<DOC>
[109th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:25260.wais]
HOMELAND SECURITY: SURVEILLANCE AND MONITORING OF EXPLOSIVE STORAGE
FACILITIES, PART II
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 31, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-105
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
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http://www.house.gov/reform
______
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee DIANE E. WATSON, California
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
DARRELL E. ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JON C. PORTER, Nevada C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina Columbia
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania ------
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio (Independent)
------ ------
Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director
Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
JON C. PORTER, Nevada BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Ex Officio
TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
J. Vincent Chase, Chief Investigator
Robert A. Briggs, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on October 31, 2005................................. 1
Statement of:
Ekstrand, Dr. Laurie E., Director, Homeland Security and
Justice Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office,
accompanied by Philip Caramia, Senior Analyst, Homeland
Security and Justice Issues; Michael Gulledge, Director,
Office of Evaluation and Inspections Division, Office of
the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice; Lewis P.
Raden, Assistant Director Enforcement Programs and Services
Division, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, U.S.
Department of Justice...................................... 9
Ekstrand, Dr. Laurie E................................... 9
Gulledge, Michael........................................ 25
Raden, Lewis P........................................... 37
Gonzalez, Fernando, battalion chief, Fort Worth Fire
Department, Division of Arson/Bomb Investigation; Dr. Tibor
G. Rozgony, professor and head, Mining Engineering
Department, Colorado School of Mines; Sgt. Stanley
Mathiasen, chairman, National Bomb Squad Commanders
Advisory Board; Dr. Vilem Petr, assistant research
professor, Mining Engineering Department, Colorado School
of Mines; James Christopher Ronay, president, the Institute
of Makers of Explosives [IME]; Don Horsley, county sheriff,
San Mateo County Sheriff's Office; and Lt. Gary Kirby, San
Jose Police Department..................................... 62
Gonzalez, Fernando....................................... 62
Horsley, Don............................................. 97
Kirby, Gary.............................................. 102
Mathiasen, Sgt. Stanley.................................. 79
Petr, Dr. Vilem.......................................... 85
Ronay, James Christopher................................. 92
Rozgony, Dr. Tibor G..................................... 68
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Ekstrand, Dr. Laurie E., Director, Homeland Security and
Justice Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office,
prepared statement of...................................... 11
Gonzalez, Fernando, battalion chief, Fort Worth Fire
Department, Division of Arson/Bomb Investigation, prepared
statement of............................................... 64
Gulledge, Michael, Director, Office of Evaluation and
Inspections Division, Office of the Inspector General, U.S.
Department of Justice, prepared statement of............... 27
Horsley, Don, county sheriff, San Mateo County Sheriff's
Office, prepared statement of.............................. 99
Kirby, Gary, San Jose Police Department, prepared statement
of......................................................... 104
Lantos, Hon. Tom, a Representative in Congress from the State
of California, prepared statement of....................... 7
Mathiasen, Sgt. Stanley, chairman, National Bomb Squad
Commanders Advisory Board, prepared statement of........... 81
Petr, Dr. Vilem, assistant research professor, Mining
Engineering Department, Colorado School of Mines, prepared
statement of............................................... 86
Raden, Lewis P., Assistant Director Enforcement Programs and
Services Division, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, U.S. Department of Justice, prepared statement of 39
Ronay, James Christopher, president, the Institute of Makers
of Explosives [IME], prepared statement of................. 93
Rozgony, Dr. Tibor G., professor and head, Mining Engineering
Department, Colorado School of Mines, prepared statement of 70
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............ 3
HOMELAND SECURITY: SURVEILLANCE AND MONITORING OF EXPLOSIVE STORAGE
FACILITIES, PART II
----------
MONDAY, OCTOBER 31, 2005
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
San Mateo, CA.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9 a.m., in San
Mateo Council Chambers, 330 West 20th Avenue, San Mateo, CA,
Hon. Christopher Shays (chairman of the subcommittee)
presiding.
Present: Representatives Shays and Lantos.
Staff present: J. Vincent Chase, chief investigator; Robert
A. Briggs, clerk; Jason M. Rosenstock, minority senior
legislative assistant; Lynne Weil, minority communications
director; and Ron Grimes, minority legislative director.
Mr. Shays. The Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations hearing entitled,
``Surveillance and Monitoring of Explosive Storage Facilities,
Part II,'' is called to order. Good morning. It is good to be
back in San Mateo with my good friend and colleague Tom Lantos.
The persistence and perspicacity he brings to national and
international issues inspire bipartisan respect, and it is a
privilege to join him in today's important discussion. Ours is
an oversight partnership dating back to my first days as a
Member of Congress in 1987. I have learned a lot since then,
much of it from Tom.
In August of last year, this subcommittee met here and
learned first-hand about security gaps and potential
vulnerabilities in the protection of explosive material held by
State and local authorities. To get a clearer picture of the
depth and breadth of the problem, we asked the Government
Accountability Office [GAO] to visit some explosive storage
facilities and assess the rigor and consistency of security
measures there.
Why? Because it is beyond debate storage magazines
containing C4 plastic explosives and other highly volatile
material are attractive targets for terrorists and criminals
looking for a big bang on the public buck. An unknown number of
publicly maintained storage sites, likely containing hundreds
of tons of explosives, constitute a potentially serious
homeland security challenge, a classic disaster waiting to
happen. If not critical infrastructure, explosive storage sites
certainly represent combustible temptations over which someone
should have adequate visibility and accountability.
Regretfully, the GAO report released today describes an
uncertain, inconsistent, at times inadequate, system of
regulation over publicly managed explosive storage facilities.
The Federal Government, through the Department of Justice's
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives [ATF],
licenses and inspects private manufacturers and handlers of
explosives but has almost no authority over State and local
government users.
Their compliance with security standards is voluntary. ATF
does require public facilities to report thefts of explosive
materials, but even that requirement is not uniformly
understood, adhered to, or enforced.
The GAO report also pierces the assumption that State and
local regulation of explosives magazines would fill any vacuum
left by Federal law. Most of the 18 public storage facilities
visited by GAO were not required to be licensed or inspected by
State or local regulators. But, as we will hear in testimony
today, some States and localities have taken steps to secure
explosive stockpiles, following best practices in many respects
more demanding than the voluntary ATF standards.
So we look to our witnesses this morning to help us
understand what is being done to secure government-held
explosives, and what more should be done to define and mitigate
the threat posed by these facilities. We appreciate the time,
dedication and expertise of all our witnesses and we look
forward to their testimony.
At this time the chair would recognize the distinguished
Member Mr. Lantos.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]
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Mr. Lantos. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
delighted to be with you again here in San Mateo following the
hearing we conducted in August of last year. At the outset, I
want to express my very sincere appreciation to the remarkable
work done by members of your staff and members of my staff in
preparing for this hearing. I want to thank you once again for
agreeing to convene this subcommittee hearing in San Mateo
where the national problem of poorly secured high explosives
first came to light.
I also want to put in some kind of perspective our
collaborative relationship. Not only have we worked together
since your arrival in Congress many years ago, but just this
past year, year and a half, I had the pleasure of working with
you on three entirely different issues each of them of enormous
importance to the American people and each of them totally
nonpartisan in character.
When it was brought to my attention that Reservists and
National Guardsmen and women suffer a severe financial hardship
in many instances when they are activated, I decided to move
with legislation to rectify this appalling injustice. Not only
are we asking Reservists and National Guard folks to risk their
lives in conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, but we are also
imposing an extraordinary financial burden on members of their
families.
This issue was brought to me by a constituent of mine in
south San Francisco. I was very delighted that you chose to be
the No. 1 Republican co-sponsor of this legislation. The goals
of which we have partially achieved and we are working on fully
achieving them in the near future.
Second, you came on board with the legislation that we are
dealing with today. In San Mateo, when we discovered the theft
of explosives, I asked you to call a hearing in your capacity
as chairman and, as always, you immediately and graciously
responded in the affirmative.
The final piece of legislation on which you and I are the
principal co-authors is a legislation that was born as a result
of the hurricanes in the Gulf. As everybody else, I was glued
to my television set watching the nightmare pictures. But the
one that stood with me most poignantly was a 7-year-old little
boy with his dog who was taken from him because dogs are not
allowed in shelters.
If you saw the face of this little boy, and the only one
left in his whole life was forcibly taken from him, I felt that
legislation was needed to deal with this issue. You and I
introduced legislation, Mr. Chairman, and the markup will take
place this week to mandate that communities in order to take
advantage of FEMA funding must provide in their evacuation
plans provisions for household pets and service animals. Next
time a tragedy strikes we will never again see a 7-year-old
little boy or an elderly blind person being deprived of their
pet or service animal in order to be admitted into a shelter.
Congress always does its work best when it goes so on a
bipartisan basis and you are known in Washington not only for
your passionate commitment to public service but for your deep
and thorough bipartisanship and I am profoundly grateful for
that.
Last year's hearing raised many, if not more, questions
than it answered. Today we will hear from some of the same
witnesses and some additional witnesses and hopefully we will
have more answers than we got 14 months ago. Today we will
learn the result of a study by the Government Accountability
Office that Congressman Shays and I commissioned a year ago, a
study which has just been completed.
This study, along with the testimony of today's witnesses,
will be instrumental in ensuring that the legislation Chairman
Shays and I will introduce in the near future is based on solid
data. The chilling implications of last summer's theft from a
poorly secured law enforcement storage shed just a little ways
from where we hold our hearing horrifically illustrated this
past July when terrorists attacked the London transportation
system.
Immediately after hearing the news of the bombings I rode
BART to show my support for the safety of the Bay Area Transit
System. While the terrorists who bombed the London subway used
homemade devices, I can't help but wonder how much more
destructive their actions would have been had they been able to
arm themselves with high strength plastic explosives stolen
from the San Mateo Law Enforcement Agency bunker.
At the hearing 14 months ago, the overwhelming response to
our repeated questions was, ``We don't know. We don't know how
many public facilities are uninspected by ATF for safety and
security precautions exit in our country. We don't know how
much explosive material is stored at these facilities.'' That
answer was unacceptable then and it most certainly will not
wash now after 14 months of opportunity to discover the
answers.
Mr. Chairman, our country is still very much in the midst
of the war on terrorism that officially began on September 11,
2001. Sometimes we are reminded of it dramatically as a bomb
scare shuts down a tunnel as it recently did in the Washington
area. While such episodes tend to dominate our attention, we
should not underestimate the dogged vigilance needed every
single day so that in this struggle we shall prevail.
Thieves should not be allowed to raid stockpiles of high
explosives right in our backyard to sell them to the highest
bidder, potentially terrorists. Uniform standards for
safeguarding such materials must be established and they must
be enforced.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding this hearing. I
also want to thank our witnesses for agreeing to share their
perspectives from this most important topic and I look forward
to hearing their views.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Tom Lantos follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you, gentlemen. If I had been in the
cabinet room of the White House and my phone went off, the
President would have taken it and put it in a glass of water. I
apologize for the phone going off.
Mr. Lantos. We plan to do that after the hearing.
Mr. Shays. I would like to invite our panel to come forward
and I will introduce them. We have Dr. Laurie E. Ekstrand,
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Team, U.S. Government
Accountability Office accompanied by Philip Caramia, Senior
Analyst, Homeland Security and Justice Issues.
Our second testimony will be from Michael Gulledge,
Director, Office of Evaluation and Inspections Division, Office
of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice.
Our third testimony will be from Mr. Lewis P. Raden,
Assistant Director Enforcement Programs and Services Division,
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, U.S. Department of
Justice.
Before swearing our witnesses in--if they would come
forward. Oh, I see. Are they speaking from--OK. This is
interesting. I was looking and seeing no witnesses. OK. Before
swearing them in, let me ask unanimous consent that all members
of the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement
in the record and the record remain open for 3 days for that
purpose. Without objection so ordered. I ask further unanimous
consent that all witnesses be permitted to include their
written statements in the record and without objection so
ordered.
At this time I would ask our witnesses to stand up. If
there is anyone they may call on to answer a question, I would
like them sworn in as well if that is the case. If they would
rise, raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. I will note for the record all four of our
witnesses have responded in the affirmative and we will begin
with the GAO. Then we will go to the Inspector General. Then we
will go to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. The way
the system works is we have 5 minutes. If you go over 5 minutes
I am not going to stop you but we would like you to be as close
to 5 minutes as possible. If you dare go to 10 minutes, things
go off. Your testimony is very important and we look forward to
hearing your testimony and then asking you questions.
Dr. Ekstrand.
STATEMENTS BY DR. LAURIE E. EKSTRAND, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND
SECURITY AND JUSTICE TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY PHILIP CARAMIA, SENIOR ANALYST, HOMELAND
SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES; MICHAEL GULLEDGE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE
OF EVALUATION AND INSPECTIONS DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; LEWIS P. RADEN, ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS AND SERVICES DIVISION, THE BUREAU
OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
STATEMENT OF DR. LAURIE EKSTRAND
Dr. Ekstrand. Mr. Chairman, and Representative Lantos, Mr.
Caramia and I are very pleased to be here today to discuss
security at State and local government explosive storage
facilities. A report on this issue is being issued today in
conjunction with the hearing. My statement covers three topics
and let me briefly touch on them in turn.
First, the extent to which State and local storage
facilities have been vulnerable to theft. The short answer is
that no one knows. We know that ATF data indicates that there
have been nine thefts of explosives from State and local
government storage facilities during the 3-year period that
ended in February 2005 and that this is a relatively small
number compared to the 205 thefts reported from all sources
combined.
But we have reason to believe that the actual number of
thefts from public facilities could be higher than nine. While
requirements for prompt reporting of thefts from private
facilities are clear, it is less so for public entities. ATF
officials acknowledge that State and local governments may be
unclear as to whether they are covered by theft reporting
requirements.
Indeed, during the course of our work we found evidence of
five thefts from State and local government facilities but only
four appeared in ATF's theft data base. We are recommending
that action be taken to ensure that all thefts from public as
well as private facilities are promptly reported so that
appropriate actions can be taken to recover the explosives and
apprehend the thieves.
Now, let me turn to ATF oversight of State and local
explosive storage facilities. First, all facilities both public
and private are required to comply with Federal storage
regulations. However, only private facilities are required to
attain a license from ATF. Oversight, and that is inspection to
ensure that storage standards are being met and sanctions are
administered for noncompliance, is linked to the licensing
process. That is because public facilities are not subject to
licensing. They are not subject to mandatory Federal oversight.
The licensing process is also the main source of data on
the numbers of facilities, locations, and types of explosives
in storage for private sector facilities. As with oversight, no
licensing results in no nationwide data for public facilities.
During the course of our work we identified three types of
State and local government entities that use or stored
explosives. They were law enforcement bomb squads, public
universities with mining programs, and transportation
departments. However, we were unable to gather sufficient
information to estimate the total number of facilities in these
categories.
Finally, during our audit we visited 14 State and local
entities, 13 bomb squads, and one university. We observed the
security in place at their total of 18 storage facilities. We
found a wide variety of safety and security measures in place
across the facilities. For example, some had fences and
electronic monitoring devices. One was in the basement of a
municipal building behind locked doors.
Another was in an open area without any physical barriers.
All of the storage facilities seemed to meet ATF's requirements
in relation to security. However, this is by no means a
representative sample of public storage facilities nationwide.
In conclusion, as I indicated, we have made a
recommendation to try to ensure that all incidents of theft are
timely reported to ATF so that they can be properly recorded
and investigated. Not only would this reporting ensure
investigation of crimes by ATF but it would also help us gauge
the level of vulnerability of State and local facilities as all
thefts would be required to be reported.
This completes my oral statement and Mr. Caramia and I
would be glad to answer any questions you might have.
Note.--The GAO report entitled, ``AFT, Thefts of Explosives
from State and Local Government Storage Facilities Are Few but
May Be Underreported, GAO-06-92,'' may be found in subcommittee
files.]
[The prepared statement of Dr. Ekstrand follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Gulledge.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL GULLEDGE
Mr. Gulledge. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lantos, on behalf of the
Inspector General, I appreciate your invitation to testify
today. We were invited because we recently issued a report on
the ATF's implementation of the Safe Explosives Act. My
testimony is based on that review and I will discuss the issues
we identified and recommendations we made and the actions that
the ATF has taken. I will also briefly discuss the ATF's
inspector staffing levels.
After September 11th Congress passed the Safe Explosives
Act to reduce the chance that terrorists could easily obtain
explosives to carry out attacks in this country.
Mr. Shays. Excuse me. I am going to interrupt you. Mr.
Lantos and I are both having a little bit of trouble hearing
you. Could you pull the mic a little closer to you? Don't feel
you have to rush your testimony. Just speak at a nice pace.
Mr. Gulledge. After September 11th Congress passed the Safe
Explosives Act. Is that better?
Mr. Lantos. Pull it closer.
Mr. Gulledge. After September 11th Congress passed the Safe
Explosives Act to reduce the chance that terrorists could
easily obtain explosives to carry out attacks in this country.
The act expanded the licensing requirements to include
interstate users of explosives and it strengthened the
application and licensing process.
A key provision is that in addition to all corporate
officers all employees who have access to explosives are to
receive background checks. Every explosives license applicant
is also to receive an onsite inspection. Our review found
several deficiencies in ATF's implementation of the act which
prevented it from ensuring that all prohibited persons were
identified and denied access to the explosives. Prohibited
persons are generally felons, fugitives, drug users, and other
people who are not authorized access to explosives.
We compared a sample of ATF and FBI records and found that
about 9 percent of the employee applicants in ATF's records had
no corresponding record of an FBI NICS check. Second, the ATF
had not adjudicated about 30 percent of the cases we reviewed
in which the FBI had completed a background check.
Third, the ATF did not promptly deny prohibited persons
that were identified by those NICS checks. The data available
during our review showed that the FBI had identified 1,157
prohibited persons through August 2004 while the ATF data
showed that about 502 individuals had been denied access to
explosives.
Another problem identified during our review was that ATF
inspectors were not consistent in their enforcement of
explosive regulations, the ATF plan to send all its inspectors
to an enhanced explosives training course but we estimated it
would take about 7 years for all ATF inspectors to attend that
course.
The report that we issued last March included 10
recommendations to help the ATF improve its implementation of
the act. Since then ATF has provided information on the action
it is taking to correct the deficiencies. For example, ATF has
told us that it is in the process of conducting 100 percent
cross match of its data with FBI NICS data to identify
individuals whose backgrounds were not previously checked and
has implemented procedures to ensure that FBI background checks
are conducted on all future applicants.
The ATF has also told us it has taken action on all the
prohibited persons previously identified by the FBI and has
taken steps to ensure that any prohibited persons identified in
the future are promptly denied access to explosives.
The ATF informed us that through its cross match it has
identified and updated the records of over 24,000 individuals
that had been cleared by the FBI and its records still showed
as pending or denied. To improve the consistency of its
regulatory enforcement, the ATF is making information more
readily available by disseminating documents electronically and
posting information on its Internet and public Web sites. ATF
has also told us it is improving its training for its inspector
work force, for example, by distributing training courses on
DVD so that inspectors can view them as needed.
Finally, the ATF developed an interactive CD that contains
the publications, forms, technical descriptions of explosive
products, and other information that inspectors need to conduct
inspections. I will give you a brief update on staffing. In
August 2004 I discussed the ATF's estimate that it needed 1,775
inspectors to accomplish its inspections workload. That
included inspections of firearms dealers and gun dealers.
We questioned that number and we asked the ATF to revise
the projection using more accurate assumptions. Last month the
ATF provided a revised estimate that indicates it needs 1,114
inspectors. As of last week ATF told us that it has 610
inspectors on board not including managers. Although ATF's
latest calculation is 760 fewer inspectors than before, it is
still over 400 less than they have right now. Sorry, 400 more
than they have right now.
Also, it is based on the current population of firearms and
explosives licensees. At present inspections of publicly owned
explosive storage facilities are not a significant portion of
ATF's workload. Only about 100 last fiscal year. So if the
ATF's responsibility is expanded to include these facilities,
the staffing requirements will have to be adjusted further.
In summary, although our report reflected strong concern
with ATF's implementation of the Safe Explosives Act, it
appears that the agency is taking steps to correct the
deficiencies we found. We believe the actions that the ATF has
reported taking will make it better prepared should Congress
decide to expand its authority to include publicly owned
storage.
This concludes my remarks. I would be pleased to answer any
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gulledge follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
Mr. Raden.
STATEMENT OF LEWIS RADEN
Mr. Raden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lantos, and members
of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear
before you today to discuss the report by the Government
Accountability Office on thefts of explosives from State and
local government storage facilities. I hope to provide you with
an understanding of how the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives [ATF] can assist in the protection of
these facilities.
As discussed during this subcommittee's August 2004
hearing, the ATF enforces Federal explosives laws and regulates
commerce in explosives. The ATF also is responsible for
regulating most explosives storage facilities in the United
States. The ATF's regulatory authority over explosives extends
back to the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.
This statute imposed controls over the manufacture,
distribution, importation, and storage of explosives, and gave
the ATF enforcement responsibility for these controls. The Safe
Explosive Act, enacted in 2002, expanded ATF authority to
require permits for persons who receive explosives and
background checks for all licensees and permittees and their
employees who possess explosives.
Federal explosives laws require all persons who store
explosives to comply with applicable storage regulations,
except for Federal agencies. With respect to private entities,
the ATF's authority to inspect explosives storage facilities is
related to its authority to regulate licensees and permittees.
The ATF has warrantless inspection authority only for persons
who hold a Federal license or permit.
State and local governmental entities are required to
comply with the Federal storage regulations, but there is no
mechanism in place to ensure this compliance. Because these
entities are not required to obtain a Federal license, the ATF
does not have statutory authority to conduct inspections at
their storage facilities but ATF cannot conduct voluntary
inspections.
There are approximately 12,100 Federal explosives licensees
and permittees in the United States. Under the Safe Explosives
Act, the ATF is required to conduct an onsite inspection of an
applicant's storage facilities prior to issuance of a Federal
explosives license or permit. The ATF also is required to
inspect storage facilities at least once every 3 years after
issuance of a license or permit.
During fiscal year 2005, the ATF conducted 3,800
inspections of Federal licensees and permittees. To put these
inspections in context, the ATF currently oversees
approximately 118,000 firearms and explosives licensees
nationwide. The ATF has approximately 610 to 620 industry
operations investigators--again, these do not include
supervisory--who regularly conduct both explosives and firearms
inspections.
Any person who has knowledge of a theft or loss of
explosive material stock must report that theft or loss to the
ATF within 24 hours of discovery. In an effort to keep
explosives out of the hands of those who would use them for
criminal or terrorist activity, it is the ATF's policy to
investigate all reported thefts of explosives.
The GAO report on explosives thefts concluded that the ATF
would be better positioned to monitor and respond to incidents
of missing or stolen explosives if the ATF clarified the
Federal theft reporting requirements to ensure that all persons
who store explosives--including State and local government
agencies--understood their obligation to report all thefts. We
have acted on this recommendation.
First, in conjunction with the ATF, the National Bomb Squad
Commanders Advisory Board and the International Association of
Bomb Technicians and Investigators sent a letter dated April
19, 2005, to each State and local bomb squad commander, urging
each of them ensure that all bomb squad explosives facilities
were as secure as.
Second, in August 2005 ATF gave presentations on storage
requirements to the NBSCAB Conference. On September 24, 2005,
ATF conducted a similar presentation at the International
Association of Chiefs of Police Annual Conference.
Third, in October 2005 the ATF issued letters of guidance
to the Attorneys General of each State, the International
Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Association of
State Fire Marshals, and the National Sheriffs Association,
informing these organizations about Federal storage
requirements, the timely reporting of lost or stolen explosive
materials, and requested that agencies with magazines
voluntarily report the locations of these magazines to ATF.
Finally, several times a year the ATF trains State and
local law enforcement officers and bomb technicians on Federal
storage and theft reporting requirements. Again, Mr. Chairman
and Mr. Lantos, I appreciate the opportunity to testify today
and share with you the latest information on the ATF's
explosives enforcement efforts. We have made progress in making
our communities safer, but we know there is much more to do. We
are determined to work with you to succeed in our mission of
reducing violent crime, preventing terrorism, and protecting
the public. I look forward to responding to any questions you
may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Raden follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you. What we are going to do, Mr. Raden,
is have you move to the other side so we can actually see you.
Sorry. You sat where we put you but it would be better to have
you over there. Is that mic on as well, Bob? OK.
Let me also say that we are going to take questions. We are
just going to pursue our questions with no clock. Mr. Lantos,
you have the floor for the first round.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me first
thank all four of the witnesses for their testimony. There are
some very broad and very specific issues I would like to raise.
First, let me state for the record that I am fully cognizant of
the fact that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms is
severely under-funded. The Bureau is not to be criticized for
being under-funded. It is to be criticized for not asking for
adequate funding. I believe that over recent times that has
been the case.
I am also very conscious that ATF, as every other
organization, needed time to adjust to the paradigm shift
following September 11th. Prior to September 11th the
assumption was that if there are thefts of explosives the
reason for that basically is for thieves to sell these
explosives to the highest bidder.
Now we are confronted with the possibility that these could
be sold to terrorists. Since we are expending unbelievable sums
of money to deal, for instance, with airplane security, it
seems incomprehensible how little attention is being paid to
these enormously dangerous items.
I also find it puzzling, and I would like any of you ladies
and gentlemen to answer me, why we differentiate between public
and private storage facilities for explosives.
The terrorists couldn't care less whether the explosives
they gain control of come from a private facility or from a
public facility. And to have public facilities subjected only
to voluntary inspection boggles the mind. It is nonsensical.
Why shouldn't we have the same mandatory provisions for public
storage facilities that we do for private storage facilities
since the purpose is to prevent explosives from getting into
the hands of terrorists who don't care whether the explosives
come from public or private facilities. I would like to ask all
four of you to answer my question which is, is there any
justification for a dichotomy between public and private
facilities?
Now, I also find it extremely disturbing that years after
September 11th my wife routinely has her little manicure nail
confiscated at the airport, as it should be, but there is no
comparable effort to take charge of facilities which contain
hundreds of pounds of very dangerous explosives. This is an
absurdity that the Department of Homeland Security must explain
to the American people.
I find myself in the hilarious, but at a different level,
very idiotic experience of going to visit my daughter at the
New Hampshire airport at Manchester where all the people know
me perfectly well. I take off my shoes and they inspect me
while conversing with me knowing me full well on a first-name
basis. Money and resources are spent for such idiotic
activities while explosives go uninventoried, undetected,
thefts unreported with potential damage of vast proportions.
Fifty-nine people were killed in India over the weekend.
Fifty-nine people were killed in a terrorist episode because
those terrorists could not get hold of more powerful
explosives. We are all in agreement that on September 11th the
perpetrators would have loved to have killed not 3,000 but
300,000 or 3 million of our fellow citizens.
This failure of the agency in charge to differentiate
between nail scissors and the theft of vast quantities of
dangerous explosives literally is nonsensical. I would be
grateful for your comments.
I also am intrigued by the fact that according to your
testimony, Mr. Gulledge, prohibited persons continue to have
access to explosives until after their case is finally
resolved. It would seem to me that prohibited persons should
immediately have their ability to have access to explosives
terminated and if they are cleared, their opportunity to deal
with explosives be reinstated rather than assuming that since
they are only prohibited and the final determination was not
yet made, they can continue to deal with these dangerous
materials.
The final question I have and, again, all of you are
welcome to comment on it, is the nonviability of the 24-hour
reporting requirement. What are the penalties if a storage
facility does not report a theft within 24 hours? Would you
like to begin, Dr. Ekstrand, on my questions?
Dr. Ekstrand. At first in terms of why public facilities
were exempt in the passage of the law, I would think that it
was probably a number of reasons and one of them is probably a
States rights issue but----
Mr. Lantos. I am not questioning why that was so in the
past. I am asking why, at a time of a serious terrorist threat
globally which we experience every day, 1 day in India, and 1
day in London, 1 day in Baly, 1 day in the United States, this
dichotomy between public and private facilities still
continues.
Dr. Ekstrand. I think that in respect it is a better
question for ATF since they are responsible for----
Mr. Lantos. Would you favor eliminating the distinction?
Dr. Ekstrand. I think that it is a complicated question.
All of the facilities we looked at including, and we didn't
look at the facilities near San Mateo where the theft was. It
is our understanding that they all would have met ATF standards
in terms of security. We think that this is a far more
complicated issue than perhaps even the requirements for
security at public as well as private are not where they should
be.
Fences are not required. Video surveillance is not
required. We did not feel at GAO we are in a position to
prescribe what security there should be for explosive
facilities but the ATF standards are fairly minimal in terms of
security. We were not finding things that looked like obvious
breeches of that in the public sector.
Mr. Lantos. But you are favoring, I take it, from what you
are saying, a dramatic upgrading of the standards and making
them uniform?
Dr. Ekstrand. We can't be very specific about it because we
didn't do enough work but the work that we did do leads to at
least the consideration that maybe the standards that are in
place are not stringent enough for protection.
Mr. Lantos. Do you have any comments on my other questions?
Mr. Caramia. Background checks. The question about the
background checks is probably best left for the Department of
Justice and Inspector General since they did the work on that.
We did not do any work on verification of the background checks
on the persons that handle explosives.
If I could just mention one other thing to elaborate on
what Dr. Ekstrand said. One has to keep in mind that these
facilities even though ATF does not have any responsibility for
mandatory oversight, they are required to still comply with the
Federal storage regulations. It is not like they are completely
operating out there without any sort of regulation whatsoever.
However, right now there is no mechanism whereby ATF can
verify where everyone of those facilities are whether they are
in compliance with the regulations. In that respect there is a
bit of a disconnect. They are required to comply with the
regulations but ATF has no authority to go out there and verify
that they are in compliance.
Mr. Lantos. Is that a bit of a disconnect or is that an
absurdity?
Mr. Caramia. Well, it is certainly different from what is
required of the private sector.
Mr. Lantos. Do you see any justification for a
differentiation between the public and the private sector when,
in fact, a terrorist couldn't care less where they obtain
explosives?
Mr. Caramia. Well, since you put it that way, it doesn't
seem to make a whole lot of sense, but as far as the way the
law was written, and, again, ATF can probably speak to this a
little bit in more detail, as Dr. Ekstrand explained, it is
probably a bit of a State's rights issue, that is, the Federal
Government not being in a position to tell State and local
government entities what they should be allowed to do with, for
example, their law enforcement agencies. That could be a little
bit of a sticky wicket, so to speak, and that may be at least
partially one of the reasons why State and local agencies were
made exempt from the requirements back when the original law
was passed.
Mr. Lantos. I understand the historic reason. I am talking
about now in a global terrorism age is that any justification
in your judgment for a differentiation between public and
private storage facilities.
Mr. Caramia. I think it makes a lot of sense but it is an
issue right now of resources for ATF whether they can be able
to handle the additional responsibility.
Mr. Shays. I am sorry. It makes a lot of sense meaning
what?
Mr. Caramia. It seems to make a lot of sense on the face of
it.
Mr. Shays. To do what?
Mr. Caramia. That ATF would have the same responsibilities
for public sector as they do for private sector. However, there
are other issues to consider there, one of which is the ATF
resource issue, how much would they need in resources to be
able to handle those additional responsibilities.
Mr. Lantos. The resource issue is a very simple issue. ATF
has to ask for what it needs and Congress has to provide what
it deems ATF should have. If ATF doesn't ask for enough
resources, then it bears a considerable share of the
responsibility for its failure to be able to adequately
discharge its responsibilities.
Let me turn to you, Mr. Gulledge. What is your view of
discrepancy, putting it mildly, between individuals found to be
prohibited persons but since the final determination is not yet
in they are allowed to continue dealing in explosives?
Mr. Gulledge. A prohibited person is an individual who by
virtue----
Mr. Lantos. Can you speak into the mic?
Mr. Gulledge. Yes. A prohibited person is someone who
because they have a criminal background or have been
adjudicated mentally defective or certain categories of aliens
are not allowed under the law to have access to explosives.
When an individual starts to work for an explosives
company, that company has, I believe, 30 days to submit
information on that individual to the ATF. The ATF then enters
that information into its system and conducts a background
check which it does using the FBI's national instant background
check system, the same system used for guns.
When the results of that NICS check come back, it indicates
whether or not the individual has any of those prohibiting
characteristics in their background. If they don't, then they
are allowed to access explosives. If they do, then they are
denied.
During the interim between when they start to work, their
information is submitted to ATF and the ATF gets those results,
makes its determination, and responds back to the company
telling the company whether that individual is a prohibited
person and is, therefore, denied or is approved. If approved,
they are allowed to continue working. The problem that we saw
was that some people were not getting the background checks
requested from the FBI and, second----
Mr. Lantos. What does that mean, the company did not submit
the name?
Mr. Gulledge. The company submitted the information. We
found the individuals in ATF's records but when we went to the
FBI to confirm that the checks had been conducted, we didn't
find a record at the FBI. More importantly, once the FBI did
its check and ATF was retrieving the results, the individuals
until they get that background check back from the time ATF
enters them and submits the background check request to the FBI
and they get it back, the person is held in what is called
pending.
We found that a considerable number of records in the ATF
system were held in pending. Even though the ATF had requested,
and the FBI had completed its background check most of those
people were approved. About 1,150 of them were not approved.
However, a lot of those people, particularly the ones we were
most concerned with, were the ones who had been found to be
prohibited persons. As long as they were still showing as
pending and had not been reported back to the company, they
continued to have access.
Once the ATF makes its determination and enters into its
records that a person is denied and reports that to the
company, that individual is denied access to explosives. They
can't appeal that but during that appeal they do not have the
authority to continue working with explosives. Our concern was
that even once an FBI check was done, the individuals continued
to be held in pending with no final determination and continued
to have access to explosives.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. I know since September
11th, and Mr. Lantos, I think, introduced this point, that
since September 11th there has been a paradigm shift. I will
tell you that since September 11th I sometimes feel like I am
in the water and I am gasping for breath and someone dunks my
head down and then I come up again and they dunk my head down.
I would imagine that is the way a lot of people feel in
government, particularly as it relates to concerns about
terrorism.
I just want to affirm Mr. Lantos' point that if ATF doesn't
ask for the money, it rests on its shoulders. If it does ask
for the resources and Congress doesn't provide it, it rests on
our shoulders. If we are not told what needs to happen, then
you are depriving Congress of the most important part of our
job, information to be able to evaluate what we do.
I am surprised that a year later, actually much more than a
year later, we had our hearing on August 2, 2004. We are beyond
a year now. I don't really feel that much has been done in
terms of responding to this issue. I am just going to also
agree with Mr. Lantos that terrorists and criminals could care
a twit about whether it is a government facility or private
facility.
I am also left with the feeling from this hearing that the
standards for private facilities is not all that good so it is
almost like an argument why do we want to mirror what happens
in private facilities. But I have heard no testimony that says
that the public facilities are much better. Disabuse me of that
if I need to be. But I also have a sense that nobody cares in
government about this issue to the extent they should care.
Mr. Raden, I had mentioned before the hearing that I am a
bit puzzled by the kind of response that we are getting from
ATF. Last year Mr. Lantos asked in the hearing, and this is
from the transcripts, ``I am not asking you whether you want to
make technical comments. I am asking you representing the
agency whether you are prepared at this stage to recommend a
complete accounting of all such facilities which, it seems to
me, is step one in regulating them. If you don't know how many
there are, how can you regulate them and if you don't know who
they are.''
Then Mr. Nelson, who I think is your Deputy, is that
correct, Mr. Raden?
Mr. Raden. Yes, sir. That is correct.
Mr. Shays. Walforde Nelson, Deputy Assistant Director,
Enforcement Programs, ATF, is he still in his position?
Mr. Raden. As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, today is his
final day on the job. He is retired as of the end of the day.
Mr. Shays. In the response he said, ``Anything we attempt,
and it is probably a good idea to get this count, would have to
be voluntary. We do not have authority to require agencies.''
Mr. Lantos says, ``Are you asking for the authority?'' ``We
have not asked for it.'' ``Why not,'' Mr. Lantos asked? ``Mr.
Nelson, again, when it comes to State and local agencies, we
partner with them in many things but we are not their
regulatory agency.''
Mr. Lantos, ``But don't you minimally need to know how many
such facilities are in the United States?'' Mr. Nelson, ``Could
you repeat the question?'' Mr. Lantos, ``Yes. Wouldn't step one
in dealing with theft such as this one we have here in San
Mateo need to know how many such facilities there are and where
they are located?''
So let me just start and ask Dr. Ekstrand do we know how
many facilities there are?
Dr. Ekstrand. No, sir. We don't. We made a rough estimate
just for internal use that in relation to bomb squads there are
probably somewhere between 1,000 and 1,200 different
facilities. In terms of university related facilities and
transportation departments, we really couldn't get----
Mr. Shays. So we don't know how many facilities are so,
therefore, we don't know what facilities are. Correct?
Dr. Ekstrand. Correct.
Mr. Shays. Yes. Do you agree with that, Mr. Raden?
Mr. Raden. Yes, I do agree with that, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Gulledge.
Mr. Gulledge. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. Shays. So we don't know how many facilities there are
and we don't know--first, we don't know what facilities there
are and we don't know how many there are. We all agree on that.
Mr. Gulledge. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Would you like to jump in, Mr. Lantos?
Mr. Lantos. I just find this the theater of the absurd. We
are sitting here, seriously for the second year in a row,
attempting to plug a whole in facilities that hold dangerous
explosives of potential great use by terrorists. All of the
agencies represented here are telling us they don't know how
many such facilities there are.
In which case the notion of regulating them, controlling
them, establishing standards for them, becomes an absurdity. I
find, as our chairman does, incomprehensible that in none of
the agencies represented here is there any apparent sense of
urgency that step No. 1 is to find out how many such facilities
there are.
I mean, it is insane to cavalierly say we have no idea how
many storage facilities there are and then talk about how we
should regulate them or whether we should regulate them. What
organization would be responsible for just counting how many
such facilities there are? What would be the appropriate
agency, Dr. Ekstrand?
Dr. Ekstrand. They would come under ATF.
Mr. Lantos. Well, why doesn't ATF take the time and trouble
to count the number of facilities?
Mr. Raden. Mr. Lantos, that is a good question and I do
have an answer for you.
Mr. Lantos. Good.
Mr. Raden. In fact, I have put together a survey. We were
in the process of getting that survey through the
administrative requirements that a survey of collection of
public information is required. It needs to work its way
through the department and through OMB. In that survey----
Mr. Lantos. When did you commence that survey?
Mr. Raden. That survey was recently commenced----
Mr. Lantos. What does recently mean?
Mr. Raden. Within the last 2 weeks, I think.
Mr. Lantos. Within the last 2 weeks. So 14 months ago we
held a hearing and you didn't do a damn thing for 13 months and
knowing that a hearing is coming up again 2 weeks ago you start
scurrying around and counting the number of facilities. You
think this will wash with this subcommittee.
Mr. Raden. No, Mr. Lantos, I don't think it will wash with
this subcommittee. I had asked that question myself and when I
found out the answer was we internally had not asked ourselves
that question or had gone out to seek that information, I found
that an absurdity. When it was brought to my attention I acted
upon it. It is late. I agree with you.
Mr. Lantos. Whose responsibility was it to begin a survey
just counting the number of facilities?
Mr. Raden. It would have been ATF's responsibility.
Mr. Lantos. Who at ATF?
Mr. Raden. It would have been my responsibility, sir, and I
did not do that.
Mr. Lantos. When will this survey be completed?
Mr. Raden. I cannot give you a firm date on that because we
do need OMB approval for it. On a similar topic, if I may, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Sure, Mr. Raden.
Mr. Raden. That is from an ATF perspective because it was
not brought into the line of questioning from me directly. Our
agency is on record--it is a law enforcement sensitive
document. I can't sell it with you--with the department to
bring State and local agencies and private entities under the
inspection authority of ATF. We have made that recommendation
to the department. That was back in April of this year.
Mr. Shays. Let me be a little critical and a little
thankful at the same time just to continue with this question.
In response to Mr. Nelson saying, ``Could you repeat the
question,'' Mr. Lantos said, ``Wouldn't step No. 1 in dealing
with theft such as this one we have in San Mateo be to know how
many such facilities there are and where they are located?''
Then Mr. Nelson said, ``One thing we did in 2001 is we put
out a letter to all State and local enforcement agencies about
their requirements for storage and the fact that we did a
voluntary inspection some weeks ago.'' ``Some weeks ago.'' This
is in August so in July 2004. ``Some weeks ago we started
developing another letter to go out and as part of that we are
again offering to do these inspections. We can certainly
develop a list for this effort I would think, Mr. Lantos. You
have 39 responses in that right.''
Let me put in my words and you can agree or disagree. We
have a letter from you, Mr. Raden, being sent out to a variety
of local government agencies. The first paragraph is the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and Explosives. ``ATF
respectfully request the assistance of your association in
distributing information pertinent to the safe and secure
storage of explosive materials.
It has come to ATF's attention that some State and local
government entities may not be aware of the Federal
requirements for the storage of explosive materials and for the
reported materials that have been stolen. ATF is seeking to
correct this by reviewing the Federal requirements with these
government entities.'' Is this letter that was sent out
basically in just a few--what is the date on this? There was no
date. When was this letter sent out?
Mr. Raden. Is that the letter to the National Sheriffs
Association? That letter was sent out on October 18th.
Mr. Shays. OK. Let me say that Newt Gingrich told me one
time that sometimes having hearings accomplishes what you want
to accomplish just by having the hearings. I am getting a sense
that this issue hadn't been shown on your radar screen. It had
been on Mr. Nelson's. He had participated in this hearing. He
is your assistant and we appreciate you being here today. Is it
fair to say that ATF dropped the ball on this? I mean, was this
letter of last year finally getting sent out this year?
Mr. Raden. Well, the letters went out after I had read the
GAO report and one of the recommendations was to collect
information and advise State and local entities of their
requirements under the storage laws and give them the
information that they needed to be able to conduct basically
what would be a self inspection. But to answer your question,
it is late and I will take responsibility for it being late. We
are doing and moving, I believe, at this point in the right
direction and we were not before but I am determined to make
sure that we are.
Mr. Shays. Let me say that what we will do in this
subcommittee is hold a hearing in Washington sometime in March
if you need to use us as a bit of an excuse with OMB. What I am
hearing you say is a few things. One is you all did drop the
ball. Is that correct?
Mr. Raden. That is correct. There is no other way to put
it. When it came to my attention I acted upon it. It came to my
attention late and I hold myself responsible for it.
Mr. Shays. Well, that is one point. The second point is
that you have asked OMB to do what as it relates to the
oversight of public facilities?
Mr. Raden. What we are doing, and it hasn't gotten to OMB
yet because it is still in the vetting process, when you are
conducting a collection of information, a Federal agency is
collecting information from sources, it has to go through a
vetting process through the Department of Justice and then over
to OMB who then basically gives the agency the authorization to
collect that information.
Mr. Shays. OK. What is the information you are trying to
collect?
Mr. Raden. The location of all the storage facilities of
the State and local law enforcement and other, shall we say,
public entities.
Mr. Shays. You are saying that it has to go through vetting
but ultimately OMB has to approve it?
Mr. Raden. OMB does not have to approve it but unless there
is something unusual or some legal twist to it that I would be
unaware of at this point, I would think that it would make its
way through the system.
Mr. Shays. Let me just say one other thing. Besides having
this hearing that we will have in March, maybe the end of
February, maybe the beginning of April, but somewhere in that
range, Mr. Lantos and I, I think, will seek to speak to the
Director of OMB either by letter or in person because this is a
no-brainer so we appreciate knowing that.
Now, I thought I heard you say besides collecting this
information that it was your recommendation, not necessarily
someone else's, that there be uniformity and oversight and that
you have the ability to have oversight besides knowing these
facilities. Did I hear that or just dream it?
Mr. Raden. No, you heard it but perhaps it was--let me
characterize it. Maybe I was unclear on it. What we have
recommended over to the department in a memorandum from our
Director is that it be examined, that ATF be given the
authority to have statutory inspection authority over State and
public facilities so we have recommended to the Department to
take a look at this issue, sir.
Mr. Shays. So you are recommending that, one, you have the
authority and then you are not suggesting that you will use
authority but you are saying at least give us the authority. Is
that what I am hearing you saying right now?
Mr. Raden. I would suggest that if we were given the
authority that we would be using it. We also recognize the
issue regarding and it has been brought up in different fora
including the GAO report and what my colleague at the IG's
office has said on the issue of the resource issue. That is
additional responsibility. There is no question.
Mr. Shays. Let me say that one of the challenges--I speak
now as a Member of the majority party. One of my extraordinary
disappointments is that what has developed in the
administration has been that once an agency has been given its
budget, then it is supposed to argue for its budget, nothing
more and nothing less, even to the extent sometimes of not
being honest and forthright with Congress as to what they truly
need.
It is one thing to say this is what we are requesting and
this is what the President is requesting. It is important that
when you are before committees that if they say, ``Do you have
enough to do your job?'' the answer is no if it is no, not
that, ``We can do it.'' What I am hearing you say is, one, this
is going to get more of your attention that you all dropped the
ball, two, that you are asking to know about where these
facilities are, and three that you're recommending that you
have the authority to have over-sighted these facilities. Is
that correct?
Mr. Raden. That's correct, sir.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Lantos, did you want to followup on
anything?
Mr. Lantos. If I may, Mr. Chairman. As I understand it,
between 2002 and the present ATF inspectors conducted 77
voluntary requested inspections. Is that correct?
Mr. Raden. Yes, I believe that is the number.
Mr. Lantos. How many of these inspections resulted in
findings that were unsatisfactory?
Mr. Raden. I don't have that information right in front of
me at the moment, Congressman, but I could get that information
to you.
Mr. Lantos. That is not satisfactory. I mean, this hearing
was scheduled. You are representing the agency. You claim that
you conducted 77 investigations that were requested on a
voluntary basis. It is not an unfair question of me to ask what
was found in the 77 voluntary examinations.
Mr. Raden. It is not unfair of you to ask that, sir. I have
it in materials but I do not have it before me. If that is me
being unprepared, I apologize to you, sir.
Mr. Lantos. Do you know theoretically if the results of the
77 voluntary inspections are unsatisfactory, what does ATF do
to bring the agencies into compliance?
Mr. Raden. We would make recommendations to them on what is
required of them to come into compliance.
Mr. Lantos. And how many instances did you make
recommendations to them?
Mr. Raden. Again, that relates back to the materials that I
don't have in front of me but we would work with the
departments to ensure that they are in compliance.
Mr. Lantos. How would you characterize the performance of
your agency in controlling depositories of dangerous explosive
materials on a scale of 10 to 0, 10 being perfect?
Mr. Raden. Well, we have a very, very dedicated work force,
extremely hard working and knowledgeable.
Mr. Lantos. That is not my question.
Mr. Raden. I am getting to your question, sir. I would
probably rate us given what we have and what the statutory
requirements are, what we can and we can't do in terms of
combining the statutory mechanisms and the regulatory
mechanisms, and using that in judging our ability, I would give
our agency about a five or six at this point.
Mr. Lantos. Is it part of the responsibility of the agency
to vigorously advocate for adequate resources when the task it
has is not adequately funded?
Mr. Raden. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lantos. Has that been done?
Mr. Raden. We have asked for resources. We are on record
with Congress. There are any variety of different reports that
are open source whether it is through the IG or through GAO
that plainly demonstrate the resource issues with ATF.
Mr. Lantos. I would like to address a question to all four
members of the panel. On the basis of what you know and what
you have learned, would you be in favor of dramatically
upgrading the security requirements that all storage facilities
of explosive materials whether publicly or privately owned. Dr.
Ekstrand.
Dr. Ekstrand. I think we saw storage facilities that were
without any barriers around them that were visible from major
highways. From a lay person's standpoint in terms of security
that makes me nervous. We also saw a storage facility that is
in the basement of a municipal building. That makes me a little
bit nervous, too, but maybe from a safety standpoint rather
than a security standpoint.
I think that GAO is really not in a position to have the
expertise to determine what types of security is appropriate
for these facilities. I think we saw situations that even
though they would meet ATF standards for security, from a
layman person's point of view didn't seem very safe. The fact
that over a 3-year period there were over 200 thefts, that
again makes me feel that maybe the standards are not high
enough.
Mr. Lantos. How about the uniformity of standards? Would
you favor uniformity of standards irrespective of whether the
ownership is public or private?
Dr. Ekstrand. Well, I don't think it makes sense to have
more stringent standards for public than private because one
thing that seemed clear from our work is that the amount that
is stored in these facilities and the number of facilities are
far greater in the private sector than in the public sector. In
terms of vulnerability, the private sector is probably more
vulnerable just because of the amounts, both the number of
facilities and the amount stored in those facilities.
If there is any difference in terms of standards, then it
probably is weighed on the side of the private facilities. I
certainly agree with the tenor of the hearing that even the
loss of 1 pound of explosives is a serious matter. If you can
get 1 pound from public or private, then they are both
vulnerable.
Mr. Lantos. Mr. Caramia.
Mr. Caramia. Yes. If I could just bring in a little bit
from the locations we visited. I just wanted to address one of
the chairman's comments earlier about whether public security
was better or worse at these public sector facilities. We
actually visited quite a few where they exceeded what the
current standards require right now.
Mr. Lantos. The current standards are palpably unacceptably
low. To exceed unacceptably low security standards when it
comes to explosives is not much comfort to this subcommittee or
to the American people.
Mr. Caramia. Actually, that's true. The standards for
security are quite minimal for storage magazines. They require
you to have a magazine that is theft resistant and has locks
basically. That is the extent of the security. Some of the
locations we visited, in effect, that's all they had. There was
one location we visited where the storage magazine was sitting
out next to a law enforcement training facility.
It was sitting out in the open by itself not surrounded by
any fences. You could drive a car right up to it and walk right
up to it. Yet, that facility was in compliance with the Federal
standards so that gives you an idea of perhaps the minimum
level of standards that are currently required of all
facilities and that is the same thing that is required of
private sector facilities as well.
Mr. Lantos. Any comment from either of you gentlemen?
Mr. Gulledge. Sir, first off, we agree that there need to
be adequate safeguards in place and that they should be
standardized across public and private.
Mr. Lantos. And that is not the case today.
Mr. Gulledge. Well, the standards do apply to all. As Dr.
Ekstrand's report demonstrated, generally they are meeting them
in the public sector.
Mr. Lantos. But they are meaningless standards. They are
inadequate standards.
Mr. Gulledge. Well, I don't have the information to say
that. I think first----
Mr. Lantos. Have you not been listening to the conversation
this morning?
Mr. Gulledge. Yes, sir. I have.
Mr. Lantos. You have no other basis for learning it. What
is your judgment on the basis of what testimony we have had?
Mr. Gulledge. Well, first, I think I would need to know how
the explosives that were stolen were stolen. Were they inside
jobs or were they someone from outside the organization coming
in. No matter how many safeguards you have in place physically,
if it is an inside job, it is irrelevant.
Mr. Lantos. Let me ask the other side of the panel. Is
there any indication of the proportion of inside jobs in the
thefts?
Mr. Caramia. One of the locations we visited had a theft
that involved actually the keys to the magazine being stolen. I
am not sure if that would be considered an inside job but the
person did not have to break into the storage magazine. They
simply stole the keys and then opened the door and broke in
that way. We have no other evidence based on the site visits we
made of any of the thefts that were inside jobs.
Mr. Lantos. The San Mateo case certainly was not an inside
job. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Gulledge. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lantos. OK. Go ahead.
Mr. Gulledge. In deciding what you want to do with this in
any case----
Mr. Lantos. We have decided what we want to do with it. We
want to secure explosives so the American people are not
exposed to thefts which might convey these dangerous substances
into the hands of terrorists. That's what we want to do. We
have long ago decided that, Chairman Shays and I. That is our
goal.
Mr. Gulledge. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Let me just ask our Inspector General. I am
feeling a little bit of a push back from you and that maybe I
am misinterpreting it. From GAO's standpoint we are basically
hearing one, there is erratic standards on the public side and
some States may do a good job, some counties may do a good job,
some may not, and some do not. We are hearing from them that we
don't know how many facilities we have so we don't know where
these facilities are and we don't know how many of them there
are.
We don't even know who to contact because we don't know if
they have a facility or not. We are also hearing from GAO, and
correct me if I am wrong, that even if we went to the standard
of the private side, which is overseen by ATF, that standard
isn't all that impressive. Is that correct?
Dr. Ekstrand. Correct.
Mr. Shays. Do you agree with that or disagree with any part
of it?
Mr. Gulledge. I think I heard it a little bit differently
from Dr. Ekstrand. I think the standards are the same for both
sides. The point is that the public facilities there is
variance in the degree of protection of the public facilities.
Generally all of them met the standards if I read the report
correctly. There is also variance on the public side.
Mr. Shays. A comment on what you just heard?
Dr. Ekstrand. The standards are the same across the board.
What we found when we went out was a wide variety of achieving
or overachieving the standards. That is that some facilities
had additional safeguards in effect that went beyond the
standards. We didn't find any facilities that weren't meeting
the standards but the standards are fairly minimal.
Mr. Shays. Right. So respond to that part. I appreciate
your distinction. Respond to just the standards being fairly
minimal. Do you think they are minimal?
Mr. Gulledge. I think they are minimal. I think there are
decisions that will have to be made as you go forward in this
raising the standards certainly requiring video surveillance or
electronic surveillance or physical protections.
It will be easier for some public entities as well as
private entities to meet than others. Some companies that use
explosives are very small. It may create a difficulty for them.
Those are all considerations. We don't have a position on
whether or not you should do this but those are considerations.
Mr. Shays. Shouldn't do what?
Mr. Gulledge. Implement the new standards on safeguards.
What we would try to do as----
Mr. Shays. Let me be clear. You have no opinion on whether
we should raise the standards?
Mr. Gulledge. On what the specific standards should be.
Like Dr. Ekstrand, we can't tell you what the exact standards
should be. All we can really do is tell you the information.
Mr. Shays. That is because you don't have the authority to
or you haven't done the research?
Mr. Gulledge. I haven't done the research.
Mr. Shays. OK. Dr. Ekstrand, you made the point that one
facility, if I heard you correctly, kept explosive devices in a
municipal building?
Dr. Ekstrand. That is correct, in the basement of the
municipal building.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Lantos. What city is that?
Mr. Caramia. Well, actually, when we originally did the
work we decided that we would not divulge any of the locations
for security purposes.
Mr. Shays. I would like for you afterwards to tell Mr.
Lantos and I what facility it is.
Mr. Caramia. We certainly can.
Dr. Ekstrand. By all means.
Mr. Shays. Well, I just laughed. I mean, laughed not at the
fact that a facility is like that but laughed that somehow
we're not outraged. You are basically saying that there are men
and women and the general public who would go to a municipal
building that in the basement there were or are explosive
devices. Are the explosive devices still there?
Dr. Ekstrand. As far as we know.
Mr. Caramia. As far as we know, yes.
Mr. Shays. OK. Well, you know----
Dr. Ekstrand. I would point out that it is certainly a
safety issue. It is not necessarily a security issue but it is
still an issue.
Mr. Lantos. We understand that.
Mr. Shays. When you heard that, Mr. Raden, what was your
reaction when you heard that there was a public--that is not
your standard, correct?
Mr. Raden. That is correct, Mr. Chairman, to put a magazine
in an inhabited building. The circumstances, as I read it in
the GAO report, is a clear violation of the existing standards
and regulations.
Mr. Shays. OK. So at least your standards would not allow
for that.
Mr. Raden. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Lantos. May I just raise an issue which is much more
than semantic, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Ekstrand keeps using the term
minimal standards. In ordinary conversation the notion of
minimal means acceptable. If you are minimally qualified, you
are qualified. You reach the minimal level of qualification for
a certain position. I don't think the use of the word minimal
is appropriate in this context.
These are unacceptable standards. They are not minimal
standards. They are useless, worthless, pro-forma standards.
They are not minimal. They are way below minimal. Minimal would
be no more than what is necessary. That is what minimal is. If
I have the minimal qualifications to be admitted to a college,
I am qualified to attend that college. These are subminimal.
These are below minimal. Would you accept that modification?
Dr. Ekstrand. I would say these standards are the ones that
are currently required.
Mr. Lantos. They are currently required and they are
unacceptable because they are meaningless.
Dr. Ekstrand. I really don't want to go that far because--
--
Mr. Lantos. How far do you want to go?
Dr. Ekstrand. Well----
Mr. Lantos. If you say minimal, you find them acceptable.
Minimal means acceptable.
Dr. Ekstrand. Well, I certainly want to indicate that they
are in accordance with ATF regulations.
Mr. Lantos. But if ATR regulations are idiotic, that
doesn't make them acceptable.
Dr. Ekstrand. From a layman's point of view we did see
circumstances that did not seem very acceptable. We don't have
sufficient information at GAO to make a statement that they
are----
Mr. Shays. Could I just interrupt a second? You make me
uncomfortable when you say from a layman's standpoint. Are you
saying that you don't have people GAO qualified to be more than
laymen?
Dr. Ekstrand. We certainly do in many respects. We do not
have people that have specific experience in relation to----
Mr. Shays. Then let me say this to you. That is
unacceptable from our standpoint because GAO to me is of the
standard along with some Inspector General agencies. When you
all come before us, I don't consider you laymen. I consider you
disinterested parties in the sense that you are not connected.
If your testimony is that you happen to be a layman in this
regard, I could accept that but I would like to think the
people that did the research aren't laymen. Otherwise, your
value is diminished tremendously. We don't want laymen to look
at this. We want experts to look at this. Do you not have
experts to look at this issue?
Dr. Ekstrand. Our researchers are extremely well qualified
in relation to the work we do and I have no doubt about the
quality----
Mr. Shays. Do you have anybody in your department that has
expertise in explosive issues?
Dr. Ekstrand. We have no one who has that specific
expertise but from time to time we do work with outside
consultants. In this particular case we felt that we were at
least adequately trained to determine----
Mr. Shays. Let me interrupt you because I know where you
are going. The bottom line is you are saying for what we tasked
you to do you had the expertise.
Dr. Ekstrand. We feel that we did.
Mr. Shays. We want to bring this up to another level. I
mean, I almost don't think we need to go much further with this
panel because what I am getting from it is that basically the
local and State and county governments, local, county, and
State governments play by their own rules. There are certain
standards that are uniform but that bottom line is they are not
overseen by your agency, Mr. Raden.
I am getting the sense that even the standards for the
private sector is simply unacceptable and I agree with Mr.
Lantos' terminology. We would also agree that we would not be
saying to the States if they want to make them tougher than
what ultimately we want as good Federal standards, the States
are always free.
They can't go below the minimal but we want the minimal to
be acceptable and acceptable is not reached. What I hear from
you, Mr. Raden, that you have a lot of things on your plate to
deal with. You are going to give this higher attention. We will
be able to confirm that in our hearing in Washington in
February, March, or April, in that timeframe, to give you some
time.
In the meantime, Mr. Lantos and I will certainly
congratulate you whether late or not in wanting to move this up
to a different level. We will be in touch with OMB to make
sure, one, you can get the information of where these
facilities are because you know where the private site is,
correct?
Mr. Raden. Yes, sir. That is correct.
Mr. Shays. Then you would want the authority to be able to
step in. I also go under the assumption that whether or not you
technically have the authority or not that you will raise some
questions about any facility being stored in a public place
where you may have city workers and the public visiting. That
is an outrage and we don't even need alliance of authority to
step in.
I would like to think that you will raise some questions
with GAO immediately about that. We will as well. We want those
explosives to be taken out of those buildings post haste and we
would like to make sure that is stated today, not tomorrow or
the next day.
I would just say to you, Mr. Gulledge, the bottom line to
my sense is that I would like to see that you have a greater
sense of urgency in overseeing ATF on their oversight of these
issues. I would like to make sure it is showing up on your
radar screen a little better.
Mr. Lantos and I, I think, waiting for the GAO report, were
seeing back a little more than we should have so we are going
to up the pressure, I think, quite significantly.
Mr. Lantos, are there any questions or any other points you
want to make? OK. Then I think what we will do is go to our
next panel.
Let me just say is there any question we should have asked
you that you need to put on the record? This is my reason for
asking this. I don't want to hear later on that you weren't
asked and, therefore, you didn't put it on the record. If there
is anything pertinent that we should be aware of, that you have
made us aware of, I want to put the burden back on you. Is
there any point that any of you want to make? Any closing
statement you all want to make before we go?
Dr. Ekstrand. I think that I would like to add one thing,
and that is there is a real question in terms of what this
security standards should be to be safe. I would suggest that
over the past 3 years up until the time that we completed our
review, there had been a little over 204 thefts.
I would suggest that information on those 204 thefts could
be a good starting point to analyze what kinds of things are
associated with thefts in facilities and might help to have a
data-driven way of figuring out what kind of things are lacking
that result in these thefts. Representative Lantos asked how
many were inside jobs and the data on these 204 could help us
understand that and help us move along rationally in figuring
out what kinds of standards might be most appropriate to
prevent thefts.
Mr. Caramia. I just wanted to clarify one other thing. You
had asked earlier about the results of the voluntary
inspections that ATF had conducted and what they had found. I
would just like to point out what we found at the locations we
went to in addition to the one we just talked about where the
storage facility was in the basement of the municipal building.
We did find three other locations that appeared to be out
of compliance with some aspect of the regulations. Now, while
that didn't appear to relate to security, in other words, it
didn't make the facilities more vulnerable to theft, it does
tend to indicate that maybe there are some public sector
facilities out there that are not quite in compliance with even
existing regulations right now. That certainly raises the issue
of why it is important to maybe have some more oversight of
these facilities going forward.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Gulledge. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one
statement and answer one question that I didn't get a chance to
answer before. I would say we do take this very seriously. The
reports that we have issued on ATF, both firearms inspection,
enforcement of the Brady Act, the Safe Explosives Act
implementation show that we take our oversight of them very
seriously.
In this instance identifying the storage locations was a
tasking that went to the GAO specifically and we coordinate
with each other and we don't duplicate each other's work. That
is why we did not proceed with that question. We did attend
their entrance briefing and we knew what they were doing.
To answer the question then of who should identify and
inventory where these locations are, that is a separate
questions of who should conduct the oversight. I think as an
alternative I would offer that there are two mechanisms within
the Department that could be helpful to you in this. The first
is the Joint Terrorism Task Forces and the second is the Anti-
Terrorism Advisory Council, the former run by the FBI and the
second run by the U.S. attorneys offices.
Those councils and joint task forces have contacts with all
law enforcement agencies and other public agencies within every
county in the United States and there are over 3,000 counties.
One of their duties, one of their responsibilities is to do
risk assessments and this could fit within the purview of what
they are supposed to be doing to contact their members, have
them identify and report in without going through a formal
survey process.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Raden. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lantos, I would just in terms
of security in the future for magazines whether private or
public sector. We do need to take into some considerations, I
think, in terms of some of the unique factors.
I think some of the people on the next panel will address
these issues but the unique factors involved with some of the
public sector facilities such as storage of evidence and things
of those natures in criminal cases.
Obviously you would want to ensure that your criminal
evidence had a great deal of security and I think you will find
that the GAO report demonstrated that in some situations
security was above what we have referred to here as the minimal
standard. There is also economic impacts for remote sites and
why some of them don't have electricity.
Some of these things really need to be taken into
consideration. I know that you both will in terms of if you are
crafting legislation the type and form it will take in terms of
ensuring that the best security model for the particular
individual facility is taken into account. That is just
something I wanted to comment on.
I also wanted to clarify with Mr. Lantos, I did find the
information on the 102 law enforcement magazines that we had
inspected. We did note nine discrepancies in those, sir, eight
of them related to the lock that was on the structure itself.
It was inadequate and was subsequently replaced and one dealt
with a recordkeeping issue. They weren't keeping their books
for a while so I did get that information.
Mr. Lantos. Let me be sure I understand you, sir. You say
there were 102 inspections?
Mr. Raden. Yes. Well, there were 102 locations.
Mr. Lantos. 102 locations.
Mr. Raden. 102 locations.
Mr. Lantos. Among those 102 locations, in 9 of them the
security was inadequate?
Mr. Raden. In eight of them the locking systems were
inadequate. That is the case, sir. The other was recordkeeping.
Mr. Lantos. Ten percent of the cases had inadequate
security locks. Isn't that true?
Mr. Raden. That is true, sir.
Mr. Lantos. That is extremely alarming and I would very
much hope that all the agencies, including yours, will share
the sense of urgency that Chairman Shays and I clearly have.
These are very serious matters. These are not slight traffic
violations. These cases provide the basis for a potential
terrorist attack in the United States.
I must say that while I was very disturbed by the hearing
last year, I am no less disturbed by the hearing today because
I see no sense of urgency or an indication that the seriousness
of the matter under consideration is assimilated by those who
are responsible for dealing with these matters. The very fact
that you began the survey on October 18th when our hearing took
place in August a year ago is profoundly disturbing.
Mr. Raden. I understand that, sir, and let me assure you
you have my attention on it.
Mr. Shays. You know what? I think we can move forward in a
very positive way from what we have learned from this first
panel. Mr. Lantos and I recognize that we have some obligations
as well. We are going to be even more aggressive than we have
been. If that helps you persuade OMB that come March you need
to have some good news for us, that would be constructive.
I thank you all very much for your service and we are going
to move to the next panel. Thank you.
Our next panel is Mr. Fernando Gonzalez, battalion chief,
Fort Worth Fire Department, Division of Arson/Bomb Inspection;
Dr. Tibor G. Rozgonyi, professor and head, Mining Engineering
Department, Colorado School of Mines; Sgt. Stanley Mathiasen,
chairman, National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board; Dr.
Vilem Petr, assistant research professor, Mining Engineering
Department, Colorado School of Mines; Mr. James Christopher
Ronay, president, the Institute of Makers of Explosives [IME],
the Honorable Don Horsley, county sheriff, San Mateo County
Sheriff's Office, and Lt. Gary Kirby, San Jose Police
Department.
I thank you and you can remain standing and we will swear
you in. Thank you very much.
Just so you understand, all our witnesses in the Government
Reform Committee are sworn in because we are an investigative
committee. In my many years of being chairman now, the only one
we never swore in was a Senator from West Virginia. I chickened
out. Do we have everyone here? I think we are missing someone.
Is that correct? OK. We will wait for you to come, sir.
If there is anyone from your department that you may ask to
respond to a question or your agency or whatever, we would want
them to rise as well. OK. Then if you are asked to speak, we
will have you identified then. We just have one additional
person being sworn in.
Are you gentlemen standing to be sworn in or not? OK. Fair
enough. Raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much. If you can remember, are
you in order of how we called your names? I think we are. We
are just going to come around this way. Let me say that your
full testimony will be part of the record. If you want to just
respond to what you have heard and respond that way, feel free.
Because we have so many witnesses it would be good if you could
stay within the 5-minute limit. Then we will proceed with our
questions. Thank you all very, very much for being here.
Thank you, Mr. Gonzalez.
STATEMENTS OF FERNANDO GONZALEZ, BATTALION CHIEF, FORT WORTH
FIRE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION OF ARSON/BOMB INVESTIGATION; DR.
TIBOR G. ROZGONY, PROFESSOR AND HEAD, MINING ENGINEERING
DEPARTMENT, COLORADO SCHOOL OF MINES; SGT. STANLEY MATHIASEN,
CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL BOMB SQUAD COMMANDERS ADVISORY BOARD; DR.
VILEM PETR, ASSISTANT RESEARCH PROFESSOR, MINING ENGINEERING
DEPARTMENT, COLORADO SCHOOL OF MINES; JAMES CHRISTOPHER RONAY,
PRESIDENT, THE INSTITUTE OF MAKERS OF EXPLOSIVES [IME]; DON
HORSLEY, COUNTY SHERIFF, SAN MATEO COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE; AND
LT. GARY KIRBY, SAN JOSE POLICE DEPARTMENT
STATEMENT OF FERNANDO GONZALES
Chief Gonzalez. Good morning.
Mr. Shays. I would just say the closer you are to the mic
the better. I realize it presents a problem if you are reading
but it would be helpful. Sorry we are so crowded on that side.
You know, I don't mind if one person would like to come up
here. Would that make it easier? Is it kind of crowded there?
Chief Gonzalez. It is fine, sir.
Mr. Shays. I think you feel a little crowded. We are not
breaking any rule, are we? OK. You can spread out a little bit
and have a little bit more room. OK. We are all set for you,
Mr. Gonzalez.
Chief Gonzalez. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Shays and
Congressman Lantos and all the other distinguished ladies and
gentlemen at this proceeding. I am Battalion Chief Fernando
Gonzalez. I am representing the Fort Worth Fire Department. Can
you all hear me OK?
We utilize four explosive magazines in our city. All of
them are alarmed and monitored 24 hours a day, 7 days a week by
our fire alarm office. That hasn't always been the case. At
least one of the reasons that I was invited, I assume, to this
proceeding was because we have had not one but two thefts at
our explosives magazines.
In 1991 we had our first burglary. Thieves tried to cut a
hole in the side of the magazine with a welding torch. When
that was unsuccessful they tried to pry the roof off the
magazine. That also did not work. Ultimately they cut the locks
off with that welding torch.
They stole over 100 pounds of explosives and the thieves
were never identified. However, the explosives were recovered
when they were found abandoned on a road about 3 weeks later.
Not for lack of trying but they were not identified.
As a result of that burglary, we installed an intrusion
alarm on our magazine. Approximately 8 months later we had a
second burglary. At this burglary, 40 pounds of explosives were
stolen. This time the thieves used a grinder to cut the hinges
off of the door. This time they were apprehended and the
explosives were recovered again.
This second theft led to the installation of perimeter
fencing with concertina wire. I don't know if you have my
testimony with you but there is a picture of it in exhibit A
there.
Mr. Shays. We have your testimony.
Chief Gonzalez. OK. Thank you. We haven't had any thefts
since that time. I am skeptical that alone has made our
facility secure, the perimeter fencing. What I think it has
done is made a little too much trouble for your garden variety
thief to attempt.
As a bomb squad commander there are a few security measures
that I would welcome at our facility and I think would be
beneficial for other facilities. The most prominent among them,
besides perimeter fencing, would be video surveillance and
audible alarms. Theft is not the only problem. Vandalism, of
course, is another problem, in terms of destroying the
explosives on the spot.
On the second front, I think it would be beneficial to
mandate BATF inspections of our facilities. There is a tendency
to mass explosives in our business, not only through
confiscations but through acquisition. When budgets are tight
our training aids are the first to go.
I think mandated inspections would accomplish two things.
First, they would require a detailed inventory and detailed
inventory, I believe, would help in case there was a theft to
recover them quicker. The second effect that having BATF
inspections would have, I believe, to mitigate unsafe
practices. I think they were mentioned in the GAO report also,
storage of explosives with the blasting gaps or storage of
explosives with deteriorated military ordinance.
At any rate, and all that being said, I thank you for your
interest in the matter.
[The prepared statement of Chief Gonzalez follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF DR. TIBOR ROZGONYI
Dr. Rozgonyi. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Congressman
Lantos.
Mr. Shays. I need you to speak a little louder. You have a
nice Hungarian voice that Mr. Lantos can hear but for me it is
a little bit of a problem.
Dr. Rozgonyi. I am Tibor Rozgonyi, professor and head of
the Mining Engineering Department at Colorado School of Mines.
I am really very pleased and honored to practice my citizen
requirement and responsibility to testify for you.
Mr. Shays. It is an honor to have you here as it is with
all of you. Thank you.
Dr. Rozgonyi. We have been reviewed and asked to provide
input to your subcommittee, because to our educational research
program we store and utilize substantial quantity of explosive
material regularly at the Edgar Experimental Mine.
The Colorado School of Mines is a public institution that
was established in 1874 to support the needs of the mining
industry. It continues to fulfill this mission today with
special expertise in the development and stewardship of the
Earth's mineral and energy resources.
The Edgar Experimental Mine was donated to the Colorado
School of Mines after the 1880 Gold Rush. It is used
extensively for instruction, research, and testing special
equipment, excavation technology, mining metal. It is in this
capacity that we use explosives and, therefore, store
explosives.
As long as explosives remain the most effective rock
fragmentation technology, we will educate our students on the
safe handling of explosives and also deal with industry
partners to provide them health and safety training and
education.
We work with State officials and various law enforcement
authorities in training of their work forces and special rescue
team. We offer education training for mining construction
companies to enable them to be certified and licensed in
explosive handling, storage, and use.
We have always been mindful of the safe use and storage of
the explosives, but there has been special emphasis placed
after September 11th. After September 11th, we established a
special protocol for the use and safe transport and storage of
explosives in the Colorado School of Mines premises.
The document provides guidelines, information, and
requirements of how we can transport the material explosives
from one place to the other. All of these requirements are in
compliance with the ATF and the State's regulations. Each CSM
employee who is directly or indirectly involved in the
utilization of explosives has been required to obtain a
``Responsible Person Letter of Clearance'' from the U.S.
Department of Justice.
We have a Type I magazine for explosive storage. It is
built like a tunnel in a mountainous area and secured and
furbished with all necessary equipment in order to deter any
kind of problem.
I would like to mention that it was a little bit of a
surprise to me when I heard that some of those minimum
standards were questioned here in the previous panel. I
probably would like to point out the mining industry, which is
very conscious, the safety and security of the explosives and
have a very clear regulation what you can do, how you can do
it, how you can store the explosives.
You must dig up a certain tunnel. You must secure with a
certain door and even specify what is the thickness of that
steel door, what kind of padlock you can use, how you can store
the detonators and how you can use the explosives. It is well
specified so I believe the mining industry, and coincidentally
the Colorado School of Mines, is very keen to maintain this
kind of standard.
At the Type I storage facility we do have electronic
surveillance system. If somebody will break in, it will
automatically inform the campus police and the campus police
very quickly inform the Colorado Spring police department and
the sheriff department.
In 24 hours we report the accident if it would happen to
the ATF. I would like to report to the committee that we have a
very cordial and professional relationship with the ATF and the
law enforcement agencies. As a matter of fact, I was very happy
to see the ATF manager here. We requested their visit and they
came and visited our facility and we are very happy to work
with them. They gave us advice and we upgraded the system.
What I would like to suggest for your consideration: I
believe that we wholeheartedly can support that some Federal
agency should be responsible for a nationwide repository for
all explosives. I think the cheaper system is readily available
so you can go one visit and you have the coordinate and
everything where it is located.
I am more concerned with the education background of the
individual who handles explosives. I am not sure that each
State or every agency or even employers are requiring. In the
mining industry, they definitely do but I am not sure that in
the construction industry or in other industry the individuals
who are handling and using explosives has the minimum knowledge
which is required to handle that kind of dangerous material.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Rozgonyi follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you very much, sir.
Dr. Rozgonyi. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Appreciate it. Thank you, Dr. Rozgonyi.
We will go now with Sgt. Mathiasen. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF SGT. STANLEY MATHIASEN
Sgt. Mathiasen. Gentlemen, thank you.
Mr. Shays. Nice and loud, sir.
Sgt. Mathiasen. I am Stan Mathiasen. I am a sergeant with
the Santa Barbara Sheriff's Department and the bomb squad
commander for that agency. I am also chairman of the National
Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board.
The National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board was
formed in 1998 under the auspices of the FBI Bomb Data Center
by popular vote of U.S. State and Local Bomb Squad Commanders.
The board is composed of 12 elected State and local bomb
squad commanders from the four FBI reporting regions in the
United States and its territories. Three members are elected
from each region with one new member from each region elected
yearly.
NBSCAB represents all 458 State and local bomb squads and
over 2,600 certified bomb technicians. Several Federal agencies
are liaison members to NBSCAB including ATF, FBI, NIJ, and the
Department of Homeland Security. NBSCAB is tasked to set
standards for accreditation of bomb squads, certification of
bomb technicians, review and recommendation of training
curriculum, and review and guidance regarding research and
development of new tools and equipment. NBSCAB is recognized as
the sole voice on matters concerning accredited State and local
bomb squads within the Federal Government.
State and local bomb squads are aware of their
responsibility to provide security for their explosive storage
magazines and to comply with all applicable Federal, State, and
local laws governing storage of explosives.
NBSCAB in conjunction with the International Association of
Bomb Technicians and Investigators has notified bomb squad
commanders via a letter dated April 2005, to examine their
security measures to ensure they are in compliance with
applicable laws, to keep a current and accurate inventory of
stored explosives, to improve security measures if needed, and
to avail themselves of voluntary magazine inspections provided
by ATF.
I have provided a copy of this letter that was sent out to
the bomb squads and would ask to have it entered in the records
of these proceedings which I understand it has. Thank you.
NBSCAB is not opposed to increasing security requirements
for magazine security. However we have several concerns. State
and Local public entities are required to comply with current
ATF--as well as any State and local--requirements for storage
of explosives. Adding new Federal requirements for lights,
alarms, fences, and other security measures will place
additional compliance burdens on public safety agencies not
required of Federal agencies, or the private sector.
Any requirement for mandatory inspection by ATF may be
problematic for State and local bomb squads, in that not only
are explosives stored in magazines, but explosive related
evidence in criminal cases are stored there as well.
The offer by the Federal Government to pay for additional
security measures through Homeland Security Grant Funds,
mentioned in the proposed draft legislation, while attractive,
may present a situation where the bomb squad will receive only
those funds necessary to provide additional magazine security,
and will not enhance their response capability.
With the competition for grant funds among local agencies
great, I fear this requirement may actually decrease the
ability of bomb squads to obtain needed equipment. It may set
up a situation where grant administrators are required to spend
funds on magazine security in lieu of response equipment.
Bomb squads are on the front line in the response to
terrorism in the United States and it is imperative that there
be no degradation of operational response capabilities in these
critical incidents. While this proposed legislation stands to
provide some limited benefit to public safety through the
addition of extra layers of security for stored explosives,
there is a real danger that this benefit will be offset by a
higher risk to the public through a potential diversion of
funds for critical operational resources.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Sgt. Mathiasen follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you very much, Sergeant.
Mr. Petr. Thank you. I think that mic may have been turned
off.
STATEMENT OF VILEM PETR
Mr. Petr. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and subcommittee members,
ladies and gentlemen, I am sorry for my Czechoslovakian accent.
Mr. Shays. It is a great accent.
Mr. Petr. Thank you. I am pleased and very happy that I can
testify today for you.
Just quick introduction of myself. My name is Vilem Petr.
Mr. Shays. I am going to have you not give your
introduction of yourself. Just tell us about what you want on
the record here.
Mr. Petr. OK. Yes.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Only because we are aware of
everybody's qualifications. That is why we invited you.
Mr. Petr. OK. Thank you. I am a research assistant
professor at Colorado School of Mines. At the same time I am an
explosive inspector for State of Colorado, Department of Labor
and Employment, Division of Oil and Public Safety, Denver
office in Colorado.
I have two things I would like to address. One is from the
end of the user, people who are using daily explosives and also
when you can control and regulate the explosives. One part that
I think is important that also Dr. Rozgonyi mentioned for
education purposes is how we can regulate and how we can use
explosives.
The other part is when I represent the State of Colorado,
when I am State inspector, I would just bring quickly overview
of how many people, how many licenses we have by October 22,
2005. We have 1,725 active Type I permits, people who
physically touch explosives, and we have 675 Type II permits.
This is the companies who own explosives.
Also we have 287 Type III, the license for explosive
magazines. The State of Colorado is following Federal
regulations. Also we are controlling like if somebody will come
and would like to have license from State of Colorado or
practice explosive demolition or different things using
explosives, they will also have to not just have ATF license
but they will have to have Colorado license.
To be able to get Colorado license or use explosives, you
have to have a minimum of 1 year experience under someone who
has experience using explosives. The second part we also have
is a regulation that you have to be 21 and mentally and
physically able like we have with ATF.
But they have to provide us with employer letter that they
have more than 1 year experience under supervision of somebody
who has license.
We are not just giving a license to people. I want only to
point it out. We can talk more about that later. Not all the
States have controls like in Utah or Wyoming. They are much
more leaning for the regulations and who has access to the
explosives.
I will stop here. If you have some questions, I will be
happy to answer them.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Petr follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you. One of the reasons we invited you was
that our reading is that Colorado has paid a lot more attention
to this than other States and we thank you.
At this time we will go to Mr. Ronay.
STATEMENT OF JAMES CHRISTOPHER RONAY
Mr. Ronay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Representative
Lantos. Good morning.
The Institute of Makers of Explosives is very pleased to be
here today once again having participated last year. We are the
Safety and Security Institute serving the commercial explosives
industry and the government since 1913. You may recall from my
previous testimony that over 5\1/2\ billion pounds of
industrial explosives are consumed annually in the United
States. All of the metals, minerals, petroleum products,
construction materials, and many consumer products are
available today because commercial explosives make them
possible.
Since our last meeting, the IME has completed and published
safety library publication No. 27 which I have provided to the
subcommittee. It is entitled, ``Security in Manufacturing,
Transportation, Storage and Use of Commercial Explosives.''
This comprehensive document addresses security in all aspects
of daily operations and is intended for use by all who use
commercial explosives.
The IMR is also working closely with the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives to develop security
recommendations for Federal explosives licensees. We have also
produced a training video with ATF dealing with the safe
storage of explosives. The explosive industry embraces the
oversight of the many agencies that promulgate the rules by
which we are governed. We are very proud of our contribution to
the development of these rules over the last 90 years.
I want to emphasize that the current Federal regulatory
regime works very well for the industrial sector. We believe
that any mechanism that prevents explosive materials from
falling into the wrong hands enhances security. It would
undoubtedly be best to require Federal oversight of all
explosive storage facilities. However, I must emphasize that
any additional mandate given to the ATF must not infringe on
its ability to maintain appropriate oversight of the many more
and much larger industrial explosives operations and
facilities. The ATF presently has barely adequate facilities to
oversee all the private sector licensees.
Finally, let me emphasize this industry's commitment to the
security of all explosives operations. We continually seek to
develop more effective and reasonable requirements that will
ensure the continued availability of our products for use in
the commerce of our Nation.
I thank the subcommittee for this opportunity and will
respectfully answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ronay follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Ronay.
Sheriff Horsley.
STATEMENT OF DON HORSLEY
Sheriff Horsley. Thank you, Chairman Shays and Congressman
Lantos. It has been over a year since my initial testimony
before this subcommittee and my staff has been hard at work to
improve the effectiveness of our bomb squad and rectify the
conditions which led up to the July 2004 burglary of our shared
storage facility located on the city and county of San
Francisco Watershed Property, located in unincorporated San
Mateo County.
Over the past year we have conducted a thorough review of
our bomb squad to determine its operational status, training
needs, management oversight and feasibility of a new storage
site in San Mateo County. Last year our bomb squad had only two
certified bomb technicians. Since then we have added three more
bomb technicians to the squad as a consequence of the
international events.
In addition, I have mandated that my management staff who
has responsibility for oversight of the bomb squad attend the
Hazardous Devices School [HDS], executive management course
located at the Redstone Arsenal in Alabama. This course is
designed to provide managers to effectively manage a bomb squad
to ensure proper oversight and accountability.
Since the last public hearing on the subject, we have been
successful in obtaining Homeland Security funding for much
needed equipment, such as a response vehicle, state-of-the-art
robot and various other mitigation tools and safety equipment
that was lacking for our bomb squad in the past.
As of today's date, however, we have been unsuccessful in
finding a suitable site in San Mateo County for storage and
mitigation. However, within the next 60 days, we will be making
a presentation to a city council in San Mateo County, with
hopes of using a site within their city limits that meets both
our requirements, and that of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives [BATFE].
We are currently in the process of securing a temporary
agreement with another law enforcement agency that exceeds that
of the Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms, and Tobacco guidelines
within the San Francisco Bay Area to store our explosives. Our
Sheriffs Office executive staff has inspected this storage
site. In fact, I have some photographs if you wish to see them
later. They have reviewed their security and feel that it is
suitable for our needs while we continue to search for a
permanent site in San Mateo County.
The sheriffs bomb squad receives and responds to
approximately 200 calls per year. When we collect explosive
evidence, we render it safe, photograph the evidence, document
our findings and dispose of it immediately at a predetermined
location. On certain occasions, when the explosive device is
rendered safe and disassembled, a small representative sample
of the incendiary powder is kept as evidence to authenticate
the device. At this time, we are not storing any explosive
evidence but we are storing evidence with a neighboring
county's facility.
Without a storage and/or training facility of our own, we
must travel out of county, which reduces our response time to
bomb call-outs, increases staff costs in terms of overtime,
creates another link in the chain of custody for those cases in
which explosive evidence must be maintained.
Sheriffs bomb technicians currently provide expert
testimony from the evidence that is collected and/or tested to
authenticate any type of explosive device for all law
enforcement agencies in San Mateo County. They do so from
evidence that has been collected in either a pre- or post-blast
crime scene.
Since we do not currently have explosives to train with, we
have been doing explosive training with other local bomb squads
and enrolling our staff in explosive training courses provided
by both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Hazardous
Device School.
Some of this training could be done in house which would
reduce costs to the Sheriffs Office, and at the same time
ensure that our bomb technicians meet the minimum monthly and
yearly Federal training requirements.
As we move forward in planning to secure a new storage
site, the main affect on our agency is the inability to store
explosives, explosive evidence and to assist local in-county
law enforcement agencies with collecting and storing
confiscated illegal fireworks.
This concludes my comments. I would like to again thank the
subcommittee for your interest in this issue and for your work
in helping to develop national standards for explosive storage
facilities.
[The prepared statement of Sheriff Horsley follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you, Sheriff Horsley.
At this time Lt. Kirby.
STATEMENT OF LT. GARY KIRBY
Lt. Kirby. Good morning, Chairman, Mr. Lantos, and
subcommittee members. I am currently a lieutenant for the San
Jose Police Department assigned to the Chief's Office as
commander of Research and Development Unit.
The San Jose Police Department has 12 active bomb
technicians and investigators and we investigate approximately
250 to 300 explosive incidents a year. Since 1992 the
department has maintained an explosive storage magazine for
both high and low grade explosives on the site of our 6-acre
Bomb Range and Training Facility.
The Bomb Range and Training Facility is the only explosive
magazine available for use to other county, State, and Federal
law enforcement agencies within Santa Clara County. This
facility exceeds current ATF explosive storage requirements as
set forth in U.S. Government codes.
In addition to the ATF storage regulations, this facility
has daily inspections of the explosive storage magazine and is
completely surrounded with locked cyclone fencing and
electronic monitoring devices.
Explosives are stored at the facility for a variety of uses
which include evidence storage of a criminal investigation,
related bomb technician duties for rendering safe explosives,
rendering safe explosives for training facilities, ongoing
training and special instructional courses provided in
conjunction with the FBI and ATF, as well as providing the safe
storage of explosives used exclusively for training San Jose
Police Department bomb detection dogs assigned to the San Jose
Airport as part of the Transportation Safety Agency security
requirements.
The BRTF is located in a heavily industrialized section of
the city of San Jose which also happens to be a considerable
distance away from residential populations and also frequent
patrol activities that would check during non-business hours.
In the past, the San Jose Police Department was confident
with the existing security measures in place for the protection
of explosive materials and safety measures for personnel
responding to alarm calls on breaches in security at the BRTF.
In light of the current threat environment, however, associated
to potential terrorist activity, our position and level of
comfort on adequate security measures has changed.
We, along with other associations such as the International
Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators, believe we
should elevate our ability to secure, monitor, and respond to
incidents relating at our BRTF. The course of corrective action
determined by the police department to provide the desired
security enhancements is to install a more sophisticated
security alarms that will detect intrusive movements anywhere
on the bomb range training facility prior to any intrusion
targeting the explosive storage magazine.
The addition of remote camera viewing through secured
computer Web access directly to the San Jose Police Department
Communications dispatch operators is an additional enhancement
recommendation. This will not only allow for remote camera
viewing during security breaches, but also adds increased
security during training and routine explosives handling.
Most breaches in security require a post investigation that
centers around such questions as what was taken, who took the
explosives, and how do we initiate a timely investigation with
suspect descriptions and routes of departure. The proposed
security enhancements would assist in the post-investigative
process and could possibly act as a deterrent to a breach in
security by their mere presence.
To secure funding for this project, estimated at a cost of
approximately $20,000, the San Jose Police Department submitted
a request for funding on the 2005 U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness, through the
California State Homeland Security Program. The request was
submitted to the Santa Clara County State Homeland Security
Approval Authority for consideration. The Approval Authority
took the request under submission and presented it along with
other law enforcement agency requests to be prioritized in
order of importance as determined by the Santa Clara County
Association of Police and Fire Chiefs.
Through their prioritization process, the funding to
purchase the increased security and monitoring equipment was
not granted on the first round of approval. To the credit of
the Santa Clara County Approval Authority, this body did
recognize the importance of this equipment and committed to
earmarking any identified project savings during this funding
period to purchase the requested equipment.
However, in the interim, a similar request for funding has
been submitted to the Department of Homeland Security, Buffer
Zone Protection Plan. We feel this is a greater likelihood that
this security enhancement will be made available through the
BZPP funding rather than waiting for identified project savings
from State Homeland Security.
Law enforcement agencies nationwide continue to work
together in the fight against terrorism. We know that the use
of explosives is a key effort in the terrorist activity. I
believe the efforts of this subcommittee will assist in the
winning of this war, through collective sharing and support of
security enhancements that will work toward guarding the
Nation's storage of explosives.
I thank you for the opportunity to talk to this committee
and I am available for questions.
[The prepared statement of Lt. Kirby follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you. We appreciate the testimony of all of
you. Let me just start out by saying I would like to know from
each of you what you may have agreed with most from the first
panel and what you may have disagreed with most from anything
you heard from the first panel. What you agreed with most and
what you disagreed with most.
I am going to be looking for not long answers but fairly
concise. I want to confide with all of you that I have a flight
that leaves before 1 p.m., and if I could be out of here at
12:40 p.m., I will make my flight fine. Why don't we start with
whoever is ready first to start.
Lt. Kirby. Listening to the testimony today, I think that
it was quite spirited and got to the point that although
standards, though minimum, need to be quickly exceeded. We have
tried to do that. Some of the things that I think need to be
imposed upon is that we have talked about either two types of
intrusion, either internal theft or external blatant break-ins.
Nowhere has there been a consorted discussion of how law
enforcement agents such as myself and the sheriff seated here
today would be responsible for recovering and successfully
prosecuting these people that did that. As you create your
standards, I would anticipate that there would be something
into the early warning system, the capturing of photo ID and
alarm systems that go to establish those procedures.
I also noticed that there was no discussion in the enhanced
security within reason that these measures are using electronic
devices for monitoring of breeches, that there is backup power,
and that there are procedures set in place when there are power
interruptions that inspection processes take place of those
facilities. Those would be a couple of things that I would add
to for consideration.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Sheriff Horsley. I think in my last testimony from a year
ago, I recognized that there needed to be a national standard.
Reading the GAO report on the number of thefts that occurred
just in a few months of 2003, it was disconcerting to find out
how many thefts there were from private storage facilities. I
would recommend that there be national standards that apply to
both the public and private sector, that they be consistent,
and that there should be either annual or bi-annual inspection
of all of those sites.
Mr. Ronay. I would have to agree with the first panel
entirely that security should be the same for all storage
entities. We have no question that they are already required to
do so but the oversight that we have discussed would be
appropriate.
I really don't have any cause to disagree with any of the
presentations made except that in the development of these
standards that we have today consideration has had to be given
to the reality of conducting business in the United States,
providing these products realistically to the consumers.
What might appear to be inadequate in some cases or
minimally acceptable--I am commenting on your observation, Mr.
Lantos--some of these things have been deemed to be required
just for operational necessity. However, there is great room
for improvement and our recommendations in the document that I
mentioned do require considerably enhanced security measures.
Mr. Shays. Quickly before going to the rest of the panel,
what State to you is the benchmark that we should look to that
would toughen our standards beyond what the Federal Government
has? What State to you is the most impressive in its oversight
and regulation?
Mr. Ronay. What State of the union?
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Mr. Ronay. We are dealing in the State of Pennsylvania
right at the moment with some very, very onerous security
regulations that they have put in emergency effect.
Mr. Shays. I didn't ask you which is the most onerous. I am
asking which of the ones do you think make the most sense? Is
it Colorado? Is it what State? Think about it and I will come
back to you.
Mr. Ronay. OK.
Mr. Shays. Am I putting you in an awkward position?
Mr. Ronay. No, not at all. I am just not sure I can answer
that.
Mr. Shays. OK. Just think about it and I will come back.
Mr. Petr.
Mr. Petr. Thank you. I agree with everybody here that we
need some uniform force here who can inspect magazines, not
just private or the government like a bomb squad. In my private
experience, I was helping with training bomb technicians and I
have buried lots of friends but I think we should have access
and somebody should overview their bookkeeping about explosive,
how much explosives out, how much explosives in, who sold it,
who bought it. I think it should be not just ATF but also maybe
even the States should be involved in this regulative role.
What I disagree with, you know, the last 13 years I was
here in the USA and I saw the change of the ATF. I saw that ATF
before didn't do too much about explosives because they were
not interested. They did lots of gun control and all that. Now
I think they are doing a great job the last couple of years and
I see the changes that ATF is improving for State of Colorado,
Utah, and Wyoming.
They have only three inspectors to inspect all the
magazines. Now they have 10 inspectors and they finally are
getting up to speed. I am just saying this is from the field
and I am getting feedback that they do a great job. They go
back and they go in depth with checking. I think this is----
Mr. Shays. So whatever we see as a state of affairs, it was
a lot worse before?
Mr. Petr. Yes.
Mr. Shays. And you have seen improvement.
Mr. Petr. Yes.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Sgt. Mathiasen. With this morning's testimony, I think we
all know that these standards are probably set too low and we
need to bump them up and we are in agreement with that. I was
just a little bit surprised that they did identify some thefts
that weren't reported. In the 20 years I have been a bomb
technician and a bomb squad commander you know that when
explosives are stolen you report it to ATF. That is drilled
into you day one when you go to training.
Mr. Shays. So you were surprised they were not reported and
we should be taking a better look at that and the consequences
of not reporting. Thank you. Any other point?
Sgt. Mathiasen. The only other point is sometimes those
reporting requirements sometimes are paperwork errors. Somebody
checked something in, somebody checked something out and they
weren't on the same page. I would like to know more about what
those thefts that weren't reported were.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Dr. Rozgonyi.
Dr. Rozgonyi. I think almost everybody took away what I was
thinking, but I fully agree that we definitely should have a
common basis for both public and private institution including
universities. Especially if you take into account the diversity
of the student body, what you are dealing with at the
universities. I do not see a clear system how we should deal
with that and the liability of the universities.
I think also that clear incidents reporting mechanisms
should be established so there should not be any kind of
misinterpretation and whom should report that one and when and
how. And some kind of consequences if it is not happening in
due time. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Gonzalez.
Chief Gonzalez. Thank you. One of the gentlemen from ATF
mentioned the remoteness of the facilities which they are by
need remote from most areas.
Mr. Shays. Unless they are in a municipal building.
Chief Gonzalez. Except for that one. That is true. Because
of that remoteness it protects the thieves as well as the
people around them. Although this is a nuts and bolts issue, I
guess, the security of these facilities should be something
preventative, something prior to the magazine actually being
breached because that is what takes the time. If you actually
want to prevent a thief, I think that is where the security
should concentrate.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank all the
witnesses. I am very pleased that there is a growing consensus
among these knowledgeable people that there ought to be no
differentiation between public and private facilities because
it simply doesn't make sense, that there need to be higher
standards, that ATF needs to be better funded, and the higher
standards will have to be fully adhered to and punitive
measures taken where they are not.
I want to commend Sheriff Horsley and his department for
taking these very significant steps that you have outlined to
improve security here in San Mateo County. While we were all
deeply regretful that these thefts occurred here, in the long
run, it may have very positive ramifications because both the
first hearing and this hearing, the subsequent hearing the
chairman is planning, and the legislation we will introduce are
the direct result of this episode and I am pleased that from
this unfortunate incident positive nationwide consequences will
flow.
I also want to thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for taking
your very precious time and coming out here. This is a
difficult area to come to and we appreciate your willingness to
visit us.
Mr. Shays. My only problem is that I have family, a brother
in Hillsboro, and I didn't tell him I was even here. He may
read about it in the newspaper and wonder why.
Mr. Lantos. We will have a news blackout on this hearing,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Let me ask. Is there any final point that anyone
wants to make sure is on the record that needs to be on the
record so we don't leave here without that information being
provided? First of all, I would quickly like to say give me a
few of the model States. You don't have to give me just one.
Mr. Ronay. Yes. I was just thinking about it. I think in
addition to Colorado, Kentucky and Connecticut have excellent
regulatory----
Mr. Shays. You didn't say Connecticut just because I am
from Connecticut?
Mr. Ronay. I had forgotten that entirely that you were from
there.
Mr. Shays. Good to know. That makes me feel very good.
Thank you.
Mr. Ronay. They are pretty good. I would make my one final
comment if I might.
Mr. Shays. Sure.
Mr. Ronay. That is, throughout the many years I have been
with the IME we have always endorsed funding for ATF to do
their job properly. We know that it is a heavy task on them and
if anything additional is added to their responsibilities, I
know they have asked and we certainly would endorse that
additional funding.
Mr. Shays. We totally agree that if you are going to ask
them to do more, given that they are not funded enough now, we
had better come up with some dollars for it. I think that is
very clear.
Anyone else like to put any----
Mr. Petr. Mr. Chairman, I just want to thank by name Vince
Chase and Bob Briggs of your staff for an outstanding job.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. And thank your staff as well.
Mr. Lantos. Jason Rosenstock, Lynne Weil, and Ron Grimes.
Mr. Shays. We appreciate their work as well. Is there any
other----
Mr. Petr. If you will make some changes in these
regulations, can we define some license for the whole Nation,
explosive license or explosive user that maybe ATF will double
up tests that can be uniform for each? Right now every State
has different regulations.
Mr. Shays. I think the focus that you are making clear to
us, and others have as well, that besides looking at the
facility and where we have the facility and how we keep the
facility, the people who handle the explosive devices obviously
are equally, if not more, important. That is a very key point.
I see nodding of heads by the witnesses.
Any other comment before we hit the gavel? Any point that
needs to be made part of the record? OK. With that we adjourn.
I thank you for the cooperation of this panel. Excellent panel
and we appreciate your work and help. We look forward to
reporting back to you in March about where we're at. This
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m. the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Additional information submitted for the hearing record
follows:]
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