<DOC>
[109th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:28228.wais]
LOOKING A GIFT HORSE IN THE MOUTH: A POST-KATRINA REVIEW OF
INTERNATIONAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 6, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-151
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
28-228 WASHINGTON : 2006
_____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512ÿ091800
Fax: (202) 512ÿ092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402ÿ090001
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee DIANE E. WATSON, California
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
DARRELL E. ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JON C. PORTER, Nevada C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina Columbia
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania ------
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio (Independent)
------ ------
David Marin, Staff Director
Lawrence Halloran, Deputy Staff Director
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on April 6, 2006.................................... 1
Statement of:
D'Agostino, Davi M., Director, Defense Capabilities and
Management; Scott Rowell, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of Defense; Gregory C.
Gottlieb, Acting Director of the Office of U.S. Foreign
Disaster Assistance, U.S. Agency for International
Development; Casey Long, Acting Director of the Office of
International Affairs, Federal Emergency Management Agency,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Deborah McCarthy,
Director of the Hurricane Katrina Task Force Working Group,
U.S. Department of State; and Hudson La Force, Senior
Counselor to the Secretary, U.S. Department of Education... 18
D'Agostino, Davi M....................................... 18
Gottlieb, Gregory C...................................... 44
La Force, Hudson......................................... 84
Long, Casey.............................................. 62
McCarthy, Deborah........................................ 70
Rowell, Scott............................................ 36
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Maryland, prepared statement of............... 13
D'Agostino, Davi M., Director, Defense Capabilities and
Management, prepared statement of.......................... 21
Davis, Chairman Tom, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Virginia, prepared statement of................... 4
Gottlieb, Gregory C., Acting Director of the Office of U.S.
Foreign Disaster Assistance, U.S. Agency for International
Development, prepared statement of......................... 46
Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Ohio, prepared statement of................... 98
La Force, Hudson, Senior Counselor to the Secretary, U.S.
Department of Education, prepared statement of............. 86
Long, Casey, Acting Director of the Office of International
Affairs, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, prepared statement of..... 64
McCarthy, Deborah, Director of the Hurricane Katrina Task
Force Working Group, U.S. Department of State, prepared
statement of............................................... 72
Rowell, Scott, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Homeland
Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, prepared statement of. 38
Waxman, Hon. Henry A., a Representative in Congress from the
State of California, prepared statement of................. 8
LOOKING A GIFT HORSE IN THE MOUTH: A POST-KATRINA REVIEW OF
INTERNATIONAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 2006
House of Representatives,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:13 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Davis
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Presents: Representatives Tom Davis, Ros-Lehtinen,
Gutknecht, Platts, Miller, Dent, Waxman, Owens, Cummings,
Kucinich, Clay, Ruppersberger, Higgins, and Norton.
Staff present: David Marin, staff director; Chas Phillips,
policy counsel; Rob White, communications director; Andrea
LeBlanc, deputy director of communications; Grace Washbourne
and Wimberly Fair, professional staff members; Teresa Austin,
chief clerk; Sarah D'Orsie, deputy clerk; Phil Barnett,
minority staff director/chief counsel; Michael McCarthy,
minority counsel; Earley Green, minority chief clerk; and Jean
Gosa, minority assistant clerk.
Chairman Tom Davis. Good morning. Thank you for your
patience. A quorum being present, the committee will come to
order.
After Hurricane Katrina, donations from other countries
poured into the U.S. Government. Offers of money, water, food,
and medical supplies and other commodities came from more than
130 nations and a dozen international organizations. In cash
alone, the United States has received $126 million to date.
On behalf of the members of the committee and the people we
represent, I want to thank those nations who rushed in to offer
assistance and aid to those Americans affected by Hurricane
Katrina. The list of countries who offered to help as reported
by the State Department and the Department of Defense is
enormous, and it reflects the goodwill of all people who come
to the aid of those in need. The United States is eternally
grateful for your generosity.
We are here today to find out if our government in effect
looked this gift horse in the mouth. We will examine how
prepared the Federal Government was to accept this
unprecedented level of aid from foreign governments and whether
the ad hoc procedures for accepting aid put in place after
Katrina has been adequate. It appears that policies and
procedures were lacking simply because no one in the Federal
Government anticipated needing or receiving this assistance. It
does no good to be offered money, food, water, or potentially
life-saving medical supplies if we don't have procedures in
place to get those donations into the hands of the people who
need them.
The Government Accountability Office is here to talk about
some of the problems they uncovered, among them about $66
million of $126 million donated has been allocated to the
Federal Emergency Management Agency to assist with long-term
recovery of Gulf Coast citizens. The remaining $60 million is
being held by the Department of State in a non-interest bearing
account. Why is this money not earning interest? Are there not
people or organizations in New Orleans or southern Louisiana or
the Mississippi Gulf Coast who could use the money?
Several thousand MREs, or meals ready to eat, were donated
for the hurricane relief but were not used. Why? The Federal
Government had difficulty accounting for in-kind assistance
received. The ad hoc procedures put in place after Katrina
didn't include policies to help ensure FEMA had oversight of
donated commodities such as food and water and medical supplies
and to ensure that commodities were vetted through the State
Department exceptions process. This resulted in incomplete
knowledge of in-kind assistance received from foreign
countries.
It appears in-kind contributions were not always properly
tracked at those final destinations. In one case, this failure
cost the U.S. Government approximately $80,000 in storage fees.
These are GAO's conclusions. FEMA may have a different view,
and we have FEMA here today as well to give its side of the
story.
I chaired the House Bipartisan Select Committee that
investigated the Katrina disaster. I traveled to New Orleans
and the Gulf Coast twice to see the damage and the recovery
firsthand. The American people saw the destruction on their TV
screens and the pages of their newspaper for weeks. I think
they, like me, would want answers as to how this unprecedented
amount of foreign assistance was used or not used.
The National Response Plan does contain procedures for
accepting offers of international assistance and response to
domestic incidents of national significance. The plan's
international coordination support annex charges the State
Department to coordinate and facilitate U.S. requests for aid
as conveyed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security or our
Federal Agencies. The State Department also acts as an
intermediary for offers of assistance, expediting delivery of
such assistance whenever possible. In addition, international
affairs offices within our government agencies are to act as
primary partners with the State Department in such endeavors.
Under this annex, the department may also engage the Red Cross
and the U.S. Agency for International Development.
Today we have witnesses from across the government, the
Department of State, the Department of Defense, USAID, FEMA,
the Department of Education, and the GAO to explain what
procedures were used to accept and distribute foreign disaster
assistance received during the aftermath of Katrina. We need to
get to the bottom of how this coordination should work and if
the current polices in place for the acceptance and use the
foreign disaster assistance are adequate. Under what authority
did the Department of State determine that it should hold
foreign cash donations that were meant for domestic disaster
assistance for Hurricane Katrina? Why did it take so long to
decide where to distribute the money? When the decisions were
made to give money for levy repair, why did the Army Corps of
Engineers turn down the $60 million? Why were they allowed to?
How did the Department of Education become involved in the
distribution of funds? And what led to the involvement of the
National Security Council regarding the international cash
donations?
Since the Department of Homeland Security is responsible
for developing the National Response Plan, how does DHS or FEMA
ensure the agencies involved in international assistance are
prepared to manage international assistance? How does FEMA
provide oversight for international assistance that is received
in the United States for domestic incident? Equally important,
does Congress understand how priorities for distribution are
reached and are we helping to make sure that the people who
need the foreign assistance are getting it?
On February 23rd, the White House released its report,
``The Federal Response for Hurricane Katrina, Lessons
Learned.'' The report recommended that the State and Homeland
Security Departments lead an interagency effort to develop
procedures for reviewing and accepting or rejecting any offers
of international assistance for a domestic catastrophic
incident, including a mechanism to receive, disburse, and audit
any cash assistance. These procedures are due to the Homeland
Security Council June 1st.
I look forward today to hearing what changes need to be
made so that this country can take advantage of the generosity
of other countries in our time of tragedy.
I would now yield to our ranking member, Mr. Waxman, for
his opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Tom Davis follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.003
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Chairman, this Nation is grateful for the
outpouring of support from around the world the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina. Nations large and small generously offered
money, supplies, and technical aid to help us recover from this
enormous natural disaster.
Unfortunately, we will hear today of a new GAO report that
finds serious waste and mismanagement of these international
donations. More than 6 months after Katrina made landfall,
nearly half of the funds donated by other nations have yet to
be spent. The Army Corps of Engineers for reasons unknown
decided not to accept $60 million of this money for levy
reconstruction. As a result, the $60 million has been sitting
in a State Department account that doesn't earn interest.
GAO says FEMA could have earned more than $1 million in
interest on this money, but the State Department wanted to keep
control of it. Well, this is bureaucracy at its worst and the
citizens of the Gulf Coast are suffering for it.
The Bush administration's mishandling of international
donations for Hurricane Katrina comes on the heals of its
mismanagement of international donations to rebuild Iraq. Just
this week, the Army Corps admitted that a project to build 142
health clinics in Iraq would run out of money with just 20
clinics completed due in part to runaway contractor overhead
costs as high as 50 percent. Army Corps officials said they
would seek foreign donations to complete the work, but the top
world health organization official for Iraq found the lack of
progress, ``shocking'' and said, ``that is affecting people's
expectations and people's trust, I must say.''
The same problems are recurring in the Gulf Coast except
the funds being squandered are for Katrina relief and it is our
citizens who are suffering. The State Department, the National
Security Council, which have no experience administering
domestic programs, have been controlling how international
donations will be distributed. The Agency for International
Development, which does have experience in rebuilding, seems to
have been pushed to the sidelines just as it was in Iraq.
Meanwhile, donations remain in limbo for months, and other
nations questioned whether their contributions were necessary
or appreciated. We should all be grateful for the generosity of
other nations. We should be equally grateful for the hard work
of the many government officials and volunteers who have been
working diligently to rebuild the Gulf Coast, but what we need
to overcome is the bureaucracy and mismanagement that is
frustrating their efforts and impeding recovery in the Gulf
Coast.
I commend the chairman for holding this hearing and hope
that this hearing will be a first step toward progress.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Henry A. Waxman follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.005
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.006
Chairman Tom Davis. Do any other Members wish to make
statements?
The gentleman from Maryland.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I have
to tell you I really appreciate you calling this vitally
important hearing to examine the Federal Government's system
for accepting and distributing foreign donations intended for
Hurricane Katrina relief, and as I listen to you, Mr. Chairman,
and certainly to our ranking member, I can only say that a lot
of what has happened with regard to Katrina either shows one of
three things or a combination: a lack of empathy, incompetence,
or a failure to synchronize conscience with conduct.
I guess what I have seen and what we have seen over and
over again, Mr. Chairman, and I do applaud you for your Select
Committee on the Gulf Coast problems and the way that was
handled, but we have seen it over and over and over again, a
failure on the part of the greatest government in the world to
shoot straight. It is incredible to me. It is incredible to me
that people could literally be begging for a piece of bread and
a glass of water in the United States where 100 miles away
there was probably a Safeway or a Giant that somebody could
have put some food in a helicopter and got it to them, but yet
and still, we with all of our phenomenal expertise and our
ability to go clear across the world to deliver disaster
relief, we can't seem to get it right.
One need not study the history of the United States very
long to identify the legacy of generosity our Nation has shown
to the world. In light of that tradition, it may come as a
surprise that before Hurricane Katrina, America had never
accepted international assistance following a disaster;
however, as images from the Gulf Coast evoked grief and
compassion throughout the world, some 76 foreign countries and
international organizations were empathetic enough to provide
cash, in-kind contributions, and military assistance to support
our relief efforts.
While the Federal Government embraced the helping hand of
the world community, it seemed ill-equipped to accept and
distribute this international assistance effectively and
efficiently due to inadequate planning and inadequate
interagency communication. Incredible. Consequently, nearly
half of the $126 million in cash donations have yet, have yet,
to be spent and donated relief supplies were distributed slowly
if at all.
Specifically, the GAO reported that efforts to distribute
international aid were plagued by the absence of a commodity
tracking system and procedures to identify resource needs at
FEMA, a divide between Federal agencies that included the
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense
and intergovernmental turf battles. For example, donations of
meals ready to eat and medical supplies were poorly handled and
failed to meet our health and safety standards. While thousands
of Gulf Coast Americans were abandoned for days without food or
water and called refugees, by the way, Federal officials were
at times bewildered about what supplies were safe and therefore
eligible for distribution.
I am also concerned that the international cash donations
were deposited with the U.S. Treasury in a non-interest-
generating account. It runs counter to common sense that such
an account be utilized when an interest-bearing account could
have thus far accrued $1 million in interest. With an
additional $400 million in international cash donations
expected, we must immediately address this problem. In doing
so, we would generate millions of additional dollars that could
be used to meet the critical needs of the Gulf Coast residents
for housing, jobs, education, and reconstruction.
Mr. Chairman, 6 months after Hurricane Katrina, the need
still exists for us to clarify what entity or entities have the
authority and experience to best manage international aid.
Moreover, we must make certain that contracts that are funded
with international donations are awarded through a competitive
process. This helps to ensure that we obtain the best goods and
services at the best price. Make no mistake. Our international
donors put faith in us that the assistance given to help
Americans are efficiently and effectively utilized to provide
meaningful relief to those in need. We must honor that trust by
demonstrating that we are good stewards who are willing to take
immediate action to strengthen our Nation's systems for
accepting, managing, and distributing international assistance.
I look forward to the testimony of today's witnesses, and
with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings
follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.122
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.123
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.124
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Ms. Norton, do you want to say anything?
Ms. Norton. I do want to. This is one of those hearings
which astonish you, you really learn something very
astonishing. I appreciate that you have called the hearing and
hope that it will not only keep something like this from
happening again, but hasten what are some pretty obvious
remedies.
I start out with an understanding that if we had no
experience with a hurricane like Katrina, we certainly had no
experience with receiving cash donations from other countries.
We are the country who donates to other countries. So I can
certainly understand that we would not have in place a capacity
to know how to do that and then to do it quickly.
I find this GAO report, however, depressing, Mr. Chairman,
because we are talking about a little itty bit of money, $126
million. It seems to me it is such a small amount of money that
it leads me to another concern, and that is whether or not the
government is sufficiently flexible in the face of something
new to do what is required. I have regarded and I think there
is no way to avoid believing that Katrina was a dress rehearsal
for a terrorist attack; otherwise, why do we have these
agencies all together in the Department of Homeland Security,
and we have seen what happened when we had no notice that a
hurricane was coming. Imagine what the chaos would have been
with a surprise attack.
Here, we have 76 countries generously offering us aid. My
first instincts given who some of these countries were would be
to say perhaps we should not have accepted some of the aid, but
should have said it is a wonderfully generous thing to do. That
might have offended them. So I guess in the behavior of
diplomacy, that is something you do, you accept the aid; but
what kind of flexibility does it take to assign the money to a
lead agency, use existing procedures even if you insist--and I
don't know if this was a turf battle or not--that it go to an
agency with no responsibility in the past for distributing
funds on the domestic side? There are procedures, gazillions of
procedures, one could borrow from, pick your agency, pick the
one that best suits you, assign it to a lead agency, and there
goes the money.
Apparently, early in September 2005, FEMA identified an
account that could earn interest. Hey, FEMA was incompetent,
but you know the account wasn't. Simply depositing the account,
it seems to me, would have taken care of that. Of course, that
would have meant that the administration would assign somebody
to do this job, and that is what is most disturbing, that
somebody wasn't put in charge of this little itty bit of money,
small to us, small to our government, but when you consider
what the need was out there at the time that this money began
to flow in, the notion that there would have been chaos on what
to do and still undistributed money and we are talking about so
small an amount can hardly give this committee confidence in
our ability to handle larger items, larger matters, associated
with natural disasters and with terrorist attacks.
Here, we had the money, plenty of notice it is coming,
procedures on the domestic side for distributing money, a small
amount of money relative to what our government is used to
handling and can't figure out what to do rapidly enough to
matter to many. It is very disconcerting, particularly that
there is money left now almost a year after the event needs to
be fixed, but to me what is important is what it tells me about
the larger effort and the lack of flexibility in the face of
the unknown that our government has, the lack of an ability to
move in keeping with the challenge that you are faced with, and
that is the whole ball game on homeland security. If you can't
do that for money you are glad to receive this late after the
event, then I don't know how the committee can have confidence,
and it has to do what you are doing, Mr. Chairman, and simply
find out why.
I am going to try to stay as long as I can, and thank you
very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
We may have to be interrupted by votes on the floor. We
expect a series of two votes. So it won't be lengthy. Why don't
we get started with our very first distinguished panel.
We have Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino, who has been no stranger,
who is the Director of Defense Capabilities and Management of
the GAO; Mr. Scott Rowell, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Homeland Security; Mr. Gregory Gottlieb, who is Acting Director
of the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance at USAID; Mr.
Casey Long, the Acting Director of the Office of International
Affairs at FEMA; Ms. Deborah McCarthy, the Director of the
Hurricane Katrina Task Force Working Group, U.S. Department of
State; and Mr. Hudson La Force, the Senior Counselor to the
Secretary, U.S. Department of Education.
Thank you all for being here with us. It is our policy we
swear you in before you testify. So if you would just rise and
raise your right hands.
Ms. D'Agostino, you have someone behind you that is going
to help you?
Ms. D'Agostino. Yes. McCoy Williams.
Chairman Tom Davis. All right. Thank you very much.
And DOD does. OK. Let me just state their names for the
record, so it is on the record. We have Berand McConnell and
Deborah Cagan. Is that right?
OK.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
Ms. D'Agostino, we will start with you. Thank you.
STATEMENTS OF DAVI M. D'AGOSTINO, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT; SCOTT ROWELL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE;
GREGORY C. GOTTLIEB, ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF U.S.
FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT; CASEY LONG, ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEBORAH McCARTHY,
DIRECTOR OF THE HURRICANE KATRINA TASK FORCE WORKING GROUP,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND HUDSON LA FORCE, SENIOR COUNSELOR
TO THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
STATEMENT OF DAVI M. D'AGOSTINO
Ms. D'Agostino. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I
am pleased to be here today before you to discuss GAO's work on
international assistance for Hurricane Katrina. My testimony is
based on the report we issued today that reviewed how several
departments and agencies dealt with the accountability for both
international cash and in-kind donations. In-kind donations
include food, medical, and other tangible items as well as
technical assistance and support.
As you and the members have noted, Mr. Chairman, Hurricane
Katrina was the first time the U.S. Government had been
generously offered and welcomed such large amounts of
international assistance for domestic disaster relief. The U.S.
Government received $126 million in cash from 36 foreign donors
by December 31, 2005 and literally tons of in-kind items from
43 foreign donors.
Several departments and agencies were involved in agreeing
to receive, accept, and distribute the international
assistance, including the Departments of Homeland Security,
State, Defense, and Treasury, and FEMA. Also, the National
Security Council was involved in decisions about the
international cash donations.
In summary, the agency has created ad hoc procedures to
manage the acceptance and distribution of the cash and in-kind
assistance. For cash donations, while we could account for all
the funds that were received and disbursed, cash management
policies were not in place to deal with their acceptance and
use. Instead, the National Security Counsel established an
interagency working group to decide how to use the foreign cash
donations. State Department provided parameters to the working
group regarding conditions it believed important for the use of
the donated funds.
While the group was deciding how to spend them, the funds
were kept in a State Department custodial account that did not
pay interest. As a result, the funds's purchasing power was
diminished and the opportunity to maximize the resources
available for relief was lost.
The chart we provided today lists the key dates and events
that took place regarding the cash donations. As you can see,
by September 21st, $115 million was received and FEMA had
identified an interest-bearing account to accept the donations.
On September 23rd, FEMA presented a number of items for funding
to the interagency group, including living expenses, building
materials, furniture, and transportation. Then on October 20th,
the State Department transferred $66 million to FEMA for a
grant to provide case management assistance for up to 100,000
households affected by the hurricane.
As of March 2006, the remaining $60 million was
undistributed; however, on March 16th, the State Department and
Department of Education signed a memorandum of agreement on the
remaining $60 million to support various educational needs in
the affecting areas, including holding $121 million in reserve
for further potential projects. State also told us that at
least $400 million in additional cash donations could possibly
arrive, making it even more important that good planning and
cash management policies be in place going forward.
Now I will turn to the in-kind donations, and I have three
key points about the accountability of these items. First,
while the in-kind assistance was reasonably accounted for as it
arrived at Little Rock Air Force Base and the Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance did account for it, these goods, however,
were not tracked to the FEMA distribution sites with
confirmation of receipt from those sites.
Second, the lack of clear policies, inadequate information
up front, and insufficient coordination with regulatory
agencies resulted in the U.S. Government agreeing to receive
food and medical items that could not be distributed in the
United States.
Third, the ad hoc procedures allowed confusion as to which
agency, FEMA or DOD, Defense, was to accept foreign military
donations that were vetted through a State Department process
that was created for that purpose. As a result, it is unclear
today whether any agency properly accepted and took
responsibility for the foreign military donations.
The administration's recently issued Lessons Learned Report
you mentioned highlighted the need for improvements as well in
policies and procedures. We also recommended a number of areas
where such improvements could be made in managing and
overseeing international cash and in-kind donations. Homeland
Security and Defense Departments generally agreed with our
recommendations.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement, and I
would be happy to respond to any questions.
[Note.--The GAO report entitled, ``Hurricane Katrina,
Comprehensive Policies and Procedures are Needed to Ensure
Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International
Assistance, April 2006, GAO-06-460,'' may be found in committee
files.]
[The prepared statement of Ms. D'Agostino follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.007
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.008
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.009
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.010
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.011
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.012
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.015
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.016
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.017
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.018
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.019
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.020
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.021
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Rowell.
STATEMENT OF SCOTT ROWELL
Mr. Rowell. Chairman Davis, Ranking Member Waxman,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to address you today on international disaster
relief received by the United States as a result of Hurricane
Katrina. In order to save the maximum amount of time for
questions, I would like to submit my formal prepared testimony
for the record, but provide the committee a brief verbal
summary.
Chairman Tom Davis. Great. Everyone's entire statement is
in the record.
Mr. Rowell. I would also like to take this opportunity to
introduce Mr. Berand McConnell, Director of Interagency
Coordination from the U.S. Northern Command, and Ms. Deborah
Cagan from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs. I have asked these two
individuals to join me at today's hearing to provide any
additional details to your questions on the Department of
Defense's involvement in the receipt of international disaster
relief assistance.
Hurricane Katrina was one of the most destructive natural
disasters in U.S. history and proved to be the deadliest storm
to strike since 1928. The international assistance received by
the United States in the wake of this disaster was tremendous.
151 nations and international organizations offered assistance.
Many of these same nations had accepted donations from the
United States in previous disasters in their our countries.
This generosity displayed by our friends and neighbors
continued until well after Hurricane Katrina had passed.
When it became clear that the United States was going to
accept international assistance in response to Katrina, the
U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance contacted the U.S. Northern Command in
order to establish an appropriate location for the delivery of
international donations. Working with U.S. Northern Command's
logistics director, OFDA identified Little Rock Air Force Base
Arkansas as the central collection point for foreign relief
donations.
Little Rock Air Force Base was selected because of its
proximity to the affected area and because the supplies that
were arriving could then be loaded on trucks and moved out
immediately. Although it was not a major hurricane relief
staging area and was not responsible for warehousing relief
supplies, Little Rock Air Force Base served as a vital
transportation hub in the response.
The receipt of international donations was a mission led by
OFDA; however, the men and women of Little Rock Air Force Base
provided needed assistance to OFDA contract support on base.
Overall for the Hurricane Katrina response, relationships
between USAID, OFDA, and U.S. Northern Command worked well.
As with any significant event, the lessons learned from
Katrina, the Katrina experience, are critical to future
success. For the Department of Defense, the three
recommendations identified in the GAO report require our
attention.
We concur with the recommendations one through three.
Specifically, recommendations one and two speak to the need for
policies and procedures to ensure that foreign military offers
of assistance for domestic disasters are coordinated with the
Department of State and that internal DOD guidance to our
military commanders on this issue is clear and for
recommendation three, which speaks to the need for Federal
Departments, DOD among them, to have appropriate State guidance
on how offers of assistance are processed, match existing
requirements, meet U.S. standards, and are delivered to the
right locations.
Mr. Chairman, I commend you and the members of this
committee for your leadership, interest in, and support of the
Department's homeland defense and civil support missions with
the particular focus today on international disaster relief
assistance received by this country as a result of Katrina, and
I look forward to any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rowell follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.022
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.023
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.024
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.025
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.026
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.027
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Rowell, thank you.
Mr. Gottlieb, you will probably be the last one we get in
before the break, and then we will probably take a 15, 20-
minute break.
STATEMENT OF GREGORY GOTTLIEB
Mr. Gottlieb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee
members, for this opportunity to testify today. I will present
a synopsis of USAID's role during Hurricane Katrina and what we
are doing to make improvements in case there is a next time.
Hurricane Katrina response was the first of its kind for
the USAID, which is a signatory agency to the National Response
Plan. Although USAID coordinates often with FEMA, until
Katrina, USAID had never before been asked to provide
significant support for domestic response. Our role in the
Hurricane Katrina response was one of our most challenging and
unusual experiences.
On August 29th, the day the hurricane came ashore on the
Gulf Coast, USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance,
which has a long history of coordination with FEMA, offered any
assistance it could provide. On August 31st, the USAID
Administrator offered the entire agency's support to FEMA.
Through formal mission assignments from FEMA, USAID began
its work on Hurricane Katrina shortly thereafter. In probably
its most important role, USAID provided support for handling
internationally donated resources and commodities. FEMA, the
Department of State, and USAID came to agreement on a division
of labor.
The State Department task force would receive international
offers of assistance from countries around the globe. FEMA
would determine which offers to accept, and USAID would
coordinate the overall process, including the logistics, of
receiving the donated goods and integrating them into the FEMA
distribution system.
USAID was perhaps uniquely qualified to fill this function.
On the one hand from its extensive experience responding to
disasters overseas, USAID understood the operational
responsibilities of FEMA. On the other hand, from its
experience as an operational foreign assistance agency, USAID
understood the foreign policy concerns of the Department of
State.
Since international assistance of this magnitude had never
been previously received, ad hoc systems were rapidly developed
by FEMA, State, and USAID. While these systems were not
perfect, the cooperation among these three agencies was
outstanding and in the end performed remarkably well. The
mechanisms established during Katrina have become a rough model
for a more formalized and codified management tool that is
currently being created.
On behalf of the overall effort and at FEMA's request,
USAID activated a response management team in Washington and
dispatched USAID personnel throughout the Gulf Coast. USAID
disaster response systems lend themselves to easy integration
with FEMA because both agencies operate on the principals of
the Incident Command System.
During the weeks following Hurricane Katrina, USAID
provided a variety of staff, commodities, and services in
support of the overall domestic response efforts. Some
highlights include: The response management team in Washington
became a hub for coordination of international offers of
assistance, working closely with State and FEMA. The work was
in some ways more complex than some of the largest foreign
responses we have ever orchestrated. In particular, the
response management team hosted a variety of liaison officers
from domestic U.S. Government Agencies, including State,
Defense, Department of Homeland Security, the Department of
Health and Human Services, and USDA. We also for first time
hosted international counterparts, including NATO, several
United Nation's officers, the European Union, and the
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies.
The response management team worked to integrate
international partners into Federal and regional agencies,
coordinating field visits throughout the affected regions.
USAID also created systems and procedures to support the
review, acceptance, and delivery of international donations.
Specifically, the RNT negotiated and communicated official
dispatch procedures for supplies that had been received from
international donors and also created a comprehensive data base
to organize and track transportation of commodity offers and
donations.
I have brought with me today copies of our final dispatch
spread sheet from Little Rock which indicates the distribution
points for all commodities received. We believe this will show
the effectiveness of the dispatch system to donation points.
Overall, USAID deployed a total of 24 field officers to the
affected region in the first several weeks of the response. We
facilitated a total of 52 flights of donated goods from
international donors and consolidated all of these at Little
Rock Air Force Base. From that reception point, USAID processed
more than 2,500 metric tons of donated goods and transported
142 truckloads of foreign donated commodities to distribution
centers.
Let me just say in conclusion through its unprecedented
involvement in a domestic disaster response, USAID has learned
many lessons. There is a unique and valuable interagency role
for USAID during incidents of national significance. USAID
staff members adapt quickly and our systems function well
within the context of the domestic response, a proficiency that
we have come to expect in a foreign environment. Experience
gained by USAID overseas is valued and beneficial when applied
in the United States and, as with most things, nothing works
perfectly the first time.
Finally, USAID has learned that it can look constructively
and critically at itself to continually improve its performance
and is already working hard to ensure that it will.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gottlieb follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.028
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.029
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.030
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.031
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.032
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.033
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.034
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.035
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.036
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.037
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.038
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.039
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.040
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.041
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.042
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.043
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. I am going to
declare, I would say, about a 15-minute recess, maybe 20
minutes you can count on, and then we will finish up.
Thank you for your patience.
[Recess.]
Chairman Tom Davis. I want to thank you all for your
patience. I think, Mr. Long, we can start with you. Is that
where we left off?
STATEMENT OF CASEY LONG
Mr. Long. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. My name is Casey
Long, and I am the Acting Director of the Office of
International Affairs at the Federal Emergency Management
Agency of the Department of Homeland Security. I want to thank
you for inviting me here today to discuss international
assistance in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and how that
assistance was used.
It is important to note that the United States had never
before accepted international assistance on such a large scale
as it did during Hurricane Katrina. The outpouring of
international aid was both heartwarming and beneficial, but
also created some difficulties. In total, 151 nations and
international organizations offered financial and material
assistance. In response to this outpouring of generosity, FEMA
with their Federal partners quickly developed a system to
manage international assistance. Today I hope to explain to you
that system and what we intend to do in the future to manage
both material and cash donations.
After Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast of the United
States, the U.S. Government began to receive offers of
assistance from foreign governments and private organizations.
On September 1st, the administration indicated that the U.S.
Government was accepting all offers of international assistance
in principle. Consistent with its role in the National Response
Plan [NRP], the State Department set up a Hurricane Katrina
task force and took on the duty of receiving those offers of
international assistance.
As the lead agency in coordinating the Federal response to
Stafford Act disasters and emergencies, FEMA has the authority
to request assistance in responding to these disasters from
other Federal agencies. Accordingly, in the immediate aftermath
of Katrina, FEMA turned to the agency that has expertise
working with the international community in responding to
disasters, the U.S. Agency for International Development's
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance [OFDA].
On September 2nd, FEMA formally tasked OFDA to manage
logistics and operations of international donations in response
to Katrina. On Saturday, September 3rd, FEMA convened those
departments and agencies that might play a role in managing
national donations. These departments and agencies included
other components of DHS such as Customs and Border Protection,
the State Department, OFDA, the Department of Defense, Health
and Human Services, and the American Red Cross, all of whom are
signatories to the NRP. Collectively, this group met to discuss
the roles and responsibility of each agency and to determine
how the United States was going to management international
material donations. The outcome of this meeting was a system
for accepting and using or declining commodities from
international donors, which worked as follows: The State
Department would act as the focal point for receiving and
responding to international offers of assistance. FEMA would
identify the potential requirements and communicate acceptance
of offers to State. OFDA would manage the operations and
distribution for those international donations.
Despite the fact that the U.S. Government had never managed
such a large quantity of donated international assistance
before, we successfully accepted blankets, cots, tents,
generators, school supplies, and other materials. Ultimately,
on FEMA's behalf, OFDA distributed 143 truckloads of
international donations to distribution centers in Louisiana,
Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, and Arkansas.
Since additional decisions were required to determine how
to send monetary donations, pledges of cash were handled under
a different system. State received and held donated funds in a
custodial account until a decision about how these funds would
be used was made. When it became apparent that the Nation's
cash would be coming in from foreign sources, FEMA also
identified an account to hold a portion of these funds. An
interagency group was convened to discuss how international
donations, cash donations, would be accepted and distributed.
FEMA identified types of activities for which the donated funds
could be used to help meet the needs of communities and
individuals impacted by the disaster, and we provided these
options to the monetary donations working group.
Later, FEMA provided this working group with a more
detailed proposal for individual case management which proposed
that the funds be used to assist disaster victims by
identifying immediate needs and helping them reach a level of
self-sufficiency and begin the process of recovery. As a
result, a portion of the cash donations were transferred to
FEMA and awarded for a case management initiative.
Last November, FEMA initiated meetings to form an
interagency work group made up of departments and agencies that
participated in Hurricane Katrina's international donations
effort. This effort corresponded with recommendations from the
Homeland Security Council to develop a process for
international assistance. The working group has begun
formalizing an international assistance system. Participants
include DHS components of FEMA, Customs and Border Protection,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Citizenship and
Immigration Services, the State Department, Defense,
Agriculture, USAID, FDA, the American Red Cross, and the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, among others.
Much progress has been made to develop standardized
procedures to review and accept or decline international offers
of assistance and to respond to international inquiries. By
June 1st, the interagency group expects to agree to a system on
managing offers of international assistance.
Once again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for having me
here today. If you have any questions, I would be happy to
answer them at the appropriate time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Long follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.044
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.045
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.046
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.047
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.048
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.049
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Ms. McCarthy.
STATEMENT OF DEBORAH MCCARTHY
Ms. McCarthy. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
I would like to immediately go to the issue of how we
managed the cash donations and how we came to decisions on how
best to place them, and I would like to start off by first
saying that we have placed the balance of the funds that we
have received. $60.4 million were transferred on March 17th to
the Department of Education. So the amounts of money that we
have received, the $126 million, have been transferred to FEMA
and to the Department of Education.
I wanted to note a couple of things with regards to the
cash process and noting, for one, that on September 15th at a
Homeland Security meeting, the Department of State agreed and
was given the lead in developing options on how to distribute
and utilize the funds. Subsequently, the Department of State
and the National Security Council initiated as many have
referred to here an interagency process. FEMA was requested and
provided proposals for consideration for use of the funds. It
was agreed in the interagency to use the funds immediately for
immediate needs, and the case management system met that
requirement.
Subsequently, we obviously entered into a memorandum of
agreement with FEMA. Then the interagency looked for ways to
place the money into tangible reconstruction projects where
there were unmet needs. We considered a number of options and
ultimately decided through the interagency that the funds
should go to support schools, K through 12 and universities, in
the affected area where there were unmet needs for
reconstruction, bricks and mortar, libraries, scholarships for
students, and financial and ability to retain some staff and
faculty. On March 16th, as I noted, we signed an agreement with
the Department of Education, and we transferred the moneys on
March 17th.
We have obviously learned a lesson on how to process the
money, and in the wake of the recommendations of the Homeland
Security Council, we are developing guidelines to set up an
interagency process that would be more swift, more effective in
moving international donations should we get them and accept
them in another crisis. We are under a short time line to
report to the Homeland Security Council by June 1st and we are
well on way.
I want to note one other thing just before I sum up on a
conclusion, and that is we need to recognize that moneys came
in not only from governments, but this country received a huge
amount of assistance, the sum total of which has never been
calculated, from private individuals and organizations, and I
want to mention a few: The donation of an entire life savings
by a senior citizen in Europe who arrived at one of our
embassies and asked that this gift be accepted in return for
her having been liberated by U.S. soldiers from a concentration
camp in World War II. She could not afford to give her savings
but she did; the donation from one family in France of a check
of approximately $602,000; millions of dollars in private
donations from individuals and companies in Japan; funds raised
by our own State Department foreign service nations; and last
but not least, the offers of many Canadians to open up their
homes to take in displaced people as they had after September
11th when our planes were stranded.
To sum up a few things, our Nation received, as we have
noted, an unprecedented amount of international assistance
reflective that the people and governments around the world are
prepared to support us and stand with us in our hour of need.
We want to thank the international community and all those
private citizens who gave so generously. We have ensured the
best we could that the gifts made reached those affected by
Hurricane Katrina.
We believe that in a major domestic crisis, it is likely
that we will again receive generous offers, particularly from
neighbors and close partners. Should we decide to accept them,
we will have the mechanisms in place to quickly process the
assistance given.
I would like to thank you for having the opportunity to
discuss the international support we received during Katrina.
It is an unknown aspect of this crisis, and I look forward to
responding to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. McCarthy follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.050
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.051
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.052
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.053
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.054
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.055
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.056
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.057
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.058
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.059
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.060
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.061
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. La Force.
STATEMENT OF HUDSON LA FORCE III
Mr. La Force. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, on
behalf of Secretary Margaret Spellings, thank you for the
opportunity to testify on the actions Education is taking to
distribute funds received from international donors following
Hurricane Katrina. We regard these international donations as
one important element of our total effort to provide assistance
to schools and colleges directly impacted by the hurricanes
last summer and to those schools who have enrolled students
displaced by those storms.
Within days of when Hurricane Katrina made landfall,
Secretary Spellings sent high level officials to the affected
States to gain firsthand information about the situation and
the needs in those jurisdictions. We focused on listening to
the issues faced by educators in the Gulf States and developing
solutions that would work for schools, colleges, and students.
We have provided significant technical and financial assistance
to States, school districts, and colleges and have granted
waivers when necessary to support State and local school
leaders in managing their response to the disaster.
On December 30th, President Bush signed into law the
Hurricane Education Recovery Act which gave education $1.6
billion for hurricane relief activities. Included was $750
million to help public and private schools in Louisiana,
Mississippi, Texas, and Alabama restart their schools, $645
million to public and private schools across the Nation for the
costs they have incurred in enrolling displaced students, and
$190 million for colleges in Louisiana and Mississippi.
We made the first allocation of over $250 million less than
1 week after President Bush signed the law, made the first
allocation of aid for displaced students 1 week after final
applications were due from the States, and as of today have
fully allocated nearly $1.5 million of the $1.6 billion
appropriation. The only remaining funds are a portion of the
aid for displaced students which by statute is intended to be
made in four quarterly payments across the school year.
We are actively engaged with the States and our Inspector
General in monitoring the use of these funds. In January, we
began discussions with the Department of State regarding
approximately $60 million in donations that State had received
from foreign donors. We developed a proposed strategy for using
this aid and on February 16th presented that strategy to an
interagency task force comprised of officials from the
Departments of State and Homeland Security, the National
Security Council, FEMA, and the Office of the Federal
Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding. The task force decided
that education should receive and manage these foreign
donations.
On March 16th, we entered into a memorandum of agreement
with State under which Education has accepted these donations
and will allocate the funds to educational institutions in
Louisiana and Mississippi. The agreement provides a framework
for education to maintain the funds in a separate trust account
and to administer them in an accountable and transparent
manner, including proper Internet controls and performance
measures. While we have not yet made final decisions on the
distribution of this aid, we do know that it will go to schools
and colleges in the hardest hit areas of Louisiana and
Mississippi, and we expect to make those final decisions and
disburse the money in May. I believe that we have established
and maintained an effective working relationship with State on
this matter, and if the Federal Government were to receive
education assistance from foreign sources in the future, we
would be ready to do so again.
Education has learned important lessons about crisis
management and response from our Katrina experiences. We are
using those lessons to inform ongoing agency activities in
emergency response and crisis management, including our
preparedness for the potential flu pandemic. We are working
with the Homeland Security Council and other agencies to
implement the recommendations of the Federal Response to
Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned Report and are reviewing our
internal capabilities for crisis planning and response and our
capabilities to work with State and local education leaders in
emergency situations.
This concludes my statement, and I am happy to respond to
any questions you have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. La Force follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.062
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.063
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.064
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
The good news is I am the only one here. The bad news is
there is no time limit. So I get to ask what I need to ask.
I will start with Mr. Long. Is it accurate that FEMA has
not invested the $66 million in international funds yet?
Mr. Long. I don't know. I know that the money was
transferred into a FEMA account, and then it is my
understanding that as the UMCOR got up and running that we
would then transfer upon receipt. As to how we would utilize
those funds, FEMA would then transfer the money to UMCOR to
utilize those, but I don't have a current status as to where
the money resides.
Chairman Tom Davis. Is there anyone here from GAO that can
answer that? What is your understanding of the money?
Mr. Williams. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is our
understanding also, that is the case.
Chairman Tom Davis. But these funds sat in non-interest
bearing accounts. Is that accurate?
Mr. Williams. We identified $60 million that had been in
non-interest bearing accounts.
Chairman Tom Davis. For how long?
Mr. Williams. From the September timeframe when the money
first started to come into the organization, and I would feel
it was through March 16th.
Chairman Tom Davis. Six months, 7 months.
Mr. Williams. About 7 months or so, and we estimate that if
it had been invested, it would have earned nearly $1 million.
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Long, do you know why that is? Is
there some law that makes it go to a non-interest-bearing
account or anything?
Mr. Long. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. Can you repeat that
question?
Chairman Tom Davis. Why would the money go to a non-
interest-bearing account? Is there a prohibition in law about
putting it in an interest-bearing account or was it thought
that it would be there a short period and it just languished
there?
Mr. Long. It is my understanding that the FEMA account is
interest-bearing.
Chairman Tom Davis. Is that correct?
Ms. D'Agostino. Yes.
Chairman Tom Davis. So was any money lost as a result of
going into the--did we lose any money in the investments, I
guess is my question.
Ms. D'Agostino. By not placing it in the FEMA account, the
FEMA interest-bearing account, yes.
Chairman Tom Davis. How long did that happen? Was it a 6-
month period?
Ms. D'Agostino. We calculated about $1 million in interest
would have been gained on the moneys had they been in the FEMA
account.
Chairman Tom Davis. Ms. McCarthy, you sat on the money, not
you personally, but State sat on the money for 6 months?
Ms. McCarthy. I think Mr. Chairman, I think we need to
clarify something here, which is absent specific authority,
funds held in the U.S. Treasury do not ordinarily accumulate
interest. We discussed with Treasury and OMB that we had a
specific State Department account and it would be the
appropriate place to place the money as it flowed in over time.
It didn't come in in one fell swoop, and it was determined at
the time that the donations in this account could not earn
interest.
Chairman Tom Davis. Why not?
Ms. McCarthy. I would have to ask my legal team here.
Chairman Tom Davis. Go ahead. Ask them.
Ms. McCarthy. Absent statutory authority, our moneys could
not earn the interest.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK.
Ms. McCarthy. That is the key element, and another element
to consider is----
Chairman Tom Davis. I gather you would welcome statutory
authority in a case like this so we don't leave $1 million on
the table.
Ms. McCarthy. We are discussing in the interagency group
right now that is looking at how best to stand up a team
immediately and an interagency, we are discussing precisely
that.
Chairman Tom Davis. Well, hurricane season officially
starts shortly, and moving things through this Congress even
when they are easy takes a period of time. We will probably
just initiate something on that right away and try to work with
your team.
I think that is something we all ought to be a little
embarrassed about, not that it is anybody's fault. I understand
the rationale, but when money is pouring in, maybe somebody
should have said this ought to go in an account where it can
earn some interest.
Ms. McCarthy. One of the things we may have to keep in mind
is that the interest, I suppose, that these funds--again, I am
not from Treasury, but if these funds earn interest in U.S.
Government investment mechanisms, those who are paying the
interest are the U.S. taxpayers.
Chairman Tom Davis. Well, basically you are using it for
debt reduction instead of for its intended purpose. That is
all. I mean, I know everything is fungible, accounts and
everything like that, but I think in a case like this, this is
$1 million that really should have been earmarked for the coast
and should have gone to the coast as opposed to debt reduction.
I understand Government think and how this works, but at a time
when you still have a lot of people along the coast that are
looking for help and aid and everything else, that is my only
point.
So I think from a statutory point of view, we would like to
get this to a conclusion sooner or later, which is probably
moving. I know what the government pays in interest. I don't
know if we could have gotten something better off in a
different marketplace or not, but I think that explains it.
Now, FEMA has not invested the $66 million in international
funds yet; is that right, Mr. Long, and what is it about the
United Methodist Committee of Relief Contract? Can you tell us
a little bit more about that?
Mr. Long. The interagency group upon receiving
international donations collectively as a group decided that
case management would be an appropriate use of those funds.
After that decision was made, FEMA pulled together a panel and
reviewed proposals in the November timeframe and based on
reviewing those proposals decided that UMCOR was a cost-
effective efficient way to utilize those funds.
Chairman Tom Davis. Well, Ms. McCarthy, FEMA has told the
committee and GAO that they provided the State Department-led
task force with uses for $326 million on September 23rd,
identifying that the international cash donations could be
spent on social service assistance, medical transportation,
adopting homes for medical and handicap needs, job training,
education, living expenses, building materials, and so forth.
Why did the task force decide not to give the entire amount to
FEMA for these purposes?
Ms. McCarthy. If I can respond, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Tom Davis. Sure. I was asking you.
Ms. McCarthy. The initial allocation was for the case
management system, which would be for people to go out and
determine the longer-term needs of those who had been affected
by the hurricane. The other proposals as reviewed by the
interagency needed further development and would flow from the
case management system, and essentially what we decided to do
in the interagency process is to look for something that was
tangible immediate reconstruction and not wait for the
development of what would be the results of the case management
system, the citizens would need ``X'' or ``Y'' or housing,
etc., because that process was going to take a longer time.
Chairman Tom Davis. I mean, I know these are foreign
dollars flowing and somebody has to hold them, but I wonder if
the State Department is competent. I mean they are not really
part of the FEMA and recovery efforts as we look at this in the
future. I don't know if that is something we are looking at,
but it is just not something you are used to, the State
Department is used to, overseeing. Right?
Ms. McCarthy. Correct. It is not something we are used to
overseeing, and that is why in the interagency process that we
set up, we pulled in agencies who have a better feel for what
is occurring on the ground, and in the future, that is what we
would do. Obviously, the nature of the crisis is hard to
determine. It could be manmade. It could be natural-made. And
the moneys could go to one agency or another. That is
essentially what we are discussing right now, to set up at
least a mechanism to determine which agency would be the
appropriate one to then process the money depending on the
nature of the crisis.
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Rowell, during the aftermath of
Katrina, what process did DOD use to route foreign military
assistance through the State-led task force charged with the
responsibility for recording all offers of assistance? Was it
an effective process?
Mr. Rowell. Mr. Chairman, let me ask you to restate the
question, please.
Chairman Tom Davis. What process did DOD use to route the
foreign military assistance that came in through the Department
of State-led task force charged with the responsibility of
recording all offers of assistance?
Mr. Rowell. Sir, let me ask Mr. Berand McConnell to address
that, please.
Chairman Tom Davis. That would be fine.
Mr. McConnell. Good morning, sir.
Chairman Tom Davis. Good morning.
Mr. McConnell. The NORTHCOM role in particular followed
essentially the same procedures that you have heard already
described, which is to say when an offer of foreign assistance
was received directly, we would refer those to the State-led
task force for determination as to whether that task force
would go to accepting the offer. Our part directly was to
validate with General Honre and his task force whether those
offers met a valid military need and then we made a
recommendation on that point.
If all the pieces aligned, to include the Department of
State task force agreement, we communicated directly with the
military representatives to facilitate delivery.
Chairman Tom Davis. Ms. D'Agostino, GAO reports that the
Federal Government didn't have the policies to help ensure FEMA
had oversight of donated commodities and to ensure that the
commodities were vetted through the Department of State
acceptance process, but FEMA reports to the committee yesterday
that everything went through the DOS acceptance process. Can
you resolve that for us?
Ms. D'Agostino. Apparently not everything went through the
DOS acceptance process, and, in fact, there is actually still
confusion about particularly the foreign military donations,
who actually accepted them and was responsible for them.
Basically, as we understand it from DOD, well, actually
NORTHCOM General Counsel, they believed that because they used
the task force process at the State Department that FEMA
accepted the foreign military donations, and FEMA has also told
us that they did not accept anything that went through the
foreign military donations.
Chairman Tom Davis. I mean, this is part of the debate
going on with Congress about should FEMA be part of Homeland
Security or should it be attached to the Office of the
President. Obviously, if this were in the White House or
attached right there, this stuff moves very, very quickly. It
looks here like we have a bureaucratic jumble. Everybody is
getting sign-offs and everything and money is sitting in
accounts and it is not getting out there.
Mr. McConnell. Mr. Chairman, if I may.
Chairman Tom Davis. Yes, please.
Mr. McConnell. Maybe I misunderstood the question. The
interagency process either accepted or declined the military
offers. Once the acceptance of those things, purely military
goods, was complete, then they----
Chairman Tom Davis. What kind of things did you decline?
Mr. McConnell. I don't know that we declined anything,
because the things that we accepted were divers, nurses. Ships
from various countries came in to provide that sort of support.
I don't know that once something was defined as a purely
military offer, I do not believe we declined anything.
Chairman Tom Davis. My information shows that some of the
items that were declined, we had some Japanese self-defense
force units. Jordan offered two field hospitals. France offered
an enabled frigate and hospital ship. Israel and Germany
offered ground-based cellular communication systems,
Switzerland two disaster relief platoons.
Mr. Rowell. Mr. Chairman, we will have to take that one for
the record. We are not prepared to speak to that.
Chairman Tom Davis. There have been widespread news reports
about items that were offered from countries that we weren't
prepared to take and turned back. Does GAO want to add anything
to that?
Ms. D'Agostino. No, we don't.
Chairman Tom Davis. I just named a few. We have a couple of
pages of things that were declined at this point.
Mr. McConnell. Sir, I agree with you that there were things
that were declined. As far as NORTHCOM was concerned, our
process was part of the interagency process. Those things that
we were able to validate against General Honres' requirements,
we recommended for the interagency process.
Chairman Tom Davis. All right. Mr. La Force, in your joint
memorandum of agreement with the Department of State, which I
think is in Attachment A, are you familiar with what I am
talking about?
Mr. La Force. Yes, sir.
Chairman Tom Davis. It indicates that the department will
dedicate funds to Xavier and Dillard Universities, the
Louisiana Department of Education, and the Laura Bush
Foundation for American Libraries. In your written testimony,
you say that you haven't yet decided who to give the money to.
Is this like a draft?
Mr. La Force. The attachment to the memorandum is a summary
of the proposals that we had received at the time the
memorandum was signed. We have received additional proposals
since that time and have made no decisions about the actual
grant awards that we would be making.
Chairman Tom Davis. Ms. McCarthy, you reported to this
committee that State-led interagency working group offered
international funds to the Army Corps of Engineers for the
rebuilding of levies and that the Corps turned down the offer.
Is that basically the gist of it?
Ms. McCarthy. In the interagency effort to move the money
swiftly for reconstruction, yes, we did approach the Corps, and
once they had made a determination based on the moneys they
received in the supplemental, they indicated to us that they
did not need the international funds.
Chairman Tom Davis. All right. I am just trying to
understand it. The Corps reports to the committee this morning
that the Department of State was looking for options regarding
how they could best allocate the foreign donations, but they
never actually offered to give the money to the Corps. The
Corps said they referred State's inquiry to the Department of
Homeland Security Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf
Coast Rebuilding who is responsible for overseeing all of the
recovery operations because they felt they would have a better
feel as to where the greatest needs were.
Ms. McCarthy. Sir, I am not privy to how internally they
deliberated and who they went to, but ultimately the response
to us on approximately November 22nd was that they did not and
would not need these funds.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
Ms. D'Agostino, does GAO believe that the current process
that is currently in operation for acceptance and distribution
of international assistance is transparent enough for proper
oversight by Congress?
Ms. D'Agostino. Certain aspects of the process were very
transparent and we were able to get very good records and
access and information on. I would say that certain aspects
regarding the role of the National Security Council were not as
transparent.
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Long, how does FEMA provide
oversight for international assistance it has received in the
United States for domestic incidents?
Mr. Long. We would utilize standard case management
oversight. Just to give you a brief overview of how FEMA
manages these sorts of engagements, one would be to review the
financial status, provide progress reports and close-out
reports. In the case of UMCOR, we conduct site visits where we
would go over a routine checklist of business and
administrative systems, review the subgrantee selection and
monitoring process. We monitor by telephone to maintain
consistent communication, and there is consultation with the
program officer at the time of payment requests and also at the
time of progress reports, and then there is review of audit
reports as well.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Let me ask this: I will start with
Ms. D'Agostino, if you can shed some light on it. The National
Security Council had a large role in determining how
internationally donated funds would be used. What led to the
involvement of the National Security Council regarding
international cash donations? Any idea?
Ms. D'Agostino. The only thing I can tell you is that part
of the National Response Plan acknowledges that there may be
policy issues that need to be elevated to either the Homeland
Security Council or the National Security Council. Since these
were international cash donations and the State Department is a
member of the NSC, I assume that is why they went the route of
the NSC.
Chairman Tom Davis. Can anybody shed light on that? Is
somebody afraid we would take some bad money from somebody? The
NSC seems that it is really not equipped to decide how this
stuff ought to be sent and accepted and stuff. Can anybody shed
any light on that?
Ms. McCarthy. If I could clarify, the NSC offered to pull
together agencies working with us so we would start a
deliberative process. I don't think one can infer from that
they had veto making authority. It was an interagency
deliberative process. They pulled the agencies together for
meeting.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Until just a week or two ago, we
still had some of these commodities sitting in a warehouse in
Arkansas; is that right?
Ms. D'Agostino. That is our understanding.
Chairman Tom Davis. While everybody is meeting and
discussing and everything else.
Ms. McCarthy, as you interpret it, what kind of authority
does the NRP give the Department of State for making decisions
about handing foreign assistance to the United States? As you
interpret it, what kind of authority does the NRP give the
Department of State to make decisions about spending foreign
assistance given to the United States? What is the current
thought?
Ms. McCarthy. Essentially, we act as an intermediary for
foreign offers of assistance under the NRP and we work with
other agencies to respond to requests and expedite the delivery
of assistance. That in a nutshell is essentially our role under
the NRP.
Chairman Tom Davis. All right. Mr. Long, GAO reports that
FEMA and USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance were
unable to provide the GAO with evidence that they had
determined or confirmed that international in-kind assistance
arrived at FEMA distribution sites. Can you shed any light on
that?
Mr. Gottlieb. Mr. Chairman, I think I mentioned in my
remarks that we actually recently received from our dispatch
agent, DHL, a thorough listing of all that came into Little
Rock, what those donations were, who the donors were, and the
distribution points to which those are were dispatched. I
believe we left 30 copies with the clerk.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK.
Mr. Gottlieb. So I think if you look----
Chairman Tom Davis. We just got them. OK. That is fine.
Mr. Long, let me ask you this: If matching funds that are
required for State and local governments for public assistance
was an issue and not using Stafford Act funds, could the
Stafford Act be amended to permit international donations to be
used for such matching funds? Do you have any thought on that?
Mr. Long. I was just informed that it would require
statutory action.
Chairman Tom Davis. So that is something we could consider
from our end?
Mr. Long. Yes. It is something we could consider.
Chairman Tom Davis. Is FEMA seeking statutory authority to
change the Stafford Act to allow it to use international funds
for other uses currently permitted under the act? That is what
we are asking. That is something else we ought to look at.
Mr. Long. We are currently looking at all the changes that
should be considered to be made to the Stafford Act based on
what happened in Katrina.
Chairman Tom Davis. Let me ask this for the panel, if
somebody can answer it: Who is responsible for tracking who
received in-kind donations to their final destinations, from
the beginning to the end, receiving them and going to the end
with this process? Who is ultimately responsible for that? We
have all these different agencies up here. We have all these
task forces. Ultimately, who makes those decisions, or it is
just so diffuse at this point that you just kind of have to get
GAO involved to try to follow the cash?
Mr. Gottlieb. Mr. Chairman, if I can respond in part and I
think Mr. Long may respond afterwards, I think the way the
system developed, which is fairly rapidly after we----
Chairman Tom Davis. Kind of ad hoc?
Mr. Gottlieb. Ad hoc, but because we didn't have a system,
that is the best we can call it, but it was pretty clear what
our role was at OFDA, and that was once a decision had been
made to accept an offer, after OFDA then liaised with wherever
that donor was, whether it was consolidated goods from a NATO
air base or it was Britain or wherever it was, and then those
planes were directed into Little Rock. At Little Rock Air Force
Base, that is where we had our logisticians. We were working
with DOD. They helped us with some of the offloads. We then
engaged the services of DHL to help us then dispatch those
goods to destination points that were given to us through
consultation with FEMA.
So in the documents to which I referred earlier, it shows
many, many destinations throughout Mississippi and Louisiana
and Alabama where we actually dispatched those. Now, after that
point, that was the end point for us. We sent it to a
distribution center.
Chairman Tom Davis. You sign off at that point?
Mr. Gottlieb. That is where we sign off, yes.
Chairman Tom Davis. Then who gets it? I guess FEMA gets it.
Mr. Long. At that point, when the goods landed in Little
Rock, FEMA would be in communication with OFDA as to where to
distribute those based on need. If the goods were transferred
to a Federal staging area, which would be FEMA warehouse or
distribution center, we then, yes, would take physical receipt
of those goods.
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Rowell, let me ask did we have any
issues with DOD coordinating with the Department of State,
ensuring permission or visa for foreign military ships and
planes and personnel during this emergency? Did it run pretty
smoothly or did you run into some red tape in moving and
getting people in and out?
Mr. Rowell. Our information is even though this was an ad
hoc and quickly formed group, I have to say that the people at
this table and the folks that supported them, it went well
after we got our sea legs, if you will, and DOD has no problem.
Chairman Tom Davis. So we don't need any statutory or any
changes in a case like this to make sure that it functions
should this happen again? We are asking this not to come back
and chew everybody out for what happened this time around,
but----
Mr. Rowell. In my discussions in the department, I know of
no conversations regarding a change to statutory authority.
Chairman Tom Davis. This was the largest storm in recorded
history in the United States, and I think as we take a look at
that, and I have been down there three times and I know many of
you have been down, even though it was predicted, it was
predictable, we learned a lot and a lot of mistakes got made.
The key is to make sure the next time around we are ready and
we can be a smooth efficient machine.
We are going to wrestle up here with some major issues on
organization. Frankly, we know FEMA is having trouble filling
the slots at this point. There is some concern that being
attached to the Department of Homeland Security, that it can't
operate as quickly and efficiently under the National Response
Plan. It really never got a chance to operate in this
particular case because Michael Brown who was on the ground
kind of didn't believe in the plan to begin with. He had
handled emergencies before. He just tried to circumvent it and
deal directly with the White House.
So, look, a lot of things happened that in retrospect today
we would all do differently. You are just spokesmen for your
different agencies. What we are trying to elicit here is the
kind of statutory changes so we can give these departments the
flexibility you need to get the job done should something like
this occur again. That is ultimately what we are after.
Any other comments before we close the hearing? I
appreciate everybody's patience today.
Mr. McConnell. Just one brief one, sir, and that is I am
here as the NORTHCOM kind of representative, and just speaking
from an operational basis, I think in many ways this is a very
good news story. Yes, there was no system, there was no
anticipation that there would be a need for this kind of a
system, but once the people on the ground started to work
together--and particularly kudos to the Office of U.S. Foreign
Disaster Assistance who has impressed the men and women of JTF
Katrina very well--I think this in some ways as a good news
story in allowing us to proceed along the lines that you just
described.
Chairman Tom Davis. I am not sure I disagree with that. I
think one of the problems is that we have institutional
barriers, some statutory, some regulatory, that made it harder
for people to get the jobs done, and that is really what we are
trying to solicit here.
I was down on the ground and saw people working 24-7. I saw
volunteers, fire departments, and emergency personnel from all
over the country coming in and making this work. I saw people
in the face of the storm who had made some early decisions
decide they were going to put everything into saving lives,
which meant some other things had to go by the wayside and did
a remarkable job of actually limiting loss of the life once the
levies broke and once some of the initial decisions that they
probably wished had gone otherwise came about, and there were a
lot of heroes in this story, and I don't mean to detract from
that at all.
We are really ultimately after institutionally what do we
need to do to make sure that we can be a smooth-running
machine. I know you have to deal with the rules and regulations
that are passed by Congress and in some cases regulations that
come through the agencies, and you are subject to that, and
when you violate them, we will call you up and say why did you
do that. Of course, emergency situations are different, and one
of the things we found with FEMA and the folks on the ground--
the Governor of Louisiana talked about this, even Michael Brown
when the military came in--they were mission-oriented. They
were not driven by regulations, and they were able to get
things done a lot quicker than some other elements of the
government that seemed to be just constrained by regulations.
In emergencies, you have to look at the mission. You have to
get the job done. It sometimes goes outside the box. We are
seeing this all the time.
Anyway, I appreciate everybody sharing their thoughts with
us today, coming before us. I am sure if we had it to do over
again, we would all do it differently, but so would we up here.
We are just trying to see what we need to do so that the next
time, we give you the tools.
I appreciate your patience. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:07 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich and
additional information submitted for the hearing record
follow:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.065
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.066
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.067
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.068
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.069
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.070
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.071
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.072
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.073
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.074
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.075
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.076
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.077
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.078
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.079
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.080
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.081
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.082
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.083
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.084
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.085
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.086
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.087
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.088
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.089
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.090
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.091
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.092
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.093
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.094
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.095
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.096
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.097
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.098
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.099
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.100
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.101
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.102
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.103
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.104
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.105
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.106
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.107
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.108
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.109
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.110
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.111
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.112
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.113
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.114
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.115
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.116
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.117
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.118
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.119
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.120
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8228.121
<all>