<DOC>
[109th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:23041.wais]
BRAC AND BEYOND: AN EXAMINATION OF THE RATIONALE BEHIND FEDERAL
SECURITY STANDARDS FOR LEASED SPACE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 27, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-54
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
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_____
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee DIANE E. WATSON, California
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
DARRELL E. ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
JON C. PORTER, Nevada BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia Columbia
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina ------
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina (Independent)
------ ------
Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director
Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on July 27, 2005.................................... 1
Statement of:
Moran, Hon. James P., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Virginia.......................................... 9
Williams, Dwight, Chief Security Officer, Department of
Homeland Security; F. Joseph Moravec, Commissioner, Public
Buildings Service, General Services Administration; Get
Moy, Director, Installation Requirements and Management,
Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for
Installations and Environment, Department of Defense; and
John Jester, Director, Pentagon Force Protection Agency,
Department of Defense...................................... 20
Moravec, F. Joseph....................................... 32
Moy, Get................................................. 40
Williams, Dwight......................................... 20
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Davis, Chairman Tom, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Virginia: prepared statement of................... 4
LaTourette, Hon. Steven C., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Ohio, briefing notes.......................... 50
Moran, Hon. James P., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Virginia, prepared statement of................... 13
Moravec, F. Joseph, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service,
General Services Administration: prepared statement of..... 34
Moy, Get, Director, Installation Requirements and Management,
Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for
Installations and Environment, Department of Defense,
prepared statement of...................................... 42
Porter, Hon. Jon C., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Nevada, prepared statement of..................... 79
Waxman, Hon. Henry A., a Representative in Congress from the
State of California, prepared statement of................. 7
Williams, Dwight, Chief Security Officer, Department of
Homeland Security, prepared statement of................... 23
BRAC AND BEYOND: AN EXAMINATION OF THE RATIONALE BEHIND FEDERAL
SECURITY STANDARDS FOR LEASED SPACE
----------
WEDNESDAY, JULY 27, 2005
House of Representatives,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room
2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Davis (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Davis, Gutknecht, LaTourette,
Brown-Waite, Porter, Foxx, Waxman, Maloney, Kucinich, Watson,
Higgins, and Norton.
Also present: Representatives Moran of Virginia and Jones
of Ohio.
Staff present: David Marin, deputy staff director/
communications director; Keith Ausbrook, chief counsel; Rob
White, press secretary; Drew Crockett, deputy director of
communications; Victoria Procter, senior professional staff
member; Teresa Austin, chief clerk; Leneal Scott, computer
systems manager; Karen Lightfoot, minority senior policy
advisor and communications director; Mark Stephenson, minority
professional staff member; Earley Green, minority chief clerk;
and Cecelia Morton, minority office manager.
Chairman Tom Davis. The committee will come to order. I am
going welcome everybody to today's hearing on security
standards for Federal-leased space.
The Federal Government owns or leases approximately 3.4
billion square feet of space. As the Federal Government's
primary property management, GSA is responsible for a large
percentage of that space, while other agencies, such as DOD
have independent land holding and leasing authorities. These
agencies are responsible for ensuring the safety and security
of the sites they own and lease. In light of foreign and
domestic terrorist attacks against U.S. targets over the past
10 years, Federal agencies have been at a heightened state of
alert. In fact, the threat of terrorist attacks against Federal
facilities was one of several factors that prompted GAO to
include Federal property on its January 2003 high risk list. We
need to take every possible measure to secure and protect
Federal facilities, employees and visitors.
Now, immediately following the Oklahoma City bombing in
1995, the President directed the Department of Justice to
assess the vulnerabilities of Federal facilities to terrorist
attacks and recommend minimum security standards for federally
occupied space. The result was the categorization of Federal
buildings into five levels based on several factors such as
building size, agency mission and function, tenant population,
and volume of public access. The Department of Justice also
published its vulnerability assessment of Federal facilities
report in June 1995, which proposed minimum securities for
Federal buildings, the first time government-wide security
standards were established.
In 1995, the Interagency Security Committee [ISC], was
established by Executive order and is currently chaired by the
Department of Homeland Security. The ISC was tasked with
developing and evaluating security standards for Federal
facilities and overseeing the implementation of appropriate
security measures for those sites. However, these standards
weren't readily applicable to leased space. So the ISC
established a committee to develop its security standards for
leased space which was approved by OMB in September 2004.
Meanwhile, the Department of Defense created the
antiterrorism force protection standards. These standards still
apply to new construction and new leased space beginning
October of this year, and beginning in October 2009 they will
apply to the rollover of existing leased space. We are here
today because it is unclear to many of us why DOD needs its own
security standards separate from those developed by the ISC. I
am concerned that DOD not only developed leased space criteria
that are inconsistent with the ISC standards, but does not
apply them appropriately. For example, DOD used its standards
to justify seemingly arbitrary recommendations to base
realignment and closure commission, including a recommendation
to vacate a significant percentage of its leased space in the
National Capital region. I don't think any of that was in my
district, for the record. I understand that other members of
the committee have similar concerns in their own districts
arising from DOD's inconsistent applications of its standards.
DOD insists that leased space security standards and the BRAC
recommendations are unrelated issues. Frankly I disagree and I
anticipate we are going to hear from several members today who
don't share DOD's stovepipe outlook.
Technological advances have led to improvements in the
procedures machines and devices that can be employed to protect
employees and visitors in public buildings, to restrict access,
and to detect intruders. Part of the challenge of securing
space comes from the desire to balance critical security needs
with cost efficiency. While certain security technologies such
as x-ray machines, magnetometers, access cards and biometrics
may help ensure protection of people and buildings, they may
also prove inconvenient or intrusive. Furthermore, none of
these measures can be implemented in a leased site without the
owner's agreement.
Given the government's reliance on leased space and the
unique challenges of securing privately owned sites, the
committee is interested in learning more about the development
and implementation of security standards for leased space.
Today we will evaluate the rationale behind the different
leased space standards and how they are implemented by
agencies. We are going to hear from Congressman Jim Moran and
three agencies that have been actively involved in the
development and implementation of security standards for leased
spaces, DHS, GSA and DOD.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Tom Davis follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Waxman.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Today's hearing will
examine the differing security standards used by the Department
of Defense and by the General Service Administration for leased
space. Much of the space needed for Federal office buildings,
particularly in the National Capital region, is in buildings
leased from the private sector. The Defense Department requires
leased space to meet the security requirements used for
federally owned buildings. This includes the standards for
setbacks and blast protection required when the government is
building new buildings.
GSA's government-wide security standards for leased space
do not include the same setback and blast protection
requirements. We all want Federal employees adequately
protected in their place of work. While higher security
standards for bases and other military installations are
probably appropriate, creating separate minimum security
standards for different agencies including the Defense
Department civilian workforce could create unnecessary
confusion. Today's hearing will provide important information
on our efforts to assess the most appropriate security
standards for our Federal space and I look forward to hearing
from our witnesses today. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Henry A. Waxman follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Tom Davis. Well, thank you very much. Members will
have 7 days to submit opening statements for the record. We now
recognize our first panel. It is Congressman Jim Moran from the
8th district of Virginia. Jim, welcome. Thank you very much for
being with us. I know this is a hearing you have given a lot of
thought to and a lot of study, and this impacts, I know, a lot
of your constituents and mine in terms of convenience, cost.
And you sit on the Appropriations Subcommittee on DOD, so you
are going to have some say about this in the future, but we are
very anxious to hear your thoughts today and thanks for being
with us.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES P. MORAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA
Mr. Moran. Thank you very much, Chairman Davis and Ranking
Member Waxman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear today and
before this oversight hearing to examine DOD's building
security standards for leased space and the rationale behind
using those standards in the BRAC process. I would like to
address the problems I foresee with the Department of Defense's
approach in both the BRAC process and the larger building
security standards for leased space. No. 1, the adoption of
these standards were done without any public process. Second,
there is a strong bias against leased space without supporting
data and documentation.
And third, there is an arbitrary nature to the standards.
What the message these standards sends to the Nation is
troubling. And the lack, finally, unlike any other government
agency of performance-based standards that would take advantage
of the extraordinary wealth of innovation and technology that
we have in northern Virginia and in other metropolitan areas,
but particularly here around the Pentagon, that we have this
available to us the opportunity to provide incentives for
producing better building security methods that will make all
Americans safer by using that innovation and technology, and I
also say judgment because that is lacking in some of these
prescriptive base standards that we are faced with.
The Department of Defense's minimum antiterrorism standards
for buildings and leased space, they represent a prescriptive-
based approach that deviates from the performance standards
that most government agencies follow today. The new standards
overlook the work of the interagency security committee
security standards, it is called the ISC. They have standards
for leased space that were approved less than a year ago and
these DOD standards don't allow alternative means to achieve
maximum security, at leased office space. They overlook how to
prevent other forms of terrorist threats such as suicide
bombings and chem/bio contamination and would have done nothing
to prevent the attacks of September 11th.
These building standards are designed to protect against
one primary threat, a truck bomb, basically a truck bomb that
would hold approximately 200 pounds of TNT. It is a
prescription based standard requiring all DOD agencies,
military command centers, and even some private DOD
contractors, to abandon their present locations in favor of new
sites on military bases or in locations without underground
parking and that are set back at least 82 feet from the street.
It will be difficult, if not impossible, for military
facilities in leased space in an urban area, such as Washington
or its heavily developed suburbs or any other major
metropolitan area, to meet this demand. It makes no economic
sense and there are better ways of doing it.
So what is at stake is more than the region's economic
well-being? Fighting international terrorism requires a far
greater reliance on communications between the FBI, our
intelligence community, the Defense Department and the new
Department of Homeland Security. These installations are based
in this region for military enhancement to ensure ready access
to the Pentagon, the White House and Congress, but also, to a
growing public and private web of creative software development
and intelligence that are critical to the 21st century threats
that this Nation confronts.
It is an extraordinary assumption to believe that the kind
of intelligent minds critical to this new mission will want to
relocate so far from our countries high tech corridors as some
of these recommendations require them to. Secured communication
lines and infrastructure will be disrupted and they will take
years to re-establish at the new locations. Contractors will
experience fewer opportunities to collaborate and work hand in
hand with the military and the weapons systems enhanced
response capabilities and software innovation. Congress and key
policy advisors throughout the government will be denied the
direct feedback and contacts that have fostered a highly
productive relationship between the military and other parts of
the Federal Government and private industry.
The National Capital region has more than 8.3 million
square feet of leased space, 3.9 million square feet of which
is in Arlington County alone. That will be affected by these
proposed BRAC recommendations. More than 8 million square feet
are affected by the BRAC recommendations, and most of that is
in my congressional district in northern Virginia. The BRAC
recommendations on leased space approved will reduce total DOD
leased space within our region by 80 percent, virtually gutting
entire buildings in our region. An additional 4 million square
feet of leased office space in northern Virginia that is not
affected by BRAC but will also be affected though by DOD's
minimum antiterrorism standards for building security.
These combined proposals represent a double punch to our
region that will not only reduce available Federal lease space,
but will have a devastating impact on our region's government
workforce and the tens of thousands of contractors and
businesses that are collocated near these agencies. The
symbiotic relationship that has been created in this region has
helped make our military the strongest, most technically
innovative in the world. The irony is that the Defense
Department's master plan for its own headquarters affirms that
the Pentagon cannot meet the prescriptive building standard it
seeks to impose on its satellite offices and facilities.
Its setback is not sufficient and a metro public transit
center, although it was recently moved, is still less than 148
feet from the building. DOD's proposed changes will also
adversely affect our military readiness if our highly trained
personnel do not move with their agencies and leave the Federal
workforce. Chairman Davis and I did some surveys and we found
that in some cases, 50 to 75 percent of the workforce has said
they will not move out of this area. Their wives are employed
in other jobs here, their children are in the school system and
they want to stay here.
In light of the costs and minimum added security offered by
these standards, it is difficult to understand why the
Department of Defense would unilaterally impose such standards
and then expect the Congress and the country to foot the bill
which is going to come to billions of dollars. At a meeting
that Chairman Davis and I convened last week with
representatives from northern Virginia's business community,
and Ralph Newton, who is the principal deputy of Washington
headquarters, serves as the Director of Defense Facilities, we
raised several concerns with DOD's minimum antiterrorism
building security standards.
And it was clear from this briefing that many questions
remain unanswered concerning the Department's rationale behind
its stand and why such limited criteria were used over other
methods of achieving maximum building security. So I hope that
today's officials will be able to shed some much needed light
on the development of these standards and why they were applied
to the BRAC process, which never included building security
standards among its criteria.
The DOD building security standard was unfairly applied in
the BRAC process in a manner that disadvantaged leased space.
It seemed to be a back-door attempt by the Secretary of Defense
to eliminate leased space in the National Capital region, a
move which is not going to produce cost savings and could
result in the loss of thousands of our most talented personnel
if they do not move when their agencies relocate outside the
metro corridor.
So Mr. Chairman, as you and your colleagues on this
committee examine possible legislative measures, I would like
to call to your attention that report language that you alluded
to that I put in the 2006 Defense appropriations bill that will
require DOD to issue a report by the end of the year on the
cost for implementing the antiterrorism standards and which
compare DOD and GSA antiterrorism standards for buildings. As a
member of that subcommittee on defense, we required the
Secretary of Defense to provide a report to ``explain
differences in criteria used by the two agencies and propose
alternatives for reconciling any conflicts between the
standards to ensure that managers have one set of rules for
meeting Federal Government antiterrorism criteria.''
I encourage this committee to also consider legislation
that will further underscore this congressional intent and to
examine alternative security approaches and technologies that
are available to help achieve enhanced security consistently
across government agencies in leased buildings.
So in conclusion, I believe the Secretary of Defense's
process set out to eliminate leased space in northern Virginia.
It failed to collect and compare actual data and as a result,
is neither sufficiently accurate--it is not accurate in fact,
nor sufficient to meet the requirements of the law. And
similarly, Defense Department's minimum antiterrorism standards
reflect narrow approaches to building security and do not
consider the kind of technology and performance-based criteria
that is readily available and could bring many more agencies
into compliance for a fraction of the cost that DOD will incur
if agencies are moved out of leased space in the National
Capital region.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I applaud your committee for holding
today's hearings. I am happy to respond to any questions. I
know that you know a great deal about this, that the two of us
have worked to understand the process, understand the
motivation and to represent our constituencies, many of whom
are very adversely affected by this. So thanks again, Mr.
Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Hon. James P. Moran follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Tom Davis. Thanks for being here and sharing your
thoughts. Let me ask a question. As I understand the DOD
guidelines, underground parking is a taboo; is that correct? Is
that an absolute, as far as you're concerned?
Mr. Moran. Well, it has to be very limited as I understand
it, so that--of course, you can't have public access for
underground parking. And while some employees, I believe, would
be able to go through a screened process to use that
underground parking, it substantially reduces the amount of
parking that would be available in a metropolitan area.
Chairman Tom Davis. I mean, we have underground parking
here in the Rayburn Building. We have it in Cannon. We have it
in Longworth. And you can screen it perfectly well. But I am
not sure that DOD allows this kind of flexibility. It just
seems very prescriptive in its nature instead of taking a look
at the overall safeguarding of the building.
Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for making that,
pointing that fact out with regard to our own security here at
the Capitol which is, you would think, would be ground zero in
terms of a possible threat from terrorists.
Chairman Tom Davis. Well, let me ask you this: You look at
Rayburn, which trucks can drive right by currently. Under DOD,
if we were DOD employees, they would be getting rid of Rayburn
at the end of this lease, and we would have to find other
space, just to draw the analogy in this case.
Mr. Moran. We have employed judgment. You can't move the
Capitol. You can't move the House offices.
Chairman Tom Davis. How about the Supreme Court? You can
drive by the Supreme Court. But the brass gets a different
standard.
Mr. Moran. These are very important observations, Mr.
Chairman, and I don't blame the professionals in the Department
of Defense who are carrying this out. They are doing what they
are asked to do and they are trying to provide for as much
judgment and flexibility as they can. But their orders, I
think, are too limiting.
Chairman Tom Davis. Well, let me just ask another thing. I
mean, you have limited amounts of dollars. If you had unlimited
amounts of dollars, I guess you could say we can go ahead and
do this. But when you're spending money on this, and if you
take a look at the terrorist attacks that have happened in
other places and so on, and like it, I mean, you have to put
everything into an appropriate context. These are dollars that
you can't spend on getting, you know, protective gear for our
troops in Iraq, that you can't spend on getting the best
scientific equipment in some other areas, that you can't use
for military pay. I mean, this is, to some extent, a zero sum
gain. It's not like we have a lot of additional dollars.
So you have to be prudent. And what concerns me about this
is by being so prescriptive they are basically saying just in
northern Virginia and in other parts of the country, 4 million
square feet has to be re-leased, obviously at higher rents. And
over the long term this is billions and billions of dollars.
Mr. Moran. It is going to be extraordinarily expensive to
build these new buildings, to set aside the amount of land that
will be required for the setbacks. And they will have no use
subsequently, because no private owner is ever going to want to
use these buildings because of the construction premium. I
don't know how long we are going to be fighting this war on
terrorism, but we do need to look to the future and be cost
conscious. And you made a very good point. Specifically, the
money for this construction is going to have to come from the
Veterans Affairs Subcommittee, the Military Quality of Life
Appropriations Subcommittee.
So, in effect, it is going to be coming from compensation
for our military enlistees and veterans. And I have to say it
is going to be difficult for the Congress to justify spending
billions on new buildings when we have a less expensive
alternative. And again, what we are dealing with is only one
form of terrorism, the possibility of a truck bomb. Now the
General Services Administration has to build buildings in
metropolitan areas. They have just built a building for the
American delegation to the United Nations in New York City. New
York City, you can't have an 82-foot, let alone 148-foot
setback. But they built a building that, where the perimeter
around it was used as a lobby, but it--they understood that a
blast might go through that. But the interior was hardened with
few windows, the sensitive activities were in the core of the
building. The traffic management was organized so that trucks
couldn't stop in front. They exercised judgment and technology
and they come up with approaches that are cost efficient, but
are pragmatic and nevertheless achieve the desired objective of
security.
And that is what we are asking. We think that a combination
of GSA's approach and DOD's concern, they are working together,
the professionals themselves, if you put aside some of the
people that may be--well, let me just say the professionals. If
the professionals were to sit down together, the folks from
DOD, who are terrific and the people from GSA I think they
would come up with standards that we could not argue with. But
right now, I think we have arbitrary prescriptive standards
that don't accomplish a whole lot for DOD and they certainly
cause very adverse economic consequences for the metropolitan
Washington region.
Chairman Tom Davis. Well, thank you. I mean, what you end
up with are buildings that are going to have the thickness and
maybe the longevity of the pyramids, but it's also going to
have about the same occupancy rate over the long term. I mean,
you are not going to have anybody there.
Mr. Moran. I wish I would have thought of that. I would
have put it in my statement if it had occurred to me.
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Waxman.
Mr. Waxman. I want to thank Mr. Moran for his presentation.
I think you have given us many issues to consider quite
carefully. Thank you.
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. LaTourette.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Moran, I want
to thank you too. And I want to reference a hearing that
happened over in the Senate when your Senator and Mr. Davis'
Senator, Senator Warner, testified on this issue. And my
understanding from reading the newspaper is that he was one of
the authors of the BRAC legislation. And he opined that giving
a bias, DOD giving a bias to get out of leased space violated
at least the spirit of the law if not the intent. Do you agree
with that assessment?
Mr. Moran. I strongly agree with that, Mr. LaTourette. I
appreciate the fact of your bringing it up. Senator Warner said
before the BRAC Commission that as an author of the
legislation, he believed that the implementation as it is, as
it affects leased space in northern Virginia, is inconsistent
with the underlying BRAC law, the authority that they had.
Basically they were carrying out a directive they were given,
but it was not a directive consistent with BRAC's objectives
which are to save money and enhance military operations to
effectiveness.
Mr. LaTourette. I happen to agree with you. And when we
receive our second panel, we have actually discovered a
document from February of this year where the answer is given
by the BRAC red team that yes, there was a specific DOD
directive to get out of leased space. And I will have some
questions about that. The other thing that I just want to
comment on, I don't want to hold you. I agree completely with
you and Chairman Davis.
I had a Federal employee come up to me. We have a DFAS
facility in the Cleveland area near Congressman Kucinich's
district and mine. And it is scheduled for closure; 1,100 jobs
scheduled to go. But the Federal worker that came up to me
works for the Social Security Department and the question is,
why, if we have these minimum terrorism standards, is it OK for
the accountants that are issuing paychecks and payroll checks
for members of the Defense, a very important function, why do
we have to have force protection for them, but for the Social
Security, Coast Guard, Department of Labor and Veterans
Affairs, they can be in this ``dangerous building?'' I find
that to be hypocritical and I assume you would as well.
Mr. Moran. I do. I think that is an important observation,
the inconsistencies here, and the assumption that terrorists
are going after bureaucrats who are doing their lives--we don't
refer to them as bureaucrats, but I think they would see them
as bureaucrats. I don't see that there is a whole lot
accomplished by going after some of these leased office
buildings. In fact, I can't imagine many terrorists knew where
they were located until the BRAC Commission reported on their
addresses. But it is much to do about very minimum security
enhancement as far as I can say. That's an important
observation, the inconsistency across the government.
Mr. LaTourette. I appreciate that. We just have one more
piece of leverage in Cleveland, Congressman Kucinich and Tubbs
Jones and I, and that is that apparently President Bush's
paycheck is cut in Cleveland, and so we are thinking of
stopping payment after September 8. We'll see how that works. I
thank you Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. Kucinich. I want to thank Mr. Moran and associate
myself with Congressman LaTourette's remarks. One of the things
I think we will need to get into in the next panel is this
question of the relationship between BRAC's objective of saving
money, and since BRAC has determined to spread out so many
functions into relatively new areas, it will be interesting to
see if they took into account the increased costs of securing
those areas as compared to what the costs were in the first
locations.
So I want to thank my colleague for expressing his concern
about the security issues involved. But security issues
inevitably have a price tag, and so we have to see where the
price tag comes into play on a security factor with respect to
BRAC. And of course, that is what this hearing is about. So
thank you, Mr. Moran.
Chairman Tom Davis. Any questions, Ms. Brown-Waite?
Ms. Brown-Waite. No.
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Porter, any questions? Ms. Norton.
Jim, thank you very much. You've laid a good predicate here for
the hearing and we'll take about a 1-minute recess as we move
our next panel forward.
OK. Our second panel, we have Mr. Dwight Williams, the
Chief Security Officer of the Department of Homeland Security;
Mr. Joe Moravec, who is the Commissioner of Public Buildings
Service at the General Services Administration. I just want to
thank Mr. Moravec for appearing today. I am going to--I'd say
congratulate you on your retirement. Let me congratulate you on
a job well done. I just wish you well as you leave GSA. You
have been a very bright star over there. We are going to miss
you. Dr. Get Moy, the Director, Installations Resource
Management, Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for
Installations and Environment at the Department of Defense. And
John Jester, the Chief of the Pentagon Force Protection Agency,
Department of Defense. Mr. Jester testified before the
subcommittee, which I chaired in 2002, and we want to thank you
for being here as well. As you know it is our policy to swear
in witnesses before you testify so if you would just rise and
raise your right hands with me.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Williams, we will start with you.
STATEMENTS OF DWIGHT WILLIAMS, CHIEF SECURITY OFFICER,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; F. JOSEPH MORAVEC,
COMMISSIONER, PUBLIC BUILDINGS SERVICE, GENERAL SERVICES
ADMINISTRATION; GET MOY, DIRECTOR, INSTALLATION REQUIREMENTS
AND MANAGEMENT, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; AND
JOHN JESTER, DIRECTOR, PENTAGON FORCE PROTECTION AGENCY,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
STATEMENT OF DWIGHT WILLIAMS
Mr. Williams. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Waxman and
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
address you today and for your ongoing support for the
Department of Homeland Security. My name is Dwight Williams. I
am the Chief Security Officer of the Department, and as such, I
am also the new Chair of the Interagency Security Committee.
Prior to this, I spent 4 years at Customs and Border Protection
as the Director of the Security Programs Division, and I was
director of the Office of Professional Responsibility at the
Washington, DC, Metropolitan Police Department. I am pleased to
appear before you today to discuss the ISC security standards
for leased space. Following the bombing of the Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City in April 1995, the President
established the Interagency Security Committee to enhance the
security of Federal facilities for non-military activities. The
ISC has 21 primary members, including the Departments of
Justice, Defense, State, the General Services Administration,
as well as 14 associate members and officials from other key
agencies.
The President also directed DOJ at the time to conduct a
vulnerability study assessing Federal office buildings. This
study set forth specific security requirements regarding
perimeter entry and interior security as well as general
security planning considerations. In 1997, GSA drafted security
criteria based on the DOJ study and these criteria were updated
in 2001. This document, however, primarily applied to new
buildings and construction. Although the DOD standards were
intended for use in all federally occupied facilities, they
were not readily adaptable to most leased facilities. Building
owners were often reluctant to make the significant alterations
in order to comply with stringent security standards.
The situation led to a double standard for owned buildings
and leased buildings. As a result, the ISC established a lease
security subcommittee that combined the expertise of security
specialists, design professionals, engineers, architects and
fire and safety specialists from member agencies. To maintain
consistency, the subcommittee started with the 1995 DOJ study
and the 2001 ISC standards as the basis for compiling standards
for leased space. The ISC subcommittee also sought input from
the real estate private sector. Subsequently, the subcommittee
issued a proposed draft in July 2003. Following an analysis of
the costs involved, the full committee approved the lease
standards and they were issued in February 2005. It is
important to recognize that the security standards for leased
space establish the recommended minimum security requirements
for protecting Federal facilities while providing the agency
the ability to tailor security to their mission as well as
threats and vulnerabilities. They do not prohibit an agency
from imposing more stringent security requirements.
The ISC security standards do not establish a single one-
size-fits-all standard for every leased Federal facility. Our
goal is to ensure that we have an effective program for
securing lease space utilizing a risk management approach based
on three primary factors as recently articulated by the
Secretary. That is threat, vulnerability and consequences. The
ISC recognized that resources are limited within the government
and therefore, the ISC aimed to strike a balance between
security and feasibility. One purpose is to educate Federal
agencies regarding what minimum standards are prudent in order
to make informed security decisions. They are not intended to
substitute ISC's judgment for the agency's own. These security
standards represent a living document that will be reviewed
regularly at ISC meetings and updated as threats evolve and
additional issues are identified.
Further, DHS is pursuing ways to implement these standards
at its own facilities. The Department is working with other
stakeholders to communicate these standards, and the Federal
Protective Service is already using the lease standards in
conducting vulnerability assessments of Federal buildings.
In closing, I would like to thank the committee, again, for
the opportunity to appear before you today. The security of
Federal employees is of paramount importance to the Department
of Homeland Security, and we will continue to ensure that every
effort is made to provide them with government facilities that
are designed and constructed with their security in mind. I
would now be pleased to answer any questions that you may have.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Williams follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Moravec.
STATEMENT OF F. JOSEPH MORAVEC
Mr. Moravec. Good morning, Chairman Davis and members of
the committee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your gracious
acknowledgment of my service. It has been my high honor to
serve our President and our country. My formal statement has
been previously submitted, and I would ask that it be entered
into the record of these proceedings. If I may, I would like
now to highlight its salient points. The mission of the Public
Building Service is to provide a superior workplace for the
Federal worker and superior value for the American taxpayer. A
superior workplace obviously means a safe and secure workplace
including one that is as secure as we can make it against a
terrorist attack. The Oklahoma City bombing changed forever the
way in which we design, build and operate Federal buildings in
the face of such threats to Federal workers and the millions of
Americans who visit our buildings every day to do business with
their government.
While the best defense against a terrorist attack is
foreknowledge, provided by coordinated criminal intelligence
sources, we are also committed to taking every feasible
precaution to defend against and mitigate the effects of
terrorism at every building under our control. In doing so, we
attempt to achieve a balance between security countermeasures
and the other elements that constitute a superior workplace
supportive of the missions of our customers' agencies. These
elements would include location, accessibility to other
agencies and the public, functionality, aesthetics, energy
efficiencies, sustainability and integration with the life of
surrounding communities at a cost that represents good value
for the American taxpayer.
For example, to avoid creating an impressive climate of
fear at Federal buildings, we try to design buildings whose
architecture first welcomes and then challenges visitors. And
because it is possible to spend lavishly on building security
without necessarily reducing the threat, we try to tailor
security counter measures that address a particular building's
perceived vulnerabilities to craft a package of physical
upgrades and operational procedures that will actually reduce
the threat to that particular building and its occupants.
Because the value of innocent human life is beyond measure,
whether it is an owned or leased Federal space, GSA led the
effort, under the auspices of the Interagency Security
Committee, to develop security criteria for leased Federal
space based as closely as possible on the 1995 Department of
Justice vulnerability study and the ISC's security design
criteria for Federal construction.
The effort was also, in part, in response to requests from
the commercial industry to establish a reliable and consistent
security baseline for landlords competing for Federal leases.
This is critical to government in that we rely on the private
sector to house nearly half of the civilian Federal workforce.
Just as for their own Federal space, the ISC standards for
leased space which have been circulating in draft form for the
past 2 years and which were formalized in February of this year
require respondents to government solicitations for office
space to meet an escalating hierarchy of security requirements,
levels one through four, based on square footage, size of
tenant population, intended use and the security profile of the
tenant agency.
While the security of our people was and, of course, is the
paramount consideration, the ISC subcommittee which drafted the
leased space standards did not want to produce a prescriptive
one-size-fits-all document that would be impossible for the
private sector to respond to. The committee consulted
extensively with industry to develop standards that could both
be tailored to an agency's particular needs and that could be
applied in the real market place in a way that was consistent
with procurement law.
Cost was definitely a consideration. It's one thing for
government to incorporate setbacks and obstructions to
vehicular access, hardened curved walls and add a progressive
collapse structural design in buildings that it owns. It's
another for the private sector to do so in a speculative
building and still be competitive. The lease standards are
meant, as Mr. Williams has testified, to be minimums to be
incorporated into solicitations for offers. Landlords not
meeting the criteria are considered to be nonresponsive. Any
customer agency, including the Department of Defense may, upon
consultation with us, request that higher standards be
established in response to perceived particular vulnerabilities
and in build-to-suit competitions, new buildings designed for
lease, exclusively for the government, must achieve the same
security design criteria required for Federal construction.
In preparation for a lease solicitation the GSA realty
specialists, in consultation with the customer, craft a program
of requirements. The Department of Homeland Security
represented by the Federal Protective Service provides threat
assessment input based on its security evaluation. GSA
provides, at that time, information about what is available in
the marketplace and then the appropriate ISC level of security
is established for the purposes of the solicitation. Although
the ISC standards are just now being incorporated into lease
solicitations, it's anticipated that the market will be able to
respond well and competitively to level one through three
acquisitions.
Level four, which requires full security control by
government and dedicated heating ventilating and air
conditioning for lobbies, mailrooms and loading docks, will
present, we think, some challenges in most markets.
Fortunately, level four requirements represent a very small
percentage of our anticipated lease procurements in the years
ahead. This concludes my prepared oral statement. I am, of
course, prepared to answer whatever questions you may have of
me.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Moravec follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Tom Davis. Dr. Moy, thank you for being with us.
STATEMENT OF GET MOY
Dr. Moy. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the
committee, we appreciate the opportunity to present the
Department of Defense's antiterrorism force protection
standards for leased spaces. We have a written statement and
with your permission, we will submit it for the record. I'll
just spend the next few minutes to highlight the issues that
we're going to discuss today. I also would like to recognize
three members of the DOD team here that participated in those
standards and worked with the rest of the Federal Government.
John Jester who is the Director for Pentagon Force
Protection, Ralph Newman, who is the Deputy Director for
Washington Headquarters Services, and Joe Hartman who is the
structural and security engineering team leader at the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers. Force protection is an extremely
important subject matter for all of us at all times. Back in
the--with the terrorist threat and bombing at Khobar Towers in
1996 after that the Department renewed its emphasis on
developing criteria on how it could protect its mission and its
personnel against terror threats.
As a result, it issued a series of documents, first in
1999, a document focusing on construction. In 2002, it issued
what we now call the Unified Facilities Criteria. Included in
that issue was the standards for leased spaces, and the current
issue was last put out in 2003. In comparison, the Interagency
Security Committee guidelines for federally owned facilities,
were put out in 2001 and for leased facilities was recently
signed out in February of this year, 2005. In terms of the
discussion of the ISC guidelines versus the Unified Facilities
Criteria, I would submit to the committee to go back to the
roots of these documents. The ISC was established by Executive
order in 1995 with a basic focus on buildings and facilities
for Federal employees for non-military activities. And it
covers a great range of security issues in the guidelines.
The Unified Facilities Criteria, however, was specifically
developed in response to protect personnel as a mission against
terrorist threats. And it is very specific in terms of
application for lease spaces in the case of where we have more
than 11 people, 11 DOD employees in a building or any part of a
building, and where the DOD components of that building is 25
percent or more of the population, so it is very specific in
terms of its application.
The specific focus in terms of contrast between ISC
guidelines and Unified Facilities Criteria has to do with the
set-off distances and the blast mitigation. The Department
feels that vehicle-borne threats are very much a security
threat to the Department that must be considered in any
security plan. And that is why there is such a heavy emphasis
on design and construction and setback distances. There is
allowances in the Unified Facilities Criteria to deal with
alternative ways of meeting that setback distance and the blast
mitigation using the technologies.
Implementation of the UFC requirements is fairly
straightforward for new construction. It is difficult for
existing construction. While there are many challenges we have,
the Department has had a number of developers approach us in
terms of offering different ways in which they can provide the
blast mitigation, the setback distances and provide solutions
for the Department, meeting the Department's requirements. I
appreciate the opportunity in addressing the subject. We look
at the ISC standards and guidelines as addressing those
concerns for Federal employees that are doing non-military
activities. The UFC specifically focused on protecting the
mission and personnel against terrorist threats, the
professionals from both communities continue to work with each
other, talk with each other. We extend our efforts and our
partnership in working with the ISC professionals as well as
the private industry in enhancing, making better risk based
assessments, analyses, mission assessments, capability
enhancement as well as protecting our people. Thank you.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Moy follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Jester, you are here for questions,
is that to answer questions? Do you want to make any statement?
Mr. Jester. No, sir. It was a joint statement.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Thank you very much. Mr.
LaTourette, you served on the Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee. You actually served as subcommittee chairman on
building consulting. Why don't we start the questioning with
you.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
the courtesy, and Mr. Moravec, I'd add to the congratulations
the chairman lauded on you, and I want you to know I'm sorry
for taking your Federal building fund money in the
transportation bill. A couple of observations. I mentioned when
Congressman Moran was here that we are having a little bit of a
problem with understanding what it is the Department of Defense
did relative to the city of Cleveland. It is clear to me, at
least, and I think to my colleagues from Cleveland, that from
internal BRAC documents I don't think Cleveland ever stood a
chance because it was penalized for not meeting these minimum
antiterror standards 4 years before they need to be
implemented.
And it is also clear to me that I don't think Cleveland
received a fair break relative to how its lease was evaluated.
I want to talk to you a little bit about that Mr. Moravec, if I
could start with you. The staff at GSA has informed us that GSA
operating cost, not the shell rate that you charge, and it
includes maintenance utilities and janitorial services, is that
correct?
Mr. Moravec. That is correct.
Mr. LaTourette. Do GSA operating costs, not the extra cost
but the actual operating costs ever include things like joint
use of space, parking, or antennae? Are those part of your
operating costs that you pass along to your tenants?
Mr. Moravec. I am not sure whether they are included as
part of our operating cost, but they're certainly included as
part of the rent.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. Do operating costs ever include
overtime or communications?
Mr. Moravec. Communications.
Mr. LaTourette. But not overtime?
Mr. Moravec. I would have to research that before giving
you an answer.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. The difficulty that we have in this
process is that my understanding of the cost of the space is
about 20 percent of the BRAC calculation that was used. And a
new lease was signed in Cleveland, and you can throw in all of
the extra cost. It's $19 a square foot and change. It's
competing against Indianapolis. And in 1996, somebody, we could
speculate who the powerful people are in Indiana secured a $123
million to rehab the former, I think, Fort Benjamin Harrison.
And now GSA, even though that is a GSA building because it
was a closed DOD building after the last round of BRAC, is
charging it a suppressed level of rent under something called
an ISA, an interservice. Can you tell me how that--isn't rent
rent?
Mr. Moravec. Well basically, occasionally we will make
arrangements with a customer agency who provides their own
funding for the rehabilitation, and in this case of the Bean
Building in Indianapolis, we adjust the rent to reflect their
economic contribution to the building.
Mr. LaTourette. I would assume that there are many Federal
buildings in your inventory that don't currently meet the DOD
minimum antiterror standards that we are talking about today.
Mr. Moravec. That is correct.
Mr. LaTourette. And then, Dr. Moy, maybe you are not the
right guy from DOD, but the building that we are talking about
in Indianapolis, meets the new stringent antiterror standards,
but it doesn't have the best terror assessment rating and it
doesn't appear to be, it's ninth in terms of military value.
Are you aware of the Indianapolis facility at all?
Dr. Moy. Sir, I did not participate in any of the BRAC
discussions or deliberations.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. Well, let me ask you two questions that
maybe you can help me with. I think you have in front of you a
document that is dated February 21, 2005. And that document is
from the headquarters and support activities joint cross
service group briefing from that particular date. And anybody
is welcome to jump in if you can give me an explanation. If you
look down on the second page, under the bold heading, Informal
Observations provided at the briefing, the eighth bullet point,
it says DFAS could be your Achilles heel since you close
installation with the highest military value and keep the
lowest. The explanation for doing so needs to be strengthened,
at least to make sure it's closely tied to the discussion about
optimization models. Can anybody help me understand what that
means in DOD language? Can anybody help me with that one?
Dr. Moy. No, sir. I can try to get a response for the
record, but I am not aware of that.
Mr. LaTourette. If you could, I would appreciate it. And
then again further down, three more bullet points down, it says
that HSA, which is headquarters, support activities, and then
the code for DFAS justification needs to be linked to strategy.
You need to say up front that closing highest military value
location, because otherwise, the MILCON costs would have been
huge. Does anybody have any light that they can shed on that
particular? No?
Dr. Moy. No, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. Well, let me just ask a final question then
that I was talking to Congressman Moran about. I assume most of
you saw or read about Senator Warner's testimony over in the
Senate and his opinion that it was not appropriate for the BRAC
process to give a bias toward getting people out of leased
space. Again, on that same page of the same document, under the
bold questions that arose, the question was as follows. Was it
DOD guidance to get out of leased space? The answer, yes, but
there is no supporting documentation. And to me that means yes,
but we didn't want to write it down so people would find out
about it.
Chairman Tom Davis. Let me just say, I'd ask unanimous
consent that the gentleman's time be extended.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you. And I'll try and make this my
last question. I thank you. And then it goes on to say there
was a general sense that being in the NCR is not good. Most
space in the NCR is leased. So the connection was made that
vacating leased space is favorable. This is something that was
attributed to the former Acting Secretary and Secretary of the
Navy. And I guess my question is, can anybody help me with or
express an opinion as to how much the desire to get out of
leased space shaped the BRAC recommendations, not just in the
National Capital region, but all across the country? Anybody
give me a hand with that?
Mr. Moravec. I don't have any insight into that.
Mr. LaTourette. Dr. Moy.
Dr. Moy. Sir, I can't address the specific issue in terms
of the National Capital region, but I would say that there were
a number of factors that entered into the developing of the
BRAC recommendations command and control putting, trying to
gain efficiencies of putting similar units together, trying to
take a look at how the command and control with operational
units, security was a factor. But it was one of many factors
that entered into the decision, all ending up with military
value.
So I would say it is correct to say that getting out of
leased space was not, that I know of, a factor in and of
itself. There were many factors that entered into the
deliberations.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. Again, just to make this my last
observation, the Honorable H.T. Johnson, who was the former
Acting Secretary, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, was a member
of the BRAC red team and in response to a question, was it DOD
guidance to get out of leased space, his answer was yes. And
you can't enlighten me anymore about that?
Dr. Moy. No, sir, I can't.
Chairman Tom Davis. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. LaTourette. Sure.
Chairman Tom Davis. Where is Mr. Johnson now?
Dr. Moy. Mr. Johnson has left his position as being the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for installations.
Chairman Tom Davis. Is he still in the Department of
Defense?
Dr. Moy. I do not know.
Chairman Tom Davis. Could you get that information to this
committee? Or is this guy--he comes in as a cowboy, makes his
recommendations and leaves and goes on to whatever. Do you
agree with the observation here that being in the National
Capital region is not good, Dr. Moy?
Dr. Moy. No, sir.
Chairman Tom Davis. You don't agree with that. How about
you, Mr. Jester, do you agree with that?
Mr. Jester. No, sir.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Mr. Moravec, do you agree with
that?
Mr. Moravec. No, sir.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Mr. Williams, do you agree with
that?
Mr. Williams. No, sir.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK. We don't know if Mr. Johnson is
even with us anymore, but that seems to be the basis for some
of these recommendations.
Mr. LaTourette. It does. And again, I'd ask unanimous
consent that this document go into the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Tom Davis. Is there objection? Without objection,
so ordered. Mr. Waxman.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Moravec, I also want to join in thanking
you for your public service. It's been one of dedication and
professionalism and I wish you all the very best as you leave
the GSA.
Mr. Moravec. Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. Waxman. I wanted to raise with you an issue in Los
Angeles, in my district, GSA has proposed to significantly
expand a federally owned property at 11000 Wilshire Boulevard,
so the FBI can modernize and consolidate its resources and
operations. The Federal building sits between two of the
busiest intersections, not just in Los Angeles, but in the
Nation, Wilshire and Westwood Boulevards and Wilshire Boulevard
and Veterans Avenue. The 405 Freeway, the second most congested
freeway in the Nation, has an on ramp and an off ramp within 1
block of the building. The largest VA medical center in the
country, the 388-acre greater Los Angeles health care system,
is directly across the street from the Federal building, and
UCLA is just over a mile away. The Los Angeles Department of
Transportation rates the level of service at the location as an
F, the worst possible grade. There is a bus, but no transit
service in the area.
Traffic is terrible for many hours every day, including
weekends. And peak hour traffic volumes are extreme. The
infrastructure simply cannot support the plans GSA and the FBI
have for the property. I have asked GSA a number of times to
provide me with specific alternative sites it may be studying
for this project. And the most recent letter I received from
the regional administrator in April 2005 indicated that GSA had
received suggestions for about 25 sites from community members
and the L.A. economic development corporation, but was ``not in
a position to identify those 25 sites as serious potential
alternatives.''
He further indicated that the process was still in a very
early stage and the GSA had not yet started evaluation of the
alternative sites. Yesterday, my staff learned from the
Washington GSA office that the draft EIS should be ready in
October 2005, and it will include an analysis of alternative
sites, if any such sites have been identified. In addition to
the severe infrastructure problems that expansion would cause,
there are serious security concerns. First, it's difficult to
understand how the FBI could deploy in an emergency in the
middle of this densely populated area with some of the worst
gridlock in the Nation. And I understand the FBI's need to
better secure its facilities but the surrounding community
believes that while the Federal Government will make an effort
to harden a potential target against attack, there doesn't seem
to be sufficient concern that the FBI's consolidated presence
at this location would leave the residents more vulnerable to
attack with an infrastructure further burdened as a result of
the expansion.
The community's also worried that during a national
emergency, requiring the deployment of the FBI, its residents
would not be able to reach the trauma center at UCLA or the VA
Medical Center to receive care. And when you realize how close
both of these facilities are, that's quite a concern. They just
wouldn't even be able to get to that place. Well, I am saying
all of this to you to express my very strong concern about the
process. It just seems to me there hasn't been a willingness to
look at alternative sites. It looks like there is a
predetermined decision to go ahead with this.
I don't like the process, but I have to tell you that I
think this is a mistake to locate the FBI in this particular
place and to go through the kind of building that is imagined
for that area, the original GSA proposal called for a two-
phased project, renovation of the existing building,
construction of two additional buildings, construction of a
470,000-square foot building, plus parking to be completed by
2016.
And there are a number of groups that are just strongly
opposed to this, Veterans Park Conservancy, West L.A. Chambers
of Commerce, Westwood Hills Property Owners Association, Bell
Air Association, Holmby Westwood Property Owners Association,
South Brentwood Homeowners, Westwood Home Owners Association,
Friends of Westwood, Westwood South of Santa Monica, Brentwood
Community Council, West Side Neighborhood Council, and I want
to include on that list their representative, the ranking
member of this committee, myself.
So I want to bring this to your attention. I don't know if
you're prepared to discuss it now.
Mr. Moravec. Well, I would say I'm sorry that you have lost
confidence in the process. I will say I have no information
that the outcome the environmental impact study has been
predetermined. We believe we are proceeding in good faith. I
know it's taking a little longer than many people would have
liked. We anticipate its issuance in October.
I think one of the reasons I've been told for the delay is
that we have attempted to cast a very wide net in a search of
alternative sites and to expand community involvement. As you
may know, we have advertised in the L.A. Times. We have run
notices on FedBizOpps. We have had meetings with the mayor. We
have had meetings with the community. We have formed an
informal voluntary group called the traffic working group,
which has now met a number of times. And I know that an
invitation has been extended to your staff to attend those
meetings.
The next meeting is on August 9th, and of course, your
input is welcome. At this point we are fulfilling our
responsibilities under the environmental impact study process.
I would hope that all of the factors that you have raised
would be taken into consideration in terms of our analysis of
what that study reveals.
Mr. Waxman. I hope so too. And I thank you for that
suggestion that there is going to be some input from all of
these other leaders in the community.
When I first raised the issue, I got a bureaucratic blowoff
letter thanking me and ``so long.'' We have gotten a little bit
more of a response, but it doesn't really--it seems to me that
this is not a good site. And I don't know if they are looking
at alternatives seriously, because if this is not a good site
there ought to be an alternative.
So we will continue to work with the GSA and with you and
others and see what we can do to solve this problem.
Mr. Moravec. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you.
Chairman Tom Davis. Dr. Moy, the Department of Defense
building standards rely on setbacks, preferring setbacks of 148
feet. Is that correct?
Dr. Moy. Yes, sir.
Chairman Tom Davis. This is a distance that can't be met in
this congressional office building, at any airport in the
Nation or in most urban areas.
Could you tell us what setback requirements were in place
in London, Tel Aviv, Madrid or other cities that have far
greater experience in terrorist attacks? And do you know what
precautions they take to protect their government facilities?
Dr. Moy. Sir, I can't address specifically as to what
offset standards are being used in other countries and other
cities or other locations.
Chairman Tom Davis. Do you know if anybody looked at those?
Dr. Moy. My expectation is that after the Khobar bombing we
did an analysis of what was being used in other locations by
other countries, and we also looked at developing tests
ourselves through our various laboratories and determining what
types of threats, what types of damage, because this goes back
to taking a look at, it is not just setting that distance. And
there is nothing else other than that distance that must be
satisfied. We take a look at what types of blast mitigation,
what types of progressive collapse has been built in the
building. We take a look at parking or traffic control that is
around the building. There are a number of issues that enter
into the adequacy of the security of a facility, not just the
offset distance.
Chairman Tom Davis. Of course. But unlike the ISC, DOD's
solution is very prescriptive.
Dr. Moy. We have determined that the vehicular bomb is the
significant threat and must be considered in any security plan
for the facilities where we have DOD employees in, sir, yes.
Chairman Tom Davis. I understand that. But when you take a
look around the world and you take a look at cities that have
gone through a lot of different bomb blasts, we have different
population makeups, you can't tell me what their standards are.
I can tell you for a fact that they are not as strict as yours,
and yet they are very deterrable. And I am very concerned.
Look, I am not faulting you, because if what your job is is
to protect the buildings and the people working in the
buildings, I can draw you something that is foolproof. I will
put you underground bunkers out in the desert surrounded by
barbed wire and troops and they will be safe. You won't be able
to hire anybody and get the job done, but you will have other
problems. But if that is your only public policy purpose, that
works.
But what I am concerned about, and I think other members of
the committee are as well, is balance. This is a lot of money.
Yeah, it has impact economically and some of this stuff can be
mitigated and some can't. But even under the language by the
ISC, there is going to have to be some changes. But they are
not nearly as prescriptive. They are much more general in their
nature. They allow for flexibility to meet certain standards.
And I am very concerned when I see a memo from the
Department of Defense, from somebody we don't even know if he
is there now or not, when he talks about, makes a comment on
a--by the way a memorandum that says not to release under FOIA.
They don't want us to see it, but it is obviously a part of DOD
making a decision on this--where they said that being in the
National Capital region is not good.
We have some of the best educated workers in the country
here, a concentration of them, that has produced DARPA, the
Internet. They've produced some wonderful things that keep our
defense No. 1 in the world. And when you move outside this
region, there is some assumption that people are going to
follow you, in an area where there is a 1.4 unemployment rate
with a great school system, and they don't necessarily follow.
They go across the street and make more money than you pay over
at DOD. Nobody even looks at that. They want to be in this
region.
Frankly, I find it very, very short-sighted. If DOD would
just face up to this instead of trying to hide in these
documents, I might feel a little bit better about the decision.
But I will tell you something right here. Mr. Moran said it
earlier, and I am going to say it. You're not going to get it
funded. You're not going get it funded through this House.
You're not going to get it funded through the Senate.
If you think it is more important to protect your brass and
these buildings than it is to provide housing for troops--
because it comes out of that budget--housing for troops out
there in the field and their families and enlisted men, you
have another thing coming, because that is not what this
Congress is about. And I think being so prescriptive puts you
out of work with ISC and other government agencies and don't
think you're so special that you're better than the
intelligence agencies and other Federal workers working around
that you need something different.
Why are you so different than everybody else that you moved
ahead instead of coordinating with these other agencies under
the Executive order that calls for coordination?
Dr. Moy. Sir, we believe we have tried to coordinate with
the----
Chairman Tom Davis. But you have different standards.
Dr. Moy. Yes, sir, and that is specifically because we have
taken the approach that we want to protect the mission as well
as the personnel against a terrorist threat.
Chairman Tom Davis. I understand this is not your problem,
but in protecting one group, it is a limited amount of money
here. It is a limited amount of money. This means fewer money
for housing for military personnel on bases because it comes
out of the same pot. I will let you answer. Go ahead.
Dr. Moy. I would also submit, sir, that if we were to take
a look at other practices, if we look at the State Department
that is allowed to--under the ISC guidelines, does put a lot
into the protection of the embassies around the world.
Chairman Tom Davis. That is around the world. This is
Washington, DC, which is a much safer haven where we can to
some extent, through immigration and visa policy and everything
else, doesn't have the track record that you have in some of
these other cities. And that is why I asked, looking at other
cities that we coordinated, see what they do routinely in
Madrid, what they do routinely in London, what they do
routinely in Tel Aviv, where you have--these are far greater
occurrences. But I understand. And look, nobody here is
faulting giving flexibility. But what your standards do is not
give flexibility.
Dr. Moy. It still boils down to the commanding officer,
installation commander, if they elect to accept that the
threat, that the risk assessment, that the mission does not
require the UFC specific requirements, there is leeway for
relaxing the requirement.
Chairman Tom Davis. Well, there is no leeway in the BRAC
recommendations. These are recommendations that have come out
that Senator Warner thinks they are illegal, but that will be
determined later on. But this is a BRAC discussion that just
says that being in the National Capital region is not good.
That certainly--that policy is not something that has been
subject to any kind of public comment. It was in a secret
meeting that is not subject to FOIA by a guy we don't even
think is still in DOD, and it just doesn't give me a high level
of confidence, but maybe other Members have different opinions.
Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. Kucinich. I want to thank the Chair for calling this
meeting because members of this panel have information that I
think is relevant to a BRAC process that has unfairly affected
our community in Cleveland. I would like to ask Dr. Moy some
questions.
When the Department of Defense analyzes the security
threats for U.S. installations, I assume it takes into account
who works there, correct? You take into account who works at a
particular installation, who works there or who would work
there?
Dr. Moy. It takes into account the mission that's there,
the criticality. Yes.
Mr. Kucinich. And the likelihood of a facility being a
target for attacks?
Dr. Moy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kucinich. Would you describe for this committee what,
according to your criteria, do you consider high value targets?
What are high value targets?
Dr. Moy. High value targets we would consider those that
are involved in the intelligence gathering, communications,
those that are very necessary in the global war on terrorism.
We take a look at those facilities that have a large number of
personnel that could very well be subject to mass casualties in
the event of a terrorist attack.
Mr. Kucinich. So it is not simply the function, it is how
many people are in the building?
Dr. Moy. That enters into the picture, yes, sir.
Mr. Kucinich. Go ahead. What else is involved in high value
targets?
Dr. Moy. It basically comes back to focusing on what the
mission of that facility is and its criticality to
accomplishing the mission of the Department of Defense, taking
a look at the number of people that are in that facility. I
would say that those are two major components to the high value
of the facility.
Mr. Kucinich. Now, the military value rankings, are they
based on supposed threats? Are they based on actual threats?
What are they based on?
Dr. Moy. Sir, I cannot address the determined military
value in that context.
Mr. Kucinich. The high value targets, what is the
underlying assumption there? Is that based on information that
the Department of Defense has or is it speculation or what?
Dr. Moy. The high value goes back to the impact that
facility has to accomplishing the mission of the Department of
Defense.
Mr. Kucinich. Well, let me ask you specifically. The
Defense Finance Administration. You're familiar with that?
Dr. Moy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kucinich. Are the Defense Finance Administration
functions considered to be high value targets?
Dr. Moy. I cannot comfortably give you a yes or no answer
to that.
Mr. Kucinich. Why not?
Dr. Moy. The function of making sure our folks are paid,
the function of making sure that our contractors are paid, I
personally would judge that as being a high value for our
service members. But in terms of considering that alongside a
facility that is supporting the global war on terrorism, there
is a difference in, of what a high value is. So I can't
arbitrarily say, yes, it is high value, period.
Mr. Kucinich. I understand. But what I am trying to
determine, I think it would be helpful for this committee, is
to be able to--so much of the work that you seem to be doing is
quantifiable.
Do you have a listing like a matrix? Does anyone on this
committee have any kind of a matrix--on the panel--have a
matrix where you list the building, who is in the building, the
threat assessment based on real or supposed threats, the
ranking as to what the value is with respect to the--from high
to low value target and where would accountants and other
civilian defense employees fall into that kind of a matrix? Do
you have any kind of documents like that in your possession?
And if you do, Mr. Chairman, I think it would be useful for
this committee to ask for those documents.
Chairman Tom Davis. Well, we'll ask for them. And if not,
we can subpoena them.
Dr. Moy. Sir, I don't believe that we have any documents,
either individually or in one place, that would array the
500,000-some facilities in the Department of Defense ranking
them from one to zero.
Mr. Kucinich. I guess the question then becomes, how do
they come to that conclusion whether something is a high value
target or not?
We are told that enters into a decision as far as BRAC.
Now, if that enters into the decision and we have the person
who is charged with----
Chairman Tom Davis. I guess the question is how is that
conclusion reached if there is not a ranking?
Dr. Moy. With the specifics of, again, relating to how you
reach that decision according to BRAC, I would have to say I
cannot answer that question. But in terms of addressing
specific facilities, what I was trying to answer the question
is, I don't know what inventory that we have that--a
comprehensive inventory that we have for all of our facilities.
Chairman Tom Davis. You don't have a listing. But do you
have general guidelines?
Dr. Moy. We have, JSSEWG teams that go out and inspect
installations, inspect key facilities. They come back and----
Chairman Tom Davis. Do you have anything on this particular
facility Mr. Kucinich is asking?
Mr. Kucinich. I appreciate the indulgence of the Chair here
and the assistance, because the question that comes, you know,
since we had this as a general discussion, and you don't--you
would rather be specific, so would I.
In the draft analysis we have a site--and Mr. LaTourette is
familiar with this because he has been leading this effort--the
Defense Bratenahl site was ranked, was rated as the 6th highest
in terms of military value, which compares to Denver at 3rd,
Columbus at 9th, Indianapolis at 12, and Cleveland downtown at
13, but the Bratenahl site was eliminated from the final
rankings, and I am wondering why, speculating here as to why
DOD didn't offer a scenario site to include DFAS to a site down
the street which would save 1,200 jobs.
So, again, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that this committee
can perform a service by trying to pin down the Department of
Defense on this criteria, because there is something about the
criteria that seems nebulous and its application which seems
arbitrary.
Chairman Tom Davis. Dr. Moy, you didn't make the BRAC
decisions though, is that right? You're not in that loop?
Dr. Moy. No, sir.
Mr. Kucinich. I understood that, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Tom Davis. But you would be, or could get us
information in the loop in terms of how this was ranked, how
someone came out and looked at this and evaluated this and
decided somehow this is a high value target, couldn't you?
Dr. Moy. I could certainly take that for the record.
Chairman Tom Davis. If you could get back to us for the
record, which is what we want to look at. And if you can't do
that, I know the record is somewhere. You just tell us you
don't feel we can have it, and then we can proceed from there
to see what we might need to do. I understand--this isn't meant
personally, you just happen to be the flack guy they sent out
here today and you have some knowledge about how this stuff
happens. And we are just trying to get some answers. But
there's obviously some disagreement among Members about some of
the individual decisions that have come out of the agency. And
we are just trying to get answers and to the extent you can
give it to us, we will try to get it. Any other questions?
Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for your
participation in helping to get some answers. Thank you, Mr.
LaTourette.
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. LaTourette, do you have any
questions?
Mr. LaTourette. If I could followup on what Congressman
Kucinich is asking and if we are asking Dr. Moy to find the
former Under Secretary Johnson, I do have one more question I
would like to ask him for the record.
But Mr. Williams, not to ignore you, I think Congressman
Kucinich has asked a good series of questions and I keep
reading in the newspaper that the Department of Homeland
Security is interested in chatter. We want to see what people
are talking about and what sites are at risk. When we go about
allocating our scarce homeland security money there is a real
argument to be made that the lion's share should go to places
like Washington, DC, and New York City.
Are you aware of any chatter that has targeted the
accountants at DFAS that indicates that they are particularly
at-risk members of our Defense Department? The reason I ask you
is that I think this is the first BRAC round that has put the
accountants in with the soldiers, the warfighters. And I think
it is a little bit like trying to take a square peg and put it
into a round hole. But are you aware of any chatter that the
accountants are in danger?
Mr. Williams. I don't have any specific information, no.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank you for that.
And Dr. Moy, the other thing I would ask you just if you
can find out, one of the successful sites is the Buckley Annex,
which is in Denver. And again the Air Force member at another--
I don't know if it was a secret meeting but it was another
meeting not subject to FOIA, that occurs and it is listed on
January 19. And it is the second of the two documents that I
provided to you. The Air Force member asked if the Buckley
annex is the best place for DFAS to be located considering the
high labor rates in Denver, and aside from the issue of
terrorism, cost is something that is of interest to us. And I
think, again, to be parochial, Cleveland was just labeled the
most impoverished city in America. And it has a workforce that
is substantially lower labor rates than Denver. And if you
could ask whoever you're going to ask to get back to us and
they can make a comment on what is 6(a) on the second document
from January 19, I would appreciate that.
Chairman Tom Davis. And Dr. Moy when we say, ``get back to
us'' again, this is not directed to you personally.
Could you get back within 2 weeks from today and if you
don't have it, at least tell us where you are on getting it?
DOD, your agency, sometimes works on things for years at a time
and doesn't come up with it.
We just need to know what kind of response we are likely to
get, what manpower is involved and you can get back to us and
we will try to work through it and see what we can get or get
the subpoena out. But I think at this point if we could--just
let us know how it is working and what is involved with it. We
will try to work it out. We are not trying to be hard here. But
obviously Members have some issues.
Dr. Moy. Absolutely, sir.
Chairman Tom Davis. Any other questions, Mr. LaTourette?
Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Chairman, before you get on to the next
person, I just want to say all of us in the Cleveland area
appreciate the exceptional work that Congressman LaTourette has
done on this, and the information that he has produced is very
important to all of us.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Also, we are trying to find out where the missing Mr.
Johnson is, too.
If that is one of the questions, maybe you can find that
out in the next 2 weeks, too.
Dr. Moy. Yes, sir.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Now, first I want to join in with those who have expressed
congratulations to Mr. Moravec for his years of service. He has
been a first class professional. I have worked with him for 15
years in the GSA. Regardless of administration, he sets
standards. Sorry to see you go.
Mr. Moravec. Thank you very much. That is very generous of
you, Congresswoman.
Ms. Norton. Let's look at what the DOD has done. I am tired
of the use of these letters. Let's break it down here right
now. When people hear DOD, they think they are hearing things
like the Pentagon, you know, guys in uniforms, brass. So the
word can be used when it is used generically to the average
American, let's see if it calls to mind the personnel and the
agencies that would be moved out of northern Virginia. Dr. Moy
even evoked the State Department standard in foreign countries
of embassies. So you see what we have here. We are trying to
create an image of what is being moved based on the kind of
generic image that the public has of what the DOD is.
I think it is only fair to ask our witnesses to break down
for us the agencies and the kinds of personnel we are talking
about moving from northern Virginia to an army base, and I
would like to have the greatest specificity you can offer, and
I should hope that you did not come here without being able to
go behind the word ``DOD.''
Speak up whoever wants to speak up first.
Dr. Moy. Ma'am, let me try to answer your question this
way. I am not going to be able to go through a line item
description of all the things that are being moved from one
location----
Ms. Norton. Just do your best. I know you're not ignorant
on this score. Because given your title, I know you're not
ignorant. So I am not asking for line-by-line item. I am asking
for--to the best of your ability, name me the agencies, name me
the kinds of personnel that work in those agencies.
Dr. Moy. We have--the people that work in these agencies
are a mixture of uniformed and civilian personnel. And if we go
back to----
Ms. Norton. What percentage are uniform and what percentage
are civilian personnel? Are most of these uniform? Are most of
these civilian? What kinds of work do they do in these
agencies?
Dr. Moy. In answer to your question about the percentages,
I cannot give you an answer to that. The answer to your
question about what kind of work these folks do, they do a
variety of work. Some support the intelligence requirements for
the Department. Some support the acquisition of equipment, of
weapon systems, some support the facilities, business of the
Department. There is a variety of things that these folks
provide for the Department of Defense.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Moravec, these are agencies that you have
been responsible for finding leased spaced for in northern
Virginia.
Would you, to the best of your knowledge, tell me some of
the agencies involved? You found the space, and the kinds of
personnel that are found in those agencies, are they generals?
Are they military personnel? Are they uniformed personnel for
the most part?
Mr. Moravec. I would simply concur with Dr. Moy's
characterization. This is a diverse workforce consisting of
uniformed and civilian personnel working on a very wide variety
of Department of Defense headquarters type functions, high
administrative functions for the most part.
Ms. Norton. The figures I have been given are for civilian
15,754; military, which does not necessarily mean uniform,
6,199.
Now, I would like you to provide to the chairman of this
committee the exact agencies and a rundown of the personnel
functions they do. It is my understanding that these are mostly
people who do the same kinds of things that are done for other
agencies. You know, the kinds of things that are located in
northern Virginia, for example, is inspector general, there are
education and training facilities, there are researchers. But I
think you have an obligation to disaggregate for this committee
what you're talking about and to rebut my assertion that we are
talking about people that look like the same people who are
sitting all across the region doing the same kinds of
administrative tasks that they do, including contractors, who
often are in some of these buildings side by side with Federal
workers, but not contractors working on some great big nuclear
secret, not contractors like people in embassies, but
contractors like people doing essentially the kind of head work
that most terrorists could care less about. I can understand
their interest in military facilities.
But I ask you to provide within 30 days to the chairman of
this committee, Dr. Moy, a breakdown of the line-by-line that
you, of course, do not have in your head, of the agencies
involved.
I have been involved with the BRAC matter because there is
a facility here which raises wholly different concerns. And of
course, that is Walter Reed Hospital. And what I have tried to
do is to understand what the BRAC calls for. So I said to my
people who don't want Walter Reed to move, don't want to hear
what a nice thing it is for the community. These are military
folks, and the foremost of the standards is military value.
So my question is--really goes to this. Weeks before BRAC
ever came out, the Defense Department announced that it wanted
to move these personnel from northern Virginia to an army base.
Then here comes BRAC. And BRAC says, guess what? We want to
move these people to an army base. In the law we would call
this protectoral, that the decision had been made quite apart
from military value to move these facilities.
And I would like you, Mr. Williams, and you, Dr. Moy, to
describe what the military value is to the U.S. taxpayer of
moving personnel specialists, researchers, many of whom simply
have their headquarters or offices there, training facilities
and the like, into a shuttered army base where for good reasons
we make it very difficult to get in.
Yes, sir. Mr. Williams.
Mr. Williams. I, for one, don't feel that I am qualified to
respond to what the mission and the mission needs are of DOD.
Again, as a chairperson of the ISC, we are primarily concerned
with non-military activities. So I have not been involved in
that.
Ms. Norton. Aren't you on this 12-person agency--task
force? I am sorry.
Mr. Williams. Which----
Ms. Norton. The interagency group that together is supposed
to consider all these matters so that you have at the table,
for example, not the DOD making a decision by itself, oh no,
but with the input of GSA, God help us, of the Department of
Homeland Security. Or is DOD out there by themselves and it
doesn't matter what the standards are for everybody else?
Mr. Williams. Well, again, DOD was part of developing the
ISC standards. And we have set them minimum standards so there
is quite an array of missions between the many government
agencies that could require great elevation of those standards.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Williams, I would hope that these standards
meet the necessary flexibility, agency by agency. Are you
saying that no amount of flexibility or of thinking or of
drawing in experts was possible to avoid moving mostly
civilian, non-military, administrative employees to an army
base, that this was the last resort, these personnel are so
valuable to the terrorists, we look at so many options for
making sure that they were safe, cross them all off, just
couldn't do another thing and finally said, ``Golly, these
folks have to go to an army base because there is no way else
to protect them,'' and we don't know, and the private sector is
not able to help us provide ways to keep them where they are,
we are going to undertake this for that reason? You are saying
all those options were looked at?
Dr. Moy. Ma'am, I would like to add that the issue of
moving the subject people to an army base, that the unified
facilities criteria was not the only----
Ms. Norton. What was not the only? I am sorry, what was not
the only criteria?
Dr. Moy. The Unified Facilities Criteria, the anti-
terrorism force protection criteria was not the decisionmaker
for moving people.
Ms. Norton. What was the major criteria then?
Dr. Moy. It always goes back to military value. But it
takes a look at--the intent was to try to gain efficiencies of
placing like functions together, trying to address command and
control among units, placing them in closer proximity, in terms
of cost savings of moving them to DOD or federally owned
facilities. So there are a number of things that entered into
the decision, not just whether they met the anti-terrorism
force protection requirements of the Department.
Ms. Norton. Of course, although that is the primary point
here. Gentlemen, the carving out of the DOD almost entirely, it
would appear, regardless of the personnel, regardless of the
function, calls into question all you have done for Federal
workers. You've taken the largest number. Maybe Homeland
Security now, Mr. Williams, is the largest number. We cannot
fail to believe that your standards are worthless because after
DOD I don't know why, Mr. Williams, you won't be here saying, I
am sorry, we have to move all the personnel. Of course, they
are all civilians, but somebody might attack them, so we just
have to move them as far as we can.
And I want you to tell me, Mr. Williams, what is the
difference between you and Dr. Moy when it comes to moving
facilities based on exposure to terrorism, and he says a whole
bunch of other matters. I don't see the distinction.
Mr. Williams. Again, the ISC, we have--there was a
collaborative effort that I think involved many entities from
National Capital Planning Commission on through. We have
developed a set of minimum standards that are very flexible.
They can be tailored based on the mission of the individual----
Ms. Norton. But these are not--please answer my question.
They weren't tailored. You gave up on the standards here and
moved them to a military base which is the most secure place
you can locate in our country. So they are outside of the
standards.
Mr. Moravec. I am not sure I would agree with the
characterization of the ISC standards as worthless. They are
adequate for the purpose for which they were intended, which
was to establish a minimum baseline of security upgrades to
which private landlords could respond. They provide a
reasonable level of protection under most circumstances. The
ISC standards definitely reduce or mitigate the threat. They
don't eliminate it. And I would also----
Ms. Norton. Mr. Moravec, if that were the case in your own
testimony you mentioned level 4 standards. You yourself I am
sure are no small part, given your expertise, responsible for
and you say what some of these standards are and they can be
very burdensome. You say it could involve control of common
entrances, parking areas, some inspection, and the like. And
then you go on to say one solution may be to consolidate
agencies with similar security profiles, to secure efficient
and cost effective building occupancy. But you say, ``may
receive less interest from the market.'' That is to say, what
you require, let's say an already leased space, may receive
less interest from the market and be less competitive.
I would like to know what is the evidence from the market
in northern Virginia that that leased space was unwilling to
try to meet standards--your standards--with some flexibility.
What is the evidence? Did you call them together? Have you
drawn in the development community, a very extensive community
around the National Capital area, sat them down at a table,
told them what you are up against, that your personnel
specialists and DOD needs to be in an army base unless they
will, in fact, conform to some of these more burdensome
standards and if so, what did they say, did they say, yeah, I
guess you have to move them to an army base?
Mr. Moravec. The private sector was very definitely
extensively involved in the creation of the ISC standards.
There was extensive consultation, not just in the National
Capital region, but around the country with private landlords
as to how they would respond to different kinds of security
countermeasures that would be mandated as part of a
solicitation for offer of space. So they were very definite.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Moravec, please answer my question. I asked
you because the chairman wants me to go on. I asked whether the
private development sector here, which you say may be less
willing to conform with these standards, whether these people
were told this is likely to happen, you are likely to have
agencies increasingly moved to shuttered bases unless you think
deeply and creatively about whether you can meet these
standards? If you have, I want to know when and I want to know
who.
Mr. Moravec. We didn't tell anybody that as part of the ISC
process. Basically we developed the standards and thus far we
really mostly have anecdotal evidence as to what the reaction
is. Other than level 4 protection, which requires pretty much
complete control of access to the building and parking areas
and segregated heating, ventilating and air conditioning
systems for big parts of the public areas of the buildings, we
don't think that the private sector is going to have a hard
time responding competitively with regard to the first three
levels of security. The big difference between the DOD
standards and the ISC standards have to do with setback and
blast protection. Basically the DOD standards are incorporating
and actually enhancing what we call the security design
criteria for Federal construction, and they are applying it to
leased space. So they are fairly consistent with the ISC; in
other words, the rest of the Federal community standards for
security for owned space. But they are applying it to leased
space. So philosophically it is consistent. It is just
requiring a much higher level of security.
Ms. Norton. Could I just ask, Mr. Chairman, could I ask you
to call a meeting of the development community in this area to
put before them what may face them, to begin to get them to
think about what you should get them to think about anyway,
because you know that you have owned space, space you own in
the District of Columbia and Maryland that you can't begin to
move anywhere? So you should have had them coming in and
talking about the Ronald Reagan Building down there. You own
it. Yes, there are private agencies there, but those agencies
remain there, but you control the parking. And you are in
greater control of that building. The fact is that you do not
have open to you the option that has been used with BRAC as a
subterfuge and a pretext in order to try to move things out of
northern Virginia. You know you can't move it out of the
District of Columbia. You know you can't move the Pentagon. You
know you can't move the National Capital area.
And what this process reveals is that there is almost no
innovative or creative thinking going on among those who are in
charge of the facilities in this area. If there were, we would
have heard some of that back. You already said that you have
not called in the development community. I am asking you
specifically to do that.
Call them in. Lay it on the table. Do it not only because
we want to keep people from moving out, do it because you owe
it to us because you have buildings in D.C. not only like the
building that the chairman brought to your attention, you have
the Secret Service here. You have the FBI here. And you have
departments I won't even name here. And only when you begin to
do that will you be able to protect those who are here, much
less running for cover--and that is why I am ashamed of you--
running for cover by essentially giving up when we are talking
mostly about workers like every other worker around here, not
people who are attached to security at all, and every last one
of you at the table know it.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Moravec. I may not be clear, but we have involved and
will involve the private industry in the evolution of the
interagency security standards. This is a living document that
will be adjusted as we learn more.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman, could I ask that you ask the
developer or at least perhaps as part of another hearing ask
the development community to come before us and testify what
they think of----
Chairman Tom Davis. We'll certainly ask them. And I know we
had a meeting with DOD, and DOD, which is their restrictions
are far worse than I see from a development point of view. We
have had some meetings informing them of what would be helpful
hearing from them. We can do that. But thank you very much.
Ms. Watson, and then Mrs. Tubbs Jones.
Ms. Watson. Thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman. I think
this is a very critical hearing we are having this morning. I
would like to thank the panelists as well.
I was a U.S. Ambassador assigned to the Federated States of
Micronesia. Our Secretary of State constantly informed us of
the new standards, this back in the late nineties. And so I
brought my packet to Washington, DC, to the State Department
describing our facility. They told me, sorry, I was No. 80. I
would be No. 81 on a list of 80 that were already there. So our
attention is not going to the needs of all of our embassies
overseas. I was just turned down flat. Because we were right on
the road. If somebody wanted to do us harm, all they would have
to do is throw a canister up on the roof and that would be it.
I say that to say we are all at risk. So I think I am going
to address this question to Mr. Moravec.
You mentioned in your testimony that the ISC Security
standards for leased space do not preclude the utilization of
space in the central business districts. And as a result of the
Oklahoma City bombing, the ISC was formed.
I want to know, do our offices that we lease as Federal
employees and as elected officials come within that standard?
If not, why not? We lease space. And let me go just a minute
further. We got a call--three calls from the FBI in Los Angeles
that there had been a threat made not only to my person, but to
my office. I asked my staff to find out more about it. So I
called the agent that had called our office, and I inquired.
When I came here, I called the FBI. They moved this guy out of
my region.
And so I am saying, if we are threatened, then I should be
able to instruct my staff and my constituents when they come to
my office what risk they are under when they come. I could
never get any information.
So let me know, Mr. Moravec, if you consider our federally
leased space within the standards. And I wrote down here, are
we a high value target or not? And if not, why not?
Mr. Moravec. Well, the ISC standards have just become
formalized within the last 5 months. So it is clear that not
all buildings are in compliance with the ISC standards at this
point. Every Federal agency, regardless of whether they are in
owned or leased space, is supposed to have an occupant
emergency plan. There is supposed to be a building security
committee chaired by the highest ranking member of the largest
tenant in a Federal building, whether it is owned or leased,
that is responsible for developing an emergency plan
specifically for that building and in consultation with the
Department of Homeland Security and with the building
management with GSA.
Ms. Watson. It is not happening. I am in Los Angeles and
right down the street from the freeway that Mr. Waxman
mentioned and our districts are. Whatever happens in his
district impacts mine as well. And I am right up to the
airport. I don't have the airport. But I go right up to it. And
we are not informed.
Mr. Moravec. Are you in a federally owned building or a
multi-tenant?
Ms. Watson. No. I am in leased space in a commercial
building. So my question to you is, do the regulations and the
requirements apply to Members, Federal employees who are in
leased space?
Mr. Moravec. Absolutely they do.
Ms. Watson. OK. Well, I haven't seen any of that. And we
then asked the manager and the owners of the building to help
us secure our property and then I asked the FBI for more
details? You know, are they going to try to get us in our cars,
underground, my staff that comes and goes on public
transportation. You know, help us reduce the risk and protect
our people. I have not seen any of that.
Mr. Moravec. Well, we will endeavor to do better.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you. The standards are new. They
are brand new. It takes a long time. Even DOD standards are
just starting to kick in, when these leases are expiring and
the like. But thank you very much. Ms. Tubbs Jones.
Ms. Tubbs-Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the
opportunity to ask just a couple of questions. Good morning.
Well, almost afternoon. I come from Cleveland, OH. You already
heard from two of my colleagues, Dennis Kucinich and Steve
LaTourette, with respect to a BRAC closing of a DFAS facility
in our congressional district.
I guess what I am interested in is in the process of a
BRAC, what consideration is given to the existing facility that
a group of employees is working in as compared to a new
facility, a facility that they would be moved to for purposes
of considering whether the BRAC should take place? Are you
understanding my question or am I confusing you? I see the
frown. That is I why I'm asking.
Mr. Moravec. I understand your question. I would have to
take that for the record, and I am not able to answer your
question now.
Chairman Tom Davis. He was not part of the BRAC process
formally. He was part of the group that formulated some of the
security details of buildings.
Ms. Jones. So what I am interested in is to whomever this
question will be directed, so it will be clear, so that they
won't be confused about what I am asking, is the DFAS employees
who are currently in a Federal facility on 9th Street, the
physical Federal buildings?
Mr. Moravec. Celebrisi Building. It is a beautiful building
from the 1960's. It has aged very well. We are very proud of
that at the GSA.
Ms. Jones. Depends on who you ask. Regardless of that, what
consideration is given to the security of that facility as
compared to a facility that they would be moved to if they were
moved to Denver or Columbus or Indianapolis in terms of
pointing and deciding where--what is the best place for this
DFAS to be located? That is what I am interested in knowing,
and anything else that my colleagues asked. And since I am at
the end of this and the chairman has been so kind, that will be
the only question I will ask today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
I am trying try to get back on all those issues. Dr.
Moravec, you just make sure you have a conversation with the
staff so you know what you are supposed to get back and just do
your best to try to get some of the information and let us know
where we are. I know some of these requests may seem fairly
cumbersome, but you can get back and work out what we need to
answer some of the Members' questions.
Dr. Moy. Yes, sir.
Chairman Tom Davis. I want to thank everybody. It has been
2 hours. Dr. Moy, you don't get combat pay for coming up today.
But I would be happy to make that recommendation to your
superior.
Dr. Moy. Sir, I enjoy being your constituent.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much and nothing from--I
don't think is addressed to you personally, it is obvious that
there is frustration with some of the decisions and some of the
decision matrix coming out of the departments. And you are the
guy that is here. But we appreciate the job all of you are
doing on this and I just want to say, it isn't always easy
where we sit either. But thank you, very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[Note.--DOD did not submit responses to committee members'
questions for the record.]
[The prepared statement of Hon. Jon C. Porter follows:]
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