is desperately trying to gain technology for a long-range ICBM, and they are not trying to develop it in-country as our intelligence people would have us think. That's a real threat, and that's why they say, well, it's a period of 5, 10, maybe 15 years before a country like Iraq could develop this.

That's not the approach Iraq is going to use. They are going to steal or buy this technology from a country that already has it. And this is a concrete incident documented by the Washington Post provided to us by Jordanian and Israeli intelligence that this technology is being transferred.

When I asked the American ambassador, Ambassador Pickering, in Moscow in January, what was the response of the Russians to the violation of the MTCR, his response, Mr. Chairman, was, we haven't asked them yet.

Now, why wouldn't the Clinton administration ask the Russians about a direct violation of the MTCR? And that's because this administration, in my opinion, has so convoluted its support of treaties and arms control agreements that it doesn't want to ask a question because it knows the response is going to require economic sanctions to be placed against Russia which then is going to undermine Boris Yeltsin's Presidential race.

So here we have an administration saying that their basic relationship with Russia is based on arms control agreements, but when the Russians violate one of those agreements, they don't want to ask the question or call into play the violations because the sanctions then would have to be imposed.

Mr. Chairman, you can't have it both ways. If you are for arms control agreements, then, doggone it, you'd better enforce them. And if you are not going to enforce them then certainly you have to acknowledge that we are vulnerable. So the second incident is the treaty violation and the technology transfer.

A third incident, Mr. Chairman, if one of my staff would put up the SS-25 chart, what I am showing you here is an SS-25, perhaps the mainstay of the Russian strategic force structure. The SS-25 is a mobile launch system. As you can see, it's carried on mobile launch trucks, tractors. The Russians have over 400 of these launchers. We don't know exactly; we think it's over 400. The number would be classified if we did know it.

The Russians' SS-25 has a range of 10,000 kilometers. That means that that SS-25 can hit any city in the United States or any of our allies, 10,000 kilometers. Now, up until recently, the SS-25 has been very strictly controlled because it's always had a nuclear weapon on the top of it and it has been under the central command and control of a very centralized, tightly controlled leadership.

Well, that's not the case today, Mr. Chairman. Russia is desperately in need of hard currency. They are selling everything and marketing everything they can, and I understand the need for that, which is why I am helping them in their energy area so they don't have to sell their nuclear materials, but could allow us to help them with energy developments, which we are doing. We just concluded two major deals that will see \$15 billion of Western investment at Sakhalin in eastern Siberia.

The SS-25, the Russians now are marketing as a space launch platform, Mr. Chairman. Now, they were originally going to sell the SS-25 system directly to a country that would buy it and they initially proposed last year to have a separate launch capability in both Brazil and South Africa.

When we heard that, we said, that is just ridiculous. We put pressure on the administration. The administration responded and said, that you can't do that. That's another violation of an existing arms control agreement. But what the Russians are doing now is they are offering this capability to any country that will pay the price.

Mr. Chairman, before my subcommittee we have had the intelligence community come in, and they have said to us publicly that it would be possible for one of those launchers to be taken out of country without us knowing it. Mr. Chairman, it doesn't take a rocket scientist to understand that one of those SS-25 systems, just one of them—and not with a nuclear tip on it; take the nuclear weapon off—with a conventional weapon, a biological or a chemical weapon, presents a threat to this country for which we have no defense.

Mr. Chairman, I am here to tell you that this threat is not 10 years away. This threat is a matter of months and years away because when the right price is paid, we will have this technology get

in the hands of one of our enemies or perhaps a rogue nation that may not launch it, but may threaten to launch realizing we have no defense against this type of a threat.

Mr. Chairman, this is real. The instability in the Russian military has been documented. I will be happy to provide for the record a study done by Deborah Jarsis Cabal from the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, where they did a scientific poll, using Russian polling companies, of the Russian military, looking at their loyalty to the senior Russian military officer leadership. In addition, this poll looks specifically at—15 percent of the sampling were people who oversee strategic nuclear forces inside of Russia. The results are alarming because the concerns are real.

Likewise, Mr. Chairman, if you read the Russian media, over the past year there have been repeated times where Russian utility companies have cutoff the power supplies to strategic installations. At one point in time, the entire strategic headquarters of Russia's nuclear command and control had lost its power because the defense ministry had not paid its power bill for a matter of 6 months. Boris Yeltsin had to intercede and had to have the Russian Duma enact special legislation to make sure that power was not cutoff to one of Russia's strategic military installations.

Mr. Chairman, the instability in Russia is real. It is dramatic. And, unfortunately, we have no protection for our people against the possible sale of a technology or a capability which would pose an immediate threat to us.

Now, Mr. Chairman, let me say that Russia is not the only threat that we have. And the liberals will say, well, we are trying to protect ourselves against an all-out nuclear attack. No one is saying that. No one is saying that we are fearful of an all-out nuclear attack, and that is not what we are talking about. We are talking about the kind of situation I have just outlined to you.

We are talking about North Korea developing a Taepo Dong 2 missile, and the Taepo Dong 4 missile which could eventually reach Alaska and Hawaii. We are talking about the Chinese with the CSS-2 and the CSS-4, which could have a similar capability, not in 10 years, but in a matter of 5 to 7 years. We are talking about threats that are real.

When those who argue that we must strictly adhere to the ABM Treaty talk about mutually assured destruction, they never want to talk about the fact that North Korea and China are not signatories to the ABM Treaty. There are no similar constraints placed upon North Korea and China. And those same people who call for strict adherence to the ABM Treaty also, Mr. Chairman, don't want to speak to the fact that Russia already has an operational ABM system. Their ABM system, which has been upgraded three times, protects 80 percent of the people around Moscow—or 80 percent of the population of Russia. It's an effective system. It's real and it's in place.

The irony of this whole debate is that what we are saying—and this is a bipartisan effort by the way; it's not just the Republicans, although our party is leading the way. What we are saying is that our people deserve the same protection that the Russian people have. And, in fact, we can provide that initially within the confines of the ABM Treaty. This President doesn't want to do anything

within the ABM Treaty. In fact, this President doesn't want to move toward missile defense.

Let me get to my closing comment, Mr. Chairman, and say that we have the technology, we have the capability. The rhetoric that came out last week about dollar amount was a red herring. Anyone who knows the issue knows that there are capabilities that we can clearly articulate, which I will be happy to respond to, that have cost us in the—that are not in the tens of billions of dollars of ranges, and they are not pie-in-the-sky dreams.

General Garner and General Lenhart have both testified on the record, even though the administration tried to gag them, in a hearing that I held earlier this year that they have options that are in the \$2.5 to \$5 billion range that give us a thin layer of protection while we move toward a more robust protection. That more robust protection, Mr. Chairman, is going to require us to eventually amend the ABM Treaty or eventually do away with it and ignore it.

What I am saying, Mr. Chairman, is—and I know there are some others in my party who disagree with me—I think in moving toward, in amending or in doing away or abrogating the ATM Treaty, we need to take into consideration the Russian perspective; and therefore, I think we should proceed more slowly with the capability of technology we have now, while convincing the Russians, which our bill allows us to do over the next year and even beyond that perhaps, that they should work with us in a joint way to explore missile defense technologies.

And in that regard, Mr. Chairman, in our Defense bill that passed the House 2 weeks ago, we put \$20 million in that bill with a specific line item for joint Russian-American missile defense initiatives. So we are not about tweaking the Russians. We are not about scaring the American people. This is a debate based on substance and based on fact and based on a real threat.

I thank your subcommittee for allowing this timely discussion and I would be happy to respond to any questions that you might have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Weldon follows:]

Statement of Congressman Curt Weldon  
May 30, 1996

Hearing on Ballistic Missile Defense  
National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice Subcommittee

This morning it gives me great pleasure to testify before the Government Reform and Oversight Subcommittee on National Security on an issue of major national importance: ballistic missile defense. I thank my colleagues on the Committee for providing me with this opportunity to present the facts on missile defense -- facts that are not as well understood by the American people as they should be.

Unfortunately, there has been a great deal of misinformation put forward on the issue of national missile defense. As a result, many have expressed concerns about the Defend America Act, H.R. 3144. I would like to address a number of concerns that have been raised regarding the Defend America Act and sort out fact from fiction.

First and foremost, I would like to discuss the cost associated with deployment of a national missile defense -- because this remains the most important concern of many Americans and Members of Congress. And it is the one area where there has been the greatest distortion. Opponents insist that a national missile defense system would cost tens of billions of dollars, and now cite the CBO estimates up to \$60 billion. They are insisting that a national missile defense would require layered defenses and space-based weapons, and as a result, assumed greatly inflated costs. The facts do not bear out their argument.

H.R. 3144 calls for a national missile defense by 2003 to defend only against a rogue missile attack or accidental launch. According to Pentagon officials, we can deploy such a national missile defense for between \$2 and \$7 billion, depending on the option the President chooses. The Air Force has stated for the record that it can provide an ABM-Treaty compliant national missile defense for \$2 billion, and the Army can provide one for \$5 billion within four years. These funds have already been included in the Republican budget resolution -- we are not asking for new money.

Earlier this year, the Research and Development Subcommittee which I chair had planned hearings on these Treaty-compliant options. Army and Air Force officials had prepared their briefings and were ready to testify. But mysteriously, just two days before that hearing, the Secretary of Defense put a gag on the witnesses. They were told to cancel, because this Administration did not want the record to show that the ABM Treaty and cost are no obstacle to a near-term deployment of a national missile defense. Had we heard from those witnesses, there would be less confusion and more momentum toward a national missile defense today.



Another issue continually raised by opponents of the Defend America Act is that it would require the U.S. to abrogate or withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Wrong. Under the current terms of the ABM Treaty, both the United States and Russia are allowed a single anti-ballistic missile site to defend their citizens from a ballistic missile attack. Russia has taken advantage of this provision and deployed a treaty compliant missile defense system around Moscow. As I just mentioned, there are at least two Treaty-compliant option that the President could choose to deploy right now.

Yet another argument that opponents have unconvincingly used is that deployment of a national missile defense would be a major impediment to START II ratification. Having spoken with Russian officials and Russian citizens countless times, I can tell you this is a red herring. The Russians have made repeatedly clear that the real impediment to START II ratification is NATO expansion, not the deployment of a missile defense or ABM amendments. President Clinton continues to push for the expansion of NATO with little concern for START II. Ironically, President Clinton opposes a national missile defense, arguing that he fears it will undermine START II.

Given that this legislation would not cost taxpayers tens of billions of dollars, that it would not require the abrogation of the ABM Treaty, and that deployment of a national missile defense is not a major impediment to Russia's ratification of START II, opponents have been forced to argue that there is no ballistic missile threat to the United States. Missile defense opponents cite the 1995 National Intelligence Estimate as proof that a threat to the U.S. does not exist. That claim is both misleading and dangerous. What the NIE does say is that there is no threat to the continental U.S. from a rogue nation, such as Iraq, independently developing and deploying a ballistic missile for ten to fifteen years.

Unfortunately, this Administration has chosen to ignore the ballistic missile threat to Alaska and Hawaii. If a rogue nation attempts to nuclear blackmail the United States by threatening to attack one or both of these states, would the President simply dismiss these states as a lost cause? I doubt it. Any consideration of the threat to the United States must take into account the entire fifty states, especially since previous CIA testimony confirms that long-range missiles -- the Taepo Dong 2 -- now under development by North Korea may pose a threat to Alaska or Hawaii by the year 2000 or shortly thereafter.

The NIE also ignores the most realistic possibility that a rogue nation will purchase a ballistic missile or ballistic missile technology from a country that currently or will in the near future possesses the technology. North Korea, for example, has been more than willing in the past to export SCUD-type missiles for hard currency or oil. And as the country's economy continues its downward spiral, there is little reason to be hopeful that North Korea would not take advantage of any opportunity to sell its deadly new weapon.

The situation in the former Soviet Union is also cause for grave concern. Reports indicate that Russian soldiers are underfed, underpaid, and highly demoralized. Soldiers have resorted to selling ammunition and weapons to obtain money for food and vodka. Recently, the power was cut off to a Russian military base, a base that happened to be the strategic command center for Russia's nuclear weapon arsenal.

Even more ominous are the proposals by some in Russia to sell mobile SS-25 ballistic missiles to foreign countries as space launch vehicles for satellites. These intercontinental-range missiles are capable of striking any city in the United States from within the United States. Should these rockets fall into the wrong hands, it would not require much effort to reverse the process by which they were transformed from long-range ballistic missiles into space launch vehicles, making a rogue nation capable of striking American cities. With Russian military corruption and disaffection on the increase, there is also reason to be concerned of the illicit sale or transfer of such weapons. And the CIA recently acknowledged to me in a briefing on the NIE that if an SS-25 is transferred out of Russia, we might not detect it. But once that occurs it would be too late to decide to deploy a national missile defense.

Even if you want to ignore these facts, it makes no sense to remain undefended until a threat emerges. It will take a few years to put a defense into place. It would be extremely unwise to wait for a threat to become clear to all before we commit ourselves to deploying a limited national missile defense. The earlier we deploy, the greater chance we have of deterring nations from attacking or developing new missiles. Until we make a decision to deploy, the Russians will not take our plans seriously or begin to discuss ABM changes with us.

As you may know, I have a longstanding involvement in U.S.-Russian relations, and have worked actively over the years to promote more cooperative efforts between our nations. I started the U.S./Former Soviet Union Energy Caucus to encourage U.S. involvement in energy development in Russia. I convinced the Speaker to establish a Duma - Congress Study Group, and included funds in the defense authorization bill for an account to support U.S.-Russian technology developments.

My philosophy has never been to use Russia as a convenient political whipping boy and I have rejected efforts which would seriously jeopardize our relations with that nation. I was not an original cosponsor of H.R. 3144, specifically because I wanted time to review the bill and ensure that it would not mandate any actions that would adversely impact U.S.-Russian relations.

After considering H.R. 3411 thoroughly, I am convinced that it is the right approach. This bill will ensure that we begin working constructively with the Russians to convince them that it is in the interests of both our nations to be defended against missile threats. We should not put that necessary step off any longer, as the Administration would have us do.

Mr. EHRLICH. This is a fascinating issue, particularly for freshmen Members of Congress, and you have certainly touched upon an awful lot of interesting observations as many of us newer to Congress have gotten into this issue. I have a couple of questions for you, Curt, briefly.

When the President vetoed the Defense Authorization bill last December, he argued that the provisions calling for deployment of National Missile Defense by 2003, as you know, would violate the ABM Treaty and threaten progress with respect to negotiations.

What is your view with respect to the validity of the President's argument?

Mr. WELDON. I don't know that there's a polite way to say—maybe I should say he misspoke, because I don't want to use the word "lie." But in no way did our bill cause the ABM Treaty to be violated. In fact, I was the one last year who opposed an amendment that was going to be offered on the House floor that would have had us abrogate the ABM Treaty immediately. It in no way, would have caused the President to violate the ABM Treaty, no way.

The second part of your question dealt with the—

Mr. EHRLICH. Future negotiations.

Mr. WELDON [continuing]. Future negotiations.

What's interesting with this administration is they always throw up what we are doing as a possible mechanism or activity that will cause the Russian Duma to not ratify the START II talks. What's absolutely amazing to me, as someone who traveled to Russia twice this year and who interacts with Russians all the time, I had two in my office this morning, they don't talk about the ABM Treaty. When Senator Bradley and I were there at the Carnegie Center for International Peace in Moscow 3 weeks ago, the only issue we heard all day was the expansion of NATO and the possibility of former Soviet republics being brought into NATO. There was no discussion about what we are doing here, yet this administration never wants to talk about NATO expansion because they are for that. So they always throw up the red herring of missile defense.

You can't have it both ways again, Mr. Chairman. If you are saying that missile defense is a possible threat to START II, well then you better acknowledge that the No. 1 priority of every Russian, from Mr. Lukin, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, to every leader of every political party in Russia, is the expansion of NATO, and you better acknowledge that and discuss that upfront.

Mr. EHRLICH. You certainly raise a troubling point, which seems to be a compliance with treaties with respect to this administration; compliance with treaties is subrogated at the administration's whim to geopolitical consideration. That seems to be the thrust of your testimony.

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Chairman, I would encourage—I would implore this subcommittee to look at the whole legacy of our lack of enforcing arms control agreements which this administration claims are its mainstay. Because you could get the ring magnet, the ring magnet sale that occurred last year, which the administration waived the sanctions on, you could get rocket motor transactions that occurred in 1993, the carbon fiber technology in May 1995, the MTCR violation of the accelerometers and the gyroscopes

in December, all of which the administration waives or they say we don't have enough evidence, or we really can't verify that, all of it is gobbledygook that basically reinforced the notion that while we have arms control agreements, we don't want to enforce them.

Mr. EHRLICH. Let me ask you—in my view, this is a threshold issue and something I am struggling with, quite frankly.

What do you believe the U.S. policy should be with respect to the ABM Treaty?

Mr. WELDON. Well, I—

Mr. EHRLICH. It's the cornerstone of our strategic defense. What is your position?

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Chairman, my first amendment as a freshman Member of Congress in 1987 was the Krasnoyarsk amendment, which basically said the ABM Treaty was violated by the Russians with the installation of Krasnoyarsk. It passed the House by a vote of 418 to 0, yet the liberals said, don't worry about it. It's a technical violation of the treaty, but it's really—it's really not designed for battle management. It's just for space tracking purposes.

Last year, General Volintsev, who for 18 years was the Russian Commander in Charge of Strategic Forces, acknowledged publicly that he was ordered to put Krasnoyarsk where it was located, in direct violation of the ABM Treaty. So my opinion is the Russians have never seriously looked at their adherence to the same treaty the liberals always want us to adhere to.

Now, I will say this, the treaty has had some positive benefit when we were two superpowers. Even though the Russians have violated it from time to time, it has had some positive benefit, but the treaty eventually either has to be seriously amended or done away with.

Now my point is that we should do it and be sensitive to the political sensitivity of the ABM Treaty in Russia. And that means we need to work with people like Dr. Keith Payne, who's one of your witnesses today, who will talk about the kinds of initiatives we are doing with the Russians to get them to understand that missile defense and common defense is the appropriate direction of the future and not this ridiculous posture of mutually assured destruction.

So my opinion is, the ABM Treaty has outlived its usefulness but we should be gradual in terms of the way we move away from it and the way we amend it. And certainly what really troubles me is this administration is right now in Geneva putting in place a side agreement to the ABM Treaty that will make it difficult, if not impossible, to amend, because this administration wants to now allow the former Soviet republics to be equal signatories to the ABM Treaty. They want to multilateralize it.

When I was in Geneva and met with Mr. Koltunov, who was the chief Russian negotiator, I asked him the question: Why do you want to multilateralize the treaty? Ukraine, Belarus, they don't have the kind of capability that the treaty covers. So why do you want them to have an equal say?

He looked me right in the eye and he said: "Mr. Congressman, you should be asking that question to the person sitting next to you," who was Stanley Riveles, Mr. Clinton's chief negotiator. He said he has never raised that issue with us.

So my impression is that it wasn't the Russians pushing to multilateralize the treaty, that it was this administration. Now why would they want to multilateralize the treaty? Well, one of my grave concerns is that perhaps it would make it more difficult to amend the treaty because then instead of just having two signatories, you have the United States and you have as many as four, or perhaps as much as 12, former Soviet republics as equal signatories to the ABM Treaty.

Mr. EHRLICH. I think I want to come back to that issue. That's a disturbing observation.

At this point, I will recognize our friend Karen Thurman from Florida.

Mrs. THURMAN. And I will yield my time to Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Weldon, you make a very forceful case, but the last point, surely, surely, we haven't reached a conundrum in our foreign policy where we try to complicate life for ourselves by inviting more people to the bargaining table. I would agree with you about multilateralizing the treaty, but surely we aren't somehow perniciously doing that so we make the treaty more difficult to amend.

Mr. WELDON. May I respond?

Mr. SPRATT. Sure.

Mr. WELDON. When I raised the question with Mr. Koltunov, directly across the table from me, he looked me right in the eye and he said, Mr. Congressman—

Mr. SPRATT. But you said our motive was to make it more difficult for the treaty to be amended.

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Congressman, he said, you are raising that issue with the wrong person. You should raise that issue with the person sitting next to you.

The implication was, this was not a priority that Russia was pushing, that this was something that our own negotiating side—now, I would say this to you, Mr. Spratt, there are some, and you know this, in the administration, who are so wedded to the ABM Treaty that they don't want to have any discussion at all about any change to it.

And you are aware of this as someone who supported the eventual modification of the treaty.

Mr. SPRATT. Absolutely. And—

Mr. WELDON. You are aware there are some in the arms control arena, who have their arms so tightly around this treaty they think it is the cornerstone of everything that we do and say with the Russians.

Mr. SPRATT. Let me ask you briefly, because I am subject to a 5-minute limit; what are you calling for?

Mr. WELDON. I am sorry?

Mr. SPRATT. What sort of Ballistic Missile Defense System are you calling for to be deployed?

Mr. WELDON. I am calling—first of all, I am not a technical expert and I don't profess to know what's the right technology. What I am saying is that we have the capability right now to provide a protection, treaty compliant, within a short period of time, at a low cost, which this President said we did not. We have proven him totally wrong on this issue.

What I also am saying is that that investment, I think, would be wise, because it would give us the capability now from a single site, and I know there are others who will disagree with me following me, while we look at a more robust capability, that will require a modification of the ABM Treaty, that could require what you have proposed, which is a multiple-site, land-based system, or that could require at a much more cost-effective way a use of our existing Navy capability using the Aegis technology that would give us a national missile defense capability that is—that would pose a direct threat to the ABM Treaty and would require major change to the treaty. That would be down the road.

But what I am saying is, make things happen, Mr. Spratt, what I would say to you is the key difference between what we want to do and what this President wants to do, is one word, and that is “deploy.”

Mr. SPRATT. I understand that.

Mr. WELDON. Mal O'Neill has said repeatedly we have the capability.

Mr. SPRATT. What you are calling for in the near term, and by that I mean between now and 2003, is a ground-based system based initially at Grand Forks, 100 interceptors up to the treaty limit, and then you decide where to go from there based upon its efficacy and its cost.

Mr. WELDON. I have read your comments along that line. I would say to you that I understand where you are coming from.

Would you agree then to put the word “deploy” in your alternative to make that happen?

Mr. SPRATT. Our bill simply says, spend 3 years developing it and if you have got something worth deploying, worth what it costs, efficacious, then make the decision then to deploy. But do it in such a way—and I give you credit for this—plus-up the funding in the next 3 years so that in 3 years' time you are at that point where you can realistically make that decision and within 3 years move to a realistic deployment.

Mr. WELDON. The problem with that is it will be like we have done for the past 10 years, which you alluded to, we have put a lot of money, we have got nothing deployed—well, we have gotten something deployed. And I think you would acknowledge, we have a lot of technology—

Mr. SPRATT. Sure.

Mr. WELDON [continuing]. In the battlefield that's helping our troops. But unless and until we make a decision—I think you will hear Dr. Payne mention later on, hopefully in his testimony, that actually deployment can be a deterrence and that we can talk about deploying a defensive system as a deterrent, which we have never heard the administration talk about before.

So I actually think the word “deploy” and having this Congress and administration go on record as deploying, will send a signal to the Russians that we are serious. We are not serious about gaining an advantage over them. We are serious about moving away from this ridiculous, mad theory that has outlived its usefulness.

Mr. SPRATT. Would you agree that ratification of START II is essential to having an effective missile defense? They are removing 5,000 warheads, which is many more warheads than we can neu-

tralize, of any sort of defensive system deployable in the foreseeable future?

Mr. WELDON. If I was confident that the Russians will totally adhere to the final terms of the agreement, then perhaps I would be more aggressive in my support. I am not sure of that, given the status of the Russian military.

I don't know whether the gentleman has had a chance to read the Surikov document or not.

Mr. Chairman, I am going to leave this document here. You need to ask me about this, if you have time. But if you look at the internal thinking in the Russian military, some of it is very scary. And the Surikov document, which is a 40-page document developed internally by one of the Russian defense think tanks, presents some very scary scenarios in terms of what the relationship of the United States should be. And, therefore, I am still reserving judgment on START II, although I do support the objectives of what it wants to accomplish, Mr. Spratt. I'm not ready to fully embrace that right now at this point in time.

Mr. SPRATT. I was simply saying, I think you said it obliquely, namely that—elliptically, namely, that it doesn't pay us now to rattle the Russians' cage on—

Mr. WELDON. Right.

Mr. SPRATT [continuing]. The ABM Treaty.

Mr. WELDON. Right.

Mr. SPRATT. Our first objective should be START II ratification, START I implementation, getting those warheads out. And once we get to a world of 2 to 3,000 warheads, we can realistically begin talking about defensive systems that will give us substantial protection.

Mr. WELDON. Well, when you listen to—

Mr. SPRATT. And then we can also talk about modification of a treaty that's 30—25, 30 years old.

Mr. WELDON. Those discussions are already taking place. Mr. Yeltsin, when I was there in January, had already appointed, which hasn't got much public play, a multi-member, I believe it's 20 members, of his senior leadership on the Duma who are looking at modifying the ABM Treaty and looking at the ABM Treaty itself and what Russia is concerned with. We should be doing the same thing in this country.

We are already having discussions with the Russians about the ABM Treaty. I think the key impetus here is once we make a decision to deploy, that's going to change the discussions. Right now the Russians think we are bluffing because they think this President bluffs all the time.

I mean, if you look at what's happened in terms of treaty violations, what else could you think? I mean, when we don't even call them on a violation of the MTCR after we brought them into the process last fall and then we kind of ignore it and say, well, it really didn't happen or we really—we don't want to call them, or we are going to finally waive the sanctions, mean, I think the Russians see a pattern here that is not decisive and that does not want to be confrontational. I happen to think that's wrong.

Mr. EHRLICH. At this point, if there's no objection, I would ask that the Blair article be submitted for the record.

Without objection, so ordered.

[The information referred to follows:]




Bruce G. Blair

Nuc. Wpns

# LENGTHENING THE FUSE

## Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces



During the Cold War a massive array of opposing Soviet and U.S. nuclear forces stood ready for launch on a moment's notice. In accord with the perceived needs of deterrence, strategic and tactical nuclear weapons were scattered around the globe, carried by a host of ground, sea, and airborne delivery systems, and primed to inflict instant and total devastation in retaliation against any nuclear attack.

The ideological tensions of the Cold War have diminished, the urgency of the need for deterrence has diminished, and the Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals are smaller. Yet thousands of warheads on both sides remain on hair-trigger alert. And, by a bitter irony, the geopolitical revolution that defused the Cold War confrontation has posed a chilling new nuclear danger—loss of control. In an atmosphere of political turbulence and economic duress, Russia must now oversee the tailoring nuclear weaponry of the Soviet Union, much of it still ready for instant launch. The possibilities for nuclear anarchy are many—from unauthorized use of weapons by rebellious command is in the field, to political breakdown in Moscow to a spread of nuclear weapons and material onto the global black market.

But dangerous as these scenarios are, an effective and realistic solution exists: an international

agreement to take all nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert, remove warheads or other vital components from the weapons delivery systems, and institute monitoring arrangements to verify compliance. Such an agreement would drastically reduce the risk of a catastrophic failure of nuclear control. But it would also require nuclear planners to back away from their traditional focus on deterrence—and to make a commitment to safety instead.

### Safety Always Came Second

The vast nuclear arsenals maintained by the superpowers during the Cold War were a product, of course, of deep political and ideological antagonisms. But they were also a product of the adversaries' commitment to deterrence, their faith that rational decisionmakers would refrain from striking first if they knew an opponent could retaliate with devastating effect. War was to be prevented by ensuring that each of the opposing sides was capable of retaliation destructive enough and credible enough to override any potential gain from striking first. The two defense establishments deployed forces capable of retaliating against tens of thousands of enemy nuclear warheads so in the moments between enemy missile hit-off and arrival.

In all this, deterrence came first. Safety came second. Not that safety's importance was lost on the rival strategists.

...to the Bushing... program... Zero Alert... 1995, from which this article is adapted.

organizations. After all, neither would likely have survived the political repercussions of a major failure in safety. Much of their immediate activity revolved around safety during peacetime. They strove to prevent the accidental, inadvertent, or unintentional detonation of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons received considerable attention, augmented on occasion by high-level special investigations, to identify safety hazards and remediate them. They evolved sophisticated weapon design principles and operational procedures to prevent inadvertent control. On the essential point—nuclear weapons do not explode—the record was perfect. On lesser but still critical points—namely, nuclear accidents resulting in the dispersal of toxic plutonium—it was nearly perfect.

**That deterrence took precedence over safety is nonetheless demonstrable. If safety had been a governing**

**influence at the planning level, the strategic deployments would not have been so large, so dispersed, and so geared to rapid use. At the design and daily**

**operational level, too, trade-offs between safety and deterrence were regularly resolved in favor of deterrence. For example,**

**locks to prevent low-level U.S. weapons commanders from firing strategic forces were not installed on heavy bombers until the early 1970s, on intercontinental ballistic missiles until the late 1970s. And they were installed only after a finding that they could not impede the primary retaliatory mission. The Strategic Air Command stalled on ballistic missile submarines because it feared they would jeopardize the ability of submarine crews to carry out authorized launches.**

**And although the missile propellants used in Trident and M-X missiles, as well as the**

**conventional explosives used in Trident warheads, are relatively susceptible to accidental detonation, safety requirements were waived for the sake of wartime performance.**

#### Changing Perspectives

Despite history's abrupt change of course with the end of the Cold War, the established practice of deterrence, with all its inherent danger, remains unchanged. Despite the rollback of the nuclear arsenal, let in motion by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, nuclear policy and force deployment on both sides are still directed toward deterring deliberate attack. The nuclear confrontation is thus being sustained by a dubious rationale that sustains hair-trigger postures that undercut safety.

In key respects both the U.S. and Russian nuclear portfolios are actually being enlarged. Russia, for example, has "dropped nuclear "no-first-use" policy from its new military doctrine and expanded the role of nuclear forces to compensate for the sharp decline in its conventional strength. The United States also appears reluctant to lower further its nuclear profile, despite the evaporation of the primary threat justifying nuclear vigilance during the Cold War: Soviet invasion of Western Europe. The United States now projects conventional superiority over all prospective adversaries that can rely more on conventional and less on nuclear forces. Accordingly, further reciprocal nuclear reduction would be beneficial. Yet the U.S. security establishment seems content with the numbers allowed under START II and shows little interest in another round of reductions.


Prompting that reluctance are fears that Russia may revert to authoritarian rule and revive nuclear hostility toward the West. Despite the grim outlook for the rejuvenation of Russia's economy and the projected steep decline in its defense spending for the next decade or more, uncertainty about the Kremlin's attitudes toward the outside world has assumed critical importance in U.S. estimation of the future nuclear threat and in planning U.S. nuclear posture through at least 2005. The Pentagon's annual reports the traditional U.S. strategic mission statement policy. As Defense Secretary William Perry wrote in the 1994 Defense Department annual report, "these Cold War tools of nuclear deterrence remain necessary to hedge against a resurgent Russian threat."

U.S. nuclear planners also envisage new missions tied loosely to contingencies in the third world. Although the Pentagon plans to use conventional weapons in dealing with weapons of mass destruction brandished by third-world states, U.S. nuclear forces will doubtless play a major retaliatory and deterrent role. The U.S. Air Force is identifying targets in third-world nations that are developing weapons of mass destruction—chemical, biological, and nuclear. And the U.S.

Strategic Command has assumed major responsibility for planning both nuclear and non-nuclear strikes against these targets, whose numbers could easily reach many hundreds and might approach a thousand.

China will also figure more prominently in the global nuclear balance as it modernizes its ballistic missile forces. An eightfold increase in the nuclear threat China projects to the United States may well prompt a review of U.S. nuclear planning, particularly the decision in the early 1980s to exempt China from the U.S. strategic war plan.

Like the United States and Russia, other charter nuclear states are likely to be disposed to invoke deterrence to justify aggressive behavior. Britain and France seem committed to maintain a large portion of their nuclear forces on active alert, while China's extensive program of strategic



modernization could bring its ballistic missile forces to a comparable level of combat readiness. Other states such as India, Pakistan, and Israel appear heading down the same path. In spite of strenuous international efforts to deny membership in the nuclear club, *de facto* and aspiring members not only have nuclear weapons programs but also surely have plans if not current capabilities for "weaponization"—mating nuclear warheads with dispersed delivery vehicles capable of rapid use. Intentional and technical progress are difficult to gauge, but the general picture is clear enough and does not bode well.

The proliferation of advanced aircraft and ballistic missiles with increasing range and accuracy certainly expands delivery options. In the name of deterrence, emerging nuclear states can be expected to equip, or prepare to equip quickly, these delivery systems with nuclear weapons from their stockpile. And the decision by the United States, Russia, Great Britain, and France to preserve rapid reaction postures sets an international standard that encourages emulation. Moreover, if the history of the nuclear superpowers is a reliable guide, and the classical dilemmas of nuclear security come to bear strongly on regional dynamics, regional rivals will be induced to shorten the fuses on their arsenals.

Absent effective international constraints, the standards for daily combat readiness seem destined to rise.

#### Safety First!

There can no longer be any justification for putting operational safety second. Not only is deterring a deliberate nuclear attack a less demanding challenge today than it was during the Cold War, ensuring safety has become more demanding. The disintegration of the former Soviet

Union and the dangers emerging from the attendant turmoil make loss of control the central problem of nuclear security. Indeed, the specter of nuclear anarchy, in the former Soviet Union animates U.S. policy toward Russia and drives U.S. support for the Yeltsin government and Russia's fledgling democratic institutions. Nor are weaknesses in nuclear control confined to the former Soviet Union. Lacking sophisticated systems for safely managing their arsenals, the aspiring nuclear weapon states also face problems of control. And while deliberate nuclear aggression growing out of regional tensions in areas like South Asia, the Korean peninsula, the Middle East, and other potential hot spots is conceivable, the specter of a catastrophic failure of nuclear command and control looms even larger.

If safety is to become the paramount goal of nuclear security policy, the operational stance of the world's nuclear forces—in particular, their high combat readiness—will have to change. The major defense establishments must lower their alert levels and coax the rest of the world to follow suit.

To de-alert the bomber forces, bomber payloads would be moved to storage facilities far away from the bombers'

home bases. The retrieval and uploading of the payloads would require elaborate, time-consuming, and observable procedures. Similarly, warheads (or other vital components such as guidance sets) would be removed from land-based missiles and put in storage—a standard Soviet practice for all land-based strategic forces until the late 1960s. Although warheads could also be removed from ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), an attractive alternative is to take guidance sets off the sea-based missiles and place them in storage on board attack submarines (SSNs) deployed at sea. Under routine practices, the components would remain separated at all times and invulnerable to attack. If necessary during a nuclear crisis, the SSBNs and SSNs could rendezvous and quickly transfer the guidance sets. The SSBNs could then install the components on all missiles in about 24 hours.

We should strive to further lengthen the fuse on all nuclear forces, extending the time needed to bring them to launch-ready status to weeks, months, and ultimately years.

Taking all nuclear weapons off alert—adopting a stance of universal "zero alert" in which *no* weapons were poised for immediate launch—would not only create a strict international standard of safety for daily alert, but also ease nuclear tensions by removing the threat of sudden deliberate attack. Certainly, a surprise or short-notice nuclear strike by any of the major nuclear

powers is already implausible.

But because all of them except China can mount a strike with ease, their strategic nuclear

forces, particularly those of the United States and Russia, maintain a daily posture of rapid reaction to deter it. A remote, hypothetical scenario thus induces alert operations that feed on themselves. Although designed only to deter, the operations confer the ability either to strike back in retaliation or to mitigate a sudden attack. The opposing forces create and perpetuate the very threat they seek to thwart.

In fact, an internationally monitored agreement to remove all nuclear weapons from active alert status could serve much the same purpose as traditional deterrence. Any initial preparations to restore alert status prior to attack would be detected and disclosed to monitors, allowing for counterbalancing actions thereby denying a decisive preemptive advantage to those contemplating redeployment and escalation.

Zero alert would thus eliminate the regional pretext for sustaining tensions in the post-Cold War era. Besides improving alert, it would relax the nuclear

stances, bringing them into harmony with improved political relations.

#### Overcoming Inertia

Left to themselves, the nuclear establishments will never adopt a zero-alert posture. The bureaucracies that created the standard practices of deterrence cannot be expected to put safety before deterrence.

Typical arms negotiators on both sides have little scope for reining in aggressive alert postures. Even with the low ceilings on strategic nuclear arms set by START II at the turn of the century, if the U.S. and Russian powers could

still keep thousands of warheads poised for immediate release. The nuclear control systems that regulate force operations are still generally peripheral to mainstream arms control. If arms control were to proceed as usual, the numbers of weapons would continue to drop, but their reaction time would not change. The last weapon in the arsenal would still be cocked on hair-trigger alert.

The U.S. defense establishment is aware of the danger of nuclear anarchy. Recognizing the unstable and transitional character of the Russian political center, the Pentagon has quietly initiated extensive military-to-military contacts to nurture durable cooperation between the U.S. and Russia:

military establishments. It has also conducted exercises to probe U.S. responses to nuclear attacks in Russia in various scenarios that feature illicit strategic strikes by Russian commanders. Furthermore, U.S. strategic war planners are devising options that allow selective nuclear strikes against breakaway units of the Russian nuclear force, which resorts to operations with units. The Pentagon is also spearheading an effort to encourage Russia in dismantling its nuclear arms, an endeavor it portrays as an urgent priority of U.S. national security.


Taken to its logical conclusion, this policy thrust would lead the Pentagon to make bold operational changes, including some form of zero alert, to ensure the safety of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. Yet the Pentagon's overall commitment remains deterring Russian nuclear attack.

The review of the U.S. nuclear posture completed last September exemplifies the Pentagon's parochial perspective. The review advocates aggressive hedging against a turn for the worse in U.S.-Russian relations. It ignores the safety hazards that persist or grow as a result of aggressive hedging. It advances a U.S. nuclear force structure and operational posture that will reinforce Russia's reliance on quick launch. **From the standpoint of operational safety, Russia's nuclear posture is more dangerous today than it was during the Cold War.** And current U.S. nuclear planning will likely induce Russia to take yet *more* operational risks to buttress deterrence.

The Pentagon has so internalized deterrence as the essence of its mission that it simply cannot bring the two different conceptions of nuclear threat—the risk of deliberate attack and the danger of loss of control—into clear focus and perspective. At the height of the Cold War nuclear planners could argue, with some justification, that the danger of deliberate attack necessitated putting safety second. Today they cannot.

Redirecting nuclear policy toward an emphasis on safety not only addresses the danger of nuclear anarchy but would also constrain the ability of any state to launch a sudden nuclear attack. But if safety is ever to be put first in U.S. nuclear planning, it will be because public discussion and broad public support—not the Pentagon—not it there. ■

From the standpoint of operational safety,  
Russia's nuclear posture is more dangerous  
today than it was during the Cold War.



Mr. EHRLICH. Curt, I will get back to the Surikov—

Mr. WELDON. Surikov.

Mr. EHRLICH [continuing]. Document when I have my turn. At this point, I would like to recognize my fellow freshman from Arizona, John Shadegg.

Mr. SHADEGG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Weldon, I want to start out by complimenting you and telling you that the Nation owes you, in my opinion, a great debt of gratitude.

Mr. WELDON. Thank you.

Mr. SHADEGG. You are obviously extremely knowledgeable in this area and carrying the fight very, very well.

I have got to tell you, I simply cannot understand and am mystified by the arguments of the other side. I listened to Mr. Spratt. He seems extremely knowledgeable in this area but the logic which supports his argument absolutely escapes me.

The notion that because, for example, it will be phenomenally costly to build an impermeable net over the entire Nation preventing the single—a single launch from getting through, if there were a massive launch, is therefore some reason to delay in developing a system which could—and not just developing, in deploying immediately, as soon as we could get it deployed, a system which would intercept one rogue missile, much less four or five, which I understand is what we could do in the range of \$2 to \$5 billion, it is lost on me. When I talk to people in my district—

Mr. SPRATT. If the gentleman will yield?

That's because you didn't understand the argument. We don't have time to get into that, but I mean—I'm not saying you didn't understand it. I obviously didn't make it clear, but that's not what I argued, but go ahead.

Mr. SHADEGG. Well, that's what I heard you argue and that's what I seem to hear on this issue, that because it's going to be very, very costly to do the whole net, we shouldn't be deploying anything.

Mr. WELDON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHADEGG. Certainly.

Mr. WELDON. That is what the President said last year in vetoing the bill. That's exactly what he said, and he was totally, completely, 1,000 percent wrong.

Mr. SHADEGG. When I talk with the people in my district about this issue, they are, A, flabbergasted at the notion that we couldn't stop a single missile. And they don't say to me, well, yeah, but I'm not too worried about one. What about 500? That's not exactly their approach.

Let me ask you a couple of questions that are a little more specific. Mr. Spratt indicated that the bill we voted—we were to have voted on last week, which I believe we should have passed and I believe we are placing the Nation at risk by not passing, would have violated the ABM Treaty because it authorized potentially the deployment of either a sea-based or space-based system. You obviously disagree with that. I appreciate it if you would reply.

Mr. WELDON. I disagree with that because the bill specifically allows, I believe, a timeframe of 1 year to discuss with the Russians the ABM Treaty and the necessary modifications. And without put-

ting words into the mouth of my friend over here, even he has said publicly that eventually the ABM Treaty is going to have to probably be modified. Most people who are involved in this debate would acknowledge that, except for the extreme liberals who never want to touch the treaty, who want to keep it as a cornerstone.

The bill does not call for the abrogation of the treaty. Specifically, last year we opposed an amendment which would have been allowed on the floor that would have done that.

It does give us a timeframe and it forces a new level of discussion with the Russians. You know what's startling, is the Clinton administration when they came into office, stopped discussions that were taking place that were very fruitful. They were called the Ros-Manov talks. They were taking place at the highest level between our country and the Russians on sharing defense technology.

Yeltsin came out, in, I believe it was up in Vancouver, about—and said publicly that he embraced the notion of the United States and Russia working together which was a take-off on the Ros-Manov talks. Without any explanation, the Clinton administration stopped those discussions.

So actually, the Clinton administration, for the past 3 years, has moved away from a joint dialog with the Russians on missile defense and basically allowed this theory of use of the ABM Treaty as a key cornerstone to be the mainstay of our relation with Russia, which I think is ill-conceived and ill-thought-out.

Mr. SHADEGG. Let me ask a related question. One of the things you talked about was the money we had put into the defense bill, which would allow the joint work between the United States and Russia on ballistic missile defense. At the moment, why should I not be deeply concerned that if we do that, and if we develop any new technology it won't be sold or given to Iraq or some other?

Mr. WELDON. Well, that's an excellent question. The key thing here is that we show the Russians—and we have to understand the mindset of the Russian people. They have been invaded 27 times in this century. They are very paranoid that again someone is going to come in and invade their homeland.

The point is that we need to convince them that this is not about gaining a strategic advantage over Russia so that we can take them over and have them become a subservient state to the United States, but rather we are very concerned about the vulnerability of the American people, especially given the fact that Russia already has an ABM system that they have had deployed for at least 15 years.

It's a case of where—and we are not going to give them away technology that is, you know, supersensitive. We are talking about basic technology-sharing. And one of the programs we already have underway is the Ramos project, which we have funded with existing DOD dollars, that the Ministry of Defense has yet to give the approval of in Russia.

If the administration wants to focus some attention, they should be asking the Russians to give the approval to let their scientists work with our missile defense organization on the Ramos project. I have raised this issue three times with the Russian ambassador here, Ambassador Vorontsov, and he is trying but he is meeting with obstacles.

The point is that I think we—and I will defer to Dr. Payne to elaborate on this in greater detail. I think we need to understand the political realities inside of Russia. They are in a very unstable climate right now. That's why I opposed many of my colleagues on Nunn-Lugar.

I think we have to keep this program operational, even though it doesn't sell well back in my district. I think it is important that we show the Russians that we are not about trying to stick it in their eye or to achieve some kind of strategic advantage over them, but, rather, we are out to protect our people and change the whole debate in the world from one of pointing missiles at each other, which is ridiculous in my mind, to one of defending our borders and our citizens.

Mr. SHADEGG. If I could just conclude?

The last point I want to make is a combined one and that is, when I go home and explain to the people in my district that Russia has the ability to protect 80 percent of its population from an attack of this nature and we have none, they are shocked. And they look at me and say: "Why in the world do we not have one?"

I, quite frankly, heard today for the first time from Mr. Spratt, we had already spent \$35 billion to try to get there. The thought that we would delay—in my opinion, the thought that we would delay an additional hour before we deploy and use the technology that we have developed with that \$35 billion is beyond me. But it is particularly beyond me in the context in which it is given to us, and that is, we are told by this administration that we should rely on treaty compliance.

My wife is a school teacher. She taught me not long after I met her and as we were talking about having a family of our own, she said, John, when you have children, you need to do two things: One, you need to set rules for them, but more importantly than that, you need to be rigidly consistent in enforcing those rules, because if you don't, they will not understand which rules have meaning and which don't and when they have meaning and when they do not. And she explained to me the importance of consistency in handling children.

I believe that same situation exists in this context, where we say to Russia, well, we are regarding the ABM Treaty or ultimately, if we get there, START II, to be our bulwark of defense, for us then to simply ignore repeatedly their violations, how can we expect them to understand what our position really is?

Mr. WELDON. If I could just respond to that quickly?

Mr. EHRLICH. Quickly.

Mr. WELDON. I agree with the gentleman totally. And I would just say that in terms of the Russian ABM, some coming after me may say, well, don't worry about that, it's not important. I would say to those who embrace arms control as the cornerstone of our relationship, then why shouldn't the Russians agree to dismantle their ABM system?

If they are so supportive and if the liberals of this country are so supportive of arms control agreements and mutually destroyed destruction, then convince the Russians to tear down their ABM system. But you won't hear them talk about that. They will say it's ineffective.

Let's ask the question. That might be a good question for you to ask later on.

Mr. EHRlich. Thank you very much.

At this point, I will recognize our friend from California, Mr. Gary Condit.

Mr. CONDIT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I will try to make my comments brief.

I would like to thank Mr. Weldon for being here. He has been very gracious with his time. And my comments or questions directed to him is simply to get his view and opinion. Obviously, he has studied this considerably.

My attitude is a little bit simplistic about this. This SS-25 that you have put up a poster on, Curt, it—are the Russians selling the technology or the physical?

Mr. WELDON. They initially tried to sell the actual launcher but we called them on that last year and they are now selling the technology. They are selling the space launch service right now.

But I can tell you a story of a Member of this Congress who was in Russia as a citizen in a car, and I will give you the—well, I will give you the name personally, and an SS-25 went by him with total lack of control and security over that system, a Member that's a friend of yours.

Mr. CONDIT. Well, I mean, this is sort of a populist attitude or simplistic attitude, but it just seems to me—I got here in 1989. We had been here a few months, and I was approached, and we eventually passed, which I didn't support, that we had to give a lot of money to Gorbachev or he was going to fall. And the Congress gave a lot of money, and he fell. Same thing to Yeltsin. Got to give him a lot of money or he is going to fall.

My point is, is why do we give people money without conditions? Why would we say—why wouldn't we say, you can't sell this stuff, you can't sell the technology? Or why don't we buy it? I mean, are we that silly? I mean, that just doesn't sound like good business. You hand them money with no conditions.

I didn't support that because I thought we ought to buy this equipment, or we ought to at least get some agreement or conditions on the money that we sent them.

Mr. WELDON. To show you how available their equipment is, we have bought I believe it's the SA-10, which is one of the most sophisticated systems that they have, the SA-10, the SA-12. We bought it. The CIA, when they had it delivered down in Huntsville, it called—the New York Times had an editorial about it, it was so blatant. But we have one.

As a matter of fact, if you bring over the—when I was in Russia in January, I went to Roseburgina, which is the marketing arm of the Russian Government. Here is what you can buy from the Russians. If you flip through that, these are all the technologies—this is a slick marketing brochure. Just go through some of the missiles that are identified. Any of these you can buy. At all these arm shows at Abu Dhabi and the rest of the shows around the world, this is what is available for you to buy today. We cannot buy everything.

And the problem is Russians need hard currency. That's why Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar were so correct and the Nunn-



Lugar program helps divert them away from having to sell these arms, and that's why it's important to help them develop their energy because that will bring in the hard currency that hopefully will not have them revert to selling these arms all over the world that pose a threat to us.

Mr. CONDIT. Curt, do you agree that if we are going to give money to bail anyone out, that we ought to get some conditions—

Mr. WELDON. Absolutely.

Mr. CONDIT [continuing]. To buy those to keep them off the market from other people?

Mr. WELDON. Absolutely.

Mr. CONDIT. Even if maybe they are not the state-of-the-art for us?

Mr. WELDON. They should at least agree to the agreements. The arms control agreements that they are a signatory they should abide by.

Mr. CONDIT. Well, after saying that, it surprises me—I don't know if I heard this correctly, I think I did—that you don't support the Nunn-Lugar approach.

Mr. WELDON. No, I was one of the Republicans that opposed the attempt to cut it.

Mr. CONDIT. To cut?

Mr. WELDON. I opposed the cut.

Mr. CONDIT. So you support it.

Mr. WELDON. I support it.

Mr. CONDIT. You think that's a good concept?

Mr. WELDON. Now, I would have supported Mr. Solomon's amendment if it would not have been as severe as it was. I mean, he went, in my opinion—I respect Jerry—he went too far. But I think he could have accomplished what I would have supported if he would have been more specific in terms of certain agreements. But some of the things he wanted us to verify I think were really impossible to verify.

Mr. CONDIT. So, then, is it your advice that if we get one of these situations where we are told if we don't give Yeltsin or whoever money, he is going to fall, and it's going to be a threat to us, then shouldn't there be some sort of amendment on the House floor to say there are some conditions—

Mr. WELDON. Oh, yes. I mean, there are conditions.

Mr. CONDIT [continuing]. To sell the weapons.

Mr. WELDON. And I think part of our problem has been that we have allowed our relationship between Russia and the United States to be totally dominated by the President and by President Yeltsin, and we have not had the parliaments involved. That's the whole reason why Speaker Gingrich has empowered this new effort with the Russian Duma so that we can begin to play a role in this process.

Mr. CONDIT. Thank you. You have been very gracious with your time and your opinions.

And I would like to yield, if I may, Mr. Chairman, the balance of my time to Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Just one—two rejoinders.

First of all, as to H.R. 3144, I never said it violated the ABM Treaty. It did call and sanction sea-based and space-based systems

which are beyond the treaty. It would be no violation until we actually developed and deployed them.

It also called for us to spend a year renegotiating the treaty with the Russians, and if we reached no results, to seriously consider abrogating it. And I didn't think that was prudent at this point in time. I didn't think it was a necessary step or a smart signal to send. That was my argument.

Second, as to the golash system, it's a terminal system. Notice that none of these designs you will see of any of the BMD systems we are talking about do we have a terminal layer because it is very easy to overcome, and indeed we can overcome the golash system that surrounds the city of Moscow. You simply put more warheads on, saturate it, and put penails, too, for that matter, and we don't have—we can ask the DCI. I don't think we have very much doubt that we could overwhelm the system that's in place right now. So it is an example of what we might have spent lots of money on if we had rushed to deployment in the past.

Mr. WELDON. Just one quick response, if I might. My point with the golash system was not that it could prevent us from responding to attack, but it gives Russia a protection against a single missile that may not come from us that we don't have. That's the key point.

Mr. EHRLICH. At this point, I would recognize our friend from Florida, John Mica.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate your testimony, Mr. Weldon, and your bringing to the attention of the Congress probably one of the greatest deficiencies that we have seen in our time as far as military preparedness.

I like to go back in history and look at history. I asked the intern behind me to get a copy of the Constitution, which is contained in the Rules of the House. Its preface is the Rules of the House, and it goes back to the Constitution of 1787. The reason we came together, really, under this Constitution was because the Articles of Confederation had failed us and didn't provide for the unity, nor provide for the common defense, which is one of—the reason we came together as a country.

Then I begin to wonder if that's our obligation, and we are spending more on interest on the national debt, I guess, starting next year than we are on defense. I wonder where our priorities are?

The other thing that comes to mind, Mr. Weldon, is I have only—well, I have been here for 30 some months, 40 months, I guess, and in that period of time we have been through Somalia at a cost of \$2 to \$3 billion. We are in Haiti at a cost of about \$2 billion. Bosnia, the estimates are \$5 to \$6 billion. Rwanda cost us almost another billion. Now, I am not very good at math, but that gets me up into the \$12 billion range in a very short period of time, helping people straighten out their internal affairs.

As I understood it, this system could cost—now there's different estimates—\$5 to \$7 billion; is that correct?

Mr. WELDON. The Air Force has a variant, using the existing Minuteman capability, that they score at \$2.3 billion. The Army, General Garner, three star, just sent a letter to Floyd Spence,

which you can get a copy from the committee's records, that lowers the price of the Army variant, treaty compliant, by the way, from \$5 billion to \$3.5 billion. Each of these two systems can be deployed within 4 to 5 years. They—the only technology that needs to be developed with them is the kill vehicle, which we have—we assume there are no show-stoppers with, and that can be developed—and that can be deployed on either of the systems.

They are very thin-layer systems. In fact, let me put a quote in here. And this quote is, "A ground-based system to defend against a relatively thin attack could be built for perhaps \$5 billion." Guess who said that? Secretary of Defense Bill Perry, January 27, 1995.

Mr. MICA. So you would say, sir, then, that the Constitution basically says one of our primary responsibilities is to provide for the national defense?

Mr. WELDON. Absolutely.

Mr. MICA. The second question is the cost, and as I said, since I have been here we have spent at least \$12 billion on these different engagements, and you are talking about less than 50 percent of that cost. So the next thing is the cost, I guess, in that.

Then I guess the third element, as I would see it—is there a threat? Now, you showed me that calendar, and I have also been aware of probably the greatest arms sale in the history of mankind that has taken place since the fall of the former Soviet Union as we know it. Is that correct, too?

Mr. WELDON. Yes.

Mr. MICA. I was asking the staff, I heard the other day how many submarines Iran bought. Was it?

Mr. WELDON. Three.

Mr. MICA. Three, three submarines. And you talked about the Russian decision of April 1996 to sell the SS-18 TAC ICBM.

Mr. WELDON. Well, they are denying that publicly, but we have information intelligence-wise that there have been discussions.

Mr. MICA. But we also have North Korea. We have Libya. We have Iran. We have Iraq, China. So is the potential out there for threat, or is this just a—

Mr. WELDON. It's there. It's real, and it's now. It's not 10 years. And the way they contrive the NIE—if you want to talk about the NIE, that's another whole story in itself, the politicization of the intelligence process. I mean, they talk about no threat in 15 years. You know what they very carefully did—and talk about outrage—they very carefully put to the contiguous 48 States. Can you imagine a threat assessment ignoring Alaska and Hawaii? What are they, aliens from outer space? They are not American citizens?

But the administration, when they—when they generalized their statement, said, oh, there is no threat for 10 to 15 years. But the threat assessment says 48 States. That is because they didn't want to talk about the threat to Alaska and Hawaii.

Mr. MICA. So we have the responsibility, we have the cost, and you are saying we have the threat through the arms sale. It's kind of—it's not humorous, but someone told me that they were in the Soviet Union and literally a cab driver offered to sell them a nuclear—some type of nuclear material, or material. I don't know if it's real or not. You showed us the glossy advertising and the calendar.

I just wondered, I got one of these free Arch Deluxe with a purchase of large fries and a medium soft drink. I know there's a McDonalds in Moscow. Are they having a special where I could get another coupon?

Mr. WELDON. Sure. It's a huge one. Now they have drive-in over there, too.

Mr. MICA. So with my Arch Deluxe I could get some ingredients or technology maybe in a special meal deal that's going on this week.

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Mica, your point is well made. And let me just add one other thing.

You talk about cost. What's so ironic is we have an administration that doesn't want us to have a national missile defense system, but has agreed to spend our total commitment right now, which I support, for Israel, for the Arab program, is about half a billion dollars. Now that's going to give Israel the first national missile defense system in the world that the United States basically helped develop.

And here is an administration where the President went before APAC several weeks ago and gave a big speech and talked about how we are going to deploy the new Nautilus system. It's going to give them another protection, laser system. For the past 3 years this President zeroed out funding for the high energy laser program each year. If we had listened to him, we would have had no money for the high energy laser program and no money for Nautilus, and he wouldn't have been able to make his speech. But he made it, and he is able to do that because we in the Congress put the money in for the high energy laser program.

Mr. MICA. My final point, and I know my time has expired, is that it's, what, 5 short years ago that Israel had pretty primitive SCUD missiles being aimed at their cities and towns. If we had even one—the American public knew there was the potential of one missile, and that capability and threat you are saying exists, it seems like this expenditure would be—is almost minutia in the total scheme of the money we spend here.

Mr. WELDON. It is. You will get others who will say, well, this is not really the biggest threat. The biggest threat is terrorism.

For the record, Mr. Chairman, let me point out, before your other witnesses might come up—

Mr. EHRLICH. Actually, we have one 5-minute. I am going to give Karen another 5-minute.

Mr. WELDON. The terrorism—we plussed up each other—our budget pluses up funding for terrorism because this administration wasn't putting enough money in for chem-bio defense and for dealing with the threat of a terrorist act coming into our ports or coming into our airports. We in our defense bill have plussed it up each year. So if someone comes in and says that that's the real threat, we are also aware of that, and we are dealing with that as well.

Mr. EHRLICH. Curt, in order to get to our panelists, I just have two quick followups. I will get the first one out of the way. This Surikov document, I am going to make that part of the record. Without objection, so ordered.

[The information referred to follows:]

Institute of Defense Studies

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**GENERAL DIRECTOR, INOBIS  
DOCTOR OF TECHNICAL SCIENCES  
PROFESSOR /s/ V. M. SURIKOV**

**CONCEPTUAL PROVISIONS OF A STRATEGY FOR  
COUNTERING THE MAIN EXTERNAL THREATS  
TO RUSSIAN FEDERATION NATIONAL SECURITY**

**MOSCOW**

**OCTOBER 1995**

There is a significant number of external threats to Russian Federation [RF] national security at present which are difficult to classify. At the same time, several of the main threats of this kind are rather obvious.

An analysis shows that above all ~~the United States is the main external~~ ~~potentially capable of creating a threat~~ to RF military security and to Russia's economic and political interests abroad and of exerting substantial influence on the economic and political situation within Russia and on Russia's mutual relations with former USSR republics. As a rule, the United States implements its policy in the Russian direction in coordination with other Western countries, Israel, and Japan. "Assistance to processes of democratization and of transition to a market economy with the help of the West and in close, equal partnership and cooperation with it" is declared to be the West's official policy with respect to Russia. At the same time, experience of recent years demonstrates that the West puts its own interpretation into all of the above terms. In particular, the term "~~democratization~~" is understood to mean ~~democratic support in the direction of U.S. and Western policy~~ in the international arena. And the West's "help" to Russia is extremely limited in nature and determined by the fulfillment of a whole series of preconditions. On the whole, it appears the principal mission of U.S. and Western policy with respect to ~~Russia is to prevent from turning into an economically, politically, and militarily dependent force and to transform post-Soviet space into an economic and political appendage and raw materials colony of the West~~. Because of this, it is the United States and its allies that are the sources of ~~an external~~ ~~threat to Russia's national security~~, and they should be considered the ~~major potential enemies of the Russian Federation~~.

## 1. Nature of main threats to Russia's national security caused by the effect of external factors.

a. The line of the United States and its allies toward intervening in Russia's internal affairs to impose on it paths of development in a direction favorable to the West represents the greatest danger.

The comprador model of building the economy suggested to Russia by the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and World Bank consists of orienting

Russia toward exporting raw materials and importing everything else, encouraging default on the debt to Russia by CIS countries, as well as encouraging outflows of capital from Russia to the West and, in parallel, ~~national industry, science, and agriculture~~. Attempts at ~~destroying the high-tech potential of national industry and above all of our military-industrial complex by not admitting Russia to world markets of arms and of space, missile, aviation, and nuclear technologies and nuclear materials~~ are most obvious at the present time. Protectionist measures against Russian exports of fuel for nuclear power stations, opposition to the ~~export of nuclear fuel~~, and the hysteria over cryogenic rocket engine deliveries from Russia to ~~the West~~ are examples of such attempts.

On the whole, the economic model being realized threatens to degrade the country's economic potential and eliminate the unified domestic market, which in turn can become a basis for regional separatism and for raw materials regions and maritime regions to fall away from Moscow, thereby ~~destroying the country's 19th- and 20th-century borders~~. It should be noted that in following that line, the West finds support among part of the Russian elite and relies above all on Russian comprador business, which has become especially entrenched in speculative-finance banking structures and export-oriented raw materials sectors of the economy. The West is least interested in the growth of internal accumulations of any kind whatsoever in Russia, otherwise such accumulations could be used for modernizing the national processing industry and agriculture, for conversion and rescue of high technologies of the military-industrial complex, and for maintaining Armed Forces combat power and solving their social problems. A so-called ~~strategy of black holes through which material and financial resources are being pumped out of the country~~ is being implemented to prevent this. And although Dudayev's Chechnya has been the most well-known "black hole," it is far from the only one on the country's territory. The comprador-oriented export policy being effected within the framework of the described ~~strategy~~ in the ~~nonferrous and in part ferrous metallurgy, the timber industry and production of mineral fertilizers~~ is leading to ~~the loss of the country's national wealth in favor of a narrow group of people—the so-called "new Russians."~~

The outflow of capital from Russia abroad, with the TEK [fuel-energy complex] accounting for the lion's share, is estimated to be from one to two billion dollars monthly. The bulk of these funds settle in foreign bank accounts of "new Russians" or is invested in real estate, stocks, and bonds abroad. But even the receipts from export that return to Russia often go for comprador imports and for importing expensive consumer goods into the country for the "new Russians." Or they go via the budget to commercial and above all "authorized" banks for "investment." Or in the final account they are directed toward realization of various expensive projects of dubious importance, above all in the construction area. It should be recalled here, for example, that the local Mafia in Sicily traditionally makes its main money specifically on construction contracts by inflating by many times the estimate of work done.

It is also important to note that all major operations of pumping resources and funds out of the country are being carried out with the involvement of foreign partners. In the petroleum export area alone there are approximately 20 various joint ventures operating in Russia today. And according to up-to-date information from Russian special services, a considerable number of the foreign associates of such structures are persons connected with intelligence agencies of Western countries. It follows from the Federal Security Service press release "On Federal Security Service Activity in 1994" that "around 10 identified intelligence agents and around 90 specialists and advisers whose affiliation with foreign special agencies generates no doubt have been exposed just within the system of a number of major RF economic departments ~~and~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~form~~ ~~of~~ ~~foreign~~ ~~firms~~ ~~and~~ ~~organizations~~ ~~including~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~banking~~ ~~sphere~~ ~~are~~ ~~being~~ ~~used~~ ~~as~~ ~~cover~~ ~~by~~ ~~special~~ ~~services~~." Special services of Western countries have full access today to all documentation of joint ventures and other partners of Russian exporters, they have the originals of financial documents, they are knowledgeable regarding the movement of commodity resources and financial flows, they have information on bank account numbers of the "new Russians," and they know about their real estate and securities transactions abroad. And it should be understood that the activity of the outflow of resources and capital from Russia abroad in the form in which it is being accomplished today is criminalized to the highest degree and represents not only a violation of domestic laws, but also the grossest violation of laws of the Western countries themselves. Consequently, foreign intelligence agencies have in their hands compromising criminal information on many



Russian parties to foreign economic activity and on the politicians and state officials connected with them. As a result, these ~~representatives of the Russian business and political elite are not completely independent in their actions~~ and are extraordinarily vulnerable to the pressure of outside forces who possess compromising information. It follows from what has been said that they are by definition incapable of following a consistent policy conforming to Russia's national interests. The most striking example of that situation lately appears to be Russian Government policy on the question of Caspian oil. Another notable example is the "peacemaking process" in Chechnya.

b. ~~Turkey's~~ political penetration and U.S., UK, and FRG economic and intelligence penetration into Azerbaijan is in full swing. This is the most suitable base of operations for subsequent Turkish and Western expansion in the direction of Central Asia, the Povolzh'ye and the North Caucasus using the "Turkic" and "Islamic" factors. And Turkey is acting here as an instrument by which U.S. policy is being pursued.

The principal goal of such a policy is to establish ~~Western control over energy resources and above all, petroleum resources of the Caspian Sea~~. Caspian oil reserves are commensurable with oil reserves of the North Sea and Alaska at the moment their exploitation began, but oil resources of the latter two will be exhausted in the foreseeable future. Therefore to avoid the Persian Gulf region's total monopoly in the oil export area, the West is showing an extreme degree of interest in Caspian oil. It should be noted that the problem of Caspian Sea oil arose immediately with the USSR's disintegration. It was then that the regimes of Caspian states cast doubt on the 1940 Soviet-Iranian Treaty on the division of the Caspian and began its repartition without prior arrangement. And this is being done illegally--the Caspian is not a sea, but a lake. Since that is so, then rules of international maritime law do not extend to it. Any decisions relating to use of Caspian resources must be made based on a consensus of all Caspian countries of the CIS. And the 1940 Soviet-Iranian Treaty, ratified at one time by the USSR Supreme Soviet, can be revoked only by Parliamentary vote, not by a decision of particular RF Government representatives. It follows from this that the so-called "contract of the century" concluded by the Azerbaijan government with an international consortium of eleven oil companies is ~~invalid~~ from the very beginning, ~~and the West openly ignores this fact.~~

With the actual assent of a number of highly placed Russian government officials and businessmen, the question of the right of ownership of Caspian shelf resources is being replaced by a discussion of pipeline routes over which it is proposed to pump "early" oil.

Another aspect of the West's Caspian policy is the attempt to cut Russia off from the Transcaucasus by encouraging separatism in the North Caucasus, above all in Chechnya. In particular, there are projects for establishing an anti-Russian "Confederation of Mountain [gorskiy] Peoples" made up of Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia and Adygea. It is presumed this formation will gain direct egress to the Black Sea and to Turkey through the territory of Abkhazia. ~~By establishing separatism in Tataria and Bashkiriya for the purpose of actually cutting off from Central Russia regions of the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East rich in energy resources, are being considered in the longer term.~~

c. ~~Western policy with regard to NATO's future is seen as an attempt to isolate Russia and ultimately oust it from Europe:~~ An eastward expansion of the NATO bloc obviously is inevitable and is planned in several stages. In the first stage (over 2-3 years) Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary will be accepted in NATO. In the second stage (tentatively by 2000) it is planned to accept Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria and, if possible, also Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in NATO. The inclusion of Finland and Austria in NATO is likely in this same stage. Finally, the ~~occupancy of Ukraine in NATO is not excluded~~ in the third stage (approximately in 2005). But Russia will not be accepted in NATO under any circumstances.

The FRG is the main instigator of NATO's eastward expansion (the decision on expanding NATO was ultimately made after the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces from the former GDR had been completed). ~~Western policy with a resumption of German expansion in the eastern and southeastern directions was interrupted in this century and being accomplished this time for now primarily by political and economic means under the American nuclear umbrella.~~ The United States is another instigator of NATO's eastward expansion. In the opinion of a number of influential representatives of the American elite, such a line will permit reinforcing the U.S. leading position on the European continent and thereby compensate

somewhat for America's obvious economic weakness compared with the European Union headed by the FRG.

~~Many western politicians now give the assurance that they do not plan a NATO expansion by means of the Baltic and Ukraine or the stationing of Western troops and nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe, but there are no grounds to believe this.~~ Just two years ago Russia was assured that they did not plan to expand NATO at all, even by means of Poland, Hungary, and Czechia. Moreover, there generally was uncertainty in NATO during 1991-1992 with respect to the future of this military-political alliance. Today, however, proposals for stationing tactical nuclear weapons in Czechia and Poland are being discussed, operational plans for the movement of NATO mobile forces to the Baltic in case of its conflict with Russia are being drawn up, and the idea of establishing a 60,000-person "Baltic Corps" from troops of Poland, Denmark, and the FRG is being discussed.

d. The line toward Russia's unilateral disarmament, which threatens strategic stability in the world, also should be examined in the very same direction. With respect to strategic nuclear weapons, this line is being fulfilled today in two main directions. First of all, due to the absence of financing a rapid degradation is occurring in strategic systems presently in the inventory, and much RDT&E in this area has been slowed or entirely halted. Secondly, ~~new agreements clearly unfavorable to Russia are being imposed on it: the START II Treaty and proposed changes to the 1972 ABM Treaty.~~

With respect to the START II Treaty, there are two groups of arguments, military-strategic and political, against its ratification. In speaking of the first group of arguments, one should single out the problem of inequality in so-called ~~implying potential asymmetry by degradation of the U.S. and Russian strategic forces (especially in the U.S. favor of the United States)~~ and U.S. attempts to change the regime of the ABM Treaty ~~under the pretext of a possible "tactical ABM defense system".~~ It should be emphasized that ~~improving the U.S. strategic proposals of the Geneva talks are accepted, they legalize the U.S. right to create a strategic system for ABM defense.~~ And the Republican majority in the U.S. Congress is stepping up pressure on the U.S. administration to persuade it to take such

a step even without coordinating with Russia and in spite of international restrictions which are in force.

In considering the second group of arguments, one should direct attention to the fact that as of the moment the ~~START Treaty was signed in 1991~~, ~~there were no discussions in Russia regarding the possibility of~~ ~~developing a partnership between it and the United States~~. Because of this, skews in the Treaty favoring the United States did not seem so important, but today ~~such Treaty shortcomings appear quite differently under conditions~~ ~~of the approaching "cold peace" caused by the NATO bloc's planned eastward~~. At the same time, the practice being followed of implementing Treaty provisions without prior arrangement, without its ratification, and on a unilateral basis may lead to ~~serious consequences in the very near future~~.

Above all, ~~observance~~ of the principle of quantitative equality with the United States in strategic arms may become practically unattainable. The importance of observing this principle is explained by the fact that ~~the majority of Western politicians are not specialists in the military area and are capable of grasping only the simplest quantitative parameters characterizing the ratio of the sides' nuclear forces~~. Under these conditions the expected future substantial lag of Russia's strategic nuclear forces behind U.S. strategic forces in the number of operational nuclear warheads (the expected result of START II implementation in a version curtailed for financial considerations is no more than 500-600 Topol'-M missiles in the Strategic Missile Troops by 2003-2005, and new nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines have not been built at all since 1990) obviously will be perceived in the West as grounds to regard Russia as a second-rate nuclear power, ~~which the only remaining nuclear superpower, the United States, will be able to subject to nuclear blackmail for the purpose of dictating its will~~.

The situation also is largely similar in the area of the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe—CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe]. Russia's partners in the CFE Treaty refused to accommodate Russia until recently on the question of so-called flank quotas; i.e., to agree that Russia can have as many heavy weapons in the inventory in North Caucasus and Leningrad military districts as necessary for the country's defense, and not as many as specified by the Treaty concluded in November 1990 under quite different

military-political conditions, when the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact Organization still existed. Only when it became clear that Russia would unilaterally refuse to fulfill this part of the CFE Treaty in case that line was continued did NATO begin to show readiness to take Russia's interests into account. **But in exchange they demand that Russia remove objections to the NATO bloc's eastward expansion.**

e. Western attempts to counteract integration trends operating within the CIS framework are obvious. This is manifested most openly with respect to Belorussia[sic], which is more ready than the other former Soviet republics to undertake close integration with Russia. On the whole, however, this opposition as well as NATO's eastward expansion, the activeness of Turkey and Western oil companies in the Caucasus and the Caspian, attempts to coerce Russia into unilateral disarmament, barring it from world markets of high-tech products and, finally, the economic model being imposed on Russia by the IMF and World Bank all are links in the same chain: **creeping expansion of the United States and its allies having as its ultimate goal eliminating Russia as a state and turning its territory into a raw materials colony of Western countries.**

## **2. Strategy for neutralization of external threats and for national survival of the Russian Federation**

a. A most rapid, fundamental change in the country's economic course appears to be fundamentally important to the Russian state's survival. The general outlines of such a change are presented in detail in programs of a number of political parties and blocs which plan to take part in the 17 December 1995 parliamentary elections. They include in particular rejecting cooperation with the IMF and World Bank; revising results of privatization of state property; imposing elementary order in foreign trade, in the banking system, and in exporting sectors of the economy (even within limits of existing legislation, which will permit reducing the outflow of capital abroad and thereby increasing state investments in converting the military-industrial complex and in modernizing and restructuring national industry); increasing import tariffs for 15-25 years; i.e., until national industry and the national agrocomplex will be able to withstand the competition of imported goods relatively painlessly;

extraordinary measures in fighting organized crime and corruption, and expropriation of criminal money and property; and economic integration within the CIS framework.

b. **Preventing illegal exploitation of Caspian Sea shelf resources by Western oil companies is a vitally important goal for Russia, and the problem of deterring the "Turkic" and "Islamic" factors should be considered above all in this light. The main task here in the short term is a most rapid end to the war in Chechnya by imposing constitutional order throughout its territory, providing for the elimination of Dudayev's armed units and disarming the population. It is obvious that this is possible only by force; therefore, it is advisable to stop the so-called "peacemaking process" and renew operations of federal forces to disarm and eliminate illegal armed units.**

Another very important task is to prevent fulfillment of the "Caspian oil contract" in its present form. In this case it is advisable to carry out a set of measures such as officially refusing to recognize that part of the Caspian stipulated in the contract as a zone of Azerbaijan's jurisdiction; taking practical steps, **including also steps of force, should it be necessary, to stop any oil production activity of foreign companies in the former Soviet part of the Caspian until its legal status is determined; preventing Turkey's territorial tie with the main part of Azerbaijan territory; and exerting pressure on the regime in Baku; e.g., by creating threats of a fragmentation of Azerbaijan and of an Armenian military offensive on Gyanzha [sic] and Yevlakh.**

c. **Opposition by force to the NATO bloc's eastward expansion seems an extremely urgent task. At the same time, in the case of Poland and other Eastern European countries, it is obvious Russia has no real opportunities to hinder this by way of force, and threats not backed up by corresponding actions only discredit a state. An example of such discrediting was Russia's reaction to the NATO military operation in the Balkans in September 1995. But the need also is obvious for creating a military bloc of CIS countries, particularly the involvement of Central Asian countries in confronting the NATO bloc. With respect to Ukraine, it obviously will refuse to participate in such a military alliance in the foreseeable future.**

The situation with respect to Belorussia has a different look. Close military cooperation on a bilateral basis should be developed here, and a key element of such cooperation should be the **deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Belorussia, in the Kaliningrad Special Area, and on naval ships of the Baltic Fleet.** The need for such a step lies in the fact that out of economic considerations Russia cannot permit itself to have a large Army today as the USSR did 10 years ago. NATO now surpasses Russia by 2-3 times in numbers of troops and conventional weapons in Europe. This gap will grow even more after Poland, Hungary, and the former Czechoslovakia join the Alliance. Under such conditions the only possible and economically realizable way is to **deter NATO by relying on tactical nuclear weapons** ~~Capable of leveling enemy superiority in conventional means;~~ i.e., the idea is to adopt the strategy to which the NATO bloc itself adhered in "cold war" years. And it is a question not only of the Western Theater of Military Operations (TVD), including the former Soviet-Polish border and Baltic Sea waters, but also of the Northern Theater of Military Operations, encompassing Russia's border with Norway and Barents Sea waters, and the Southern Theater of Military Operations, encompassing Black Sea waters and bases of Russian troops in Crimea, Abkhazia, Georgia and Armenia--~~tactical nuclear weapons~~ must become the basis of Russia's defense in all three European theaters of military operations.

The situation is completely different with respect to the Baltic as compared with Eastern Europe. In general, a neutral status of the Baltic republics similar to that of Finland during the "cold war" probably would meet Russian interests, but in case NATO should venture to accept the Baltic republics in its makeup, ~~then~~ **RF Armed Forces** must be introduced to the territory of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

It should be noted that Russia has all legal and moral grounds for introducing troops to the Baltic. First of all, an extension of the NATO military infrastructure to this region will present extreme danger to RF national security interests. In the period of the "Caribbean crisis," when the USSR began deploying nuclear weapons on Cuban territory at Cuba's request, a similar situation from the U.S. standpoint provoked a naval blockade of the island by the United States accompanied by direct threats of military invasion and led to the most acute crisis of "cold war" times. Inclusion of the Baltic in NATO would

present **no less** a threat from Russia's standpoint than did the deployment of Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba at one time from the U.S. standpoint...

Secondly, there are illegal, antidemocratic regimes in Estonia and Latvia similar to those that previously existed in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. In these biethnic republics, one ethnic group arbitrarily deprived people of the other nationality of their civil rights and usurped all power. Under these conditions, the part of the population being discriminated against (so-called "non-citizens") have the right to establish their own parallel structures of authority and power structures. In case force is used against them, they have the right to turn to Russia for armed support. With respect to Lithuania, it does not recognize the "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact." Consequently, Russia and Belorussia have the right to take back Klaipeda and Vilna Kray.

Thirdly, **the Baltic is a criminal zone** living chiefly on smuggling and controlled by Mafia structures. Considering the precedent of the U.S. invasion of Panama and the arrest of General Noriega, Russia also has the right to arrest and indict a large number of Baltic figures in Russian courts. It is obvious that a Russian return to the Baltic must be accompanied by the deportation to the West of persons who sullied themselves by complicity in discriminating against people of different nationality and who do not wish to live in republics where the scope of civil rights does not depend on nationality.

With respect to presumed Western reaction to the probable introduction of Russian Armed Forces into the Baltic, an analysis shows that ~~persons in the West~~ plans to fight Russia over the Baltic. Economic sanctions are possible, but they most likely also will not be in the nature of a total embargo. Above all this concerns the export of Russian energy resources. In particular, it is expected that in the foreseeable future Europe will experience a natural gas consumption deficit of 100<sup>1</sup> billion m<sup>3</sup> per year. At the same time, Russian natural gas reserves make up one-third of world reserves. The experience of the conflict over the "gas/pipes" deal in the 1980s persuades us that the FRG, France, Italy, Finland, Greece, and Eastern Europe will continue to buy raw material resources from Russia as before, which will provide funds for

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<sup>1</sup>Translator note: the first digit is only partially legible, but the figure appears to be "100".



conversion of the domestic military-industrial complex and for the country's reindustrialization.

Finally, in case of a total break in relations with the United States, ~~Russia has such~~ convincing arguments for it as the nuclear-missile potential and the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction around the world, which with skillful tactics can play the role of a kind of trading card. And in case Russia is persistently driven into a corner, then it will be possible to undertake ~~to sell~~ military nuclear and missile technologies to such countries as Iran and Iraq, and to Algeria after Islamic forces arrive in power there. Moreover, Russia's direct military alliance with some of the countries mentioned also should not be excluded, above all with Iran, within the framework of which ~~a~~ Russian troop contingent and tactical nuclear weapons could be stationed on the shores of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

d. Concerning the question of the attitude toward strategic nuclear forces, ~~it~~ should be noted that the Russian nuclear potential is one of the few arguments convincing to the West that Russia inherited from the USSR and that is not yet fully destroyed. ~~There~~ needs to be a most rapid formation of a program for developing the strategic nuclear forces based on the fact that they must develop within the framework of the START I Treaty over the next 15 years. The RF Ministry of Defense must develop such a program in a short time, and Parliament must provide financing for its realization. Funds for these purposes could be found, for example, in case of a termination of financing of recovery work in the Chechen Republic and of a large number of other programs, the need for which is not obvious.

An analysis shows that if the strategic nuclear forces develop within the framework of quantitative limits of the START I Treaty, then this is a technically and economically fully realizable option, even considering Russia's loss of production capacities of the former USSR Ministry of General Machinebuilding on Ukrainian territory. And in the first stage the warranty operating life of part of the MIRVed ICBMs in the inventory today--UR-100N, R-36 M UTTKh,<sup>2</sup> R-36 M2, and RT-23 UTTKh--obviously should be extended to 20 years. In the second stage (by the beginning of 2009), ballistic missiles equipped with six

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<sup>2</sup>Possible expansion "Upgraded specifications and performance characteristics"

medium-yield-class warheads and presently being developed within the scope of RDT&E for creating the D-31 naval missile complex obviously should be deployed (400-500 of them) in silo launchers of the above MIRVed ICBMs as well as in certain UR-100K ICBM silo launchers. After 2008 (when the effect of the START I Treaty will end) it is advisable to begin deploying approximately another 100 such missiles in a railroad flatcar basing version.

It appears extremely important to offer opposition to U.S. plans for creating a "tactical ABM defense system" and in this connection changing the terms of the 1972 ABM Treaty. These plans essentially are another attempt at dragging the SDI idea in through the back door and they present a significant threat to strategic stability in the world and provoke the PRC and other "small nuclear countries" to a sharp buildup in their nuclear missile forces. In China's case, for example, its nuclear forces, which even so are heavily inferior to the strategic forces of Russia and the United States, can be completely depreciated by the deployment even of a very limited U.S. ABM defense system. In view of this, a sharp quantitative increase in PRC nuclear-missile forces, above all in the MIRVed ICBM grouping, should be expected if a U.S. ABM defense system is deployed. This in turn obviously will have a provoking effect on India, which in that case will follow the PRC. Then Pakistan also undoubtedly will join in the nuclear race.

Russia must not consent to any kind of changes to the text of the Treaty which would contradict that part of it which prohibits giving tactical ABM defense systems characteristics permitting their use for strategic ABM defense purposes. Arguments according to which Russia and the United States should cooperate in the area of creating a "tactical ABM defense system" in view of the fact that they allegedly have common enemies sound altogether unconvincing. It is obvious that such countries as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea are not Russia's enemies. Secondly, any kind of cooperation between Russia and the United States hardly will be possible at all under conditions of the approaching "cold peace" connected with the upcoming NATO bloc expansion. Finally, by virtue of a policy of "dual standards" being followed by the United States relative to the Israeli nuclear program, which is aimed against Russia among others, any U.S. argument regarding the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons should be viewed with suspicion--in view of the power of the pro-Israeli lobby in the United States, one should not expect any kind of serious

steps by the United States to force Israel to give up its nuclear potential.

On the whole, we should take into account the fact that, as an analysis shows, the regime of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons most likely cannot be preserved over the long term and the number of nuclear powers will grow steadily. Israel already has approximately 200 nuclear devices in the inventory. The range of Israel's nuclear weapon delivery vehicles is up to 2,500 km (i.e., Moscow is within reach of Israel's nuclear forces). It is obvious that Israel will not give up its nuclear potential and accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons under any circumstances. It should be understood that Israel's nuclear potential was created not just for deterring a non-nuclear attack of Arab countries, but also for blackmailing the USSR to compel it to exert a deterring influence on the Arabs in case of their conflict with Israel and the latter's military failures.

A final decision on creating nuclear-missile forces of small size to deter the PRC and Pakistan also was made in India not long ago at the level of the country's political leadership. And this decision is the product of national consent of all of India's political forces and in all likelihood no arguments of the world community about the inadvisability of turning India into a nuclear power will be accepted by India's leadership and no threats of sanctions against India will influence its resolve to create its own nuclear-missile forces. At the same time, it is obvious that equipping the Indian Armed Forces with nuclear weapons will deprive the world community of any kind of arguments against Pakistan turning into a nuclear power, already the eighth in count (after Russia, the United States, UK, France, PRC, Israel, and India). Along with this, Algeria, in which there is a great probability of Islamic forces coming to power, also has everything necessary for creating such a potential in a short time if its leadership makes the corresponding political decision.

Under the conditions which are shaping up, Russia has two possible options of behavior. The first option presumes a continuation of the present RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs line toward cooperating with the United States in order to pressure potential Third World possessors of nuclear weapons to give up realization of their nuclear programs. It appears that such a line will suffer total failure already in the short term. The second option presumes Russia's refusal to follow the U.S. line in the question of non-proliferation of nuclear

weapons and missile technologies and an unfolding of its cooperation in the nuclear-missile area above all with India. ~~India~~ ~~today~~ is one of the few world countries whose national interests do not run counter to Russia's national interests. Russian and Indian cooperation in the nuclear-missile area according to the model of U.S. and UK relations, where the United States supplies the UK with delivery vehicles--Polaris and Trident missiles--on which the UK installs its own nuclear warheads, is seen as most rational. And it is important to remember that India also is capable of creating its own nuclear-missile forces independently, and in the extreme case undoubtedly will do this. But it would be extremely advantageous for it to cooperate with Russia in this matter. The economic advantage to Russia in case of such cooperation also is obvious.

~~In the~~ ~~more~~ ~~distant~~ ~~future~~ Russia also could develop cooperation in ~~this~~ ~~area~~ ~~with~~ ~~Iran~~ and a number of the Arab countries. It appears that such cooperation not only would bring Russia appreciable commercial advantages and political influence in South-West Asia and North Africa, but also would be capable of exerting a certain deterring influence on Russia's Third World partners with respect to the content and direction of their work in this area.

e. The course toward integration within the CIS framework, above all with Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan, must become a very important direction of Russian policy. With respect to Belorussia and in part to Kazakhstan, it can be said that these republics probably will welcome integration tendencies coming from Russia. The situation appears enormously more uncertain with respect to Ukraine. At the same time, an analysis shows that, judging from everything, the results of Kuchma's "reforms" will be even worse than those of Gaydar's "reforms" in Russia. In contrast to Russia, Ukraine has no oil and natural gas, and the West will not be able to place Ukraine on full support. This fundamentally distinguishes the prospect of Ukraine's development from that of the Baltic, for example. Because of the small size of its population, the latter can be subsidized by the West in the extreme case within the range of \$3-5 billion per year--this is little for Ukraine but enough for the Baltic. On the whole, it should be expected that in 3-5 years Ukraine's economy will approach a final collapse and the republic quite probably will go to pieces. Under these conditions its eastern and southern parts obviously will express a desire to voluntarily reunite with Russia.

Realizing this, the West and Western Ukraine's nationalist forces may try to provoke a conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Crimea might be the cause, and the goal would be to start the two peoples quarreling and sow hatred between them, as the West succeeded in doing in the former Yugoslavia with respect to the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats, and thereby make any future reunion of Russia and Ukraine impossible.

In this connection it should be emphasized that the West's goal is to provoke a sharp deterioration of Russia's relations not just with Ukraine, but also with such countries as China and Iran, and to create powerful, constant pressure on the periphery of post-Soviet space in the Tajik-Afghan and Asia Minor zones. It appears that Russia on the one hand should be decisive in following its line concerning NATO expansion, the Baltic, Chechnya, the Caspian shelf, and the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border. But on the other hand it should react with extreme caution to provocations of Western Ukrainian nationalist forces in Crimea and in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, especially as Crimea's present political elite is comprador-oriented and totally corrupt.

On the whole, it appears that if a judicious policy is followed, there are all grounds to count on restoration of a renewed union state in 5-10 years made up of Russia, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, the greater part of Ukraine, as well as the Dniester region, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. And Russia's relations with the Transcaucasus and Central Asia could develop according to the model of relations which existed earlier within the framework of CEMA, and with Moldavia, the Baltic, and Western Ukraine according to the model of Soviet-Finnish relations of 1944-1991 times.

This document may be used in developing a new Russian Federation military doctrine.

Document prepared by  
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Candidate of Technical Sciences /s/ Anton Surikov

Mr. EHRlich. Could you discuss it real briefly?

Mr. WELDON. Internal—I want to make the point, this is not established Russian military policy. But to give you some idea of some of the thoughts going through internal Russian leadership, this document was prepared by, I believe his first name is Anton, Anton Surikov, Institute of Defense Studies, and it's scary. It's scary because some of the things that it talks about, I mean it talks about—many of you probably have Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians in your district.

It says, and I will read, "The Baltic is a criminal zone living chiefly on smuggling and controlled by Mafia structures." And it goes on to say that the United States, if it puts its troops there, will never defend the Baltics because we don't have the backbone, and it says that we never—that the Russians never have to worry about us defending the Baltics because we will never jeopardize our troops to go in and defend. But then it goes on to say that if Russia gets backed into a corner, it should share its nuclear technology with Iran, with Libya, with Iraq, and with other rogue Islamic States. It's right there in the military document as an option for Russia to share this technology if, in fact, there are some circumstances not described here that would cause Russia to be, in their opinion, backed into a corner.

So the document is an internal document that's being used for discussion, but it presents some very scary scenarios.

Members of Congress—and I sent this, I had it translated in January of this year, and I had this sent to all the Members of our House National Security Committee. I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, you want to put the entire document in the record. But understand, this is not established policy, but it is a—it is the discussion occurring within the Russian military that we need to be aware of because that's the future threat.

Mr. EHRlich. I have made that part of the record.

Last, let me get one thing straight in my own mind. Is it your personal opinion—I understand the distinction between development and deployment—that the deployment of the space and/or sea-based missile defense will or will not constitute a violation of the ABM Treaty?

Mr. WELDON. The ABM Treaty allows each of the two signatory countries to have one single-site system. The Russians exercised their option with the Moscow system. We have not because the Congress has never agreed to fund it. We are allowed to have one single-site system. That we can do.

Mr. EHRlich. So it is your opinion that it would not—

Mr. WELDON. And the Russians agree with that. We can deploy one single-site system.

Mr. EHRlich. Thank you.

Karen.

Mrs. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, I just have a couple of questions.

Mr. Weldon, evidently the Department of Energy has asked for \$95 million to increase the nuclear safety and security at Russian facilities. Do you believe that increase in that funding would assist in combating the threat from smuggling?

Mr. WELDON. I think it will help. The Russians have a terrible problem with smuggling. As a matter of fact, for the past 4 years

I have worked with DOE to have them establish guidelines for operating Russian nuclear power plants.

I sent a letter to President Clinton before the G7 Summit on Nuclear Safety asking him to do two things, asking him to establish among all nuclear nations a standard set of guidelines that we developed with the Russians for the nuclear power plants which hopefully will be done, and secondarily to consider establishing an international commission to monitor nuclear wastesites and nuclear disposal sites. That's a terrible problem worldwide. Both of those issues we have to be helpful with the Russians.

And, in fact, in our bill this year we again put \$15 million in the Defense bill to help the Russians deal with their nuclear waste problem in the Arctic. As you may know, they have been dumping their nuclear waste in the Arctic for the past 30 years. Mr. Seoblikov documented that for Yeltsin 3 years ago. We have helped them come up with alternatives and, in fact, at the summit Yeltsin agreed to abide by the London convention and no longer dump nuclear waste in the Arctic Ocean, the Barents Sea or the Sea of Japan.

So we are making progress, and, yes, I support those efforts.

Mrs. THURMAN. I guess some of our energy companies would like to have that same opportunity, right?

Mr. WELDON. Well, most of the actual work is being done by our energy companies with American dollars, as you probably know. Babcock and Wilcox is doing a lot of the engineering work over there.

Mrs. THURMAN. In the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, they suffered, what, a 30 percent budget cut this year. Do you see that shifting over to the Department of Defense or somebody else to take care of this problem? Or do you think we should put that money back in?

Mr. WELDON. Well, I am not one to say that arms control agreements should be totally wiped away. They are important. I think they can provide confidence-building measures. I think the point is, if you are going to focus totally on arms control, which is what this administration does, then you also need to support the enforcement of those agreements.

And that's what I have—my main criticism of this administration is. However, I think it should be a balance. The balance should be, yes, have agreements that we can agree on. We should enforce them and they should enforce them with us if we violate them. But also have the ability to protect our people. And that's what—in this case, I think the administration is lacking on both fronts. We don't have a commitment to defend, and we don't have support of the requirements to enforce the arms control agreement.

So what do we have? In my opinion, we have a severely lacking foreign policy.

Mrs. THURMAN. But do you think that helps us with a 30 percent budget cut in those very areas that would help us with that? I mean—

Mr. WELDON. I am not here to take a part in—I can tell you they still had a reception for me when I went to negotiate with Mr. Koltunov, so I guess there was some money available over there. I don't know.

Mr. EHRLICH. Curt, thank you very much. We appreciate your testimony.

Mr. WELDON. Thank you.

Mr. EHRLICH. Before I call the next panel up, I would acknowledge the presence of our beloved chairman, Bill Zeliff.

Mr. ZELIFF. Thank you, very much.

Mr. EHRLICH. Mr. Chairman, welcome.

Thanks, Curt.

Mr. WELDON. Thank you.

Mr. EHRLICH. Mr. Woolsey and Mr. Gaffney, would you all stand, please.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. EHRLICH. Welcome, gentlemen. As many know, certainly people in this room, Mr. Woolsey has had a long and distinguished career which recently included serving as President Clinton's Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He brings special expertise in a number of areas, but particularly in the understanding of the ballistic missile threat and its implications.

Mr. Gaffney is a director of the nonprofit Center for Security Policy and is also a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, senior Defense Department position responsible for nuclear forces, arms control and U.S./European defense relations.

Gentlemen, welcome. I would ask you to make your opening statements and try to highlight, if you would, your opening statements, because I know we have some questions for you. Thank you.

**STATEMENTS OF R. JAMES WOOLSEY, FORMER DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; AND FRANK J. GAFFNEY, JR., PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY**

Mr. WOOLSEY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With your permission, I would ask that my seven-page statement be inserted inside the record.

Mr. EHRLICH. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. WOOLSEY. I will talk briefly to the main points.

About 3 months ago, I was in Taipei when the Chinese Government announced its intention to begin the ballistic missile launches just off of Taiwan. The original statements from the administration left something to be desired. They seemed to emphasize that there would be consequences should these tests go wrong.

The main point should never have been what would be the problem if the Chinese turned out not even to be able to hit a square in the ocean 20 miles on a side. The main point—and I think finally the administration got around to much stronger and positive statements, as well as sending the aircraft carriers—always was what the consequences were when actions of this sort, by China or any other government, go right.

The problem is that off Taiwan this spring, as well as in Tel Aviv and Riyadh in 1991, we have been given a major insight into the future of international affairs, and it is a very ugly picture. It is a picture that emphasizes the potentiality for blackmail, terror and efforts to drive wedges between us and our allies using ballistic missiles.



Let me say a few words about the ballistic missile threat in general before I turn to the National Intelligence Estimate, at least as it has been publicly described, that was issued a few months ago.

Ballistic missiles are normally discussed in the same breath with weapons of mass destruction, but it's certainly not always necessary to deploy nuclear, chemical or bacteriological warheads for them to be used effectively for terror and blackmail. Certainly, the Chinese tried to do this in March. Saddam tried to do it particularly against Israel as an effort to split our coalition in the war against Iraq.

Second, even with respect to conventional warhead missiles, we are in an era of revolutionary improvements in missile guidance. To mention only one, the Global Positioning System satellite network is in the process of being made available not only in its degraded form, but in a very accurate form, free to the world. It will not be too long before Saddam or the Chinese rulers will be able, for example, to threaten to destroy precisely the Kneset or precisely a Taiwanese nuclear power plant in order to create an intentional Chernobyl incident and with, again I stress, conventional weapons, not weapons of mass destruction.

Third, of course, even relatively inaccurate ballistic missiles can be given an awesome capability if they are equipped with chemical, bacteriological or nuclear warheads. Often, as in the colloquy here with Congressman Weldon, the emphasis is on a nuclear capability, and as some of that questioning indicated, it is certainly true that the loose controls, especially over fissionable material in Russia, are a substantial problem.

We used to be able to tell what the Soviet Union was going to do in nuclear programs by watching its test ranges and the deployment of ICBMs in Siberia with our technical collection systems, such as reconnaissance satellites, but a couple of years ago the Russian Interior Ministry arrested a janitor from a nuclear power plant or a research reactor facility, I forget which, who had some substantial quantities of plutonium. We didn't used to have to watch janitors in Russia in order to understand what was happening with fissionable material. But for all the looseness, and it is troubling, there are at least some important constraints on the flows of fissionable material.

I believe that chemical or even, more terribly, bacteriological warhead systems will be with us and will be possessed by rogue states in the very near future. Bacteriological systems, for example, are relatively inexpensive to manufacture and produce and weaponize.

Fourth, it is not at all necessary, for purposes of threatening terror or blackmail against the United States, to threaten an effective counterforce strike—that is, a strike against our own nuclear forces, such as bomber bases or ICBM silos in the interior of the lower 48 States. That was the issue that dominated much of the discussion during the cold war.

For example, I was the principal drafter of the Scowcroft Commission Report in 1983 as a commission member, and that was pretty much the whole focus of our concerns.

But in current circumstances, for blackmail purposes, it's perfectly adequate for North Korea, China or any other country to be able to threaten Anchorage or Honolulu.

Fifth, we should not automatically assume that the post-cold war world is going to be one in which we have a relatively benign Russian democracy moving slowly toward a free enterprise economy, and a relatively benign Chinese free-enterprise economy moving slowly toward democracy. I think it's at least as likely that we will have an increasingly autocratic and imperialistic Russia, regardless of who wins the election next month, and I think we saw China's new international face solidly in the Taiwan Straits this past spring. The possibility of chaos and disorganization in both of those countries also has to be taken seriously.

I think it's important in this context, let me put it this way, to focus on the fact that the recent National Intelligence Estimate that covered, "Emerging Missile Threats to North America During The Next 15 Years," is a very different kind of document than the National Intelligence Estimates that have been produced over recent years with respect to this threat. It is a very limited document. It is one that focuses on a portion of the threat to the United States.

The problem is that even if the NIE is accurate within its four corners and within the limited subject which it addresses and is the best that the intelligence community can do—on that limited set of issues, that may, in fact, be the case—it is quite wrong, I think, because of the limited nature of the NIE, to make broad statements such that intelligence indicates that ballistic missiles don't pose a serious threat to U.S. interests.

In the first place, the last time I looked, Alaska and Hawaii had not been admitted to the Union on terms that exclude them in some way from the common defense that is called for in the Constitution's preamble. For purposes of blackmail, they are certainly of no less concern to us than, say, Oklahoma and Kansas. And this contiguous 48-State frame of reference for the National Intelligence Estimate is, in some ways, akin—making a generalization from an NIE of that limited nature is somewhat akin—to saying that because we believe that for the next number of years local criminals in the District of Columbia will not be able successfully to blow up DC police headquarters, that means that there is generally no serious threat to the security or safety of police in the District. The conclusion simply doesn't follow from the premise that is discussed.

The concentration in the National Intelligence Estimate on indigenous ICBM development also seems to me to limit too much the important concerns that one needs to focus on in these days and times. Indigenous development of ICBMs was of heavy interest during the cold war because the Soviets were trying to maintain a monopoly on this technology. But, again, as was pointed out in some of the colloquy with Congressman Weldon, transfers of technology and materiel—ICBM launch services for space vehicles and all the rest—deserve a great deal more attention now than they did during the cold war. And in any case, transfers or indigenous development, let's put it this way, by countries that are currently hostile to the United States are only part of the problem, because a country may change its allegiance and focus and national orienta-

tion rather quickly, and certainly within a 15-year timeframe. Iran, certainly did that at the end of the 1970s.

Finally, I think it is a bad idea in the field of ballistic missile defense for us to study only what we see through intelligence today. By assessing only what we could actually see, we badly underestimated Iraq's efforts in the area of weapons of mass destruction before the Gulf war. And so one important aspect of assessing the national problem with dealing with ballistic missile defense is that we need to look technically at what is possible, not only what we actually see other countries doing.

So to the degree that President Clinton was extrapolating a general conclusion about a lack of threat from ballistic missiles to American interests from this very limited National Intelligence Estimate, I believe that this was a serious error.

Let me finally turn to the current state of arms control negotiations. As was remarked by Congressman Weldon, the 1992 negotiations that followed President Yeltsin's January speech of that year, in which he called for cooperation between the United States and Russia on ballistic missile defense, were a promising development. What has happened since 1992 in addition to policy changes, I believe, by the Clinton administration, is that President Yeltsin is now surrounded by advisors such as Mr. Khorzakov, Mr. Primakov, Mr. Barsukov and others who have, to put it mildly, not yet established solid reputations as democratic reformers. To be blunt about it, several of these individuals have strong ties to rogue States of the Mideast. They represent the most unreconstructed portions of the old Communist establishment. They are quite close to the military and industrial managers who produce military hardware and are interested in selling it for personal, as well as organizational, profit.

And so whatever the causes of the shift during these last 4 years, from Russian willingness to cooperate with us to Mr. Primakov's recent effort to undermine the effectiveness of our theater ballistic missile defense programs by some of his statements, the change really is very striking.

I would suggest that in negotiating with the Russians on this point we take something of a leaf from their strategy of negotiation. I negotiated a treaty in 1990 in the Bush administration, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, which I believe is a sound treaty. It had some provisions in it which limit substantially the then-Soviet Union's ability to deploy the overall number of their forces that are permitted to their northern and southern flanks.

A lot has changed since 1990. The Soviet Union is now Russia and the other former soviet states. Some of the flank areas are now in different countries, and the Russians want more flexibility with respect to some of their flank deployments within the agreed limits.

I think some such adjustments are reasonable. They are reasonable as long as we continue to coordinate our responses and our increased openness to flexibility with our NATO allies who are most concerned, in this case Norway and Turkey. If Norway and Turkey can go along with some of these deployment changes, I think it is a reasonable thing for the Russians to ask and a reasonable thing for us to work on.

But the point is that while the Russians are demanding that we be extremely reasonable with respect to CFE Treaty adjustments, they are trying to make the ABM Treaty more restrictive on the United States in a number of ways, and the most troubling way is to place limitations on the speed of our theater ballistic missile interceptors as a device to limit our theater ballistic missile defense capability, arguing that this is necessary in order to assure that these theater key functions are not strategic defenses.

I think it is perfectly reasonable to accept limitations upon the speed and range of targets, target vehicles that are fired for ballistic missile, defense tests. That, to me, is a reasonable accommodation with provisions in the ABM Treaty, but it is not necessary, and I think it is most unwise, to accept speed limitations on the capabilities of our own interceptors. It is not called for within the treaty and I think it is most unsound.

The administration reportedly is resisting these Russian proposals but they have so far done it in a way that I think is not the best way, not the soundest way to try to delineate theater defenses from strategic defenses.

I hope very much that we will be able to move in the near future toward a combined program of improved theater ballistic missile defenses—improved beyond the level of the administration's budget request—to some type of national defense. I believe we can at least initially do that within the framework of amendments to the ABM Treaty.

One that ought to be considered is to go back to the number of sites that were permitted under the original ABM Treaty in 1972, two sites rather than one. There are other potential systems such as a sea-based system that could also be quite effective, and I think some of these are compatible with amended versions of the ABM Treaty.

We have no reason to be hesitant in telling the Russians that we seek modifications to the treaty, that we are willing—assuming this is our national decision—to continue to have an ABM Treaty of some kind that does not permit a full defense against each other, but that we require some substantial amendments and changes in order to be able to protect ourselves from rogue states, from China, from accidental launches and the rest. We should tell the Russians we expect them to be reasonable on these points and we should have no hesitancy on being quite firm about this. We are dealing from a position of strength. It was their political and economic system that was cast on to the ash heap of history, not ours.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EHRlich. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Woolsey follows.]

Statement of R. James Woolsey  
House Committee on National Security

March 14, 1996

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, it is an honor to be asked to testify before you today on the topic of ballistic missile defense.

Let me begin by addressing the subject of the threat.

Ten days ago I was in Taipei when the Chinese government announced its intention to begin ballistic missile launches three days later into two 20-mile-square impact areas, one a mere 20 miles off Taiwan's northeast coast and the other 30 miles off the southwest coast. These launches have interfered with access to Taiwan's principal port, Kaohsiung, to Taipei's international airport, and to rich fishing grounds. In Taipei I called the announcement a "de facto, partial, temporary blockade." After originally stating that the firings did not constitute a blockade, were only political theater -- albeit "a little too close to the edge of the stage" -- and announcing that "there will be consequences should these tests go wrong," I was glad to see that the administration later labelled the firings reckless and provocative.

The main point here should never have been what the consequences would be in the event that China turned out not to be able to hit even a square in the ocean 20 miles on a side. The main point is what the consequences are if, as seems to have been the case so far, the tests go right.

The key issue is that off Taiwan this past week, as well as in the streets of Tel Aviv and Riyadh in early 1991, we have been given an important insight into the future of international relations. It is not an attractive vision. Ballistic missiles can, and in the future they increasingly will, be used by hostile states for blackmail, terror, and to drive wedges between us and our friends and allies. It is my judgment that the administration is not currently giving this vital problem the proper weight it deserves.

I will turn in a moment to the presentation given the end of February to this Committee by Richard Cooper, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, covering the new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), "Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the Next Fifteen Years." (I would stress that throughout my testimony today in my references to this NIE, this

unclassified presentation of Dr. Cooper's is my only source of information about this estimate.) But here at the outset let me say a few words in general about the threat that ballistic missiles are coming to pose to American interests in the world.

First, although ballistic missiles are normally discussed in the same breath with weapons of mass destruction, it is important to realize that it is not always necessary to deploy nuclear, chemical, or bacteriological warheads in order to use ballistic missiles -- even with current accuracies -- as weapons of terror and blackmail. The Chinese, for example, have admitted that they are using these current missile launches near Taiwan to attempt to influence Taiwan's Presidential elections later this month and to affect Taiwan's conduct of its relations with other countries. Saddam's SCUD attacks on Israel, using conventional high-explosive warheads, were clearly an attempt to provoke an Israeli response and to split the coalition against Iraq, which included a number of Arab states which would have had great difficulty fighting alongside Israel against another Arab nation.

Second, we are in the midst of an era of revolutionary improvements in missile guidance. These improvements will soon make ballistic missiles much more effective for blackmail purposes -- again, even without the need for warheads containing weapons of mass destruction. The New York Times reported last week, for example, that the White House will shortly announce a policy to permit other-than-U.S.-government-users of the Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite network to have much greater confidence that the satellites' signals will not be interrupted or degraded by the U.S. The press also reports that the administration believes that regional agreements will ensure that the signals cannot be used by hostile forces. But the efficacy of such arrangements remains to be seen. The current type of GPS access is adequate for many commercial purposes. But if it is true that the current policy of "selective availability" of GPS is about to be abandoned, there will be a definite risk not only that guidance signals, provided by the U.S., will be usable by other nations for their ballistic missile systems (that is true today), but that truly excellent accuracy will thereby be achievable for many countries' missiles.

With such guidance improvements, it is quite reasonable to believe that within a few years Saddam or the Chinese rulers will be able to threaten something far more troubling than firings of relatively inaccurate ballistic missiles. They may quite plausibly be able to threaten to destroy, say, the Knesset, or threaten to create, in effect, an intentional Chernobyl incident at a Taiwanese nuclear power plant.

Third, even relatively inaccurate ballistic missiles may be given awesome power if equipped with weapons of mass destruction.

Although attention is usually focused on the possibility of various countries' obtaining nuclear warheads, nuclear capability is at least somewhat constrained by the difficulty of acquiring fissionable material. Loose controls over fissionable material, particularly in the former Soviet Union, are nevertheless quite troubling because unauthorized sales and smuggling of fissionable material to rogue states are becoming increasingly likely. But it is even easier to acquire the wherewithal to produce chemical or, much worse, bacteriological warheads than it is to acquire fissionable material. Chemical and bacteriological weapons will be available far sooner and to a much larger number of countries than will nuclear warheads. Bacteriological warheads in particular will serve about as well as nuclear ones for purposes of turning a country's ballistic missiles into extremely effective tools of terror and blackmail, even if they are never launched. This Committee is well familiar with the large number of countries working on ballistic missiles, and with the international traffic in technology and equipment -- much of it out of Russia, China, and North Korea -- that assists other nations in developing and improving ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

Fourth, it is not necessary to be able to conduct an effective counterforce strike with ballistic missiles against ICBM silos, bomber bases, and other nuclear facilities in our continental heartland in order to use ballistic missiles for terror and blackmail directly against the United States. This concern with a counterforce strike against nuclear facilities in the interior of the lower 48 states was, of course, a principal issue for us during the long strategic stand-off against the Soviet Union during the cold war. Much of our strategic analysis during those years centered on the ability of, particularly, our ICBM's and strategic bombers to withstand such a strike and retaliate effectively. For example, the Scowcroft Commission Report in 1983, of which I was the principal drafter, was heavily devoted to this question.

But in current circumstances, nuclear blackmail threats against the United States may be effectively posed by, e.g., North Korean intermediate-range missiles targeted on Alaska or Hawaii, or by Chinese ICBM's targeted on Los Angeles.

Fifth, we should not automatically assume a benign post-cold-war world in which Russia is a democracy, with a few inconsequential anomalies, that is steadily developing a free enterprise economy and China is a free enterprise economy, with a few inconsequential anomalies, that is steadily developing democracy. It is at least as likely, in my judgment, that the Russia that will face us will be increasingly autocratic and imperialistic -- we may hope, but we should not be confident, that it will retain some measure of civil liberties and some free sectors in its economy. As for the new China, in addition to our

serious differences with its leaders over civil liberties, proliferation, and trade, we may well be seeing its international face in the Taiwan Straits today. In short, we cannot discount the possibility of serious international crises developing in the future with either country -- including crises in which Russian or Chinese officials will repeat new versions of the recent barely veiled threat expressed to former Assistant Secretary Freeman: American leaders "care more about Los Angeles than they do Taiwan."

It is with these considerations in mind that I have some thoughts about the recent NIE covering "Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the Next Fifteen Years." The answers provided to the questions that were asked -- based on the public record -- during the process of writing this NIE may well be the best consensus that the Intelligence Community can produce, and may be generally consistent with earlier work. The reason, it seems to me, why this estimate seems to differ in important ways from assessments during my tenure as DCI, lies much more in the questions that are asked. To focus an NIE on the threat to the contiguous 48 states, in my judgment, is to focus on a sub-set, and not a particularly useful sub-set, of the strategic problems that are posed for us by other countries' possession of ballistic missiles in the post-cold-war era.

If broad conclusions are drawn from an NIE of such limited scope, as they apparently have been -- for example, that "intelligence indicates" that ballistic missiles do not pose a serious threat to U.S. interests -- the conclusions could be quite wrong, even if the drafters of the NIE answered as best they could the questions they were asked. If decision-makers conclude, and I believe this would be a serious error, that this NIE -- at least as it has publicly been described --- covers the most important questions about ballistic missile threats to American interests, what would they say about, e.g., nuclear blackmail threats against Anchorage and Honolulu? These sort of threats will in great likelihood be present from North Korean intermediate range missiles in well under fifteen years. Such questions as these seem to be an afterthought, at least in the public description of the NIE. But the last time I looked, Alaska and Hawaii had not been admitted to the Union on terms that exclude them in some way from the common defense called for in the Constitution's preamble. As objects of blackmail they are of no less concern to us than Oklahoma and Kansas.

I believe that the "contiguous 48" frame of reference for this NIE, if the document is used as a basis for drawing general policy conclusions, can lead to a badly distorted and minimized perception of the serious threats we face from ballistic missiles now and in the very near future -- threats to our friends, our allies, our overseas bases and military forces, our overseas territories, and some of the 50 states. Using an estimate that



focuses on the ICBM threat to the contiguous 48 states to make general judgments about our need for ballistic missile defenses is, if you will grant me some literary license, akin to saying that because we believe that for the next number of years local criminals will not be able to blow up police headquarters in the District of Columbia, there is no serious threat to the safety and security of police in the District.

I would add several other points about this NIE, as it is set out in the unclassified February testimony to this Committee. The concentration on indigenous ICBM development also seems to me to limit sharply any general conclusions that might legitimately be drawn. Dr. Cooper's testimony indicates that "the potential for foreign assistance introduces some uncertainty into our predictions of timelines." That is putting it mildly. Again, the NIE's answers may be reasonable in view of the questions it seeks to answer. If you are assessing indigenous capabilities within currently-hostile countries to develop ICBM's that can hit the lower 48 states, the NIE's answer that we have 15 years of comfort may well be a plausible answer.

Indigenous development of ICBM's was of interest during the cold war because the Soviets sought to maintain a monopoly on their most precious military capabilities and export of fully developed ICBM's was not in the cards. But in the cold war's aftermath, Russia, China, and North Korea are in the export business for missile technology and components, and for some technologies related to weapons of mass destruction as well. Moreover, with respect to some such exports the degree of control exercised by Moscow, and perhaps by Beijing, may not be at all complete. Consequently, transfers deserve more attention than they did during the cold war. A further problem is created by transfers of ballistic missile technology or components to a country which is friendly to the U.S. if that country should later turn hostile through a revolution or radical change in government. Even with the best intelligence in the world it is impossible to forecast fifteen years in advance such events as the Iranian revolution of the late 1970's, which turned a friendly state into a hostile one.

Because of these uncertainties we should study carefully the possibility of technically feasible threats, not only threats for which we actually see nations conducting tests and assembling components. One reasonable course of action, for example, would be for the government to assemble a small technical "red team" of bright young American scientists and engineers and let them see what could be assembled from internationally available technology and components. I would bet that we would be shocked at what they could show us about available capabilities in ballistic missiles. We should remember that by assessing only what we could actually see, we badly underestimated Iraq's efforts in the

years before the Gulf War, especially with regard to weapons of mass destruction.

It may be that the President was relying on something other than this recent National Intelligence Estimate when he said, in vetoing the 1996 Defense Authorization Bill, that US intelligence "does not foresee" the existence of a ballistic missile threat to the US "in the coming decade". But to the degree that the President was extrapolating a general conclusion from the very limited part of the overall ballistic missile threat that appears to be assessed by this NIE, I believe that this was a serious error.

Finally, let me turn briefly to the current state of arms control negotiations as they might affect our BMD programs and to those programs themselves as set forth in the administration's proposed defense budget for 1997 -- also based, of course, on public reports.

A little over a year ago, my law partner and friend, Steve Hadley, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy in the Bush Administration, set out in testimony before this Committee the history of the negotiations in 1992 that followed President Yeltsin's January speeches of that year. President Yeltsin called for "a global system for protection of the world community [that could be] based on a reorientation of the U.S. SDI to make use of high technologies developed in Russia's defense complex."

Recently, according to press reports, the new Russian Foreign Minister, Mr. Primakov, threatened to withhold Russian ratification of the START II Treaty unless the U.S. agreed to restrictions that could substantially limit even our theater ballistic missile defenses, in the context of distinguishing such theater systems from treaty-limited systems.

Among the many things that have changed since 1992 are that President Yeltsin is now surrounded by advisers, such as Mr. Korzhakov, Mr. Primakov, Mr. Barsukov, and others who have, shall we say, not yet established solid reputations as democratic reformers and are generally not inclined to promote cooperation with the U.S. Indeed several of these advisers have very close ties to either the rulers of rogue states that are at the heart of our proliferation concerns, to the most unreconstructed portions of the old communist establishment, especially hard-line elements of the military and industrial managers who produce military hardware, or to all of the above. Their reasons for wanting to limit cooperation with the U.S. are obvious -- such cooperation endangers their ability to use nationalism and calls for autarky in order to enhance their status, control of resources, and power.

But whatever the reasons, the shift during these four years from Russian willingness to propose overall cooperation with the United States on ballistic missile defenses to Mr. Primakov's recent effort to undermine the effectiveness of our theater ballistic missile defense programs is quite striking. We may see a sharpening of such hostility even if President Yeltsin is re-elected in June. If the Communist candidate, Mr. Zyuganov, is elected, we can count on it.

During these same four years, the Russians have expressed substantial disagreement with one particular aspect of the treaty that I negotiated in 1990, covering conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) -- the special limitations that apply to the Russians' share of their total conventional armed forces that they can deploy to their northern and southern flanks. The United States has worked with its NATO allies during the last year to find ways, by making certain adjustments in the map defining the CFE flank zones, to accommodate some of the Russian concerns. I have no quarrel with these efforts to date, because they have been coordinated with our NATO allies, especially Turkey and Norway, who are principally interested in these particular limitations, and because the administration has indicated that it will seek Congressional approval for any map changes.

The point is that we are being quite reasonable with respect to CFE Treaty adjustments, but Russia is headed the opposite direction with respect to adjustments to the ABM Treaty. The Russian government is now trying to make the ABM Treaty more restrictive on the U.S. -- for example, by trying to get us to agree to limitations on the speed of our theater ballistic missile interceptors. It is my understanding that the administration has resisted these Russian efforts, but it is unfortunate that -- again according to press reports -- we have apparently agreed to language that establishes interceptor speeds (below 3 kilometers per second) that would not violate the treaty. I hope and trust that we will continue to insist that faster interceptors (such as those that would be used for the Navy's Upper Tier theater defense system) are also treaty-compliant, but I am concerned that we have agreed to discuss interceptor speed at all. Limitations on the range and speed of targets for theater systems should be sufficient to establish that our theater systems are not being "tested in an ABM mode" in violation of the treaty.

I also have difficulty in understanding the reasons for adding other nations, such as other former Soviet Republics, to the ABM Treaty. Multilateralizing the Treaty will make it harder to amend and adjust it in order to accomplish the purposes President Yeltsin set out in 1992. The original purpose of the ABM Treaty was to prevent a Soviet ABM deployment that would endanger our ability to retaliate following a Soviet counterforce

strike against the U.S. We fear no such a strike from, e.g., Byelorussia. I see no reason why we are moving to make it harder to adjust the Treaty to the post-cold-war era rather than easier.

Finally, I am quite disappointed that the administration's defense budget for 1997 delays and cuts the funding for the theater and national BMD programs that Congress has called for. I am sympathetic with the dilemma faced by the senior leaders of the Defense Department as they were forced to set priorities among BMD programs, given the fact that the funds available for defense procurement overall were less than two-thirds of the sustaining level of approximately \$60 billion that was needed. The problem is not so much, in my view, the choices that the Defense Department leadership made in the face of these fiscal constraints. It is the constraints themselves.

Any overall assessment of the risks and needs facing the United States should, in my judgment, indicate the primary importance of a vigorous program for theater defenses (Navy Upper Tier and THAAD) and also the importance of a sound program to move toward some type of national defense (coupled with a diplomatic effort to increase, not decrease, the flexibility in the ABM Treaty). I would personally put the top priority at the present time on the theater defense programs, in addition to the shorter-range systems that are already being pursued. The reasons are set forth very well in last year's report by the Heritage Foundation, "Defending America." In general, much of the work on theater systems, particularly in connection with space-based sensors, is also relevant to national defenses.

I would defer for the time being the question whether we should consider withdrawing from the ABM Treaty. I believe that, with an appropriately firm negotiating approach to the Russians and with adequate funding for our own BMD programs, we should be able to accommodate our needs within the Treaty for some time if it is appropriately interpreted and, possibly, modified.

In 1992 we explored seriously with the Russians how we might move toward limited national defenses cooperatively with them so that both countries could be defended from a wide range of ballistic missile threats. With any reasonable Russian government, this approach should eventually bear fruit. For example, if we could reach agreement on returning to the ABM Treaty's original 1972 form (permitting two sites, not one, in each country), a thin national defense against most threats other than a large attack by Russia would be made substantially easier. As part of a combined approach we might be willing to supply the Russians, as well as other nations, with data from our space-based sensors such as Brilliant Eyes. This would substantially enhance the performance of their theater defense systems. Such a combined approach of treaty modification and cooperative

programs would give us a few more years to assess the direction in which we want to move over the long run.

One final point. The Russians should be made aware that we expect them to be reasonable and that particularly their international conduct and military programs will be weighed by us as we make our long-term decisions about our approach toward the Treaty and cooperative programs. We have no reason to be hesitant to make clear to the Russian government what American needs and desires are. We are dealing from a position of strength. It was our cold-war adversaries' political and economic system that has been cast onto the ash-heap of history, not ours.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EHRLICH. Mr. Gaffney.

Mr. GAFFNEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for affording me an opportunity to contribute to this committee's deliberations on what I think you and many of the Members present regard as the single most serious national security threat or problem that we face in this country. That is, as has been noted repeatedly this morning, our inability to stop even a single ballistic missile launched at this country, whether by accident or intentionally.

It is my particular pleasure to have this chance to do so in the company of an old colleague, Jim Woolsey, whose thoughtful, realistic assessments of this threat have been a very important antidote to the Pollyannish intelligence assessments served up—most especially in the past year—by the Clinton administration. I don't know if Congressman Spratt had left but I was hoping that—

Mr. EHRLICH. He will be back.

Mr. GAFFNEY. Good. I regard him as the single most effective opponent in the Congress of prompt deployment of missile defenses. It is also my privilege to have a chance to have further interactions with him on this subject.

I will skip comments in my prepared text. I hope you will allow them all to be—

Mr. EHRLICH. We will make your prepared text part of the record.

Mr. GAFFNEY. I would simply acknowledge the large and growing number of Members in this body, and on the Senate side, who have taken a very courageous visionary and principled position on the importance of missile defense in the face of what is generally, if not universally, the opposition to such an initiative on the part of the policy elite here inside the Washington Beltway and certainly many in the press.

One of those Members, of course, is Speaker Gingrich, who has correctly described this debate as "the most important national defense debate since Churchill argued for building radar" in the years prior to World War II. I think that is an apt analogy as well as an accurate depiction of the stakes. After all, had Britain not taken the steps prior to the outbreak of hostilities to prepare for them with an investment in what was then thought to be a somewhat exotic and unproven technology, there is very little doubt that the casualties that would have been experienced at the hand of the Luftwaffe—if not the course of the Battle of Britain and perhaps even the war itself—might have been very different.

I fear that unless the United States similarly acts today to begin the prompt deployment of missile defenses, we too at some future point will experience immense and otherwise avoidable losses as well.

I think I can skip the remarks that I wanted to make about the threat. They have been covered very nicely by both the previous witnesses and those of you who have asked them questions. I would like to make just one or two points.

It is certainly the case that we don't know today at what moment in time nations, other than Russia and China, will have the means to deliver ballistic missile weapons of mass destruction against our people. I think there is sort of a bell curve involved here. It is entirely possible, as Congressman Weldon described, that the pur-

chase of missiles outright could cause these developments to take place in very short order. It is also possible at the far end of the bell curve that it will take 10 or 15 years. But I suggest to you that the trends, and again they have been amply covered, argue that it is probably the case that countries that we have considerable reason to fear will acquire these means of intimidating, coercing, blackmailing, if not actually attacking, us in the timeframe that it will take us to do something about it in the form of deploying missile defenses.

I would just mention in connection with the point that Congressman Weldon made on the SS-25 sale, it is regrettably the case that the Clinton administration actually negotiated a change to the START I Treaty, that legitimates the transfer of so-called "space launch vehicles" to anyone the Russians see fit. And I think it far from unlikely, indeed, entirely plausible, that we will see some of these so-called space launch vehicles appearing in some of the countries that we are all concerned about.

On the point about the politicization of the latest intelligence assessment, I would just like to make one point. I am of the view generally that it is no accident that there is a convenient correlation between the administration's preferred policy and the latest intelligence assessment. But I had called to my attention the other day a remarkable statement from a man who ought to know—a senior member of the National Security Council of the Clinton administration by the name of Robert Bell. He is well-known, I think, to most of you here as a former congressional staff member, who now runs I believe the arms control and strategic forces portfolio at the NSC. He spoke to a Washington audience not far from this room on May 8th.

Mr. Bell said the following with respect to the question of 15 years' used, as has been noted in National Intelligence Estimates:

Quote, "Why 15 years? . . . What the analyst did was to say Let's take a timeframe and look at it, and see what we think could occur between now and then." And the question was what timeframe to pick, recognizing that it's ultimately an arbitrary decision. If you picked 10 years, you're not helping the policy or acquisition communities, because the life cycle ". . . for an acquisition program is on the order of 12 to 15 years."

Now I am not entirely sure what to make of that but it seems to me a reasonable reading of it is that this estimate was tailored for the convenience of policy and/or acquisition people. Not necessarily to give the best, most realistic estimate of the actual threat.

This, in my view, argues powerfully for Congress to get a second opinion. This is a reasonably good practice in the medical world and I think even more so in terms of national security.

I mention in my prepared remarks precedent for this so-called Team B that was commissioned in the mid-seventies by then-Director of Central Intelligence Agency, George Bush, to examine independently what the then-Soviet Union was up to. I think the results were far more accurate, although more pessimistic than was the CIA estimate at the time. I am delighted that Congressman Spratt and his colleagues have included a direction to commission

such a second opinion in the Fiscal Year 1997 Defense authorization bill.

In the meantime, Mr. Chairman, I would like to call your attention to an informal and unofficial effort along a similar line that was sponsored by the Heritage Foundation. An updated version of this document has just been released and I would ask your permission, if I may, it is fairly short, to have it submitted in the record at an appropriate place as well.

Mr. EHRLICH. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. GAFFNEY. I would like to make a couple of points. It looked hard—

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, why are we inserting it in the record? It is available in the booklet form. May I ask how much it will cost to reprint and put it in the record? I object. It is available. We can put it in our library. I see no reason to reprint it at a substantial cost to the Government.

Mr. EHRLICH. Objection is heard.

Mr. GAFFNEY. I certainly have no idea how much it would cost to reprint it.

Mr. EHRLICH. We will get an estimate.

Mr. SPRATT. It is a routine for the Congressional Record that a cost estimate be first obtained from the GPO sticking it in the record here. It is available there and I think it is unreasonable to reprint it at a cost to the Government.

Mr. EHRLICH. I understand, Mr. Spratt. You are not a member of the subcommittee. I am not sure if you have a standing to object to that.

Mr. SPRATT. Touché, I don't know but—

Mr. EHRLICH. I will take it under advisement.

Two, I would appreciate the opportunity to have Members have it available to them. We will make it available to all members of subcommittee.

Mr. GAFFNEY. In light of the possibility that it might not be made otherwise available to them, let me highlight three particular points that are raised in it, if I may quickly.

One is the judgment of the distinguished participants in this study, which include two of the former directors of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, Dr. Henry Cooper and Lieutenant General James Abrahamson, as well as other former senior military individuals, scientists, and other experts.

We found that, quote, "This optimistic view," that is to say the Clinton administration's view, "of the threat is not consistent with the observable pace and nature of proliferation, the technical facts of missile development or the political instabilities of the former Soviet states and China."

We also go on—and this is perhaps the most important thing I would like to leave with you—to argue for an option that has only been addressed in passing here this morning. I, frankly, can't figure out why that is, in light of the technical and cost considerations that argue for a specific near-term approach to providing a missile defense for both our forces and allies overseas and for the American people. And that is to take advantage of the roughly \$50 billion investment we have already made as a Nation in the Navy's fleet air defense system known as the AEGIS program. The esti-



mates available to us from official sources and unofficial sources and recommended by this distinguished study group concluded that for approximately \$2 to \$3 billion that infrastructure that is in place today could be made a near-term and very effective theater as well as national missile defense system.

Approximately 22 cruisers could be rapidly modified, 650 of the existing missiles could be modified as well, and we would have as a result what you might call a layered defense system. By virtue of the fact that multiple ships are deployed—as they are typically on any given day on the world's oceans—might have an opportunity to take not only repeated shots themselves but also sequential shots along the flight trajectory of a ballistic missile.

This I believe is entirely consistent with the thrust of the Defend America Act of 1996, which as you know calls for a layered defense. It is one of the options alluded to in the bill, but I think it is so clearly the way to go. I would very strongly urge you and your colleagues not only to review the recommendations made here but to acquire independently information about this option.

To give you a concrete example of what it could mean: A few months ago the U.S.S. *Bunker Hill*—an AEGIS cruiser deployed off the coast of Taiwan—was in a position, if it had been equipped with a wide area defense capability, not only to prevent Chinese ballistic missiles from landing near or for that matter on Taiwan. It could also prevent China—had it acted upon its threat, which you alluded to, Mr. Chairman, in your opening comments, to attack Los Angeles—from doing so. This seems to me a far more attractive, far more flexible, far more quickly available and far more cost-effective approach than the various ground-based options that we have heard discussed by Congressman Spratt and others here this morning.

Finally, let me just comment on the ABM Treaty, if I may, because that, frankly, is the only reason why the Navy's wide area defense would not be the obvious initial option of choice.

As has been noted here, a sea-based system is explicitly prohibited from providing territorial defense of the United States. I think I agree with some of what Congressman Weldon said and comments others have made here. The ABM Treaty has outlived whatever usefulness it once had. We can have a very interesting debate about how best to bring our present defensive capabilities into line with our requirements. In light of the continuing effective veto exercised on our defenses by the Russians, some suggest amending, some suggest unilateral withdrawal—which we have the right to do. I would simply suggest to you it is time now to recognize that the Nation needs a national missile defense capability and impediments to that must be removed as quickly as possible.

And if I may, Mr. Chairman, let me just make this final point. I have spent most of my professional career, 20 odd years now, in some capacity or another worrying about arms control—most of it with the former Soviet Union and its successors. I think I am in a position to speak to the question of traumatizing the United States-Russian relationship, therefore, with some authority.

I would argue to those who are sufficiently concerned about that possibility as to continue to deny this country the means of defending itself against a threat from any other quarter to think about

the following proposition: It is hard for me to imagine a more severe and lasting trauma to the relationship between the United States and Russia than would be the case if Americans were killed by a ballistic missile supplied by Russia—or a ballistic missile fired by a Russian client state. Even if neither of those happens to pertain, what if the reason we had to give Americans as to why we did not have a defense against such an attack was that the Russians had effectively vetoed our ability to deploy missile defense? I believe that anyone who wishes to insulate ties between Washington and Moscow from undue stress has a powerful incentive to eliminate the fragile hold that the Kremlin, whether we like it or not, currently exercises over needed American programs.

Finally, just in passing, I would say, Mr. Chairman, in one of my capacities I serve as the coordinator of a coalition called the Coalition to Defend America. We have done a fair amount of opinion research as to what Americans know about our current vulnerability, and what they think about it. And I would like just very quickly to share that with you.

As a result of national opinion polling and five focus groups we have done around the country, including, interestingly enough, in Congressman's Spratt's backyard, we have I think fairly conclusively established that the vast majority of Americans have no idea that we are not currently defended against ballistic missile attack. Once more, when they discover it, the majority of them turn out to be pretty horrified that their government would, as a matter of policy, deliberately leave them vulnerable to such attack.

I think that creates a political requirement—as well as a moral and strategic requirement—for corrective action to be taken as quickly as possible. And I would just like to leave you with a closing thought. I believe it really is no longer a question of whether the United States will be defended against missile attack. I think it is now clear that we will have effective defenses against ballistic missiles, and I suggest to you that we will have a Navy sea-based-wide area defense as part of that.

The only question really—and it is a question I entreat you and your colleagues to address squarely—is: Will we have a missile defense in place before we need it? Or will we put it into place perhaps after some catastrophe has made clear that there is abundant need for having these sorts of defenses in the future?

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your courtesy.  
Mr. EHRLICH. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gaffney follows:]

THE  
CENTER  
FOR  
SECURITY  
POLICY

**SUBMITTED TESTIMONY OF FRANK J. GAFFNEY, JR.**  
Director, Center for Security Policy

before the

**HOUSE GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE**  
National Security, International Affairs and General Justice Subcommittee

Washington, D.C.  
30 May 1996

**THE CASE FOR PROMPT DEPLOYMENT OF  
EFFECTIVE, GLOBAL MISSILE DEFENSES**

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this distinguished Committee to address what I regard as the single most serious national security problem we face: our present, utter inability to prevent even a single ballistic missile launched at the United States from reaching its target. It is a particular privilege to do so in the company of Jim Woolsey — a man whose realistic appraisal of the growing threat posed by ballistic missiles *to this country*, as well as to its forces and allies overseas, has been an invaluable antidote to the Pollyannish intelligence assessments served up recently by the Clinton Administration.

Permit me to say at the outset how much I and my colleagues at the Center for Security Policy and the other participants in the Coalition to Defend America appreciate the leadership Speaker Gingrich, Majority Leader Arney, Majority Whip DeLay, and you and other relevant committee and subcommittee chairmen — notably, Reps. Spence, Livingston, Young, Hyde, Hunter, Weldon and Cox — are providing on this issue. You and like-minded members of the Senate leadership are to be commended for the determination, vision and courage you are exhibiting in the face of widespread hostility from the press and Washington policy elites to the Defend America Act of 1996 and related missile defense initiatives.

**The Historical Significance of this Debate**

As you know, House Speaker Newt Gingrich has correctly described the ongoing deliberations about defending America as "the most important national defense debate since Churchill argued for building radar" in the peacetime years before World War II. This seems to me to be both an accurate depiction of the stakes and a particularly apt analogy: Had the British government not taken steps to develop radar *before* hostilities broke out, the course of the Battle of Britain and the Second World War might well have been different. Certainly, the devastation wrought by the Luftwaffe would have been substantially greater.

Today, if we fail to put into place effective missile defenses, it is probable that the United States will also sustain otherwise avoidable, immense casualties. The following are among the grounds for such a grim forecast:

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- o The trend in the proliferation of ballistic missile technology is unmistakably in the direction of longer- and longer-range missiles coming into the hands of ever more dangerous nations.
- o In the absence of effective, global American anti-missile defenses, there is little if any disincentive to rogue states' pursuit of increasingly capable ballistic missiles. Such weapons currently promise to make them *instant world powers*, able to blackmail their neighbors and even the great United States. If anything, the Clinton Administration's policies of rewarding proliferating nations like North Korea for trying to "go nuclear" has created *incentives* for doing so. (Interestingly, South Korean press reports indicate that Pyongyang now expects the United States to offer fresh concessions in order to slow the North's ballistic missile program.)

Some contend that U.S. defenses will only spur the North Koreans and others to build more missiles. I must tell you that I was *not* among those during the Cold War who believed the Soviet Union would be either willing or able to afford the vast expenditure needed to overhaul their ballistic missile force so as to counter U.S. strategic defenses. I think it *even more unlikely* that, in the face of American defenses, a rogue developing nation will deem it worthwhile to sink more of its limited resources trying to end-run us by adding to the quantity and/or the quality of its vulnerable ballistic missile force.

- o There are lots of ways rogue nations can reduce the time it would take to have deployable long-range ballistic missiles. The transfer of militarily relevant technologies by the U.S. and other Western nations, by Russia and by China is one short-cut.

Another way is through the sale of so-called "Space Launch Vehicles" (SLV) or related technology. We have recently learned of Russian and Ukrainian efforts to sell SS-18 ICBM components to China. For some time, Moscow has also been offering for sale a "START" SLV -- a missile that appears to be functionally identical to road-mobile Soviet SS-25 ICBMs. Incredibly, these transactions have been legitimated by an amendment to the START I Treaty negotiated by the same Clinton Administration that is publicly minimizing the missile threat!

- o It should be remembered that even relatively primitive and inaccurate ballistic missile systems can pose a lethal threat to populous areas like the East and West Coasts and other major urban centers of the United States. The majority of Americans living within several hundred miles of the shoreline could be at risk even from short-range ballistic missiles launched from seagoing vessels.
- o And arguably most important of all, *a nation that already has deployed ballistic missiles of sufficient range and accuracy to reach this country* has begun engaging in "nuclear blackmail" of the United States. As you know, within the past few months, communist China has communicated to the highest levels of our government the threat of devastating attacks against Los Angeles if the U.S. interfered with its campaign of intimidation against Taiwan.

In short, Mr. Chairman, it is simply no longer possible to describe the threat of long-range ballistic missile attack on the United States as a distant possibility. It is literally a present danger.

As to the reasons why the Clinton Administration would be commissioning -- and aggressively publicizing -- National Intelligence Estimates whose assumptions are artificially circumscribed as to produce a contrary conclusion, I would refer you to recent remarks by a senior Clinton Administration official -- National Security Council staff member Robert Bell. On May 8, 1996, Mr. Bell declared to a Washington audience:

"...Why 15 years? ....What the analysts did was to say, 'Let's take a time frame and look at it, and see what we think could occur between now and then.' And the question was what time frame to pick, recognizing that it's ultimately an arbitrary decision. If you picked ten years, you're not helping the policy or acquisition communities, because the life-cycle...for an acquisition program is on the order of twelve to fifteen years."

#### Needed: A Second Opinion

So out of touch with reality does the latest National Intelligence Estimate appear to be that it begs an urgent recommendation to this Committee and to the Congress as a whole: *Get a second opinion!*

This sensible medical practice has a precedent in national security policy: Faced in 1975 with growing concerns from serious national security experts outside the U.S. government that the official assessment significantly understated the Soviet Union's military build-up, then-CIA Director George Bush arranged to have the Agency's estimates formally second-guessed. This so-called "Team B" initiative produced a much more sober, pessimistic and accurate evaluation of the Soviet threat. I am pleased that the House-passed version of the FY1997 Defense authorization bill directs that a similar, independent review be mounted to provide a second opinion on the missile defense threat.

In the meantime, an unofficial effort along these lines has been undertaken thanks to the sponsorship of the Heritage Foundation. This Missile Defense Study Team (dubbed "Team B") included two of the former directors of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization -- Lieutenant General James Abrahamson (USAF, Ret.) and Dr. Henry Cooper -- and a number of former senior civilian and military officials, scientists and other experts in the field. They joined together initially in 1995 to critique the Clinton Administration's ballistic missile threat estimates and to offer recommendations concerning the best way to protect against such threats. This Team B has just updated the original findings to reflect threat, programmatic and arms control developments that have subsequently occurred. I would respectfully request that this updated report be printed in full at the appropriate place in the record.

I would like to call the Committee's attention to our key finding with respect to the relatively robust threat assessment the Administration subscribed to *prior to the adoption of the latest NIE*:

"The Clinton Administration's portrayal of the ballistic missile threat is unjustifiably sanguine, particularly with regard to threats to the territory of the United States. On the one hand, Administration officials have expressed alarm at the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with which to deliver them. On the other hand, the Administration's official view mutes any sense of urgency about protecting the American people from that proliferation threat....

"This optimistic view of the threat is not consistent with the observable pace and nature of proliferation, the technical facts of missile development or the political instabilities of the former Soviet states and China. The Administration's assessment of the threat is consistent with its slow approach to developing ballistic missile defenses, raising concerns that the Administration's estimate of the threat may have been tailored to match its leisurely pace in building missile defenses. This is a huge mistake. The failure to respond to clear and ominous signs is, in fact, a failure of strategic proportions, potentially threatening U.S. interests worldwide and American security at home." (Emphasis added.)

#### An Affordable Near-Term Response to the Growing Threat

Permit me also to call your attention to another important finding of the Heritage-sponsored Team B: The reason the United States does not currently have a deployed defense capable of defending the American people against the sorts of ballistic missile attacks presently in prospect (i.e., that of small numbers of missiles with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons) is *not* because the technology is unavailable or because it is unaffordable.

In fact, thanks to an investment of nearly \$50 billion already made in the U.S. Navy's AEGIS fleet air defense system, the United States actually has already deployed virtually all of the ingredients for a global missile defense system. Team B determined that, for an additional investment of just \$2-3 billion spent over the next five years, 22 cruisers and 650 of their surface-to-air missiles could be modified to enable them to intercept ballistic missiles in flight. The typical deployment pattern of such ships allows them to provide a *layered* defense -- with several ships having an opportunity to take one or more shots along an intercontinental missile's ballistic trajectory.

In short, Mr. Chairman, by acting promptly to deploy AEGIS-based anti-missile systems, the United States could begin providing protection for the American people -- as well as U.S. troops and allies abroad -- *within three years' time*. What is more, it could do so for an additional investment over the next five years that is *less* than the Clinton Administration proposes to spend on research and development of various missile defense technologies.

To give you a concrete example of what this means, consider the following: Had the U.S.S. *Bunker Hill* -- an AEGIS cruiser deployed off Taiwan during the recent crisis -- been equipped with this Wide-Area Defense capability, that ship could have protected not only Taiwan against the missiles Beijing fired in the direction of the island's two main ports. It

could also have defended the American people had China acted on its threat to Los Angeles by launching an ICBM toward the United States.

### What About The ABM Treaty?

The *real* reason the United States remains undefended against missile attack is the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty -- an agreement signed twenty-four years ago with a country, the Soviet Union, that no longer exists. The ABM Treaty prohibits effective territorial anti-missile defenses, a posture of assured vulnerability once justified as a formula for strategic stability when the other power in a bipolar world promised to remain equally exposed. In today's world, such a posture is not only immoral; it is a reckless invitation to disaster.

After all, the ABM Treaty (and, for that matter, other bilateral U.S.-Russian arrangements like the START I and II Treaties or the Nunn-Lugar program) have *no bearing* on the threats emerging from China, Iran, North Korea, Syria, etc. Instead, such rogue states may actually be given an *incentive* to pursue threatening capabilities, thanks to the U.S. vulnerability thus fostered.

For these reasons, the House Republican Policy Committee -- led by a distinguished participant in the Coalition to Defend America, Rep. Chris Cox (R-CA) -- issued a policy statement on May 9th declaring:

"Since the ABM Treaty does not permit the United States to protect our people and our territory, Republicans recognize that it no longer serves our national security interests. Either the Treaty's restrictions on legitimate U.S. defense efforts should be lifted, or America should exercise our right to withdraw under [the Treaty's] Article XV."

For those who worry that taking such steps might traumatize the U.S.-Russian relationship, one consideration should be borne in mind: It is hard to imagine a more severe and lasting trauma to that relationship than the reaction of Americans to an incident in which a U.S. or allied city is destroyed by a ballistic missile because a *de facto* Russian veto had prevented the United States from putting into place the defenses that would have protected it. Matters will only be made worse if the party launching such a missile were a long-time Russian client state and/or if the missile in question had been supplied by Russia. Anyone who wishes to insulate ties between Washington and Moscow from undue stress has a powerful incentive to eliminate the stranglehold the Kremlin currently exercises over needed American programs.

### The American People Expect -- and Deserve -- to be Defended

Permit me to close with one final observation. If for no other reason, Members of Congress must take the threat of ballistic missile attack seriously because opinion research conducted for the Coalition to Defend America indicates that *your constituents do*.

More to the point, our research demonstrates that most of your constituents think their government is *already protecting them* against missile attack. Indeed, the five focus groups we have conducted around the country over the past fifteen months powerfully showed that most Americans are incredulous and many actually become angry when they learn the truth -- namely, that we cannot stop even a single ballistic missile launched at the United States.

That posture is ever more untenable militarily and irresponsible strategically. To those in the executive and legislative branches who *still* oppose defending America, I would argue that such a posture will increasingly become a serious *political liability* -- one that I encourage you to eliminate promptly, for your own sake if not for that of our country.

### **The Bottom Line**

In a sense, the question no longer is *whether* the United States will be defended against missile attack. It now seems clear that America *will* have a global missile defense; in all likelihood, it will begin with the deployment of a Navy Wide Area system based on AEGIS infrastructure.

The only question yet to be decided is: *Will we have it in place before we need it? Or will we, instead, acquire it on a crash basis after someplace we care about -- perhaps overseas, perhaps here -- has been devastated by a ballistic missile?* I urge you to continue to work, through the adoption of the Defend America Act of 1996 and other steps, to ensure that we do not wait for an avoidable catastrophe to strike before we deploy effective, affordable global missile defenses.



Mr. EHRLICH. A question for both of you. One of my frustrations concerning my new job is the attention span I guess of the press. I know you will both appreciate this observation of the press and of the public with respect to very important issues.

One recent example is an example you both cited, the missile games with respect to Taiwan in the spring. Since we all like to draw lessons from their important incidents and, of course, nobody talks about that now. We are in June, that was March. Many of us here took it very seriously, and I know both of you do as well.

What lessons would you draw from our little experience with the mainland vis-a-vis the Taiwanese elections in the context of today's debate?

Mr. WOOLSEY. I would draw the conclusion, Mr. Chairman, that the theater defenses—I think in this case something like the Navy wide area defense especially—that tie into the Brilliant Eyes program, the SMTS, would be the types of systems that would give the United States the ability not only to deploy a couple of aircraft carrier battle groups, which I applauded, to implicitly threaten China with retaliation if the Chinese attack Taiwan, but more directly, simply by putting an AEGIS cruiser, as Frank very accurately said in his statement, off Taiwan, to be able effectively to put an umbrella over the whole island with one ship. Now we are a few years from being able to do that, but by moving ahead promptly with the Brilliant Eyes program and by taking advantage of the investment that has already occurred in the AEGIS system, making relatively minor modifications to the radar and having a new front end, an important part of the program, a new front end for the Standard Missile too, one could respond quite promptly to threats against many U.S. allies and have much of the technology in place which would make it possible, if we so chose, to follow the route Frank suggested. If there were national emergencies and we simply had to move promptly to have the best ballistic missile defense we could put together from existing systems we could use the upgraded theater systems to be part of a continental defense.

I think that the Chinese actions this spring illustrated the importance of the kind of flexibility and the kind of capability that you could get from theater defenses. You could also do the same thing with somewhat less logistical flexibility with the Army's land-based system too.

Mr. GAFFNEY. Mr. Chairman, I am as worried, frankly, about what other countries took away from this exchange with China as I am with what the Chinese did. You will recall—

Mr. EHRLICH. Which will lead me to my next question.

Mr. GAFFNEY. You will recall the riveting article that appeared on January 24th on the front page of the New York Times, Ambassador Chas Freeman was cited as an intermediary for high-level communications from Chinese officials to National Security Advisor, Tony Lake, in the course of which the Chinese were said to have talked about nuclear blackmail, talked about their willingness to exchange millions of men and entire cities in order to safeguard their sovereignty, and talked in terms that at least Chas Freeman interpreted as an indirect threat of nuclear attack against the United States, about American leaders being more concerned about

Los Angeles than they were about Taiwan. All of which I think is, as I believe Jim said, the shape of things to come.

I believe that China is an immediate beneficiary of the ABM Treaty. We are undefended not only against Russian missiles but against Chinese missiles. They are likely in the future to take ever greater advantage of the fact that their missiles have a free ride; their willingness to threaten us has, as a result resonance: But I fear that a great many other countries, having watched this, will also appreciate how valuable it would be to have ballistic missile capabilities of a similar kind, if not exactly the same, at least sufficient to threaten the United States in the future.

Mr. EHRlich. That is an observation I have not seen commented on in the national press.

Mr. GAFFNEY. I think it does get it but it is sort of a hit or miss thing. But by and large, the national press has wanted to describe all this as a retro debate about Star Wars. And one of the points I wanted to make about this team B study, which I encourage every member of the committee to read, is that the program that offers the nearest term means of defending us against theater and national missile threats over wide areas is about as far removed from the exotic space-based technology of Star Wars fame as you can imagine. It is a prosaic modification of existing assets already bought and paid for by the American people.

Mr. EHRlich. Thank you. My time is up. I am going to use the discretion of the Chair to, since there is no one on our side and lunch is approaching, I will yield 10 minutes to Mrs. Thurman and hopefully get you both out of here unless there is a compelling need, and line of questioning I see a need for further questions. With that, I will recognize Mrs. Thurman.

Mrs. THURMAN. If Mr. Spratt would give me just 1 minute.

Mr. Woolsey, I am interested since you have talked about your time that you spent with Russians, and do you believe that the Russian Government would amend the ABM Treaty to permit some of the programs that have been outlined in the Defend America Act like space-base lasers, any of those? Do you see that realistically?

Mr. WOOLSEY. I think it would be quite difficult to get them to agree to amendments to deploy space-based laser systems.

Mrs. THURMAN. Is it part of the Defend America Act, though?

Mr. WOOLSEY. Not according to my understanding. My understanding is that the act is open with respect to what types of technologies might be pursued, but whatever the Defend America Act says, my own view is that the Russians respond best to firmness in negotiation.

I started negotiating with them over 25 years ago, in 1969, as an advisor to Paul Nittze during the Nixon administration, and I have participated in negotiations against them in five different sets of negotiations now. First in SALT I, then I was President Reagan's designee as a part-time negotiator to the three negotiations in the mid 1980's on strategic, intermediate-range and space systems. And I was the Ambassador and Negotiator for the CFE Treaty. I think the absolute worst way to deal with Russians, and especially in a period of time in which the Russian military is as ascendant in influence as it is today, is in a way in which we figure out what objections they may make in advance and then discount

our own positions to take account of those objections. I think the way to deal with them is quite firmly.

I believe that a rather more modest modification of the treaty such as one that would permit two sites, one in the northwest and one in the northeast—which is not much different from the original ABM Treaty which permitted two sites, one at the national capital and one at the north, I think a modification of that sort wouldn't be easy; it would have been a lot easier in 1992. It wouldn't be easy today, but I don't think it would be impossible. I think one has to deal firmly and forcefully with the Soviets and Russians in negotiations and I don't think that is beyond the pale.

Mrs. THURMAN. But it would seem to me based on those comments that you do believe the treaties are an important part of what we are doing and that the United States should not put ourselves in jeopardy of abrogating on that, would we?

Mr. WOOLSEY. I have not advocated the abrogation of the treaty. I advocate the amendment of it and firm negotiations with the Russians to bring about such an amendment. I think INF, which I worked on, START II, which I worked on, are sound treaties. I think the CFE Treaty, which I negotiated, is a sound and important treaty.

I am not opposed to arms control in general, but just as the Russians have been quite forceful with respect to the need to make some changes in the CFE Treaty in order to accommodate their interest, I see absolutely no reason why we should not be even doubly forceful with them with respect to the accommodations and changes we need in order to be able to protect the United States against rogue states, China, accidental launches and all that.

Mrs. THURMAN. Just a yes or no to this question so I can yield the rest of my time. Do either one of you now have any kind of intelligence clearance where you would have to your benefit any of the intelligence reports that are available to Congress today and/or to any other—

Mr. WOOLSEY. The answer—I can't give you a simple yes or no but I can do it in a couple of sentences. I retain until, I think 2 years from now, all of the clearances I had as Director of Central Intelligence Agency, but I have intentionally not reviewed the classified version of this National Intelligence Estimate or any recent intelligence on ballistic missile defense because I wanted to be free to comment on the issue publicly without having to have each thing that I wrote or said cleared through the clearance process with the CIA.

Mrs. THURMAN. Mr. Gaffney.

Mr. GAFFNEY. Congresswoman, I retain a top secret clearance but I have taken the same approach that Director Woolsey has done so as to be able to talk about it.

May I just address your previous question briefly? There is an important term of art here. Abrogation of the Treaty suggests that we are going to violate its terms, rip it up on a unilateral basis. As you know, I am sure the Treaty actually provides as an explicit part of its terms Article 15, a means upon which we can withdraw from the Treaty if our "supreme interests" are jeopardized.

My own view is this is manifestly the kind of circumstance in which our supreme interests are being jeopardized and we are well

within our rights to withdraw from the Treaty, not abrogate it, withdraw from it if we cannot arrive at some understanding with the Russians.

My own feeling, as Jim's was, we have to be firm. The Russians have not believed us to be credible to this point. And where we are headed, as I see this debate continuing, to unfold, is in a direction that they will continue to believe allows them to exercise a veto over our missile defense options.

Mr. EHRlich. May I remind the gentlelady she has an additional 5 minutes.

Mrs. THURMAN. Has this report been made to anybody in the Congress? Just for clarification, which there was an objection raised, that is available.

Mr. GAFFNEY. It is my understanding it has been made publicly available. I don't know how many Members of Congress have received it. It has been circulated by the Heritage Foundation.

Mrs. THURMAN. I just wanted to clarify that for this committee that the reason we have objected is that it is available. Thank you. I would yield my time to Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Woolsey, as I understand your testimony, you would see the theater threat as a greater, more primary threat than the strategic missile threat.

Mr. WOOLSEY. Yes, if I had to pick between those two, my first choice would be to put increased resources on the Navy Upper Tier, but I do believe if we do that program, those programs correctly, particularly with the tie-in to Brilliant Eyes, to SMTS, that a great deal of what we do will also be helpful and relevant to a range of several types of interim national—

Mr. SPRATT. Including the scenario you drew in your op ed piece and in your testimony today of the Formosa Straits. If we had THAAD or PAC 3 and if we had advanced sensors like the Brilliant Eyes, we would have in all probability a fairly robust missile defense system to offer the Taiwanese.

Mr. WOOLSEY. Yes, well, PAC 3, if deployed, already deployed on the island in some numbers, THAAD if already deployed and developed and deployed on the island in a limited number, maybe one or two sites, and Navy Upper Tier if anywhere in the Western Pacific a day's sail or so away.

Frankly, Congressman Spratt, I would also try to bring the Japanese into such a program. They have AEGIS cruisers as well, and although their economy is not quite what it was a short time ago, they are a very wealthy country. I think there is no reason for us not to work together with allies as well as with the Russians on providing, for example, sensor data from Brilliant Eyes to their theater defense systems. I think it is in our interest that Russians not feel intimidated—

Mr. SPRATT. Let me raise a problem with you that gets into the complexity of this argument. Last year in conference, you have been there before without discussion or debate or consideration of the consequences, we legislated an IOC for the SMTS for the Brilliant Eyes 2003. The problem with that is that the cryogenic coolers had to be developed so they have long-term life.

We have still yet to perfect the focal plane array medium and we are still working on the signature and the algorithms and the tar-

get object maps. All of these things have to be done well. And signal processing has been militarized to the point where it can handle a lot of the transmissions. If we deploy by 2003, we are told by the Air Force we will have downgraded some of those things in order to meet that deployment date. One of the downgrades will be in the signal processes. And transmission, we will go from a potential 5 megabits to 1 megabit, 20 percent of the capacity of the optimized system.

You have been on the Senate Armed Services Committee, general counsel before, do you think it is a good idea for Congress to arbitrarily legislate or to legislate IOCs? And if we do that, by the way, let me finish my thought, what we do is we get a system that will handle adequately the national missile defense mission but it will handle inadequately the theater missile defense mission and particularly address one MRC at a time.

Mr. WOOLSEY. There is always a question in the Congress and in the administration, for that matter, in any administration, between setting deadlines in order to make developments occur and give impetus on the one hand, versus bringing technology along and only deploying it when it is mature.

I haven't made a study of the Brilliant Eyes IOC debate but I think I know you well enough to say that the facts you stated I would stipulate to. I imagine you are quite correct. My response in that case would probably be, what, about 2004?

Mr. SPRATT. You said something like that, 2004, you begin deployment and you are there by 2006.

Mr. WOOLSEY. It seems to me that the national defense debate might or might not involve the need for a Brilliant Eyes IOC of 2003, but if that is a central feature of all of the potentially useful national defense programs, then it seems to me what is necessary is a dialog between the executive branch and the Congress on a precise date.

I don't hold any particular philosopher's stone that will let me see whether or not 2004 is necessary or whatever. I think the commitment to a deployment by this point has come to be an important feature of actually getting there, and although there may be adjustments that need to be made in dates, it seems to me that the important feature is for the country to decide to move forward both in its negotiations with the Russians and with its technology toward a date certain, which might slip by a year or so, in order to get this thin type of national defense that I have characterized.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much.

Mr. GAFFNEY. Mr. Chairman, before we break for lunch, could I ask your indulgence, if I may, just before you break, there were several questions that Congressman Spratt put that I would like to respond to as well. I don't know if he cares to hear the response or not. If I could have your permission, I will leave it for the record. I am sure you will get a chance to look at it later.

I just wanted to make the point that I do not agree that the most urgent threat we face is that of theater missile attack. We have lived for several years now, as those who watched Desert Storm will recall, with the danger that people will launch ballistic missiles at our forces overseas and our allies. That is a present danger. There is no disputing it.

The problem is that we have no capability to defend the American people against even a single ballistic missile attack today. That I would argue from the standpoint of just a regular citizen is an urgent national security priority, arguably the most urgent.

On setting initial operational capabilities [IOC's], I agree with Jim Woolsey, the Congress tells the executive branch all the time what to do and when to do it—whether it is achievable or not. I believe in the case of technology, stressing that it needs to be done as a national priority is the best incentive in the world to getting it done. And just at the risk of repeating myself, Congressman, if you want to have something deployed quickly that will defend large theater areas as well as the American people—with or without Brilliant Eyes—I strongly recommend that you seriously look at the recommendations here on the Navy-wide area defense system. Whether we get Brilliant Eyes in 2003 or 2004 or 2006 or 2010, it will help immeasurably with this system as well as with others. It need not be the pacing item to defending our people.

Thank you very much.

Mr. EHRLICH. Bear with us just a moment. I thank you both very much.

Speaking for the freshmen who were here, this is a very important issue and your expertise is very much appreciated. We are reading and learning an awful lot about what I think will be a major issue in this country for the foreseeable future.

What we are going to do is break. We have a vote on the floor. We will break until 1:15. The next panel will be convened at 1:15 sharp. Thank you.

Mrs. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, is it your intention for the committee to be able to submit questions to the witnesses, further questions, so we might get answers?

Mr. EHRLICH. That certainly would be my intent. Without objection, so ordered. Thank you.

The committee stands in recess.

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 1:15 p.m.]

Mr. EHRLICH. The subcommittee will come to order.

The Chair would like to introduce our third panel consisting of Dr. Keith B. Payne and Mr. Michael Krepon.

Dr. Payne is the president and director of the National Institute for Public Policy, specializing in international security affairs, Russian defense policies and arms proliferation. He is the author of dozens of articles and 11 books on international security, including many on ballistic missile defenses.

Mr. Krepon is president of the Henry L. Stimson Center, a Washington think tank devoted to arms control and international security, and he is the author of seven books on international security.

Gentlemen, welcome.

If the witnesses would now stand pursuant to the committee rules, I will swear you in.

[Witnesses sworn.]

**STATEMENTS OF MICHAEL KREPON, PRESIDENT, THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER; DR. KEITH B. PAYNE, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY**

Mr. EHRLICH. Gentlemen, welcome, and whomever would like to proceed can begin.

Mr. KREPON. Keith, since your side of the debate has been heard for the preceding several hours, how about if I went first?

Mr. PAYNE. I will defer to Michael Krepon.

Mr. KREPON. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the full text of my remarks be placed in the record.

Mr. EHRLICH. Without objection so ordered. In fact, I would ask both of you to hit the highlights of your testimony so we can get to the Q and A.

Mr. KREPON. Thank you, sir.

We need stronger and better protection against weapons of mass destruction. We also need stronger and better protection of taxpayer wallets. The real question before this committee and the subject of this hearing is how we get better protection of both the United States and taxpayer wallets.

National missile defenses constitute the last line of defense. National missile defenses constitute the last 15 minutes of the problem facing our country. When an ICBM—intercontinental ballistic missile—or submarine launched ballistic missile is heading in our direction, that is about the time we have in order to respond.

It is extraordinarily difficult to defend the country in the last 15 minutes, even if we spend tens of billions of dollars by deploying national missile defenses. We have to know that. And therefore, we have to spend a lot of time and effort, and, if necessary, money, on everything that comes before the last 15 minutes to increase the odds in our favor. If we do a bad job on everything that precedes the last 15 minutes, we are in deep trouble, even with national missile defenses.

This committee and its counterparts in the Congress can authorize as much money as you like for the last 15 minutes of the problem, and it will not work if we fail at the front end of the problem. If the front lines of defense are weak, the last line of defense will be porous.

The front lines of defense are all of the nonmilitary means that we use to protect ourselves. That means good intelligence, good cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies, early warning. It means good diplomacy, preventive diplomacy, coalition diplomacy, coercive diplomacy when necessary. It means threat reduction and destruction treaties like START.

I am not just talking about START II. I am also talking about START III and START IV and START V, because we really have to draw down the potential threats to our country to increase the chances of successful defense.

The front lines of defense are export control regimes that work, that become broader and broader, and stronger and stronger, bringing more people in. There are all kinds of front lines of defense against this problem. You know what I am talking about. I am talking about the Nunn-Lugar program that was discussed earlier this morning. I am talking about NEST teams, the Nuclear Emergency Response Teams that receive taxpayer money to work the

problem of nuclear accidents in this country. I am talking about FEMA and having a FEMA that works against the kinds of terrible contingencies we are talking about. All of that constitutes the front end of the problem.

Now, the second line of defense is our military forces, and they have to be properly trained and equipped. They have to have the means to take care of these threats, if it comes to that. It costs a lot of money, and it is worth it.

The last line of defense is ballistic missile defenses, and they come in various kinds. You heard about missile defenses against short-range ballistic missiles, tactical ballistic missiles. You heard about theater ballistic missile defenses, and then there are national ballistic missile defenses. I would like to give you—if you could have one of your staff people come here—I could hand this out. I would like to give you all a chart that was prepared by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization for Under Secretary of Defense Paul Kaminski, and if you would be so kind, I would like to put it in the record as well. This chart—

Mr. EHRLICH. Without objection so ordered.


[The information referred to follows:]





# TBM FORCE PROJECTIONS

## Potentially Hostile Countries



Mr. KREPON. This chart will tell you what the threat is projected to be out until the year 2015. And if you look at this series of bar charts, you see the biggest bar charts now and in the future and in the far term are ballistic missiles that are 500 kilometers and less in range.

If you look at the far end of the chart, you will see the most pressing threat from nations of proliferation concern, so-called rogue states.

And that little bar at the very, very end of the axis is, in effect, the Taepo Dong II missile. That is the North Korean missile that we worry about. It is a missile that has never been flight-tested. It is a missile that we have seen once. It is a missile that may be, if everything goes right for the North Koreans, it may be four times as long a range as their best missile.

That is not easy to do, going from 1,000 kilometers out to 4,000 kilometers, a fourfold increase in range. That requires the North Koreans to master the art of missile staging, stage separation, guidance at that range; master the arts of weaponization, and reentering. Those are pretty difficult tasks for a country that is on the ropes looking at a 15-year-long program, a crash multi-billion dollar program to master these arts. If they can do all that, then they will have themselves a missile that will land 1,000 kilometers short of Anchorage and 2,000 kilometers short of Honolulu.

That is the threat 15 years from now out here, and that is what you are proposing to spend very large sums of taxpayer dollars to address. That is the threat.

Now, if you look at this chart, what is not here are the missile defenses that the Congress is funding that we are proceeding to flight-test and deploy to deal with this problem. I am talking now about the PAC 3, the Navy Lower Tier program and the THAAD program, the Theater High Altitude Area Defense Program that you have heard about this morning. All of these programs are being flight-tested and will be deployed. All of them are permitted under the antiballistic missile treaty.

If you correlate the things that we are doing against this threat right here, the small bar at the very end of the chart, all of these programs are covered. That is why we are spending taxpayer dollars, and it is worthy money to be spent, and I support it. But that is the threat.

Now, if in addition to that you wish to spend large sums of money, taxpayer dollars, on national missile defenses, you can do that as well. But I would like to call attention to several things in the public record by our intelligence community on this subject, because I know you worry about the threat to the United States by a rogue state with a ballistic missile.

This is what James Woolsey's National Intelligence Estimates said on the subject in 1993. In unclassified form, this was released to the Congress, and perhaps it would be a good idea, if you so permit, that just a couple of pages of this estimate from 1993 be inserted into the record. It is unclassified, and it won't—because it is only three pages in length, it will not be at great taxpayer expense.

[The information referred to follows:]

## Appendix B

### Prospects for the Worldwide Development of Ballistic Missile Threats, 1993

Central Intelligence Agency  
Declassified November 1993

#### Scope Note

This paper presents a detailed examination of the prospects for future ballistic missile threats to the continental United States (CONUS) from a number of non-NATO countries. The countries examined either have ballistic missiles in place, ballistic missile development programs, space launch vehicle (SLV) programs (which inherently encompass most ICBM technologies), or intentions to pursue a ballistic missile or SLV program.

Capabilities were examined and no prospect was found for ICBM development in countries such as those of the former Warsaw Pact that have ballistic missiles but no development programs or even an appropriate R&D infrastructure. Therefore, these countries are not covered in this paper. Other countries not covered are those with a current capability to strike CONUS with ballistic missiles such as China and states of the former Soviet Union. Some countries neighboring the United States were not considered in this study because of their extremely short ranges from the United States.

For the countries evaluated in this paper, the health of each country's economy and the political climate within the country to determine the capability to support lengthy and costly ballistic missile development programs were considered. Each of the nations' technical capabilities to indigenously develop propulsion systems, guidance and control systems, reentry vehicles (RVs), and nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon warheads were taken into account.

Capabilities are projected based on a high-risk, accelerated timeline and minimum system testing development of a weapon system satisfying minimal requirements:

- ◆ A missile or modified SLV that can reach the United States at the closest point to the threat country;
- ◆ High-drag RVs or space return capsules;
- ◆ Warhead targeting accuracies on the order of 10 km or better; and
- ◆ A warhead consisting of a nuclear, biological, chemical, or conventional weapon.

No evidence exists that any of the countries examined in this study are developing missiles--especially ICBMs -- for the purpose of attacking CONUS.

## Prospects for the Worldwide Development of Ballistic Missile Threats to the Continental United States

Only China and the CIS strategic forces in several states of the former Soviet Union currently have the capability to strike the continental United States (CONUS) with land-based ballistic missiles. Analysis of available information shows the probability is low that any other country will acquire this capability during the next 15 years.

A number of non-NATO countries were identified as having either the motivation or the development capability to produce ICBMs. Out of these, only four -- Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Libya -- have the political support or motivation to undertake an ICBM program to strike CONUS and, with the exception of Libya, also have the technical capability to indigenously develop an ICBM within 15 years. However, for different reasons -- including political and economic -- the probability is low that any of these four will complete development in that time.

No prospect for ICBM development was found in countries such as former Warsaw Pact countries that have ballistic missiles but no development program capability or even an appropriate R&D infrastructure.

None of the countries considered has the need to develop ICBM-range missiles (greater than 5,500 km) to satisfy regional security. In all cases, these countries can meet and react to primary threats from neighboring countries with medium- and short-range ballistic missiles.

### Countries Most Likely To Develop ICBMs

**Iraq and Iran.** It is believed that only the current intrusive UN inspections and economic sanctions prevent Iraq from pursuing ICBM development. Development in Iran is unlikely to be initiated within the next five years because the Iranian economy is already straining to support other higher priority weapons modernization programs necessary for regional security. Iraq and Iran are assessed to have the technical capability to indigenously produce an ICBM capable of carrying a chemical or biological weapon -- in 10 to 15 years from the time the decision is made to begin development.

**North Korea.** At a minimum, North Korea would require nearly 10 years to develop an ICBM capable of delivering a chemical or biological weapon warhead and 10 to 15 years to develop an ICBM to carry a nuclear warhead. However, the probability of North Korean ICBM development is currently low because of competing demands for dwindling resources among existing high priority military programs.

**Libya.** The leadership of Libya has made public statements explicitly stating a desire for weapons of mass destruction that could be delivered by ballistic missile to CONUS. The Libyan leadership's actual commitment to such an expensive and technically and politically risky development program is questionable. Because of its limited technical capabilities, however, Libya probably could not develop a system within 15 years.

These four countries are likely to attempt to avoid costly and lengthy development by trying to purchase everything from, complete missile systems to essential technologies from countries with existing ICBMs. It is likely that Libya, Iran, and Iraq would significantly shorten their indigenous development timelines through the acquisition of foreign equipment and help.

## **Countries With Disincentives**

Several of these technically capable countries have significant disincentives for pursuing development of an ICBM. These countries either have, or are trying to develop, strong economic and political ties with the West -- particularly the United States -- and, in some way directly depend on the United States for aid or support. On the basis of an analysis of leadership priorities, it is highly unlikely that these countries would judge that possible benefits from an ICBM program would outweigh the loss of their standing in the international community, potential punitive actions by the West, and serious economic consequences.

## **Countries With Greatest Indigenous Technical Potential**

The countries with the greatest technical potential for indigenous ICBM development have close relations with the United States, improving relations with the United States, or no identified motivation for ICBM development. A few countries have the technical ability to develop from their space launch vehicle (SLV) programs an ICBM to strike CONUS in five years or less. Technically advanced countries could develop an ICBM to threaten CONUS within 10 years.

## **Limited Number of Missiles and Minimal Performance**

Because of modest technology infrastructures and weak economies, most countries now without ICBMs -- if they choose to pursue ICBMs -- probably would be able to produce only a small number of missiles. Because of the limited capabilities and likely motivations for attacking CONUS with ICBMs -- such as international coercion, deterring US attacks, and regional influence building -- it is likely that any country making the decision would pursue a high-risk development program with no (or limited) testing in order to shorten schedules and reduce the visibility of the program. In addition, the country probably would adopt minimal requirements for the weapon system; that is, boosters capable of reaching only the nearest large US city, guidance and control systems that would give reasonable probabilities of placing the weapon within city limits, and relatively large, high-drag (and therefore, relatively low-technology) reentry vehicles (RVs).

## **Motivations and Capabilities For Launching**

The missiles, if developed, would probably be used as weapons of last resort or as deterrents against a threatened US attack. To be a credible deterrent or to provide a counterstrike capability, however, the country must have the ability to launch or hide the missile before it could be destroyed. Unless the missile or converted SLV is made ready for launch before an anticipated conflict, this additional survivability or quick-reaction requirement of the missile system increases the technological

complexity and the cost of the program. In addition, a requirement for launch during conflicts likely will preclude using typical SLVs or an ICBM disguised as an SLV, which would require on-pad preparation times from days to weeks and which would have to be launched from large, unhardened, above-ground facilities.

Analysis of political and military doctrine within countries supports the conclusion that a launch without provocation -- referred to as a bolt out of the blue -- for most countries is very unlikely. Only countries such as Libya or Iraq would have the motivation for such an attack to perhaps gain regional prestige for striking a much more powerful nation regardless of the consequences of US retaliation. Several highly visible test launches would be required before a country could produce an operational ICBM.

## **Propulsion Technology Limits**

In almost all cases, propulsion technology would be the primary limiting factor in a country's longer range missile development program. The technologically advanced countries that have SLV development programs have progressed to designing and producing advanced propulsion systems. Most of the remaining countries propulsion capabilities are limited to assembling or almost understanding 30 - 40 year old technologies such as that found in the Scud missile.

Scud technology can be modified to increase performance but not to ICBM ranges. Clustering the lower performance engines is an option available for increasing the missile's payload capacity. Although existing Scud-type boosters could be clustered together to produce a missile with a range greater than that of a single Scud, the extremely inefficient Scud engine and relatively heavy Scud structure preclude the clustered system from achieving ICBM ranges.

## **Guidance and Reentry Vehicle Technology**

Guidance and RV technology satisfying the minimal requirement for placing a warhead close to a target in CONUS probably could be developed within 15 years by most of the countries, although few currently have it. Similarly, although the RV technologies would be new for many countries, developing the necessary technologies would not be a limiting factor because the countries would probably not consider high system accuracy and penetration of a ballistic missile defense system to be a requirement.

## **Warheads**

It is highly likely that all countries could develop an ICBM warhead within the time it would take for the country to develop the delivery system. The more advanced nations in nuclear technologies would require less than 10 years to develop a nuclear warhead. For the less advanced nations the production of fissile material, design of a nuclear weapon, and miniaturization and weaponization of the design would take about 10 years or more to develop. Therefore, it is likely that most of the countries examined in this study could have at least one nuclear device within the next 15 years.

Chemical or biological weapons require technologies that are readily available to most countries. Any country could purchase or develop the ability to produce high-explosive or other conventional weapons and package the weapon for the ICBM warhead within several years.

## **Converted SLVs**

There is a low probability that any country hostile to the United States will covertly acquire the ability to target CONUS with a purchased or indigenously developed, converted SLV. Existing international technology transfer agreements recognize that an SLV could be converted relatively quickly by technologically advanced countries (in about one or two years) to a surface-to-surface missile. Therefore, acquiring an ICBM capability by purchasing an SLV or its production technology is recognized as a purchase of a delivery vehicle. Furthermore, acquisition of just an SLV does not establish an operational ballistic missile delivery system. The construction of preparation, maintenance, test, and launch facilities and associated equipment is a lengthy and technologically stressful process beyond the capabilities of most countries without extensive foreign assistance.

## **Foreign Assistance**

Experience has shown that if certain countries began indigenous ICBM development, foreign help would reduce ICBM development time. Some countries already have purchased ballistic missile-related equipment and expertise and are likely to continue relationships with foreign suppliers. Any country probably could purchase small quantities of almost any component, although purchases of entire subsystems or systems are less likely.

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is the primary multinational forum focused on controlling the proliferation of technologies capable of being used in the development of unmanned delivery vehicles for weapons of mass destruction. The MTCR has been moderately successful at slowing the transit of missile related technologies between member and non-member countries. In addition, the United States has enacted unilateral restrictions that increase the difficulty of missile-related technology transfers between MTCR and non-member countries.

## **Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years**

**Richard N. Cooper, Chairman National Intelligence Council**

*Written Statement for Hearing of the House National Security Committee, 28 February 1996*

My remarks are based on a recent National Intelligence Estimate "Emerging Missile Threats to North America during the Next 15 Years." I would add that the focus of that estimate was on emerging threats from countries other than Russia and China, although it did touch on their strategic forces. I will outline the key judgments of that study. In addition, I will comment on the process that generates NIEs in general--and this one in particular--necessary in my view because some questions have been raised about the integrity of this process.

In this open forum I am obviously constrained in what I can say about our intelligence. I would be glad to meet with you in closed session, where I and my colleagues can provide a more detailed assessment.

Mr. Chairman, let me make some brief remarks on the missile threats from Russia and China before I turn to the bulk of the judgments of our estimate dealing with other countries.

### **Russia**

With the end of the Cold War, the United States faces a clearly diminished threat of nuclear attack by the missile forces of the former Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Russia continues to maintain an operational strategic nuclear force capable of delivering thousands of nuclear warheads against the United States. START I has resulted in a numerically smaller force, but Russia continues strategic force modernization programs, albeit within the constraints of a greatly weakened economy.

### **China**

The Chinese force of nuclear tipped ICBMs is small by US and Russian standards and will remain so. Many of China's long-range systems are probably aimed at the United States. China plans to update this force with new missiles and, unlike the Russians, to increase the number of missiles deployed. Possible future improvements are to include a mobile ICBM.

### **Unauthorized Launch**

In our recent NIE, the Intelligence Community reaffirmed earlier assessments that the current threat to North America from unauthorized or accidental launch of Russian or Chinese strategic missiles remains remote and has not changed significantly from that of the past decade.



## Other Nations

Nearly a dozen countries other than Russia and China have ballistic missile development programs. In the view of the Intelligence Community, these programs are to serve regional goals. Making the change from a short or medium range missile--that may pose a threat to US troops located abroad--to a long range ICBM capable of threatening our citizens at home, is a major technological leap.

The key judgments of the estimate I noted above are as follows:

- ◆ First, the Intelligence Community judges that in the next 15 years no country other than the major declared nuclear powers will develop a ballistic missile that could threaten the contiguous 48 states or Canada
- ◆ Second, we believe North Korea is developing a missile, which we call the Taepo Dong 2, that could have a range sufficient to reach Alaska. The missile may also be capable of reaching some US territories in the Pacific and the far western portion of the 2000 km-long Hawaiian Island chain.

North Korea is unlikely, in the next 15 years, to obtain the technological capability to develop and deploy a longer range ICBM capable of reaching the contiguous 48 states.

--North Korea would have to develop a new propulsion system, it would have to develop or acquire improved guidance and control systems, and it would have to conduct a flight test program. Meeting these challenges will take time, given the technical and manufacturing infrastructure of North Korea, and the political and economic situation in the country.

--We have no evidence that P'yongyang has begun or intends to begin such a program.

- ◆ Third, no other potentially hostile country has the technical capability to develop an ICBM in the next 15 years.
- ◆ Fourth, any country with an indigenously developed space launch vehicle--for example, France, Japan, Israel or India--could develop an ICBM within five years if so motivated.

We are likely to detect any indigenous program to develop a long-range ballistic missile many years before deployment.

--A flight test is a sure, detectable sign of a ballistic missile program. Normally the first flight test would provide at least five years warning before deployment.

--Moreover, we would almost certainly obtain other earlier indicators of an ICBM program.

- ◆ Fifth, foreign assistance can affect the pace of a missile program. Since specific technological assistance is difficult to predict, the potential for foreign assistance introduces some uncertainty into our predictions of timeliness. In making our assessments, we have allowed for acquisition of some foreign technology by the countries of interest.

--The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) has significantly limited international transfers of missiles, components, and related technology, and we project it will continue to do so.

--That said, leakage of components and critical technologies into developing countries has occurred, and will likely continue. A good case in point -subsequent to the publication of the NIE -is the recent interception of Russian missile guidance components en route to Iraq

- ◆ Sixth, we expect no country that currently has ICBMs will sell them. Each of these countries has agreed to adhere to the MTCR, and transfer of an ICBM would show blatant disregard for the MTCR Regime. Also, exporting countries probably would be concerned that the missiles might be turned against them.

## Cruise Missiles

- ◆ Seventh, we examined worldwide development programs for cruise missiles because of the possibility of their being launched from forward-based ships. By 2005, several countries, including some potentially hostile to the United States, probably will acquire land-attack cruise missiles to support regional goals. We believe that an attack by cruise missiles launched from ships off the coast would be technically feasible, but unlikely.

## NIE Process

I have discussed what the NIE said. Let me spend a few minutes outlining how the NIE process works. A national intelligence estimate is the Intelligence Community's most authoritative projection of future developments in a particular subject area. It is prepared by the National Intelligence Council, which I head, with the participation of all agencies of the Intelligence Community, and it contains the assessments and judgments of all these agencies. Each NIE is discussed and approved at a meeting of the most senior members of the Intelligence Community.

The process for producing NIEs is directed particularly at ensuring presentation of all viewpoints. We do not impose consensus; in fact we encourage the many agencies that participate in NIEs to state their views and we display major differences of view in the main text. Lesser reservations are expressed in footnotes.

The estimate on which I based my testimony today is no exception. It is the most authoritative current statement on the subject by the Intelligence Community. Moreover, the key judgments I outlined were free of contention.

Furthermore, the judgments in the estimates are largely consistent with previous Intelligence Community assessments and with those of individual agencies. The only areas of change are

- ◆ First, the timelines for development of the Taepo Dong missiles. Most agencies believe the Taepo Dong 2 program will move slower than we projected earlier, and there are some concrete reasons for this change.

- ◆ Second, for two countries, our estimate of the time required for ICBM development has been extended somewhat. I would be happy to provide the members of the Committee the details of the countries and timelines in closed session.

To emphasize how little our assessments have changed, I would like to read from an unclassified summary of a 1993 CIA report that is similar in content to our recent NIE.

"Analysis of all available information shows the probability is low that any other country [than China or the former Soviet Union] will acquire this capability [for an ICBM attack on the United States] during the next 15 years."

Let me conclude with a final comment on the time frame of the estimate. During the formative stages of our recent NIE, the time frame was a topic for discussion. A compromise was reached at 15 years -- 20 years being too speculative, and five or ten years not being of maximal value to the acquisition community.

Uncertainty of course grows as we project more distantly into the future. As we have seen in recent years, world politics can change quite rapidly. But because ICBM programs move slowly, and because the technological base, motivation, and economic resources of potentially hostile countries are all limited, we have concluded in the NIE that these countries are highly unlikely to deploy ICBMs within 15 years.

Our problem would have been harder if we had attempted to predict what will be in development or on the drawing board in 15 years, or if we had evidence today of either an ICBM program or strong technological infrastructure.

The fact that we project out 15 years does not mean that we can safely dismiss this subject until well into the next century. Our analytical work will continue, we expect to monitor developments, to produce additional studies, and to bring to the attention of the President and the members of Congress intelligence information on this subject of critical importance to our national security.

Mr. KREPON. In 1993, the National Intelligence Estimate under James Woolsey said, "Only China and the CIS strategic forces in several States of the former Soviet Union currently have the capability to strike the continental United States with land-based ballistic missiles. Analysis of all available information shows the probability is low that any other country will require that capability during this next 15 years."

That is Jim Woolsey. That is not the current National Intelligence Estimate.

With respect to countries like North Korea, we worry about upgrading their ballistic missile forces. This is what Jim Woolsey's National Intelligence Estimates said. This is a direct quote: "In almost all cases, propulsion technology would be the primary limiting factor in a country's longer-range missile development programs. Most of the remaining countries' propulsion capabilities are limited to assembling or at most understanding 30- to 40-year-old technologies such as that found in SCUD missiles." The SCUD missile can get you up to 1,000 kilometers. You have to go way beyond the SCUD missile to begin to threaten the United States, including Alaska and Hawaii.

SCUD missile technology—that is a direct quote from Jim Woolsey—SCUD missile technology can be modified to increase performance, but not to ICBM ranges.

With respect to guidance and re-entry vehicle technology, this is what Jim Woolsey's NIE had to say: "Guidance and RPV technology satisfying the minimal requirement for placing a warhead close to a target in the continental United States probably could be developed within 15 years by most of the countries, although few currently have it. Although the RPV technologies would be new for many countries, developing the necessary technologies would not be a limiting factor."

That is what Jim told you, that guidance is not the problem.

With respect to the warheads on top of these upper-range missiles, the NIE from 1993 said, "It is highly likely that all countries could develop an ICBM warhead within the time it would take for the country to develop the delivery system;" in other words 15 years.

Converted space launch vehicles. You saw the picture of the SS-25. Quote, 1993 NIE: "There is a low probability that any country hostile to the United States will covertly acquire the ability to target CONUS with a purchased or indigenously converted space launch vehicle." And it goes on to say, "Furthermore, acquisition of just the space launch vehicle does not establish an operational ballistic missile delivery system." That takes a lot more work.

So basically, it is a dangerous world. There are a lot of missiles that can do great harm to our troops overseas, to our allies and to our friends. We need ballistic missile defenses that are effective against these clear and present dangers.

The threat to the United States by an intercontinental ballistic missile is 15 years down the road. Why spend taxpayer dollars for a remote threat that is 15 years down the road? I would urge you to spend that money for threats that are far more urgent, far more pressing, that are here and now.

Thank you very much.

Mr. EHRLICH. Thank you, sir. For the time being, I will take the request to make that memorandum part of the record under advisement.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Krepon follows:]

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL KREPON  
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS  
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
MAY 30, 1996

Mr. Chairman and Members of this Subcommittee:

I welcome the opportunity to testify today on the subject of missile defenses. The topic of today's hearing is, of course, extremely timely and important. How do we best protect the citizens of our country from the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction, while spending tax dollars sparingly and wisely?

To answer this question, we must first note that, in many important respects, succeeding administrations have made significant gains in combating and reducing the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction:

- Extraordinary nuclear arms reduction treaties have been negotiated that are dramatically reducing deployed forces. Entire categories of weapons have been entirely destroyed or decommissioned.
- All but a very few countries have now stopped producing weapon-grade fissionable material.
- The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has recently been extended indefinitely. Companion treaties exist for other weapons of mass destruction, although the Biological Weapons Convention requires a verification protocol, and the Chemical Weapons Convention has yet to enter into force, as it awaits the Senate's and Duma's consent to ratification.
- Many states of proliferation concern have either joined the NPT or embraced equivalent constraints in recent years, most notably Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakstan, Belarus, and Algeria.
- Most countries able to export missile and nuclear technologies have agreed not to supply states that do not adhere to non-proliferation norms.

- Countries that once had ballistic missile programs of concern, such as Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa, have now agreed to adhere to the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime.
- North Korea's dangerous nuclear program has apparently been frozen, and its export of medium-range ballistic missiles to countries of proliferation concern could place in grave jeopardy foreign financing of desperately needed nuclear power reactors for civilian use.
- Saddam Hussein's programs to produce weapons of mass destruction have been uncovered. Captured weapons and key equipment have been dismantled and destroyed. Periodic inspections continue on Iraqi soil.
- A truly comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty that will reinforce other efforts to devalue dangerous nuclear weapons is within reach.

This is only a partial, but quite impressive, list of accomplishments over the past decade. On the other hand, significant concerns remain, and some problems have become more troubling in recent years.

- U.S. relations with both Russia and China have deteriorated and could worsen. This is unlikely to result in ballistic missile attacks against the United States, but could easily translate into more, or more serious, transactions with states of proliferation concern.
- There are quite large and dispersed stockpiles of nuclear material in the former Soviet Union. While much progress has been made to secure these stocks, some facilities remain poorly guarded and must be inviting targets for those who wish to acquire the means of spreading nuclear terror.
- Recent gains in states such as North Korea and Iraq are not set in concrete. Reverses could occur at any time. Other states, such as Iran, Libya and Syria, stubbornly remain outside of international norms. While these states are unlikely to acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles, they have other means of causing harm.
- While most regions are moving away from proliferation, South Asia is moving in the wrong direction.

- Chemical and biological weapons are easier to acquire than nuclear weapons. The first use of crude chemical weapons as an instrument of urban terror by a subnational group occurred one year ago in Japan--a very disturbing precedent.

What, then, is the balance sheet? It's important to acknowledge, at least in my view, that we're making significant progress in some areas, while other parts of the problem remain quite troubling. We face both positive and negative trend lines. One positive trend line relates to ballistic missile threats to the United States, which have decreased markedly in recent years. The most important area of concern--again, in my view--remains the potential for seepage of nuclear material from the former Soviet Union, and the use of that material by a subnational or terrorist group.

Overall, it appears that advances in non-proliferation over the past decade clearly outweigh setbacks. Many key states have joined non-proliferation regimes, and only one state has tried (unsuccessfully) to leave. Efforts are underway to strengthen these regimes. Troubling nuclear weapon programs have decreased in number. While short-range ballistic missile and crude cruise missile programs have spread, sophisticated and longer-range missile programs remain few in number. The best judgment of the U.S. intelligence community--both during Mr. Woolsey's tenure and at present--is that new potentially hostile states are not likely to develop their own intermediate- or longer-range ballistic missiles over the next fifteen years. All of this is welcome news.

There is no room for complacency, however. The illicit purchase of nuclear materials from the former Soviet Union constitutes a clear and present danger to U.S. and international security. The acquisition and use of chemical and biological weapons by states, subnational groups, or terrorists also constitute a clear and present danger to U.S. and international security. Unlike threats from intermediate- and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles that may be fifteen years away, the threats posed by terrorist acts involving nuclear, chemical and biological material are here and now.

Thus, the sense of urgency that some Members of Congress have placed on defending against North Korean missiles that may or may not be able to reach the Aleutian Islands appears misplaced. Is this really the best use of taxpayer dollars? It is far from clear why a state facing the threat of extinction would engage in a multi-billion dollar, fifteen year-long crash effort to deploy the much-discussed Taepo Dong II missile. This missile would require an impoverished North Korean state to master new tasks of missile staging, guidance, and weaponization. Even if, somehow, the



North Korean government could master these tasks sufficiently to deploy a 4,000 kilometer missile--a fourfold increase in range from the existing No Dong missile--it would still land 1,000 kilometers short of Honolulu and 2,000 kilometers short of Anchorage. Nor is Pyongyang likely to be able to purchase intermediate- or intercontinental-range missiles from another state. Given the dangerously unpredictable state of the wobbly North Korean regime, any seller would immediately become vulnerable to the buyer.

The North Korean missile threat is regional in nature. It provides ample justification for effective theater missile defenses, but it is a poor justification for national missile defenses. This Committee would better serve the interests of tax payers by focusing on far more pressing problems, such as preventing a repeat of urban terror, such as the tragic incidents at the Federal Building in Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center in New York. The biggest problem we now face is truck bombs, not intercontinental ballistic missiles. We need better preventive defenses against terrorists who might use BW or CW to disable city centers or subway systems.

During the Cold War, several crash programs to deploy national missile defenses were proposed. Since 1962, the United States Congress has appropriated a total of \$99 billion (in FY 1995 dollars) for national missile defenses. No defenses were deployed, and no missiles attacked our shores. Nuclear deterrence worked. Our fearful ability to retaliate with devastating force to any missile attack proved to be our best and most cost-effective defense. Our nation's retaliatory capabilities remain in place. Why would a nation choose to attack us with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles now that the Cold War is over?

While the threat of such an attack is deemed to be quite low by the unanimous judgment of the U.S. intelligence community, the threat posed by short-range ballistic and cruise missiles is significant. Short-range missiles pose a clear and present danger to forward-deployed U.S. forces, allies and friends. The Department of Defense and the defense contractor community have yet to solve this pressing problem. This has to be our top priority in the missile defense field.

National missile defenses constitute the last line of defense against the most sophisticated and improbable threats to the American people. The last line of defense is also a very difficult line to defend. If the front lines of defense are weak, the last line of defense will be porous, no matter how much extra money the Congress authorizes for NMD.

The front lines of defense are the sum total of the non-military means our country employs to reduce the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction. The front lines of defense include our intelligence efforts, preventive, coalition, and coercive diplomacy, export controls, the Nunn-Lugar program, threat reduction and destruction treaties, and non-proliferation regimes. These front lines of defense have been short-changed in recent years. Spending large sums of money for the last line of defense while short-changing the front lines of defense is extremely unwise, and potentially very dangerous.

The first line of defense against the proliferation of these dangerous weapons and their means of delivery begins with early detection of troubling programs and continuing attention to subnational groups or states of proliferation concern. Once detection has occurred, this line of defense requires intense oversight of commercial transactions as well as the indigenous development, testing, and production of dangerous weapons.

Proliferation is a global problem, requiring cooperation with other nations. Just as the United States cannot be a global policeman, so, too, we cannot be a global traffic cop. If we're going to succeed in combating proliferation, we'll need strong alliances. We need friends that will help isolate adversaries. We need help to convince states not to provide the building blocks of weapons of mass destruction to countries of proliferation concern. We need persuasive and firm diplomacy once detection occurs. Export control regimes don't work on automatic pilot. We need to work on the regional security issues that prompt some states to acquire WMD. Diplomacy isn't a dirty word in the fight against proliferation. It makes little sense to trash the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency while spending large sums for ballistic missile defenses. By weakening the front lines of defense, we make it that much harder for the last line of defense to succeed.

Global agreements against the acquisition or spread of weapons of mass destruction are essential to combat the proliferation problem. Global agreements set international norms against possession or use of weapons of mass destruction. Norms can be broken, of course, but norms also make international sanctions more feasible. Treaties require teeth in the form of routine and challenge inspections. It makes little sense to oppose ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention or the negotiation of a verification protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention, while promoting defenses against missiles that may carry chemical or biological weapons.

Threat reduction can take many forms. The most direct line of defense against nuclear danger is negotiated, verified reductions in nuclear forces that can, if used, cause incalculable damage to our country. Does it make sense to be for missile defenses and against a START III or START IV treaty? We need greater transparency of nuclear stockpiles. We need to make reductions irreversible. Secretary of Defense Perry talks about "preventive defense." Defense spending that facilitates threat reduction in the former Soviet Union is a wise investment for everyone concerned. Senators Nunn and Lugar paved this road, which now branches off to include interactions between nuclear weapon laboratories. Some argue that these investments are unwise, and that they simply allow the Kremlin to budget more for defense modernization. But spending in Russia for defense modernization--although at significantly lower levels--will occur in any event; spending to dismantle weapons and increase their physical security is far from assured.

No single one of these front lines of defense is sufficient; all must work in concert to make up for each one's deficiencies. If all of the front lines of defense are breached, then we must rely on properly trained and equipped conventional forces, operating alone when necessary, but preferably in concert with allies and friends. Our forces must be able to respond to attack with devastating force. Only when our forces are unable to deter or defeat the launch of missiles must we then turn to our third and last line of defense: the interception of these missiles or their warheads in flight.

All members of Congress have a solemn responsibility to oversee defense preparedness. To succeed in combating the spread and use of WMD, we need to view the problem whole. We can't simply focus our energy and funding on the last fifteen minutes--or fifteen seconds--of the problem, when ballistic missiles are on their way or when their re-entry vehicles are subject to intercept. We need to strengthen all three lines of defense. If we address the problem whole, in a balanced and prudent way, we can protect taxpayer wallets as well as our country.

At present, I believe that many in Congress are pursuing an unbalanced approach to defending our country. We are spending extremely large sums for the last fifteen minutes of the problem, while short-changing the front lines of defense against weapons of mass destruction. Consider what could be achieved with a fraction of the money this Congress added to the administration's budget for national missile defenses

- The Department of Energy's budget request to increase nuclear safety and security at Russian facilities is only \$95 million. For an additional \$25 million, the Congress can vastly increase security at six additional facilities.
- The budget for the Non-Proliferation Treaty's watchdog agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency, has been flat for over a decade. "Safeguard" activities at nuclear facilities now cost \$75 million. For an additional U.S. voluntary contribution of ten million dollars, the IAEA could hire fifty new inspectors.
- If the Senate consents to ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the U.S. share to fund verification and other treaty activities will be less than \$20 million. For an additional voluntary contribution of \$10 million, the United States could provide for another sixty inspections annually under the CWC.
- The Federal Emergency Management Agency is only now in the process of assessing its capability to deal with the consequences of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, although the conclusions of this assessment are already apparent: FEMA isn't ready, and the country isn't ready. The budgetary consequences of our national lack of preparedness have not begun to be addressed.
- The government agency with the best track record in negotiating treaties and creating norms against weapons of mass destruction--the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency--is threatened with extinction, its budget slashed by 30 per cent.
- Last year's budgetary request for Nunn-Lugar funding was cut twenty per cent.

Many other examples could be cited to demonstrate the imbalanced nature of our national efforts to defend against weapons of mass destruction. The Clinton administration has been too stingy, in my view, in supporting the front lines of defense against dangerous weapons. The Congress' added generosity toward the last line of defense and increased stinginess for the front lines make for an extremely unbalanced program.

I believe that the Clinton administration's BMD program has the right priorities. The first order of business must be to field a defense system that actually works on the battlefield against short-to-medium-range ballistic missiles. As Under Secretary of Defense Paul Kaminski recently testified, well over ninety per cent of all ballistic missiles from states of proliferation concern will have short ranges for as far into the future as we can see. Our country lacked an effective missile defense system against these threats during the Gulf war, and it's about time we had one. If it takes more money to field such systems that work, let's do it.

As for more ambitious and costly theater missile defenses, we can afford to go slower and to be more protective of taxpayer wallets. The nature of this threat is extremely limited today, and the intelligence community projects the threat to remain extremely limited for the next fifteen years. It is not at all clear to me why we need separate Army THAAD and Navy Upper Tier programs to address this modest threat. If the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps can collaborate on the next generation combat fighter, is it too much to ask for the Army and Navy to develop jointly a theater missile defense system? Alternatively, should we not ask the Pentagon to choose between these largely overlapping programs?

I believe the Clinton administration's plans for a "3 plus 3" program for national missile defenses is on the mark. Pushing NMD faster is unwise on budgetary and programmatic grounds. As Gen. Malcolm O'Neill has recently testified, near-term deployment options are unlikely to evolve into a more effective defense. In other words, if we rush to deployment now, we will spend taxpayer dollars on a system that will have to be replaced almost immediately. In light of the U.S. intelligence community's finding that the threat of an ICBM or SLBM attack on our shores is "remote" and "unlikely," why adopt a crash course to deploy national missile defenses? If the Committee feels that additional funds are warranted for defenses, I urge you to direct these funds to the front lines, rather than to the last fifteen minutes of the problem.

The pursuit of multi-site NMD, as some have suggested, would be an anticipatory breach of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Many in the Congress view the ABM Treaty as a "Cold War relic" that deserves to be placed on the ash heap of history. If the ABM Treaty served no useful purpose, and if the United States needed multi-site defenses against clear and present dangers, I would agree. But the Congress has before it the unanimous assessment of the U.S. intelligence community, the key judgments of which have been free of contention under CIA Director Woolsey as well

as under Director John Deutch. As the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, Richard N. Cooper, has recently stated, "in the next 15 years no country other than the major declared nuclear powers will develop a ballistic missile that could threaten the contiguous 48 states or Canada."

Simply put, the ballistic missile threat provides no compelling reason to trash President Nixon's handiwork. There are other fundamental reasons why the ABM Treaty remains useful and necessary. The Treaty constitutes a safety net against the free fall in U.S.-Russian relations. Remove the safety net, and many equations change for the worse, including our ability to field effective defenses. Our relations with Russia, like those with the Soviet Union, will always be uneven: as in the Cold War, we can co-operate in some areas while we strongly disagree on others. If we trash the ABM Treaty, co-operation will be minimal and tensions will be the norm.

The ABM Treaty is not sacrosanct. It should be a living document, like the U.S. Constitution, subject to ongoing interpretation and occasional amendment. This can be done without scrapping the Treaty. Finally, the ABM Treaty is needed because it facilitates the transition from offense to defense. Kill the Treaty, and you kill prospects for reductions far, far below START II levels--the kind of reductions needed for effective defenses. Kill the Treaty and you also kill prospects for the degree of U.S.-Russian cooperation necessary for a transition from offense to defense.

Mr. EHRLICH. And, Dr. Payne, you may begin your statement.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure to be here this morning. I will summarize my prepared statement, and with some trepidation ask that it be submitted for the record.

Mr. EHRLICH. Oh, your statement is fine.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.

Mrs. THURMAN. We won't object on that one.

Mr. EHRLICH. Without objection.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. The question I have been asked to address is how severe is the threat to us posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. I personally like the way President Clinton described that threat. In Executive Order 12938, it's very short, the President says, "I, William J. Clinton, President of the United States of America, find that the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and of the means of delivering such weapons constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States, and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat."

In this Executive order, the President has, I believe, properly described the threat we face as a national emergency. To be specific, a missile threat will exist within the foreseeable future in every region where American expeditionary forces might realistically be needed, and that threat is going to be magnified by the presence of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction.

The combination of missiles and weapons of mass destruction is going to enable regional foes of the United States to threaten the annihilation of American forces and eventually American civilians. And, in fact, one of the primary reasons, one of the self-declared motives for some rogue States to acquire missiles and weapons of mass destruction is to have this threat of annihilation for purposes of deterrence and coercion and, in particular, deterrence and coercion of the United States.

Unless proliferation is controlled and countered, the post-cold war period is going to be characterized by rogue and terrorist states with the capability to deter and coerce us. This is going to be an unprecedented situation, and it's going to defeat our strategy.

Now, I am well aware that some say that there will be no missile threat to the United States itself for the foreseeable future, even for 15 years. In fact, you just heard that repeated here a few minutes ago. Such a statement simply is a misrepresentation of the public discussions on the subject by intelligence officials. In fact, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the current Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has stated publicly that the new North Korean long-range missile in development, the Taepo Dong II, if deployed, would have the potential to target American territory, specifically Guam, Hawaii and Alaska.

And last year, the Acting Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, William Studeman, stated in congressional testimony that this North Korean missile could be operational within 3 to 5 years. And even public statements from the most recent intelligent estimates dispute this assertion that the missile threat to the United States is 15 years off.

That can only be valid if you do not count Alaska and Hawaii as States of the United States and you do not count Guam as a territory of the United States. We frequently hear this misrepresentation; I am not sure why.

Some recent comments by Chinese officials and North Korean commentators may add a little bit of insight to this discussion. I think you will find this interesting. For example, earlier this year, according to senior officials of the Clinton administration, Chinese officials claimed that the United States would not intervene in China's dispute with Taiwan because American leaders, quote, "care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan," and because China would, and I quote, "rain nuclear bombs on Los Angeles." Chinese officials, again according to Clinton administration officials, also reportedly stated that China would sacrifice "millions of men" and "entire cities" to unify China, while the United States would not make such sacrifices.

These threats may well be bluster. At a minimum, however, they demonstrate China's willingness to use their nuclear threat to deter and coerce us from intervention if there happens to be a crisis over Taiwan.

Are these threats serious? Well, just last week we learned that China tried to buy the most deadly ICBM technology available from Russia. This, I believe, portends a serious threat. Similarly, last month Kim Myong Chol, a North Korean reported by the Washington Post to have close contacts with the government in Pyongyang, stated frankly that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il has, "ordered the development and deployment" of "strategic long-range ballistic missiles tipped with a super-powerful warhead." The purpose of this missile, according to Kim, is to provide North Korea with the capability to, "destroy major metropolitan and population centers."

He added that, "in less than 10 years, North Korea will likely deploy an operational intercontinental ballistic missile force capable of hitting the American mainland."

And in commenting on the potential for nuclear war, Kim observes that North Korea would, and again I quote, "fare much better than the Americans and the Japanese" because North Koreans, "have long geared all their military, political, economic and social institutions for nuclear doomsday." Again, this may be bluster, but given the desperate conditions in North Korea and the potential for surprising behavior by its isolated leadership, this talk, I believe, is cause for concern.

Now, many claim that this missile threat can be discounted. And why is that? Well, it's because rogue states would never dare to launch a strike against the United States given our threat of nuclear retaliation. Deterrence will work. This frequently heard assertion reflects what I believe is a profound ignorance of deterrence. Think tank commentators can and do claim with utter confidence that future regional challengers would never dare to attack us because of our nuclear threat. There's no basis for making such claims, and, in truth, we know very little about how the governments in North Korea, Libya, Iraq, Iran or even China will respond to the United States deterrent in the context of a severe crisis. The promise that the U.S. nuclear deterrent will work reliably is irre-



sponsible, it's dangerous, because it promises safety where there may be no safety. This point, by the way, is beyond dispute among those who have studied deterrence seriously.

And in addition, debating whether a challenger would actually—would actually launch a missile against us misses, I think, the fundamental point. The mere possession of missiles and weapons of mass destruction by regional challengers and aggressors will compel an American leadership to weigh the costs and risks of American power projection with a consequent inhibition on our options for acting abroad. If you don't understand this coercive potential of missiles and weapons of mass destruction, you miss possibly the primary motive for proliferation and its implications for our own national security.

In conclusion, there is an obvious missile proliferation trend. The trend is toward greater ranges and greater payloads. There is simultaneously a trend toward the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical weapons, and added to this dangerous brew is a self-expressed desire on the part of rogue states for the capability to deter and coerce the United States.

Missiles and weapons of mass destruction now threaten to provide what otherwise would be second- and third-rate military powers with the capability to deter and coerce the United States. That is an unprecedented and dangerous situation, and unless countered, it's going to be the defining feature of the post-cold war period. That's why I welcome President Clinton's description of the situation as a national emergency.

And that leads me to conclude that we should now take those steps necessary to establish the legal and programmatic basis for deploying a limited National Missile Defense System. The American people already believe that they are defended, and it appears now that there is no technical impediment to doing so vis-a-vis limited missile threats. For example, Secretary of Defense Perry has recently stated that effective defense against, and I quote, "several dozens of warheads is quite achievable with present technology, and it's achievable with several tens of billions of dollars." Even the Arms Control Association, which is no friend of missile defense, has stated that, and I quote, "there is little doubt that it is technically possible to protect the United States against a handful of missiles launched by accident, a mad commander or a Third World country." That's what we are talking about, limited missile defense.

Now, the threat may mature over 5 years. It may mature over 10 years. It may mature over 15 years. The truth is, nobody honestly knows the year that it's going to happen with any confidence, as Jim Woolsey, by the way, has observed.

But whether it's 5 years, 10 years or 15 years in the future, unless we start towards deployment now, we will be lucky to have a National Missile Defense System available in any of those timeframes. There are, of course, complementary means to counter the proliferation threat, as Michael Krepon has just described and mentioned, and those should be strengthened. They all, however, are going to be inadequate in the absence of national missile defense.

I would like to point out that in my work with Russian colleagues over the last 2 years, we have come to conclusions that

suggest that we may be able to cooperate with the Russian Federation in the deployment of a limited national missile defense system, but that cooperation is going to require that the Russians believe we are serious in our intentions regarding national missile defense.

We should begin to move in that direction, and we should do it now. And this is not an either/or issue. We can pursue the diplomatic initiatives. We should pursue diplomatic initiatives. As I said, this is not an either/or issue. We should pursue missile defense simultaneously.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Payne follows:]

*The Long-Range Missile Threat to National Security*

**Dr. Keith B. Payne**

**President, National Institute for Public Policy  
Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University  
National Security Studies Graduate Program**

How severe is the threat to us posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles? Although an old question, it recently has become one of the key issues in the debate about ballistic missile defense. I would like to note at the outset that I agree with President Clinton's description of that threat. Just as a reminder, allow me to quote the President's very brief Executive Order #12938 concerning the proliferation threat to national security: "I, William J. Clinton, President of the United States of America, find that the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and of the means of delivering such weapons, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat."

In his Executive Order the President has, I believe, properly described the threat we face as a "national emergency." To be specific, a missile threat will exist within the foreseeable future in every region that American expeditionary forces might realistically be needed, and that threat will be magnified by the likely presence of nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads—weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

In the emerging strategic environment, the combination of missiles and WMD will enable regional foes of the United States to threaten the annihilation of American military or civilian targets. Indeed, one of the primary self-declared motives for some rogue states to acquire missiles and WMD is to wield this threat of annihilation for the purposes of deterrence and coercion—particularly including deterrence and coercion of the United States. Unless proliferation is controlled and countered, the post-Cold War period will be characterized by rogue and terrorist states with the capability to deter and coerce us with missile threats involving weapons of mass destruction.

I am well aware that some say there will no missile threat to the United States for the foreseeable future, even for 15 years. Such a statement simply is a false portrayal of public discussions on the subject by intelligence officials. In fact, the Director of Central Intelligence has stated publicly that a new North Korean long-range missile now in development--the *Taepo Dong*

II--if deployed could have the potential to strike American territory, specifically Guam, Hawaii and Alaska. And last year Admiral William Studeman, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, stated in Congressional testimony that this North Korean missile could be operational within three to five years. Even public statements from the most recent intelligence estimates dispute the frequent assertion that the missile threat to the United States is fifteen years off.

Some recent comments by Chinese officials and North Korean commentators may add insight to this discussion. For example, earlier this year, according to senior members of the Clinton Administration, Chinese officials claimed that the U.S. would not intervene in China's dispute with Taiwan because American leaders "care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan"—and because China "would rain nuclear bombs on Los Angeles." Chinese officials also reportedly stated that, China would sacrifice "millions of men" and "entire cities" to unify China, while the U.S. would not make such sacrifices. Such threats, at a minimum, demonstrate China's willingness to use their nuclear threat to deter the United States from intervention in the event of a crisis over Taiwan. Are these threats serious? Just last week we learned that China has tried to buy the most deadly ICBM technology available from Russia. This, I believe, is a serious threat.

Similarly, last month Kim Myong Chol, a North Korean reported by the *Washington Post* to have close contacts with the government in Pyongyang, stated frankly that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il has "ordered the development and deployment" of "strategic long-range ballistic missiles tipped with a super-powerful warhead." The purpose of this missile, according to Chol, is to provide North Korea with the capability to "destroy major metropolitan and population centers." Chol adds that, "In less than 10 years, North Korea will likely deploy an operational intercontinental ballistic missile force capable of hitting the American mainland." In commenting on the potential for nuclear war, Chol observes that North Korea would "fare much better than the Americans and the Japanese" because North Koreans "have long geared all their military, political, economic and social institutions for nuclear doomsday." Given the desperate conditions in North Korea, and the potential for surprising behavior by its self-isolated leadership, this kind of talk should be cause for concern.

Some say that this missile threat has been overblown by proponents of missile defense, and that "rogue" states never would "dare" to launch a WMD strike against the United States because of our threat of nuclear retaliation. This typical comment reflects a profound ignorance of deterrence. For deterrence to have a chance of working predictably requires that we have a relatively sophisticated understanding of the opponent. This is the conclusion of my own 20-year empirical study of deterrence, and the conclusion of every other empirical study of deterrence. Think tank

commentators can claim with utter confidence that future regional challengers would never dare to attack us because of our nuclear threat; but they have no basis for making such claims. In truth they do not have a clue as to how the governments in North Korea, Libya, Iraq, Iran, or even China will react to the U.S. deterrent in the context of a severe crisis. To promise that the U.S. nuclear deterrent will work reliably against rogue states in the future is the height of hubris. This point is beyond dispute among those who actually have studied deterrence seriously. And, to put it starkly, even if the United States were to retaliate with nuclear weapons and annihilate a state having just struck us, that would not restore the many thousands of lives potentially lost if our nuclear deterrent does not work as hoped.

In addition, debating whether a challenger would actually “dare” to launch a missile attack against us misses a fundamental point. A primary reason that missiles and WMD pose a threat to our security is because of the capability for deterrence and coercion that missiles and WMD will provide rogues and terrorists. Actually launching a missile against us has little to do with strategies of deterrence and coercion; such strategies involve the *threat* of missiles and WMD, not actually using them. The mere possession of missiles and WMD by regional aggressors will compel American leaders to weigh the risks of U.S. power projection—with the consequent inhibitions on our options for acting abroad. If you do not understand this distinction between this value of missiles and WMD for deterrence, versus their actual launching, you can not understand one of the primary motives for proliferation and its implications for our own national security.

Three fundamental uncertainties hinder the ability to forecast confidently ballistic missile threats to the United States through the next 10- and 20-year periods. First, intelligence indicators are often ambiguous. Therefore, forecasts are subject to inaccuracies. During our 40-year confrontation with the Soviet Union, the United States devoted considerable resources to understanding Soviet missile research, development, testing, and deployment. Even so, Soviet capabilities still surprised us on occasion. For example, while Western sources reportedly estimated that the Soviet Union possessed 20 launchers for the SS-23 missiles, Soviet negotiators revealed during talks leading up to the INF Treaty that they in fact had some 100. And, of course, we should not forget that only weeks before the Soviet Union’s first atomic bomb test in 1949 the CIA released its annual report on Soviet atomic energy stating that the most probable date for a Soviet test was mid-1953.<sup>1</sup>

The natural ambiguity of much intelligence data is magnified by the fact that the United States has focused on the Soviet Union and consequently

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<sup>1</sup>See Richard Rhodes, *Dark Sun: The Making Of The Hydrogen Bomb* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), p. 363.

lacks a comprehensive understanding of developing-country missile programs. For example, Iraq's December 1989 test of the *Al-Abid* space launch vehicle reportedly took the U.S. intelligence community by surprise, as apparently did the 1988 Chinese announcement of its sale of CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia. Also, despite numerous inspections of the Iraqi missile program by United Nations experts, questions about its scope and maturity persist. While it is relatively easy to define the generic requirements of a successful ballistic missile program, we must realize that our ability to predict the future course of such programs for other countries with which we have limited familiarity is likely to be modest.

Second, a number of events could alter the capabilities or intentions of some states to field long-range ballistic missiles even during this decade. Therefore, forecasts are subject to the vagary of rapid change. Trade in missile technologies is brisk and can quickly improve a nation's ballistic missile capabilities. The sale of liquid-fuel rocket motor technology by Moscow to India is a prominent example, but there have also been a host of less-publicized transactions. In addition, the technical infrastructure of potential proliferants is maturing even as technology is becoming more accessible. In other cases, cooperation on peaceful space programs may facilitate capabilities that could be used in military systems—permitting countries to establish long-range missile capabilities more rapidly than otherwise could be expected.

Third, there is the possibility of dramatic and rapid change in U.S. political relations with states either possessing long-range missiles or capable of fielding such systems if they so choose. It is important to note that the character of U.S. relations with such countries may be subject to relatively rapid shifts during the 1990s or early in the next century. The potential for the rapid deterioration of political relations also entails the possible emergence of shorter-range missile threats from Latin American or Caribbean countries.

History demonstrates that rapid change in political relations does occur. The fall of the Shah of Iran—a fall that caught our intelligence community by surprise—moved that state very rapidly to hostile relations with the United States. The political changes in the Soviet Union—changes that were similarly surprising—quickly led to much more cordial relations with the United States. While such changes, occurring within the space of 5 to 7 years, is not the norm in international relations, it does take place—and often is associated with conflict. Historically, over a longer period of 10 to 20 years, this type of major reorientation of political relations is much more common. In a period of political uncertainty and instability, the prospect for political relations to deteriorate rapidly with states possessing long-range missiles, or capable of fielding such systems promptly, must be acknowledged.

In summary, plausible routes to missile proliferation and additional missile threats could shape the situation during and after this decade. Either independently or in combination, these could lead to the emergence of additional missile threats to the United States. In these circumstances, the conclusion that the probability is quite low for the emergence of new ballistic missile threats to the United States for at least 15 years can be sustained only if these plausible but unpredictable developments, such as the transfer and conversion of SLVs, are dismissed or considered of negligible consequence

In conclusion, there is an obvious missile proliferation trend toward greater ranges and greater payloads. There simultaneously is a trend toward the proliferation of WMD. Added to this dangerous brew is the self-expressed desire on the part of some foreign leaders for the capability to deter and coerce the United States with missile and WMD threats. Almost three thousand years ago the great Chinese strategist Sun Tzu said that the best method for a weak state to have its way against a strong state is for the weak to use deterrence and coercion against the strong to defeat its strategy. Missiles and WMD now threaten to provide otherwise second- and third-rate regional aggressors with the deterrence and coercive capability to defeat U.S. strategy. This is an unprecedented and dangerous situation and, unless countered, it will be a defining feature of the post-Cold War order. That is why I agree with President Clinton that the proliferation of WMD and means for their delivery constitute a national emergency.

The existing difficulties with North Korea and China, combined with the inherent uncertainty surrounding when and from where additional missile threats will arise, lead me to conclude that we should now take those steps necessary to establish the legal and programmatic basis for the deployment of a limited national missile defense. Long-range missile threats may mature over the next 5, 10, or 15 years, no one honestly knows precisely when with any confidence. Yet whether 5, 10 or 15 years in the future, because of the great political impediments to our deploying missile defense, unless we start down the deployment path now we will be lucky to have an NMD system available in any of those timeframes. There are, of course, complementary means to attack the missile proliferation threat which also should be pursued. They all, however, will be inadequate in the absence of NMD.

Mr. EHRLICH. Thank you, Dr. Payne. I am hearing a fairly consistent set of objective facts from almost every witness and wildly different conclusions.

A question to both of you, and I guess, Dr. Payne, you really touched upon it in your testimony.

Mr. Krepon, you appear to discount it.

I don't want to put words in your mouth. I understand your point with respect to the nonability, inability, of Third World countries, even developed nations, to develop this technology today or the foreseeable future. But what—do you discount the ability of these countries to purchase such technology, either the technology or the delivery systems themselves, from developed nations of the world?

Mr. KREPON. Let's—

Mr. EHRLICH. I would like you both to comment on that.

Mr. KREPON. OK. There is technology seepage. There is a black market in technology. States of proliferation concern are getting things that we would rather they not have.

With respect to an entire system, they are not for sale. ICBMs are not for sale. The issue is whether or not a space launch vehicle, which could, with considerable modification, be used as an ICBM, be purchased by a state of proliferation concern and thereby threaten the United States.

I think that's the concern that has been raised.

Mr. EHRLICH. Yes, sir. I think you have—and your opinion is?

Mr. KREPON. My feeling is that first of all, no such state has done this to date. A lot of states have provided space launch vehicle services to other states while retaining control of the launch vehicle. So, for example, China could launch a satellite from a third country at its own space launch facility without trucking the entire missile to the other country and launching the satellite from the other country. It's not economically sound. It's very hard to do. It's tough on the guidance system of these missiles to be—

Mr. EHRLICH. I don't want to put words in your mouth. Is your testimony that the purchase of the technology is plausible, but then again you are looking at a time line, but the purchase of the system itself is not really plausible in the intermediate future? Is that your point?

Mr. KREPON. The purchase of an entire space launch vehicle from another country is conceivable, but control over that space launch vehicle will be held by the state which owns it at all times.

Mr. EHRLICH. OK. I am not sure that raises my comfort level a great deal. Does it raise yours?

Mr. KREPON. I think that what you need to is get the expert advice of the intelligence community on this issue. They have written about it.

If I am—let's say I own an SS-25, and I am Russia, and I want to use that as a space launch vehicle even though I have got other space launch vehicles. I would offer the services of that missile launcher. The satellite, communications satellite or whatever, would come to me. I would retain exclusive control over that vehicle. There has never been an instance of this happening any other way.

Mr. EHRLICH. Well, we just had—we just had some very serious war-like diplomacy played in the Taiwan Straits.



Mr. KREPON. Correct.

Mr. EHRLICH. Does that figure into your analysis in any way?

Mr. KREPON. It certainly does. Now we are not talking about a highly improbable use of space launch vehicles to threaten a state. Now we are talking about short-range ballistic missiles being used for political coercion. That's a huge problem, a serious problem, and it requires addressal.

The solution to that problem is theater ballistic missile defenses. These are things like the PAC 2, PAC 3, the THAAD, the Navy program. That's what you need to deal with that particular very serious, clear and present danger.

Mr. EHRLICH. A quick followup. The ICBM-based threat with respect to the Los Angeles quote, wild in your estimation? Not to be taken seriously?

Mr. KREPON. It speaks very poorly of the person, whoever it was, who conveyed that message.

During the entire history of the cold war, it was understood by everyone that if a city, an American city, were attacked by a ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead, there would be devastating, terrible retaliation. That condition still holds, even after the cold war is over. So if China would wish, in some crazed moment, to attack Los Angeles, then China would receive the same kind of devastating retaliation in return.

But we are looking at what I think are generally conceded to be remote threats. The problem to your constituents, sir, is a truck bomb. It's not an ICBM. It's a terrorist using nuclear materials, using chemical materials, using biological materials. This is a terrible problem.

Mr. EHRLICH. These are very important distinctions, I understand.

I want to get to Dr. Payne to ask him. I know he has been writing furiously over there. Thank you for your answer.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.

Mr. EHRLICH. I am out of time, but you can finish, make your observations.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.

You started your question by saying that you were hearing the same facts, and, in fact, I think you are hearing some different facts. On the one hand, you are hearing that—I don't believe I am misquoting here, that there's no threat to the United States for 15 years. On the other hand, what I reported from—

Mr. EHRLICH. Well, from what?

Mr. PAYNE. Well, not necessarily specified, from an—from a missile.

Mr. EHRLICH. OK.

Mr. PAYNE. No missile threat to the United States for 15 years. You heard that. In fact, you just heard that repeated again.

On the other hand, you are hearing, including from Jim Woolsey, to give a more balanced version of his quotes, that the threat to the U.S. territory could come sooner than that. It could be even a handful of years. We don't really have a very good handle on that.

And why is that? That's because some of these missile threats may happen much sooner because there are shortcuts. There are shortcuts to missile development, and there are a number of short-

cuts that can reduce that 15-year figure. And in addition, you are hearing, I believe, as a fact, the presentation of publicly reported intelligence community statements that say there are States of the United States that could be threatened by missiles in a much shorter time span than 15 years. Again, the only way you can make the statement that there's no threat to the United States for 15 years, is if you don't count States of the United States as States of the United States.

Now, I think that the assertion that there is no threat to the United States, that blanket assertion, is a distortion of the point that the NIE makes, at least as publicly discussed: that is for 15 years there's a low expectation of any indigenously developed threat to the contiguous 48 States. All right?

There are a number of—there are a number of caveats in that. Remember, low probability of a—of a threat to the contiguous 48 States within 15 years from indigenously developed ICBM. That's a far cry from saying there's no threat to the United States for 15 years. In some ways, this distortion and misrepresentation of the point has hounded us even in this particular hearing.

And let me comment on your question with regard to the statement by the Chinese officials, as reported by members of the Clinton administration. I believe you asked the question as to whether the Chinese really would strike the United States. Let me suggest that the more important question is: Would the Chinese use their missiles to threaten the United States? Because the key point with regard to the missile threat to the United States is how that threat is going to coerce and deter us from acting as we would prefer to act in regional crises.

The issue isn't whether the PRC actually would attack Los Angeles. The question is: Will they threaten to attack Los Angeles, and how will our leaders respond to that threat? We know that they will threaten to do that because, as reported by Clinton administration officials, they have made that threat. Whether they would follow through on that threat, at least in terms of deterrence and coercion, is really a moot point.

And by the way, our retaliation against China, as Michael Krepon mentioned, wouldn't really do much to heal the people in Los Angeles or whatever urban area had been targeted by the Chinese if, in fact, they did follow through on a threat. So the hope that's placed in U.S. nuclear retaliation seems to me to be a thin reed. Thank you.

Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. EHRLICH. Yes.

Mr. SHADEGG. During the course of Mr. Gaffney's testimony, the issue came up of putting into the record of this hearing Defending America, a report by the Heritage Foundation. There was some question about whether or not that would be put into the record. I would like to formally move that it be placed in the record at this time.

Mr. EHRLICH. Let me recognize Mrs. Thurman. I believe the state of the record is that Mr. Spratt objected, but under the rules of the committee Mr. Spratt is not a member of the subcommittee, so he had no standing to object.

I will recognize Mrs. Thurman.

Mrs. THURMAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, I—in backing up my colleague Mr. Spratt, who was sitting here, we would have to object. And I think his basis was on the fact of the cost, that anything over two pages in the Congressional Record had to be costed out, and that was the reason for the objection.

Interestingly enough, a couple of minutes ago, we had several of our Members down here anticipating that this particular issue may come back up. Our Members have now left, which is quite convenient for you all. I obviously don't have the votes on this side, since you have delayed this until you could get your Members here. So we would still object. You will probably take a vote, and that will be the end of it.

Mr. EHRLICH. I will recognize Mr.——

Mrs. THURMAN. But—or I could ask if you would like to give me the courtesy of giving me about 5 minutes to get our Members down here, we would appreciate that, too.

Mr. EHRLICH. I think it is going to be the same outcome. I think you have two Members.

Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Chairman, as Mr. Spratt was not a member of the subcommittee, it does remind me of the admonition that no good deed goes unpunished. You allowed him to sit on the subcommittee, and he objects to the admission of a report. It seems to me with the stake of the fate of the Nation at hand, and some city such as my city, Phoenix, being subject to a missile attack, I am willing to say this is worth the cost of inserting in the record. I move that it be inserted in the record, and if that requires a formal vote, I call for a vote.

Mrs. THURMAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, this still is a democracy of people being allowed to vote in their committee. I mean, I do believe that we would still like to be given that opportunity. And it's not in question about the report. If you had been here earlier, it was made mention that this report has gone to every congressional office, and every Member has got a copy of this. It is not like something that is not available to the public. That is my only reason for raising that. But if you would like, if you would give me 5 minutes or at least let us continue our line of questioning and come back, that would be fine.

Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I was, in fact, here earlier, and I don't think the issue is whether or not every Member has it. I think the issue is once it's inserted in the record of this hearing, it's available for all members of the public, and I think this is an important enough issue that it ought to be there for the world to see.

Mrs. THURMAN. It is anyway.

Mr. EHRLICH. Actually, I have indulged the gentlelady, I think, in trying to buy a few minutes here to get your guys here.

Mr. SHADEGG. I have no objection to them having time to come down and vote. They are welcome to come down and vote. If they get here, so be it.

Mr. EHRLICH. I understand Mr. Condit and Mr. Brewster wanted to vote. I will—what time is it? It's 15 past. I will—at 20 past, we will have a vote. And out of an abundance——

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Chairman, I have an objection to that because I didn't—I didn't actually come over here to vote. I came over be-

cause I have been in a markup. I wandered in here. They called John because I came over. It was his proposal. I have motions going on that I am missing votes in another committee to be here. I don't think I should have to wait because somebody else didn't come in. I didn't get called to come in. Somebody may have called my office, but I came over because I have been trying to get in and out of the hearing as much as I can, and indulging one Member then hurts another Member.

Mr. EHRlich. The objection is heard, and as a result, the question before the subcommittee—

Mrs. THURMAN. What is the objection?

Mr. EHRlich. I was going to wait until 20 after.

Mrs. THURMAN. He is objecting.

Mr. EHRlich. The objection has been heard. Mr. Souder is objecting.

Mr. SOUDER. We are marking up in another committee.

Mr. EHRlich. With that, the question before the subcommittee is whether the Heritage Foundation report should be made a part of the record. All in favor, say yea.

All opposed.

The ayes have it.

Roll call?

Mrs. THURMAN. I am not—I can count.

Mr. EHRlich. The chairman has a keen ear. With that vote, it is so ordered.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Richard Odenmatt

## WILL CLINTON PAY THE PRICE FOR AMERICA TO REMAIN A GLOBAL POWER?

### INTRODUCTION

Defending American freedom, security, and prosperity from foreign threats requires that America remain militarily strong and preserve its military alliances. It is no accident that the U.S. became involved in World War I and World War II during the first half of the 20th century when it was essentially a regional military power, still disinclined to exercise global leadership. Nor is it an accident that there have been no world wars and few major U.S. wars since America's emergence as a global power and leader of the West after 1945. The lesson of history is clear: The best way to keep the United States out of costly major wars is to remain a global power.

America's status as a global power, however, could be in danger. The refusal of the Clinton Administration and Congress to provide adequate funding and other support for national security programs could leave the U.S. no longer able to make good on its commitments to military alliances in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. Analysts at the Heritage Foundation estimate that the Clinton Administration is underfunding its defense plan for fiscal years 1997-2002 by some \$130 billion. If not corrected, this shortfall will leave America with a serious mismatch between its security commitments and the military capabilities needed to fulfill those commitments.


The time is rapidly approaching when this mismatch may force the nation to abandon at least some of its security commitments. Indeed, the time is rapidly approaching when the U.S. will have to decide between remaining a global power capable of preventing wars or becoming a mere regional military power, condemned to fight and possibly lose them.

Congress needs to sound the alarm over this problem. Congress also needs to conduct a serious debate on how to close the gap. One solution would be to pledge the nation to honor its existing security commitments and propose increasing the defense budget over projected levels to meet these commitments. If Congress and the Administration are not willing to

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support a defense budget and force levels sufficient to honor U.S. security commitments, they will leave America with only one feasible course of action: partial withdrawal from existing U.S. security commitments while projected defense spending levels are held steady.

This second approach is not a solution, but an evasion. It would mean the end of America as a global military power capable of defending its freedom and interests. And it would mean the beginning of a new age of insecurity of the sort that Americans have not known since the first half of this century.



### U.S. SECURITY COMMITMENTS AND MILITARY CAPABILITIES: THE COMING MISMATCH

At the heart of the emerging mismatch between U.S. military capabilities and security commitments is declining funding for defense. Since 1985, U.S. defense spending has declined by about 35 percent (through the end of the last fiscal year, or FY 1995). Both Administration and congressional budget proposals would result in an FY 2002 defense budget that is between 6 percent and 8 percent below the level prevailing in 1995 (see Chart 1). Reductions of this magnitude mean that the force structure recommended by the Clinton Administration's Bottom-Up Review cannot be sustained.<sup>1</sup> In fact, the defense budget proposed by the Clinton Administration for fiscal years 1997 through 2002 falls roughly \$130 billion short of what is required for the President's proposed force structure. In other words, the Clinton Administration is failing to fund its own defense force, and the size of the U.S. armed forces will shrink to levels below those recommended in the Administration's own Bottom-Up Review (see Chart 2).

<sup>1</sup> The Bottom-Up Review was a comprehensive review of U.S. conventional military policy that was completed by the Department of Defense in 1993. Its most important recommendation was to set the size of the U.S. military's conventional forces for the post-Cold War period.

**Chart 2**

**The Clinton Defense Budget Is Likely to Reduce Conventional Force Structure to Levels Below Those Recommended by the Bottom-Up Review**

	End of Fiscal Year 1988	Bottom-Up Review	Estimated Forces Under Clinton Budget	Decline from 1988 to Estimated Clinton Budget Forces
<b>Army Division Equivalents</b>	28	15+	12	-57%
<b>Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings</b>	379	20	15	-60%
<b>Navy Ships</b>	566	346	300	-47%
<b>Active Marine Corps Troops</b>	197 000	174 000	140 000	-29%

Source: Heritage calculations based on Department of Defense data.

The Clinton Administration and defense critics in Congress have explained the reduction in resources for the military as a natural result of the end of the Cold War. However, while defense budgets and force structure have diminished, U.S. security commitments have not changed. These commitments are derived from such important security treaties as the Washington Treaty of 1949 establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Japanese-United States Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaties of 1951 and 1960 (see Chart 3). Other non-treaty commitments, such as those to U.S. friends in the Persian Gulf, also remain in force. In addition, at the same time President Clinton is cutting defense, he is seeking to expand the level of American military commitments by increasing U.S. participation in peacekeeping and

**Chart 3**

**While U.S. Forces Are Declining,  
All U.S. Commitments from the Cold War Continue**





**Sample of Cold War Security Treaties Still in Force**

- The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947
- The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949
- The Australian, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty of 1951
- The Japanese-United States Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaties of 1951 and 1960
- The South Korean-United States Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty of 1954

Note: List does not reflect non-treaty security commitments, such as those to the Gulf Arab states.

Chart 4

### Clinton Administration Defense Budget Will Make It Difficult to Mount an Operation the Size of Desert Storm

	Force Element Under Bottom-Up Review	Estimated Force Element From Clinton Budget	Forces Used in Operation Desert Storm	Share of Bottom-Up Review Forces Required for Future "Desert Storm"	Share of Clinton Budget Forces Required for Future "Desert Storm"
 Active Army Divisions	10	8	7+	70+%	87+%
 Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings	20	15	10	50%	67%
 Active Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups	11	8	6	55%	75%
 Active Marine Corps Troops	174,000	140,000	93,000	53%	66%

Source: Heritage calculations based on Department of Defense data.

peace enforcement operations and expanding NATO membership to qualifying states in Eastern Europe.

All of these commitments place an extraordinary drain on the resources of the armed services. The Clinton Administration's policy calls for the Army to have ten active divisions, but the Administration's underfunding is likely to force down the number of active divisions to eight. U.S. security commitments to the countries of the Persian Gulf (in this case non-treaty commitments) oblige the U.S. to confront an attack on its friends in the region by either Iraq or Iran. As a result of this commitment, America could find itself fighting another Persian Gulf War, say in 2005. But sending the same number of active Army combat divisions to a future war in the Persian Gulf as were sent in 1990/91 would require more than seven divisions—at least 70 percent of active Army divisions called for under the Bottom-Up Review, and 87 percent of the active divisions likely to result from Clinton Administration budget policy. Similar demands would exist for the combat forces of the other services (see Chart 4).

The demand placed on military support systems by U.S. security commitments cannot be quantified as easily, because such support systems as strategic lift, worldwide communications, and intelligence are global in scope and can be used to support combat forces in several regions concurrently. Nevertheless, it is accurate to say that the cost of developing and procuring this global infrastructure is based on the worldwide scope of U.S. commitments and is very expensive. For example, the Pentagon has spent roughly \$6 billion annually on developing, procuring, and operating its airlift and sealift systems during the 1990s.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 1996*, March 1995, Table 6-4.



## THE FINANCIAL COST OF U.S. MILITARY LEADERSHIP: THE PERSIAN GULF WAR MODEL

Some critics of defense spending are quick to point out that the U.S. defense budget is three times larger than any other country's. They make this point to convince both Congress and the American people that the defense budget can be reduced safely from projected levels without

jeopardizing U.S. security commitments. This assumes, however, that the U.S. needs to spend only as much as—or slightly more than—other states on defense, particularly regional bullies like Iraq or North Korea. This assumption is wrong. The U.S. needs to spend much



more than three times the amount spent by rogue states in order to uphold its commitments to its allies in important regions. The history of the Persian Gulf War demonstrates why.

History shows that from 1988–1990, the U.S. had to spend annually some seven times as much as Iraq to defeat Saddam Hussein in Kuwait (see Chart 5).<sup>3</sup> The reasons:

- ① **The U.S. needs to meet commitments on a global basis**, which requires greater spending on overseas bases, logistical support, airlift, and other military infrastructure. By contrast, rogue regimes need only threaten a U.S. commitment in one region, which is considerably cheaper.
- ② **American military forces need to project power** to regions thousands of miles from American shores, while the militaries of rogue regimes have only to operate in close proximity to their own territories.

Chart 5

**To Liberate Kuwait, the U.S. Had to Spend Seven Times as Much as Iraq Spent Preparing for the Invasion**

Annual Investment in Military Forces Used in Persian Gulf War, Late 1980s–1990	 United States	 Iraq
Airlift and Sealift	\$6 billion	\$300 million
Communications and Intelligence	\$30 billion	\$1.3 billion
Army Forces	\$18 billion	\$10.6 billion
Navy and Marine Forces	\$19 billion	\$70 million
Tactical Air Forces	\$18 billion	\$850 million
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$91 billion</b>	<b>\$13.1 billion</b>

Note: Figures are in current dollars. Individual line item figures for Iraq are estimated.  
Source: Department of Defense and the International Institute for Strategic Studies

3 An assessment of the annual cost to the U.S. of building and maintaining the Persian Gulf War force and its supporting infrastructure includes the following items: \$6 billion for airlift and sealift; \$30 billion for global command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence; and somewhat less than \$20 billion each for the portion of the expeditionary forces of the three military departments required to prosecute the war. Assuming 100 percent of Iraq's annual defense expenditures in the years leading up to the war are counted as the cost of building the force used to invade Kuwait, Saddam Hussein's total investment would be some \$13 billion per year. Thus, the U.S. spent around seven times that amount in achieving its victory in the Gulf War.

- ④ **The U.S. requires a high-technology force to defeat its enemies with limited casualties.** By contrast, rogue regimes have fewer high-tech military systems and care little for the loss of human life on either side.
- ⑤ **The U.S. chooses to retain a more expensive all-volunteer force as opposed to a conscript army of the sort retained by Iraq.**

If America wishes to remain a global power—and it must if it wishes to protect its own freedom and security—it must accept the burden of paying much more for its own defense than would its adversaries. U.S. forces are not “overstuffed.”<sup>4</sup> They are, if anything, already growing too weak to meet the challenging task of outgunning rogue states that have the luxury of spending less on defense than does the U.S. In this respect, rogue states are to the U.S. as an arsonist is to a fire insurance company: The arsonist, with his gasoline and matches, can spend much less than the insurance company, which either must focus on fire prevention or pay the cost of rebuilding a house burned down by the arsonist.

This cost, though high, must be borne by the U.S. It was the price of victory in the Gulf War, and it will be the price of victory in similar wars in the future. U.S. friends and allies, like Kuwait, understand that if America does not make the necessary investments to protect its regional interests, it will be unable to fulfill its commitments. This is why reductions in the defense budget threaten to undermine U.S. security commitments. As friends and allies like Kuwait question American commitment, they may begin to seek security elsewhere. These commitments are more than an academic question for U.S. friends and allies: As any Kuwaiti will attest, their very existence as sovereign states may hang in the balance.

### ANSWERING THE QUESTION ABOUT U.S. SECURITY COMMITMENTS

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been no debate about whether the U.S. should continue to uphold its existing security commitments to friends and allies around the world. As a result, defense budgets and military forces have been shrinking without consideration for the potential impact on the alliance structure. The Clinton Administration is largely responsible for this state of affairs. First, it failed to fund its own defense policy. Second, it altered internal accounts in the Pentagon budget to fund daily military operations at the direct expense of its ability to buy new weapons for the future. This has allowed the Administration to retain a conventional force that for the last several years is larger than the budget otherwise would allow. As pressure to buy new weapons builds, so does the pressure to reduce the size of the force to free up money for new weapons.

Congress, however, has exacerbated the problem. The budget resolution approved last year, covering fiscal years 1996 through 2002, added more funds for defense each year for fiscal years 1996 through 2000. Nevertheless, at the end of the seven-year period, in fiscal 2001 and 2002, Congress would spend less on defense than would the Clinton Administration. Further, even the \$7 billion increase in defense expenditures Congress provided for the current fiscal year is not enough to fund the Clinton Administration’s Bottom-Up Review force structure. Putting the Pentagon on a path that funds both the readiness and

4 Lawrence J. Korb, “Our Overstuffed Armed Forces,” *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 1995, p. 23.

modernization needs of the military would require an increase of somewhat less than \$20 billion.

One can only speculate about the sort of ugly reality the American people will have to face sometime during the next five years if Clinton Administration defense policies continue on their present course: for example, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the disintegration of NATO, an invasion of South Korea by the North, Russian hegemony over the "near abroad," or Iranian military control of the Persian Gulf. All that is needed is for the U.S. to be perceived as militarily weak and unable to uphold its security commitments in Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf. Clearly, the time has come for Congress to clarify this situation for the American people.

### CALL TO DEBATE

The best way for Congress to educate the American people about the emerging gap between U.S. security commitments and forces is to debate the issue. The mere fact that Congress is debating the issue will serve to bring home to the American people that there is a serious problem. As of now, they cannot know because the Clinton Administration refuses to acknowledge that the problem exists. As the American people become aware of the emerging gap, the likelihood that the Clinton Administration will be forced to address it increases. Then, and only then, can the gap between forces and commitments be closed.

Congress also can propose a resolution to uphold U.S. security commitments by increasing projected defense budgets to fund the Clinton Administration's Bottom-Up Review force. Even with the additional funding, however, Congress would be required to propose a riskier strategy than the one proposed in the Bottom-Up Review. The resolution should admit this by asserting that, at best, the Bottom-Up Review force is capable of handling one major regional conflict (similar to the Persian Gulf War) and one minor regional conflict (similar to the 1989 invasion of Panama) simultaneously, as opposed to two major regional conflicts "nearly simultaneously" (a sample draft resolution can be found in the appendix to this paper).<sup>5</sup>

### CONCLUSION

Currently projected defense budgets have America on a forced march along the path to military weakness and withdrawal. The alarming thing is that the American people are not aware that the nation is headed in this direction. A congressional debate over the future of U.S. security commitments is needed to start the process of educating the American people about this potentially life-or-death issue. The debate should be on a resolution that puts Congress on record as saying that America does not go back on its commitments to its friends and allies. Further, this resolution would make it clear that Congress will continue to provide the military resources, above the Clinton Administration's requested levels, needed to back these commitments.

<sup>5</sup> For a detailed description of this alternative approach to handling regional contingencies, see Kim R. Holmes, ed., *A Safe and Prosperous America: A U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy Blueprint* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1994), p. 52.

The Clinton Administration and its allies in Congress will deny that they wish to abrogate America's commitments to its friends and allies. But in this respect, their actions speak louder than their words. The American people need to know that a choice must be made and that the President and Congress so far have not made it. Hanging in the balance is whether America will or will not be a global power capable of defending its own interests and freedom, which requires it to meet its security commitments to its allies and friends around the world.

Baker Spring  
Senior Policy Analyst

**APPENDIX**

**Sample Resolution for Closing the Emerging  
Gap Between U.S. Military Forces and Overseas Security Commitments**

**S. Con. Res. 1**

Expressing the sense of Congress concerning the overseas security commitments and the national security of the United States.

**IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES**

Mr. X submitted the following concurrent resolution, which was referred to the Committee on National Security

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**CONCURRENT RESOLUTION**

Expressing the sense of Congress concerning the overseas security commitments and national security of the United States.

Whereas the United States currently maintains a wide variety of security commitments to its friends and allies around the world, including countries in Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East;

Whereas the Clinton Administration in 1993 proposed in its "Bottom-Up Review" of defense policy to uphold the existing security commitments of the United States by fielding conventional military forces capable of fighting and winning two major regional conflicts, each roughly similar in size and scope to the Persian Gulf War, "nearly simultaneously;"

Whereas the Bottom-Up Review recommends the retention of ten active divisions in the Army, twenty tactical fighter wings in the Air Force, 11 active aircraft carriers in the Navy, and 174,000 active duty troops in the Marine Corps;

Whereas the Bottom-Up Review recommends the retention of a military manpower endstrength of 2,366,000 positions in the active and reserve components combined;

Whereas four retired military officers reported to Senator John McCain in February 1995, that the conventional forces recommended by the Bottom-Up Review, even if fully funded, are not capable of meeting the assigned mission of addressing two major regional conflicts in short succession;

Whereas there is widespread agreement among defense analysts outside the Clinton Administration, including those with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Congressional Budget Office, the Defense Budget Project (now the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments), the General Accounting Office, and The Heritage Foundation, that the Clinton Administration's defense budget is too small to pay for the force recommended by the Bottom-Up Review;

Whereas the Clinton Administration's six-year (fiscal years 1997-2002) defense funding shortfall relative to the force recommended by the Bottom-Up Review likely exceeds \$100 billion;

Whereas the Clinton Administration's defense funding shortfall, assuming the needs for readiness and modernization are properly addressed and strategic and nuclear forces are funded at necessary levels, will likely force the reduction of conventional forces to levels of no more than eight active Army divisions, 15 Air Force tactical fighter wings, eight active aircraft carriers, and 140,000 active duty Marine Corps troops;

Whereas the Clinton Administration's defense funding shortfall is likely to drive the military manpower endstrength down to a level of just over 2,000,000 positions in the active and reserve components combined;

Whereas seven active divisions from the Army, twenty tactical fighter wings from the Air Force, six aircraft carrier battle groups from the Navy, and 93,000 troops from the Marine Corps either participated in or contributed to the force fielded during the Persian Gulf War;

Whereas the conventional forces likely resulting from the levels of defense spending proposed by the Clinton Administration during the next six years would make it difficult to field an expeditionary force of the size that fought the Persian Gulf War, much less the two such conflicts envisioned by the Bottom-Up Review; and

Whereas the 1995 congressional budget resolution (House Concurrent Resolution 67) directs a total level of expenditures for defense for the six-year period covering fiscal years 1997-2002 that is roughly similar to that proposed by the Clinton Administration: Now therefore be it

*Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that—*

- (1) the protection of the vital interests of the United States requires that the United States uphold its existing security commitments, including those to friendly and allied countries in Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East;
- (2) the conventional forces of the United States should be large and strong enough to uphold the existing overseas security commitments of the United States;
- (3) the smaller conventional forces likely resulting from the defense budget proposed by the Clinton Administration will be too small to fulfill the existing overseas security commitments of the United States;

- (4) the existing overseas security commitments of the United States can be met by fielding conventional forces capable of fighting and winning one major regional conflict, roughly the size of the Persian Gulf War, and one minor regional conflict, roughly the size of the 1989 invasion of Panama, simultaneously, as opposed to the two major regional conflicts called for by the Bottom-Up Review;
- (5) fulfilling the existing overseas security commitments of the United States requires the United States to contribute military forces to peacekeeping missions only when doing so will serve to protect the vital interests of the United States;
- (6) fulfilling the existing overseas security commitments of the United States can be met with conventional military forces roughly of the size proposed by the Bottom-Up Review, which include the equivalent of 15 total divisions in the Army (10 active divisions), twenty tactical fighter wings in the Air Force, 11 aircraft carrier battle groups (active) in the Navy; and 174,000 active duty troops in the Marine Corps, provided these forces are both combat ready and fully modernized;
- (7) fulfilling the existing overseas security commitments of the United States can be achieved with a total military manpower endstrength similar to that proposed by the Bottom-Up Review, some 2,366,000 positions in the active and reserve components combined;
- (8) Congress should provide the funds required for the forces recommended by this resolution, even though they will likely be substantially more than what the Clinton Administration has budgeted for defense over the next six years.

Mr. EHRlich. And I apologize to our two witnesses for what they just heard in the last 10 minutes. And I will proceed with the questioning from my friend—still, if she is my friend, the gentlelady from Florida.

Mrs. THURMAN. Hey, we don't take this stuff personally, do we?

Mr. EHRlich. No.

Mrs. THURMAN. I think there are much more serious matters before us.

But I would state that today, again, once more, we have the Foundation report, and, of course, we look at the witnesses who have all testified, except for one, on the other side of this issue, with not much being heard on the other side. So, I mean, let that record be. And you have your Heritage and you have everything else now, so beyond that, fortunately, hopefully there are other committees that have been hearing this and are getting equally—well, actually they may be having the same thing happening to them. But—and you guys may agree with that, too.

Dr. Payne, a couple of things. In your testimony you talked about the fact that we had learned that last week that China had tried to buy this ICBM technology which was available from Russia. I take it that did not happen?

Mr. PAYNE. The public report, which is all that I am commenting on, suggests that the Chinese made the attempt. There's no indication from the public report that the Russians actually sold that material.

Mrs. THURMAN. OK. What would you do, based on some of the information—I mean, one of the things that has been talked about in this hearing is this—and certainly with Mr. Krepon's last testimony, that we should be doing everything possible to avoid sales and all of the other things we might be able to do to stop states—rogue states and other states to get these weapons in hand.

Besides—I mean, say we can't do all of the, you know, weapons to be able to stop this from coming here. I mean, what would you be doing? I mean, do you agree with him that, in fact, we should be doing as much as we can do outside of this particular area, whether it's intelligence or diplomacy, the treaties, whatever? I mean, is that the right way for us to be—to be going as well?

Mr. PAYNE. I fully concur with Michael Krepon's point, and I believe your point, that we should be trying to pursue and strengthen diplomatic efforts, including the multilateral initiatives, to inhibit the export of missile technology, the MTCR regime, for example. Clearly, we need to pursue those kinds of diplomatic efforts, and they should be strengthened. The point that I tried to make is that I don't see this as an either/or issue.

Mrs. THURMAN. Right.

Mr. PAYNE. It is presented as an either/or issue. It needn't be. It shouldn't be, because we should pursue each of these measures. We are going to need them all.

Mrs. THURMAN. But could it become an either/or if what—some of what we have heard is that with whatever the name of that bill is, Defenders of America or whatever, that we could potentially put ourselves into jeopardy by going ahead with something like this. I mean, would that not potentially put us into some problems, going outside of the realms of what we have agreed to?



Mr. PAYNE. Well, are you referring to the ABM Treaty?

Mrs. THURMAN. Uh-huh.

Mr. PAYNE. No, because—I don't believe so. The ABM has provisions, Article 13, Article 14 and, in fact, Article 15 which Frank Gaffney referred to, that allow for the two parties to engage in revisions to the treaty as either sees fit on the basis of technical changes or strategic changes.

There's no reason whatsoever for the United States not to approach the Russian Federation in this regard.

Mrs. THURMAN. But if we did, and they suggested to us, in fact, that was not acceptable, would we then go ahead? I mean, I mean all of this is subject to, you know, we say, they say, who says, you know. It's 5 years, it's 15 years, you know. We can go in with strength in negotiations, and we can do that, but if they say, no, I mean are we—then what do we do? I mean, in what kind of position do we put ourselves?

Mr. PAYNE. That's really one of the key issues. I can report to you, after having worked with Russians, including Russians from the Presidential staff, on this exact issue over the last 2 years. I have been engaged as the co-director of a joint study with a superb and expert writing team from the United States and an equally superb and expert writing team from the Russian Federation. The question you just posed is the question that we posed for ourselves. I can report we now have conclusions, and the Russian team has agreed to these conclusions and the United States team has agreed to these conclusions. There is, in fact, an avenue for cooperation in the area of NMD, National Missile Defense. Now, the Russian team specified the kind of steps that would be—that would need to be taken to achieve that cooperation.

Mrs. THURMAN. Do you—are you at liberty to reveal that?

Mr. PAYNE. In general, I would be happy to. They have identified, for example, many of the same steps that the United States and the Russian Federation talked about during the Ross-Mamedor talks. The Ross-Mamedor talks took place in 1992, and they came out of a proposal by Boris Yeltsin for a joint missile defense program. The Ross-Mamedor talks talked about things such as a joint nonproliferation center, where both sides would have their people in a joint center to track missile proliferation, to receive data from space-based sensors so that missile launches could be tracked jointly. So the joint nonproliferation center was one point.

The sharing of early warning data was another point, and I believe you heard Jim Woolsey here just several hours ago at this point say what we ought to do is share early warning data with the Russian Federation. These are exactly the kinds of things that the Russian Federation has said, at least in this study, that they would like to see go forward as part of cooperation on National Missile Defense. I believe they are sincere on that, and I also believe that there is light at the end of that tunnel based on this 2-year study.

Mrs. THURMAN. Mr. Krepon, would you like to respond to that?

Mr. KREPON. Russia is a very hard place to hear messages right now, because there are so many conflicting messages from so many people. I don't doubt that the people Keith talks to would like to cooperate on nonproliferation and early warning. That's something

that's widely shared. The issue that you raised is whether or not the kind of multilayered, highly effective defenses that are envisioned in the piece of legislation you have—

Mrs. THURMAN. Defenders of America or whatever. Defend America. That's it. I am sorry.

Mr. KREPON [continuing]. Would preclude a very long-term process leading to the progressive reduction and elimination of dangerous weapons that threaten this country.

I think the answer there is, yes, it would, and we would be consigning our children and our grandchildren to live in a world with many thousands of these weapons. I'm not prepared to concede that just yet.

I still remember what President Reagan had to say on this subject: That we ought to try and go as low as we can. And one-half of the equation of defenses on the one hand and deep, deep, deep cuts on the other, seems to have been lost in this current round of debate. And it troubles me greatly.

But if we are going to manage both, that is to say, prudent defenses combined with very, very deep cuts in threatening weapons, we have to be very, very careful, based on my discussions with the Russians that I meet.

My understanding is that it might, it might be conceivable that we can continue a process of reductions with a single-site treaty compliant system. And one of the major reasons for that is economics.

But once we decide, if this Congress should choose to decide and if the executive branch should agree, to proceed with multilayered defenses, and it's clear from the sentiment on this side of the committee and in the House at large, that people are not—people who support defenses in principle are not willing to stop at defenses against four—up to four first generation reentry vehicles without chaff, decoys or other confusion coming in; that it's not—that's not enough.

And that's not the kind of defense, in all fairness, that people who support ballistic missile defenses want. They want a lot more. And that multilayered highly effective defense will surely preclude the kinds of reductions I want.

Now, the Russians would take shortcuts. Their easiest and cheapest shortcut is to hold on to their land-based missiles that carry more than one warhead. Those are the weapons that are most tailored to penetrate defenses. And they are the cheapest.

Now, START II calls for the complete elimination of multiple warhead land-based missiles. So my sense is that if this side of the aisle gets their way, what would happen is that Russian strategic forces would contract for economic reasons, but not by treaty arrangements, not through verification, and they would hold on to their most troubling weapons. Moreover, even deeper cuts, I'm talking START III, IV, V, why should we stop with each site having 3,500 of these deployed weapons? Those kinds of cuts would really be out of the question.

Mrs. THURMAN. Thank you.

Mr. EHRlich. Mr. Payne, I know you may want to comment on that. But I would ask maybe Mr. Souder to yield a minute. I will

be liberal, too, if you want to make a quick comment or two on the other points you just heard.

I will recognize Mr. Souder.

Mr. SOUDER. I am supposed to be voting over in another committee but I wanted to get a couple of questions in.

Mr. Payne, Dr. Payne, in your statement you had a quote from the—from North Korea about 10 years, that they might be able to be—have strategic long-range ballistic missiles tipped with super-powerful warheads. A CIA report indicated that they might within 5 years pose a threat. Do you agree with that?

Mr. PAYNE. The CIA comment that I believe you are referring to was from Admiral Studeman when he was Acting Director of the CIA. It was about a year ago when he indicated the North Koreans may have a missile, the Taepo Dong II, within 3 to 5 years, that could target Hawaii, Guam and Alaska or portions thereof. I have no reason to dispute the Acting Director of the CIA with regard to that particular estimate.

The point of the article, that I mentioned, is that within 10 years—at least the assertion is made by this person who reportedly has connections with the government in North Korea—North Korea would have an ICBM force capable of striking the Continental United States. That's the point.

So what you are talking about, if we are keeping track of these dates, and you take that statement as a credible statement, is possibly 10 years to strike the continental United States, fewer years to strike portions of the United States.

Mr. KREPON. Mr. Souder, may I respond to your question?

Mr. SOUDER. I am sorry. I want to focus on—

Mr. EHRlich. Sir, you will have another round with Mrs. Thurman.

Mr. SOUDER. That on the Korean question I would like to pursue that for a minute with Dr. Payne. That in the question of the—in your statement, you also have a statement that Russia had some surprises that we didn't necessarily know what they actually had.

I assume the CIA is doing everything they can to tell where exactly North Korea is. Can we say with confidence of where they are at in their level of—I mean, I know former President Carter goes over there and checks these things out, presumably, to some degree, but how confident are we that we haven't underestimated the threat? Obviously, we may have overestimated the threat. But it's also possible, is it not, that we could have underestimated the threat?

Mr. PAYNE. I have great respect for the CIA's ability to look at these things. I am also well aware of the problems in the past of trying to predict when things are going to happen. We are surprised relatively frequently, for example, the CSS II sale by China to Saudi Arabia apparently came as a surprise. The test of the Iraqi space launch vehicle in 1989 apparently came as a surprise. The test of the Russian atomic bomb, which the CIA 3 weeks before it was tested said, in—3 weeks before it was tested in 1949, the CIA issued report that said it probably won't be tested until 1953.

This isn't to be particularly critical of the CIA. It's to say that projections like this, predictions like this, are very hard. They are based on human estimates. And we have been wrong on occasion,

and I believe that, as I said earlier, Jim Woolsey, if you look at sort of a full quote of his statements concerning that earlier NIE, basically admitted that. He said: We don't know when these missiles are going to appear because there are shortcuts to their appearance.

So it's very difficult to come out with a prediction that says it's going to be 7 years from now or 15 years from now, which I believe takes up your point that we get surprised and we get surprised because no one is able to have a perfect crystal ball.

Mr. SOUDER. And the fact that these countries don't allow much verification.

Mr. PAYNE. Well, many of them are quite secretive, there's no doubt about that.

Mr. SOUDER. And is that not also true of mainland China, that who—at least there have been all kinds of things that I have seen just in the media, not being any kind of expert in this area, but it seems like Korea is doing some trade of potential things that could lead to weapons with China, and China doesn't even want to let us look at their ships yet alone presumably their experiments in the nuclear area.

Mr. PAYNE. I would only point out that even when we have an army of investigators on the ground in Iraq for years, you keep seeing in the press reports of how they come across something they hadn't expected to see and were surprised by.

I mean, the point is, even if you have ample on-site inspection you can still get surprised. When there is virtually no on-site inspection then you are almost certain to get surprised.

Mr. SOUDER. What would prevent—as we have heard Korea potentially selling to—North Korea to Pakistan, what would prevent China or North Korea from further distributing these ballistic missiles to other countries belligerent to us.

Mr. PAYNE. Well, presumably U.S. political pressure will try and prevent them from doing that. Whether that will be effective or not is, I think, an open question.

Mr. SOUDER. Particularly—that may have more impact on China than North Korea, for example.

What—and I may have misunderstood one thing I heard Mr. Krepon say, that—my understanding from the brief period I was here earlier, was that Russia had sold some ICBM technology in April, and does that increase a threat? And second, is there a dispute over some of these things whether they were or were not sold?

Mr. KREPON. Are you asking me that?

Mr. SOUDER. I'm asking you whether you are disputing it, and then I want to know if there's a dispute, what the dispute is. And if they were sold, does that increase the threat to the country?

Mr. KREPON. There were reports in the Washington Times, the first paragraph of which—and I could insert them for the record, if you would like—which asserted that such a transaction had been made. If you read further down into the story, you read the qualifier that we are worried that they may be made and then you will also hear from administration officials that we have demarched the parties, that they have not been made. We are concerned about it and we have spoken at some length to both the Ukrainian Govern-

ment and the Russian Government, the sources of the SS-18 technology in question.

Mr. SOUDER. Do you agree with that, Dr. Payne, or do you have any other information on that?

Mr. PAYNE. I think Mike Krepon has presented the public record on that accurately. There may be more to it, but it's not on the public record.

Mr. KREPON. No.

Mr. SOUDER. So as far as we know, the sale, we are more worried about it than any evidence that it was sold. If that were sold, how proportionate would that increase the threat to us? Is that something that we have to be ever vigilant on? Is it medium, high-level risk? And obviously if it's Cuba, it's a different threat than if it's adjacent—and I will ask Dr. Payne and then Mr. Krepon.

Mr. EHRlich. Pretty quickly.

Mr. PAYNE. Sure. What you are talking about is how porous, frankly, are borders. And the problem is that even if you get the Russian Federation Government to agree to inhibit the sale of technology, and it has said it will abide by the MTCR agreement, for example, the problem with smuggling is very difficult.

What we have seen is the possibility for transfers without necessarily the Russian Government being involved in it. In other words, it could involve independent operations. And the problem goes all the way to the fact that scientists are hooked together on the Internet.

I mean, how do you control the kind of information that is passed between individuals and particularly when at least some of the Russian scientists are looking very much for possible employment in various areas? These are the kind of issues, the porousness of this technology, that I think is going to be very difficult to control, even when you can get governments to agree that they are going to try and control it.

Mr. KREPON. Mr. Souder, this is what Jim Woolsey's National Intelligence Estimate said about a Korean ICBM, this is the fall of 1993, "The probability of North Korean ICBM development is currently low because of competing demands for dwindling resources among existing high-priority military programs."

We are talking about a country that is in dire straits. We are talking about a country that doesn't have money. We are talking about a country that may not survive in a third of the time it takes to develop an ICBM. You are looking at one tiny aspect of the threat spectrum that is probably the most remote of all the threats that we face regarding weapons of mass destruction.

The problem is truck bombs. The problem is terrorism. The problem is subnational groups. The problem is not an ICBM headed out of North Korea at full extension 4,000 kilometers that lands, perhaps, in a rocky island on the Aleutian chain.

It is true what Keith says. There are parts of the Aleutian Islands that could come within the radius of a Taepo Dong II, assuming they could put together a multibillion dollar program, cut all the corners possible. It's possible they can hit a rocky outpost in the Aleutian Islands. It is also possible they could hit a rocky outpost in the 2,000 mile long Hawaiian Island chain.

I'm not saying you should dismiss that possibility. I am saying that before you spend tens of billions of dollars to address it, make sure that higher-priority threats involving weapons of mass destruction are pretty well covered.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Chairman, I want to make a brief comment with that, because I find all of that interesting and if we indeed knew what all the facts were it would be even more compelling, and if we knew how unstable or unpredictable the North Korean Government was and what things would keep them in power vis-a-vis the change there and in China, which may or may not occur, I would argue, as one of the hard-line hawks, that one of the things that help pressure the changes in Russia are when they see us being at the cutting edge and having potentially the ability to block that, the very nature of forcing them into the defense competition often causes the collapse of the Communist government that has been belligerent.

Furthermore, while at this point given the known apparent knowledge that we have, it may be of marginal given the fact that our known knowledge may or may not be completely accurate, even with our best efforts, the risk of the long-term threat is still there and we need to make a decision in internal priorities.

I don't disagree that we need to focus the bulk of the dollars on the most imminent threat. The question is, do we not put dollars in and do we not look at the high risk given the—both the instability and unpredictability of some of those nations combined with the fact that we may indeed help accelerate their collapse as we did in Russia.

Mr. EHRLICH. Well put. And your time has expired.

Thank you, Mark.

Mr. SOUDER. I am going to head back over to my other committee.

Thank you.

Mr. EHRLICH. OK.

Go vote.

For the wrap-up of the afternoon, I will rerecognize Mrs. Thurman from Florida.

Mrs. THURMAN. Just maybe a little bit in response.

You know, part of this is that we do depend on our intelligence. We do depend on the Chiefs of Staff or, you know, to make recommendations to this Congress based on probably more knowledge than any of us sitting in the room will ever possibly have, know or may want to know for that matter.

But—so I think that in response to that, I mean, I think that part of our problem here is that we have not had all of the information. Certainly we have not had the same briefings from intelligence that the committees with jurisdiction over that would have. So for us to draw any kind of conclusion, I think, is probably not a real good idea.

Dr. Payne, just one thing that I wanted to clear with you and to see if you agreed, or Mr. Krepon had mentioned the fact that probably from the rogue states that our biggest threat would be the suitcase with the bomb coming into the United States.

Do you agree that that possibly is—from the rogue states? I mean, is that—

Mr. PAYNE. I disagree with that entirely.

Mrs. THURMAN. OK. But do you see that as a threat?

Mr. PAYNE. I see it as a threat.

Mrs. THURMAN. But you don't see that as a major threat or the possibility?

Mr. PAYNE. If you go and look at what the rogue leaders actually say as opposed to us sitting back and pretending like we are rogue leaders and know what they are thinking, if you go and look at what they actually say, which I do all the time, what they talk about is the need for missiles. They want missiles because missiles are good for deterrence and they are good for coercion.

Think of yourself, if you are a rogue leader, probably not trusting many of your colleagues around you and you have just spent a good portion of your available budget to build or buy a nuclear weapon. You may only trust a handful of the people around you. Are you going to give that to some saboteur to put in a suitcase or a barge to take it somewhere? You are just as likely to find that thing under your bed.

What I am telling you is that rogue leaders talk about the need for deterrence and missiles are great for deterrence because they can stay on your home territory. They are protected. They are visible. They are there. They are great for deterrence.

And what I tried to make out—the point I tried to make in my opening statement was, these rogue states want these systems primarily for deterrence.

Suitcase bombs don't make for good deterrence. They are good for blowing things up. Remember, the rogue states don't necessarily want to blow things up. They want to be able to control and coerce us through deterrence.

If they actually launch an attack on us, they are going to reap the whirlwind. They know that. That's why I'm—again, my opening point said the real question is, how they threaten us and how we respond to their threats.

Mrs. THURMAN. But, Dr. Payne, if they are not going to use it and they just want it for deterrence, why would we spend all this money on the missile defense then?

Mr. PAYNE. Because American leaders won't take the chance of sending power projection forces into an area and count on the fact that rogue leaders won't use their weapons. You have to think that you are sending your power projection forces into, you name the state, Iraq, and your power projection forces are defeating Iraq's military.

Are you going to count then on Iraq not using its most formidable weapons? You can't count on that. And, therefore, that's why my concern is, what does that threat do to our ability to project forces?

We came very close to not sending forces, our forces, into Iraq in Desert Storm and Desert Shield, very close. What would have happened if Iraq had had the capability to threaten even our allies with weapons of mass destruction?

I have asked—I had the opportunity to give testimony before the House of Lords, and afterwards their lordships were kind enough to take me out to dinner, and I said: What would have happened?

Mrs. THURMAN. Lucky you, you can do that.

Mr. PAYNE. Yes, that was very nice. Perhaps we should talk about that.

I was able to ask their lordships, what would have happened if Iraq had had a missile that could have targeted London, even with a chemical or biological weapon? Would you have been willing to engage with us as you did in Desert Storm and Desert Shield? And they answered with a big laugh.

And, of course, they couldn't because their costs and their risks would have been very different; it's very different to send your forces into the face of that kind of risk. That's why I say the concern is: what does the threat do to us and our ability to project power? It's going to inhibit it. We know that. Historically it has happened.

Mr. KREPON. Mrs. Thurman.

Mrs. THURMAN. I am going to let you answer that, but when you answer that I have one question that I do want to get, though, with you on, because we do have the CBO estimate that talks to us about the \$60 billion that we potentially—

Mr. KREPON. Right.

Mrs. THURMAN. What kind of effect does this have on us, on all of our military necessities, procurement, acquisition of existing weapons systems, I mean, the kinds of things that we are doing? I mean, we don't have an infinite amount of money here.

Mr. KREPON. That's—it speaks very directly to the priorities of the Congress. The Pentagon's capitalization program is very, very thin. We know that. The forces that could well go into harm's way next month, next year, the year after that, have to be properly equipped.

You know, it's your job to assess threats to this country and then direct—and allocate resources accordingly. And I am talking domestic threats, as well as rogue states, as well as missiles.

But I am very surprised to hear Keith talk about missiles being more of a threat to this country than the suitcase bomb or the truck bomb. We have lived in a world of nuclear weapons and missiles for quite some time and thankfully this country has never experienced an attack by a missile. We have never had a defense and we have never had an attack.

But look what's happened in the last couple of years. Look at the World Trade Center. Look at Oklahoma City. Look at the Tokyo subway system. I mean, we don't have to be—to have great gifts of prophecy to see where the problem lies.

And this has got to be a top priority issue for us. And the \$60 billion that we spend against a North Korean missile that might be able to hit the Aleutian Islands is \$60 billion that we are not going to spend for a lot of other things.

And I—I think it would be very wise if this committee followed your advice and brought the intelligence community up here, brought the Pentagon up here, and heard what they have to say. Get the best estimate you can. Ask the toughest questions you can. And you will get a picture of a threat.

And I think it won't be that much different than the picture of the threat you received here today, curious as that may sound. I think all of us agree that short-range missiles are a real problem.



All of us agree that our expeditionary forces can be put in harm's way. That's a problem with these missiles. All of us agree that our allies are at risk, when they are close to states that are of proliferation concern that have these missiles.

All of us agree that our friends in these regions are at risk. And all of us agree that we ought to deal with that problem in a variety of ways: Export controls, treaty—threat reduction treaties, as well as theater missile defenses.

Where we disagree is the possibility of a country like North Korea acquiring a space-launch vehicle or enough technology so they can reconstitute an intercontinental ballistic missile. We disagree about whether or not they can do it indigenously in 15 years or 10 years or 5 years. But the intelligence community can help you out there because we have a lot of experience in looking at ballistic missile development programs.

We have a pretty good idea how they work, what steps you have to go through to get there, to get to where you want to go. The intelligence community has told you—or not directly but in the unclassified reports, that they have factored in to their assessment the acquisition of some foreign technology. And they still tell you it's going to be 15 years. It's that hard a problem.

And we disagree how much money you should spend to deal with that little narrow wedge of the threat spectrum. But everything else in the threat spectrum I think you have heard pretty much the same thing.

Mrs. THURMAN. Mr. Krepon, Dr. Payne, I do appreciate it.

And the chairman and I talked a few minutes ago and he will agree, I think, that we can put your exhibit in the record.

Mr. EHRLICH. Without objection.

Mr. KREPON. It's a Defense Department exhibit.

Mr. EHRLICH. Without objection, so ordered.

Mrs. THURMAN. I do thank both of you for your expertise and hopefully we will get to do some follow-up on this. But thank you both for being here.

Mr. EHRLICH. I do have to inform the—my friend, the gentlelady from Florida, that counsel informs me that we did provide all the witnesses that the minority requested for the hearing today. But I do agree that this is a very ripe issue for future hearings and we will certainly continue that practice of supplying whomever the minority deems appropriate.

We thank you both very much and look forward to hearing from you in the future.

With that, the subcommittee hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]