<DOC>
[109th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:22809.wais]
CONTROLLING RESTRICTED AIRSPACE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE MANAGEMENT AND
COORDINATION OF OUR NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 21, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-50
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee DIANE E. WATSON, California
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
DARRELL E. ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
JON C. PORTER, Nevada BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia Columbia
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina ------
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina (Independent)
------ ------
Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director
Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on July 21, 2005.................................... 1
Statement of:
D'Agostino, Davi M., Director, Defense Capabilities and
Management, Government Accountability Office, accompanied
by Brian Lepore, Assistant Director Defense Capabilities
and Management, Government Accountability Office........... 21
McHale, Paul, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense, Department of Defense; Major General Marvin S.
Mayes, Commander, 1st Air Force and Continental U.S. North
American Aerospace Defense Command Region, Department of
Defense; and Robert A. Sturgell, Deputy Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration............................ 76
McHale, Paul............................................. 76
Mayes, Major General Marvin S............................ 89
Sturgell, Robert A....................................... 97
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Maryland, prepared statement of............... 18
D'Agostino, Davi M., Director, Defense Capabilities and
Management, Government Accountability Office, prepared
statement of............................................... 25
Davis, Chairman Tom, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Virginia:
Prepared statement of.................................... 4
Prepared statement of Mr. Kasprisin...................... 68
Mayes, Major General Marvin S., Commander, 1st Air Force and
Continental U.S. North American Aerospace Defense Command
Region, Department of Defense, prepared statement of....... 91
McHale, Paul, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense, Department of Defense, prepared statement of...... 79
Sturgell, Robert A., Deputy Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration, prepared statement of...................... 99
Waxman, Hon. Henry A., a Representative in Congress from the
State of California, prepared statement of................. 11
CONTROLLING RESTRICTED AIRSPACE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE MANAGEMENT AND
COORDINATION OF OUR NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 21, 2005
House of Representatives,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room 2154 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays
(acting chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Davis of Virginia, Shays, Mica,
Duncan, Miller, Issa, Porter, Foxx, Waxman, Cummings, Kucinich,
Clay, Watson, Van Hollen, Ruppersberger, Higgins, and Norton.
Staff present: Melissa Wojciak, staff director; David
Marin, deputy staff director/communications director; Keith
Ausbrook, chief counsel; Jennifer Safavian, chief counsel for
oversight and investigations; Anne Marie Turner, counsel; Rob
White, press secretary; Drew Crockett, deputy director of
communications; Grace Washbourne, professional staff member;
Teresa Austin, chief clerk; Sarah D'Orsie, deputy clerk, Leneal
Scott, computer systems manager; Andrew Su, minority
professional staff member; Earley Green, minority chief clerk;
Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.
Mr. Shays. Good morning and welcome to the Committee on
Government Reform's hearing on the United States' restricted
airspace and how the Federal Government coordinates the
protection of that space.
While we are all aware that restricted airspace exists
across the national capital region, restricted airspace is also
scattered throughout the United States. It includes such
obvious places as Camp David and Crawford, TX to military
bases.
There can be temporary flight restrictions put in place
during certain sporting events and of course, depending on the
President's location. It is incumbent on pilots to be aware of
these areas and they learn of them through the FAA Notices to
Airmen.
To give you a sense of what we are talking about, we have
two maps on display. One map shows all the restricted spaces
and prohibited areas in the United States, including military
bases.
If you look at the coastal areas of the United States, you
can see there is a contiguous air defense identification zone
[ADIZ] which encompasses the entire U.S. water border. There is
also an ADIZ surrounding Alaska and Hawaii. These zones are in
place for defense purposes and they establish requirements for
incoming international flights, including providing an
established flight plan before entering the ADIZ.
The other map shows the restricted airspace over the
national capital region. In total, the D.C. prohibited airspace
is approximately 20,000 square miles. The map shows two rings
around the region. The inside ring is the flight restricted
zone [FRZ]. The FRZ is the 15 miles around Ronald Reagan
National Airport, or DCA. Included within the FRZ is prohibited
airspace over the White House, the National Mall, the U.S.
Capitol, the Naval Observatory and Mount Vernon, VA.
The outside ring is the ADIZ. The D.C. ADIZ is a 30-mile
radius around DCA which spans out to Dulles, BWI, and the
Andrews Air Force Base. At the top left of the map you can see
the bottom of a circle. This is the 3-mile prohibited airspace
for Camp David in Thurmont, MD, which would be expanded when
the President is at Camp David.
These maps of restricted airspace look daunting. It may
seem even more daunting when we take into account the many
departments and agencies responsible for watching this
airspace. That is why we are here today, to better understand
how these entities are working to manage and coordinate their
efforts to protect and defend the United States restricted
airspace.
One of the best steps taken in this effort was the creation
of the National Capital Regional Coordination Center [NCRCC].
Housed in Herndon, VA, the NCRCC is an interagency group that
monitors D.C.'s prohibited airspace 24 hours a day, 7 days a
week.
The Washington, DC, area is the only area of the country
with such a center. The Department of Defense, FAA, the Secret
Service, Customs, and Border Protection and the U.S. Capitol
Police, along with the TSA, which acts as the executive agency,
are represented at NCRCC full-time. During major events or
search operations, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the
U.S. Park Police, the Coast Guard and local law enforcement,
including D.C. Police, are also NCRCC participants.
Each agency or department at NCRCC is responsible for its
own mission and jurisdiction as it relates to airspace
security. However, the participants work together in
identifying airspace that are violated or may violate
prohibited airspace. While the response to each possible
aircraft violation is decided by each government entity
independently of the others, the information is immediately
shared by all participants at the NCRCC. That, at least, is our
understanding of how it works.
I know the Government Accountability Office [GAO], has some
concerns about how well the coordination and information
sharing actually functions. According to NCRCC statistics,
updated as of July 17, 2005, there has been 3,495 airspace
incursions in the National Capital Region since January 17,
2003. These statistics are on the overhead. Airspace incursion
can include a variety of incidents, including as you see on the
overheard, FRZ violations, Camp David TFR violations, and
penetrations of prohibited airspace; 655 out of the 3,495
incursions resulted in the decision to launch or divert
Government assets to intercept an aircraft.
As many of you know, occasionally these airspace violations
lead the Capitol Police or the Secret Service to evacuate the
Capitol complex and the White House. While none of us are
particularly fond of the evacuations, to say the least, I think
it is important to note that only 3 times out of the 3,495
incursions has that happened.
Despite the work of the NCRCC, there are still questions to
be asked regarding coordination of the U.S. airspace. Today,
GAO is releasing an unclassified version of their report on the
interagency management of restricted airspace.
GAO asks some important questions: How is air defense
working without a single Government agency taking the lead? How
do we adequately determine a threat to the prohibited airspace
when agencies and departments have different definitions of
what constitutes a threat?
How will DOD, FAA, and DHS continue to work to improve
information sharing? I believe these are all valid questions
that merit discussion and these agencies will have a chance to
respond to GAO's concerns.
In the Washington area we have three commercial airports,
countless general aviation airports. We are pleased to welcome
general aviation back to Reagan National--all of this aviation
combined with the flight restriction we see on the maps clearly
show that protecting America's airspace, particularly around
the Nation's Capital, is a challenge.
As the committee responsible for oversight of the Federal
Government and the District of Columbia, it is our obligation
to ensure these agencies are working seamlessly together. A
fast, coordinated response is absolutely vital if we are ever
again faced with an aircraft with hostile intent.
Thank you for your patience in listening to the statement.
This is the chairman's statement.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Tom Davis follows:]
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Mr. Shays. I now yield to the ranking member, Mr. Waxman,
for any statement he would like to make.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all the
witnesses who are going to be appearing before the committee.
Almost 4 years after the horrific attacks on our country of
September 11, 2001, we are still trying to shore up
vulnerabilities to our Nation's air defense. I know it is a
formidable effort. Yet we know that despite our best efforts
thousands of violations of restricted airspace have occurred,
some of them dangerously close to high risk targets and large
populations.
The way our current system is working, agencies have only
minutes to react when a plane enters a restricted area. Clear
coordination, command and control structures and plans are
essential in responding quickly to a situation.
Most of these violations, however, are accidental. Pilots
can better avoid restricted airspaces, but they need updated
information on no-fly zones and temporary restricted areas.
In some cases the administration's zeal to keep information
secret from the public has undermined national security rather
than enhanced it. This is also true for air security.
This week the Congressional Quarterly Weekly reported that
the Federal Aviation Administration placed restricted airspace
around the Nation's nuclear power plants, but would not tell
pilots where the power plants were located. The locations, they
said, were considered sensitive security information.
How are pilots supposed to stay away from high risk targets
if they are not told where those targets are? Eventually, FAA
softened its order and now allows the Pilots Association to
post maps indicating the general areas pilots are supposed to
avoid.
However, new FAA advisory notices remain vague instructing
pilots to avoid the airspace near all power plants, refineries,
industrial complexes, military facilities and other similar
facilities.
So, Mr. Chairman, not only do we need to reexamine our
aviation security policies so that there are improvements in
Federal planning and cooperation, but we can also better
communicate the growing number of restricted airspaces to the
public and aviation community.
By doing so we can focus our attention on those who intend
to harm us and avoid as many of these false alarms as possible.
I want to thank the chairman again for calling this
hearing. I understand it is the first time that any
congressional committee has examined the progress of Federal
agencies in controlling restricted airspace since September
11th. I believe our discussion today will improve our national
air defense.
I look forward to the witnesses' testimony. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Henry A. Waxman follows:]
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Mr. Shays. I thank the gentlemen for his statement. At this
time the Chair will recognize Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I don't have
a formal opening statement. You have covered the topic more
than adequately. I would just simply say that, you know, we
have over 700 million passengers flying commercially in this
country and millions more flying in general aviation. The bulk
of those are in the eastern half of the United States.
So, we have a very crowded airspace, especially in this
region. This is a very difficult problem. I am pleased that you
are looking into this in the way that you are and I look
forward to hearing from the witnesses. Thank you very much.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentlemen. At this time the Chair
would recognize Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Of course, I
have a special interest in this hearing and regret that because
of other hearings I won't be able to be here the entire time.
But because this is the Nation's Capital and because these
incidents have begun to happen with just a little regularity,
this is an important hearing for getting to the bottom of it.
Since we are all amateurs at this, we have never had to deal
with a situation like September 11th, we need to systematically
look at what needs to be done, kind of the zero budgeting way.
If you started from scratch, what would you do?
I am concerned about the coordination of airspace. The only
people who seem to know what to do are the people in the jets
who get up pretty fast, ready to shoot somebody down, the last
thing we want to have happen, of course.
I am pleased that somehow, and I don't know if this is an
accident or not, the planes that have penetrated the space have
been small planes. I would be very interested to know whether
or not there is some way, something in our system that we keep
with planes we really feel, the September 11th planes, from
doing the same thing or if we have just been lucky.
Mr. Chairman, I must say that coordination has a purpose
and the purpose is to save lives on the ground. What strikes me
as particularly amateur is the evacuations. The evacuations
have been wholesalely from the Capitol, and from these
buildings when we have had very small planes.
Now, you don't have to be a native Washingtonian to know
that among the most secure buildings in D.C. are the sub-
basements of the Capitol and of some of our office buildings
because they are old, you know, when buildings really used to
be very solidly built, and to wonder whether or not the best
place, if there is a penetration of airspace, is to be out
there in the open saying is it coming down, or to follow the
advice that now the security officials are giving everyone in
the case of an event, if you hear of any event, stay in place
and listen.
Of course, we have evacuated because the Capitol Police
have told us to evacuate. But I must say, it runs against my--
forgive the use of the non-technical word--common sense, to be
out in the open when we are dealing with what appears to be a
small plane. Or did we not know it was a small plane and why
didn't we know it before we said evacuate?
If we said evacuate, was that the right thing to do
whenever there is something overhead or only when there are
certain kinds of things overhead? Again, the coordination in
the air is for a purpose. It is to preserve lives on the
ground. I am not convinced that the evacuations of the Capitol
have been designed to or would have had the effect of
preserving lives on the ground.
I am not sure whether the President was evacuated or the
White House was evacuated to the outside or whether they were
taken to a basement. But I do think that is all part and parcel
of coordination.
Finally, let me say the historic District Building or the
historic city hall of the District of Columbia is within a
stone's throw of the White House. When these evacuations
occurred, they are supposed to occur around that endangered
area. I would think that they would involve not only the White
House and the Capitol, but other parts of the city that are in
close proximity.
These are some of the questions I would want the panel to
answer. I thank you very much.
Chairman Tom Davis [presiding]. Thank you. Mr. Mica.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you also for
conducting this hearing. First of all, I appreciate, as
chairman of the House Aviation Subcommittee, Government Reform
taking a look at this. You do have broad jurisdiction over all
of the agencies and I think it is important that this type of
review take place.
We did, after the so-called Ernie Fletcher flight last
year, conduct a hearing. We looked at some of the problems that
had occurred in sort of a disjointed effort in detecting planes
and then alerting folks and the different agencies that were
involved.
I think you outlined here in your briefing paper the
corrective actions that have been taken by the various
agencies. I think it is important that we still look at
problems that we continue to have.
I know that there are proposals being drafted and we are
trying to work with folks to look at possibly adjusting some of
the penalties. The information I have is that in 2003 there
were 998 violations and in 2004, 600 violations into the
National Capital airspace.
Only a very few folks received penalties. We may need to
look at that. I don't favor exorbitant fines. We were trying,
before September 11, on the Aviation Subcommittee, to actually
open up some more of the airspace because we have more
airplanes in the air and we have limited corridors in which to
fly.
Again, I don't favor exorbitant fines. I think we have to
look at intent and disregard for rules and law. In that case
I'm in favor of throwing the book at offenders.
We are going to take up legislation maybe as early as
September, but in the fall, to consider increasing the fines.
They are currently, I guess, $1,100 and it is discretionary
within FAA. That is for an incursion in 30 to 45 miles in the
ADIZ zone, air defense zone.
A possible 90-day suspension is the current penalty. That
may have to in fact be toughened up. The flight restricted zone
which again comes in a lot closer, 15 miles, there are
proposals to increase fines. Some of them that we are looking
at may be as much as $100,000 to 5 years and without any
discretion of imposing the fine. So, those are some of the
things that we are looking at that would certainly get people's
attention.
Again, there can be unintentional violations of airspace.
There may be a need in weather and other conditions to get into
airspace. There are still concerns. We have had actually two
tests of the system.
The Fletcher flight was one of the faster ones. It was a
small jet. It was going around 240 miles an hour. Even at that
speed, you can reach the Capitol within 20 minutes from outside
the zone.
Smaller aircrafts, again we can track. We have some warning
time. However, we haven't been tested by a large aircraft
traveling at 500 miles an hour. That will give us a very short
window of opportunity.
I know that they are looking at these planes that either
get off course or are off course even further out than the 50-
mile zone. I think that is something that we have to consider.
The thing that concerns me is the approach. First of all a
terrorist is not going to abide by our rules of flying at
certain levels and speeds. They are going to come in at treetop
level. We haven't had that experience, except we did have one
where a small aircraft did hit the White House under the
Clinton administration, or a tree in front of the White House,
to be more specific. So, we still have that threat.
Then we have the threat of a large aircraft coming in at
500 miles an hour with a very limited warning time. Finally, we
have a disconnect still. We have FAA, DOD, TSA, DHS and Secret
Service who have much better coordinated their efforts. I'm not
sure how you solve this, how different folks go on alert like
the Capitol and that needs to be addressed.
The Capitol Police did order the last evacuation, but
others did not. The District of Columbia, again we have a
disconnect there in notifying police. Others are at risk, the
District police and District officials.
Also, again the most important one is DOD becoming engaged
to take down an aircraft. We haven't had that experience yet.
That may be in the future. But we do face a number of
challenges. I appreciate your letting me mention some that we
are looking at from our subcommittee standpoint.
I yield back.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. The gentlemen from
Maryland.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. In light
of the fact that we have been going at it a while, I will be
very brief.
I am very pleased, Mr. Chairman, that you have scheduled
this hearing. September 11th illustrated the deadly intent and
capability of terrorists who seek to destroy us.
In the post-September 11th world our Nation must be fully
prepared to protect the homeland by effectively and efficiently
managing our national air defense. Intelligence reports
indicate that terrorist elements continue to consider another
September 11th style attack against U.S. targets where aircraft
are used as missiles.
In light of this kind of threat, flight and airspace
restrictions are essential to help in the Department of
Homeland Security, the Department of Defense and the Federal
Aviation Administration who primarily share the charge to
prevent or rapidly respond to an aircraft that has violated
restricted airspace. Unfortunately, the 3,400 violations of
restricted airspace since September 11th clearly demonstrate
deficiencies in our national air defense.
More specifically, the violations point to a need to
standardize Federal agencies roles more clearly and to improve
communications. For example, on May 11, 2005 a student pilot
violated a restricted airspace, necessitating a red threat
level designation and a frightful evacuation of the U.S.
Capitol. Disturbingly, although the risk and gravity of the
airspace violation were designated severe according to the
homeland security advisory system, the President and the Mayor
of Washington, DC, were not informed of the incident until the
episode ended.
In evaluating the management and coordination of our
national air defense, the GAO reported commendable improvements
since September 11th, but identified information sharing and
coordination problems that must be resolved. For example, the
GAO found that there is no standardized definition of an
airspace violation among agencies and that the FAA, the North
American Airspace Defense Command utilize distinct data bases
to track airspace violations.
It seems a step in the right direction would be to address
these challenges with common sense solutions that would improve
our monitoring capabilities and management of a Federal
response to an aviation threat. It seems just as sensible that
Congress seriously consider GAO's recommendation that one
agency be given the responsibility of responding to restricted
airspace violations.
Mr. Chairman, while we need not be an expert to understand
the disastrous impact another September 11th style attack would
have on our society and our economy. The American people expect
more from us than understanding. They expect for us to get it
right when it comes to securing our national air defense and
protecting their communities and families from those who seek
to do us harm.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings
follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you. Mr. Issa.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the gravity
of the statements made by yourself, by the ranking member and
other members on this committee.
I would like to take a slightly different tack in my
remarks and that is I would like to ask the witnesses to also
recognize that America has a tradition of being a leader in
aviation that includes a strong tradition of non-commercial
pilots, sport, aerobatic, commuter, and the $100 hamburger
pilots of which I am one. For those of you who aren't private
pilots, that is a $2 hamburger and $98 worth of fuel and
maintenance to get to the hamburger stand.
Complying with Homeland Security's desire to minimize
aircraft in or around our cities while still allowing the
freedom that has given us self-trained pilots in every war of
the previous century is a balancing act. I believe we need to
modernize communication requirements for aircraft without
unreasonably restricting the right of Americans to fly
anywhere, anytime, whether it is for a business meeting or to
fly friends and family to a hamburger stand on the other side
of the mountain, just for the joy of seeing this great land
from the air.
I would certainly hope that as we are looking at the
security needs of our Capitol and other areas we would
recognize that incrementally, as your map shows, we have first
taken airspace and said that it would be under control. Then we
made it restricted.
Today, we are moving toward saying that if you live in a
city, essentially you are going to have to drive for an hour or
two to get to your airplane so that you can travel. It doesn't
make a whole lot of sense. There's no question that the
technology exists today to provide better alerts of restricted
airspace even to the training pilot.
My background in technology shows me that although they are
not presently on board our aircraft, there is no question that
you can have an alert beacon similar to our collision avoidance
that would come on when you enter restricted airspace,
requiring no radio contact and so on.
Now, I recognize that many sport pilots choose to have the
minimum aviation assets on board and they may not do that. But
for those who fly modern aircraft and would like to comply with
the rules, but at the same time, have a difficult time.
Camp Pendleton and San Onofre Nuclear Power Plant are both
in my district. Ten years ago, if there were no operations at
Camp Pendleton, overflights were routinely granted. Today that
is never granted.
As a result, every small aircraft must either fly
significantly inland along high meetings or fly over the ocean.
There is a very narrow band for any pilot flying at low
altitude between being outside of San Onofre and Camp
Pendleton's restricted space and being too far away from land
to safely land if they were to have an engine failure.
So, on behalf of the vast majority of flights taken, and
the vast majority are taken by single engine fixed aircraft, I
would hope that now and in the Q and A session that we can look
at how to balance that while maintaining the safety in and
around our major cities.
With that, I yield back.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you. Are there any other members
who wish to make opening statements?
Mr. Ruppersberger. Mr. Chairman, not an opening statement.
I have one, but this is an extremely relevant issue. One of the
main reasons with respect to our air in the Capitol region is
unfortunately the Capitol is a target for terrorists.
It seems to me that the teamwork approach, whether it is
NORAD which is in charge of controlling the security of the
airspace, whether it is TSA or FAA, all these organizations
coming together, we need to focus on what needs to be done to
protect.
Now, we have had incidents in the past where we have had
violations, where we have had over 10,000 people running into
the streets. I think it is very important when we analyze and
come up with a plan that we look at what we have done when in
fact there was a possible attack. Did we pull the trigger too
quickly? Do we need 24/7 jets in the sky, at least during these
difficult periods?
I mean these are issues that I would hope we can address in
this hearing. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. Do any other
Members wish to make opening statements?
If not, we will move to our first panel. Thank you for
being with us. We have Ms. Davi D'Agostino, Director of Defense
Capabilities and Management at the U.S. Government
Accountability Office accompanied by Mr. Brian Lepore who is
the Assistant Director.
Thank you both for being with us. I want to thank both of
you for taking the time, working so hard to declassify your
report so that we could have this hearing today.
I also want to point out that because the classified report
will not be released until September 2005, our second panel of
witnesses have graciously allowed GAO to testify first so we
understand the limits of what we can talk about today.
I am going to remind the Members that if the witnesses
can't fully answer some of your questions because they might be
classified, the committee will take all questions for the
record.
It is our policy that we swear in all people before they
testify.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Tom Davis. You may be seated. Ms. D'Agostino, take
whatever time you need and then we'll open it up for questions.
STATEMENT OF DAVI M. D'AGOSTINO, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES
AND MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED
BY BRIAN LEPORE, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND
MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. D'Agostino. Thank you very much. Good morning, Mr.
Chairman and members of the committee. We are pleased to be
here today before you to discuss the results of GAO's work on
the interagency response to violations of U.S. restricted
airspace.
While much progress clearly has been made since September
11, 2001, we believe there are still opportunities to enhance
our Nation's airspace security.
My remarks today are from the unclassified portions, as you
mentioned, of our classified report, which we will be issuing
shortly.
As you know, intelligence agencies believe that terrorists
remain highly interested in U.S. aviation, both commercial and
general aviation, to attack airports or to use aircraft to
attack targets, including critical infrastructure.
As you noted in your opening remarks, since September 11th
several Federal agencies such as the Federal Aviation
Administration [FAA], the North American Aerospace Defense
Command or NORAD, and the Transportation Security
Administration [TSA] have made noteworthy advances to protect
our Nation's airspace.
I believe the next panel will elaborate further on their
progress.
I would also add that we were impressed that the FAA and
NORAD took actions to correct certain problems we identified
during the course of our review.
Today I will focus on first, how restricted airspace is
protected; second, key gaps we identified in the interagency
process to respond to violations; and third, the agency's
comments on selected recommendations on our draft report and
our response.
Let us start with how restricted airspace is protected. FAA
reported that between September 12, 2001 and December 31, 2004
there were about 3,400 restricted airspace violations, most of
which, about 88 percent of which were committed by general
aviation pilots.
Our diagram, if you will look at our diagram, and we
provided copies to the Members, shows the concept of restricted
airspace where the larger circle is restricted airspace and the
center is the protected asset or potential target. If a
violation is imminent or underway responding agencies have very
limited time to decide what actions to take. However, they need
enough time to determine the pilot's intent. In addition, NORAD
and Homeland Security need time to order, scramble and launch
aircraft, if necessary, to intercept the violator.
Our diagram shows an aircraft deviating from its originally
planned flight path. As you can see, in one example the
aircraft is making an incursion that in the end is non-
threatening. They go in and out of the restricted area. In the
other example the aircraft is making a threatening incursion by
heading directly at the protected asset.
Agencies take specific actions depending on the nature of
the violation. For example, FAA can report a restricted
airspace violation based on its radar tracking. If the
offending aircraft deviated from its planned flight path but
was not heading directly toward the protected asset, they may
simply monitor the aircraft and try to contact the pilot.
On the other hand, if NORAD or FAA perceives the aircraft
to be a threat, NORAD or Homeland Security can alert their
aircraft and attempt to interdict the violator. At the same
time, FAA would continue to try to contact the pilot and
monitor to assure safety of the airspace. If the violating
pilot does not divert and continues to operate in a threatening
manner, the NORAD pilot can be ordered to engage the violating
aircraft.
Clearly, the process for responding to a violation can
include many agencies. There are seven principal agencies, each
simultaneously responding according to their own procedures.
The agencies have made great strides to enhance air
security, including setting up, as you mentioned, an
interagency coordination center known as the National Capital
Region Coordinating Center [NCRCC] and an interagency
teleconferencing system for real time communication,
coordination and sharing of information for responding to
violations known as the Domestic Events Network [DEN].
While these interagency tools are functioning, we
identified some gaps that need to be addressed. Before we turn
to some of the gaps we identified, we need to recognize up
front that it is not possible to prevent all protected airspace
violations.
Airspace security measures could be challenged purposely.
In addition, some pilots simply do not check to see if they
will be flying in or near restricted airspace. Such challenges
highlight the need for clear policies and procedures and
optimal interagency coordination.
Our review identified these key gaps in the interagency
process: First, there is no leadership over and no organization
in charge of the end-to-end interagency process of responding
to violations. We noted also the lack of an over-arching
concept of operations plan or other relevant document to guide
the interagency process of responding to violation in all U.S.
airspace.
Third, the lack of key interagency policies and procedures
for either the NCRCC or the DEN. Fourth, no formal agency
information-sharing protocols and procedures. For example,
sharing segments of data on violations and aggregated
information on FAA's enforcement actions would be beneficial.
Fifth, the lack of common definitions for use in this time-
critical interagency operation.
Now I will discuss the agency's comments on selected
recommendations we made in our classified draft report.
Homeland Security and Defense disagreed with our draft report
recommendation to appoint one agency to be in charge, largely
because of concerns about command and control over their
resources. Nevertheless, the aim of our recommendations is to
ensure that someone is available and accountable to resolve the
interagency issues and problems in a timely and effective
manner.
Next, Transportation, Defense and Homeland Security agreed
with the general recommendation to establish information-
sharing protocols. DOD disagreed with a specific recommendation
to discuss with FAA sharing segments, not all, of FAA's pilot
deviation data base with NORAD.
DOD cited concerns over the appearance that it would be
collecting information on U.S. citizens. We appreciate DOD's
concerns and certainly did not recommend information sharing
that would run afoul of existing laws and policies.
We believe segments of FAA's data base could be shared
within the law and that DOD and FAA should explore that
possibility. Our work showed that this is particularly
important in light of the fact that NORAD's air defense
mission, which includes tracking aircraft in U.S. airspace,
could benefit from segments of the information as additional
input into deciding how to allocate their limited resources
around the country.
In conclusion, while much progress has been made, we have
found that the interagency effort to secure U.S. airspace could
be enhanced by proactive leadership with accountability, an
over-arching strategy and plan, clear interagency policies and
procedures, formal agency information sharing protocols, and
common definitions.
Today, nearly 4 years after the September 11th attacks, we
believe it is time to treat airspace security as a national
program with an eye toward balancing commercial and security
needs and applying risk management principles.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my oral summary. At this time
we would be happy to address any questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. D'Agostino follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. Let me start. Most
of us have read in the newspapers different accounts of the
interagency process that was used in recent incursions of the
National Capital Region. As GAO conducted this study, did you
look at any of these incidents and can you comment on what you
saw?
Ms. D'Agostino. Mr. Chairman, our work did not focus on a
specific incident. We did look into the Kentucky Governor
incident. But actually we had completed our review by the time
the May 11 incident had occurred and we had begun writing our
report. So, we did not dig deeper into those specific cases.
Chairman Tom Davis. Does TSA need to do more to identify
security vulnerabilities on general aviation aircraft?
Ms. D'Agostino. I think our statement points out areas
where TSA could do more. There are 19,000 general aviation
airports. It is a rather huge population. They are trying to do
a risk-based approach to their effort and they have developed a
risk-assessment tool and they have deployed some to general
aviation airports, so I think they deserve some credit for
that. There may be more that they could do.
Chairman Tom Davis. What responsibilities do you think the
TSA should have as the executive agent for the National Capital
Region's Coordination Center and do you think the TSA if
fulfilling its responsibilities? Can you give them a grade?
Ms. D'Agostino. Well, I think as the executive agent TSA
describes its own role as one of deconflicting. It is not
seeing itself as in charge and it is not clear that they see
themselves in a leadership role or in a proactive leadership
role.
One of the questions we have is if there were to be an air
security strategy or plan put together, who would do the first
draft, Mr. Chairman. We would wonder who would do the first
draft and then broker the coordination of that draft with a
timetable.
That's where we would like to understand whose leadership--
--
Chairman Tom Davis. So, what do you think the National
Capital Regional Coordination Center needs? What improvements
do they need?
Ms. D'Agostino. I think we pointed out some communication
problems. They need a concept of operations plan. Although they
have one, it does not go into the kinds of specificity much
beyond roles and responsibilities of the individual agencies.
So, we think that could be pushed a little further.
Chairman Tom Davis. You did identify gaps in the management
of the interagency response to airspace violations. What is
lacking in the management of the Federal responses? What is
lacking? Is it somebody in charge at the end?
Ms. D'Agostino. Right, somebody in charge, an over-arching
strategy and plan, information sharing protocols as among the
agencies, some clear concepts of operations, how things will be
communicated. Our team actually observed the DEN and they
observed there's a lot of shouting. When there are multiple
incidents it gets very confusing. You can't tell who is
talking.
Chairman Tom Davis. You ought to see it from this angle. I
was meeting with six presidents of nations in Central America.
We had a meeting and it just got started. They came in and just
literally carried them out, put them in cars and left.
This building was emptied, office buildings around here,
not just the legislative branch and Library of Congress, but
others. I mean thousands of hours of productivity lost. Of
course, at the end of the day it was just somebody who got lost
flying over the area.
But you can tell from some of the Members' opening
statements, there has to be a better way to do this. There have
to be penalties for the violations. I don't know if that starts
with education or as people are leaving, to understand it. But
it is getting very, very disruptive in terms of both the
private sector and the Government sector.
Ms. Watson.
Ms. Watson. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I welcome the
panelists.
I was listening very intently, Ms. D'Agostino, to your
testimony and your recommendations. Do you believe that we
ought to create--would that be one of your recommendations--
that we create a new agency to coordinate all of this? Because
it doesn't appear that we are talking to each other, the
various agencies involved, and that we are coordinating.
I understand with one incident there were two different
agencies that were trying to intercept. Do you think there's a
need for a new agency or department?
Ms. D'Agostino. We do not think there's a need for a new
agency or department. There are enough agencies and departments
now participating in this response. What we do think is that
one agency needs to agree to step up to lead the response and
be the leader and coordinate the response and smooth out the
rough edges.
They are coordinating fairly effectively. Again, it is very
striking how far they have come from September 11th in the
coordination process. The problem is there are seams there
still between and among the agencies and nobody has the job of
ironing out those seams and working out those differences and
rough edges, as I'm calling it.
Ms. Watson. Who should do that? Who should make that
decision that we need to destroy those seams and have more
merging and flowing? Who should do that?
Ms. D'Agostino. I actually think all the agencies believe
that they need to work on the seams, but they need to agree on
who should lead that effort. The NCRCC, the executive agency is
TSA. Both DOD and DHS, in their comments on our classified
draft report mentioned a working group, which TSA is also the
lead in.
There have been other working groups that DOD has
participated in trying to work on some of these problems and
get a strategy, get a plan. But their plans, and I know there
have been draft plans, have not made it to the final stage.
Ms. Watson. Well, you mentioned that TSA doesn't realize
they have this responsibility or authority. I am trying to
gleam from your testimony and your report where do we start
this? Who is in charge of it? What language is where that
clearly can direct these activities and take into consideration
your recommendations? Can you respond?
Ms. D'Agostino. I think it is up to the executive branch to
determine who is the right party to be in the lead. I think
they would need all the agencies to agree to it and accede to
it to make it work. You know, one candidate is TSA. But we did
not recommend a specific organization.
We suggested that the three departments discuss amongst
themselves whether it makes sense to have somebody in charge or
take the lead, as we finally adjusted our recommendation to
say.
Ms. Watson. I feel a sense of frustration because the last
time we had an evacuation we found that there was a plane that
some way, accidentally, got into the restricted zone.
We as the policymakers hear nothing about followup. We have
to depend on you coming in and reporting to us. So, I would
hope that one of the recommendations that would come out of GAO
is that whatever this group is, a study group, TSA or the
executive branch, inform members so we, too, will know whether
we need to put into the process legislation or should the
executive branch just start to designate where they would like
to see this occur.
Some way, and this goes to the Chair as well, we need to be
informed. It should not be a confidential meeting. I am not
talking about sharing confidential information with us. But at
least followup so we can be alerted and aware and propose
corrective legislation.
Thank you very much, Ms. D'Agostino.
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Issa.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, when I look at
the map for the Washington, DC, region particularly, you know,
I'm struck by the fact that your restricted airspace versus
your protection, it all looks very simplistic.
But when we go over it and we actually look at the
sectional, what we discover is that there are--to use a word I
shouldn't use--a plethora of small airports, some of which were
dramatically impacted by September 11th, aircraft stuck on the
ground, unable to fly for a long period of time.
From a practical matter, and I'll try to make this a
question, a Cessna 150, 152, 172, these small light aircraft,
for that matter, any aircraft under 12,000 pounds, single or
twin, that operate out of those airports, basically, at the
moment that they take off they are in a sense in your zone.
Some of these historically didn't need radios. They all now
have radio communication. They will be squawking 1,200 or
something.
From a practical standpoint, aren't we over-controlling to
assume that there won't be a number of mistakes when somebody
takes off and does left traffic versus right traffic or coming
in to an approach isn't aligned, talking about a VFR pilot
particularly, isn't aligned exactly where they should be on one
of these many runways that are in this relatively small area.
Ms. D'Agostino. I don't think that we actually could come
to a conclusion that we are over-controlling or not. Again, I
think we are very supportive of a risk management approach to
controlling the airspace as we are with a lot of other programs
that the Federal Government runs. But I don't think we are in a
position to make that judgment about whether they are over-
controlling or not.
Mr. Issa. Well, I will bring up something you mentioned
earlier. I was not yet a Member of Congress when during the
Clinton administration a small Cessna landed at the White
House. What it struck had very little to do with the fact that
it was attempting to do what it did, which was land at the
White House.
The response at the time was to close Pennsylvania Avenue.
Now, I always wondered if that was to make it easier. But it
apparently was not.
We have had a long history here in Washington of having
reactions that don't seem to line up with the problem. From a
practical standpoint these small light aircraft do not
represent a large enough risk to have the kinds of evacuations
from here, the Capitol, that we have had.
Would that be fair to say that a Cessna 172 cannot have a
degree of impact? And we will assume that it doesn't have a
thermonuclear weapon that it somehow snuck in. Because you can
have that in a pickup truck. You can have that in a car. You
wouldn't need an aircraft.
The mass of the aircraft, its carrying capacity in any
reasonable, conventional way simply can't do much damage to
these buildings as Representative Norton said. Isn't that
correct?
Ms. D'Agostino. I would say that it depends on your
perspective. No. 1, as you say, a very small aircraft can be
loaded with some fairly dangerous material or horribly
hazardous material and you don't know whether it does or it
doesn't when you are an FAA controller and you are looking at a
blip on the screen or when they file their flight plan and get
authorization.
The other problem is, about assuming a small aircraft is
not a threat, is the Secret Service made it very clear to us in
our exit conversations that a small aircraft targeting the
President or the Vice President or the White House leadership
is still a big threat from their perspective. So, I think we
have to think about it from all the different angles and try to
pull it apart.
Mr. Issa. I appreciate that. I appreciate that the Secret
Service will not let people go to the restroom when the
President is in a room. They cannot walk away from the
President under Secret Service control. So, I am very aware of
their view and I appreciate it and I think protecting the
President is extremely important.
A final question for now: The way we deal with large
aircrafts, the upgrading of communication of all fast movers,
of all aircrafts, let us say, over 12,000 pounds, can we in
fact have an initiative to upgrade the communication with those
devices to prevent the Ernie Fletcher type of situation?
I realize you may have some of this already thought out.
Can we upgrade that so that we can bifurcate, if you will,
outside of the White House, the normal threat of a small light
aircraft, let us say, flying over a military base or something
versus aircraft capable of inflicting huge damage on large
targets?
Mr. Lepore. Well, it is certainly possible to mandate
something like that. I guess one of the challenges that you
might all encounter and that you may hear is who would actually
pay for that? Who would pay for the cost and how much it might
cost to do that?
In the study that we conducted for the committee we didn't
actually look at that particular question. That was really
outside the scope of the work. But I suspect one of the key
issues would be the cost and who would pay for it.
Mr. Issa. Thank you very much.
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Mica.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have read through some
of the report. You do raise a series of issues that need to be
resolved, developing a common concept, really, of even
violations, and then sort of who is in charge.
The DOD versus Homeland Security is a tough one. DOD, they
have the real enforcement power. They will shoot the plane.
Homeland Security really doesn't have that capability. The true
enforcement is taking the plane out and getting up there and
eyeballing what you have.
We do have a problem with definitions of violations. That
also becomes an FAA issue because it applies to all aircrafts.
We are not just talking about restricted airspace in our
Nation's Capital.
That's another question. Do you favor a different standard
for the Nation's Capital or maybe some designated potential
targets, nuclear plants? I don't know if New York City is a
whole target. How would you separate this out?
Ms. D'Agostino. I think that the executive branch sort of
separates them out already as a practical matter. The TSA has
made clear that the National Capital region is unique space in
all of U.S. airspace because of the Capitol and the White
House.
Mr. Mica. Again, for violations you want a separate
standard.
Ms. D'Agostino. Yes.
Mr. Mica. They are coming to me right now. I have heard
everything from, you know, a $1 million fine on down. We are
going to have incursions. I think you and I both have cited--
fortunately I think we have had less in the closer area as
people become more aware and we have more incidents.
But I have to address the issue of fine and fairness. I
raised the issue of intent and also purposely penetrating. Have
you given any thought to levels of fines or penalties?
Ms. D'Agostino. We did not look at enforcement actions at
all in the scope of our work. We looked only at the interagency
operation of dealing with violations.
Mr. Mica. Do you think TSA or Homeland Security should have
a say in the level of fine for a violation? Again, you have to
have a definition of a violation. You have to have a penalty
for the violation.
You know, the guy that just flew across the edge there,
what is that worth? Is FAA going to impose the fine? Is
Homeland Security? What do you recommend?
Ms. D'Agostino. I don't think it would hurt for the
agencies to consult with each other and come up with a proposal
that is acceptable to them. You do have to balance this. As I
said in my concluding remarks, you need to balance the
commercial interests and the freedom of flight, as Mr. Issa
pointed out, with the valid and genuine security concerns since
September 11th.
Again, we aren't proposing to have the right answer on the
right line level for the type of violation or the intent of
that. It wasn't in the scope of our review. But it would make
sense for people to consult with each other from their
different perspectives and weigh the penalties.
Mr. Mica. Did you also find the information I found
correct, that there are very few fines imposed?
Ms. D'Agostino. We didn't look at it. But we do know that
the people who are actually monitoring the airspace and dealing
with the deviations of restricted airspace are interested in
knowing what happened to the pilot who were doing the
violations?
Mr. Mica. I also use Officer Thompson as an example. If you
go out to First and C Street over by the Capital Hill Club,
there is a guy by the name of Officer Thompson.
Officer Thompson enforces the letter of the law. If you
don't have both hands on your bicycle he will give you a
ticket. If you jaywalk and it is not green, he will give you a
ticket. Everyone looks twice before they cross that street
because he is a tough enforcer.
First, we don't know the definition of the violation and
second we don't have a tough enforcement policy and we have
different people, as you say, going in different directions.
Hopefully, we can get it together a little bit better.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. We will excuse
this panel. We will take a 2-minute break and move to the
second panel.
Ms. Watson. Before you do that, Mr. Chairman, may I just
make a comment?
Chairman Tom Davis. I will let the panel go, but you are
welcome to make a comment.
Ms. Watson. I think all of us are asking the same
questions. I notice, Ms. D'Agostino, that you took notes. But
this question goes to our committee. We are having kind of this
oversight hearing and we really want to know.
Would it be in order, Mr. Chairman, for this committee to
put in legislation based on what we have heard today and their
report so we can clarify definitions, get definitions and
suggest that we do have, whoever responsible for following up
on these recommendations, for enforcement and for some way for
pilots to understand.
One of the questions I would have asked is when you have
violation of airspace simultaneously like what happened on
September 11th, what do you do? Who is in charge? Is it DEN and
are they effective?
So, my question really goes to the chair. This panel
doesn't have to respond. Mr. Chairman, what do you think?
Chairman Tom Davis. Well, let us hear from the second
panel. I think that's a good question to ask the second panel
as well. We could certainly put that in.
Thank you all very much. We will take a 2-minute break and
then proceed with the next panel.
[Recess.]
Chairman Tom Davis. We will now move to our second panel. I
want to thank them for taking the time to appear today. I
welcome the Honorable Paul McHale, a former colleague of ours,
who is now the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense at the Department of Defense.
We have Major General Marvin Mayes who is the Commander of
the 1st Air Force and Continental U.S. North American Aerospace
from the Defense Command Region, Department of Defense. Then we
have the Honorable Robert Sturgell, who is the Deputy
Administrator from the Federal Aviation Administration.
We are also going to hear from Dr. Kenneth Kasprisin who is
the Acting Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security at the
Department of Homeland Security.
Because of the situation unfolding in London this morning,
Mr. Kasprisin won't be able to attend, so I am going to ask
that his statement be included in the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kasprisin follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. It is our policy that we swear
witnesses before they testify.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
Your entire statements are in the record and the questions
are based on the entire statement.
Paul, we will start with you. Welcome back.
STATEMENTS OF PAUL MCHALE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
HOMELAND DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; MAJOR GENERAL MARVIN
S. MAYES, COMMANDER, 1ST AIR FORCE AND CONTINENTAL U.S. NORTH
AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND REGION, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE; AND ROBERT A. STURGELL, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
STATEMENT OF PAUL MCHALE
Mr. McHale. Mr. Chairman, it is good to be back. I thank
you and the distinguished members of the committee for the
opportunity to appear once again in front of you.
As you indicated, my formal statement has been submitted
for the record, so in the interest of preserving the maximum
amount of time for questions, I will present a brief summary
with your consent at this point.
Not too long ago we knew who our enemies were and where
they lived. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
Madrid train bombing of March 2003 and most recently the tragic
bombings in London have introduced us to the new enemies of the
21st century. In the 21st century, facing a new threat in a
more ambiguous and dangerous world, we are in a war with an
asymmetric enemy without armies, navies or air forces.
Today a complex network of ideologically driven extremists
seek to terrorize our population, undermine our international
partnerships and erode our global influence. The threat of
catastrophic violence dictates a new strategic imperative we
must actively confront, when possible, early and keep at a safe
distance those who directly threaten us, employing all
instruments of our national power.
Using the total force concept, active, Reserve and Guard,
the Department of Defense is postured to deter, defend against
and defeat threats to the United States in the air, maritime
and land domains. Focusing specifically on the subject of
today's hearing, the Bi-National U.S.-Canada North American
Aerospace Defense Command, NORAD, represented here today by
Major General Mayes who is seated to my left, is responsible
for protecting North America from air threats.
Over the last 4 years we have achieved dramatic
improvements in our understanding of that air threat. Our
military command and control systems have been overhauled.
Response assets are deployed for rapid and decisive threat
interdiction and our collaboration and coordination with
interagency partners have increased significantly.
Prior to September 11th NORAD's surveillance efforts were
directed outward from North America, primarily focusing on our
country's borders in anticipation of a Soviet air threat.
Today surveillance efforts include airspace over the
interior portions of North America, recognizing that threats
can now manifest themselves within our own borders.
Carefully defined rules of engagement and a clear chain of
command have been established to defeat terrorist air threats.
The President has delegated to the Secretary of Defense the
authority to take immediate effective action in response to a
terrorist air threat.
We have developed a classified conference capability with
specific protocols for DOD decisionmaking in the event of a
domestic air threat. These classified conferences are routinely
monitored by U.S. Government air security organizations. We
exercise our command and control systems to ensure that our
senior civilian and military leaders are well trained and
prepared to exercise their authority.
Since September 11, 2001, under Operation Noble Eagle, the
men and women of the U.S. Air Force, the Air Force Reserve and
the Air National Guard have secured the skies over major
metropolitan areas and our Nation's critical infrastructure on
a daily basis. The rotating nature of this coverage, changed
daily, denies terrorists the opportunity to pre-plan attacks
based on routine schedules. We have conducted more than 41,000
sorties and have scrambled fighters or diverted air patrols
toward suspected air threats on more than 1,900 occasions.
The Air National Guard provides more than 90 percent of the
daily fighter alert and irregular air patrol requirements of
Operation Noble Eagle. Under the control of three NORAD
regional commands, we now have air defense alert fighters
positioned throughout the United States and Canada that are
capable of reaching major population centers and high value
infrastructure within minutes. The Department of Defense cannot
conduct the air defense mission without critical support from
our interagency partners. Our support is fundamental to their
success as well.
In the last 4 years we have taken tremendous strides in
this arena, reinforcing relationships with existing agencies,
specifically and most especially, the Federal Aviation
Administration, and forging ties with new ones, especially the
Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation Security
Administration. Key areas include shared situational awareness
and exchange of liaison personnel at headquarters and operation
centers and the development of operational responses that
reflect a common understanding of air domain threats.
The establishment of robust liaison relationships
facilitate daily operations and have significantly improved our
ability to address potential air threats. Full-time FAA liaison
personnel are located at NORAD Headquarters at Cheyenne
Mountain and at the operations complex in Colorado Springs.
DOD and FAA liaisons are also stationed at the TSA-hosted
National Capital Region Coordination Center. Operational
responses now reflect a common understanding of the full range
of threats in our domestic airspace.
Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. Let me just briefly come
to a conclusion. DOD conducts military missions in the air
defense of the NCR as you heard during an earlier portion of
this hearing. We conduct irregular air patrols. We have a
dedicated 24/7 alert fighter response based at Andrews Air
Force Base.
We have a dedicated ground missile defense system. We have
implemented a visual warning system to provide a laser warning
to pilots who stray off course. DOD liaison officers serve at
the NCRCC. As previously mentioned DOD has developed a
classified conference capability with protocols for DOD's
decisionmaking.
Since September 11, 2001, the Department of Defense has
implemented substantial improvements in the defense of the U.S.
airspace. Our ability to detect, interdict and ultimately
defeat air threats is good, but it can get better.
With our interagency partners we continue to improve our
air defense capabilities and in that context we welcome the
GAO's thorough, credible and constructive report.
I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McHale follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
General Mayes.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL MARVIN S. MAYES
General Mayes. Chairman Davis and other members of the
committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to be here
on behalf of Admiral Timothy J. Keating, commander of NORAD,
NORTHCOM.
It is an honor to appear before you and represent the
exceptional men and women of that command. Our professionals
are ready to act on a moment's notice to protect and defend our
Nation's airspace.
Since 1958, the United States and Canada have defended the
skies over North America through NORAD. It is a bi-national
command. Using data from satellites as well as airborne and
ground-based radar, NORAD monitors, validates and warns of
attack against the United States and Canadian homelands by our
aircraft, missiles and space vehicles, as well as the emerging
asymmetric threat.
The plan ensures United States and Canadian air sovereignty
through a network of alert fighters, tankers and airborne early
warning aircraft and ground-based air defense assets cued by
military and interagency surveillance radars such as those of
the FAA and its Canadian equivalent, NAV CANADA.
NORAD forces, as part of Operation Noble Eagle, maintain a
steady state quick response posture to counter these potential
threats to North America. We conduct irregular air patrols
above major metropolitan areas, critical infrastructure
facilities, in addition to maintaining an alert force of
fighter, tanker and control aircraft.
Our response posture is based on a tiered system and as
threat levels intensify, the number of aircrafts and other
resources we put on alert increase. Since September 11th we
have flown over 41,000 fighter and support aircraft sorties and
directed more than 1,900 fighter intercepts in response to
potential threats.
Because the U.S. National Capital Region is a symbolic
target and contains many elements of our Nation's critical
infrastructure it is protected around the clock by multi-
layered joint and interagency integrated air defense system.
The surveillance, warning and air defense systems of the
National Capital Region consists of Army Sentinel radars, the
ground-based visual warning system as described by Secretary
McHale, Department of Homeland Security helicopters, fixed wing
aircraft on alert at Reagan National, Air Force fighters on
alert at Andrews Air Force Base and the Army ground-based air
defense system which includes medium range Norwegian Advanced
Surface-to-Air Missile systems and short-range Stinger and
Avenger missiles. These systems augment our fighter defenses by
providing assets in place in a quick reaction posture to
protect the seat of Government.
The NCRCC, we believe, enhances interagency coordination by
providing a venue for all the representatives of the many
organizations, all the stakeholders, if you will, in defense of
the National Capital Region to sit and watch together. Through
the NCRCC, these various agencies have improved their
individual situational awareness by knowing the actions of
their defense partners. It is a coordination center, I would
point out, and no command and control of forces occurs at the
center. You know who the participants are.
We have established a rapid conference call capability to
facilitate information sharing among the White House,
Department of Defense, FAA, Customs and Border Patrol, AMO,
which is the Air Marine Operations Division of Customs and
Patrol, and other law enforcement in the event of an airspace
violator or a track of interest. These voice networks bring
together different levels of decisionmakers from many
organizations and increase the situational awareness for all.
Secretary McHale addressed the rules of engagement. I will
assure you that they are very precise and very directive and
held at the highest level.
Our partnership with the Federal Aviation Administration to
improve our surveillance, command and control capabilities has
made significant progress. We have full-time FAA representation
in most of our command and control centers.
Their Domestic Events Network [DEN], provides us real time
situational awareness. It brings together our senior leadership
into the decisionmaking cycle at a very early point in any
crisis. We have incorporated over 300 new radios in the FAA
centers and 39 radars that we did not have prior to September
11th.
On October 1, 2004, the Department of Defense and Homeland
Security assumed shared financial responsibility from the FAA
for our Nation's long-range radars under a 75-25 cost share
formula.
In fiscal year 2006 the radars will be funded under a 50-50
cost share formula and we would like to urge Congress to fully
fund the operations and maintenance of both departments to
preserve our critical air surveillance network. Without it, we
are operating blind.
We continue to make air travel safer through increased
airport and aircraft security measures. The action taken on the
ground prevents us from having to expend resources in the air.
We support national security events which take a great deal
of our resources and have been numerous in number of late,
including both political conventions, the inaugural, President
Reagan's funeral, and the State of the Union address.
In conclusion, since September 11th we have strengthened
our ability to detect and assess and warn and defend of air
threats against North America. We will continue to look for
ways to refine that process and maximize our ability to detect
airspace violators while we minimize the inconvenience to the
aviation public.
Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Mayes follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Sturgell.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT STURGELL
Mr. Sturgell. Good morning, Chairman Davis, members of the
committee. I am pleased to represent the FAA before you this
morning to discuss the many issues that arise from violations
of restricted airspace and how the FAA is working to help
pilots understand the complexities of flying in and around such
airspace in order to reduce the number of pilot deviations, a
few of which have resulted in the evacuation of this building.
Working with my colleagues in the Department of Defense and
the Department of Homeland Security, the FAA has a lead on
implementing flight restrictions wherever and whenever it is
necessary.
Flight restrictions around the National Capital Region have
been in place for several years, but other restrictions are put
in place around the country as needed by the military or to
provide additional security above high profile events. Pilots
are required to check to determine if there are restrictions in
place that they must comply with as part of their pre-flight
planning.
The area around Washington, DC, is highly regulated and
pilots must follow a flight plan, be in contact with FAA and
Air Traffic Control and continually squawk a discrete
transponder code in order for FAA and the other participants of
the NCRCC to know exactly who is in the airspace. Since
virtually all of the pilot deviations that have occurred in
this area have been inadvertent, the FAA is working with the
users of the system to help heighten awareness of restrictions
and what can happen if they are not complied with.
Even though we have seen a declining trend in the number of
violations over the past 2 years, we have increased our
educational efforts with the general aviation community. Since
June of last year, highly experienced air traffic control
specialists have conducted 175 formal outreach programs. These
include visits to flight schools, local flying clubs, local law
enforcement aviation units and military base units.
Our goal is to educate the pilots to use the system in this
area and help them understand how to avoid getting into what
could be a very difficult situation. These outreach efforts
have been very well received and very well attended. I should
mention that our colleagues represented here today are also
part of that effort.
We believe the trend is showing a decrease in the number of
ADIZ violations is attributable in part to this effort. So, we
want to do more. We think training is the key to further
reducing violations.
With extremely few exceptions, the pilots who have been
properly flown into the restricted airspace around this city
have not intended to do so. Some were lost. Some were avoiding
weather. All of them would have preferred to avoid the
sanctions, the publicity and the other consequences that can
result from their mistakes.
So FAA wants to go farther than our current outreach
program. By using our existing authority, we want to require
training that will begin with pilots who fly visual flight
rules within 100 miles of Washington, DC.
The FAA intends to issue a special Federal Aviation
Regulation that gives the pilots in this area 30 days to have
accomplished training on the requirements and procedures to
operate in the flight restricted zone, the air defense
identification zone and other restricted airspace. The training
can be accomplished via an FAA safety seminar or through an
online course such as those offered by the Aircraft Owners and
Pilots Association [AOPA]. The pilot must successfully complete
the course and conclude the test in order to be issued a
certificate of completion.
The FAA will then require that this certificate be carried
by the pilot on any flight within 100 miles of Washington, DC.
We think pilot awareness will be further improved by this
requirement and over time we will expand that mandatory
training on flying in and around restricted airspace to pilots
throughout the Nation.
Another part of our effort will include revisiting our
sanction guidance on pilot deviations in the District's
restricted airspace. Currently our general policy is to propose
a certificate suspension for any pilot who penetrates the ADIZ.
For a first-time offense, this is generally 30 to 90 days. Now,
this can vary depending on the circumstances surrounding the
violation as was the case for the pilot who caused the Capitol
and the White House to be evacuated on May 11th. His
certificate was revoked.
The use of increased sanctions, especially for repeat
violators and those who fly into the flight restricted zone may
serve to keep this airspace safer and will send a clear message
of the need to be aware and comply with the ADIZ rules.
Chairman Mica mentioned some of the things that he is
looking at earlier. We expect to be discussing this further
with him through the summer.
I think by and large pilots want to comply with the FAA
regulations and restricted airspace procedures. We have worked
closely with our community, especially in the D.C. area, to
make our airspace safe, secure and efficient.
I would like to commend aviation user groups like AOPA who
are working hard to help educate their members. Last year, AOPA
sent over 4 million e-mails to their members about airspace
restrictions. This, in addition to cooperative education
efforts with FAA and TSA and a continuing web-based campaign
demonstrates the commitment of the general aviation community
to proactively address our Nation's security concerns.
I appreciate the congressional interest in how the FAA and
the many other Government agencies coordinate their efforts in
a time of heightened security. We are all striving to improve
what we do and how we keep each other informed.
I appreciate the consistent review, scrutiny, and
reevaluation as appropriate. I welcome the opportunity to
continue to work with the Congress, GAO, other Government
agencies here and the users of the system to keep the airspace
safe, secure and efficient.
That concludes my statement. I would be happy to take
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sturgell follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you. Let me just start. Secretary
McHale, DOD's new strategy for homeland security and civilian
support is critical of FAA radars. It states, ``the current
radars maintained by the FAA to track air traffic within the
U.S. are aging with high maintenance costs, poor reliability
and reduced capability to track emerging threats.''
Do you have any comments on that statement? Is it true?
Mr. McHale. The Department of Defense continues to rely on
the FAA radars because the radar picture that is derived from
the deployment of those radar collection capabilities feeds
directly into the command and control centers throughout NORAD.
So, our eyes and ears throughout the airspace of the United
States, our ability to perceive what is happening in the
airspace, let me put it that way, is a direct result of the FAA
quality radar system. That is an old system. For the most part
it is a remnant of the cold war. There are issues with regard
to the very substantial expenses that are associated with the
upkeep of the FAA radars.
FAA has taken the position that there are better ways for
them to execute their civilian administrative deconfliction
requirement within the airspace and they have argued that the
FAA radars continue to have importance primarily for reasons of
national security. Reflecting that analysis, as concerned by
General Mayes, the Office of Management and Budget has now
assigned the responsibility to the Department of Homeland
Security and the Department of Defense to pay for the upkeep of
those radars.
Clearly at some point we are going to have to move beyond
the FAA radars to maintain comprehensive surveillance in the
airspace. In the interim, we seek appropriate funding both for
DHS and DOD to maintain what are still the essential
surveillance capabilities found uniquely within the FAA radars.
We still need them.
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Sturgell, can you comment on FAA's
attempts to update its radars and tell us about the development
of the Global Communications Navigation Surveillance System
[GCNCSS], the list providing a common air surveillance picture
at the National Capital Region's Coordination Center as a
requirement?
Mr. Sturgell. Chairman Davis, we have a number of different
radar systems within the National Airspace System. There are
terminal radars basically and long-range radars which provide
surveillance capability.
We have just recently approved a service life extension
program for our ASR-9 radars which are largely in the terminal
areas. We are acquiring newer digital ASR-11 radars as well. As
the General mentioned, we have incorporated some of these radar
capabilities into their networks as well.
With respect to the long-range radars which largely border
the Nation, they are an aging system. We identified that in the
years before September 11th. We operate in the FAA a
cooperative aviation system, if you will, depending primarily
on the secondary returns from aircraft through the use of
transponders.
So, we recognized that we no longer had a need for primary
skin paint returns, if you will, of the aircraft themselves
which is largely used as a surveillance function.
As the witnesses here have mentioned, that function we
maintained until after September 11th. Now it has been
transferred to the Departments of Homeland Security and Defense
and they are working for funding again, I believe, for a
service life extension of their capabilities.
I think within the National Capital Region the radar
coverage is extremely good. There are a number of other systems
that enhance that capability as well.
Chairman Tom Davis. Well, DOD's enhanced airspace security
system, their EAS and your GCNSS seem to perform some of the
same functions, namely air surveillance for the National
Capital Region. Are these two systems compatible and do you
need two departments with the same capability?
Does anyone want to take a shot at that?
Mr. Sturgell. I would say that it is my belief that they do
provide different types of capabilities, some of which Defense
is particularly interested in. I will let them speak to that.
As far as our radars, again, you know, we recognize that
D.C. is unique and there is a need for enhanced surveillance
here. Our system in general largely is a cooperative system
with the airlines through the use of the transponders.
Chairman Tom Davis. I am just trying to get the
compatibility and overlap. Secretary McHale, do you have any
comment on that?
Mr. McHale. I think General Mayes may have some comments on
this point operationally, but the most fundamental distinction
is this: the FAA uses radar to maintain awareness of what
aircrafts are in the airspace and to administratively
deconflict aircrafts that presumably are flying without any
kind of terrorist intent.
We use the same radar and some other radar systems for a
different purpose and that is once we determine that an
airplane may be under the control of someone with a malevolent
intent, a terrorist, we use that radar not only to track the
aircraft and maintain awareness of its constantly changing
location, but we also use that radar to support some of our air
interdiction capabilities.
In a closed session we could talk about that in a little
more detail. But we use radar not merely to deconflict the
airspace, which is an FAA responsibility, but to track and if
necessary shoot down an aircraft that has come under the
control of terrorists.
Thank you.
Chairman Tom Davis. Ms. Watson.
Ms. Watson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This question goes to
General Mayes. The GAO noted a discrepancy in data collection
of restricted airspace violations between the air defense
sectors and NORAD Headquarters. Headquarters knew only 10
percent of the violations monitored by the regional sectors.
Can you respond to this? What caused the miscommunication
and how has NORAD addressed this problem?
Also, in its final report the 9/11 Commission recommended
that the Department of Defense and its oversight committee
should regularly assess the adequacy of the Northern Command
strategies and planning to defend the United States against
military threats to the homeland.
So, in relation to air defense, General Mayes, how are
NORAD and Northern Command complying with the 9/11 Commission
recommendation?
General Mayes. Thank you for your questions, Ms. Watson. As
it pertains to the difference in clicker count, if I might use
that term, of the number of events recorded at NORAD versus the
Northeast Air Defense Sector, I will tell you that it has to do
with upchannel reporting requirements.
The Northeast Air Defense Sector will bump their clicker up
on any given target of interest, regardless of tactical action
requirements, whereas NORAD only requires upchannel reporting
of those TOIs upon which we executed tactical action.
I will give you an example. Let us say a target pops up in
the National Capital Region and it is initially unknown,
unidentified. It quickly is resolved. We find out who it is and
no tactical action is required.
The Northeast Air Defense Sector will record that as an
event. NORAD, on the other hand, since there was no tactical
action required, it does not require upchannel reporting. So,
therefore NEDS would necessarily have many more events recorded
than NORAD would.
In regard to your second question, is that is an answer
that you were looking for the first one, in regards to the
second question about reviewing our strategy, I will tell you
that our strategy is in constant review at many levels.
My staff at Tyndall Air Force Base, as the Joint Force Air
Component Commander, is specifically responsible for reviewing
that air strategy daily and recommending changes to Admiral
Keating, who is the commander of NORAD NORTHCOM.
Our recommended changes that have been staffed by me
initially are then staffed by his joint staff in Colorado
Springs. Any disconnects there are agreed upon.
I will also tell you that on an interagency basis we have
an interagency airspace protection working group upon which
representatives from all the stakeholders sit. We continually
review our protection strategy specifically for the National
Capital Region as well as the rest of the Nation.
We review the measures that we are taking. We look at those
measures in regards to how they affect the general aviation
public. We take input from outside agencies like the AOPA and
we evaluate modifications to our current defense strategy in
terms of a risk analysis and where possible we will change
those procedures to better accommodate the public.
Ms. Watson. Mr. McHale, and I know you have to leave
quickly, but as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense are you satisfied that the various different
headquarters and defense sectors are talking to each other with
the same language, are reporting so it is clear and there are
definitions?
I just heard General Mayes give us how NORAD looks at an
incident and how another sector might look at an incident. I
certainly would be confused. I think that is what the 9/11
Commission was getting to when they talked about putting this
under one head.
How would you respond?
Mr. McHale. The current system ensures, as was not the case
before September 11, that we throughout the interagency,
meaning the various departments of the Government, are now
talking effectively to each other.
But the ability to speak effectively to one another is only
the first step toward achieving an effective air defense.
Regrettably, before September 11 that communication as an
element of a larger requirement was not met. The 9/11
Commission recognized that, so one of the first things that we
had to do was ensure that the various departments, to include
our own, the Department of Defense, had the opportunity and the
responsibility to communicate effectively daily, continuously
to make sure that our activities were coordinated. We are doing
that now.
Without going into great detail, there are representatives
of my staff who work full-time over at DHS. There are
representatives from NORAD who work full-time at the TSA-led,
hosted, NCRCC. So there is extensive communication.
But there are gaps and seams remaining in terms of
interagency coordination. When I was subject to confirmation in
the Senate, I said that I would never use the word satisfied. I
am not satisfied. There are improvements that can be made.
I think the GAO has done a commendable job in pointing out
where some of those improvements might be found.
We had some disagreement, I think modest disagreement, but
some disagreement with GAO in terms of how they originally
phrased some of their recommendations. I will give you one
specific example. The phrase was used ``in charge of'' and we
pushed back on that because the military chain of command is
clear under the Constitution and by statute. It goes from the
President of the United States to the Secretary of Defense to a
Combatant Commander. There is no other civilian in that chain
of command.
We don't want to turn the decisions of the Secretary of
Defense into an interagency dialog. But we can, consistent with
preserving the chain of command, insist upon a proactive
leadership role in the interagency to make sure that as DOD
exercises its military responsibilities, those responsibilities
are fully coordinated with, not commanded by, but coordinated
with interagency partners.
I think there are still some unmet requirements with regard
to that coordination. As noted in the GAO report, I think one
of those areas involves leadership of the interagency process
outside the NCR. That was one of the main conclusions reached
in the GAO report and I think it is a valid conclusion
demanding an answer.
Ms. Watson. Well, I don't think the GAO needs to be looked
at as someone that should be defining and clarifying the
language in which we talk to each other through the
interagency.
They raised the issue. What I am trying to get from you is
where is the responsibility for the interagency coordination?
Where should it be housed? Are you saying the executive branch?
Mr. McHale. Yes. The position that I would preliminarily
present, and I think we are still in the process, not only in
DOD but throughout the interagency in reviewing this issue, is
who should have the role nationwide that has been assigned to
the NCRCC, TSA's executive agency at the National Capital
Region Coordination Center? Who should have that responsibility
outside the National Capital Region throughout the rest of the
country?
Now, I believe, consistent with the GAO report, that TSA
ought not to be passive in that executive agency, that there is
a leadership responsibility associated with that executive
agency; not a command responsibility, but a leadership
responsibility, that is what we envisioned within the National
Capital Region when we signed the memorandum of agreement.
The question then becomes: Who has that duty nationwide? I
believe that we ought to be open to the prospect of expanding
that duty from the NCR throughout the Nation under the primary
interagency leadership of TSA.
Ms. Watson. I think you ought to do it.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you. Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary McHale, you have been doing a great job. All of
you have done a fine job. I happen to know this gentlemen and I
appreciate the work he has done.
I would like to ask you, how will the downsizing of the Air
National Guard under BRAC and the reduction of the Air Guard
assets affect DOD's ability to protect the homeland in the near
and long term?
General Mayes. Sir, the BRAC recommendations were reviewed
before they came out on a public basis by Admiral Keating's
joint staff in Colorado Springs, at headquarters of NORAD
NORTHCOM.
As a combatant commander, his interests are in combat
capability, not in platforms or units. In reviewing those
recommendations alongside the force providers, Admiral Keating
has determined that the BRAC recommendations will not affect
the ability of NORAD NORTHCOM to complete its mission.
Mr. Shays. Would you also answer it, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. McHale. One of the factors to be considered in the BRAC
process is the potential impact of any individual closure upon
homeland defense capabilities. So, it is not only something
that one would think is the right thing to consider; by law we
are obligated to consider homeland defense implications in
making BRAC decisions.
I can assure you from conversations that I had prior to the
BRAC recommendations coming out of DOD, we had that kind of
dialog. There was a review of the homeland defense implications
associated with the proposed closures. Although that process
continues, I can tell you with confidence that homeland defense
was properly considered in coming up with the list that was
recommended by the Secretary to the BRAC commission.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. General, it is our understanding that
the 1st Air Force operates 24 alert facilities across the
United States. I would like you to describe these facilities.
Let me give you all the questions, OK? Describe the
facilities. What do they do? Does the alert facility have the
right fighter jet assets to perform the air defense mission
quickly and effectively?
Two more questions: Which air asset is best suited to the
domestic air defense mission and how many of those planes does
the Air National Guard have?
If you have forgotten one or two, I will come back to them,
but if you could kind of group it together, that would be
helpful.
General Mayes. Sir, our alert facilities vary in number
depending on our alert posture based on the given threat level.
A lot of the aspects of your question, regrettably, are
classified, so I can't get into the details of all of them.
But I will tell you that typically at any given alert site
there are at steady state, there are two aircrafts on alert
with a spare. The facilities required to do that are generally
an enclosed secured area, alert barn, as it is referred to.
That is manned by the appropriate aircraft crew chiefs, weapons
personnel, and of course the pilot force.
The facilities require extensive CON activity to the
command and control system so that those aircraft can be
ordered into the air with the appropriate rapidity. Their role
would be, obviously, to get airborne as rapidly as possible,
close on a target of interest, execute diversion signals, first
off.
We have several ways of doing that. The international civil
aviation organization has agreed upon a certain set of signals
that will indicate to an aircraft that he must alter his course
of action, perhaps follow the intercepting aircraft to landing.
If the passenger signals do not work, then those aircrafts
have flares on board to ensure that we can get the visual
attention of a potential violator. Most of our alert airplanes
are equipped with both UHF and VHF radios. We attempt at all
times to hail those aircrafts, the potential violators, on the
appropriate frequencies.
With all of that failing, then our command and control
system is such that we can access the highest available
engagement authority and provide the situational awareness, a
description of the current state of affairs to that engagement
authority and then he can make the decision about the final
course of action.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, General. I am all set.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Porter, do you have any questions?
Mr. Porter. Yes. I know we just have a few moments left.
But tell me what triggers your security interest in an
aircraft. I know there are some specific things you look at,
but what specifically would trigger your interest in an
aircraft?
General Mayes. Typically, what would cause an aircraft to
be a target of interest would be the fact that it is--well, a
couple of different things.
First of all, on the unknown side it would be either not
squawking the appropriate code, not flying on its filed flight
plan, being in a restricted area where it was not supposed to
be, non-compliant with instructions. If it was talking to us
and then it didn't comply with instructions it would become a
target of interest.
Another way that an aircraft can become a target of
interest is if we get through the intelligence fusion from the
various agencies including both civilian and military, if we
got information that there was a person on the no-fly list or
the selectee list, and that comes out of the Terrorist Screen
Center, if a person of that nature was on an aircraft, it would
be determined to be a target of interest and would merit
further scrutiny as it progressed through the national
airspace, or it could be refused entry into the national
airspace if it was coming from a different country.
Mr. McHale. Mr. Porter, in addition to what the General
just mentioned in terms of the physical activity of the
aircraft, where it is flying, the altitude, the other
indicators of potential threat activity in addition to the
information that we receive routinely regarding passengers
attempting to board or perhaps on board an aircraft may raise
issues of concern.
We also, consistent with the strategy that was quoted by
the chairman a few moments ago, see air defense as defense in
depth. That is, we want our air defense to begin overseas. So,
we have established robust intel sharing relationships with
friendly nation states and other sources overseas.
Some of our most significant air defense activity has been
triggered by information that we have received concerning
specific flights at specific times and specific threat
conditions associated with those flights so that we could bring
to bear upon those flights a very focused sense of concern.
You may recall a year ago this past Christmas, over a
period of 2 or 3 weeks we had that kind of information and it
dramatically affected how we deployed and implemented our air
defense capabilities, reviewing and in fact intercepting
certain flights, well beyond the airspace of the United States
of America.
General Mayes. Sir, I might add just one more factor. I
will tell you that the FAA, our partners in the FAA, are quite
often the first ones to bring to our attention the fact that an
aircraft is not compliant with his plan or is squawking the
wrong code. So the partnership there is working well.
Chairman Tom Davis. Well, thank you all very much. We have
votes on so I will dismiss this panel. We will move ahead and
adjourn this hearing but I appreciate everybody being here
today to answer our questions. We will keep working together.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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