<DOC>
[109th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:42324.wais]
SECURING OUR PORTS: INFORMATION SHARING IS KEY TO EFFECTIVE MARITIME
SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,
FINANCE, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 10, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-253
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
http://www.house.gov/reform
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
42-324 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2008
---------------------------------------------------------------------
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512ÿ091800
Fax: (202) 512ÿ092104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402ÿ090001
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee DIANE E. WATSON, California
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
DARRELL E. ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JON C. PORTER, Nevada C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina Columbia
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania ------
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio (Independent)
BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
David Marin, Deputy Staff Director
Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Subcommittee on Government Management, Finance, and Accountability
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania, Chairman
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
TOM DAVIS, Virginia MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
Ex Officio
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Mike Hettinger, Staff Director
Tabetha Mueller, Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on July 10, 2006.................................... 1
Statement of:
Kelly, Ray, police commissioner, city of New York............ 6
Maloney, Hon. Carolyn B., a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York...................................... 20
O'Brien, Captain Robert, Commander, Coast Guard Sector New
York and Captain, Port of New York and New Jersey; Bethann
Rooney, Security Manager, Port Commerce Department, Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey; and Stephen Caldwell,
Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, U.S.
Government Accountability Office........................... 25
Caldwell, Stephen........................................ 53
O'Brien, Captain Robert.................................. 25
Rooney, Bethann.......................................... 35
Owens, Hon. Major R., a Representative in Congress from the
State of New York.......................................... 5
Towns, Hon. Edolphus, a Representative in Congress from the
State of New York.......................................... 4
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Kelly, Ray, police commissioner, city of New York, prepared
statement of............................................... 10
O'Brien, Captain Robert, Commander, Coast Guard Sector New
York and Captain, Port of New York and New Jersey, prepared
statement of............................................... 27
Platts, Hon. Todd Russell, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Pennsylvania, prepared statement of........... 3
Rooney, Bethann, Security Manager, Port Commerce Department,
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, prepared
statement of............................................... 38
SECURING OUR PORTS: INFORMATION SHARING IS KEY TO EFFECTIVE MARITIME
SECURITY
----------
MONDAY, JULY 10, 2006
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Government Management, Finance, and
Accountability,
Committee on Government Reform,
Brooklyn, NY.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1 p.m., in
Borough Hall, 209 Joralemon Street, Brooklyn, NY, Hon. Todd
Russell Platts (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Platt, Towns, Maloney, and Owens.
Staff present: Mike Hettinger, staff director; and Tabetha
Mueller, professional staff member.
Mr. Platts. There is a quorum present.
This hearing of the Subcommittee on Government Management,
Finance, and Accountability will come to order.
Securing our Nation's ports against potential terrorist
attack has become one of our Nation's security priorities since
September 11, 2001.
Given the fact that the ports are large, sprawling
enterprises, that often stretch across jurisdictional
boundaries, the need to share information among Federal, State
and local governments, as well as private entities, is central
to effective prevention and response.
Today, the maritime system of the United States consists of
more than 300 sea and river ports, with more than 3,700 cargo
and passenger terminals, and more than 1,000 harbor channels
spread across thousands of miles of coastline.
The Port of New York and New Jersey, the Nation's third
largest port, is critical to the economic vitality of the New
York metropolitan region, as well as the entire east coast.
The Port of New York and New Jersey brings together
diverse, complex, and economically intertwined and competing
interests serving not only the States of New York and New
Jersey, but also Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and
my home State of Pennsylvania.
Coordination between and amongst all of these entities is
vital for national security.
The U.S. Coast Guard has been designated as a lead Federal
agency, with responsibility of port security.
The Coast Guard, along with the New York Police Department
and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, has made
significant progress in providing effective training for port
security here in this region.
There is more that needs to be done, however.
We are pleased to have with us today two panels; Mr. Ray
Kelly, police commissioner for the city of New York, Captain
Robert O'Brien, captain of the Port of New York and New Jersey,
Ms. Bethann Rooney, security manager of the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey, and Mr. Stephen Caldwell, from the
U.S. Government Accountability Office.
We appreciate all the witnesses being here today.
I will now yield to Mr. Towns for the purpose of an opening
statement.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Todd Russell Platts
follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.001
STATEMENT OF HON. EDOLPHUS TOWNS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Mr. Towns. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me officially welcome you and the committee to the
borough of Brooklyn.
I thank you for holding this hearing on port security, and
its vital importance to the city of New York, and to our
Nation.
I would like to welcome Commissioner Ray Kelly; also,
Bethann Rooney, Security Manager for the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey; Captain Robert O'Brien, commander of the
Coast Guard, and Captain of the Port of New York and New
Jersey; and Stephen Caldwell, acting Director of Homeland
Security.
Thank you all for coming here today to testify on the vital
issues surrounding port security in the Nation's greatest
metropolis, New York City.
This hearing could not be more timely or more important.
We New Yorkers really feel shortchanged by the current cuts
in Federal funding. New York City will receive 40 percent less
than the $207 million we received in 2005 to combat terrorism.
How could that be, if we are terrorists' No. 1 target?
I'm sure that other cities have legitimate security needs,
and obviously, there is only so much Federal money to go
around. But September 11th happened here in New York, almost 3
thousand lives were lost. We have suffered the only foreign
terrorist attack on American soil.
How much does this city have to take?
Do we have to sustain another terrorist attack before we
get the money we need to protect our ports and our cities?
I sure hope not. I believe that we must have a firm
commitment from our Federal Government to make sure that New
York City gets the money it needs to protect our ports, and our
city from the real threats of terrorism.
That leads us to why we are here today.
Since September 11, 2001, our Nation has been forced to
confront the vulnerability of its ports. I applaud the Port
Authority in its work to make our ports safe and secure.
Port commerce remains a vital component of our local
economy. Cargo activity alone accounted for over 230,000 jobs.
That's due to increased demand for imported goods. That's $132
billion that have passed through the Port Authority in only 1
year.
Certainly, the Federal Government has provided a key role
in securing our ports. The Port Authority is working with the
Federal Government to secure its terminals and improve its
screening procedures, with help from the Department of Homeland
Security.
This includes programs like the Container Security
Initiative, and the Customs-Trade Partnership against
Terrorism.
In addition, the Port Authority recently completed its
second phase of Operation Safe Commerce that helps to secure
products passing through Port Authority facilities.
But this is only a beginning. We need a more effective
security clearance process, and a better worker ID procedures
for port employees. We especially need the sharing of timely
port security intelligence between the Federal, State and local
governments.
We are not asking for the world, but we are asking for the
dollars that we need as our New York City and New Jersey ports
handle the world's good. We cannot continue to have less than
the best possible protection of our ports.
They are very important to our city, our State, to our
Nation, and the world.
That means that we must restore the budget cuts from the
Department of Homeland Security as we continue to work together
to ensure that the finest ports in our Nation are fully secured
against the threats of terrorism.
On that note, Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
Mr. Platts. Thank you Mr. Towns. We appreciate your well-
stated reporting. And we will be working with you on these and
other ports around the country.
We are also pleased to be joined by Congressman Owens, and
I recognize Congressman Owens.
STATEMENT OF HON. MAJOR R. OWENS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Mr. Owens. Thank you very much.
I would briefly like to welcome the committee, thank you
for coming to Brooklyn, and applaud Congressman Towns'
influence in getting you here today.
It is very important that you be here, and let the rest of
the world know that New York City is not only Manhattan.
Brooklyn is where most of the people live.
When the World Trade Center was bombed, the air pollutants
and the wind was easily blown right across the river to Park
Slope and parts of Brooklyn here. And the distance is quite
small. We've had polluted air blowing in the wind.
And it's hard for me to get Washington to recognize that we
have a problem with certain parts of Brooklyn as to
contamination.
Of course, the Park Slope community had large numbers of
people who worked in the World Trade Center. And a number of
our families lost members there.
We are very much part of being on the front line in terms
of homeland security and concerns.
I hope that you being here will help ease the burden that
has been placed on the New York City legislators.
We should not be a burden. Every high school sophomore
should look at the geography of New York City, and look at the
richness of the monuments minutes, and kind of targets that we
have here, and understand that we are vulnerable. Many
terrorists would like to make a statement here. That's what
happened with the World Trade Center.
It is unfortunate, and I apologize as a member of the
Government, we should not have to fight our Government to make
them realize the freedom. If you're going to officially
distribute moneys for Homeland Security, they should certainly
address New York City, in particular, in a special way. And our
ports, of course, are the most vulnerable targets in our city.
Congressman Shuman has said it many times, loudly,
intelligently, and others have said it. There is not much more
to be said.
It is obvious that we need to address the port situation,
and we need to do it right away.
The fact that there is pressure on Washington to distribute
Homeland Security funds with some kind of special formula, in a
Federal way, to everybody, gets a little bit, has been
ridiculous.
New York City does not get the fair share of agriculture.
We don't have farms, we don't ask for agriculture subsidies,
and numerous other kind of distributions of funds that take
place. It is ridiculous to talk about a fair share. We need to
money to go where it's needed.
We know that this is on the minds of all elected officials.
I can think of occasions myself. It's something that's a
pressure.
In the area of Homeland Security, we are the front line. So
this is strictly not biased, nondistrict. Let's distribute the
money strictly based on terms of security and targets.
I'm hoping that you being here today will drive home the
voice of the New York City delegation. It's common sense.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Congressman Owens.
We will now proceed to our first panel, our witness,
Commissioner Kelly.
It is our practice to swear in all witnesses.
I ask you to stand to take the oath.
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Platts. Commissioner, we appreciate the written
testimony you provided us, and the floor is now yours.
STATEMENT OF RAY KELLY, POLICE COMMISSIONER, CITY OF NEW YORK
Commissioner Kelly. Thank you, Chairman Platts, Congressman
Towns, Congressman Owens, thank you for inviting me today.
Security of New York City's ports and waterways is a huge
concern for the New York City Police Department.
Today I would like to discuss with you the range of
maritime counter-terrorism activities that we engage in,
including our collaboration with the Federal agencies that bear
the primary responsibility for port security.
In general, information sharing between the Department and
our Federal partners has never been better, and it is growing
stronger every day.
That is a credit to the various interagency initiatives
that I will discuss in a moment.
Without question, these have improved our joint efforts to
protect the homeland certainly in New York City.
At the same time, the complex, diffused nature of port
management and security leaves these facilities vulnerable to
exploitation by terrorist cells or networks.
At the end of the day, we are still left with the question
of who is really in charge of protecting our ports.
In actuality, it is a responsibility shared among the
scores of public and private stakeholders present at the ports,
a situation that creates its own set of challenges.
Two recent cases highlight why we should be concerned about
the security of our ports.
In 2003, working through the Joint Terrorist Task Force,
the Police Department took part in an investigation that
resulted in the arrest of a Queens-based Pakistani national,
Uzair Paracha, and his father, for conspiring to provide
material support to Al Qaeda.
The family owned a clothing import business in Manhattan's
garment district.
In Pakistan, they plotted with September 11th mastermind
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to use shipping containers controlled by
that company to smuggle weapons and explosives into New York
for delivery to Al Qaeda operatives.
Fortunately, they were arrested before that could happen.
We are not certain if Paracha's plan would have included
recruiting operatives to pick up the deadly cargo at its port
of entry. What we do know, this task probably would have been
accomplished easily, given the lax security check in place in
our ports.
As was reported in the media this past March, a recent
Federal investigation exposed the minimal identification
requirements for truck drivers seeking access to New York and
New Jersey terminals. Many were revealed to have serious
criminal records, and they were not required to disclose in
their applications, including 21 individuals who had
outstanding warrants.
The Federal Government has sought to address this problem
with the creation of a secure, biometric ``smart card'' for
workers at critical transportation facilities. However, that
program has experienced significant delays and is not expected
to be fully implemented until late 2007, at the earliest.
In contrast, progress in the area of information sharing
has been far more expeditious.
As you know, the Police Department takes part in a number
of interagency initiatives with the Federal Government to
gather and assess potential terrorist threats against critical
infrastructure.
They include the Joint Terrorist Task Force with the FBI.
We currently assign over 120 New York City Detectives to that
task force, up from the seventeen investigators posted there on
September 11, 2001.
Any threat information received through the JTTF that is
related to ports or waterways is shared and analyzed with the
U.S. Coast Guard's Field Intelligence Support Team, or
``FIST.''
As part of our excellent working relationship with the
Coast Guard, the Police Department assigns a detective to
``FIST,'' which also includes liaisons from numerous other
Federal and State agencies.
In addition, we work with the Coast Guard and other
agencies through the Area Maritime Security Committees. Members
of our Intelligence Division, Counterterrorism Bureau and
Harbor Unit regularly participate in meetings of the
Intelligence and Response and Recovery Subcommittees.
I also want to note a new Port Intelligence Center concept
that we are currently developing with DHS agencies.
The center, which will be housed at a DHS facility, will
focus on intelligence collection within the Port of New York
and New Jersey.
Turning to our physical protection of the waterways. The
Police Department currently deploys more assets to protect New
York Harbor than any other single agency. Our harbor units
joint with the Coast Guard in boarding high profile vessels,
like the Queen Mary 2, so as to provide additional security
when it enters local waters.
We also jointly enforce restricted zones for ships during
events such as the U.N. General Assembly. In addition, police
dive teams routinely inspect docking facilities and ship hulls
for signs of tampering.
Our Special Operations Division has conducted drills in
which police officers fast rope from helicopters onto ferries
and party boats operating in New York Harbor. And we are
prepared to do the same thing, if confronted with a real need.
Our Harbor, Scuba and Aviation units have also drilled in
exercises with the U.S. Park Police in responding to mock
incidents at the Statue of Liberty.
And under our ``Nexus'' program, detectives routinely visit
port warehouses, trucking companies and importers. They work
with employees in these businesses to train them to report any
suspicious activity.
As much as the Police Department and its law enforcement
partners are doing at the local level, I also want to highlight
the critical need for an effective international program to
pre-screen cargo.
The fact is the last place that we should be looking to
intercept a container that has been co-opted by terrorists is
in a busy, congested and commercially vital port.
Ultimately, we should see to it that every container that
arrives in a U.S. port has been pre-screened.
In Hong Kong, the public-private partnership that operates
the port has developed a prototype in which 100 percent of the
cargo that passes through its facilities is inspected for
radiation and density distortions.
The system guarantees that any container shipped to the
port is thoroughly inspected for weapons of mass destruction.
I've been to Hong Kong and seen the incredible volume of
cargo moving through that port. If it can be done there, it can
be done anywhere.
We need to replicate that system locally.
A 100 percent scanning regime is doable. It is effective,
and it's affordable, especially when compared to the disastrous
cost of a weapon of mass destruction smuggled into the country.
In a little publicized port security war game conducted in
2002, terrorists attacked the United States with dirty bombs
sent in shipping containers. One hypothetical bomb was
detected. The other was not.
It blew up in Chicago, and closed every U.S. seaport for
more than a week. It also caused the Dow stock index to drop
500 points, and resulted in $58 billion in damage.
This is the kind of nightmare scenario that we have to
prevent.
Unfortunately, the fact that New York City's Federal
counterterrorism funding was just cut by 40 percent isn't going
to help.
The Police Department had intended, for example, to use
that funding in the new initiative to secure lower Manhattan
with a comprehensive new camera network and other technology.
It is not clear now if we will be able to do that.
As if the decision to reduce the City's share of Federal
dollars wasn't baffling enough, last week, the public learned
of the latest terrorist plot to attack the Hudson River
tunnels.
It is a further reminder of Al Qaeda's enduring obsession
to target the world's financial capital, not just its ports,
but also its bridges, its tunnels and its subways.
It is a wake-up call that more must be done to harden New
York's infrastructure, across the board, if we are to prevent
disaster, and defeat the terrorists.
Thank you for inviting me today, and I'll be happy to
answer any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kelly follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.003
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.005
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Commissioner Kelly.
And we appreciate you being here, and also, the service of
yourself and all the men and women in the New York City Police
Department day in and day out, in the service to the citizens
of New York City and the terrorists that come through the city
of New York.
Commissioner Kelly. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Platts. A couple of issues that I would like to touch
on.
The funding issue, that is of real concern to New York and
other urban areas.
And in some of the analysis regarding the urban area
security initiative where now we look at both risk and
effectiveness of the proposed use of grant funds.
And New York was ranked No. 1 in the risk assessment, but
not ranked high in effectiveness.
I'm curious as to what, if any, feedback the City received
in guidelines in preparing the grant applications, requests
that have been submitted, or since the decision has been made
as to why your proposals perhaps weren't scored by the peer
review panel as high as others.
Commissioner Kelly. Well, first let me say that the
application itself was prepared by Office of Management and
Budget. The Police Department is only one agency that submits a
plan, and submits a request.
I, myself, have not received what I would consider to be an
adequate explanation of the analysis, or the evaluation process
that has gone forward, and I haven't met anybody who has. I
haven't met anybody who can explain it.
The explanation keeps changing, as far as the evaluation of
our effectiveness is concerned.
So it's difficult for me to answer your question.
I know that we, as an agency, the Police Department, adhere
to all of the Department of Homeland Security guidelines, as
far as the requests were concerned.
I think there were some changes made in the application,
the OMB application. I believe that was made after discussion
with Homeland Security officials.
Mr. Platts. And given, as you reference, the disclosure
this past week regarding the targeting of the tunnels, the
importance of us adequately filling our commitments to New York
as a No. 1 likely target, one of the other aspects besides
funding is information sharing.
And in our second panel, we will get into a little detail
as to how we stand in that.
From your perspective as police commissioner, how do you
see information sharing with regard to port security as
compared to other aspects of homeland security for the city of
New York?
Commissioner Kelly. I think information sharing is good.
And port security information sharing is part of a larger
process of information sharing.
And all indications are that all agencies are willing to
share information, and they have, obviously, there are some
constraints as far as security clearances are concerned, but
once that's addressed, the information is shared.
I believe that the area maritime security committees that
have been set up are effective, and it's working well here in
New York.
The information that I have, those are committees that have
Federal, State and local representatives, and private sector
stakeholders, as well.
I think that vehicle is effective. It's particularly
helpful when we have major events here in New York. We have 146
square miles of water here in New York Harbor. We have many
major events on the water. For instance, just on July 4th we
had hundreds of pleasure craft, party boats--actually, big
cruise ships here for the fireworks display.
And I'm told that the coordination was excellent.
Mr. Platts. On the security clearance issues, specifically,
I know there has been some great improvements made in getting
the security clearances through the pipeline.
Is the Police Department still experiencing problems,
delays, in that area, or have changes been made to help to kind
of speed up that process?
Commissioner Kelly. We still have some problems in that
regard. Part of it is the fact that, of course, we are rotating
people in and out. People retire, they have to go through the
process again.
Unlike Federal agencies, where if you come on board in
certain jobs, you're going to have a security clearance, that s
a requirement for the job.
That's not the case in the Police Department. It depends on
your specific assignment.
It's a bit of a challenge for us.
But you're right, the procedure has improved. I would like
to see it even quicker than it is now.
Mr. Platts. In relation to the clearance issue, is there
any intelligence information that you believe is available
through the Federal entities that your department, even with
clearances, doesn't have available access the way we should, or
things that you working on?
Commissioner Kelly. I think that we are, as an agency, we
have access to that information. Certain people in the agency
may not have it, but we as, an agency, will have people with
the appropriate clearance.
There are certain units that we have, that have the
adequate clearances to receive the information.
So I can't think of any examples where we are not getting
information that I think we should have.
Mr. Platts. One final question before I yield to my
colleagues.
In your testimony you talk about the identity requirements
on accessing the ports, truck drivers and long-term security,
as the intent of the smart card, perhaps sometime in 2007,
maybe best case scenario.
Where would you say we stand today to address the type of
failings of identity checks in the past? Where is that identity
check process?
Commissioner Kelly. I think we have a long way to go.
We do have a Waterfront Commission here in the Port of New
York. They do a certain amount of vetting.
In fact, you have to have a waterfront clearance to work in
the ports, or certain functions in the ports.
I think that procedure could probably be perhaps one that
delves a little deeper, and done a little more effectively than
it has so far been done.
So we have talked to the Waterfront Commission folks.
But I think that we could all be helped if that procedure
was made more effective and more in-depth.
So we await the Homeland Security's initiatives. So the
biometric card, I think, would be a big step in the right
direction.
Mr. Platts. Are we at a stage where at least we are better
vetting the criminals and those with known records?
Commissioner Kelly. Yes.
Mr. Platts. Actually, outstanding warrants. That's not
defeating itself?
Commissioner Kelly. Yes. I think the background checks, the
criminal background checks, are going forward. And yes, I think
that's reasonably effective.
But I think we need more to be done in that area, more to
be done, in a deeper examination.
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Commissioner.
I yield to the ranking member, Mr. Towns.
Mr. Towns. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, again, Commissioner Kelly, for coming.
There are always statements and rumors about the lack of
communication.
Do you feel comfortable today in terms of communications
between the various agencies that have responsibility for
making certain that our ports are secured?
Commissioner Kelly. Yes, I do.
As I said before, Congressman, I believe these areas, the
maritime security committees that have been put in place, are
an effective vehicle to foster that communication and
coordination.
I believe we are talking now, we are communicating now,
better than we ever have before, and as far as the ports are
concerned, that's a vehicle that we have facilitated.
Mr. Towns. If someone asks a question about who is
responsible for the security of our ports, what would be the
answer?
Commissioner Kelly. It's not an easy answer to give.
In 2000, I was the U.S. Customs Commissioner, I co-chaired
a committee on security in our ports.
One of the conclusions that we came to is, if you see one
port, you've seen one port. They all look different, they are
all, the jurisdictions, there are multiple jurisdictions, no
two ports look alike.
It's not easy to answer that question.
Certainly, the Coast Guard has a significant
responsibility, but then you have multiple jurisdictions.
In New York, you have New York and New Jersey.
You have New York City, New York State. You have cities in
New Jersey. You have a Waterfront Commission. You have Federal
agencies that are involved, customs and border protection.
You have Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
Those are multiple agencies, multiple State, and local,
Federal agencies that are involved.
There is no one agency that's in charge of security in the
ports throughout the country.
Having said that, again, the communication, the improved
communication that we have, and coordination, I think goes a
long way to addressing some of the concerns that existed in the
past.
We had no one in charge, we didn't have very good
communication. Now we have much better communication than we've
had in the past, much better coordination.
Mr. Towns. Now with the cuts, Operation Atlas, which
everyone had so much hope for, is that in jeopardy now, without
the money?
Commissioner Kelly. Which program, sir?
Mr. Towns. Operation Atlas.
Commissioner Kelly. Well. No, Atlas is a program where we
take large numbers of uniformed officers and deploy them at
sensitive locations throughout the city.
We are going to continue to do that program. We're using
local funds to do it.
The Mayor has made it clear that he will find the money to
enable us to do that.
But our counter-terrorism efforts in New York City, in the
Police Department alone, averages about $200 million a year.
And the Atlas program is a portion of that.
So we are going to continue to do it. We think it's very
important to have booths on the ground, technology can only do
so much.
Yes, we want additional cameras, we want license plate
readers.
But there is nothing like having a uniformed police
presence at locations that we are concerned about.
So we're going to continue to use our police officers in
our Atlas program in a comprehensive way.
Mr. Towns. It seems unfair that we are cutting funds,
knowing that the need is so great. That sort of bothers me, to
be honest with you.
When we look at the formula, when you look at the risk
factor, how do you feel about that?
It seems to me that money should be based on risk.
I think Congressman Owens is right when he said that we
need to put the money where we know that the problems are going
to be.
And the fact that New York has already been hit, it's not
something that--we know about September 11th.
So it seems to me that being we are very much aware of what
happened on September 11th, and knowing in terms of the fact
that we have all these buildings and possible threats, a strong
rumor about the Brooklyn Bridge, which you and your department
did a fantastic job in avoiding that, and we appreciate that.
But don't you think that risk should be the key factor, if
you're giving out money?
Commissioner Kelly. Absolutely.
There's no question about it.
If you look at all of the analysis, both the classified
analysis, the public analysis, there is no city in America that
is anywhere close to being at risk the way New York City is.
We are on top of the terrorists' targets, we're in the
cross hairs, as we say.
And when we examined, or when there was a big public
concern about the distribution of funds, or the reduction in
funds, this came out when Congressman King and others talked
about the fact, in closed door sessions, that it was obvious
that no other city in America comes close to New York in terms
of the risk factors, and the threat information that comes in.
There is no doubt in my mind.
Yes, there are other cities, there are other locations that
are at risk, but you just can't, in good conscience, cut New
York City 40 percent, when you're aware of, when you're given
the information that New York is far and away the city that is
most threatened by terrorism.
Mr. Towns. Thank you very much, Commissioner.
And thank you for your dedication to the city.
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Mr. Towns.
Mr. Owens.
Mr. Owens. Yes. Commissioner.
I noticed you mentioned in your statement that you had not
been apprised of the evaluation results, what things were found
to be wrong in your evaluation that was done, the plan
submitted by New York.
I have seen at least one article where the columnist said
that part of New York's problem was the Homeland Security
people in Washington didn't think that you had done anything
new with the funds that were available. And a large percentage
of the money was spent just on covering overtime, covering
things that you always do.
So I wonder if you can address the situation in terms of,
first of all, is the Police Department being asked to do too
much in this situation in terms of taking on new
responsibilities, when there are demands that are ongoing.
There are some things that only the police can do.
When it comes to certain other surveillance, some other
types of things that can be done to secure our ports, there may
be other agencies that can also do that, but the police can do
it better.
The police have other things to do that only they can do,
and they are police officers with weapons.
So is there a need for a clear distinction of what you can
do, and what you do best, and a definition of what else is
needed, and if more people are needed, Customs, whatever, or
maybe there is a new set of divisions that are needed somewhere
in terms of the ongoing need to maintain security in our ports.
This is going to be a thing with scanning machines and
modern equipment, manpower. Manpower, human power, is low.
So should the police be having too great a portion of that
burden?
Commissioner Kelly. Who else is there to do it?
Mr. Owens. There are parts that only you can do.
Commissioner Kelly. Well, we have a city of 8.1 million
people here.
Mr. Owens. But the ports is something new.
Commissioner Kelly. I'm sorry?
Mr. Owens. Securing the ports is something new.
Commissioner Kelly. Securing the ports?
Mr. Owens. That's something new added to your regular
duties.
Commissioner Kelly. When you say securing the ports, there
are other agencies. Obviously, the Port Authority has a major
role in securing the ports.
We don't have a presence on the piers, you know,
immediately at the piers.
What we are doing is patrolling the waterways here. We have
26 police launches. We are working closely with the Coast
Guard.
There are other maritime agencies. The State Police has a
presence here.
But nobody has an agency that comes close to us in size.
There are no other resources available.
So we will take help from any quarter, and I would welcome
your recommendation, or suggestion, as to who else there is out
there to help us.
If you're talking about more resources to help us protect
the ports, from Federal agencies, I'm all for it.
Mr. Owens. I just wanted to clarify the situations.
Are you being asked to do more than you can do with your
help, and then you're criticized because you use additional
moneys, resources, to pay overtime, because you use the same
people, but they are doing more.
How do you get out of that bind?
Can you work with the other agencies? Who can do what best,
and how you should not be burdened.
Commissioner Kelly. We will take help from any quarter.
But we still have not had a coherent explanation as to why
those funds were reduced 40 percent.
You said you've seen articles. I haven't seen an article.
One of the categories that said that we were insufficient
in was sustainability.
We have been sustaining protection of the city since
September 11th as far as our kind of terrorism programs are
concerned.
We have the biggest counterterrorism bureau in the country.
We are the first in a municipal police agency.
We formed our Intelligence Division. We have police
officers funded by private sources, by the way, that are
overseas.
I think the rest of the law enforcement world is coming to
New York, to see what we are doing.
So I think we've done a lot of innovative things here, and
I think we sustained it for almost 5 years now.
You just can't comprehend what their explanations are as to
why New York shouldn't get money. It doesn't stand the light of
day.
If you're looking at it in depth, as I say, nobody has
explained it adequately.
We are doing what we believe we have to. If anyone else
wants to come along and add resources here, more law
enforcement personnel, in the harbor, protecting our ports, we
welcome that.
Mr. Owens. Well, how much are your precincts involved in
training local citizens for preparedness?
Is that a city-wide policy with respect to all the
precincts, one point or another, they are involved in local
groups?
Commissioner Kelly. When you say local groups, we have
several initiatives in that regard. We have auxiliary police
officers in our precincts. These are volunteers. We have about
5,000 of those throughout the city.
There are CERT's, there are citizen emergency response
teams.
We have some of them in our police precincts.
The overall obligation of training those CERT's is with the
Office of Emergency Management.
We are also involved in training them, as well.
Then there are several volunteer groups, citizen patrol
groups, that we work closely with.
Not every precinct has them. Some precincts in Brooklyn,
and some in Queens, have citizen patrol groups that we work
closely with.
We also welcome that. We welcome citizen involvement. We
stand ready to train any group that wants to get involved in
helping us protect the city.
Mr. Owens. Thank you.
Mr. Platts. I'm pleased to be joined by Ms. Maloney, from
New York. She might have a statement, as well as questions.
STATEMENT OF HON. CAROLYN MALONEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you so much.
First, I would like to thank you, Chairman Platt, and
Ranking Member Towns, for bringing attention to this terrorists
threat area as No. 1 in our Nation.
And before my statement on port security, I would like to
followup on the excellent questioning of Congressman Owens to
our Police Commissioner Kelly.
With a cut of $123 million to the high threat area grant
program, $83 million came out of the hide of New York City.
No matter how they sliced it or tried to explain how that
happened, anyone with any common sense knows that it is just
plain wrong.
And I would like to appeal to Chairman Platts and Ranking
Member Towns to have a hearing back here in New York City with
Federal people, and our Police Commissioner, and others, on
that funding formula.
I find it highly ironic that people come from all across
this country, literally across the world, to come to New York,
to learn how to protect people.
By all categories, New York has the best, the brightest,
the finest police department.
I can't tell you how many countries say, can you get the
Police Commissioner to come over here and tell us how to defend
people.
And in the formula, the City filled it out for what we
needed. The 9/11 Commission said we needed intelligence, that
it's a new type of war, that's very, very dependent on
intelligence, on people, on having the police on the Brooklyn
Bridge to foil the attacks that have been reported several
times on that particular bridge.
Yet then they said that our application was wrong, because
the best police department in the world that everybody studied
how they defend against terrorism, said we are putting our
resources into what we think we need, which is intelligence,
people, people on the ground, people defending.
And they said that was wrong, it should have been a
concrete item.
Well, how many scandals have we read in the papers about
concrete items that have been spent all across this country to
various places that they will never absolutely ever use.
And I would like to commission a GAO report on how this
high threat money has been spent on concrete items, and whether
they have ever even been used.
I think it is a scandal beyond words what happened in that
formula. It was a disgrace to our country, it was a disgrace to
anyone who is serious about Homeland Security.
It makes a mockery of the entire system.
New York City got roughly $2.15 per capita. Wyoming gets
roughly $15 per person, and at rush hour, there are more
buffalo in Wyoming than people.
So it really--I feel it really was not our finest hour.
After September 11th, this country came together, and we
were determined to combat terrorists. That formula is an
absolute disgrace. We are trying to correct it.
I really appeal to them to have a hearing on it.
But the topic of today is port security, which is really
incredibly important. And one does not have to look far beyond
the Dubai Ports world fiasco to realize that we simply have not
been paying enough attention to the security of our ports.
I am very proud to have authored HR5337, the National
Security First Act, which has been reported out of the
Financial Services Committee with a unanimous vote, and we hope
to pass that before we adjourn by August.
And this would reform the process that conducted the
national security review of that deal, and we have a lot more
work to do before our ports will be secured.
Especially when we consider that every year we have
approximately 9 million containers entering our ports, that we
only inspect a small fraction, 5 percent.
In Hong Kong they inspect every single container that goes
into their port. We can do the same thing in our own country.
In the 9/11 Commission report, they stated that terrorists
had the opportunity, this is from the 9/11 Commission report--
``the opportunity to do harm as great or greater than maritime
and service transportation'' than the September 11th can.
Yet GAO has previously reported that staffing imbalances in
seaports has resulted in 35 percent of high risk containers not
being inspected overseas. If they were inspected overseas, the
work of our people here in the city would be a lot less, yet
it's not happening.
Since September 11th we have spent $780 million for Port
Authority to strengthen port security activity, but port
operators are on record stating that there is a $1.5 billion
gap between what is required to implement security measures,
and what the administration has been willing to support.
Incredibly, the administration sought to eliminate the port
security grant program in their fiscal 2007 budget in favor of
a targeted infrastructure protection grant, which would force
ports to compete for very limited resources, with mass transit,
rail, and other critical infrastructure.
I don't know about you, but this reminds my of the Homeland
Security fiasco and the high threat grants.
First, the Homeland Security high threat grants went to
seven cities. Then they expanded it to thirty cities. Now
they've expanded it even more.
They are doing the same thing with the port grant program,
putting it into a pot that will weaken the dollars that go to
high threat ports.
And we all know the outcome of the ``reform'' of the high
threat initiative, 40 percent of the cuts in high threat
funding for New York and D.C., a 40 percent cut for the two
cities that, by all accounts, are the highest threat in our
country.
And I hope that your appearance today will set the
groundwork for a new course when it comes to port security.
And my question that I would like to ask the Police
Commissioner was a report that came out from GAO which really
spearheaded this, that many of the people who should be getting
clearances for port security were not getting clearances in the
local area.
I know that's not your particular area, but as we know, the
9/11 Commission report said that intelligence, the feet on the
ground, and our local communities are the first to respond, the
first to hear of a threat, and play an important part.
So my question to you is, are your people getting the
security clearance that you need to be fully informed of
threats that the Federal Government, under the National
Intelligence Division, or the FBI, CIA, or other intelligence-
gathering organizations, are you within the loop? Are you being
shared the threats that they are hearing? Are you hearing it
firsthand, are you hearing it on the daily news shows at night?
Are you getting the clearances, are you part of that
intelligence information setup?
Commissioner Kelly. Congresswoman, before you arrived, we
addressed that issue.
And the answer generally is yes. I would like to see the
procedure made a little bit more streamlined, a little quicker.
But generally speaking, the system has improved.
It has become a little bit more efficient. I think it needs
a way to go.
But we are getting our clearances.
Mrs. Maloney. You're getting your clearances?
Commissioner Kelly. Yes.
Mrs. Maloney. And you're getting the information?
Commissioner Kelly. Yes.
Mrs. Maloney. Did you know about the threat down in
Florida, where they went into a cell before it was reported on
the news, or did you just learn about it from the news?
Commissioner Kelly. We knew of the investigation that was
ongoing, yes.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you very much, and thank you for your
public service.
Commissioner Kelly. Thank you.
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Ms. Maloney.
And I appreciate your participation.
On the issue of the distribution formula, the full
committee did a hearing a few weeks back, it did lead into the
broader issue of how this was being implemented.
I think you raised very legitimate concerns. And it is an
issue that has been continued to be scrutinized.
And the Commissioner outlined the needs here.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you for bringing that up.
And I did attend the hearing that Chairman Davis had.
At that hearing, there were many Members of the Congress
from the D.C. area, and they said publicly that the real threat
was New York City.
And I would just like to respectfully request a hearing on
New York City.
And specifically, the point that has been in the papers
that New York City has spent high threat money in areas that
they believe will best protect the American people, and New
Yorkers and citizens visiting our city.
It was their determination, these grant makers decided that
was not how the money should have been spent, they should have
been buying oxygen tents, or something else. I don't know.
But I think that it goes to the core of good government. It
goes to the core of protecting our people.
And I really would like to appeal for a hearing in the
city, where the city professionals are, that can explain why
they believe the high threat is what it is, and why they
believe that is what should be funded.
But to me, the disconnect that people come to New York to
study how to defend their local area, even their foreign
countries, and then, when they say this is how we need to spend
the money, and then this group--I don't know where they're
from--comes in.
I read one report they were hired, they were advertising--
comes in and said the money should not be spent that way.
I mean that is a fundamental question that I think needs to
be answered.
And I want to say that I support the Police Commissioner
for speaking up for what he thinks needs to be done to protect
people, and for being honest.
He could fill out an application that talks about hardware
that he doesn't need. He didn't do that. He said this is what
we need to protect people, and that was turned down as not an
appropriate answer.
Yet then everybody comes to New York, tells us how to
protect ourselves.
So I'm very, very disturbed.
It's absolutely wrong.
And I think that the debate on the substance has never
really taken place, and I think it needs to be.
Mr. Platts. All of us share the belief that Commissioner
Kelly and those on the front lines are better prepared to make
a decision on how best to invest the resources than others far
removed from the front lines.
That is an issue we will take back to the committee.
Specifically to appeal here in New York to the house rule
does not allow us to have one between now and February, because
of how close we are to the New York primary, and then the
general election.
But perhaps we can have one sooner, or after November here
in New York.
But it is an issue that certainly need to be investigated.
Are there any other questions?
Mr. Towns. No questions.
I would like to thank the Commissioner for sharing his
expertise with us. I really appreciate it.
People come from all over to learn from our Commissioner
and his staff.
It seems to me they should also listen when he says, ``I
need resources.''
Thank you very much.
Mr. Platts. Commissioner, again, we appreciate your
testimony.
And as one who is married to an upstate New Yorker, but who
looks back with her 2 years here in the East Village, where she
lived after college, very fondly, and it's always great,
because I have my own personal tour guide when we come to the
city.
I appreciate the effort of you and the uniformed members
under your command, what a great job you do.
Thank you.
Commissioner Kelly. Thank you very much.
Mr. Platts. We will take a 2-minute recess, while we get
the second panel set.
[Recess.]
Mr. Platts. We will reconvene.
We have Captain Robert O'Brien, Commander of the Coast
Guard, and Captain of the Port of New York and New Jersey; Ms.
Bethann Rooney, security manager, Port Commerce Department,
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey; and Mr. Stephen
Caldwell, Acting Director, Homeland Security Justice Issues,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.
I ask the three of you, now that you are seated, I ask you
to stand and raise your right hands to be sworn in.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Platts. Thank you.
The clerk will note that all three witnesses affirmed the
oath. They we will go from right to left.
Captain O'Brien, the floor is yours.
And we do have your written testimony, and as I call it, my
homework leading up to the hearing.
We appreciate all three of you sharing your testimony with
us.
And if you would like to summarize it, however you see fit
to present your oral testimony now.
STATEMENTS OF CAPTAIN ROBERT O'BRIEN, COMMANDER, COAST GUARD
SECTOR NEW YORK AND CAPTAIN, PORT OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY;
BETHANN ROONEY, SECURITY MANAGER, PORT COMMERCE DEPARTMENT,
PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY; AND STEPHEN
CALDWELL, ACTING DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE
ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
STATEMENT OF ROBERT O'BRIEN
Captain O'Brien. Thank you.
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of
the committee, fellow port partners.
It's a pleasure to be here today to discuss the Coast
Guard's role and how information sharing between Federal, State
and local authorities and private industry enhances our efforts
to better secure U.S. ports, especially here in the Port of New
York.
I serve as commander of Coast Guard Center, New York. Our
service is the largest East Coast field command.
My mission is to focus on two major operational processes,
prevention and response, in support of our services' five
fundamental roles, national defense, maritime security,
maritime safety, maritime mobility, and protection of natural
resources.
This port is an economic engine. We cannot afford, as a
Nation, to have it closed, even partially, for any extended
period of time.
Effective information sharing allows us to plan not only
for deterrence of attacks, and other unsafe happenings in the
port, but also, a reopening strategy, and effective recovery of
the port transportation system.
I use the term ``port transportation system'' because that
really includes the air, land and the maritime.
The U.S. Coast Guard has taken on the 9/11 Commission's and
the Department of Homeland Security's challenges for combatting
terrorism in the maritime domain, especially in regards to
improving our role in information sharing.
Reliable actionable information that is shared effectively
is key to our ability to address threats, reduce
vulnerabilities, become better risk-based decisionmakers, and
manage the consequences of incidents, man-made or naturally
occurring.
We place a premium on the information sharing to identify
and intercept threats well before they reach U.S. shores by
conducting layered, multi-agency maritime security operations,
and by strengthening the port security posture of our strategic
economic and military ports.
I can think of no other model of interagency cooperation
which has adapted, overcome and persevered through the attack
on our own soil on September 11, 2001, through the varied
challenges we face today.
Like the partnerships here in New York, and the Port of New
York and New Jersey, thanks to the cooperation, dedication and
hard work of Federal, State, county, city and borough agencies,
as well as the Port Authority and various levels of government,
and many, many other private sector port partners, we have
increased transportation security in our port by air, water and
on land, both surface and subsurface.
And we have protected national treasures and icons, such
has the Statue of Liberty and the United Nations, unique to
this international gateway port.
We have enhanced information sharing through the use of
interagency fusion centers, security committees, increased
maritime domain awareness, and the daily routine of information
exchanged with port partners that has been implemented and
refined to mitigate and prevent threats, while also being
mindful of maritime safety, since safety and security are
really two sides of the same coin.
As an example, our Coast Guard Field Intelligence Support
Team here in New York, as mentioned before by Commissioner
Kelly, is a one-stop interagency maritime intelligence center,
including coordination and deconfliction of intelligence-based
operations, as well as tracking of investigations with a
maritime nexus.
Essentially, fusion centers are force multipliers for all
participants.
The overall successor of the FIST partnership largely
depends on the relations between individual representatives of
each agency.
In New York, these are strong relationships, have been
essential in ensuring that all affected parties have been
notified of a significant incident, even if the agency notified
is not a participant in a fusion center.
The Area Maritime Security Committee, Harbor Operations
Committee, and Army Corps of Engineers Senior Partners Program
Group are three more examples in my written testimony of the
tools by which the information and operational coordination
takes place here in the port.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, the efforts and leadership of
this very committee have played a significant role in all of
these improvements and achievements for our entire military,
civilian, and volunteer auxiliary Coast Guard team.
We thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today.
And we thank all of our port partners for everything they
do in concert with us as equal partners to meet our daily
challenges as a unified force.
We will be happy to answer any questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Captain O'Brien follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.006
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.007
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.008
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.009
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.010
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.011
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.012
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.013
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Captain O'Brien.
Ms. Rooney.
STATEMENT OF BETHANN ROONEY
Ms. Rooney. Chairman Platt, Ranking Member Towns, members
of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on
the important issue of Homeland Security, particularly with
regards to our Nation's ports.
95 percent of international goods that come into the
country come in through our Nation's 361 ports. 12 percent of
that volume alone is right here in the Port of New York and New
Jersey.
We support 232,000 jobs, $12.6 billion in wages, contribute
$2.1 billion in State and local tax revenues, and transport
cargo valued at over $132 billion.
Perhaps most importantly is that the cargo that moves
through this port serves approximately 80 million people, which
equates to 35 percent of the entire U.S. population.
Considering all this, it's easy to see how a terrorist
incident in our Nation's ports would have a devastating effect
on our country and its economy.
As a result of significant legislative action, capital
investments, and operational improvements on the part of public
and private sectors in the nearly 5 years since September 11th,
the maritime transportation system is more secure today than
ever before.
But enhancing maritime security is a complex problem, which
requires a multifaceted and layered approach.
Maritime security is so much more than just the physical
security of our ports and terminals, and the vessels that use
them, but also enhancing cargo and supply chain security.
In addition to preventing another terrorist attack, we must
also work on developing comprehensive programs that address not
only prevention, but awareness, response, consequence
management and business recovery, as well.
As Congresswoman Maloney mentioned earlier, one of the
principal outcomes of the work of the 9/11 Commission was a
determination that information sharing and collaboration at all
levels of government was less than adequate.
Therefore, I'd like to briefly describe a number of
initiatives that enhance communication and coordination among
all of the Federal, State and local partners, as well as our
private sector members.
Immediately after September 11th, the Port Authority formed
two committees in order to facilitate the exchange of critical
security information and best practices between and among our
customers, and the Federal, State and local law enforcement and
emergency response communities that serve them.
Our tenant security working group meets a minimum of
monthly, and more often, as the threat level increases. This
working group provides a forum for port users to exchange
lessons learned, share best practices, develop programs, and
solicit feedback from our Federal and State partners on issues
of concern.
This environment ensures that port security is not a
competitive issue, but rather, an all hand evolution.
The Port Authority also sponsors a Law Enforcement Security
Committee. This Law Enforcement Security Committee brings
together the approximately 25 Federal, State and local law
enforcement and emergency response agencies that have
responsibilities within our port region.
Also held monthly or as often as the threat dictates, this
forum provides an opportunity for the exchange of intelligence,
discussion about discrete security programs and initiatives,
and planning of joint drills, exercises and training.
In addition to these two forums, both Commissioner Kelly
and Captain O'Brien have mentioned the Area Maritime Security
Committee, the objective of which is to continually assess
security risk to the ports, determine appropriate risk
mitigation strategies, and to develop, revise and implement the
area maritime security plan.
The Area Maritime Security Committee here in the Port of
New York and New Jersey is made up over forty Federal, State
and local private organizations that have a stake in port
security.
Executive leadership from each of these organizations gets
together on a monthly basis to coordinate port wide activities
and initiatives, receive intelligence briefings, and help the
Captain of the port develop security policies and procedures.
Our Area Maritime Security Committee has recently completed
the development of a 2-year strategic plan, and a structural
reorganization, to ensure that we are proactive and able to
address the myriad of goals and objectives that were identified
in the strategic plan.
Of particular note to this committee is that we have a
number of subcommittees specifically focusing on communications
and intelligence, and are a good example of how well things are
working.
While it has not yet been an issue in the Port of New York
and New Jersey, the lack of proper security clearances for key
State, local and private stakeholders has the potential to be a
significant barrier to an effective response to a credible
security threat.
The Area Maritime Security Committee was allocated about 10
security clearances in early 2005. That's 10 security
clearances for the second highest risk port in the Nation.
In the event of a credible threat, there is no way to
communicate above the security sensitive information level to
many of the AMSC executive members, and the vast majority of
the 197 facility security officers in the port.
Congress and the administration must find ways to expedite
the processing of security clearances, especially for those
individuals that have previously held clearances, and to cross
honor clearances that were issued by another department or
agency.
In order to help with coordination and communication, we
also support the concept of a joint operation center, to
enhance collaboration, coordination and communication.
While we would do not currently have such a center here in
New York and New Jersey, the Port Authority is working on an
innovative virtual alternative to a physical joint operation
center called the Regional Joint Awareness Network, or RIJAN.
RIJAN would tie together individual agencies, disparate
operation centers virtually, as opposed to requiring everybody
to sit in one particular building.
Finally, in the area of supply change security, the Port
Authority is involved in the Operation Safe Commerce pilot
project.
Operation Safe Commerce is a public-private partnership
that responds to the twin imperatives of facilitating
legitimate international commerce and increasing security,
while minimizing the impact on commerce.
The goal is to develop dependable arrangements for
verifying, securing, monitoring and sharing information about
cargo from the point of origin throughout the supply chain to
its final destination.
We have identified some very promising and cost effective
solutions in the last 3 years of this project.
Unfortunately, Operation Safe Commerce is just one of a
number of federally and privately funded supply chain security
projects that are currently under way.
While many of these individual projects show great promise,
true progress and results are hampered by the fact that they
are not tracked, managed and coordinated by a single department
or agency.
Additionally, under the guise of sensitive security
information classification, findings and lessons learned are
not being shared among the projects, results are not being
leveraged, and funds are being wasted.
We believe that all cargo security research and development
projects should be managed by a single organization within DHS
that acts as a central repository and clearinghouse for all
studies, and the focal point on supply and security issues.
Chairman Platts, the attacks of September 11th were not
directed at a maritime facility, but those terrible events
provided the impetus to focus attention at our maritime
transportation system, which is so essential to our national
economy and defense.
You and your committee are to be commended for helping to
bring focus to such a daunting task.
I would be happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Rooney follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.015
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.016
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.017
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.018
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.019
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.020
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.021
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.022
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.023
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.024
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.025
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.026
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.027
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2324.028
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Ms. Rooney.
Mr. Caldwell, I think your written testimony, you
summarized it well. The challenge here would say that the task
here is how to deal with the demands of delivery in a world
that has much-heightened security needs.
So your testimony is certainly well appreciated.
Mr. Caldwell.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN CALDWELL
Mr. Caldwell. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I'm very happy to be here. Also
Representative Towns and Representative Owens, and
Representative Maloney.
I'm pleased to be here to discuss sharing in the maritime
environment.
My testimony today is a summary and an update of a 2005
report we did which Representative Maloney had already
mentioned.
And I'll get to the issue of security clearances in a
moment.
But the 2005 report was based on visits to several ports,
but not including New York and New Jersey.
So while I can't comment too much on the situation here in
New York, I am going to need a lot from my colleagues, and as
you know, there seems to be a consensus that maritime sharing,
at least within the port, is pretty good.
But I do want to say that on some of the larger issues of
information sharing, those that go beyond maritime security,
the news is not all good, and I'll talk about that, as well.
Generally, on the positive side, our findings on the area
of maritime security committees in another locations other than
New York are also very positive, and we found that they are
helpful structures sharing maritime information.
In addition, inter-agency operational centers, the three
that we visited in 2004, appear to be another positive venue
for sharing information.
And it sounds like there are initiatives here in New York
that have very similar types of facilities here, or at least to
link existing facilities to this technology.
One of the key barriers to information sharing, that is the
lack of security clearances by non Federal officials is being
addressed by the Coast Guard.
There are a couple of new issues that perhaps have come up
today. One Commissioner Kelly mentioned, and that's the fact
that there is not always a continuity of staff among State and
local officials, and as those officials shift, the clearances
don't transfer with them, so a new person would have to apply
for those.
And another issue that was brought up by Ms. Rooney is the
issue of how many people actually have been deemed to have a
need to know by the Coast Guard, and perhaps is that number too
low.
But what we have found is the Coast Guard has taken a
number of steps since our 2005 report, and there has been
considerable progress in the numbers of area maritime security
people that have clearances, not just applications in, but
actually having been granted interim clearances.
I actually have a chart on that in my written statement.
But still, nationwide, only 36 percent of those committee
members that have been deemed to have a need to know actually
have those security clearances.
So there is still a ways to go, and so we would expect the
Coast Guard--and I think they are committed to giving this area
additional and continued attention.
While my comments on information sharing for maritime
security, as I've said, are generally positive, GO has some
much broader concerns about information sharing and Homeland
Security, as a whole.
Last year designated this topic a high risk area, because
the Federal Government faced formidable challenges in terms of
identifying, analyzing, and sharing key information among us,
more than 4 years after September 11th brought tragedy to this
city and to America.
The national still lacks comprehensive policies and
procedures to improve information sharing that is critical to
protecting our homeland.
Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, I'll be
happy to answer any questions.
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Mr. Caldwell.
I have a question really for all three of you, just on the
formal structures of these maritime security committees, the
international operational centers.
Your opinions from your various backgrounds, whether that
formal structure is the right and necessary approach, or should
we be giving more flexibility to each port entity to better
structure their needs based on their own situation?
Captain O'Brien. Well, I guess I'll start.
My experience has been in this port, as well as the port in
Hampton Roads, where I was the commanding officer for the last
3 years before coming here, the Area Maritime Security
Committee works really well.
And to have different structures of different ports means
that as people move from port to port, not just military folks,
but people who deal with ports, the consumers, the persons who
are in the shipping industry, the people who are having to deal
and trade with each port, they really need a consistent entity
to deal with. And so having a structure that is duplicated port
to port works really well from an economic standpoint.
Certainly, there are adjustments that can be made to the
structure based on what type of port you're in.
I would say I had very little trouble with security
clearances in the port of Hampton Roads, because everybody was
a retired Navy officer, or were active duty Navy officers that
we dealt with in the port.
So those clearances transferred quite well.
There are procedures in place to accept security clearances
from other agencies, and I have found it to be very easy to
transfer those security clearances in my dealings with both--
well, the area of maritime security, membership.
Do we always need more? Yes.
Is a limited amount of resource available to conduct
background checks? Yes. And there are also going to be people
who refuse to have they're background checks.
That happens on a not routine basis.
So that's my answer to that question.
Ms. Rooney. I would agree that the structure as it is today
works very well.
In addition to the Area Maritime Security Committee, of
importance to the Port Authority is that we also sit on the
Drug Terrorism Task Force, both in New York and in New Jersey.
And that forum, as well, not only in the maritime industry,
but in road, rail, and aviation, provides that structure for
intelligence sharing and coordination that is necessary.
We have a number of groups, there are a number of
opportunities, and what we value as most important is that
before an incident occurs, it's because of these forums that we
all know each other.
So that God forbid if we have to show up at an incident,
the police officers and the emergency responders actually know
each other ahead of time, and have those preestablished
relationships, and the understanding of what resources and
capabilities are available.
And that's all because of this preplanning and
coordination.
Mr. Caldwell. Thank you.
In terms of our work outside of New York, at the other
ports, we did find actually a lot of variation among how these
committees were set up, but we didn't find it was onerous in
any way.
We actually found, as Commissioner Kelly had said here,
when you've been to one port, you've been to one port. So you
obviously have to have some flexibility.
We did find slightly different structures, but all of them
seem to be doing the main thing they were intended to do,share
information.
And I think one of the other important things to note, and
I doubt New York is an exception to this, but a lot of these
port committees have been around in one form or another for
many years.
In Charleston, it went back to 1926, where there was a Port
Committee set up to discuss any variety of issues. And I think
in those ports where there was an existing structure, nobody
kind of rammed the new structure down their throat, they pretty
much absorbed to the structure that was in place.
So I think that we have a good balance now between
flexibility and being yet able to carry out their function.
Mr. Platts. A followup on this same issue, and then I'll
yield to my colleagues.
The safe port act, which recently past the house, it calls
on the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish a maritime
security command center.
How do you view that requirement, if that were to go
forward as currently written, in comparison to the Maritime
Security Committees, or centers?
What, if any, changes or similar type requirement, or adapt
to what's in place to determine something different?
Captain O'Brien. Well, I would I say the Coast Guard
already has command centers in every port. We are building them
out to make them more robust already.
Any assistance in that area would be more than appreciated.
But the concept of a central command center is a
partnership arrangement with the local, State and Federal
entities in the port to carry out operations within the port.
So it kind of hits right on the nail of where the Coast
Guard is heading.
We are just not there yet.
It's time, money and people.
Mr. Platts. Your view is you see a requirement of really
emulating what the Coast Guard is doing now with the sector
command centers?
Captain O'Brien. Yes, that's the goal of the sector command
centers, to reach that point.
Ms. Rooney. I would agree.
I think the sector command center is providing a lot of the
functionality that we would expect in a joint operation center,
as envisioned in the legislation.
My understanding of the proposed legislation in safe port
is to take it a step further to similar to what we have in
Charleston, with Project Sea Hawk, and in San Diego, and some
other places around the country.
Mr. Platts. Where it's operational?
Ms. Rooney. Where it's day to day operational of all of
those Federal, State and local partners in one location.
We have talked about the need for a similar setup here in
the Port of New York and New Jersey among our players, and we
are, through the Coast Guard, have begun to sketch out exactly
what that would look like.
In the interim, we would caution in the legislation that we
not jump immediately to buildings, and having everybody send
staff to a single location, but creating the kind of activity
through virtual operations among the NYPD, operation center,
Coast Guard, Port Authority, and everybody else's operation
centers, that the idea of building a building, and outfitting
it with all the technology, is a huge undertaking.
I submit it will be $40 to $45 million to build that
structure, but with some virtual connectivity and technology,
we can be coordinating much more closely on a day-to-day basis.
So we would caution not to require a building, but to allow
flexibility for virtual connectivity, as well.
Mr. Platts. Mr. Caldwell.
Mr. Caldwell. The issue has been around a couple of years,
and the issue actually came up when we were doing our earlier
study.
We did actually visit Project Sea Hawk, in Charleston,
Project Jay Hawk, in San Diego, as well, as Charleston, which
had a pretty similar set up to the Jay Hawk.
And the Coast Guard was actually directed by Congress to
come out with a report on what these centers might look like.
In our view, in that report, they took a very minimalist
approach to that.
I think there is kind of something that could be added to
the analysis.
One of the issues that came up right then is that the
Department of Homeland Security had an overall project to look
at its regional offices and its command centers among all its
different agencies.
What they wanted to try to see is now that they have all
these agencies under their purview is can they set up some kind
of command centers that can work across the different agencies
within the HS, within Federal agencies, and then obviously on a
local basis with the State and local officials, as needed.
Around that time, Secretary Chertoff came on board and had
announced in July 2005 a reorganization of the Department.
So I think that issue is not really resolved yet. I think
to some extent Hurricane Katrina has also taken some of the
focus of the Department away from what it wants its long-term
regional structure to look like.
I think there's a couple of areas to look at.
And in our report I can go into details, but it's in the
report.
We have identified five issue that we think need to be
addressed if we're going to go forward with these.
At that point, the sector command centers were generally
Coast Guard, but everyone was asking if they could participate.
So let me just go through some of those issues.
One is to really clarify the mission and purposes of these
centers. They can serve a variety of purposes, whether it be
for overall harbor activities, or whether it would be just for
security.
The second issue is the leadership and organization. If you
are going to build a building, if you are going to put someone
in charge, at least of that physical space, you will have to
figure out who that is, how you're going to share costs.
The third issue was membership. Would membership be open
to, obviously, Federal State and local, but then it's a little
trickier if you want to get the private sector in there,
particularly with some of the clearance issues.
And then there is also an issue with the private sector, is
if you give one private company access to these facilities, but
not others, then are you giving one a competitive advantage.
You can understand some of those things.
Then the fourth issue we had was what kind of technology
would be deployed. I think the Coast Guard has a backbone
system they call Hawk Eye, if I am correct, which I think would
serve a lot of these purposes.
One of the things they had in Charleston was not only Hawk
Eye, but they had access to customs and border protections,
automatic targeting systems, so that when ships came in, not
only could they look at all the information the Coast Guard had
on the high interest vessel list, but they could actually do a
scan of, or an analysis of, the containers on there, and what
was the average risk level of those containers, and why was
there a high risk for those containers.
Technology costs money, and sometimes it's hard to make
existing technology and new technology work together, so that's
also an issue.
And then the fifth issue was resource requirements.
Obviously, it's going to cost money in terms of people.
Some of these agencies have their own constraints.
And one of the issues in terms of resources is which agency
will fund them.
One of the issues, I mean, one of the advantages that they
had in Sea Hawk in getting such robust participation of the
State and local governments, they had sixteen different State
and local agencies involved, is they are actually paying
salaries of those.
And this is a very large question for Congress to address,
are we going to start paying salaries of all of the security-
related personnel that are not Federal.
So those five issues, I think, are fairly large issues to
address in terms of moving forward with that.
At a minimum level, Commander O'Brien is correct, the Coast
Guard has set up sector command centers, and hopefully, they
set these up in a way that they are expandable as needed, and
as an ad hoc, or even on a continuing basis.
Mr. Platts. And Commissioner Kelly challenges the
resources, whether it would create a new structure.
Ms. Rooney. If I can add just one thought to that.
We would also caution that we not create maritime-specific
command centers.
As Captain O'Brien said, the maritime industry is dependent
upon road, rail and air in some regards, and here in New York
and New Jersey especially we are a multi mobile network.
If we have maritime operation centers, it is likely that we
will see air operation centers, and road and rail operation
centers.
So we would caution that we think in terms of
transportation operation centers, because in many cases, the
same agencies or organizations are involved in multiple modes
of transportation, and because of resource issues, because of
space constraints, and any number of other things, we need to
think in terms of transportation, not mobile specific.
Mr. Platts. Thank you.
Mr. Towns.
Mr. Towns. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin with you, Mr. O'Brien.
Commissioner Kelly just stated that a cut would definitely
affect his ability to perform his ability to do things. Would
these cuts in the New York City Police Department create a
burden for you, his ability to protect the Port Authority?
Ms. Rooney. I don't believe it will cause drastic concerns.
Commissioner Kelly said the NYPD is not on the port
facility, is not out on the piers, themselves, but in a support
role through the intelligence community, and things like that.
The Port Authority Police, we have our own police force.
These cuts do not affect the Port Authority's personnel or
resources directly.
I don't anticipate that there will be a drastic impact on
Port Authority operations.
Mr. Towns. Would that affect your ability to be first
responders? It would not interfere with that?
Ms. Rooney. Well, the NYPD are certainly one of our support
agencies in terms of response. But again, at our facilities,
airports, tunnels, bridges, the PATH train, and our seaports,
the Port Authority are the first responders.
We rely very heavily on NYPD, on New Jersey State Police,
Newark and Elizabeth city and fire departments to assist us as
necessary.
But we are the primary first responders on our facility.
Mr. Towns. I guess I would like to ask all of you this. For
port security, is human intelligence more important than
technology-based intelligence?
Let's go right down the line, starting with you, Captain.
Captain O'Brien. I don't know if it's more important, but
it's equally important.
Ms. Rooney. I would agree. We have 25,000 people
approximately on our port facilities every day, and we count
those 25,000 people among our partners in law enforcement, just
as we rely on the citizens of the city of New York to provide
information to the NYPD on things that don't look right.
We rely on our longshoreman, our truck drivers and our port
workers to report things to the Port Authority Police.
Those men and women know better than anybody else when
something is awry.
Mr. Towns. Yes.
Mr. Caldwell. I don't have that much at the local
perspective in terms of the national.
As you know, a lot of our national intelligence
infrastructure was set up with a very heavy technological
perspective, and so that is one thing that they are trying to
improve, the transition from that to more emphasis on the human
intelligence side.
And I think if you look at who our enemies were that we
were trying to spy on before, versus who we are trying to spy
on now, obviously, when you have a huge country, and a military
industrial complex like the Soviet Union, it's a lot easier to
use technology to do it.
The problem we're having, the intelligence community is
having, with the terrorists is they are set up in a lot of
disparate little cells. A lot of them are, obviously now Al
Qaeda-affiliated, or Al Qaeda-related.
But these aren't real strong links that you can use
traditional intelligence technical means to always track down.
Mr. Towns. Let me ask, what is being done about the
enforcement of trucking security with regard to truckers'
qualifications, background, all of that?
What is being done in that area? This seems to be a real
concern of people, because they are in and out of the ports.
Ms. Rooney. Under the current regulations, under the
current maritime security regulations, anyone with access to a
marine terminal is required to have the basic minimum in terms
of identification.
That has recently changed with an interim program that the
Coast Guard has put in place, where the Coast Guard and TSA
will be conducting checks at least of the terrorist watch list,
and immigration status of individuals who need unescorted
access to marine terminals.
The TWIC program, the transportation workers identification
card, that smart biometric card will, in fact, address the
background, the criminal background checks of all port workers,
including truck drivers.
But today, under current regulations, only truck drivers
who have a hazardous material endorsement are required to have
a full background check.
Mr. Towns. When will that be instituted, the new program?
When will it actually start do? Do we have a date for it?
Ms. Rooney. The TWIC program is a Coast Guard and TSA
program.
Captain O'Brien. The Coast Guard will be a participant in
homeland security for the maritime sector.
The port workers, and truckers, and other folks in the
transportation industry will be checked in various different
programs.
But a date certain, I do not have.
Mr. Caldwell. I have a date, but I'm not sure it's the one
you're looking for, Representative Towns.
We have done a study of the TWIC program. In the fall of
2004 we found that program was not well managed, and was far
beyond schedule.
Mr. Towns. Repeat that.
Mr. Caldwell. We found that the TWIC program was not well
managed and far beyond schedule.
I just want to alert all of you that in July, later this
month, I think it's July 25th, one of my colleagues will be
testifying or our current review of the TWIC program.
So we will have more for you later in the month on the
status of that.
Captain O'Brien. I think we could reply later, if you would
allow us to submit a written reply to that.
Mr. Towns. I would ask you to allow the record to be open,
so they can provide that statement.
Mr. Platts. We can get a formal response later, yes.
Ms. Rooney. There was a public comment period on the new
TWIC rules that just closed last week. So it's in motion, which
is a good sign.
Mr. Towns. That would establish a permanent security
program based on risk.
Would you agree that risk is the most appropriate way to
allocate funds?
Captain O'Brien. Well, I would agree that it's certainly a
very important factor in how we allocate funds. But that's
really a decision that Congress will make.
Mr. Towns. Maybe with your advice, and your counsel. I
think you need to speak up on it.
Captain O'Brien. The Coast Guard has adopted a risk-based
decisionmaking process for our methodology for making all our
decisions.
And so risk has to be a very high factor in what we choose
to do, and what we choose to fund.
Risk can be defined in many different ways. So it's very,
very difficult to give you a clearcut answer until you really
define what risk you're talking about.
In the Port of New York, the risk factors are going to be
significantly different than they are in another port in the
United States.
Mr. Towns. I hear you.
One thing we should not lose sight of is that New York City
has already experienced September 11th, and of course, I think
that this is a fact to be considered, and every assessment,
every report, has indicated that New York City is a target,
everybody says that.
Of course, there have been situations that have been
aborted as result of intelligence.
So I really applaud the Police Department, and others who
have done that.
But I just think that we are taking this whole thing of
risk very lightly, and I don't think we should take it lightly.
I think that risk is the key, and that based on protecting
people, if we are talking about security, I think the risk has
to be No. 1.
Captain O'Brien. I can say for certain that everything we
do in this port, that the Coast Guard does injunction with our
partners, is all based on risk.
Every decision we make about what we are going to do with
our assets every day is based on risk at the port level.
Mr. Towns. Thank you.
Mr. Platts. Thank you.
Ms. Maloney.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you.
Are there any plans to create an inter-agency operational
center in New York?
Anyone?
Captain O'Brien. I can tell you that you're talking about
inter-agency operational center. We certainly have that
capability in the maritime sector, the sector command centers.
I'm not privy to everybody's plans. So I don't have an
answer to that for a wide multi-modal operations center.
Mrs. Maloney. The port will be used in lieu of operational
center, due to the fact that we don't have one in New York.
Captain O'Brien. I would say that during incidents, the
Coast Guard, as well as all of its port partners, we have
adopted what we call a unified command approach, a unified
command system, that all of us are schooled in that are in the
response and the law enforcement communities.
And we exercise that very often. And we do a pretty good
job of it.
So we do exercise command and control by looking at all the
different agencies that have different jurisdictional
responsibilities, and we get together and try to provide for
everyone's jurisdictional responsibilities in every response
that we make.
Mrs. Maloney. How many containers are screened coming into
the New York/New Jersey ports? It has been reported that 5
percent of the containers are screened.
Can you elaborate on that?
Captain O'Brien. I'll be happy to give you an answer to
that, but I can't give it to you know.
Mrs. Maloney. Pardon me?
Captain O'Brien. I can certainly give you the answer to
that later in writing.
Mrs. Maloney. Can anyone respond to that?
Ms. Rooney. It's certainly within customs and border
protection's domain to screen cargo. They would say that 100
percent of all cargo is screened, and that 100 percent of all
high risk cargo is inspected.
But as Captain O'Brien stated, I think it's best that we
get together with our port partners in order to provide you
with an answer to that question.
Mrs. Maloney. It has repeatedly been reported in various
reports that only 5 percent of our containers are screened.
With the technology that was described earlier, being able
to go in and screen it.
Ms. Rooney. And I think our partners in Customs would that
say that 5 percent number is the overall quantity which are
deemed to be high risk, and that 100 percent of all high risk
containers are screened.
It happens to be perhaps 5 percent, but they're using a
risk profile.
Mrs. Maloney. But roughly 5 percent of the cargo coming
into the United States is screened?
Ms. Rooney. 100 percent of high risk are screened. It
equates to 5 percent on average in the country. But it's 100
percent of all high risk containers.
Mrs. Maloney. Do you say 5 percent in the country, or 5
percent in the New York ports?
Ms. Rooney. It's in the country.
Mrs. Maloney. Do you know about the New York ports, what
percentage is screened?
Ms. Rooney. We can get back to you with the current
numbers.
I believe the numbers today are between 7 to 9 percent in
New York and New Jersey.
Mrs. Maloney. Seven to 9 percent?
Ms. Rooney. Yes.
Mrs. Maloney. I want to thank you for your hard work.
I've been told by the chairman that he has a plane to
catch. Thank you.
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Ms. Maloney.
I do have two quick followup questions, if I could.
One is just on the number of security, 10, that have been
allocated to the Port of New York and New Jersey.
Captain O'Brien, I know you're only 3 weeks here.
Are you able to, as far as your understanding, how that
number, you got 10, or these are the only 10 we acknowledge as
having a need to do know, per port?
Captain O'Brien. Well, the 10 per port is really sort of a
round number.
My experience up until arriving here 3 weeks ago was that I
had no trouble at all getting additional quotas for screening
of personnel.
And so I don't know what the limits--Bethann has been here
for a considerable amount of time longer period than I have.
She might be able to tell you.
But I never had a request turned down to have someone
screened.
Mr. Platts. But the issue here is not those with
transferring within.
Captain O'Brien. I'm talking about putting names in to have
them screened.
I'm not sure exactly how quickly they will get to them, but
nobody has ever me that he couldn't turn in more than a certain
number.
Mr. Platts. I was told there are currently only 10
allocated for the area.
Ms. Rooney.
Ms. Rooney. Yes, that's correct.
My share of the Area Maritime Committee was given 10
security clearances.
And at an Executive Steering Committee, we identified who
from our Federal, State and local partners had them, who needed
them, and then looked at the private sector members in terms of
who needed them.
And we prioritized, as you stated, as to who those first 10
applicants were going to.
We have gone back, we did at the time go back, as Captain
O'Brien suggested, and asked for additional clearances,
because, as I stated before, we have over forty-six agencies or
organizations that are on the AMSC.
I actually don't know the current status of that, but
again, it's something that we can get back to you on.
Mr. Platts. That's something, Captain O'Brien, coming from
a different scenario, is to look at the uniqueness of New York,
this port, the volume, the risk, as Commissioner Kelly said,
the No. 1 risk they identified in the country.
If there was a standard type 10 per port, that really
doesn't take into account the challenges here.
So that dialog that's ongoing with you and your partners,
we would encourage you to expedite as best as you can.
Captain O'Brien. Yes.
And, as you know, it's a long, drawn-out process to get
clearance.
One of the problems that I've seen in the past is that not
only sometimes the person moves on after they get the
clearance, but sometimes they move on before the clearance even
comes through, which is a significant problem.
But when you're talking about looking at someone's entire
life history, it gets to be a pretty long and drawn out
process.
I know it took me about 2 years to get my clearance.
Mr. Platts. A final question before we do need to wrap up.
With the Port Authority, Ms. Rooney, not being real
familiar with the port operations, I assume that there's a fee
based on tonnage that comes through the port, the processing of
the freight.
Is there, in response to September 11th, and the tremendous
demand on security now, was there an imposition with the Port
of New York and New Jersey as to surcharges, security, similar
to like airline tickets?
Is there anything in that you would suggest be incorporated
into the operating costs of the port?
Ms. Rooney. All of our security expenses have been
completely incorporated into our operating expenses.
By the end of this year, we will spend close to $85 million
on port security, capital and operating.
Mr. Platts. Since September 11th?
Ms. Rooney. Since September 11th.
And that's the incremental increase since September 11th.
The Port Authority has absorbed all of those expenses.
We have gotten $10.5 million of that through the Federal
port security grants in the past.
Many of our port partners around the country have
instituted surcharges, or port security user fees.
It's certainly something that we are beginning to look at,
but have not done so far.
For every dollar that we spend on security, because we
raise money through bonds, and government bonds, there is $10
less that we have for capital improvements that we need for
productivity, and efficiency, and roadway and railway capacity.
So it is critical that we have some security funding, as
well.
Mr. Platts. I want to thank each of you again for your
testimony, and your work day in and day out, and your service.
We will keep the record open for 2 weeks for additional
followup information.
This hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
<all>