<DOC>
[109th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:32439.wais]
YUCCA MOUNTAIN: BROKEN MANAGEMENT, BROKEN QUALITY ASSURANCE, BROKEN
PROJECT
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE
AND AGENCY ORGANIZATION
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 25, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-206
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
http://www.house.gov/reform
_______
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee DIANE E. WATSON, California
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
DARRELL E. ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JON C. PORTER, Nevada C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina Columbia
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania ------
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio (Independent)
------ ------
David Marin, Staff Director
Lawrence Halloran, Deputy Staff Director
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Subcommittee on the Federal Workforce and Agency Organization
JON C. PORTER, Nevada, Chairman
JOHN L. MICA, Florida DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
TOM DAVIS, Virginia MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
DARRELL E. ISSA, California ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas Columbia
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
Ex Officio
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Ron Martinson, Staff Director
Shannon Meade, Professional Staff Member
Alex Cooper, Clerk
Tania Shand, Minority Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on April 25, 2006................................... 1
Statement of:
Wells, Jim, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S.
Government Accountability Office; Gregory Friedman,
Inspector General, U.S. Department of Energy; Margaret
Federline, Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Material
Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission;
and Paul Golan, Acting Director, Office of Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management, U.S. Department of Energy.... 9
Federline, Margaret...................................... 42
Friedman, Gregory........................................ 33
Golan, Paul.............................................. 52
Wells, Jim............................................... 9
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Davis, Hon. Danny K., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Illinois, prepared statement of................... 76
Federline, Margaret, Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, prepared statement of.......................... 44
Friedman, Gregory, Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Energy, prepared statement of.............................. 36
Golan, Paul, Acting Director, Office of Civilian Radioactive
Waste Management, U.S. Department of Energy, prepared
statement of............................................... 55
Porter, Hon. Jon C., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Nevada, prepared statement of..................... 4
Wells, Jim, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S.
Government Accountability Office, prepared statement of.... 11
YUCCA MOUNTAIN: BROKEN MANAGEMENT, BROKEN QUALITY ASSURANCE, BROKEN
PROJECT
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 25, 2006
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Federal Workforce and Agency
Organization,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jon C. Porter
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Porter, Issa, and Norton.
Also present: Representative Gibbons.
Staff present: Ronald Martinson, staff director; Chad
Bungard, deputy staff director/chief counsel; Shannon Meade,
professional staff member; Alex Cooper, legislative assistant;
Michelle Triestman, GAO detailee; Tania Shand, minority
professional staff Member; and Teresa Coufal, minority
assistant clerk.
Mr. Porter. Good afternoon everyone. Welcome. I appreciate
you all being here today.
I would like to bring the meeting to order, this meeting of
the Subcommittee on the Federal Workforce and Agency
Organization.
Today marks the third hearing the subcommittee has held
with regard to its investigation of the Yucca Mountain Project.
Today's hearing is about mismanagement and the problems that
flow from it.
Last year, when the USGS e-mails surfaced indicating
quality assurance deficiencies, I requested the Government
Accountability Office to conduct a followup study of the
Department of Energy's quality assurance program. GAO recently
completed the study and released its report entitled Quality
Assurance at DOE's Planned Nuclear Waste Repository Needs
Increased Management Attention. Today's hearing will examine
these findings in more detail.
The GAO study examined, No. 1, the history of the Project's
quality assurance problems; No. 2, DOE's tracking of these
problems and efforts to address them; and, No. 3, challenges
facing DOE as it continues to address quality assurance issues
within the Project.
First, GAO found that DOE has had a long history of quality
assurance problems at Yucca Mountain. In the late 1980's and
1990's, DOE had problems assuring the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission that it had developed adequate plans and procedures
related to quality assurance. More recently, as it prepares to
submit a license application to the NRC, DOE has been relying
on costly and time-consuming rework to resolve lingering
quality assurance problems uncovered during audits and after-
the-fact evaluations.
The subcommittee's investigation sheds some light on these
findings. Subcommittee investigators have interviewed current
and former high-level quality assurance personnel. There is a
consensus among those interviewed professionals that the type
of audits conducted by the program today are ineffective at
addressing quality assurance problems. Specifically, QA
Management has shifted from conducting performance-based audits
to compliance audits, which look at adherence to general
procedures only. The ability to identify substantive issues and
technical weaknesses makes performance-based audits more
effective in correcting problems head on. This shift to
compliance audits restrict's DOE's ability to identify and
correct problems, which was a poor management decision.
Second, GAO found that DOE cannot be certain its efforts to
improve quality assurance have been effective because of
ineffective management tools.
For example, in 2004, DOE announced it was making a
commitment to continuous quality assurance improvement and that
its efforts would be tracked by performance indicators that
would enable it to assess progress and direct management
attention as needed. However, GAO found that the Project's
performance indicators and other management tools were not
effective for this purpose. Specifically, the management tools
did not target existing areas of concern and did not track
progress in addressing them. The tools also had weaknesses in
detecting and highlighting significant problems for management
attention.
Finally, GAO found that DOE continues to face a number of
quality assurance and other challenges.
First, DOE is engaged in extensive efforts to restore
confidence in scientific documents because of the quality
assurance problems raised in the USGS e-mails. At the
recommendation of the DOE Inspector General, the Department has
about 14 million more project e-mails to review.
Second, DOE faces quality assurance challenges in resolving
design control problems associated with its requirements
management process. The process for ensuring the high-level
plans and regulatory requirements are incorporated in specific
engineering details. In fact, problems with this process lead
to the recent December 2005, work suspension of certain project
work.
And, third, DOE is challenged by management continuity. In
just the last year, the Project lost its program director,
licensing manager and quality assurance director in all key
managerial positions--pardon me--all key managerial position.
GAO findings in this report present real concerns that the
Department is running an ineffective program that has not
implemented quality as a top priority and DOE's management of
this project is to blame.
The importance of a rigorous quality assurance program is
paramount to a project of this magnitude. All of the scientific
data and engineering design submitted to support a license for
Yucca Mountain should be credible, have to be credible, have to
be reliable, have to be traceable, have to be transparent. In
short, if quality assurance is not in place, the NRC could and
should reject the license application on that ground alone.
Moreover, already $9 billion has been spent. $9 billion has
been spent on this project. Rather than appropriating more
money and pushing legislation through to expedite the Project,
these serious problems should be fixed.
This is clearly a project that is consistently failing
under the weight of its own mismanagement and ineptitude at
correcting reoccurring quality assurance deficiencies. In fact,
in recent weeks, Secretary Bodman himself conceded the Yucca
Mountain Project has been poorly managed and labeled the
Project--and this is his own word--``broken.''
Mr. Bodman is preceded by Energy Secretaries who did not
provide the necessary quality assurance and oversight,
including Secretary Richardson of the Clinton administration
under whose watch two USGS scientists e-mailed accounts of
fabricating quality assurance data to multiple recipients.
Despite a clear record of mismanagement, however, it is
important to recognize that the vast majority of Federal
employees are reliable and hard-working individuals. It is
unfortunate that management structure and the procedures at the
Yucca Mountain Project have impaired their ability to perform.
Therefore, I want to take a moment to recognize those Federal
employees who have worked and continue to work very hard on
this project.
If this were NASA and this were a space shuttle, the space
shuttle would not fly. We have a program that is broken, and
the reason we are here today is to continue our investigation
in looking at the Department of Energy and its management.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Jon C. Porter follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Porter. I would like to thank, of course, our witnesses
who are here today; and I would like to first really recognize
my colleague to my immediate left, and that is Congressman
Gibbons from Nevada. Welcome.
Mr. Gibbons. Well, Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to
thank you for your leadership on this issue and thank you for
what this committee is doing in terms of highlighting the very
sincere problems that all of us feel this issue has; and I want
to also thank you for inviting me to participate with the
committee today in hearing this issue.
Before I allow for you to continue, Mr. Chairman, I would
hope that my full and written statement can be entered into the
record on this issue.
But since the proposed Yucca Mountain Project has begun,
and it was started over two decades ago, Nevadans have opposed
this ill-advised project for many, many reasons. I only hope
that someday Nevadans will have an opportunity to see and
celebrate the demise of this disastrous proposal, and only then
will Nevadans no longer need to worry about living next to the
most dangerous substance on Earth.
Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, today is not that day.
I do agree with many of the panel that we must find
solutions to the escalating nuclear waste problem in this
country. However, simply digging a hole in the Nevada desert
and burying the waste is not that answer.
One only needs to look at the recent history of the Yucca
Mountain Project to get a sense of the DOE's motivations.
Unfortunately, it is extremely disturbing to me to see that,
since the birth of this project, that the Department of Energy
has consistently failed to use sound science as their guide and
has instead been blinded by its obsession to do anything to
rubber stamp this project in order to rush it to completion.
While this might be OK to the bureaucrats at DOE
headquarters 2,500 miles away, it is completely inadequate to
the people of Nevada and throughout this country who have to
live with the reality of this substance, the deadliest
substance known to man, contaminating perhaps our water supply,
traveling through our communities and along our roads and
perhaps endangering our communities.
Last year, under Chairman Porter's leadership, this
committee held a hearing which shed a very revealing light on
the recent scandal plaguing this problem; and since that time,
it seems clear that every month a new revelation about Yucca
Mountain is revealed that continues to disturb but should not
surprise Nevadans.
First, the EPA comes out with an arbitrary and grossly
inaccurate guideline to help them push this project forward.
Then there are accounts that Yucca Mountain Project is falling
apart from inside and will require millions of dollars to
repair. Next, on April 4th, DOE sent its Yucca Mountain bill to
Congress. Since Yucca fails the test of science and cannot
satisfy traditional safety regulations for nuclear projects,
the bill would unabashedly do an end run around those
obstacles, constituting DOE's last-ditch attempt to salvage a
repository that has failed nearly every test that it has been
put through.
And today, Mr. Chairman, you are holding a hearing on the
Government Accountability's Office's assessment of the
effectiveness of DOE's quality assurance program; and this
report, may I say, is alarming, to say the least. It reinforces
what many have been saying for years, that the Yucca Mountain
Project is fatally flawed and should be stopped immediately,
without delay.
Chairman Porter, I applaud your ongoing efforts to try to
investigate the alleged falsifications of scientific data on
the Yucca Mountain Project through the House Government Reform
Committee; and I look forward to hearing today from the
witnesses who will try to explain the need to continue forward
with this project despite the mounting evidence that points to
the need to look for an alternative.
I want to thank you again for the opportunity and inviting
me to join you today, and I look forward to the opportunity as
well to hear from our witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Porter. Thank you, Congressman.
I will note for the record that Members will be coming and
going today, and we have also received or will be receiving
statements from other members of the Nevada delegation who are
also invited to be on the dais today but because of schedules
weren't able to be here but will be submitting their own
documents.
At this point, I would like to ask that the witnesses today
recognize that there may be additional questions that will be
addressed later from members of the committee, and I would like
to ask that you all stand at this point, and we will do the
customary swearing in.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Porter. Let the record reflect the witnesses answered
in the affirmative.
Please be seated. Thank you.
Our first witness today will be Mr. Jim Wells, who is
Director of Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government
Accountability Office; followed by Gregory Friedman, Inspector
General, U.S. Department of Energy; Margaret Federline--did I
pronounce that correctly--Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission; and Mr. Paul Golan, Acting Director, Office of
Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, U.S. Department of
Energy.
So, first, Mr. Wells, we appreciate your testimony. Keep it
approximately 5 minutes.
STATEMENTS OF JIM WELLS, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; GREGORY
FRIEDMAN, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY;
MARGARET FEDERLINE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL
SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION; AND
PAUL GOLAN, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE
WASTE MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
STATEMENT OF JIM WELLS
Mr. Wells. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work
concerning the quality assurance challenges facing DOE as it
tries to obtain a license to construct a geological repository
at the Yucca Mountain site. Our most recent March 2006, report,
Quality Assurance Needs Attention, and in our earlier 2004
report, Persistent Quality Assurance Problems, continued the
description of a troubled QA program.
As a Nation, we are 25 years into a process to deal with
geological burial of 50,000 metric tons and growing nuclear
waste. Most in the room today are well aware of the twists and
turns this program has taken over the years.
Today, after continuing delays, DOE still must prepare a
license request for approval from the NRC to begin
construction. NRC requires that a quality program--quality
assurance program must exist to ensure that the work and the
technical information is supporting a license that is deemed
accurate and defensible. DOE is not there yet.
While we were doing our most recent audit, DOE announced
the ``new path forward'' initiative, but it has not yet
established a new date when they will be ready to ask for a
license.
I want to start and finish my statement today saying that
resolving the QA problem we and others have found is essential
to proceeding with construction.
In 2004, we reported recurring QA problems could delay the
licensing of the repository. 2006, 2 years later, we still
don't have the request for a license.
DOE tried to make changes to improve. In 2005, DOE reported
that it had discovered a series of e-mail messages written in
the late 1990's by USGS Geological Survey employees that
appeared to imply that workers had falsified records for
scientific work. Several of these messages appear to show
disdain for the Project's quality assurance program and its
requirements; and in December 2005 and again in February 2006,
some project work has been stopped due to continuing QA
problems.
Our most recent report once again found problems.
Over the years, NRC, the DOE IG and DOE's own management
team were finding inadequate QA procedures, ineffective fixes
to earlier problems, and continuing weaknesses in data,
software, and modeling information.
Mr. Chairman, of particular concern to us was DOE's
reliance on costly and time-consuming rework to resolve
lingering quality assurance concerns, as opposed to building
quality assurance in at the beginning.
Second, we found significant problems with the management
tools, as you have mentioned in your opening statement, that
DOE was using to target, to track, to report, and document
successful fixes to past QA problems.
I guess the best way to describe by findings was that, due
to the numerous technical design flaws, what management tools
DOE management was using to fix the problems was not adequately
describing the problem or sufficiently drawing management's
attention to the best solutions.
In our report, we recommended that DOE needed to strengthen
its management tools, and we offered suggestions as to ways to
improve. DOE agreed with our recommendations.
Third, DOE's aggressive new path forward faces substantial
QA challenges going forward. They are not out of the woods yet.
The e-mails suggesting the possible falsification of
quality assurance records had resulted in extensive, again,
rework efforts to restore confidence in scientific documents.
DOE is conducting a review of 14 million additional e-mails to
determine whether they raise additional QA problems. I suspect
we will hear today about where the status of that is.
DOE also has two stop-work orders in place as they continue
to resolve new-found QA problems.
As they announce new organizational changes, including
bringing in new players to fix the problems, they will face
potential for further confusion of their accountability as
roles and responsibilities change. This will impose over an
organization that is experiencing high managerial turnover and
existing vacancies in various senior management positions. For
example, 9 of the 17 key management positions at the Project
level have turned over since 2001, and 3 different directors
have served in Washington recently.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and members, I would like to
say that, clearly, DOE was assigned a task with a very complex
and changing requirement to build something which has never
been done before.
Our GAO audit team continually met with and discussed the
Project with some really smart DOE people, very talented people
that are doing many things right. Our audits, however, we do
have--this is where we find things that can be done better. We
have made recommendations to DOE which they agree with. It is
too early for us to conclude today whether its new path forward
effort will resolve these tremendous challenges.
I will end with what I started with: Resolving the QA
problems we and others have found is essential to proceeding
with this construction.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Porter. Thank you, Mr. Wells. Again, we appreciate your
being here.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wells follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Porter. Mr. Friedman, Inspector General, U.S.
Department of Energy, welcome.
STATEMENT OF GREGORY FRIEDMAN
Mr. Friedman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased
to be here today at your request to testify on matters related
to quality assurance procedures and general management at the
U.S. Department of Energy's Yucca Mountain Project.
My office has conducted a number of reviews involving Yucca
Mountain Project over the last several years. In today's
testimony, I would like to highlight three recent reviews
relating to quality assurance and general project management.
First, my office, in coordination with the Department of
Interior Office of Inspector General and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, initiated a criminal investigation focusing on
potential falsification of research data and quality assurance
requirements pertaining to computer modeling of net water
infiltration at the proposed Yucca Mountain repository.
As part of the investigation, we conducted numerous
interviews of current and former employees of the Department of
Energy, Yucca Mountain Project contractors, and employees of
the U.S. Geological Survey. We analyzed about 150,000 e-mails
directly and also obtained and examined numerous documents that
included various reports on internal and external reviews of
the Yucca Mountain Project operations. The objective of the
investigation was to identify the facts and circumstances
surrounding a series of e-mails that discussed the potential
fabrication of data and compromise of quality assurance
requirements.
The extensive factual record developed was provided to the
U.S. Attorney's Office in December 2005 at the conclusion of
our field work.
Just last evening, on April 24th, the U.S. Attorney's
Office notified the OIG they had declined to pursue criminal
prosecution in this matter. Among the reasons given by the
Department of Justice were that they could not show intent and
the action did not rise to the level of criminality.
My written testimony, Mr. Chairman, does not include this
information because it was submitted prior to our being
notified by the Department of Justice; and my verbal testimony
will have to do in this regard.
During the investigation, we observed internal control
deficiencies that warrant the attention of Department of Energy
program managers. A memorandum highlighting these issues has
been issued to the Secretary of Energy. We understand the
Department of Interior's Office of Inspector General was
planning to issue a separate report to the Department of
Interior Management regarding issues specific to the geological
survey.
With respect to the Department of Energy, we identified the
following internal control deficiencies: First, a nearly 6-year
delay in surfacing and appropriately dealing with the
controversial e-mails, for which, frankly, we could find no
satisfactory explanation; second, the compromise of scientific
notebook requirements for an analysis and model report, an AMR
report, on simulation of net infiltration for modern potential
future climates; and, three, a failure to properly maintain
critical control files relating to that same AMR in accordance
with data management system requirements established by the
project managers.
Although criminal prosecution will not be pursued based on
the Department of Justice's declaration, observers have pointed
out that the authors of the e-mails demonstrated irresponsible
and reckless behavior and their actions have had the effect of
undermining public confidence in the quality of science
associated with the Yucca Mountain Project. This incident has
forced the Department of Energy to spend millions in actions to
address the quality assurance issues raised in the e-mails.
The second matter I would like to address is an IG report
issued in November 2005.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission procedures for granting a
license for the proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste
repository require the Department publicly disclose on a Web
site all documents, including e-mails, relative to the
licensing process. In 2004, the Office of Civilian Radioactive
Waste Management took action to review approximately 10 million
archived e-mails associated with Yucca Mountain for relevancy
to the licensing process.
Internal to the Yucca Mountain Project, an administrative
procedure required that throughout the course of all project
activities--and I stress all project activities--there be a
conscious effort to identify and resolve any and all conditions
adverse to quality. As a result of our inspection, we concluded
that the Department's review of the archived e-mails had not
been structured so as to ensure the quality assurance issues
were identified and addressed.
We were informed that, as a result of our report, Waste
Management is developing a corrective action plan to expand its
quality-assurance-related search effort to include a more
comprehensive review of the approximately 10 million or more
archived e-mails.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to discuss an IG report
issued in December 2005. We found the Department had paid
approximately $4 million in incentive fees to Bechtel SAIC,
Yucca Mountain's prime contractor, even though the firm did not
meet contract performance expectations. We concluded that Waste
Management had not established an adequate process to monitor
and evaluate the contractor's work products and services.
As a result of management weaknesses, the contractor was
rewarded for projects and services integral to the Yucca
Mountain project for services that did not meet the
requirements of the contract, including matters related to
ensuring project quality. As a result of our report, Waste
Management agreed to establish a performance incentive plan
with clearly defined standards and document its rationale for
fee payments.
The efforts to determine whether Yucca Mountain is a
suitable site for disposal of the Nation's high-level nuclear
waste and spent nuclear fuel is a complex challenge. Of
paramount concern is that this evaluation be objective and that
it be based on sound and unbiased scientific analysis
consistent with the highest possible quality assurance
standards. Thus, it is vital the Department intensify its
efforts in the quality assurance arena.
We are committed to performing independent reviews to
assist in this effort. In fact, in late 2005, at the request of
the Acting Director of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste
Management, Mr. Golan, we initiated a review of the
completeness and effectiveness of the corrective action program
to address quality assurance problems. This review is in
process.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this
concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any
questions that you might have.
Mr. Porter. Thank you very much, Mr. Friedman. I appreciate
all your efforts and your staff.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Friedman follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Porter. Next, we have Margaret Federline, Deputy
Director of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Welcome, Margaret. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MARGARET FEDERLINE
Ms. Federline. Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee, it is a privilege to appear before you today to
share with you the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's perspective
on the role of quality assurance in the Department of Energy's
Yucca Mountain program.
Since I will be presenting an abbreviated version of my
testimony, I would ask that my entire written statement be made
part of the hearing record. Thank you very much.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act assigns NRC the role of
regulator for the proposed high-level waste repository. In
addition to reviewing DOE's license application, the NRC
observes and comments on DOE's quality assurance program as
part of NRC's prelicensing activity. Implementation of an
effective QA program during the prelicensing, licensing and
operational periods will ensure that repository activities are
consistent with safety requirements.
The purpose of our observing DOE activities during the
prelicense application phase is to verify that DOE clearly
understands our requirements. We review the implementation and
effectiveness of DOE's quality assurance program by performing
independent reviews, observing audits and surveillances
performed by DOE and its contractors and monitoring significant
quality effecting activities.
While no regulatory conclusions are made during our
reviews, we do provide feedback to DOE for consideration.
For example, we performed an independent review of
important DOE model reports. Through independent technical
work, NRC had identified that the information in these model
reports was significant to a safety demonstration. During the
review, NRC staff identified concerns with some aspects of the
technical basis and information in the model reports. Also, NRC
staff identified concerns with the effectiveness of some of
DOE's corrective actions.
NRC staff members also observe DOE audits of QA program
implementation to determine their effectiveness in identifying
issues that pertain to safety in their design for the proposed
repository. Of the audits that we have observed, we have noted
that the auditors are generally qualified, trained and
independent of the areas being audited, and most audits were
adequate in assessing the activities being audited.
For example, NRC observers of a DOE audit of design
engineering products related to the fuel handling and canister
handling facilities determined that the audit was effective in
assessing the adequacy, implementation and effectiveness of
technical products and processes.
On the other hand, NRC staff has identified other concerns
during these observations. One such observation noted that NRC
did not agree with the DOE auditors' conclusion that Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratories effectively implemented certain
aspects related to control of measurement and test equipment
and corrective action. As a result of our observations, DOE is
performing additional reviews in this area.
During the current year, NRC staff reviews have noted that
DOE has made significant changes to its corrective action and
trending process as a result of Yucca Mountain Project internal
audit findings as well as the result of NRC comments.
NRC staff will continue to observe DOE activities in areas
of science as well as design work to ensure that DOE's QA
program is appropriately applied in developing the safety case
for licensing.
Some current QA program implementation issues are of
concern to us. These issues include those identified at the
U.S. Geologic Survey, DOE's design controls and requirements
flow-down and the calibration of test equipment at Lawrence
Livermore Labs. These issues concern us because they raise
questions about the systematic and effective implementation of
DOE's QA program, which is an integral part of a high-quality
license application. NRC staff will continue to review DOE's
technical approaches, findings and conclusions regarding QA
issues. We will closely observe DOE's corrective actions and
will continue to bring any issues to DOE's attention.
At the most recent quarterly management meeting, QA program
implementation issues were discussed, and DOE presented its
plans for resolving the issues.
Our recent observations of Yucca Mountain Project
activities have noted that DOE's plans for addressing current
QA program issues with design control and requirements flow-
down appear to be directed at the right problems and to be
using good approaches for correcting the root causes.
Recent Yucca Mountain Project staff additions have brought
in management personnel with previous experience in
implementing quality assurance programs for NRC-regulated
activities.
In March 2006, as we have heard, the Government
Accountability Office issued its report on Yucca Mountain
quality assurance. NRC staff had reviewed the GAO report and
found that these conclusions are consistent with what we have
observed, some of which I have discussed today.
In conclusion, the NRC staff has noticed improvements in
effectiveness of DOE's quality assurance program
implementation. We will, however, continue to fulfill our
responsibilities to ensure the adequate protection of public
health and safety and the environment.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Porter. Thank you. Appreciate your testimony.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Federline follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Porter. Next, Mr. Paul Golan, Acting Director, Office
of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, U.S. DOE.
Welcome.
STATEMENT OF PAUL GOLAN
Mr. Golan. Thank you Mr. Chairman, members of the
subcommittee.
My name is Paul Golan, and I am Acting Director of the
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management since May 2005.
Previously, I served in the Department of Energy's environment
cleanup program; and prior to that I had the privilege of
serving in the U.S. Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program.
In order for my testimony to be more productive today, I
would like to provide the subcommittee my perspective of
quality.
When most people speak of QA, they envision an organization
of auditors armed with checklists and pencil stubs counting
beans and making sure all the boxes are checked and putting an
``inspected by'' label on the box with your product. That is
not quality assurance. Rather, that is an audit or assessment.
While a necessary component of a QA program, by all means not
the most important aspect.
When I speak of quality today, quality assurance, I am
referring to an organizational culture, a culture that is a
collection of the organization's standards, actions, behaviors,
and ultimately its performance. People and organizations that
set high standards act professionally, behave responsibly and
perform in accordance with the requirements, embody good
quality.
These characteristics are critical to an organization's
ability to function effectively in a regulated environment.
Quality is an organizational trait earned by an
organization's living up to its standards and is demonstrated
by its performance.
Over the years, the Yucca Mountain QA program has been
reviewed by many of the organizations at the table today. The
set of documents here is a compilation of the reports by these
organizations, some of which go back to the 1980's. They
addressed deficiencies in the Yucca Mountain QA program and
found that, despite the development of corrective action plans,
deficiencies have not been completely corrected and the same
deficiencies tend to reoccur.
Again, these findings were consistent with the findings of
the latest review by the GAO in March 2006. In nearly all these
reviews, the Department concurred with the findings and
instituted corrective actions to address these deficiencies. I
have read the reports and agree with the findings.
The QA program and, more importantly, the culture of this
organization needs to improve. In order for us to improve,
there are two components of this program and this culture that
I would like to focus on. The first is focus, and the second is
accountability.
With respect to the first component, we need to consider
whether we are focusing on the symptoms or we are addressing
the root cause. It is like taking an aspirin for a headache. If
the headache keeps on coming back, then perhaps, maybe, the
aspirin wasn't the right medicine. We need to focus on the true
cause of the issue and ensure that the effectiveness of our
corrective actions can be objectively measured through
improvements in performance.
The second aspect is accountability. Some call
accountability follow through. Accountability is critical for
any organization or any program to be successful.
Employees are trained on the requirements and understand
the requirements. Managers and leaders need to mentor their
staff and make sure these requirements are met. Then if
employees or managers are either unwilling or unable to meet
those requirements, they need to be held accountable for their
actions. On one level, that may call for additional training.
In more egregious cases, it may also mean consequences ranging
from counseling to letters of reprimand, from potentially being
removed from having the privilege to work on this project
depending on the severity of the situation.
At the Yucca Mountain Project, it is important to recognize
that the vast majority of the nearly 2,000 people who work on
the Project--most of them citizens of Nevada--have high
standards, behave professionally and perform good work, day in
and day out. At the same time, though, we need to recognize
that the actions of a few or the actions of the one can
dramatically undermine the confidence and damage the reputation
of hundreds of credible, honest and trustworthy people who have
worked very long and hard on this project. Managers and leaders
of this organization need to monitor their ongoing activities
and address quality issues real-time. They need to know what is
going on in their work spaces and correct issues on the spot.
In order to be effective, managers and leaders need to be
visible, they need to be engaged, and they need to actively
listen. Managers and leaders need to communicate issues up the
chain of command quickly and effectively as well as be
responsible for developing solutions.
Managers and leaders need to do this today, and they need
to do it again tomorrow and the day after that until it becomes
habit. Habits, good or bad, help define who we are as
individuals and who we are as organizations. Habits over time
become our culture.
If I may take a couple of minutes to talk briefly on some
of the work stoppages that my office has ordered, I would
appreciate 2 more minutes.
Mr. Porter. No problem.
Mr. Golan. First, I would like to talk about the USGS work
performed by the Department, which were discussed in our
technical report issued in February 2006.
Our independent technical evaluation noninfiltration
estimates developed by the U.S. Geologic Survey were found to
be consistent with the conclusions that were completed by
scientists independent of this project under future predicted
climate conditions. Nevertheless, our quality assurance
requirements were not met; and, consequently, we are expending
time and resources to replace that work.
We have directed that Sandia National Laboratories
redevelop computer codes that will generate new infiltration
rate estimates in accordance with our QA requirements and then
replace those infiltration rate estimates after the work has
been independently reviewed.
I take full accountability for that decision, sir.
In other matters, more recently, we suspended the authority
of our contractor to approve quality documents in the area of
facility design because the flow-down of design requirement was
not documented in accordance with our procedures. While our QA
procedures did not require us to suspend work in this case, we
nonetheless did to address any potential issues before moving
forward with our new design to support the clean canistered
approach to waste handling operations.
In January of this year, we issued a stop-work order at the
site when a cable being laid in the exploratory tunnel did not
meet established code requirements. Workers at the site brought
this to our attention, and we appreciate and applaud their
actions. We have taken steps to address this issue.
In April, we issued a stop-work order for work associated
with the use of certain chemical standards because we found
procedures used to procure those standards did not meet our
specifications. We are taking steps to address this issue.
Additionally, we are continuing our investigation on the
calibration and use of humidity and temperature probes by one
of our national laboratories.
In all these cases, after we understand the facts, we will
in a very deliberate way take actions necessary to ensure the
quality of our work and hold managers and employees accountable
for their actions as well as recognize those individuals who
identified issues and took the right action.
We are taking aggressive actions and measures to find
quality assurance issues as well as take actions to address
them. However, as everyone on the panel has pointed out today,
these corrective actions in my mind amount to rework and a
defect. While we will do what is necessary to ensure our work
products meet our quality assurance requirements, I have a
management goal where we do all our work right the first time,
every time.
Let me digress for a moment. I do not want to give the
impression that a good QA program or good QA is defined by the
absence of issues. We will find those situations that do not
meet our requirements that will necessitate action. We believe,
however, that with a good QA program we will find these
situations early, within hours or days, and correct issues
while they are small. Early detection and prompt action is our
goal.
Secretary Bodman a year ago asked this team to focus on
working to make this project safer, simpler and more reliable
and to improve the quality and culture of this organization as
our No. 1 priority. We have worked diligently on this task, and
the Department will seek to demonstrate good quality, good
science, and good processes in our license application and
across our entire organization through our performance.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Porter. Thank you for your testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Golan follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Porter. At this time, I would like to ask unanimous
consent that all Members have 5 legislative days to submit
written statements and questions for the hearing record, and
answers to written questions provided by the witnesses also be
included in the record.
Without objection, it is so ordered.
I would also like to ask unanimous consent that all
exhibits, documents and other materials referred to by Members
and witnesses may be included in the hearing record and that
all Members be permitted to revise and extend remarks. Without
objection.
Let the record reflect a quorum is now present. Thank you.
I would like to now open it up for some questions for the
panel. I would like to really begin myself and, since we are
two Members--Congressmen--will be informal with questions. I
would like to begin.
Mr. Golan, I wear two hats, one as a Member of Congress
from Nevada, one as chairman of this subcommittee. And
whether--of course, my position is very clear on the Project,
because I represent the State of Nevada and am very concerned
about Yucca Mountain and its impact on our community and State.
But let me put on my hat for one moment as chairman.
It appears to me that no one is in charge of the Yucca
Mountain Project. And I appreciate that you have been there
about a year. But whether this is a design of a space shuttle
or whether this is a design of an airplane, I personally would
be afraid to fly it. And I know that a lot of DOE folks mean
well and are working hard and a lot of great employees that
mean well, but I am not sure any of them are responsible or
taking full responsibility. And I am not sure whether you would
let one of your children fly on an airplane that DOE is
building right now, referring to Yucca Mountain.
Time and time again, there has been questions of the safety
and quality assurance. And, again, whether it is Wall Street or
the private sector, with this much turnover in management, Wall
Street would shut you down, the private sector or local
government would shut you down, with 9 of 17 key management
positions gone, 3 of the directors gone.
Time and time again, testimony by experts that are saying
that there are serious, serious safety problems--forget the
word quality assurance. This is safety about men, women, and
children around this country and in the State of Nevada.
But my biggest concern, whether I was for or against the
Project--and you know I am opposed to the Project--I would not
trust my child to fly on your airplane. I would not trust my
child's safety to be in your hands, because I don't believe
anybody is in charge.
My staff has done hours and hours of testimony with
employees. I have spent time talking to employees, again, find
hard-working individuals, but I have yet to find anyone that
says that this project to date will be safe, other than
management personnel. They are all very concerned. Employees
are concerned. There's a morale problem. They are concerned
about the turnover in management. They are concerned about the
change in design of your airplane every other week. So I, too,
share that concern.
I know today is about some questions, but I will tell you
that I am very, very troubled as a Member of this Congress. And
I know other Members of Congress, all they want to do is find--
not all but many just want to find a place for the storage of
nuclear waste. And out of sight out of mind. But for the folks
living in Nevada, it is not out of sight, out of mind; and I am
very concerned.
Again, we have document after document after document
stating that there is serious problems from management of the
contract, with your subcontractors, there has been safety of
employees because of different things through the years. I
state that I question if anybody is in charge.
Mr. Golan. Well, sir, I am in charge; and I take
responsibility for this operation. Over the last year, I have
spent a lot of time on various aspects of the Project, from the
total systems performance assessment [TSPA], through the
seismic analysis, through the design analysis of the
facilities, all the way down to the layout of the facility at
the site.
Secretary Bodman asked--he gave us direction a year ago,
very clear direction. He said, make it simpler and make it
safer; and over the last year, we focused on that, sir.
We talked about the redesign of the surface facilities.
That is the first time we have done the redesign of the surface
facilities since the site recommendation was basically made.
And we took the approach with the clean canistered approach to
make it safer, simpler and more reliable. Rather than handling
bare spent fuel at the site, we are going to predominantly
handle canister fuel. That is safer for the workers. That is
safer for the State. That is simpler and more reliable.
Second, we designated Sandia National Laboratory to
coordinate all our scientific work. We are taking advantage of
truly one of the gems of the national laboratory system in
Sandia, and Sandia earned the right as our lead laboratory
because of the good work they did at the waste isolation pilot
plant. We want to establish a trust but verify culture.
A couple of weeks back, we designated the Oak Ridge
Institute for Science and Education [ORISE], as our independent
review of our technical work. When we issued our technical
report on the USGS infiltration work, we had that work
independently verified, but we had to put together a team of
individuals from the University of Arizona, Colorado School of
Mines and the Department of Agriculture. Now we have access to
nearly 100 universities to do the independent work.
We have established our safety conscious work environment
across the entire organization. Before, it was just set up in
the Yucca Mountain Project office out in Las Vegas. I have the
employee concerns manager and the director of quality assurance
reporting to my office. We recently reorganized our staff to
focus on line management accountability; and we have project
offices, from chief scientist to chief engineer, regulatory
authority, all assigned line management responsibilities,
reporting to the director to clarify roles and
responsibilities.
These are just a few actions that we have taken to focus on
making it safer, simpler, and more reliable. As I said, I have
looked at aspects of this project from the infiltration down to
the transport of the water as it leaves the waste package here.
I think our science is sound, our engineering is sound and
conservative, and the path forward that we intend to put this
project on will make it safer, simpler and more reliable than
it was before.
Mr. Porter. Do you agree with the Secretary's comments that
our Yucca Mountain Project is broken?
Mr. Golan. I want to put that into context. The Yucca
Mountain was supposed to start accepting waste in 1998. We are
8 years beyond that schedule. Clearly, there were things not
going right for us not to meet that deadline. So I can
understand the Secretary's frustration, and I can understand
that classification of the Project as being broken.
Mr. Porter. Thank you.
Congressman Gibbons.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Golan, I think you can agree with GAO's study, can you
not, that there has been a serious quality control problem over
years. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Golan. I agree. I have read the reports by the general
of the Government Accountability Office over the years; and I
agree with the conclusions of their reports, sir.
Mr. Gibbons. And, as you heard today, in their testimony it
does tell of a long history of quality assurance problems. You
heard their testimony as they sat here today.
Mr. Golan. I did. But the reports also include, sir, the
recognition over the years that the quality assurance program
has been improving since the 1980's.
Mr. Gibbons. I will buy that. You say you are making
improvements; you are making steps forward.
Let me ask you a question, because you just testified that
you want to make it safer. The legislative bill that you are
supporting, that you are pushing, that is coming before this
Congress eliminates any applicability of our Nation's hazardous
waste disposable laws, preempts State and local air quality
regulations and usurps a State's traditional authority to
administer the waters within its regions. How do you believe
that makes it safer?
Mr. Golan. Sir, if I may, in regards to the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act provision, the requirements for
shallow land disposal of hazardous waste compared to the
disposal requirements of the spent nuclear fuel and high-level
waste proposed for Yucca Mountain, Yucca Mountain has orders of
magnitude, more safeguards and more protection than what you
would find in a standard hazardous waste disposal cell.
Mr. Gibbons. So you're saying that DOE's high-level waste
management protection would preempt and actually be on an order
of magnitude greater maybe than the State laws that have air
and water quality assurances in them?
Mr. Golan. Sir, I am talking about the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act provision----
Mr. Gibbons. I am talking about the bill that is before
Congress today that your organization--your Department
supports.
Mr. Golan. I would like to go through the other two aspects
of the bill that you mentioned, sir.
Mr. Gibbons. I just want your statement. Do you believe
that DOE, by supporting this piece of legislation, will make
Yucca Mountain safer?
Mr. Golan. If I might just add the air provision, sir----
Mr. Gibbons. It is a yes or no question.
Mr. Golan. I would like just to go through the three
provisions that you mentioned.
Mr. Gibbons. You can go through the provisions. Just give
me a yes or no answer to it.
Mr. Golan. With regard to the air provision, we still are
required to get air permits; and the environmental protection
agency would be the issues of those air permits.
Mr. Gibbons. But this legislation is going to take State
standards out of it.
Mr. Golan. It puts authority to issue air permits with the
Environmental Protection Agency, sir.
Mr. Gibbons. Yes, the government, Federal Government.
Mr. Golan. Yes, sir.
And, last, with regard to water, the only thing the
Department is asking for is to be treated by like any other
entity. Most of the water we are using is for worker safety. It
is for dust suppression. It gets very dry and dusty. Most of
the water is being used for dust suppression.
Over the course of 5 years we intend to use the equivalent
of 4 days worth of water that is used in Las Vegas, so over the
course of 5 years we are just asking to be treated as any other
person or any other entity asking for a State water permit. We
would not be using the water that Las Vegas typically uses the
aquifers for, and all we are asking for is to be treated
equally under that provision.
Mr. Gibbons. Well, that doesn't require a law change.
Mr. Golan. We find it very difficult, sir, to get water
permits issued for simple things such as dust suppression at
the site.
Mr. Gibbons. Is that because you don't have access or you
don't have title to the water?
Mr. Golan. It is because we have a difficult time getting
permits from the State and to get access to the water, sir.
Mr. Gibbons. There are courts to deal with that if the
State doesn't give you a permit.
But let me ask you a question, because you are the expert
and you are the person sitting here talking to me about quality
assurance. I am a scientist. I come out of the mining industry.
Let me ask you a question.
Do you feel that the quality assurance standards for the
rock bolts that are in the mine that are applied today meet the
quality assurance for a long-term assessment for those rock
bolts that are in there? I mean----
Mr. Golan. Are we talking about the rocks bolts that are
currently installed, sir?
Mr. Gibbons. Yes.
Mr. Golan. For the--when--if we get construction
authorization from the NRC, our intent is to change the nature
of the support structures inside the Yucca Mountain facility.
Mr. Gibbons. Why do you need to do that?
Mr. Golan. Because we have a provision that has--the waste
has to be retrievable for a period of time from 50 to up to 300
years after emplacement. So we are going to change the nature
of the ground support.
Mr. Gibbons. In other words, the rock bolt quality
assurance today doesn't meet those standards?
Mr. Golan. Again, this is an exploratory tunnel, sir; and
when we go into actual mining excavation and preparation for
the tunnel for actual waste disposal, there will be a different
set of standards and a different set of requirements that will
be implemented.
Mr. Gibbons. But the standards today don't meet what your
expectations are, do they?
Mr. Golan. We don't intend to dispose of the waste in the
exploratory tunnels.
Mr. Gibbons. You have a wonderful way of articulating a
non-answer to my question.
Mr. Golan. I just said we are going to use a different set
of standards when we actually----
Mr. Gibbons. We will move on.
You anticipate removing about 147,000 acres, withdrawing
that land----
Mr. Golan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gibbons [continuing]. In the State of Nevada. Where is
that land located today?
Mr. Golan. It is located around the Yucca Mountain site;
and I can provide a map for the record, sir.
Mr. Gibbons. Would you please?
Mr. Golan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gibbons. Is it within the Air Force training area?
Mr. Golan. Part of the land is within Nellis Air Force
Base, yes, sir.
Mr. Gibbons. How much of it?
Mr. Golan. About a quarter, sir.
Mr. Gibbons. You anticipate restricting overflight and
training from Nellis Air Force Base in that area.
Mr. Golan. We anticipate there will be some flight
restrictions that may be required during the waste in place and
the waste handling operations.
Mr. Gibbons. So about 30,000 acres is going to be removed
from the Air Force training capability, a little more?
Mr. Golan. About, a little more, somewhere around that,
yes, sir.
Mr. Gibbons. Somewhere around 37. Nellis is one of the
principal pilot training areas that we have in this country,
one of the few remaining where those of us who have trained
there are able to get the skills and the ability to defend this
country; and because of your now urgency of withdrawing 147,000
acres, taking part of that away from the Air Force, we are
going to restrict those pilots from being able to get that
training, to be able to protect this country, to be able to
learn themselves how to better do their jobs. How do you
justify national security concerns?
Mr. Golan. Because, sir, this project has been approved by
the President and both Houses of Congress.
Mr. Gibbons. There is a lot of things we approved in this
Congress, a lot of things that are signed by the President of
United States and a lot of things that don't jeopardize the
national security of this country.
Your removal of that land, your removal of restricting that
area, in my view, takes away a measurable part of the training
area that these pilots train on; and, in addition to that, you
are going to restrict them because of the railroad access, the
highway accesses that you are going to have to build in there.
So it is more than just that small fragment. You are going to
set aside a large part of true training area that is the PhD
for our men and women who fly these airplanes and defend this
country because you want a larger and restricted area for this
waste management area.
You know, I am not opposed to nuclear energy. I am opposed
to the poorly thought-out provision of Yucca Mountain.
Mr. Golan. Sir, I am a member of the U.S. Armed Forces; and
I appreciate your concern. But when the site recommendation was
approved by Congress, it was always the intent to remove the
147,000 acres permanently as part----
Mr. Gibbons. Whose intent? I have been here for 10 years.
Mr. Gulan. That was--in order for us to receive a
construction authorization from the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission require permanent land withdrawal.
Mr. Gibbons. Congress hasn't said we are going to
permanently withdraw 147,000----
Mr. Gulan. No, that's in front of Congress to decide, sir.
Mr. Gibbons. Exactly. It's your decision to bring it before
us today.
We'll have another round, Mr. Chairman. I'm sorry to keep
dominating the questions here.
Mr. Porter. Thank you, Congressman.
Question. Margaret, explain the process of the licensing
application. Once it's provided to you, then your team
investigates all the information of the provider? How does that
work?
Ms. Federline. Yes, sir. Once the license application is
submitted to the NRC we have a 90-day acceptance period where
we will conduct an acceptance review before we decide if it
will be docketed. At that point all the information needs to be
complete. Once the application is docketed, we will conduct a
detailed rigorous independent review based on our staff's
independent knowledge of Yucca Mountain. Once that is complete,
we will develop a safety evaluation report and it will go to
the licensing board for decision.
Mr. Porter. How do you do that in 90 days?
Ms. Federline. We have established a prelicensing--
Congress, in its wisdom, established a prelicensing
consultation. And when I say consultation, I don't mean--it is
a process by which we interact with DOE so that we can identify
issues which would be essential to address to ensure a complete
license application. We have referred to these as key technical
issues, and we've identified over 290 of these issues which we
believe would be important to address in order to have adequate
information to conduct a licensing review.
Mr. Porter. So in other words, you're periodically doing
audits of your own and working with DOE and giving advice,
although they don't have to follow it at this point. Will you
give some direction as to some of the things they need to do
prior to the application being submitted?
Ms. Federline. We want to make sure that DOE understands
our licensing requirement, so we feel it's very important for
them in developing a license application to be clear as to what
our licensing requirements require. And so the prelicensing
period is for us to interact with DOE and to provide
information and guidance similar to what we do with other--
licensing other nuclear facilities.
Mr. Porter. So are we technically in the prelicensing stage
at this point?
Ms. Federline. Yes, we are.
Mr. Porter. So the last 20 years technically has been
prelicensing period?
Ms. Federline. Yes, it has.
Mr. Porter. So you have found close to 290 areas of
concern; is that what you're saying?
Ms. Federline. No. We identified a framework of issues
which need to be addressed to thoroughly characterize or
thoroughly make a safety case which answers the requirements in
our regulations.
Mr. Porter. So it's like questions that you have that they
need to answer?
Ms. Federline. Well, they're actually part of the
demonstration of the safety case, pieces of the safety case
that would need to be demonstrated to provide adequate
information for us to conduct a safety review.
Mr. Porter. So do they, then, give you preliminary
prelicensing information that may be a test prior to the final
application being submitted?
Ms. Federline. No, they don't. We have interactions in
which we identify the types of information that would be
necessary, and we do provide guidance back to them if we feel
that they don't understand our requirements. It's not--it would
be--as a regulator, we could not make a predecision before the
license application comes in. And so it's strictly intended to
establish a framework which explains our regulations and what
would be required.
Mr. Porter. So throughout this process there has been
communication between NRC and DOE which is normal in whether it
be a nuclear reactor or Department of Energy, sort of following
the guidelines that are consistent throughout the industry,
correct?
Ms. Federline. Yes. As part of design certification we do
do precertification reviews where we do a similar type of
thing, identify issues which need to be addressed as part of
the design certification.
Mr. Porter. Would the USNRC have a problem with Congress
being able to see a draft license application from DOE
regarding this project?
Ms. Federline. We have not seen a draft license
application. And when one became available to us when it was
submitted, if DOE had not made it publically available,
obviously we would make it publically available.
Mr. Porter. Would you have a problem with Congress seeing
one today if one were--or I guess let me ask this question a
little differently. We have asked numerous times for a copy of
a draft license application, and Department of Energy has
consistently refused to provide it to the American public.
Would you have a problem with us asking for a copy of that from
the Department of Energy?
Ms. Federline. Well, my sense is that at the time the
license application is submitted it would contain the necessary
and complete information. You know, we would not get involved
between Congress and DOE in terms of what you require from DOE.
Mr. Porter. So you wouldn't have a problem, then, with us
requesting that information, it's between us and DOE?
Ms. Federline. Yes.
Mr. Porter. Thank you.
Congressman.
Mr. Gibbons. Let me followup with some of my questioning
that I started before. And Director Federline, if the proposal
that's before Congress today, the legislation which, if I may
describe radically undercuts the traditional requirements by
demonstrating nuclear safety by allowing unlimited changes in
the repository with no right to a formal or informal oral
hearing and only 18 months for environmental review, do you
feel that is sufficient to give the American public confidence
in the proposals as they move forward?
Ms. Federline. I'm sorry, sir, but the Commission has not
completed its review of the legislation; we have not completed
development of comments.
Mr. Gibbons. OK. Without having a formal opinion of the--
about the condition, what's your personal opinion of language
that completely undercuts and removes the, as I said, removes
the right to a formal or informal oral hearing and restricts it
to 18 months for environmental review?
Ms. Federline. With all due respect, sir, it would be
inappropriate for me as a regulator to comment on standards
that could be the subject of a licensing proceeding.
Mr. Gibbons. Well, let me go back to Mr. Gulan. What's your
opinion of having no right to a formal or informal oral hearing
on changes to Yucca Mountain?
Mr. Gulan. Well, first, sir, after we submit the license
application the NRC, in accordance with the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act, is 3 years, with the possible exception they can
request an additional 4th year before they make a decision on
whether to grant the Department construction authorization.
What we are asking for in the legislative package is, in
the second phase of that--in other words, the licensing
amendment to receive and possess--that the NRC basically have
12 months, with the possible extension of 6 months, to review
that process, which I don't think is inconsistent with--because
they'll have had 4 years to review the license before--
inconsistent with potentially how they would review an action
in a nuclear reactor licensing arena.
Mr. Gibbons. But in demonstrating nuclear safety there's a
lot of people outside of DOE would have concerns, and you're
now restricting or limiting to any formal or informal oral
statements or position----
Mr. Gulan. I don't believe the proposed legislation
restricts the interactions as you're talking through here, sir.
Mr. Gibbons. Well, the way I read it for those unlimited
changes that DOE wants to make to Yucca Mountain, and that
means expanding from 70,000 to whatever number you plan to
propose in the future, that you are going to restrict the
informal and formal oral hearings.
Mr. Gulan. Sir, that provision in the legislative proposal
refers to the second step in the licensing process. When we
submit our license application to the NRC, they'll have a
period up to 4 years to review and to grant the Department the
license----
Mr. Gibbons. But that's for the original 70,000 tons?
Mr. Gulan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gibbons. And now I'm talking about the unlimited
changes that you want to make. Why would it be good, why should
we permit you to restrict informal or formal hearings and
restrict it to 18 months, for example, if you wanted to double
the size?
Mr. Gulan. Sir, that provision, I'd just like to go back
to, that's after receiving construction authorization, the 18-
month provision would be a license to receive and possess. So
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would still have up to 4
years to review the license application and go through the
hearing process, the formal hearing process in that 4-year
period.
Mr. Gibbons. Including the unlimited extensions and
expansions that you want to put on Yucca Mountain after you get
the original 70,000-ton determination?
Mr. Gulan. Sir, again, the second part of the license
application is the license amendment to receive and possess.
And again, I don't have a copy of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
in front of me here, and I'd be glad to take that question for
the record, but the Nuclear Waste Policy Act is clear on the
amount of time the Regulatory Commission has to review and
issue a judgment on construction authorization. What the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act didn't have when it was written or
amended was a timeframe in which the NRC would then grant the
second part of that license for receive and possess.
Mr. Gibbons. One of the things that troubles me about the
bill that your organization is proposing to Congress is the
authority to limit the exercise of jurisdictional power by
States, tribal governments, etc., over the transportation
requirements through their communities, through their
reservations, along their highways and byways. Why do you want
to take away local government's authority to review
transportation routes?
Mr. Gulan. Sir, I'd like to offer a briefing to your office
and to you on the full scope of the legislative package. I
didn't come prepared to necessarily talk in detail on that
today; however, I do want to point to the transportation
aspect.
The Department has been transporting nuclear materials and
nuclear waste over the last 50 years and it has a very good
safety record. Our intention, with the transportation provision
in our legislative proposal, was to extend all the work, all
the interactions that we currently do when we ship special
nuclear materials, when we ship low level waste and when we
ship transuranic waste. And it was meant to extend those types
of provisions to how we transport waste to Yucca Mountain, sir.
Mr. Gibbons. If those provisions, as you say, have resulted
in such a historic safety record, why do you want to exclude
local government from having a say in either the routes, which
roads or which train lines or over what bridges or along what
schools or along which communities that this material travels?
Mr. Gulan. Sir, again, I'd offer again that we would come
and provide you a briefing on the legislative package; but
again, the intent of that provision was basically to extend the
type of activities and the type of provisions that we have with
the other nuclear materials that we ship and extend that over
into the shipment of spent nuclear fuel----
Mr. Gibbons. Well, I understand the idea and the intent,
but I don't understand the idea to exclude and cut out of the
picture those people which are charged with overseeing the
safety in some of these communities, including their first
responders, which would have to respond if there was an
incident or an accident, from you giving them or bringing them
into the picture. That's what I don't understand.
Mr. Gulan. Again, I would offer that our office could come
and provide you a briefing on this and walk through that
specific provision.
Mr. Gibbons. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Porter. Thank you.
Mr. Friedman, thank you for your hard work for probably 8
or 9 months--I didn't add up the time, but I appreciate it very
much.
Mr. Friedman. Thank you.
Mr. Porter. In the report that we received today you point
out some key areas, and I appreciate you addressing them in
your opening comments. But more specifically, you talked about
the compromise of scientific notebook requirements. Now I'm not
a scientist, but it's my understanding from your information
that a scientific notebook is a standard protocol in the
science community--I'm quoting from your statement--that
document research approaches and outcomes, and in doing so they
aid an individual other than the original author in reproducing
and tracing the effort. And according to your report as of
today, an area of concern is there was the lack of a scientific
notebook--or at least that they weren't following the
requirements; and you--if I read it properly, and correct me if
I'm wrong, it's like this--it appears that this notebook
requirement was stopped once they found problems. Is that what
you're saying in this report?
Mr. Friedman. Mr. Chairman, what we--on the particular--
first of all, you have, of course, correctly characterized the
importance of lab notebooks. They're essential in the science
field. It allows recording of information that's generated
during current analyses and allows others to buildupon that. So
you have characterized it correctly.
What we found in the incident in question is the lab
notebook had not been maintained from the outset, which
violated good science principles, and this is a 6-year old
problem. And it was compounded from our perspective by the fact
that once it was determined that the lab notebook had never
been maintained from the outset, the contractor and the USGS
and the Department decided to compromise the requirement using
an alternate document, which in our view was an unacceptable
remedy to the problem.
Mr. Porter. So how do you define the difference between
intentional negligence and something that's criminal; how do
you define the difference?
Mr. Friedman. Well, there are questions of intent, Mr.
Chairman, there are questions of materiality that are key, and
those are the essence of the items that I would identify to
you.
Mr. Porter. It appears to me there was intentional behavior
to not keep track of this science so no one would be able to
check it in the future, and it appears to me that's
intentional, is that what you're saying, that it's intentional?
Mr. Friedman. I could not reach the conclusion that there
was an intent to not participate in the lab notebook
requirement for some nefarious reason as to the future ability
to track the work. I can't reach that conclusion, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Porter. Also, you mention the 6-year delay in servicing
is and dealing with the controversial e-mails, those are
inconsistent with sound quality assurance protocols. You go on
to say we could not find a satisfactory explanation as to why
the e-mails had not been recognized as problematic years
earlier. This would allow the Department to address the
concerns raised by the contents of the e-mails in a timely
manner.
Despite this, the comments--and I'm paraphrasing and moving
ahead on your comments because you know them better than I do,
but despite this the comments and e-mails appears to have gone
unchallenged. Additionally, internal quality assurance reviews
over the years failed to identify the questionable e-mails.
Again, can you explain to me a little bit more about what
you're saying here?
Mr. Friedman. Yes. Six years obviously has passed, Mr.
Chairman, since the original offending e-mails were written.
And in that 6-year period you referred earlier, or Mr. Gibbons
did, to the turnover in personnel--maybe it was you, Mr.
Chairman--people have minds, memories have faded, people have
moved on, documentation is no longer available. And the point
that we are trying to make is that if these offending e-mails
had been identified contemporaneously or very close to the time
that they were in fact written, minds would have been fresh,
memories could have been fresh, the Department could have
addressed the issues very promptly and saved a great deal of
turmoil that has occurred as a result. So our point is that
there was reason to believe--we had testimony to suggest that
quality assurance people had in fact seen the e-mails, and yet
for some reason the light bulb did not go on or they did not
bring those to anybody's attention until a 6-year period had
elapsed.
Mr. Porter. The genesis of the project is that Yucca
Mountain was chosen because the mountain may provide some
natural barrier to prevent filtration--or infiltration of
moisture into the storage which could then contaminate ground
water. And the genesis of the science is that the mountain is
safe, and that there is minimal, if any, infiltration of
moisture. Again, in your report you mention that control files
relating to the simulation of net infiltration from modern and
potential future climates, AMR was not maintained in accordance
with Data Management System's requirements, and that during the
evaluation of AMR for the simulation of net infiltration from
modern and potential future climates the team wasn't able to
reproduce the model due to the absence of certain control
files. Can you explain your findings under that No. 3?
Mr. Friedman. I can, Mr. Chairman. In recent years there
was an attempt made to reconstruct that model, to evaluate it
further and to see whether it withstood the test of time. When
they tried to recreate it, they found that there were certain
control documents which they could not find in the master
control file. And of course in a $9 billion project overall you
would anticipate that would be absolutely essential. Ultimately
the files were located in the residence of one of the
participants--or at least part of the files were found there.
Mr. Porter. Thank you.
Mr. Gibbons. Mr. Chairman, I'm a bit taken aback by some of
the answers we've gotten today because I expected a little more
of being able to bridge between the problems of the quality
assurance issues that have been described by either DOE or the
GAO in their development of the program and the policy here at
Yucca Mountain. But I'm more troubled by the fact that we are
here in Congress and we are trying to bridge and overcome these
quality assurance issues, and you know, it seems to me right
now that we've kind of got the cart before the horse. You know,
we've seen a lot of problems with the scientific analysis
coming up, maybe they weren't intentionally changed or
fraudulently put out there, and that did not give rise to a
criminal action, but it does give rise to some serious
concerns, concerns as a scientist myself, as a geologist, as a
mining geologist, it gives rise of concern to me that perhaps
those that were in charge of doing the science work and those
who actually performed that science didn't have in their bag of
work ethics the right motivation to be doing what they should
have been doing on this project and simply took shortcuts. If
that's the case, we've obviously got some serious problems
here, or if they just simply said if they want more quality
assurance I'll go write more quality assurance. Nonetheless,
there's some real serious quality assurance problems here that
haven't been answered adequately in my mind.
There is also this question about the new piece of
legislation which DOE is supporting before this Congress in an
effort to overcome some problems that they can't meet today.
And I think unfortunately I'm still of the opinion that this
project that's fatally flawed, that no matter how much you move
the goalpost to make it work, no matter how many times you
change the standard to make something fit, no matter how many
times you get a bigger hammer to fit a square peg in a round
hole, it's still going to be a square peg in a round hole. And
I think the bill that's before us is an unconstitutional
usurpation of the States' sovereign prerogatives, whether it's
in Nevada, but it sets a horrible precedence across this
country because you're forcing communities, you're forcing
States to give up traditional jurisdiction under the
Constitution of areas that they normally had authority to
regulate. It circumvents the scientific flaws that these people
here have already said have existed and have a history of
existing. It deprives the States, as I said, and localities
nationwide for the role in waste transport. It exonerates the
Department of Energy from traditional regulations for nuclear
projects.
I think what we are doing here is getting the bigger hammer
out and we are trying to make everything fit. As a geologist, I
can't accept it. First of all, to build Yucca Mountain in a
safe place or build a project at Yucca Mountain that is
supposed to be geologically stable should at first raise the
flags automatically when it was a mountain. You know, it didn't
get there, it didn't get to be a mountain by some placid
tectonic activity. It's got serious geologic problems, and we
don't have the vision to look down the road and say when those
are going to reoccur. We are hoping that the blindness--with
blinders on that we will somehow get past this, wash our hands
of it and say out of sight, out of mind, we are done, and oh,
by the way, let's make it bigger so we can take in everything.
What's happening here today is that, because of the NIMBY
syndrome--and I have to admit, it's in Nevada, we don't want it
in our back yard, no other State wants it in their back yard,
but we've failed to meet, I think, this country's expectations
of how to deal with nuclear energy, and it will result in the
end of nuclear energy in this country if the Department of
Energy is allowed to complete Yucca Mountain.
So my view, Mr. Chairman, is that the bill is fatally
flawed, the project is fatally flawed, the concepts of how to
deal with nuclear waste are fatally flawed. It has for 30 years
had blinders on to just go forward with this, to make sure the
deep geologic burial, according to the Nuclear Energy
Institute, accommodates all of those power plants that want to
close down or are closed down, but it doesn't meet the safety
requirements that this country and this public expect. And I'm
sad, saddened by the day that we sit here in here and talk
about changing the standards, eliminating the oversight, giving
unlimited jurisdiction to a department who's got sole
responsibility for this type of occurrence. And it's worse than
the chicken watching the fox--or the hen--excuse me, the fox
watching the chicken house--I'll get that yet.
And so, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you again for your
leadership. I have no more questions about this. I haven't
heard anything that allows me to get a better feeling for
what's going on, but I do appreciate the fact that you've
invited me here today, and I appreciate the fact that you have
allowed me to participate in this hearing.
With that, I want to thank all of our witnesses. I know you
have tough jobs ahead of you, just as we have tough decisions
to make, and I appreciate the fact that you have been here
before us and responded to our questions.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Porter. Thank you, Congressman. I'd like to ask just a
couple more questions.
And Mr. Wells, again, thank you for being here. I did not
want you to feel like we left you out of this debate----
Mr. Wells. No problem.
Mr. Porter. But I know that you and your staff spent a lot
of time and we greatly appreciate it, and on behalf of the
American people we appreciate it.
GAO has investigated quality assurance in Yucca Mountain
for 20 something years. And the title of the 1988 report was
Repository Work Should Not Proceed Until Quality Assurance Is
Adequate. Now this is 1988. In light of the GAO's extensive
work, why do you think DOE is still experiencing these same
problems, since 1988, the same problems?
Mr. Wells. You know, I think it goes back to--it was
encouraging, everyone in the room probably picked up on Mr.
Gulan's statement that their goal was to have early detection
of these problems; and we have--since 1988 people have gone in
and looked and found problems that seemed to--quality assurance
problems that seemed to fester under the surface for a lot of
years and under the radar screen, and all of a sudden they
accumulate and they explode, and then the Department of Energy
jumps to some type of fix, and it's rework and it's expensive.
And you have to ask yourself why does that happen. And you
know, consistently talking to the audit teams that have looked
at the Yucca Mountain project and the quality assurance
program, consistently we hear things with the culture, the
importance of QA not being as high as the importance of meeting
a schedule, or the ability to think that if it's wrong somebody
else will find it and fix it later. And I think Mr. Gulan's
commitment to change the culture is on the right track, to
elevate the importance of quality assurance to keep these
problems from festering so long. It shouldn't take 6 year e-
mails to discover that they occurred; it shouldn't take the NRC
to observe an audit and point out that the equipment they're
using hasn't been calibrated in years. It's that culture that's
unacceptable and it has to be changed.
Mr. Porter. Thank you, Mr. Wells. And I find it truly
amazing that we are talking about high level nuclear waste, and
again, whether you're for or against Yucca Mountain, the fact
that these questions of safety keeps coming up, it's nuclear
waste, it's not about a bicycle plant someplace in Des Moines,
we are talking about high level nuclear waste, a science that's
untested, and continually questions of safety. And again, I
appreciate your comments, Mr. Wells.
Ms. Federline, another question for you, please. Is this
turnover of management, 9 of 17 key positions and 3 directors
in a short period of time, is that a concern for the NRC?
Ms. Federline. Well, I think overall the NRC feels that the
perspective of QA at DOE is very important; in other words,
finding problems is not the problem; a good QA program will
normally find problems. The issue with us is those problems
need to be quickly fixed and they need to be prevented from
recurrence. And those are two aspects that we want to emphasize
to DOE. And they need to put in place an organizational
structure which they feel will be effective in making those
corrections and seeing that the problems don't reoccur.
Mr. Porter. I see Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes has left.
I'd like to just ask a couple of additional questions.
Mr. Gulan, regarding the turnover of staff, 9 of 17, were
any of those individuals asked to leave?
Mr. Gulan. No. We did not renew a limited term SES
appointment, but the people that you talk about left on their
own volition.
Mr. Porter. So there was no encouragement on the part of
DOE for any of these individuals, it was just purely attrition
and retirement?
Mr. Gulan. Basically, sir.
Mr. Porter. So then who has been held accountable for
information that's been provided today? Has anyone been held
accountable?
Mr. Gulan. Yes, they have. And there are people who are no
longer working on this project.
Mr. Porter. You just moved them to another project,
somewhere in the nuclear industry?
Mr. Gulan. No. There's been folks in the contract or
organization who are no longer part of this project, sir.
Mr. Porter. And they're still working for the Federal
Government?
Mr. Gulan. I don't know, sir. They don't work on this
project.
Mr. Porter. OK. Is there a way that we can find out?
Mr. Gulan. Sure. We'll take that question for the record.
Mr. Porter. I appreciate that. Thank you.
I guess in closing, Mr. Gulan, I'll ask you a question.
Based on the findings of GAO and the Inspector General's
office, in discussions today and in prior discussions, how can
you say that we can assure the American public that Yucca
Mountain is and will be safe?
Mr. Gulan. Sir, that's our--the burden is on us to
demonstrate to you and to the American public that we can
operate Yucca Mountain safely. There is an established process
through the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, through the licensing
process that will be a very public process, the regulator being
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. So there is a formal
process. But before we get to that formal process there is a
process within the Department. Before we submit a license
application it has to pass our standards. And one of the things
that we didn't talk about today is the fact that we have not
talked about a schedule of when the license application will be
submitted.
I mentioned earlier in my testimony, Secretary Bodman gave
me clear instructions, make it simpler, make it safer, and
improve the quality and culture of this organization. Those
were his marching orders to me, sir, and we are following that.
After we review everything from the model down through the
design basis for the facilities, the safety analysis, the
seismic analysis and develop our license application, it's our
intent to conduct our internal reviews, our internal
independent reviews to ensure that our standards have been met,
to ensure that our quality standards have been met. And only
after our standards have been met will we be in a position to
submit our licensing application to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission for them to adjudicate the licensing process here.
So there are standards that have to be met in this
organization, and the bar is set high, before we send our
application request in to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Mr. Porter. So once the application is submitted, is it the
NRC's responsibility to determine if it's safe or is it DOE's?
Mr. Gulan. It's the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
responsibility to adjudicate that process, it's not ours.
Mr. Porter. So you don't accept responsibility if it's
safe----
Mr. Gulan. No. I accept responsibility. It is my
responsibility that we submit a high quality license
application that our standards have been met. It's the NRC's
job then to evaluate on whether or not they issue us a license
to construct, and then subsequently a license to receive and
possess; but it's our responsibility to meet our standards
first.
Mr. Porter. You know, I can remember growing up many, many
years ago--and I'm not sure if this cartoon is still around, it
was Family Circle. Steve, is it still in the paper, the Family
Circle?
Mr. Castor. Yes, it's in the Washington Post, sir.
Mr. Porter. Thank you. I haven't had a chance to look at
the cartoon pages as much as I'd like to, but there was this
cartoon, the Family Circle, and these kids were around saying
not me, not me, not me, not my fault, not my fault, not my
fault. And my biggest concern--again, whether you're for or
against Yucca Mountain--is that someday we are going to wake up
and 2000 DOE employees are going to say it wasn't my job, NRC
may wake up and say it wasn't our job, even though there was a
major catastrophe or major accident, and everyone is going to
go, not me. And I sense that time and time again, as I hear the
facts that are presented, that so far your decisions have not
been based upon sound science at the Department of Energy. The
White House, multiple administrations, have based decisions on
what they believe is sound science, this Congress is basing
decisions that are based upon what they feel are sound science,
and I have yet to hear the Department of Energy is using sound
science. It appears to me that there is a rush--20 years, but
there's a rush to appease the nuclear industry, there's a rush
to appease certain Members of Congress and certain
administrations, and there's a rush to get the job done. And
Mr. Gulan, I would just hope that someday Department of Energy
officials don't wake up and say not me, because I'm very, very
concerned.
Mr. Gulan. You won't hear those words from my mouth, sir.
Mr. Porter. Again, I want to thank you all for being here.
We will continue our investigation. We still have numerous
documents to review.
I appreciate Mr. Wells, Mr. Friedman, Ms. Federline and Mr.
Gulan for being here today, and look forward to continued
testimony in the future. We will be forwarding additional
questions that we'd like to have answers for the record. So
with that, we'll adjourn the meeting. Thank you all very much.
[Whereupon, at 3:38 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[The prepared statement of Hon. Danny K. Davis follows:]
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