<DOC>
[109th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:24714.wais]
THE CRITICAL ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AT HOME AND ABROAD
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 20, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-91
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee DIANE E. WATSON, California
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
DARRELL E. ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JON C. PORTER, Nevada C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina Columbia
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania ------
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio (Independent)
------ ------
Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director
Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on October 20, 2005................................. 1
Statement of:
Kempthorne, Dirk, Governor of the State of Idaho; and Edward
Rendell, Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania...... 11
Kempthorne, Dirk......................................... 11
Rendell, Edward.......................................... 27
Walker, David, Comptroller General of the United States,
Government Accountability Office, accompanied by Janet A.
St. Laurent, Director, Capabilities and Management,
Government Accountability Office; Thomas F. Hall, Assistant
Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs, U.S. Department of
Defense; Lieutenant General David F. Melcher, Deputy Chief
of Staff, U.S. Army; Lieutenant General H Steven Blum,
Chief, National Guard Bureau; Major General Allen Tackett,
State Adjutant General, State of West Virginia; and Major
General Raymond Rees, State Adjutant General, State of
Oregon..................................................... 60
Blum, Lieutenant General H Steven........................ 134
Hall, Thomas F........................................... 90
Melcher, Lieutenant General David F...................... 119
Rees, Major General Raymond.............................. 156
Tackett, Major General Allen............................. 149
Walker, David............................................ 60
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Blum, Lieutenant General H Steven, Chief, National Guard
Bureau, prepared statement of.............................. 137
Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Maryland, prepared statement of............... 185
Davis, Chairman Tom, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Virginia, prepared statement of................... 4
Hall, Thomas F., Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve
Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, prepared statement of. 92
Kempthorne, Dirk, Governor of the State of Idaho, prepared
statement of............................................... 14
McHenry, Hon. Patrick T., a Representative in Congress from
the State of North Carolina, prepared statement of......... 184
Melcher, Lieutenant General David F., Deputy Chief of Staff,
U.S. Army, prepared statement of........................... 121
Platts, Hon. Todd Russell, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Pennsylvania, prepared statement of........... 181
Porter, Hon. Jon C., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Nevada, prepared statement of..................... 183
Rees, Major General Raymond, State Adjutant General, State of
Oregon, prepared statement of.............................. 158
Rendell, Edward, Governor of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, prepared statement of........................ 33
Tackett, Major General Allen, State Adjutant General, State
of West Virginia, prepared statement of.................... 152
Walker, David, Comptroller General of the United States,
Government Accountability Office, prepared statement of.... 63
Waxman, Hon. Henry A., a Representative in Congress from the
State of California, prepared statement of................. 9
THE CRITICAL ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AT HOME AND ABROAD
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THURSDAY, OCTOBER 20, 2005
House of Representatives,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Davis
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Davis of Virginia, Shays,
Gutknecht, Souder, Platts, Issa, Dent, Foxx, Schmidt, Waxman,
Kanjorski, Sanders, Cummings, Kucinich, Clay, Watson, Van
Hollen, Ruppersberger, and Norton.
Staff present: Melissa Wojciak, staff director; David
Marin, deputy staff director/communications director; Jennifer
Safavian, chief counsel for oversight and investigations; Rob
White, press secretary; Drew Crockett, deputy communications
director; Grace Washbourne and Brien Beattie, professional
staff members; Teresa Austin, chief clerk; Sarah D'Orsie,
deputy clerk; Leneal Scott, chief information officer; Karen
Lightfoot, minority press secretary; Andrew Su, minority
professional staff member; Earley Green, minority chief clerk;
Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk; and Gilad Wilkenfeld,
minority staff assistant.
Chairman Tom Davis. Good morning. A quorum being present,
the Committee on Government Reform will come to order.
Today, the Committee on Government Reform continues our
inquiry into the responsibilities our Nation places on the
National Guard, and whether the Federal Government is
fulfilling its commitment to our men and women in uniform.
Today's Army National Guard is in a tough spot--tougher
than perhaps at any time since the Second World War. Nearly
one-third of all of the soldiers in Iraq are National Guard
troops. At the same time, the citizen soldiers of the National
Guard continue their numerous domestic tasks: providing
security to airports and borders; monitoring the airspace of
the continental United States; and responding to natural
disasters, as we saw with Hurricane Katrina.
They do their jobs, and they do them exceedingly well.
However, the committee has learned that too often we are
expecting Guard soldiers to perform their jobs without the
assurance that they have all of the equipment and the training
that we can and should provide them.
At today's hearing, we are going to examine the Department
of Defense policies and actions affecting the future of the
National Guard, as well as hearing the critical needs of States
for National Guard manpower and resources. Unfortunately, what
we will hear about the state of the Army National Guard's
equipment is unacceptable.
Today, the Government Accountability Office will report
that: Non-deployed Guard units now face significant equipment
shortfalls because they have been equipped at less than war-
time levels, despite their vital contribution to the war on
terrorism.
The Army has required Army National Guard units to transfer
or leave behind close to 100,000 items for use by follow-on
forces, but the Army can only account for about 45 percent of
these items, and has not developed a plan to replace them, as
DOD policy requires. Without a completed and implemented plan
to replace all the Guard equipment left overseas, Army Guard
units will face growing equipment shortages and challenges in
regaining readiness for future missions.
Although deploying Army National Guard units have been
getting priority for getting the equipment they needed,
readying these forces has degraded the equipment inventory of
the Guard's non-deployed units, and it threatens the Guard's
ability to prepare forces for future missions both at home and
overseas. Quite simply, we are robbing the non-deployed
``Peter'' to pay the deployed ``Paul.'' I understand the need
to prioritize in wartime, but this shouldn't have to be a zero-
sum game.
At the rate we are going, we will bankrupt the National
Guard. And I want to know today what we are going to do to
change that prognosis.
At a recent congressional hearing, General Steven Blum
reported that the National Guard has only one-third of the
equipment it needs to respond to domestic disasters and
terrorist attacks, and will need at least $7 billion to acquire
radios, trucks, construction machinery, and medical gear, to be
in a position to support homeland operations.
As confirmed by GAO in the study being released today,
General Blum has reported that the equipment problem became
worse as Guard units deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan; taking
the newest equipment with them, leaving the home front with an
outdated and dwindling supply of gear.
Hurricane Katrina has shown us that the National Guard is
our Nation's first military responder. And I think it is
unfathomable that they are approaching equipment bankruptcy.
Today I want to hear exactly how and when the Department of
Defense and the Department of the Army will reequip the Army
National Guard. All the policies on homeland defense and
homeland security will come to naught if the Department of the
Army doesn't equip the Guard.
I hope to hear when they will be reimbursed for their
outstanding response to the citizens of the Gulf Coast. I hope
to hear when the equipment they left in Iraq is going to be
replaced with new equipment. I hope to hear how the National
Guard is integrated in all DOD and Army transformation
policies, including the Guard's role in homeland defense and
military assistance to civilian authorities.
Where is the predictability in current DOD policies for
State and local leaders to rely on? There appears to be none.
We are honored today to have the Governor of Pennsylvania
and the Governor of Idaho, to express their deep concerns with
the current equipment situation and their needs for Guardsmen
to assist with State security and emergency preparedness and
response. They are joined by the State Adjutants General of
West Virginia and Oregon. And we thank all of you for coming.
Without debating the legalities of Federal and State laws
concerning the National Guard, or lamenting the traditionally
weak funding of the National Guard, it is important that we
look at what the National Guard has done and is doing for this
country right now.
It is not enough to be grateful--even amazed--as they do so
well with so little. We need to make sure that the DOD decides
quickly what its responsibilities will be here at home, and
establishes requirements that result in appropriate training
and equipment for the National Guard.
We need to make sure that the Army starts recognizing that
the Army National Guard is charged with the same
responsibilities of active duty forces; should be equipped at
the same readiness levels as active duty; and it should not be
funded at just 11 percent of what the active Army receives.
And we have to be sure that Congress starts adjusting our
authorizations and appropriations to recognize the resources
required by the National Guard, who are also expected to be
America's first military responders.
I have been working closely with Senator Kit Bond and the
Senate Guard Caucus, to get $1.3 billion in equipment for the
National Guard included in the next applicable supplemental.
This is not even close to the amount needed, and the measure
may fail in conference. We can't let this happen.
The time to ensure the brave and dedicated men and women of
the Guard receive the training and equipment they need to
fulfill missions of safety and security for the people of the
United States is now. I look forward to hearing today from our
witnesses what we need to do to make this happen.
I would now yield to our ranking member, who has been
active on these issues as well, Mr. Waxman, for his opening
statement.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Tom Davis follows:]
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Mr. Waxman. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased you are
continuing to focus committee attention on issues affecting the
men and women serving in the National Guard.
Over the history of this country, the Guard has played a
significant role in ensuring the safety and well-being of
Americans; but the recent increasing use of Guardsmen in
conflicts abroad has placed tremendous strains on Guard members
and the institution overall. We must do everything we can to
ensure the National Guard functions effectively and
efficiently.
The Guard currently faces two major problems. First, the
Nation has not been meeting its fundamental obligations to the
Guard. As this committee has learned from previous oversight
hearings, Guardsmen aren't getting paid on time; they aren't
getting the proper and timely health care and benefits they
deserve; and they have received sub-par equipment and training,
compared to active duty forces.
Second, the recent over-extension of Guardsmen overseas
appears to be posing challenges to the Guard's ability to
respond to domestic disasters. The recent response to Hurricane
Katrina is a case in point. When the hurricane hit, many of the
Louisiana and Mississippi Guardsmen were serving in Iraq and
unavailable to help their friends and neighbors. Moreover,
National Guard equipment important for the hurricane relief
effort, such as Humvees, night goggles, and high-water trucks,
were also over in Iraq.
According to DOD and Guard plans, our reliance on the
National Guard for security at home and abroad may only
increase in the coming years. That is why I am so concerned
about predicaments confronting the Guard today.
We must make sure that the country is meeting its
commitments to the individuals serving, and ensuring they have
the resources necessary to do the job right.
I look forward to hearing the witnesses today. I
particularly want to welcome our former colleague in the
Congress, Governor Kempthorne. And I know Governor Rendell will
be here soon.
And to the Governors, and to other witnesses,
unfortunately, I have a conflict of interest--not a conflict of
interest; a conflict of time--[laughter]--a conflict in
schedule, that will keep me from being here. But my staff will
give me a full report. And I will be working with the chairman
to accomplish the goals we all seek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Henry A. Waxman follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. I have a conflict
of interest. I was in the Guard for 8 years, so I want to keep
it strong.
Do any other Members wish to make opening statements?
[No response.]
Chairman Tom Davis. If not, we will call our first witness:
a former member of the other body, a former Mayor of Boise, ID,
and the current Governor of Idaho, the Honorable Dirk
Kempthorne, who has had a very distinguished public career.
Dirk, we appreciate you being here today. It is our policy
we swear everybody. Would you just raise your right hand?
[Witness sworn.]
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. And thank you so
much for being here. And I would just note, as you do in your
testimony, Idaho has basically put more people over in Iraq and
had more people deployed than any other State, on a
proportional basis. You have taken heavy losses. You have
people down in Katrina, helping out down there. And you had an
outstanding record as Governor.
We are just really happy to have you here today, and I
thank you for being with us to share your thoughts.
STATEMENTS OF DIRK KEMPTHORNE, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF IDAHO;
AND EDWARD RENDELL, GOVERNOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA
STATEMENT OF DIRK KEMPTHORNE
Governor Kempthorne. Chairman Davis, thank you very much,
and I was very encouraged with your opening comments and those
comments by Congressman Waxman. And to all members of the
committee, I am very delighted to be here to have these
discussions.
As we meet here today, the Idaho National Guard's 116th
Brigade Combat Team is deployed in Iraq; our 183rd Attack
Helicopter Battalion is being deployed to Afghanistan; our
189th Airlift Squadron continues to rotate its C-130 aircraft
and crews in and out of Southwest Asia.
As you noted, Mr. Chairman, there are also 400 Idaho
National Guardsmen deployed in Louisiana to assist the
hurricane response effort in the Gulf Coast States. I am proud
that today, in all, Idaho has the highest percentage of Guard
forces mobilized than any other State.
I am also proud of the fact that the Idaho National Guard
has accepted every mission that has ever been requested of it,
without exception or reservation. And I am proud of the men and
women who carry out these missions with great professionalism
and honor. They represent Idaho, and they represent the United
States of America extremely well; as to all Guard units of all
States.
So I come here today with firsthand knowledge of the impact
these missions have on a State's ability to respond to a
terrorist event or a natural disaster.
In anticipation of your first question, ``What can the
Federal Government do to help States prepare?'', my first
response is to ensure that we do have equipment. Now, why would
I say that, when we have an entire National Guard? Because over
the next several weeks, the 116th Brigade Combat Team will
demobilize from Iraq and, significantly, they will leave behind
their vehicles and rolling stock that would fill a train with
212 railroad cars--over 400 vehicles.
Additionally, in the event of a natural or manmade
disaster, my State will have a significant shortage of state-
of-the-art tactical communication equipment to enable effective
communication, control, and synchronization of efforts; as well
as a shortage of critical medical equipment to facilitate
immediate casualty treatment and care.
At this time, I have not been made aware of any plan to
reequip the 116th with the basic equipment that will be left in
Iraq. Couple this with the BRAC recommendation to remove the C-
130 cargo aircraft from the Idaho Air National Guard--a move
that will not only leave Idaho, but the entire Pacific
Northwest, without airlift capabilities--and you can begin to
understand the magnitude of the gap left in our response
capabilities.
These facts are in direct conflict with my ability as a
Governor to prepare for disaster and/or domestic terrorist
attacks. We need a commitment from the Federal Government that
the equipment that is left in Iraq will be replaced in quick
order. And we need further assessment of the BRAC
recommendations on our ability to respond immediately to a
regional disaster.
When assets such as a C-130 are under the control of a
Governor, that Governor can make one call and, within an hour,
props are turning. This is not always the case with Federal
assets. A comparison of total flights flown by Air National
Guard units versus Air Force and Air Force Reserve units over a
4-day period in response to Hurricane Katrina shows that the
Guard flew 10 missions to every 1 mission flown by the Air
Force and Air Force Reserve.
A case in point: I spoke to a Governor of a southern State
who said there were 60 C-130's under Federal jurisdiction and--
much to the frustration and the disappointment of the Air Force
flight crews--few, if any, were flying.
When brigades return from a 1-year tour of duty in the
Middle East, they are at a truly proficient and efficient level
of training. How do we maintain that level of readiness upon
their return, if they now encounter a critical equipment
shortage? And what does this imply for homeland security? What
are the implications for recruitment and retention?
No one can predict the magnitude of the next natural or
manmade disaster, but I believe that we are prepared to sustain
an emergency response for a 24 to 48-hour period; and at that
point, based on the situation, we may well need to move
additional personnel quickly to the disaster scene.
Additionally, as we begin to activate National Guard
personnel, we deplete the bank of emergency responders--such as
doctors, nurses, EMTs, firefighters, law enforcement officers--
because in many cases, these men and women are part of the
National Guard.
I commend General Steven Blum and his team from the
National Guard Bureau for their efforts to coordinate State-to-
State, Governor-to-Governor support during the Gulf Coast
hurricanes. The General's efforts truly showcased how this
model can work properly.
Where it does not always work so well is in the
coordination between the State and Federal Governments. Let me
give you an example from Hurricane Katrina. In the days after
the hurricane devastated the Gulf Coast region, Idaho responded
to an urgent request to evacuate the frail elderly from the
Gulf Coast States.
We had identified more than 400 nursing home beds in Idaho
for these evacuees. We sent two C-130's, with critical care
nurses and emergency room physicians, to Houston and to
Mississippi. When our planes touched down, our people were met
with significant resistance. In one case, despite the
overwhelming need for evacuation for many of the frail elderly,
we could not find anyone who would release patients to us. It
was only after the Governor of Texas personally interceded with
the person in charge at the Astrodome that we were able to get
10 individuals out. But that was the total and the final number
of individuals that we could evacuate.
In the other case, the temporary hospital that had been set
up to receive frail elderly was on a Federal installation. When
our people arrived, they were warmly greeted by overworked and
stressed Mississippi medical personnel. But they were then told
by a Federal official that they could not help, because they
had not been ``Federalized.'' As patients were coming into the
hospital, two emergency room physicians and eight critical care
nurses from Idaho were literally informed to stand against the
wall, because they did not have the necessary Federal
credentials to treat patients.
It is worth noting that, had the hospital been anywhere
else besides Federal property, there would have been no
problems with our doctors and nurses seeing patients.
Since when did it become illegal for one State to help
another State in these United States? This is the United States
of America; it is not ``The Federal Government of America.''
From my perspective, this is a fundamental breakdown in
State-to-State assistance, that is caused by inflexible Federal
regulations. I would encourage this committee to look at this
issue as you consider various reforms to Federal emergency
response policy.
Mr. Chairman, in closing, we need to ensure the men and
women of our National Guard are celebrated for their
contributions to our safety and security; that we stand for our
Guard in all that they must carry out.
I look forward to this discussion with you and the members
of the committee.
[The prepared statement of Governor Kempthorne follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
We now have our distinguished second witness today,
Governor Rendell of Pennsylvania. Let me just note, we first
met when I was chairman of the County Board in Fairfax. You
were active in the National League of Cities and the Conference
of Mayors--an outstanding job as mayor, a leader in unfunded
mandates; as were you, Governor Kempthorne. We worked together.
And then again, when he was chairman of the Democratic National
Committee, I was chairman of the Campaign Committee for the
Republicans in the House.
In this business, which can be very hard-edged, you always
performed very admirably; as you are now. And we are just so
pleased to have you here, Governor, today to testify on some of
the problems the Guard is facing in Pennsylvania. And you do a
great job. I just want to thank you for being here.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD RENDELL
Governor Rendell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Tom Davis. And I know Mr. Kanjorski would say the
same thing, but I thought I would say it from this side. Thank
you.
Governor Rendell. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Tom Davis. And Mr. Platts, here.
Governor Rendell. And it is great to see Congressman Platts
and Congressman Kanjorski here. And I appreciate this
opportunity. I will try to shorten my written remarks a little
bit, because I am going to cover some of the same ground that
Governor Kempthorne has spoken to you about.
Obviously, everyone is aware of the joint status of the
National Guard. It is the only military personnel that perform
in that joint status. It goes all the way back to the militia
clause of the Constitution.
In many ways, today's National Guard carries out the genius
of our founders, and it constitutes federalism in action in a
military context. Formation of the militia predates the
founding of our country. The Massachusetts National Guard
traces its lineage to the first regiments established by the
General Court of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1636.
And our most renowned Pennsylvanian, Benjamin Franklin,
founded the Pennsylvania National Guard when he formed the
Associators in Philadelphia in 1747. In 1755, the Colonial
Assembly passed Pennsylvania's first militia law. And
coincidentally, on November 25th, we will celebrate the 250th
anniversary of the Pennsylvania National Guard.
Today's National Guard in Pennsylvania and across America
is the modern militia reserved to the States by the U.S.
Constitution. Based on a dual enlistment system, every member
of the Pennsylvania National Guard takes an oath of enlistment
in a reserve component of the Armed Forces--the National Guard
of the United States--and in the modern State militia--the
State national guard.
These State and Federal military entities are linked
inseparably. On a day-to-day basis, the Guard remains under the
State command and control, and the Governors serve as
commanders in chief. When the Guard is called into active
Federal service--as is the case with our soldiers and airmen in
Iraq--they are under the command and control of the Federal
Government.
There are a little more than 20,000 soldiers and airmen in
the Pennsylvania Army and Air National Guard. We are proud to
be, with Texas and California, the largest National Guard in
the United States of America.
Since September 11, 2001, of those 20,000-plus soldiers and
airmen, a total of 13,372 Guard members have been deployed in
support of Operation Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and Noble
Eagle. More than two out of three of our Guard have been
deployed in the fight against global terrorism. Today there are
more than 3,000 members of the Pennsylvania National Guard
deployed in Iraq.
When they are not deployed overseas, Guard personnel serve
in readiness centers, armories, and the Air National Guard
bases across Pennsylvania. The Guard provides me as Governor
with a well trained and equipped military force to respond to
State emergencies such as floods, blizzards, hurricanes, and
local emergency situations.
Pennsylvania is home to the National Guard's third Weapons
of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team. These National Guard
teams provide the Defense Department with unique expertise and
capabilities to assist State Governors in preparing and
responding to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
incidents, as part of the States' emergency response structure.
Each team consists of 22 highly skilled, full-time National
Guard members who are federally resourced, trained, and
exercised.
The National Guard is a partnership between States and
Federal Government. As any of you who have been involved in
this partnership know, this involves give and take. Today's
National Guard is supposed to involve day-to-day communication,
collaboration, and interaction between the State and Federal
Governments.
The National Guard Bureau, a bureau within the Department
of Defense, serves as the channel of communication between DOD
and the States. And I join with Governor Kempthorne in saying
that General Blum has done an excellent job in trying to carry
out that function.
It is fair to say that the Federal Government is the senior
partner in this partnership between the States and the Federal
Government, in terms of the supply, the equipment, and the
funding it provides for most National Guard activities. But
what is sometimes overlooked is that the States provide the
most precious resource of all to the National Guard: the young
men and women who serve their State and their Nation, and who
risk, and sometimes give, their lives in service.
The States recognize how important it is to recruit and
retain the high-quality personnel necessary to maintain and
strengthen the Guard. For example, in Pennsylvania we invest
about $10 million a year in our educational assistance programs
to provide public service educational grants to new enlistees
and members of the Pennsylvania National Guard. This is an
important recruitment and retention tool that keeps the Guard
strong to accomplish both its State and Federal missions.
So it is wrong to say that the States do not participate in
the funding of the Guard? We very much do, in recruitment
efforts like this and in other benefits that we provide.
Unfortunately, the relationship between the Guard and the
States and the Federal Government has broken down to some
extent. One place where the National Guard partnership between
the States and the Federal Government broke down badly was in
the actions of the Defense Department and the Air Force with
regard to the 2005 BRAC round.
The Department of Defense and the Air Force chose to ignore
clear congressional statutes and mandates requiring the consent
of the Governors with regard to major changes in National Guard
units. They argued that the BRAC process superseded the
requirement for input from the States, and that it was
impractical to ask 54 National Guard entities for input.
In an incredible effort to justify elimination of Air
National Guard units and missions across America, the Air Force
even suggested that the Civil Air Patrol could fill in for the
Air National Guard. Don't get me wrong: The Civil Air Patrol is
carrying out homeland security missions and helping us in many
ways. It is a great organization. But it is no substitute for
the Air National Guard. It is ludicrous to even suggest that.
Let me take a brief moment to describe what happened with
the 111th Fighter Wing of the Pennsylvania National Guard. For
several years, my staff, the Adjutant General, and the
Commander of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard had received
briefings that the 111th, which flies the A-10 Warthog aircraft
out of the Willow Grove Joint Reserve Base, was likely to
receive additional mission aircraft as part of the future total
force planning process. Imagine our surprise and dismay when,
on May 13th of this year, we received the DOD recommendation
that the 111th Fighter Wing should be deactivated.
The DOD recommendation came without a word of advance
warning. There was no coordination, no request for input, and
certainly no request for my approval as Governor, for the
elimination of this important Air National Guard unit.
The 111th has about 1,000 full-time and part-time military
personnel. It is based at Willow Grove, right outside of
Philadelphia, which of course is a key strategic location of
our State. The 111th does not just consist of pilots and
airplanes. It has security forces, mechanics, medical
personnel, and all the rest that make up a modern fighter wing.
Seventy-five percent of the members of the 111th have been
deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last 4 years.
These personnel are also key assets to me as Governor in
addressing potential threats to the security of our homeland.
What is more, I believe it is vital to maintain military flying
operations at Willow Grove to provide a surge capability to
respond to emergencies in the Philadelphia region.
Make no mistake: If terrorists again hijacked a plane, and
that plane was bearing down on Independence Hall or the Liberty
Bell--two of our three most important national icons--the
planes nearest to Philadelphia who could intercept those
terrorist-held planes would be at Willow Grove. The difference
between their response time and the response time from other
bases is a matter of minutes but, as we learned on September
11th, a matter of minutes can cost thousands of lives.
Congress has mandated that the U.S. Government cannot make
changes to the branch, organization, or allotment of National
Guard units located within the States without the approval of
the Governor. That is found in Title 10 and Title 32 of the
U.S. Code. The same law provides that I, as Governor, cannot
disband a National Guard unit that receives Federal funds
without the approval of the President. The law aptly describes
the fundamental principles of federalism upon which the
National Guard is built. Neither the State nor the Federal
Government can make basic changes to National Guard units
without the input and consent of the other.
At least, that is the way it was supposed to work. But the
Air Force decided that the BRAC law superseded these other
Federal laws passed by Congress, and that it could completely
ignore the States in making recommendations to eliminate Air
National Guard units and missions.
The 111th Fighter Wing was the only National Guard unit in
the country actually recommended for deactivation, but others
were stripped of aircraft and personnel. Aside from ignoring
what we saw as clear legal requirements, I was completely
surprised by the Air Force's attitude toward the National Guard
in general, and to the partnership between the Guard and the
States in particular.
An Air Force spokesman testifying before the BRAC
Commission said it would be unreasonable and impractical to
expect the Air Force to talk to 54, or even 28, National Guard
entities in making plans to eliminate units and missions. It
was almost as if they were saying that, ``Those pesky States
stand in the way of us getting our job done.'' Somebody even
suggested that Governors would bring politics into the BRAC
process--something that, as we all know, has been immune to
politics in its total existence.
As Governor of Pennsylvania, I was not going to stand by
and watch DOD attempt to eliminate one-fourth of the Air
National Guard force in my State. In late May, I wrote to
Secretary Rumsfeld, to advise him that I did not consent to the
proposed deactivation of the 111th. And in early July, Senators
Arlen Specter, Rick Santorum, and I filed suit in Federal
court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the DOD violated the
Governor consent statutes when they commenced action to
deactivate an Air National Guard unit without the consent of
the Governor.
We filed suit not just to stand up to the Guard [sic], or
to protect the security interests of Pennsylvania; we filed
suit to protect the vital principles of federalism grounded in
our Constitution that established the National Guard as a
military force shared by the State and the Federal Government.
We also filed suit to stand up for Congress, which had passed
laws requiring the consent of the Governor for certain changes
to National Guard units.
As a result, I was very pleased that Senators Specter and
Santorum joined me in this litigation, because their support
emphasized that DOD's actions were not just ignoring the
Governor's prerogative with regard to the National Guard, but
also ignoring the direction provided by Congress.
In the end, Federal District Judge John Pedova ruled in
favor of the Commonwealth, and held that the DOD's
recommendation for deactivation of the 111th Fighter Wing was
``null and void.''
On the same day that the court decision was issued, the
BRAC Commission found that the DOD's recommendation
substantially deviated from the BRAC criteria, and overturned
the proposed deactivation of the 111th Fighter Wing. The
Commission also ruled that military flying operations should be
maintained at Willow Grove.
We believe the Commission should have stopped there, and
had no legal right to go forward. But unfortunately, they went
ahead to recommend that the A-10's assigned to the 111th be
distributed to other units, even as they encouraged the Air
Force to maintain the A-10's there. So that set up the
unbelievably ludicrous proposition that we were going to
continue to employ and pay and train and equip in other ways
1,023 airmen and airwomen, but give them no planes to carry out
their mission.
Now, Senator Santorum and I have talked to the Defense
Department, and we are trying to reconcile what is a very
difficult situation, and one that makes no sense for the
taxpayers of the United States and the security of the State of
Pennsylvania. It is my hope that the Defense Department will
settle this litigation--and as I said, we are the only State
that was successful in Federal court--and agree to maintain the
A-10's at Willow Grove.
In fact, ironically, 12 A-10's are headed to, essentially,
a graveyard in Arizona; even though those planes are not
scheduled for deactivation until 2028. Makes no sense.
Contrary to what I have just outlined, where the
relationship between the Guard as a State unit and a Federal
unit broke down, in the aftermath of Hurricane Rita and
Hurricane Katrina, I think it worked fairly well. Obviously, I
understand the incidents that Governor Kempthorne talked about;
but in our experience, it worked well.
Pennsylvania sent more than 2,500 Guard personnel to
Louisiana and Mississippi to respond to those emergencies. We
sent the largest Guard contingent of any outside State. We
responded promptly. Our Interim Satellite Incident Site
Communication Set deployed from Fort Indiantown Gap to the
Mississippi Gulf Coast in the first days after the storms. And
for more than a week, it provided just about the only form of
reliable communications in the region. It later redeployed to
Texas in the wake of Hurricane Rita.
We sent security and military police forces from several
units--including, ironically, the 111th Fighter Wing--to
Louisiana within 24 hours after we received the request for
support. About 200 Pennsylvania National Guard personnel
deployed by air to Louisiana, and elements of our 213th Area
Support Group and our 56th Brigade deployed by convoy to the
area of devastation within just a few days.
This is a great example of how the Guard can serve in a way
that is beyond our borders. I got, personally, tens and tens of
letters and e-mails from citizens of Mississippi and Louisiana,
thanking me for sending the Guard, sending it so quickly, and
for the caliber of service that was rendered by the Guard. I
believe that, as I said, this was a good example of the best in
the Federal-State cooperation.
Now, you have heard Senator, Governor Kempthorne talk about
what is the second-biggest problem, and that is the equipment
problem, or the reequipment problem. My testimony is replete
with examples of Pennsylvania Guard units who went over to Iraq
and Afghanistan and were forced--and we understand this--to
leave a lot of the equipment behind; in one case, 10 of 41
Humvees; in one case, 7 airplanes--7 CH-47D helicopters, excuse
me.
The Defense Department has been slow in replacing materiel.
In many cases, we haven't gotten that materiel back when the
units have come back. And in many cases, it has been reported
to me that the equipment that is sent to replace the equipment
left behind in Iraq and Afghanistan is older, is inferior, and
in many cases just plain and simply doesn't work. That is a
second and huge problem, when it comes to the integrity of
State National Guards and their ability to carry out their
mission at home.
If in fact the Guard units are deployed, and I want to
remind you, two-thirds of Pennsylvania's--that is the largest
National Guard in the country--two-thirds of those soldiers and
airmen have served in Iraq and Afghanistan. That is how active
we have been. We have over 3,000 members there now. The Second
Combat Brigade left from Camp Shelby, Mississippi, and 4,100
Guardsmen went over; 2,100 were Pennsylvanians.
It is our obligation to make sure--and Congress should
enforce and make certain--that when these Guard units leave
equipment behind, that they receive commensurate equipment
quickly and as soon as they return to their States.
So those are the two problems that I see most graphically,
and the ones that I think that need to be addressed. As I said,
we have a number of specific examples about the equipment
failures in my testimony that I won't belabor you with now.
But let me tell you that the National Guard has changed.
When I was a Reservist, Reserve and National Guard were
considered weekend warriors. The contemplation that we would go
into active duty theaters like Iraq and Afghanistan was
literally something no one ever considered. Now, as I said,
two-thirds of the Pennsylvania National Guard have been
activated.
Since August 1st, 15 members of the Pennsylvania National
Guard have died in Iraq; 15 members since August 1st.
Of the 2,100 Pennsylvanians whom I said goodbye to at Camp
Shelby, Mississippi, I said that I hope to see all of them back
when their mission ended 1 year from the date that we stood in
Mississippi. Unfortunately, that is not going to be the case.
The Guard makes tremendous sacrifices. Our personnel
deserve the best equipment when they are fighting on foreign
soil, and when they are doing their security missions here. The
relationship between the Guard and its Federal and State status
needs to be addressed.
I salute you, Mr. Chairman, for having these hearings. I
believe they are very, very, very important. And I wish you
well in the work ahead.
[The prepared statement of Governor Rendell follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Governor, thank you very much. Let me
ask both of you, we know the equipment shortages. I mean, we
can just look at the funding across the board. But if you were
to prioritize, what specific equipment are you most concerned
about? Communications, airlift helicopters, trucks? Is there
anything you can, if they had to set priorities?
Governor Rendell. Well, again, for Pennsylvania, which has
a large Air National Guard, as well--an Air National Guard of
almost 4,500--the planes and the helicopters are the most
important. For example, in floods--and we were hit this past
year with two or three major floods--the helicopters are of
enormous importance at home.
For a homeland security mission--and again, the whole
nature of the Guard changed after September 11th. To say that
planes in Willow Grove under the command of the Pennsylvania
Air National Guard might be scrambled to protect the Liberty
Bell or Independence Hall from airborne assault, that was a
foreign concept before September 11th.
So I think the planes the helicopters are the first, most
important equipment. I think communication equipment is second,
because that is important, as we showed in Hurricane Katrina
and Hurricane Rita. And then last, the trucks and vehicles that
are needed to move personnel--again, as we saw in Hurricane
Rita. Of the 2,500 Pennsylvania Guardsmen who went down to the
Gulf, only about 400 went by plane. The other 2,100 went by
convoy.
Chairman Tom Davis. Governor.
Governor Kempthorne. Mr. Chairman, I would add that the
airlift capability is No. 1. And again, from my testimony, you
know that they are now recommending that the C-130's go away
from Idaho. I can show you--I would love to come back and just
show you my presentation to the BRAC Commission, to show you
response time, and how there is now a void throughout the
Pacific Northwest.
We also need the rolling stock. Idaho is a large land mass,
very mountainous. If we have an earthquake, if we have
something of that nature, or floods, the idea of evacuating--we
are going to have to have a rolling stock. The fact that we are
leaving over 400 vehicles in Iraq is very problematic.
Big picture: Mississippi ran out of gasoline for their
first responders. That was one of the requests that they put
out to the States. So the idea was, why not take a KC-135, a
tanker, fly it down there? Well, we then determined that you
cannot offload it. You need to do an aerial offloading; not on
the ground. So from Idaho, which is a 6-day trip from
Mississippi, we sent a convoy of tanker trucks down there. When
we got the urgent request from Louisiana, we sent a convoy of
120 vehicles to Louisiana.
So just as Governor Rendell is talking about response to
the Gulf Coast, we are talking about the States helping one
another, the States of these United States, for homeland
security, or natural disasters.
Much of our equipment is now in the Middle East. We have to
have that equipment back in the area of rolling stock; airlift
capability; communications; and the engineering, if in fact you
have to repair the bridges, restore the bridges, open up roads.
I think much of what you saw in the aftermath of Katrina was
moving devastation aside so that you could get transportation
realigned.
Chairman Tom Davis. Let me ask you, the ``Hot Line'' this
morning has a headline saying, in a rare split with his
brother, the President, Florida Governor Jeb Bush said he does
not support Federalizing the emergency response to future
disasters.
How do you feel about easing posse comitatus restrictions
on active duty forces and others performing domestic missions
in your State?
Governor Kempthorne. First, I would associate myself with
the remarks of Governor Jeb Bush. He is right on target. The
last thing we need when a State has a disaster, or a local area
within a State, is to have a Federalization of the assets.
We often say that the solution is always closest to the
problem. And the idea that somehow Governors would be usurped
of their responsibilities as Governors and commanders-in-chief
and that there would be some force that would come in that
would then take over the control, I do not agree with.
There needs to be a partnership, a strong partnership, and
that is what federalism is all about. But the idea of someone
immediately declaring the posse comitatus, coming in, taking
over law enforcement--I totally disagree with that.
Governor Rendell. And let me just add, I think all
Governors would agree with, Mr. Chairman, what Governor Bush
said.
But let me give you an example. And this is not meant to
place the finger of blame anywhere, but as you know, the
Federal Government--and we can talk all we want about the
reasons why this happened--it wasn't until 4 or 5 days later,
till the Federal Government activated the Army. We responded to
Governor Barber and Governor Blanco the day after Katrina hit;
we had our Guard mobilized to go down there.
If we had waited for the Federal Government's approval, it
would have been another 4 or 5 days before the Pennsylvania
Guard could have been ready to go down. And some actually left
that very next day. The communications team that I talked about
in my testimony left Tuesday. And if we had waited for the
Federal Government, we wouldn't have gotten approval until
Friday.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Kanjorski.
Mr. Kanjorski. Let me say, I appreciate the testimony of
both Governors; but, of course, my Governor is always superior
to all others. [Laughter.]
So, welcome to the Congress, Governor Rendell.
I am disturbed, because I have heard the same problems at
home about this equipment. And in effect, most of my Guardsmen
are telling me that they feel that they have been somewhat
castrated--I will use the term. They are there in spirit and
body, but they are not capable of functioning as a unit any
more, without the use of the equipment. And as you so rightly
say, 75 percent of the Pennsylvania National Guard has gone to
Iraq, and left the equipment in Iraq. And now they are
substantially uncovered.
I want to commend the chairman for having these hearings. I
certainly, when I get back to the floor, am going to be talking
to Mr. Murtha. We have to do something on an emergency basis
here to reequip the National Guards to make them sound. And I
commit myself to both the Governors to do that.
And, too, I happen to agree with you, Governor Kempthorne,
that the closest to the problem is the best solution. This
whole idea of going Federal--I mean, not that I want to strike
out at anyone, since I am part of the Federal Government--but
we didn't get very high scores in Katrina.
And I think that with every disaster that I have been
associated with in Pennsylvania, we have seen what the National
Guard can do. And my constituents sleep a hell of a lot more
comfortably knowing the National Guard is there, instead of
waiting for the Army or the Federal Government to come.
So I commend both of you for coming today, and encourage
your pursuit of this. And we will do the same thing.
Chairman Tom Davis. Yes, Governor?
Governor Rendell. And Congressman, I think you are right
on. The Congressman used the word ``castrate,'' ``emasculate,''
whatever. Our Guards feel that.
I mean, consider the ludicrous proposition, leaving aside
the Federal court decision--and we believe the Federal court
decision mandates that the A-10's stay in Willow Grove. But
consider what has happened through the BRAC process and the
position that DOD has at least temporarily taken. We have 1,023
trained airmen and airwomen; 75 percent of whom have flown
combat missions. The 111th has flown 2,500 combat missions in
Afghanistan and Iraq. And they are going to be paid by the
Federal Government. They are going to be equipped in all other
ways by the Federal Government. Yet they have no planes, if the
BRAC decision and the DOD recommendation stands and withstands
the court challenge.
That is a huge waste of taxpayers' money. And think of what
it does to the morale of those people who have flown all those
combat missions, to take their planes away.
I would suggest, respectfully--and nobody knows the
pressures of balanced budgets more than we do, because we by
law have to balance our budgets--I would respectfully submit,
though, that you cannot fight global terrorism abroad or at
home on the cheap.
Governor Kempthorne. Mr. Chairman, may I also respond to
the Congressman?
Chairman Tom Davis. Surely.
Governor Kempthorne. Two points. One with regard to the
attitude of the Guard members. I will just say that I see the
communications back from the people in Louisiana and
Mississippi, also, that are so grateful. And what I hear from
our Guard members down there that are serving is this is one of
the greatest deployments that they have ever participated in,
because they are helping fellow Americans. They are on home
soil.
And there is such a ``can-do'' attitude by Guard members,
they bring such skill sets, that even if they do not have all
of the equipment, the job they do is just exemplary. We hear
that from the brigade that will be coming home, that is Guard,
that is being replaced by active Army that says, ``We do not
have the skill sets that you have here in the Guard.''
The other point I would make follows onto Governor Rendell.
Think of the irony of this. Today, 62 percent of the combat
soldiers in Iraq, the Middle East, are Guard and Reserve. So
you have brigades that then come home. They are at an all-time
level of readiness, training, camaraderie, cohesiveness. What
could be better for homeland security? And yet, to deny them
the very equipment, so that we can retain that level of
readiness, would be tragic for the well-being of this Nation.
Mr. Kanjorski. Thank you.
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Souder.
Mr. Souder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
comments today. We are hearing in each State the problem with
our Guards.
Governor Kempthorne, in your statement you talked in
particular about what the Army had left. Do you know how much
of things like the trucks and the radios, the Humvees and the
radios and other communication equipment, that you also use for
domestic?
According to the testimony we are going to get in the
second panel, it says some of those Guard units had additional
materiel to go over. In Indiana, I guess 70 percent of the
materiel is coming back. But do you know what percentage of
that materiel in Idaho belonged to the units before they went
over?
Governor Kempthorne. Congressman, you mean that when the
brigade arrived in Iraq, the equipment that was there, waiting
for them?
Mr. Souder. Or was shipped in, knowing they were going to
be deployed.
Governor Kempthorne. Congressman, I cannot give you a
percentage. I will tell you that it is the majority of our
vehicles. It is over 400 vehicles that will be left in Iraq;
much of which was brand new equipment, new trucks, etc. Those
will remain behind.
We were still able to put together 120 vehicles to go to
Louisiana and, significantly, to make sure, as Governor of
Idaho, that I still have rolling stock and personnel in the
event of a natural disaster in my State. But you can well
imagine, it stretches us very thin. And that is the current
situation: we are stretched thin.
Mr. Souder. Before I ask Governor Rendell the same
question, have any of your units been deployed twice? And how
did that factor in?
Governor Kempthorne. This is the first deployment of the
brigade. I will tell you that the Idaho Air Guard are on
continual deployment. Many of those are 8, 9, and 10
deployments of those personnel.
Mr. Souder. But can I clarify? My Air Guard unit that was
deployed I don't believe had the same equipment problems as the
Army. In other words, they don't have to leave their materiel.
Governor Kempthorne. I believe that is correct.
Mr. Souder. Any of the Army groups that were deployed
twice, how did they get resupplied then? Do you know? Governor
Rendell, do you have any----
Governor Rendell. Again, most of the redeployment in
Pennsylvania was the Air National Guard. But in my testimony--
and I didn't read all of the different examples--but there is
one example where initially all seven helicopters that this
helicopter unit had were left behind, and they are still over
in Iraq. We have gotten five replacements, but it has been
reported to me that the replacements are older and not nearly
as effective and as efficient as the vehicles we left behind.
If we went over again, if that unit went over again, query
whether they would get the original vehicles back, or whether
we would take some of the replacement vehicles with us. But the
redeployment tends to be more Air National Guard; although some
of our ground forces have been redeployed. And I think those
that have been redeployed catch up with some of the equipment.
Mr. Souder. And it doesn't change the fact that we need to
resupply for our State Guards, but do you know how much of the
equipment that has been left behind has been damaged; as
opposed to just not being able to be brought home?
Governor Rendell. I don't know that. But I can get you and
submit to the chairman those figures from the adjutant general.
Mr. Souder. I would appreciate that. I know that the
Humvees are made in the district next to mine, but my district
supplies most of the parts. I believe 40 to 50 percent of them
are damaged, and are going through repair. And I know in
Indiana we do some of our own repair, because I have seen some
of the equipment coming back and then we are kind of
reconditioning it.
Do you have that process as well in your two States? And
are you getting the things that are damaged back, and in fact
they are leaving the good things there?
Governor Kempthorne. Congressman, no, I do not believe we
are. And also, just one other element. Much of the equipment
that is being left there is because it has been up-armored, and
so it provides greater protection for the personnel. I do not
question--I would not suggest that I want to bring back that
Humvee that in any way puts at risk the soldier who replaced
the Idaho Guard member who comes home; nor would the Guard
member. So I understand the rationale.
What I do not understand is lack of rationale: that you
don't reequip the National Guard based on homeland security,
based on further deployments, based on natural disasters that
we respond to. It would be tragic.
Governor Rendell. And that is absolutely correct,
Congressman. And again, it goes back to what I say. You cannot
do a mission, fight terrorism abroad--and the 62 percent figure
for Reserve and Guard is right--you can't do that dual mission,
and protect the homeland, on the cheap. And that is the bottom
line. And we have to come to grips with that.
Mr. Souder. Thank you.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Yes. I would like to keep following
through on that issue. Thank you all for being here. And there
are a lot of issues that we have to look at on a broader basis.
Do you have concerns about the effect of the overseas
deployments on your States' abilities to respond to natural
disasters or conduct homeland security missions?
Governor Rendell. No. Even though there were over 3,000--
almost 4,000--Pennsylvania Guardsmen in Iraq and Afghanistan at
the time we deployed 2,500 to the Gulf--which, as I said,
Congressman, was the largest of any State Guard that went to
the Gulf--that still left us with a little bit over 13,500
Guardsmen at home in Pennsylvania to carry out whatever
missions we needed there.
And although we have complained about equipment, I echo
what Governor Kempthorne said. It still left us--even with the
equipment left behind--it still left us with enough equipment
to respond to anything other than a cataclysmic event.
Governor Kempthorne. And Congressman, I would just add this
element. We have an agreement with General Blum and the
National Guard Bureau that no State will be drawn below 50
percent personnel without the agreement of a Governor. And so
we monitor this closely.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Is that a formal agreement, or informal?
Is that with every State?
Governor Kempthorne. It is with every State.
Mr. Ruppersberger. OK.
Governor Rendell. But that doesn't apply to equipment. And
I know Governor Schwitzer from Montana has told me that at one
point his planes, that are often used for forest fires and
things like that, about 90 percent of his air capacity was
abroad.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Let me ask you this. Right now, the
Department of Defense does not consider equipping the National
Guard for homeland security or emergency response and its
missions there; although they did make an exception for
Katrina. Do you believe that DOD should assist States with
resourcing equipment for homeland use?
Governor Rendell. I do, absolutely.
Governor Kempthorne. We would love to have it.
Governor Rendell. And you know, not only would we love to
have it, I think we all know the world has changed after
September 11th. And the National Guard has changed after
September 11th, as well. There is absolutely no doubt about
that.
And it is clear that the BRAC Commission, if you looked at
the military criteria--the criteria that were set up were
called ``military value criteria.'' Homeland security was one
of the criteria that the Commission was supposed to pay
attention to. But from my view of all of the hearings, it
played very little part in the decisionmaking process. It was
basically ignored.
Governor Kempthorne. I totally concur that DOD has a part
to play financially. It should not come with additional strings
attached. This should not mean that there is a Federalization
of the troops.
Also, by homeland security, by being prepared, those are
the very people that are being deployed to Iraq, performing
marvelously because of that training that they have received
here in the States. So, yes, it is to the benefit of all of us,
including DOD, against all enemies, foreign and domestic.
Mr. Ruppersberger. What procedures or steps have your
States taken to identify the equipment needed to respond to
natural disasters or security missions? And what types of
equipment do you think are most needed?
Governor Kempthorne. I sit down with the Adjutant General
of Idaho, General Lefrenz. We go over different scenarios. For
example, we have been experiencing a recent swarm of small
earthquakes in one part of our State. So we ask ourselves,
``What could that lead to? What are our resources? What rolling
stock do we have? What personnel do we have? What have we
predeployed? What about the infrastructure of bridges? If we do
lose that bridge which is the major link between the north and
the south part of our State, how do we quickly get into that?''
So we continually monitor scenarios and ensure that we have the
capabilities.
I will also mention that the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact [EMAC], is critical, because we may reach a
point, just as Louisiana and Mississippi did, that I may need
to ask other Governors for help.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Let me ask one question. And this goes
back to Katrina and the whole issue which is going to be out
there for a while about the role of the Federal Government in
natural disasters. When you have a situation where you have
like what happened in New Orleans, where both the local and the
State were totally overwhelmed--and I believe the President did
declare a disaster before the hurricane occurred--now, when you
have one decisionmaker, whether that be the mayor or the
Governor, and for whatever reason--for not realizing the
magnitude of the problem, or feeling that, ``This is our role;
we must take care of it,'' when they are totally overwhelmed--
do you believe that there should be a mechanism where the
Federal Government has to go in and help Americans, if they
have the equipment and the ability to do that?
And if you were in that situation, how would you all handle
it? And what systems do you believe--it is all about systems--
should be in place so that there can be immediate reaction to
save American lives right away, and not about the inability to
mobilize or whatever?
Governor Rendell. I think putting the systems in place is
the hard part of that, Congressman, because of the nature of
our Government and our Constitution. And even in the
interrelationship between a Governor and a mayor, there are
only certain instances where I have the power to override a
mayor in Pennsylvania on a decision like evacuation.
But I think that you could look at the power the President
has when he declares an emergency. That would be the time. That
is the time when I get my powers to override mayors, for
example. That would be the moment that I would look toward
giving some additional powers, as long as they do not hinder
the Federal relationship.
But I think it is more than just systems. It is people. And
if the situation had occurred in, let's say, State ``X,'' and I
thought that State ``X'' needed Federal troops and the people
of State ``X'' needed Federal troops, I would have picked up
the phone and I would have said, ``Governor Jones, sending in
the 82nd Airborne. You can stand with me and say 'That's a good
idea', or you don't have to. But I am sending in the 82nd
Airborne, because you are going to need them.''
I think we have to develop some form of leadership. And if
you look at the way FEMA and the State emergency management
agencies are supposed to work, we have that, I think, in most
cases. And obviously, in Katrina there were breakdowns. But in
most cases--and I think the two Pennsylvania Congressmen would
agree with me--when we had serious flooding all over the State,
I thought FEMA did a great job working with PEMA to get not
only aid, but to get reimbursement quickly. I thought that was
as good an example of the joint Federal-State response as
possible.
But if Congress is looking to fashion something to give the
President a range of powers, it would be consistent with the
declaration of the emergency. That is the way we structure it
here. And of course, when General Honore was designated as in
charge of the efforts, I think everyone fell into place.
General Honore became the commander of the Pennsylvania
National Guard, in the sense of deployment, etc., and we
followed that, as well. But I would focus on the power that is
given to the President to make those declarations, if you
wanted to buttress it.
Mr. Ruppersberger. So you do believe that power should
exist and that the President should have the ability in a
situation where it is overwhelmed; whether or not the leader--
the Governor or the mayor--understands that?
Governor Rendell. I think under certain unique situations--
and it should be framed carefully--but I think that would be
the place to do it.
Mr. Ruppersberger. How about you, Governor?
Governor Kempthorne. I believe it would be an extreme
situation, because it signals a breakdown of government, of the
system that we have all come to rely upon. I think it would be
a dire, dire situation if that ever happened. It should be at
the invitation of a Governor.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Even in the sense of an emergency
where--the total overwhelm, the facts are there, and the lack
of action will cost human lives?
Governor Kempthorne. I would, again, use the term
``extreme.'' When we think of pandemic, when we think of some
of these scenarios with potential flus that may have an
outbreak, the ideas of quarantines, etc.--very extreme. But I
think that should be the last measure taken. Because we are 50
sovereign States, comprising the United States, and the
Governor should be the individual that invites in.
When you do have regular troops that are brought in, there
is now a concept being developed of ``dual hat,'' so that your
National Guard general can then have operational control over
the military that is brought in. I believe that is very
workable.
There is one other thing, Congressman, that I would like to
note. And that is when the 82nd and the First Cav were brought
into New Orleans, National Guard, the 82nd Airborne, First Cav,
could communicate with one another with their radio equipment;
the National Guard could not get in on that frequency. That is
a problem.
Mr. Ruppersberger. I would like to agree that General Blum
is doing a great job running the National Guard.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Gutknecht.
Mr. Gutknecht. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think a lot of
the questions that I was going to ask have already been asked.
I would like to agree with Governor Kempthorne, and it is
something we sometimes forget in this city, and that is that
the Federal Government was created by the States; and not the
other way around. And I think we have to be very careful, and
try to create systems that, ``We know when someone is
overwhelmed.'' Obviously, there were some breakdowns done in
Louisiana, but I think we have to be careful we don't use that
example as an excuse if we are going to send in the 82nd
Airborne.
Let me come back, though. I think one other point I was
going to make--and I had a welcome home ceremony to some
Reservists this weekend. And they are an engineering group, and
normally their parking lot is absolutely filled with equipment.
And there was one lonely, little beat-up truck just out in
their area where they keep all their equipment. And it did seem
funny that here is the unit back, and they really couldn't do
much in terms of exercises, because all their equipment is
still over in the desert.
But I want to come back to, I think, a more serious
problem, and ask your opinions about this. One of the concerns
we have heard expressed--and we in Minnesota, I think, the
numbers that I hear are pretty good, in terms of retention and
recruitment. But this off-tempo thing, when you are sending
people back and forth as often as we are to places like Iraq
and Afghanistan and other parts of the world, not only are we
wearing out the equipment, I think we are wearing out our
personnel. How are you doing in your two States in terms of
recruitment and retention of Guard members?
Governor Rendell. Well, I would say in Pennsylvania
retention is remarkable. I can't say enough about the men and
women of our Guard, and I think it holds true around the
country. As worn out as they are, as difficult as it must be,
our retention rates are terrific.
I was at a welcome home ceremony in Chillington, PA, just a
couple of months ago, and this ceremony was about 2 months
after the troops had physically come back. And everyone got a
special medal, and I presented it with the commander. And they
came up one by one. Two people came up in civilian clothes.
Their service had run out, and they weren't retained. And one
of the two came up to me afterwards with his wife, and he
apologized to me. He said, ``I wanted to re-up, but she
wouldn't let me.'' And you know, given the multiple
deployments, you can understand that from a wife's perspective.
But the retention and the morale remain tremendously high.
It is just--it really is remarkable. You know, these days, we
are all so jaded, there is not much that inspires us. It is
almost inspiring.
But recruitment is a much, much, much different case.
Recruitment, we are going to have to keep building up
incentives. As I told you, in Pennsylvania, we have made a
tremendous educational incentive that we pay for, to get people
to come into the Guard. But notwithstanding that, recruitment
is much more of a challenge than retention.
Governor Kempthorne. Congressman, really, I would echo much
of what Governor Rendell said. And there is a schedule--be it
informal--but the concept that a brigade would not be required
to go back any sooner than 6 years, that would be a normal
cycle. I think anything more frequent than that, then you are
going to have problems with the retention of families, etc.
Morale is extremely high. The brigade from Idaho are
extremely proud of the progress which they are making. They
answered the call to duty. They are proud to have done so. When
they come back, it will be to a heroes' welcome. And again,
morale is extremely high.
I would add this that we all need to think about. With
demobilization, this is the largest single deployment ever in
the history of my State; therefore, it is the largest single
demobilization. We need to also be sure that we are in a
support for those troops that have come home--post-stress
disorder--to make sure that the support mechanism is there.
For 2 years, we have taken these wonderful people, and we
have now made them warriors. They have changed. They are going
to come home changed. Their families have had to cope. They
have had to change. And now they are going to come back
together. The world has changed at home. And so we need to help
them with those expectations, with their concerns that they go
through.
With the National Guard different than coming back and
going to the fort where they live, they are dispersed
throughout our rural communities. It is tough for them to go
down to a coffee shop and say, ``I am having trouble at night.
I am having nightmares.'' Because in the coffee shop, maybe
nobody went with them.
I would also just say, one of the toughest assignments that
I have heard from our Guard members are those that have not
been asked to deploy. They want to be with their comrades. They
are an awesome organization.
Mr. Gutknecht. Thank you.
Chairman Tom Davis. Ms. Watson.
Ms. Watson. I want to thank both Governors for coming and
sharing with us. I have been concerned about the increasing use
of our National Guard to fight in Iraq. I think it was so
appropriate that you were able to respond and come to our own
Gulf Coast and help out there. It is an absolute essential use
of our National Guard.
I have been reading through our background materials on
under what title you are called up, and how long. And what
bothers me is the equipment left behind. But more so than that
are the families and the jobs left behind.
What impact have you experienced--and I would like both
Governors to respond--with your National Guard spending
additional time off our shores, and leaving equipment off our
shores? There are going to be more Katrinas and Ritas. In fact,
one is headed to the Florida coast at the moment. And I think
when we talk about homeland security, we ought to have not only
the forces, but the resources to protect our homeland. I also
am worried about the families and the jobs that are left
behind.
So can you respond as to the overall effect of your
National Guards being called up for extended periods of time
off our shores?
Governor Kempthorne. Congresswoman, I appreciate what you
have said. I will affirm that National Guard members would tell
you they are soldiers. And they are awesome soldiers. That is
my editorial comment.
I believe that their level of morale is the highest it has
been, because they are doing something that they believe in. It
is helping freedom. It is ensuring that if we can somehow bring
stability to that troubled part of the world that used to be
called the cradle of civilization, it allows the children back
home to still grow up with peace, and to have dreams and to be
able to pursue those.
I tell them, it is so ironic. As they are hugging and
kissing their little children, as mom and dad are deployed to
go overseas, by doing that, they are ensuring that those little
children are going to continue to grow up in freedom in the
United States.
Ms. Watson. Can you address the economic impact of the
extended stays?
Governor Kempthorne. Yes. I will tell you that I think
another group that needs to be saluted are the employers; what
they have been asked to do, and how they have stepped up to
make sure that those jobs will be there for the Guard members
when they return.
Also, it is very important that we have raised funds for
family emergency situations, so that if a family has a problem,
we have the money to step forward and to help that family so
that the soldier can remain focused on his or her mission, not
worry about a family financial situation at home.
Ms. Watson. Governor Rendell, is that the same situation in
Pennsylvania?
Governor Rendell. If I can add, I think there are severe
financial hardships that are put on Guard families. We have the
same emergency fund, and that helps in emergencies. But on the
day-to-day hardships, you take--let's say it is an Airwoman,
and she is activated. And she is the breadwinner, and earning
$35,000 a year for that family. And obviously, her family takes
a tremendous financial hit by her service. Even if the employer
keeps the job available, the employer doesn't pay the
differential.
We are working on legislation in the Pennsylvania State
Legislature that will tax credit employers for paying 25
percent of the differential. But even if that gets through, it
is only 25 percent of the differential.
Then you have things like health care. You have things like
student loans. A lot of these Guardsmen and women are repaying
student loans. We have put legislation in that freezes their
obligation to make those payments while they are abroad serving
the country, or down in Katrina for any length of time. While
they are on active duty, we freeze those payments.
But the big gap--and something that I think Congress should
take a look at doing, now that the Guard and the Reserve, too,
are playing much bigger roles, 62 percent of the force--is
filling the gap between what ``John Jones'' or ``Mary Smith''
was making at the time they were called to active duty, and
what they are making with the service. I think that is an area
that I would love to see the Federal Government look at. The
State government can do certain things, as well. But together,
we should take care of that problem.
No Guardsman's or Guardwoman's family should have--in
addition to the hardships and the stress of actually fighting
and being abroad, they shouldn't suffer a financial hit as
well.
Ms. Watson. Yes. I know a difference--is my time up, Mr.
Chairman?
Chairman Tom Davis. Your time is up. I will give you one
last question.
Ms. Watson. OK. I know there is a difference from State to
State. One of the problems I face in my district, Los Angeles,
CA, is that the Guard who were in school tend to lose that time
from their course work, and then have to go back and start all
over again.
And so we do have some other problems besides equipment and
readiness, preparedness. And I just wanted to hear directly
from the States as to how they impact.
Thank you, Mr. Speaker [sic], for the additional time.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Issa.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing. I look forward to the second panel every
bit as much as the first.
I am a little confused, though, on some of the testimony.
Governor Rendell, if the BRAC Commission base realignment and
closure had sent you 50 A-10's, would you have refused to take
them as inappropriate to take from another State? If they came
from California, would you have defended that how dare the Air
Force move California assets into your State and provide those
Federal jobs and opportunities?
Governor Rendell. Well, I think, as a practical matter, the
answer to that is, no, I don't think any State would.
Mr. Issa. So isn't your basic objection to losing the A-
10--a questionable aircraft in today's environment, anyway--
really all about simply wanting to have, as something like the
ninth-largest State, the third-largest National Guard; not
wanting to lose any of that?
Governor Rendell. No. First of all, it is founded on a
clear--you, as the Congress, passed Title 32, which said
nothing could be done of any significance to the National
Guard, clearly not deactivation or----
Mr. Issa. I mean, you actually quoted the Constitution.
Governor Rendell. The militia clause of the Constitution,
and this Congress--not this Congress----
Mr. Issa. Well, I will quote that. ``A well-regulated
militia being necessary to security of a free State, the right
of a people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.''
Where does it say the Federal Government is supposed to spend a
nickel? What if we just said, ``Keep the A-10's, but you pay
for them?'' Would anything be wrong with that?
Governor Rendell. The Congress said that in Title 32.
Mr. Issa. We also passed BRAC.
Governor Rendell. Right, but----
Mr. Issa. Ultimately, whichever preempts--you know, I
appreciate the fact that you have gone to court.
Governor Rendell. And the Federal court decided that BRAC
did not preempt Title 32, for a whole lot of reasons.
Mr. Issa. But your position is that your preferential
amount of National Guard substantially paid for by the Federal
Government is a right that cannot be taken away? I can't move
those? The Federal Government cannot move them to another State
unless you decide that is OK?
Governor Rendell. That is what Title 32 says, and that is
what the Federal court has said, because Congressman----
Mr. Issa. Would it surprise you to know that I will seek to
change that, the idea that we should have to continue to
subsidize and pay, and not be able to move it from State to
State because a Governor who has a preferential position in the
amount of their Guard should continue to do so?
Governor Rendell. Well, Governor--I mean Congressman, let
me say, No. 1, you would have to change Title 32, and you have
the right to try to do that. That is No. 1. And No. 2, you
would have to do something to ensure our ability to protect our
homeland.
Again, the 111th is the only Air National Guard unit in the
southeastern part of the State. That is our most populous part
of the State. That has two nuclear reactors. It has all of
these national icons. And we have a duty. I have a duty as
Governor to protect our State.
Mr. Issa. Sure, Governor. And with all due respect, your
responsibility is from your pocketbook; not from the Federal
pocketbook.
Governor Rendell. And exercise that, when in the prior BRAC
rounds BRAC decided that it wanted to deactivate Fort
Indiantown Gap as an air base. We stepped up and said, ``We
will pay to run Fort Indiantown Gap as an air base.'' Everyone
agreed that was a good idea, and the planes were left.
We have offered to run Willow Grove as a State National
Guard facility--to pay for the upkeep, etc.--as long as the
planes are kept there. I mean, why would you want--why would
you want--to be paying the salaries of 1,023 Airmen and
Airwomen, and not give them planes?
Mr. Issa. Look, I have no problem with us talking about the
decisions of the BRAC. My question was your questioning of the
Constitutional ability to move federally paid-for assets.
Governor Rendell. It is different than a Reserve unit. You
have to understand the difference. And it comes from the
founders of this country. The militia was first and foremost a
State militia. It can be Federalized, but it is first and
foremost a State militia. We are all called ``commanders-in-
chief'' of the State militia.
Mr. Issa. I have no problem, and I am sure that----
Governor Rendell. If we were to pay for it, for example--
let's assume you were to transfer the whole bill to us. Then
what justification would there be for ever Federalizing them?
Mr. Issa. I would certainly say that the A-10's that have
been parked in the desert, if you want them back and you want
to go get them, we can make arrangements to do so. But you
would own them.
Governor Rendell. But with respect----
Mr. Issa. And, no, we wouldn't want to Federalize them.
Governor Rendell [continuing]. If we paid for the entire
National Guard, how could the Federal Government have any claim
to Federalize them in times of--and remember, this is the
National Guard unit that two-thirds of the members have served
multiple deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. You are paying
for them because you have the right to come in and Federalize
them and use them to fight foreign conflicts. And the way that
this administration is running this war, the National Guard is
becoming more and more a part of the Federal Government.
Mr. Issa. My time has expired. Hopefully, there will be a
second round. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for
calling two important Governors in to give us some of the
insights we really need as we fight our wars. This is a war on
two fronts. And I appreciate the testimony of Governor
Kempthorne and Governor Rendell.
I have to say a special ``Hello'' to my good friend,
Governor Rendell, who has been not only a good friend of mine,
but a good friend of the District of Columbia. He did so well
in bringing Philadelphia back from economic crisis that the
citizens of Pennsylvania said, ``Wow!'' and made him Governor.
And I just want you to know, Ed, all we did in bringing
D.C.--which is now in extraordinary good health--back is to
copy what you did in Philadelphia.
I have a question for you both. By the way, Mr. Gutknecht
raised an interesting point, a Constitutional point, to which
you both responded, about who knows best; after all, the States
created the national government. And of course, he is right.
I would suspect that your replies, which went to extreme
cases, would be not so much in natural disasters, but in a
terrorist disaster, where the President and the Federal
Government had information and intelligence that no Governor
could have, and maybe time was of the essence. I have the
feeling that is more likely to be the kind of circumstance
where the Federal Government moves in than a natural disaster.
I want to ask you about how we can make do. You all, I
think, can really help us. One of the reasons that support for
the war in Iraq is falling away is that there is this sense of
the American people that there is some robbing of Peter to pay
Paul. People are generally very favorable about helping the
Iraqi people, but the more they think that there is some
sacrifice being made for themselves over too long a time, the
less support there is for the war.
And one of the ways, it seems to me, to deal with this
period is to see how we can do what Americans always try to do:
do everything at once.
My question for you comes from the fact that I represent
the Nation's Capital, and so I am always concerned about two
kinds of disasters. One is the disaster that we are perhaps
greater at risk than most, and that is a terrorist disaster.
And then there is the other disaster, the kind that--well, Ed
Rendell is in my region, so he knows about those: hurricanes
and floods and the rest.
I am very close to my own National Guard. Just this past--
it was October 13th, we deployed, for yet another time, some of
our MPs. They are in high demand. You could imagine why we have
more MPs, though; because it is the Nation's Capital. And they
would be in especially high demand here in the event of any
kind of disaster, natural or terrorist. So there they go again.
My generals tell me that some have been deployed two or
three times in the last 2 years. My generals tell me, my D.C.
National Guard generals tell me, at least 70 percent of the
Army National Guard have been deployed multiple times to Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Guantanamo. Sometimes there is one deployment
Stateside. By that, they mean perhaps Guantanamo.
I was interested. For example, Governor Kempthorne, you
talked about your experience. I am looking at your written
testimony, where you speak very highly of Idaho having sent
more, a greater proportion, of National Guard to the Gulf Coast
than any other National Guard. And there is great applause, it
seems to me, due the compact that you Governors have among the
States, where you come to the aid of one another. And that
apparently happened just like that, and no question asked, and
everybody was on the ground.
You also say, Governor Kempthorne, that when you got there,
there was a lot of confusion in the Gulf Coast--Houston and
Meridian. There had been an urgent request to evacuate the
frail elderly. You had identified more than 400 nursing beds.
Some problem in even getting releases; had to go all the way up
to the Governor.
This is what my question is. We talk about borrowing
equipment. I am concerned that every time my guys and girls go
over, whatever new equipment we get goes over. So we are in an
unending lose-lose game, because we can't keep any of it.
Beyond that, the wonderful borrowing of National Guard
means, however, that whatever advantage, in either a terrorist
disaster or a natural disaster, that comes from the fact that
you have National Guard who have been practiced in what to do,
are not where you imagine them to be. They are abroad. This is
what happened to Governor Kempthorne. And his people went to a
completely new place, and they didn't know the place as well.
They wanted to do their mission, and they had to go through
what you had to go through.
With equipment gone, with personnel unfamiliar with other
States, if we have to borrow--we would have to borrow from, I
don't know, Maryland, Ohio, you in Pennsylvania--what are we to
do, and what do you do--what did you do, what can be done--if
in fact we need Guard personnel in territory where they have
never been before, have no idea about anything about that
territory?
I mean, how useful can they be? And what would you suggest
we do to shore up the possibility that for some time we may be
increasingly using, at least in the event of a natural disaster
or a terrorist disaster, personnel from other jurisdictions?
Governor Kempthorne. Ms. Norton, thank you very much for
the question. And, too, as a citizen, may I thank all of my
fellow citizens from Washington, DC, and their deployment
schedule. I know they are doing just tremendous service for all
of us.
I jotted down a few things as you spoke. One are the
lessons learned. You referenced one of the situations that we
experienced. I would note, we use the Air Guard to take food
and water. It was critically needed. But on that same aircraft,
we put from the private sector the emergency room physicians
and the nurses. So it is a partnership that goes down there.
Lessons learned: One of them is that we now believe that if
it is something out of the ordinary, if it is sheer manpower,
if it is to go and repair a breach in a dike, it is just sheer
manpower and equipment.
But if it is something that is a niche, if it is to help
the frail elderly, if we can get an advance team to do the
triage, to get on the ground first--we did this in Louisiana,
when we received an urgent request from Louisiana to send
additional Guard members. We sent an advance team, so that when
the convoy arrived, we immediately knew where they were
assigned and what their responsibilities were; so that there
was not just a gathering of hundreds of Guard members and then
trying to sort it out. So order, by sending the advance.
The EMAC process: It does work, but one of the things that
we found is that it needs to be specific so that if you are
going to indemnify--if you are going to have reciprocity of
people with credentials, that in Idaho we will accept people
from Louisiana who are professionally credentialed, that may
need to be noted in the EMAC; so that we don't run into this
confusion of who is Federalized and who isn't. But I would hope
that the Federal Government could look at that whole process,
and streamline that.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. Your time has
expired.
Mr. Shays, we have a series of three votes, and the panel
will be over at that point.
Mr. Shays. Yes, I am going to just be 2 minutes.
Chairman Tom Davis. Well, you can yield, then, to Mr. Dent.
Mr. Shays. I am told that General Honore was never in
charge of the National Guard. Not a major point----
Governor Rendell. I don't think in a formal way.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Governor Rendell. But I think in a deployment way, people
looked to it.
Mr. Shays. But he wasn't in charge. I would like to know
from both of you, do you think DHS should assist States in--no,
forget that one.
The one I want is just the NORTHCOM Control was established
to provide command and control over Federalized emergencies in
the United States. Has anyone from NORTHCOM or DOD asked you
specifically about your States' needs and assets? Have they
asked you for your input at any time? This is NORTHCOM. I will
start with you, Governor Kempthorne.
Governor Kempthorne. If we have had requests from NORTHCOM?
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Governor Kempthorne. I will tell you----
Mr. Shays. To ask your needs, etc. Has there been a dialog?
Governor Kempthorne. Congressman, Shays, approximately 18
months, 2 years ago, we had General Eberhardt from NORTHCOM,
who came and met with the National Governors Association, where
we discussed the whole process. I cannot tell you----
Mr. Shays. Right, at the Governors' association, but has he
ever met with your State and your National Guard people, to
your knowledge?
Governor Kempthorne. I have not personally had
conversation.
Mr. Shays. How about you?
Governor Rendell. And I haven't, either, but I can get that
information from our adjutant general.
Mr. Shays. It would be good to know. I mean, the bottom
line is, we set NORTHCOM up to focus on protecting the North
American continent, and it would seem logical that there should
be this interaction with the States on this kind of issue. I
thank you, and I would be happy to yield to Mr. Dent.
Chairman Tom Davis. The gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Governor Rendell, Governor Kempthorne. Good to see
you here. Governor Rendell, I am pleased to report to you that
I located one of Willow Grove's aviation assets in Kuwait when
I was there this summer--big green and black stripes on the
tail, with ``Eagles'' logo right on top.
Governor Rendell. There you go.
Mr. Dent. Just thought you would appreciate that. Just very
quickly, I was part of the hearing yesterday with Governors
Bush, Perry, and Napolitano, discussing the Federal role in
emergency response. And all three categorically said ``No'' to
revisiting posse comitatus. I believe both of you have said the
same thing.
And just as a point of clarification, Governor Rendell, you
indicated there might be some circumstances where there would
be a greater Federal role, even if perhaps the Governors
weren't willing to accept that assistance at that particular
moment. Could you just clarify that?
Governor Rendell. I think, and Governor Kempthorne
mentioned, a pandemic. Assume there was an outbreak of some
very significant plague that had the opportunity to travel
across State lines in a flash, something of that unique nature;
a terrorist attack that involved multiple States, something of
that nature, too.
And again, I think Congress should revisit that, consistent
with the President's power to declare national emergencies; but
should revisit it very carefully.
Mr. Dent. Thank you. And my final question is, what do you
Governors see as the Federal role--whether it is the Guard or
some other aspect of the Federal Government--in implementing
the State's evacuation plan? You know, we saw what happened in
Texas with that mass evacuation of Houston. Of course,
Philadelphia and New York and all of Pennsylvania would be
impacted by either evacuation. What are your thoughts on that?
Governor Rendell. Let me take that first, and very quickly.
I think that it should be an advisory role. And we do lean on
FEMA, we do lean on DHS, the Department of Homeland Security,
for their advice. They have come in and done table-top
exercises with us. But I think the evacuation plans should be a
peculiarly State function. But DHS and FEMA should be available
to give us all of the best advice and all of the cumulative
experience from around the country.
Governor Kempthorne. Congressman, I would just add that, in
addition to that, as a preliminary, but in the actual event of
an evacuation, we may need equipment, personnel to transport
people. So it should be to augment what the State is
implementing, in full partnership.
Mr. Dent. OK, and just real quick and finally, in the event
of a natural or manmade disaster, who would you see as the lead
Federal department, DHS or DOD? And do you see enough
coordination between those two Federal departments, with
respect to how they assist States, particularly in light of
Katrina? Any thoughts?
Governor Rendell. I would think that, in terms of a natural
disaster as opposed to a terrorist attack, a natural disaster,
I would still like to see FEMA take the lead. And I am talking
about FEMA from prior days. I think that FEMA was well equipped
to lead in that effort.
And again, remember, PEMA--and of course, Congressman, you
are familiar with PEMA--PEMA has contact with FEMA almost on a
weekly basis. And they are the ones best positioned, I think,
to move in. I would like to see the role of FEMA totally
reexamined by the Federal Government and by the Congress.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
Governor Kempthorne. Congressman, I believe, if it is a
natural disaster, it would be the Department of Homeland
Security. I will add, however, we in years past have had such
significant forest fires that we have asked from the Department
of Defense, and received, active battalions that have come and
helped us on the front line of firefighting. That would also be
true if it were earthquakes or floods. So I wouldn't want to
rule out that one.
Governor Rendell. Nor would I, but the coordination of it
should be done by FEMA. I think we need to revitalize FEMA.
Mr. Dent. No further questions, just a comment. But I know
in our State we have had some difficulty with the homeland
security operations center and the way it communicates with our
State homeland security department. I know it is a problem in
Pennsylvania. Is that a problem in Idaho?
Governor Kempthorne. No, sir.
Mr. Dent. OK.
Chairman Tom Davis. Can I just say, thank you, both. You
have been very generous with your time. It has been very
helpful in establishing a record here. We again appreciate the
accomplishments and the trials and tribulations of being a
Governor, but you both honor us with your presence today.
We are going to recess, as we are in a series of votes
right now, and come back in about a half an hour.
Governor Kempthorne. And Mr. Chairman, may I just thank you
for conducting this. This is critically important. And talking
about demobilization, Dr. Chu and the others at the Pentagon
are helping us. They are doing a great job.
Chairman Tom Davis. Governor, thank you.
[Recess.]
Chairman Tom Davis. Good afternoon. And I want to thank the
witnesses for their patience. I think the Members will be
trickling in.
We now move to our second panel. And we are extremely lucky
to have with us today an outstanding group of experts on the
National Guard--not only those who create and debate policies,
but those who walk the walk to serve their charges and their
country--with us today.
David Walker, the Comptroller General of the United States;
accompanied by Janet Saint Laurent, the Director of Defense
Capabilities and Management of the GAO; the Honorable Thomas
Hall, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs;
Lieutenant General David Melcher, the Deputy Chief of Staff of
the U.S. Army; Lieutenant General H Steven Blum, the Chief of
the National Guard Bureau; Major General Allen Tackett, the
State Adjutant General of West Virginia; and Major General
Raymond Rees, the State Adjutant General of Oregon.
I want to thank all of you for being here today. I remember
in my early days in the Guard, the closest I used to get to the
officers' club was when we cut the grass there, you know, on
Saturday afternoons. So we appreciate everybody being here.
Also, Mr. Walker, let me just say, the committee is just
very grateful for the outstanding work of Ms. Saint Laurent and
her team on the report that you have issued today.
It is our policy that we swear all witnesses, so if you
would, rise for me and raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Tom Davis. All right. Thank you. The entire GAO
report is in the record. General Walker, and for the rest of
you, try to stay in the 5-minute timeframe. If you feel you
have to go over to make your point, that is fine. But your
entire statements are in the record. Thank you.
STATEMENTS OF DAVID WALKER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY JANET
A. ST. LAURENT, DIRECTOR, CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT,
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; THOMAS F. HALL, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, RESERVE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE; LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID F. MELCHER, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF, U.S. ARMY; LIEUTENANT GENERAL H STEVEN BLUM, CHIEF,
NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU; MAJOR GENERAL ALLEN TACKETT, STATE
ADJUTANT GENERAL, STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA; AND MAJOR GENERAL
RAYMOND REES, STATE ADJUTANT GENERAL, STATE OF OREGON
STATEMENT OF DAVID WALKER
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to be here today to discuss the critical role of
the National Guard, both at home and abroad. As you know,
recent and ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq,
and new homeland missions, including the response to Hurricane
Katrina, have led to higher demands on the Reserve component;
in particular, the Army National Guard.
Before I address a couple of other issues, I want to
mention that I had the pleasure and privilege this last
Saturday evening to attend the Secretary of Defense's annual
Freedom Awards banquet, which is sponsored by the National
Committee of Employer Support for the Guard and Reserve.
At this banquet, it became very clear to me that the
Federal Government, which is the largest employer in the United
States, is not leading by example, nor practicing what it
preaches, with regard to support for the Guard and Reserve.
For example, GAO and other Federal employers would like to
have the opportunity to make up any pay gap that any of our
activated Guard and Reserve members might experience, but we
are precluded from doing so under current law. And candidly, we
would like this committee's and the Congress' help to be able
to give us the authority to do so, under appropriate facts and
circumstances.
With regard to the other issues that you have asked me to
address today, as you know, we issued our 21st Century
Challenges report, which demonstrated that a vast majority of
the Federal Government's policies, programs, functions, and
activities are based upon conditions that existed in the 1950's
and 1960's; and that we face large and growing structural
budget deficits that we are going to have to deal with.
In that regard, with regard to the National Guard, we
believe that Congress and the DOD need to reexamine the current
business model for the Guard, since it appears to be
unsustainable in light of recent changes in the security
environment, growing recruitment challenges, and DOD's
significant use of Reserve units.
GAO believes that policymakers should be focusing on
identifying an appropriate business model for the National
Guard that balances the Guard's multiple roles with the
appropriate human capital policies, readiness standards, and
equipment practices.
The overall readiness of the non-deployed Army National
Guard units is declining, because the Guard has transferred
large amounts of personnel and equipment from non-deployed
units to fully staffed and equipped units deploying to Iraq and
Afghanistan.
However, DOD's increased use of the Army National Guard has
not been matched with a change in its equipping or funding
strategy. Increasing equipment shortages among non-deployed
Army National Guard units illustrate the need for DOD to
reexamine its equipment strategy for the Army National Guard in
order to better match operational requirements with the Guard's
equipment inventory.
The amount of essential equipment that non-deployed
National Guard units have on hand has continued to decrease
since we last reported in 2004. For example, DOD has required
Army units to leave more than 64,000 equipment items, valued at
over $1.2 billion, in Iraq, for use by follow-on forces.
However, the Army has not developed replacement plans for this
equipment, as required by DOD policy.
The Army is in the process of developing a plan, by
November 2005, to replace some of that equipment. However, we
are recommending that the Army develop a comprehensive
replacement plan covering all equipment that the Guard units
have left in Iraq.
In addition, the overall decline in equipment levels among
non-deployed units may have made it more difficult to locate
and transport some equipment needed for Katrina; such as
communication equipment. We are conducting a review of the
Federal response in Katrina, including the Guard's involvement.
And as you know, Mr. Chairman, we will be reporting more
information on this within the next several months.
DOD and the Army have some initiatives underway to improve
the Guard's organization and readiness for these missions.
However, it is too early to determine whether the Army's
initiatives together comprise a sustainable equipping and
funding model for the Army National Guard in the future,
because implementation plans are not complete and funding
requirements have not been fully identified.
The Department of Defense also produced a strategy for
homeland defense and civil support in 2005, June 2005, that
describes the National Guard's key role in these areas.
However, the DOD has not yet developed an implementation plan
that outlines how Guard units should be trained and equipped to
carry them out.
Until these initiatives are more fully developed and key
implementation decisions are made, DOD and the Congress will
not be in a sound position to weigh their affordability and
effectiveness, and the Army National Guard will be challenged
to train and prepare and adequately equip for all of its
missions.
In conclusion, the Army National Guard's equipment problems
and personnel and recruiting challenges are symptoms of a much
larger problem of an outdated business model. While current
strategies have met DOD's immediate needs to support overseas
operations, these strategies are not sustainable over the long
term.
Moreover, it is not clear that DOD's initiatives, as
currently defined, will result in a comprehensive and
integrated strategy for preparing the Army National Guard for
future missions.
We therefore are recommending that the Army better
integrate its initiatives and conduct a broader rethinking of
the basis for Army National Guard equipment requirements that
considers both overseas as well as homeland security
requirements.
In this regard, we believe that the Congress and senior DOD
leadership must be ready to play a key role in pressing the
Army to provide more detailed plans for these initiatives and
to identify the specific funding required to implement them in
the most efficient manner.
And needless to say, Mr. Chairman, the Congress will have a
critically important role to play, to make sure that we
allocate limited resources to achieve the best value and
mitigate the most risk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Walker follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Secretary Hall.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS F. HALL
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, you will be happy to know that Mr.
Walker just told me that we have outsourced all the grass
cutting now. If you were still in, you wouldn't have to cut the
grass around the club.
I deeply appreciate your support, and that of the
committee, for the National Guard and Reserve forces. And on
behalf of those men and women, I want to thank you for caring
about them. They and their families certainly appreciate it.
And my job, as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs, is the overall supervision of all reserve components
in the Department of Defense.
In that capacity, I make it a priority to visit with our
reserve component members in the field. And during those
visits, I see America's finest young men and women serving
their Nation with pride and professionalism. They are
performing in a superb fashion at home and around the world,
and are closely interlocked with the States, cities, towns, and
communities in America.
As you already know, there is increased stress on the
force, and we are continuing to closely monitor the impact of
that stress on our Guard and Reserve members, on their
families, and their employers.
Since September 11, 2001, our Guard and Reserve have
performed superbly in missions ranging from humanitarian
assistance to high-intensity combat operations and State
disaster assistance missions such as Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita--and we are preparing for Wilma.
These operations have presented a number of challenges;
particularly for our ground forces, which carry the larger
burden of our security and stabilization efforts in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Currently, the deployment burden is not shared
equally among all the reserve components. It is concentrated on
those specific capabilities and skills required for
stabilization and security operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
There are still high demands in theater for military
police, civil affairs, military intelligence, and motor
transport capabilities. Since certain of these skills reside
predominantly in our reserve components, we have called upon
many of our citizen soldiers to serve, and they have done so
admirably.
Recognizing that the global war on terrorism will last for
many years, the Department established a strategic approach to
ensure the judicious and prudent use of Guard and reserve
components in support of war efforts. Innovative changes to
equipping policies and budgets have been made, and will
continue.
This has involved evaluations of what equipment is
currently on hand, and how to balance these requirements with
the legacy equipment, modern equipment, and the available
budget. In the short term, the Army resolved equipment
shortages with cross-leveling of equipment among mobilized
units, or having units fall in on stand-behind equipment. These
actions have impacted equipment availability, training,
reconstitution, and resetting of the return units' equipment,
as well as affecting the available equipment inventory.
My staff remains engaged with the services, supporting
their efforts to develop new approaches to mitigate the very
complex equipping challenges.
I want to just close in saying that we must guard against
over-use of our reserve components, through judicious and
prudent use. We must encourage volunteerism. We must manage
expectations through predictability and timeliness. We must
continue to address family concerns. And finally, we must
continue to encourage our employers at every turn.
A mission-ready National Guard and Reserve is a critical
element of our national security strategy. The requirement for
our reserve components has not and will not lessen. Our reserve
components will continue with their expanded roles in all
facets of the total force.
We cannot lose sight of the need to balance their
commitment to country with their commitment to family and
civilian employers.
The idea of operational reserve components is now a fact.
That is why relieving the stress on the force is absolutely
essential, rebalancing is so crucial, and ensuring that
utilization not turn to over-utilization.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
General Melcher, welcome.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID F. MELCHER
General Melcher. Chairman Davis, members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am
privileged to be here with the committee and this esteemed
panel.
We on the Army staff share with this committee and all
represented here a common goal to see that our dedicated Army
National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve soldiers have the right
equipment for the missions we have asked them to perform for
the Nation.
As the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs, G-8, I am
responsible to the Army Chief of Staff and Secretary of the
Army for materiel integration and resourcing. This includes the
fielding of equipment according to our national strategy and
departmental priorities to Army units within all components of
our service--active, Reserve, and National Guard.
I work closely with the Director, Army National Guard, and
the Chief, Army Reserve, to ensure that our reserve component
soldiers are equipped and resourced properly, according to
their mission. This includes everything from major weapons
platforms to the soldiers' individual equipment.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your acknowledgement of our
written statements and entering them into the record.
Our overall equipping posture is showing great progress,
thanks to the steadfast support the Army has enjoyed from
Congress and the Department of Defense. However, we acknowledge
that significant challenges remain, as reflected in reports
from the Government Accountability Office; particularly with
respect to equipping the Army National Guard while at war. I am
confident, though, that by working together, we will overcome
the difficulties noted.
These equipping challenges are exactly the reason why the
Army is transforming to a modular force, and why we are moving
to a force rotation model called the ``Army Force Generation
Model,'' or ARFORGEN. The modular force initiative and the
ARFORGEN model fully integrate the Army National Guard,
Reserve, and active Army. We are moving from a cold war
approach, in which the Army National Guard was the strategic
reserve, to a modular force construct that counts on the Guard
and Reserve as operational assets.
That means we also look at the Army National Guard and the
Army Reserve as full partners in the requirements, resourcing,
and fielding processes. The Army plans to invest approximately
$21 billion on equipping and modernizing the Army National
Guard during fiscal years 2005 through 2011. This compares to
only $5.6 billion just 2 short years ago. This investment will
provide the Army National Guard with equipment essential to
both its wartime and homeland defense missions.
We are also conducting a comprehensive review with the Army
National Guard to determine what items of equipment needed for
major combat operations also have the greatest use for homeland
defense missions. Thus far, the list has been refined to 342
items, such as communications equipment, including radios that
can communicate with both military and civilian first
responders; transportation equipment, including cargo, fuel,
and water dispensing trucks; engineering equipment, including
the tractors and trailers for transporting this equipment;
chemical, biological, and radiological detection,
contamination, and protection equipment; aviation equipment,
including support equipment essential to keep the aircraft
flying; medical equipment, including dental, medical, and
veterinary functions; and logistics equipment, including cranes
and forklifts, mobile containerized kitchens, and so forth.
In collaboration with the National Guard Bureau, we have
determined the times and quantities of equipment we need to
provide the Army National Guard so it can perform its missions
for both homeland defense and wartime.
The Army has done a great deal to close the equipment gap
for all three components, but we must continue to focus in the
areas of tactical wheeled vehicles, aircraft, night vision
devices, and force protection equipment, as we build this next
program for the period 2008 to 2013.
As we build the program, we are committed to working very
closely with the National Guard Bureau and the Army National
Guard, to ensure they are appropriately funded and equipped.
On behalf of our outstanding soldiers and civilian
employees who are serving around the world, I thank you for
your support. Many in this committee, including yourself, sir,
have traveled to Afghanistan or Iraq and seen firsthand our
soldiers sacrifice for the Nation. Nothing we do is more urgent
or pressing than ensuring that they have the best equipment.
I look forward to answering the committee's questions
today. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Melcher follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
General Blum, welcome.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENENT GENERAL H STEVEN BLUM
General Blum. Thank you. Chairman Davis, members of the
committee, thanks for the opportunity to appear here today and
discuss the National Guard, its role in supporting responses to
threats to our Nation both overseas and here at home.
As General Melcher has adequately stated, I totally concur
with everything that he has brought before this committee. That
is a first, probably. It shows that the U.S. Army is in fact
committed, and that we are standing as one army, all three
components--active, Guard, and Reserve--in resolving and
accepting the responsibility for equipping the National Guard.
That is the first time that has happened in the history of this
Nation.
Today, we are faced with issues that have resulted from a
deliberate and, arguably, appropriate cold war draft era
strategy that accepted large risk, significant risk, by
chronically under-equipping the Army National Guard.
The Army National Guard today is no longer a strategic
reserve. We are an operational force. You heard from the
Governors that appeared earlier about the fact that actually
over half of the combat forces in Iraq of the U.S. Army are
from the National Guard.
So we are no longer a strategic reserve. We are an
operational force abroad, as well as the first Department of
Defense responders for missions here in the homeland; whether
it is homeland defense or to support the homeland security
operations.
I want it on the record that our soldiers from the Army
National Guard, for the first time in the history of this
Nation and for the last 2 years, have not gone in harm's way--
ever in the history of this Nation have we ever sent soldiers
into harm's way or into a combat zone without the very finest
equipment that this Nation could offer.
Today, I can say that for the last 24 months, because of
the leadership of the U.S. Army, that is a reality. The senior
leadership of the Army is committed to ensuring that is a
reality and that the National Guard gets equipment, in some
cases ahead of its active duty counterparts, but in no cases
does it go without the equipment it needs for the overseas
mission.
Now we need to focus that same sense of commitment, that
same sense of dedication and sense of urgency, to ensuring that
no citizen-soldiers are called out by Governors or the
President to perform missions here in the homeland without the
equipment that they need to protect them and to deliver the
capabilities that our Governors and our citizens expect;
whether it would be ill effects delivered by a terrorist
organization, or by Mother Nature.
Before September 11, 2001, the Army National Guard had 75
percent of its authorized equipment on hand. Over the last 4
years, that equipment has been cross-leveled, sent overseas to
ensure the soldiers overseas in harm's way had the very best
equipment we could possibly provide. It was the right thing to
do. Much of that equipment has been destroyed, worn out, left
in place for others; which is rightfully the way to handle
that.
But the bottom line is, our inventory that started at 75
percent 4 years ago is now at 34 percent. And when you consider
items that are considered substitute items, that are really not
appropriate for overseas deployment, the number is even
smaller.
We can no longer accept the risk that this Nation once took
with its Army National Guard and its Air National Guard, and
today we must take the first steps to correcting this. We did
not get into this situation overnight; we won't get out of it
overnight. But this journey must begin immediately.
The fact that Army National Guard units were deployed to
Iraq at the same time that Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and now
Wilma, are visiting our Nation does not mean that the National
Guard in any way had lessened its ability to respond. It made
it more difficult, but it did not lessen our capability. We had
to take measures to mitigate that, and we did.
It should be noted that the National Guard delivered 50,000
citizen-soldiers and airmen to the Gulf region to respond to
Hurricanes Rita and Katrina in a historically unprecedented,
largest response to a natural disaster with national
implications--faster, more forces, more capabilities delivered
by every State, our territories of Guam and the Virgin Islands,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia.
All closed on the affected areas in a period of 6\1/2\ days.
This immediate, rapid reaction is unprecedented in military
history of the world; not only the United States.
More than 50,000 National Guard members responded. They
dropped what they were doing; interrupted their lives; had no
idea how long they were going to be there, under what
conditions they would be there. But when the Governors called
and the Nation called out the Guard, you called out America,
truly, in every part of the Nation.
Our highest equipment priorities are exactly in line with
what you heard from the two Governors that testified earlier
and what General Melcher just outlined. It is communications
equipment. You cannot coordinate, synchronize, and organize a
response without effective communications.
That communications must be interoperable with the other
joint and interagency responders that are there. But first and
foremost, we must be able to talk to the Army; and then, beyond
that, the other elements of DOD; and then ultimately,
hopefully, the civilian first responders, the emergency
community.
Helicopters are essential. You heard it from both
Governors, and probably the three that appeared yesterday.
Tactical vehicles--modern, reliable, economical tactical
vehicles; not the M-35 series of vehicles that are older than
most of the people in this room.
Heavy engineering equipment is essential in the time of an
emergency to save lives, to remove debris, to clear lines of
communication, to allow both civilian and military first
responders to in fact respond.
The chemical equipment, the medical sets, the logistical
equipment, the night vision goggles, are exactly the items that
are on our list.
We estimate it will take an immediate $1.3 billion to
address this need to improve the National Guard's ability to
respond in our homeland when we are called out either by the
Governors or the President.
Thank you, sir. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Blum follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
General Tackett.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL ALLEN TACKETT
General Tackett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify
today on issues that I believe are of vital importance to our
Nation as a whole and to each of our States.
As demonstrated recently in the response to Hurricane
Katrina, the National Guard is vital to recovery efforts
following natural disasters. In West Virginia, the National
Guard has responded to 37 federally declared disasters in the
last 10 years. The soldiers and airmen of the Army and Air
National Guard have become expert at these types of operations.
However, this mission, as vital as it is to the health,
safety, and welfare of the citizens of this Nation, has never
been resourced by the Federal Government with the equipment
needed to conduct these missions. All equipment issued to the
National Guard is issued on the basis of the National Guard
unit's Federal war-fighting mission. No consideration is given
to another, equally important, mission of the National Guard,
disaster relief.
As an example, our 1092d Engineer Battalion was mobilized
and deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. When the
unit returned, its engineer equipment remained in theater for
use by incoming units. When the battalion was called to State
active duty by the Governor for flood duty shortly after its
demobilization, it had no equipment, no end-loaders, no dump
trucks, to assist with recovery efforts. We were forced to rent
Bobcats and go to the EMAC to assist the citizens of our State
to recover from flooding.
I believe that this situation must be addressed before the
next hurricane, earthquake, tsunami, finds us ill equipped to
respond to a threat as potentially deadly as any enemy attack.
The military has long recognized that preparation for
combat in a realistic environment leads to fewer casualties on
the battlefield. At the National Training Center at Fort Irwin,
CA, and the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, LA,
units fight realistic mock battles to prepare them for combat.
The result can be seen in our decisive victories in Desert
Storm and Iraqi Freedom. In contrast, Katrina illustrates what
a lack of collective training can lead to.
Compare this with the situation when the Ohio River flooded
parts of Ohio and West Virginia earlier this year. National
Guard units were able to work with State and county emergency
services directors, the Red Cross, and Noah's Wish, to help the
citizens of both States in the flooded areas recover in a
timely, effective manner.
The lessons of Katrina and Rita demonstrate a clear need
for a joint interagency training capability the new Joint
Interagency Training Center, established by the Chief of the
National Guard Bureau, can provide.
We must focus not only on consequence management and
emergency response, but, just as importantly, on the preventive
and deterrence. The Joint Interagency Training Center operated
by the West Virginia National Guard focuses on key aspects of
information and intelligence sharing; chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear enhanced collective training exercises
focused on interagency and intergovernmental response; critical
infrastructure protection and mission assurance; and in the
future, non-lethal weapons.
All of these are key elements of homeland defense and
homeland security; whether it is preventing or mitigating a
terrorist attack, or effectively responding to a catastrophic
natural disaster.
Just as we use the Joint Readiness Training Center and the
National Training Center to be the most effective fighting
force in the conventional warfare, we need to use the Joint
Inter-agency Training Center concept to be the most effective
force in the new realm of homeland defense, homeland security,
and emergency preparedness.
In the new threat environment, this is just as vital a
mission as any other war-fighting mission we have for the
``away game.'' It is clearly a mission for the National Guard,
but it must be effectively resourced and supported, and not at
the expense of reducing the Guard's resources and participation
in other war-fighting missions.
The Chief of the National Guard Bureau, in conjunction with
the adjutants general, has already laid the groundwork for such
efforts with initiatives such as the Joint Inter-agency
Training Center; Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
or High-Yield Explosive Response Force Package; the CERFP;
Civil Support Teams; Full Spectrum Integrated Vulnerability
Assessment Teams; and a Rapid Reaction Force.
An example of this is the methodology the Joint Inter-
agency Training Center-East is developing on behalf of the
National Guard Bureau for assessing critical infrastructure and
mission assurance. Working jointly with the Secretary of
Homeland Defense, the Defense Contract Management Agency, and
NORTHCOM, we are looking at an ``all hazards'' approach for
making these assessments; thus allowing for the identification,
mitigation, and response planning for not only terrorist
threats, but also natural threats.
Each of the States has, or soon will have, a civil support
team on duty as a part of its National Guard force structure.
The purpose of the civil support team is to respond to
chemical, biological, or nuclear attacks, and to determine what
agents have been used, and to work with civilian first
responders in consequence management.
I propose an expansion of the civil support mission to
include natural disaster response. Civil support teams are
already trained in first aid and casualty evacuation. This type
of approach would have dedicated forces in place, ready to
respond quickly when needed.
The major criticism of the relief efforts after Katrina was
the perceived length of time it took to get troops on the
ground. The States and counties are responsible for providing
first responders. FEMA does not have a first responder mission;
nor does any other Federal agency. A dedicated force of
National Guard first responders would reduce the time, from the
call for help, to having boots on the ground.
In addition, in 1989, Congress had the foresight to
establish the National Guard Counterdrug Program. It provided
additional force structure for Guard soldiers to work in an
interagency approach to fighting the war on drugs.
It uses a ``State plans'' approach that tailors efforts to
the specific threats of each State and also allows for States
to develop multiple State initiatives. This program has been a
model for interagency and intergovernmental support for over 15
years. It could be rapidly expanded at a minimal cost to the
broader homeland defense, homeland security, and emergency
preparedness missions.
In fact, many of its assets have already been used in key
events, such as the response to Katrina and Rita, as well as
the national political conventions, the G8 summit, and the
Presidential Inauguration.
The model is there. It just needs the authorization for the
expanded role and full funding of its current 4,000-troop
authorization. It could become the core of a dedicated force
for both the narco-terrorism and the homeland defense, homeland
security, and emergency preparedness missions that are then
augmented by traditional Guard, Reserve, and active component
units, depending on the scope of an event. If properly
structured and resourced, these units could also provide assets
for key OCONUS response in training allies for homeland
defense, as well as humanitarian and nation-building missions.
In my view, funding for disaster recovery operations
conducted by the National Guard should come directly from the
Federal Government. Statutory authority to fund homeland
security missions is now in place, with the recently enacted
Chapter 9 of Title 32, U.S. Code. This statute allows the
Secretary of Defense to fund homeland security missions at the
request of a Governor for 180 days. An amendment to this
statute to provide similar authority to fund disaster relief
efforts is badly needed.
There has been some discussion of adding a disaster
response mission to our active forces. I believe that this
would be a mistake. Our active component forces are the finest
in the world. One of the reasons they are so good is their
focus solely on preparedness for war. Adding another mission
would detract from the single-minded focus required of the
forces whose primary mission has always been, and should
remain, fighting our Nation's wars.
In addition, the current OPTEMPO makes adding another
mission to our active forces unwise, if not impossible. The
primary mission military responsibility for natural disaster
relief should rest with the National Guard.
As a member of both the National Guard Domestic Operations
Advisory Board, and the Adjutants General Association of the
U.S. Homeland Security Committee, I can tell you that the
National Guard Bureau and the Adjutants General stand ready to
work with Congress, the President, and the Department of
Defense, to quickly and effectively address this vital need.
With the threats we face in the 21st century, this mission
is too vital to the safety and security of our Nation not to
address immediately. And the Guard, in its role as the militia,
is clearly the core force for the mission.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Tackett follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
General Rees.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL RAYMOND REES
General Rees. Mr. Chairman, I am Major General Raymond Fred
Rees, the Adjutant General of Oregon. I thank you and the
committee for inviting me to testify here. I provided my
written comments for the record.
I would like to focus first on equipment. I had the
opportunity, at the direction of my Governor, to go out and
survey the Oregon National Guard in the May and June timeframe,
before I assumed office on July 1st. The No. 1 issue among
soldiers was not, ``When will I deploy again?'' It was, ``Where
is my equipment?''
This affects readiness, obviously, directly; but
indirectly, the attitude of soldiers toward their
organizations, where most of our National Guardsmen are
veterans. We have more veterans in the Oregon National Guard
now than we have had since World War II, and they have deployed
with the very best equipment. They now see they have nothing,
or ``in lieu of'' equipment, and it is demoralizing. And they,
I believe, will not put up with it for long and, unfortunately,
may vote with their feet, as far as staying in our
organization.
Likewise, potential recruits are expecting to be part of a
21st century organization, and they see very little evidence of
it.
I strongly endorse the efforts by the National Guard
Bureau, the Army, and the Government Accountability Office, to
highlight the equipment shortage and the need for the emergency
supplemental equipment appropriation.
In the area of disaster response, Oregon is one of many
States. I believe, 50 to 54 entities out there responded to the
call of the Governors of Louisiana and Mississippi. We had
2,000 individuals who were called, both Army and Air Guard.
Basically, from a cold start, our advance party was on the
ground within 48 hours. The main body was there within another
48 hours after that. And this is all over a holiday weekend.
The limiting factor on this was airlift.
How did we meet these standards? How did we get there in
that timeframe? I think a lot of it has to do with the fact
that the 4-years of mobilizations has improved our processes,
refined and honed our skills at calling and moving troops--
certainly, a byproduct of the military training and the Federal
overseas mission.
How did we do it? Three things. First of all, the
authorities under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact
[EMAC], were there and in place and could be used. No. 2, the
National Guard Bureau coordination was phenomenal, as directed
by General Blum. And three, the national treasure that I call
the Air National Guard was available to provide us with
airlift. I can tell you, even though I have two fighter bases
in Oregon, having those two air bases was absolutely essential
to be able to move those troops rapidly to New Orleans and to
Bell Chase Naval Air Station.
What needs to be improved? General Tackett has already
talked about training. I endorse what he said about training
requirements. Exercises: we need to think big in terms of how
these exercises should be done. How do we stabilize and
preserve State and local government, and not attempt to
supplant it? We need to think big, start small-scale fast, in
these exercises.
The equipment, we have already talked about. And the
business of Title 32, want to thank this committee for what it
did last year to spur on revisions to Title 32. But I can tell
you that, from what I have seen, we need more work on this. The
ideas that General Tackett has just endorsed--or I endorse what
Major General Tackett has just talked about. But I see a
resistance still in the operational use of the National Guard
in Title 32.
In the area of EMAC, this needs to be improved, also,
because there needs to be clarification there. I think Governor
Kempthorne talked to that. Certainly, there is a need for
provisions in there to talk about support to law enforcement.
Standardization needs to be worked on. We need to talk
about the expansion, perhaps, of the CERFP concept that the
National Guard Bureau has advocated. And I would look at
certain other areas in there, such as aviation, for composite
organizations that could help in faster response.
Finally, I would say in the area of requirements in funding
that certainly in the business of homeland defense the
tightknit relationship between the Bureau and the Army has
worked very well in defining requirements in funding, but when
it comes to the business of homeland security I think we need
to look, and I would recommend a study directed by this
committee to look at three areas.
One, is the current DOD process for getting to homeland
security activities adequate? That is where the Guard is looked
at as a reserve of the Army and the Air Force. Or, No. 2,
should NORTHCOM have authorities such as the Special Operations
Command has, where they can do requirements and funding
specifically aimed at homeland security?
Or, third, should we look at what I would call a reverse
Coast Guard model, where there is a direct relationship between
the Bureau and DOD and DHS, so that the National Guard can
respond appropriately to the requirements of the Department of
Homeland Security?
That concludes my remarks, and I look forward to your
questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Rees follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. General Melcher, I
will start with you. You are kind of the point-guy here. It
seems to me that the Army is forgetting what is important in
transformation and reform. That is, how does it affect the
individual Guard soldier?
First, we had the pay problems. They weren't getting paid
correctly, and I think we reported on that widely. Then we
subjected them to the administrative nightmares in medical
holds, and this committee did a hearing on that. Some very
tragic cases of people that were caught in some ``catch-22s''
in terms of getting medical attention.
Then, just the recent revelations that we were sending some
of our Guardsmen to debt collection agencies for pay errors
that they didn't make, that we made; ruining their credit in
some cases.
And today, from the GAO, who calls the balls and strikes in
these issues for Congress, it appears that the Army is saying
it is OK that the Army Guard soldiers don't have adequate
equipment to train; nor can they expect it any time soon, under
modularity or the non-issuance of homeland requirements.
What is the problem here? Why is the Army treating the
Guard as second-class? Given the Guard's operational role in
the global war on terrorism, why are Guard units still equipped
at less than wartime readiness levels?
In fact, if the active duty are equipped at C-1 readiness,
why not the equally operational Guard? I mean, is this just a
question of limited resources and having to set priorities?
General Melcher. Sir, let me start by recapping just one
comment that I made in the opening statement. And that is that
I would say, up to a period of about 2 years ago, the Army
National Guard was considered, not only by the Army, but the
Department of Defense, as a strategic reserve; in that the
operating assumption was that we would have a long lead time in
which to mobilize soldiers, in which to potentially make up
shortfalls of equipping and perhaps even manning, in order to
prepare those units for war.
What happened 2 years ago is that the Army, in concert with
this global war on terror, embarked on a journey not only to
recognize that the Army National Guard was an integral part of
our operational forces, but that we should also equip and man
them commensurate with that new status.
Where you see that being played out in this global war on
terror is in Iraq and Afghanistan today, where 7 out of the 17
combat brigades in theater are Army National Guard. The number
of those brigades with each rotation varies, but the point is,
the Guard is very much committed, as is the U.S. Army Reserve.
And so 2 years ago, we embarked upon a plan, which we have
called Army Modular Forces, to try and, first of all,
standardize each one of the types of units we have in the Army,
between the active and the Guard; and second, to fill those
units with the kind of equipment and capabilities that they
require for a model that says they must be ready to go.
And we also have aligned ourselves in terms of the rotation
scheme which I believe you are aware of, the Army Force
Generation Model, where the assumption is active forces should
be ready to go one out of every 3 years; Guard forces, one out
of every 6 years.
And so that is the reason in the equipping arena that we
have gone from about $5 billion over the program years
dedicated to Army Guard equipping, to a total of $21 billion
today. And what that does is it takes each one of those Guard
units, those combat brigades, and it fills them up with
equipment between now and the fiscal year 2012 time period, in
order to make them on an equal par with their active duty
counterparts.
If I were to characterize even active units at the
beginning of this war, I would tell you that I think active
units were filled anywhere between 90 and 100 percent of their
required equipment. Not every one of those was at 100 percent.
Guard units, as you have heard here today, were equipped at
about the 75-percent level. At the end of this period where we
intend to transform all units, the intent is that all units be
equipped at the 100-percent level, and that is the direction
that we are going.
With respect to the other things that you mentioned, I am
not an expert on pay, and I am not an expert necessarily on----
Chairman Tom Davis. We have had other people up here on
that.
General Melcher. But I did just want to make a point that,
in preparing for this hearing, I reviewed some of the things
that the Army has done to try and take a harder look at our
disabled soldiers and how they are being treated with respect
to pay problems and so forth. And in fact, we have taken a hard
look at how to deal with that, both for active and Guard
soldiers alike.
And one case in particular of trying to look out for Guard
soldiers can be illustrated by Taskforce Care, which was an
effort initiated because of Hurricane Katrina to establish a
taskforce that went to theater; talked to soldiers from
Louisiana that were about to redeploy back to their home State;
tried to determine what was the situation for each one of those
soldiers and their families; and, in theater and when they got
back, make sure that we followed through to find housing for
them, or to find the benefits that they needed and so forth.
And so we looked at--you know, when I say ``we,'' the U.S.
Army--looks at the Army National Guard as an equal partner in
this war on terror that we are conducting. And they should be
so equipped.
Chairman Tom Davis. I mean, I think in some of these areas,
particularly in the pay and the health areas, it was about
systems and procedures; and we forget about the individual
soldier. There are just too many exceptions.
Let me ask another question. I understand that the $1.3
billion that is included in the Senate appropriations bill for
Guard equipment for Katrina and other homeland emergencies
isn't included in the House appropriation bills and, because of
spending caps, it might not get in at all.
I also understand the Army has requested $850 million, and
that the difference includes communications equipment and
trucks that might be used in other disasters. Why hasn't the
Army included these two key items in its request?
General Melcher. Sir, in the Army's supplemental requests
for 2006--and I am talking about the supplemental associated
with war, and not necessarily the hurricane--the Army has
requested dollar amounts for the kind of materiel you described
for the Guard and for the active forces, in order to try and
equip these units that are converting to modular configuration.
The Congress is entertaining right now a proposal for $1.3
billion, as you mentioned. Were the Congress to approve that
proposal, that would go a long way, certainly, toward providing
those capabilities quicker than we might otherwise be able to
do with the ordinary appropriations cycle and year-by-year
approach of how we intend to improve over time.
Chairman Tom Davis. Well, let me ask Secretary Hall. Why
does the Title 32 authority for Hurricane Katrina only cover
pay allotments, and not the equipment used or the training
required? I think we heard testimony and we understand that as
they lose equipment, it weakens their ability to perform State-
side. Why does the Guard stand--well, the Guard, alone, has to
come to the Hill to ask for equipment for Katrina; where every
other DOD department or Federal agency can be assured
reimbursement through Title 10 or through FEMA.
Mr. Hall. I think that there is little disagreement here at
the table and with either one of the Generals that we need to
have within the equipping strategy for the future, within the
$21 billion that the General mentioned, and more perhaps,
equipment for homeland defense, for resetting the force, for
repair of equipment, for the modularity, and for supporting the
ARFORGEN.
So I think within that model there is a commitment to
provide that equipment for homeland defense that the Guard and
the Reserve would need. So I don't think we disagree on the
requirement. It is making sure that we maintain that funding
flow over the next few years, to provide that equipment.
Under Title 32, as you know, when requested by the
Governors--the forces remain under control of the Governor--
their pay and allowances are paid for by the Federal
Government. But again, the equipment that they will need has to
be included in our overall equipping strategy, to get that
equipment that they will need now and for the future for
homeland defense.
Chairman Tom Davis. It appears that the Army and DOD are, I
think wisely, adopting equipment requirements for Iraqi Freedom
and the global war on terror. But the Department isn't coming
up with requirements for homeland military assistance.
Mr. Hall. No, I think they are. And separately, General
Melcher and General Blum have told me that over 300 separate
items that will be required for homeland defense are being
identified for the National Guard--in fact, I think 342, by
exact number. And those will be identified for homeland defense
requirements for the Guard.
Those are coming to us in a report by the end of the month,
which we will forward to you. So they are addressing those
particular requirements, and over 300 of them are identified--
trucks, communications, heavy-duty hauling equipment.
Chairman Tom Davis. Yes, General Blum.
General Blum. And it might be useful, also, Mr. Chairman,
to remind everybody that these 342 identified items are dual-
use items.
Chairman Tom Davis. Right.
General Blum. They are equally applicable for both overseas
war fighting as they are for here at home.
Chairman Tom Davis. What has hastened this is the fact that
we are just leaving a lot of equipment over in Afghanistan or
Iraq. That just depletes it, and we are not replenishing it.
And a lot of that can be used--like you say, it could be used
over there, but it could be used here, and we are missing it.
And we heard testimony from the two Governors earlier, there is
a huge deficit.
General Blum. Exactly. And it is not that the Army and DOD
are not addressing it. The issue is that the problem is so deep
and so longstanding that the measures that they have taken--and
some of them are quite extraordinary. I mean, within the
supplemental and on the global war on terrorism there is $2.5
billion identified to reset equipment for the Army National
Guard. There is $3 billion identified by the U.S. Army in their
submission for modularity for the National Guard. But that
still leaves us woefully short.
And again, we didn't get here overnight; but we are where
we are. And we are in a different world today than we were even
4 years ago.
Chairman Tom Davis. That is right.
General Blum. And we can no longer assume the risk that we
are accepting. And I, for one, welcome any emergency or
extraordinary measures to solve this problem sooner than later.
Mr. Hall. Could I just add that I compliment GAO on their
report, which we haven't mentioned, for the National Guard
equipment. They had three major findings. I concurred with all
of those three; sent them a letter back; asked the Army to
provide information by the end of this month on addressing
those three areas, so that I may prepare a report, the Army and
DOD, to you, outlining these exact issues of what are we going
to do about the equipment left behind; how are we going to have
a good accounting system for that equipment; and how are we
going to support the Army's ARFORGEN model in the future.
Chairman Tom Davis. General Walker, we don't have any
questions for you. The work that you have done, and your staff
has done, and Ms. Saint Laurent has done, on this is great.
Nobody is disputing that, so no need to give you questions. You
have kind of defined it. You have called the balls; you have
called the strikes. Nobody is disputing the calls. The question
now is what we do. And so, just again, we appreciate what you
did.
Let me just ask General Tackett, what do you think about
the Army modularity?
General Tackett. From a National Guard standpoint, it is
going to be very difficult to meet it. We are going to have a
lot of our forces that have to be retrained. It puts a lot of
stress onto the National Guard. But it is something that has to
be done. We have to mirror the active duty component.
It is taking away a lot of engineer structure from the
States, which is very important for the State missions. It is
going to cause the adjutant generals and Governors to use EMAC
a lot more than what they have in the past. There are a lot of
difficulties involved in modularity.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Thank you. How is retention coming
at this point, as people come back from the war front?
General Tackett. Well, in the State of West Virginia, I am
proud to say that we are one of the few States that met our in-
strength, and our actual retention rate is 147 percent of what
it was intended to be.
Chairman Tom Davis. I asked the right guy; didn't I,
General Blum? I asked the right man.
General Tackett. We are very fortunate. We are 106 percent
of assigned strength. And we are one of only three States in
the entire Nation that is above their assigned strength. And we
have been very fortunate and lucky in the State of West
Virginia.
The State supports us big-time. You heard one of the
Governors--from Pennsylvania, Governor Rendell--talk about the
education assistance program. We have several programs in West
Virginia that help us in our recruiting, and help us with our
retention of our Guardsmen. But we have been extremely
fortunate to meet our goals.
General Blum. Mr. Chairman, that is a great question. And
the answer that you got from West Virginia is only
representative of what you would get from almost any State that
you asked.
It almost is counter-intuitive, but the more we are using
the Guard, particularly for domestic operations--hurricane
relief and humanitarian operations right here in the United
States--it has been a spike or a boon to our recruiting in the
last 30 days.
It is interesting to see that, while we were the busiest,
with 50,000 people in the Gulf and 80,000 people overseas
fighting the war on terrorism, where we are stretched and
probably busier than we have ever been at any time in modern
history, our recruiting was better because of it. Because the
young men and women of this Nation want to be part of an
organization that is professional and is doing something that
makes a difference.
That is why having modern equipment in their hands when
they show up is so important to attract them and to keep them
in our formations. And then, when they are called to perform in
such a magnificent way, the only way they have capabilities is
that people training and equipment. So this equipment is a
vital leg in the three-legged stool of our capabilities in the
Guard.
Chairman Tom Davis. You know, it is kind of counter-
intuitive that retention--really, recruitment--would be up in
this environment. But if you go down to New Orleans, as I was
there, and Mississippi, and you see these people, and you see
them on the ground, and you see their morale--and I mean, they
are working hard. They are working 24-7. They are not getting
much sleep. They are certainly not living a very luxurious
life; some of them in tents. But the morale is amazing. And you
know, people do want to be part of something helping their
fellow man.
So I didn't know what answer I would get when I asked the
question, but I am glad to hear that.
Mr. Hall. Could I just----
Chairman Tom Davis. Sure.
Mr. Hall. Could I also just add, we were focusing on the
Guard here, but from all the components which I look at,
attrition is almost at an all-time low. And again, it is
counter-intuitive, but we have used all the components. Look at
the Marine Corps, who are 104 percent of all of their goals. We
look at the other services, the retention and attrition is at
all-time highs, and so more people are staying with us.
We have some recruiting challenges, but not in the
retention for our people that have served. And we have seen, in
fact, some of our highest levels have been the people who have
gone forward into the fight in Iraq and Afghanistan; and by the
way, many of them taking advantage of reenlisting with the
bonuses that you all provided. That was probably the most
effective tool, the $15,000 bonus that you provided last year
for our young men and women staying in-theater.
Chairman Tom Davis. General Walker.
Mr. Walker. Mr. Chairman, as has been said by several of
the panel members, for decades, the Army National Guard's role
was to be a strategic reserve. The fact is, it is no longer
strategic, and it is no longer a reserve. It is now being used
tactically, both overseas and domestically. And it is being
used with recurring frequency.
People are doing a great job. People are trying very hard
with regard to the resources and the authorities they have. But
the simple fact of the fundamental change in how the Guard and
Reserve are being used has significant human capital, has
significant equipment, has significant operational, and has
significant fiscal implications. And we need to recognize that
reality.
A part of the issue is, it is not a matter of whether or
not the Guard and Reserve need more money. They do. The
question is, where is it going to come from? And is it a
reallocation of existing resources, or is it an addition added
on top? And we need to engage in that exercise, and start
making some tough choices which haven't been made in quite a
long time.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you. Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I would really like to segue. That is
a wonderful segue for me. I feel like I am in a funny
environment right now, because I feel like, as I read your
statement, under the summary: ``The significant use of Army
National Guard forces for overseas and homeland missions since
September 11, 2001, has resulted in declining readiness,
weakening the Army National Guard preparedness for future
missions, and indicating the DOD's business model for the Army
National Guard is unsustainable and needs to be reassessed.''
Other than that, things are working well, I guess.
``The current heavy reliance of the Army National Guard for
overseas operations represents a fundamental change from the
Guard's planned role as a strategic reserve force whose
principal role was to deploy in the later stages of a major
conflict.'' I will just read a little longer. It is needed.
``Under this model, which still governs how resources are
provided to the Guard, the majority of Army National Guard
combat forces are only provided with 65 to 74 percent of the
people, and 65 to 79 percent of the equipment needed to conduct
their assigned wartime missions.'' I mean, I could keep going
on. But then you say: ``DOD is undertaking some initiatives to
improve the Guard's equipment readiness and to balance its
multiple roles in overseas and domestic operations. However, it
is not clear whether these initiatives will be effective in
enhancing the Army National Guard's equipment posture, because
DOD has not yet developed detailed plans; nor has it included
funding for all its initiatives in its budget.'' Do you stand
by your statement, Mr. Walker?
Mr. Walker. I stand by that report, and my statement.
Mr. Shays. Have you heard anything that followed your
statement that makes you want to qualify your statement?
Mr. Walker. No. I think people here are trying to do the
best they can with the resources and authorities that they
have. Candidly, Mr. Shays, as you know, I think one of the
problems you have is we need to engage in a much more strategic
and integrated review and reassessment of DOD, period. This is
a small piece, but an important piece.
Mr. Shays. Well, it is a very important piece. But what I
am trying to understand is, I admit to not hearing all the
statements, but the statements I did hear didn't seem to
address your statements. I mean, I feel like you have to look
for the gold thread of relevance in this lots of talk.
I would like to ask each of you how you are addressing
specifically; and not a long terminology. And what I would like
from DOD is just straight talk--not bullshit; straight talk.
You know, ``It is true, we haven't done this, but this is what
we are doing, and this is how long it is going to take, and
this will be the result.''
I think the head of GAO owes it. He didn't send someone
else here. He came himself to deliver this message. And I would
like some straight talk.
And I will just start to say why I don't think I am hearing
straight talk. And Secretary Hall, I have a lot of respect for
you. But I am reading that the National Guard and Reserve
Equipment Report, produced by your office, indicates a total
reserve component shortfall of critical items of more than $15
billion. Yet I read in your testimony that in fiscal year 2006,
funding for the reserve component will be only $2.5 billion for
equipment procedure.
In other words, so how could DOD let the reserve component
get into a position of a shortfall of critical items of more
than $15 billion?
Mr. Hall. Well, in the testimony before you came in, some
of it was addressed; in that the $21 billion that the Army has
planned, as General Melcher indicated, will address that $15
billion, and there might be more. That $1.3 billion is
immediate. Within the supplemental, within the yearly planning,
there is a total of $21 billion planned which 2 years ago was
not planned, as General Melcher indicated. So that is money to
address the shortfall that General Blum has talked about of $15
billion.
Mr. Shays. Well, you go on to State, I think, that in the
short term, the Army Guard's immediate requirements have been
resolved. How have they been resolved?
Mr. Hall. I think they have been resolved by the $1.3
billion that is going to be put in for immediate requirements,
plus through cross-leveling of their equipment. As they send
their forces forward, they are provided with 100 percent of the
requirements when they go into theater. Now, that involves
taking equipment and cross-leveling from units that are not
going. So I think in the immediate----
Mr. Shays. So you mean in Iraq they are resolved?
Mr. Hall. For the forces that go forward in Iraq and
Afghanistan. We are resolving the homeland defense
requirements, as I said, as part of the five areas that we are
looking at--resetting the equipment, repairing the equipment--
the homeland defense requirements.
Mr. Shays. You are giving me the impression that we are
resolving it.
Mr. Hall. No, I think the problem has been identified. What
I am giving you an impression and a straight talk is that we
are all committed to providing the resources to resolve the
requirements of the National Guard in all of those five areas.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Hall. And that commitment from all of us at the table
is here.
Mr. Shays. Now, explain to me, General Blum, why he needs
at least $1.3 million of supplemental funding for Katrina.
General Blum. I need $1.3 billion to buy equipment to do
the job here in the United States----
Mr. Shays. Because----
General Blum. Because Katrina, Rita, Wilma, and the forest
fires, and the snow storms in North Dakota, and the flooding in
New Hampshire, and all of the operational requirements we
respond to that the Adjutants General alluded to and the
Governors talked to, require equipment. That means night vision
goggles, communications----
Mr. Shays. So let me come back----
General Blum. I need the money to buy equipment, sir, in
straight talk.
Mr. Shays. I understand what you need, and I hear you. So
let me go back to you, Mr. Hall. How do I say that in the short
term the Army Guard's immediate requirements have been
resolved?
Mr. Hall. I indicated for Iraq and Afghanistan. We are in
the process, as General Blum just said, of resolving their
requirements for homeland defense.
Mr. Shays. In the process, or have been resolved?
Mr. Hall. We are in the process.
Mr. Shays. So they haven't been resolved?
Mr. Hall. They have been resolved for their forces going
forward in Iraq and Afghanistan. We still have to resolve how
we provide the necessary equipment for disasters and homeland
defense.
Mr. Shays. And that they get proper equipment to train
with.
Mr. Hall. Well, in all areas. To reset the equipment, to
repair the equipment, to train for the ARFORGEN, and to meet
all the other missions abroad and at home. So we have to do it
in all five areas.
Mr. Shays. Well, then walk me back to how--I am still
having trouble reconciling Mr. Walker's statement. I mean, I
don't mean to be dense here, but Mr. Walker stands by his
statement, and you agree with his statement. And yet you
somehow feel like it is being resolved. I don't understand.
If you are telling me you know he is right and somehow in
the future it is going to be resolved, I might say, OK, at
least you are acknowledging that. But you are saying it
differently. You are saying it has been resolved.
Mr. Hall. Well, it has not all been resolved. And I think
General Melcher wanted to comment.
General Melcher. Congressman, let me give this a try. One
of the things that was said in the report was that the old
business model was not sustainable, and we would agree with
that. The business model that says that the Reserve is a
strategic reserve is not complementary with the current
security environment that we live in, and so that model had to
change.
The way it changed, as I described it, is to accept that
the Guard is going to be an operational force, as is the
Reserve, and that they should be equipped commensurate with
that status. And so where that is being played out in terms of
a plan is in the Army's campaign plan over time to transition
both active units and Guard units to this new design--you know,
to this modular force, standardized design--and to equip them
as rapidly as possible, as rapidly within resources allowed----
Mr. Shays. What does it mean, ``in time?''
General Melcher. All right, sir. For the active force, we
are transitioning all 43 active brigades between now and the
end of fiscal year 2007. For the Guard brigades, they have
expressed the desire to transition as rapidly as possible to
the new design, by the end of fiscal year 2008.
Mr. Shays. The 43 is what? I'm sorry.
General Melcher. Forty-three active, and 34 Guard brigades.
And they will transition to the new design by the end of fiscal
year 2008. The equipping for those units will continue
throughout this 5-year defense plan period, up through fiscal
year 2011. And with lead times, they will probably get the last
of their equipment in fiscal year 2012. That is what the $21
billion that the Army has allocated is going against.
Mr. Shays. Yes, it is 7 years, but this $21 billion won't
begin to address all of those needs.
General Melcher. Sir, the $21 billion addresses all the
needs of these new formations; which, quite honestly, have more
of everything. It has more trucks, it has more unmanned air-
able vehicles----
Mr. Shays. How much will it address?
General Melcher. $21 billion takes care of, I would say,
probably about three-quarters of the total need. There is
another $7 billion on top of that, that General Blum and I have
agreed is the remainder. Most of that is replacing those things
that are ``in lieu of'' items, and bringing them up to the most
modernized level. Some are communications and others.
But those for the entire Army extend well into the next
half of the next decade. The U.S. Army, for example, will still
have less than modernized types of equipment that we will
replace--tactical wheel vehicles, for example--up to the 2015
timeframe. So that condition I described for the Guard is the
same as for the active.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Walker, help me out here. What are you
hearing, and what aren't you hearing?
Mr. Walker. Well, what I am hearing is, I believe that
there has been general agreement with regard to not just what
the report we issued says, but also with regard to other issues
that I talked about in my statement.
At the same point in time, obviously there are limits as to
the authority and the resources that these gentlemen have. And
therefore, there is a reconciliation that needs to take place,
both within the Department of Defense as well as with the
Congress, as to what the overall resource level will be and how
might those resources get allocated to be able to meet the most
critical needs.
And so I don't think there is disagreement here at this
table. I think the question is, what is going to happen to
engage in that overall reconciliation.
Mr. Shays. Well, the one disagreement I have is that I am
left with the impression from you, ``It is not clear whether
these initiatives will be effective in enhancing the Army
National Guard's equipment posture, because DOD has not yet
developed detailed plans; nor has it included funding for all
initiatives in its budget.''
And I get the impression from General Melcher and Secretary
Hall that, ``Everything is all planned out; we just have to
carry it out; and by 7 years, it is all going to be done.''
They don't jive.
Mr. Walker. I can explain part of that delta, or
inconsistency, Mr. Shays. And that is that there are certain
things that have been done by the Department that we have not
had the opportunity to see yet. For example, there is a listing
of 342 items--or whatever it was--of requirements for the Army
National Guard, and possibly other entities, that have been
developed by the Department of Defense; but that is still pre-
decisional. They haven't made decisions. We have not taken a
look at that yet.
But even if they do make decisions that this is what they
need, there is no guarantee that they are going to get the
resource allocation for it. And that is part of the other
problem.
Mr. Shays. Which is to say, in a way, to the general public
listening, ``Everything is fine.'' But to a Member of Congress,
I could leave this meeting thinking everything is fine, and
then I could have someone from the press come up to me 2 years
later and say, ``You had a hearing. You were told there was a
problem. You didn't do a damn thing about it.'' And because I
am left with this feeling like what you said is true, and it
has all been taken care of.
So let me ask it differently, General Blum or anyone else.
What steps have to be taken by Congress?
Mr. Hall. Could I comment on that?
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Mr. Hall. Following their report, we told GAO that we
concurred. I asked the Army to give us their detailed plan on
how they will accomplish this equipping. That is due by October
31st. Part of their recommendation was that, based upon that,
we, DOD, submit to Congress a report on exactly the equipping
strategy of what the Army will do. As soon as we get the
report, we will be submitting by detail on how this money is
going to be spent, on how future requirements. So this has
flowed from that to us giving----
Mr. Shays. When will that report be done?
Mr. Hall. Well, it is soon after October 31st, which is 10
days.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Hall. We need to review that. We need to make sure that
we have the correct and agreed upon integrated strategy. And
then we will give to you, the committee and the Congress, what
we have been saying about our future strategy, and what General
Melcher has outlined. So we are providing that based upon the
work that they did. And we are committed to doing that as soon
as we can.
Mr. Shays. So being committed to doing it, and its being
resolved, are two different issues. And I think that is maybe
my problem with your terminology. Your recognizing this has to
be done is a helpful and encouraging sign. That it has been
dealt with yet, no. That it will be dealt with, and that you
are pledging to this committee and others that you will deal
with it, is another issue.
And it seems to me that this is really, Mr. Chairman,
almost a preliminary effort; that it would make good sense for
us to get you back in 4 months and see where we are at.
Mr. Hall. It could have been better terminology, I admit.
But what I want you to know is, we are committed, and as you
have heard, to addressing this problem and providing equipment
that the National Guard needs to do its missions worldwide,
overseas and here.
Mr. Shays. OK. Let me just tell you why I get a little
anxious about this, and I will conclude with this.
Having been to Iraq 10 times; having continually had my own
constituents in the National Guard complain about equipment;
having shown up in the Kurdish area on a base and having the
commander of, I think, North Carolina troops show me three
Humvees--one with no protection, one with makeshift, and one
with, you know, factory protection; coming back to my staff
saying, ``Dammit, we need to deal with this issue''; and then
having the military say, ``Done, taken care of''; and then
finding out that we kept revising the number of targets, so
they said, ``We will reach this target by--'' but we never
solve the issue with the target adequate to meet the whole
needs of all our troops--and I realize that I have to ask these
questions differently.
And because we let our troops down, I know and you know
there were men and women who died because they didn't have the
proper protection, because we continually underestimated our
needs. And the end result was, we may finally have gotten it up
there, but it took us too long. Had we agreed on day one,
``This is where we need to get, way over here,'' we would have
gotten to it sooner.
And you know, it is kind of a terrible thing to have to
say, but we cost some lives of our own troops, because we
didn't, collectively, target it right.
So I am leaving this hearing with a total recognition on
the part of the military that you buy in, do not argue with
what Mr. Walker has said and his people; that you have a plan
to resolve it; that you are going to come back with a detailed
outline as to how long it will take, how much money it will
require from Congress to do the job. And then, if we don't
appropriate the dollars, it is on our shoulders. If you don't
tell us in plain English what you need, it rests on your
shoulders. That is kind of how I am feeling.
Do any of you disagree with that?
General Blum. No, sir. As a matter of fact, I agree with it
completely. But I want to make sure for the record you know
where I stand on this. I think the GAO report has described the
ugly baby in perfect detail. I think that the Department of
Defense recognizes we have an ugly baby that needs to be
addressed.
I think that the U.S. Army is working, the Department of
Army has recognized and has taken this on in a serious manner
for the first time ever. And we don't have a total plan and we
don't have a total solution, but we are working to it right
now. And we are working within the budgets that we have been
provided, and we are making some trades based on----
Mr. Shays. OK, now, that is the part that makes me nervous.
And let me say, General Blum, that I have heard nothing but
compliments about the job you have done. Nothing but
compliments about your honesty. You are straightforward.
But to say then you are working within the budget means
that you may have been provided less than the budget you need.
And if you have, you need to tell us.
General Blum. I will tell you now. I am currently, and we
agree on a number--and if you don't, please say it. We think we
are $7 billion short on what we are resourced to provide
against what we would like to have to be able to not have
risks.
Mr. Shays. $7 billion above the $21? Is that the number?
You are nodding your head. Some one say ``Yes'' or ``No.''
General Blum. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. And General, is the $21 appropriated in the
budget, or hoping to be in the budget?
General Melcher. Sir, this amount, $21 billion, is what is
in the Army's plan over the 5-year defense plan period.
Mr. Shays. So it is not in the budget yet?
General Melcher. Well, it is partially in the 2006 budget
request, the 2006 supplemental request, and so forth. But the
key point is, you are absolutely right. Once we lay this out,
we will need the support of both the administration, the
Department of Defense, and Congress, in order to make this
vision for what these forces ought to be a reality.
Mr. Shays. So is this $21--I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, because
I am concluding here. Is the $21 now becoming $28?
General Melcher. Well, the $21 only covers up through
fiscal year 2011, which is as far as we plan out for this point
in time. When we build a new program in the spring, we push
that time horizon out to 2013. And so there are some things for
both the active and the Guard that continue to happen over
time.
Mr. Shays. And it will be, by 2013, full? That is a long
time from now, folks. It is going to take us that long?
General Melcher. Sir, if the Army had a lot more money in
current years, we would go after this problem much quicker.
Mr. Shays. No, no, no. You know, I was going to conclude,
but that is not the way I would like to think about how you
communicate with us. Because you have already made an
assumption that you are not going to ask for more because you
are not going to tell us--so what I am hearing is, for the next
8 years, basically, we are going to have the problem that Mr.
Walker outlined.
General Melcher. Sir, I think we are going to continually
have a problem with equipping. And perhaps it is worth just 1
second to explain why do we have stay-behind equipment. The
reason we have it is because it is things like up-armored
Humvees or specialized equipment, night vision goggles, that
you want the next soldier to fall in on when they come over
there.
Mr. Shays. I am not arguing that they shouldn't have it.
What is your point?
General Melcher. Well, my point, sir, is that we continue
to evolve and change this mission over time. For example, we
have transition teams now that are training the Iraqi army.
Those teams all had to be equipped. We are putting pre-
positioned stocks back together overseas. Those things must be
created. So there is a constant dynamic of new equipping
requirements that come over time.
What I am saying is, this plan that we have for the $21
billion is a sound plan, but it must be seen through in each
one of the years in which it unfolds.
Mr. Shays. Well, I will just again recommend to our
committee, Mr. Chairman, that we have a followup, not in the
too-distant future, since your report is going to come. And I
appreciate all of you being here.
And I didn't have any questions for our National Guard
folks, but I know that your statements were pretty
straightforward: You need help. And you are proud of the people
that you have working for you, and you are happy with your
enrollments, in some instances.
But we know nationwide we have a problem of enrollment, and
we are overworking our National Guard. We are totally
overworking them, and under-equipping them still.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you. I just want to thank you
all. I want to thank our Guard representatives. Your statements
are in the record. I think you made a strong case. General
Walker, thank you. And I want to thank our Pentagon officials,
too.
The hearing is adjourned. And we will be back in about 5
minutes to start the committee markup.
[Whereupon, at 1:42 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[The prepared statements of Hon. Todd Russell Platts, Hon.
Jon C. Porter, Hon. Patrick T. McHenry, Hon. Elijah E.
Cummings, and additional information submitted for the hearing
record follows:]
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