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STATUS OF EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY GULF WAR SYNDROME: MULTIPLE TOXIC
EXPOSURES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 26, 1997
__________
Serial No. 105-66
__________
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois TOM LANTOS, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
CHRISTOPHER COX, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida GARY A. CONDIT, California
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
JOHN L. MICA, Florida ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia DC
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
Carolina JIM TURNER, Texas
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
PETE SESSIONS, Texas HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
MICHAEL PAPPAS, New Jersey ------
VINCE SNOWBARGER, Kansas BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
BOB BARR, Georgia (Independent)
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
William Moschella, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian
Judith McCoy, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Human Resources
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
VINCE SNOWBARGER, Kansas EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
MICHAEL PAPPAS, New Jersey BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont (Ind.)
STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
Robert Newman, Professional Staff Member
R. Jared Carpenter, Clerk
Cherri Branson, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on June 26, 1997.................................... 1
Statement of:
Garthwaite, Thomas, Deputy Under Secretary for Health,
Department of Veterans' Affairs, accompanied by John
Feussner, Chief Research Officer, Department of Veterans'
Affairs; and Frances Murphy, Director of Environmental
Agents Services, Department of Veterans' Affairs; Bernard
Rostker, Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses,
Department of Defense, accompanied by Gary Christopherson,
Acting Principal Deputy for Health Affairs; Col. Hershell
Wolfe, Assistant for Occupational Health, Assistant
Secretary of the Army, ASA, ILNC; and Col. Eric Daxon,
Radiological Hygiene Staff Officer, AEPI, U.S. Army........ 158
Metcalf, Hon. Jack, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Washington........................................ 19
Nicolson, Garth, chief scientific officer, Institute for
Molecular Medicine, accompanied by Nancy Nicolson, chief
executive officer, Institute for Molecular Medicine;
Leonard Dietz, physicist and research scientist; and Asaf
Durakovic, former chief, Nuclear Medicine Service,
Wilmington, DE............................................. 92
Roman, Col. Gilbert, retired, Gulf war veteran, Denver, CO;
Paul Canterbury, Gulf war veteran, Ashley, OH; Michael
Stacy, Gulf war veteran, Inola, OK; Staff Sgt. Mark Zeller,
Gulf war veteran, Fort Rucker, AL.......................... 25
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Canterbury, Paul, Gulf war veteran, Ashley, OH, prepared
statement of............................................... 30
Christopherson, Gary, Acting Principal Deputy for Health
Affairs, list of members of the Department's peer review
organization............................................... 222
Dietz, Leonard, physicist and research scientist, prepared
statement of............................................... 125
Durakovic, Asaf, former chief, Nuclear Medicine Service,
Wilmington, DE, prepared statement of...................... 141
Garthwaite, Thomas, Deputy Under Secretary for Health,
Department of Veterans' Affairs:
Detailed information concerning Dr. Baumzweiger.......... 225
Prepared statement of.................................... 161
Metcalf, Hon. Jack, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Washington, prepared statement of................. 21
Nicolson, Garth, chief scientific officer, Institute for
Molecular Medicine, prepared statement of.................. 96
Roman, Col. Gilbert, retired, Gulf war veteran, Denver, CO,
prepared statement of...................................... 42
Rostker, Bernard, Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses,
Department of Defense:
Information from the Armed Forces Radiological Research
Institute.............................................. 231
Prepared statement of.................................... 182
Sanders, Hon. Bernard, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Vermont, letter dated June 20, 1997............... 7
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............ 3
Stacy, Michael, Gulf war veteran, Inola, OK, prepared
statement of............................................... 53
Zeller, Staff Sgt. Mark, Gulf war veteran, Fort Rucker, AL,
prepared statement of...................................... 71
STATUS OF EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY GULF WAR SYNDROME: MULTIPLE TOXIC
EXPOSURES
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 26, 1997
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher
Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Shays, Pappas, Towns, Sanders, and
Kucinich.
Staff present: Lawrence J. Halloran, staff director and
counsel; Robert Newman, professional staff member; R. Jared
Carpenter, clerk; Cherri Branson, minority counsel; and Ellen
Rayner, minority chief clerk.
Mr. Shays. I welcome our witnesses and our guests, and we
will begin this hearing.
In the course of these oversight hearings on Gulf war
veterans' illnesses, we have delved deeply into complex
scientific, clinical, military, and administrative issues. We
are likely to do so again today as the subcommittee examines
the possible synergistic effects of exposure to toxic
cocktails, including low-level chemical weapons, pesticides,
smoke from oil well fires, experimental drugs, depleted
uranium, and biological agents.
Immersed in a sea of technical details, it is possible to
lose sight of the larger question that still confronts us as a
Nation 6 years after the war: Are sick veterans getting better?
Fortunately, testimony before this subcommittee from the
General Accounting Office, GAO, Tuesday cut through the
complexity and reasserted that simple, yet profound, important
question as the moral, medical, and operational test of
everything this Government does in the name of those it serves.
As directed by Congress last year, GAO evaluated the
effectiveness of the clinical care and research programs for
six Gulf war veterans. They found neither the Veterans' Affairs
Department, VA, nor the Defense Department, DOD, can say
whether the veterans on their health registries since 1992 are
any better or worse today than when they were first examined.
GAO also found the research effort reactive, predisposed to
certain lines of inquiry, and highly unlikely to provide
conclusive answers regarding the causes of Gulf war illnesses,
and they found some official conclusions about Gulf war
illnesses by the Presidential Advisory Committee, the PAC,
weakly supported or premature.
In short, 6 years after the war, when asked what progress
has been made healing sick Gulf war veterans, VA and DOD cannot
say where they have been and may never get where they are
supposed to be going.
Part of the journey from cause to cure runs through the
pools, clouds, and plumes of toxins in which Gulf war veterans
lived and fought. It is a leg of the trip DOD and VA have never
taken, too quickly dismissing the potential health hazards of
many known exposures. Just as research into the effects of low-
level chemical weapons was thwarted for 5 years by denials,
inquiries into toxic effects of other agents, alone and in
combination, have been dismissed or ignored.
It is simply not acceptable for VA and DOD to declare
repeatedly ``there is no evidence'' of exposures or effects,
when the evidence has never been sought.
Today, we will hear evidence of two ingredients of the
toxic soup to which many Gulf war veterans were exposed:
depleted uranium and mycoplasmas. No one claims either agent is
the silver bullet causing the myriad of Gulf war illnesses, nor
should anyone in the face of very real symptoms and very real
suffering likely dismiss their potential for causing,
enhancing, or accelerating the health effects of toxic
exposures.
Depleted uranium is a heavy metal, like lead, which is
highly toxic when ingested or inhaled. Mycoplasma infections
may explain apparent transmission of illnesses to veterans'
family members.
We asked VA and DOD witnesses to describe what is known
about the extent and effects of exposures to these agents and
how that knowledge is reflected in research, diagnosis, and
treatment protocols. We also invited researchers familiar with
the pathology and these agents to describe their work. The
subcommittee appreciates the benefit of their views and their
expertise.
The Gulf war veterans testifying today, like those who
appeared here before, still travel the uncertain road they hope
will lead to answers, good health, to the home they left to
fight our desert battle. We are honored by their presence and
we value their testimony.
Are sick Gulf war veterans getting better? Until the answer
is yes, our work as a Congress and as a Nation remains
unfinished, our debt to veterans unpaid.
At this time, the Chair would like to recognize a partner
in this effort, Mr. Sanders from Vermont.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Sanders. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
continue to applaud you and your staff for the outstanding work
that you have done for a very long period in keeping this issue
before the public eye and in trying to bring forth truths
which, in fact, have been hidden for a number of years.
Mr. Chairman, within the last week or two, I think two
important developments have occurred, which I want to very
briefly mention. No. 1 was the release of a GAO report which
basically concluded what many of us have been saying for a
number of years, and that is that neither the Pentagon nor the
Veterans' Administration have been doing a good job in helping
us understand the cause of the problems or developing a
treatment for the some 70,000 veterans who are hurting today.
And that report, of course, did not come as a surprise to the
members of this committee, because that is exactly the report
that we have been making for a number of years.
Second, I submitted for the record a letter that was sent
to the chairperson of the Presidential Advisory Committee that
had the names of 86 members of the U.S. House of
Representatives, and basically what that letter said to the
Presidential Advisory Committee is that we, Members of
Congress, disagree with the conclusion of your December 1996
report which suggests that stress and stress alone is the cause
of Persian Gulf illnesses.
And I must tell you that we could have had many more
signatures on that letter. I must tell you that it was not a
partisan issue. Democrats, Republicans, conservatives,
progressives all responded, because very few people today in
the House of Representatives and, I expect, in the Senate as
well and, I expect, within the veterans' community and, I
expect, within the United States of America today accept the
conclusion that only stress was the cause of the problems.
Is stress an important factor? Yes, it is. I happen to
believe it is. But is it the only factor? No. And I think what
we have been hearing, month after month after month, testimony
before this committee is the role that chemicals, in one form
or another, and the synergistic, the combined effect of
chemicals, the role that they have played in causing illness,
and it is impossible, in my view, to deny that conclusion any
more.
Mr. Chairman, very briefly, the concern that I have and
what the GAO had is the lack of focus and the lack of direction
on the part of the DOD and the VA. In the letter that we sent
to the Presidential Advisory Committee, we briefly summarized a
dozen different studies by outstanding and well-known
scientists and physicians who, in one way or another, point out
the role that chemicals have played.
Interestingly, two of the studies were funded by the DOD
itself. In 1995, the DOD, in one of their own studies at Fort
Detrick, MD, concluded that pyridostigmine bromide, combined
with DEET and pyrimethamine, have a synergistic effect, much
more so than the additive effect on making rats sick, dying
earlier than one would have expected, similar to the findings
released by a Duke University study. A dozen different studies,
and what the GAO is saying, where is it all going? In 5 years
from now, in 10 years from now, are we going to have more and
more studies? So I would suggest this is not an academic
exercise.
Now, the problems are many.
No. 1, I happen to believe, and I can understand it from a
human nature point of view, that the DOD is not happy to
acknowledge that after that smashing military victory in the
Persian Gulf, a victory of enormous consequence, much better
than anyone dreamed possible, that a two-bit despot like Saddam
Hussein may have been able to cause yet so much damage. People
do not want to acknowledge that.
No. 2: What about the role of pyridostigmine bromide? As we
all know, the DOD received a waiver from the FDA, and I suspect
that there is--and I am not here to criticize, in that sense,
the DOD. We know that they want the best for our troops. We
know the VA wants the best for our troops, but maybe there is a
reluctance to investigate the fact that they themselves brought
forth pyridostigmine bromide, administered it to hundreds of
thousands of our troops, and maybe that is part of the problem.
And, No. 3, and maybe most significantly, there is a strong
difference of opinion within the medical community; honest
physicians, honest scientists disagree about what is called
``multiple chemical sensitivity,'' and you have many
physicians, I think, in the VA and the DOD who simply do not
accept that diagnosis.
I will be curious to know from the DOD and the VA how many
scientists they have on board who believe in the synergistic
impact of chemicals, that chemicals can make us ill. And if you
do not believe that, then you can have all the scientists you
want peer-reviewing everything, and they are going to think,
hey, this is quackery; this does not mean anything.
So I think those are some of the questions that we will
want to explore today, and, Mr. Chairman, I simply congratulate
you and your staff for the outstanding work that you have been
doing.
[The letter referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. At this time, we have a
Member of Congress, a distinguished Member of Congress, Jack
Metcalf, who, while not a member of this committee, has been
very active on this issue and very involved. We appreciate your
involvement, and appreciate any testimony or statement that you
would like to give.
STATEMENT OF HON. JACK METCALF, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
Mr. Metcalf. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your
work and support and for the opportunity to speak to the
subcommittee on this vital issue. I would like to have my
entire statement entered in the record.
Mr. Shays. Without objection, so ordered, and I will use
your point here as an excuse to do two business things and ask
unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee be
permitted to place any opening statement in the record and that
the record remain open 3 days and without objection, so
ordered, and ask unanimous consent that all witnesses be
permitted to include their written statement in the record and
without objection, so ordered.
And does the ranking member mind if I just--OK. We welcome
your statement now.
Mr. Metcalf. Thank you very much. Gulf war illnesses have
affected thousands of service personnel, both United States
troops and those of our allies. In the beginning, the
Department of Defense officially refused to recognize the
possibility of serious illnesses related to operations in the
Gulf that were not clearly the result of an identifiable
source. However, reluctantly, in the past year there has been
an increasing acknowledgement of events during the operation
that could have potentially exposed troops to chemical and
biological warfare agents.
Considering United States shipments of both chemical and
biological material to Iraq as well as statements by Retired
General Schwarzkopf and Secretary of State Albright and others
regarding Iraq's development of biological weapons, it is
difficult to understand how the Department of Defense can
continue to deny the possibility that our troops could have
been exposed to biologicals.
Additionally, I have a grave concern that the Government's
unwillingness to seriously consider the cumulative health
consequences, cumulative health consequences of exposures to
multiple-risk factors has resulted in inadequate care for the
sailors, soldiers, airmen, and Marines who put their lives on
the line when their Nation called.
The most sobering experience I have had since I came to
Congress has been to meet the sick young men and women that
were in excellent health before their service in the Gulf. I
have heard over and over their stories of multiple-risk-factor
exposures.
Ed, a Marine scout sniper, was in outstanding health before
his service in the Gulf, as evidenced by the award he received
for attaining the maximum score on physical fitness tests. His
performance as a Marine was continually commended. His health
has steadily deteriorated since his return. As he related his
story, what is clear is the complexity of the potential
exposures.
He was seriously ill shortly after arrival in the Gulf,
although the cause was unknown. He was ordered to take PB
tablets and a botulinum vaccine. During his experiences,
chemical alarms were continually sounding and blister agents
were being detected. He and his team were breathing smoke from
oil well fires, as well as smoke from burning tanks destroyed
by depleted uranium rounds. He described a dark, foul rain that
came from the north, its cause unknown. He was exposed to
pesticides and other environmental hazards in the field.
The work done to date to help Ed and thousands like him is
woefully deficient. The Department of Defense is quick to point
out that the Government is funding 91 Gulf war medical research
studies. A close look, however, reveals a sobering reality: Of
those 91, only 3 are looking at issues associated with chemical
weapon exposure, and only 2 are examining the health
consequences of depleted uranium. What is truly amazing is that
none of these three chemical weapons studies are even being
done in this country.
Why are not the best and the brightest of our doctors and
scientists working to find answers? The young men and women who
serve this Nation deserve better.
Finally, I want to thank Dr. Garth Nicolson and Leonard
Dietz for their testimonies today. When scientists with the
stature of these researchers speak, we need to be listening. I
can only hope that the public will do so, that the Pentagon and
the public will do so.
We in Congress have a moral obligation to press for
truthful answers and to ensure adequate health for our veterans
and their family members who may be sick as a result of
exposures in the Gulf.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Jack Metcalf follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman for being here for his
statement.
At this time, the Chair would like to recognize Mr. Towns,
who truly is an equal partner in this process. I may have the
gavel, but I consider us equal partners, and I particularly
appreciate the fact that he is busy on the Commerce Committee
but spends so much time as the ranking member on this
subcommittee. Mr. Towns.
Mr. Towns. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin
by first thanking you for your kind words, and let me also
thank you, as well as the majority staff and the minority
staff, for arranging this hearing today on Persian Gulf war
illness.
While I look forward to hearing the testimony of all of our
witnesses, I am particularly interested in our treatment of the
disorder known as multiple chemical sensitivity. Some people
have questioned the VA's reluctance to recognize multiple
chemical sensitivity as a compensable injury. However, this
criticism ignores that the medical community is divided over
whether MCS is a bona fide disease. The California Medical
Association, the American Academy of Allergy and Immunology,
the American College of Physicians, the American College of
Medicine, and the Council on Scientific Affairs of the American
Medical Association have all published position papers which
question the existence of MCS, its diagnosis, and its
treatments.
Additionally, the legal community is not unified on this
issue, either. Courts have been divided over whether MCS is to
be considered as an injury under State workers' compensation
laws, and we in the Federal Government have not been
consistent, either.
MCS has been classified as a disability under the Americans
with Disabilities Act. MCS has also been recognized by the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development as a basis for
seeking protection under the Federal housing discrimination
laws, yet the Social Security Administration considers MCS on a
case-by-case basis, and the Department of Veterans' Affairs
does not recognize it at all.
In August 1997, the U.S. Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry will publish an interim report on MCS. The
Agency is composed of representatives from the Departments of
Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, and Veterans'
Affairs, as well as the National Center for Environmental
Health, the National Institute of Occupational Safety and
Health, and the National Institute of Environmental Health
Sciences, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
The report is expected to contain findings and
recommendations which may affect the compensation policies of
every Federal agency and provide some general agreement in the
scientific and medical communities, which would lead to Federal
recognition and also uniformity.
Mr. Chairman, I suggest that when the report is released,
we hold a hearing on its findings. Additionally, I suggest that
if the situation warrants, we consider legislation to require
Federal benefit uniformity for all those who are disabled by
multiple chemical sensitivity.
So I look forward to working with you, as I have done in
the past, and I would like to also applaud you for staying with
this issue, because I think it is important that we do so, and
at this time I yield back.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. In fact, we both are
staying with this issue, obviously, along with Mr. Sanders. At
this time, I am inviting to the table, recognizing our four
witnesses, Col. Gilbert Roman, retired, Gulf war veteran--oh, I
am sorry. Mr. Kucinich, I apologize. I did not see you walk in.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will be
brief. I want to thank the Chair for his diligence in pursuing
this issue over the past few years, and I have had a chance to
look at testimony that has been presented to this committee, as
well as the initial report which we received, and it is very
apparent that there were many shortcomings in the approach that
the Department of Defense used.
I would like to think that the United States of America has
a Defense Department which is second to none in the world and
that they really are dedicated to protecting the American
people and assuring the security of Americans around the world
and making sure that Americans' interests are protected.
But in this one case I think we have seen where despite
perhaps some of the best intentions and some of the best
people, it is quite possible some serious mistakes were made
and those mistakes were repeated, that people went into the
crisis affecting the Gulf war veterans with a theoretical
forward which did not allow for the consideration of other
possibilities other than post-traumatic stress or psychological
conditions which can arise from people being separated from
family and being in a certain environment, and the analysis was
flawed from the beginning.
And so if we can, in these hearings, find a way to not just
admit that possibility, but to remedy the injustice which has
been done to the Gulf war veterans, then we can celebrate the
unending possibilities of a democratic tradition which can
include error and seek to create remedies which can overcome
those errors.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the work that you
have done on this.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. At this time, we will
recognize our four witnesses and ask them to stand to be sworn
in: Col. Gilbert Roman, retired, Gulf war veteran, Denver, CO;
Mr. Paul Canterbury, Gulf war veteran, Ashley, OH; Mr. Michael
Stacy, Gulf war veteran, Inola, OK; and S/Sgt. Mark Zeller,
Gulf war veteran, Fort Rucker, AL.
Gentlemen, we swear in all our witnesses, including Members
of Congress. Raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Please be seated. I note for the
record that all four have answered in the affirmative.
We will begin in the order in which I called you, so we
will just go right down the table. We are going to have a timer
on, but you are free to run over the timer. We want to just
keep track of how we are doing here, so I welcome you, Colonel.
STATEMENTS OF COL. GILBERT ROMAN, RETIRED, GULF WAR VETERAN,
DENVER, CO; PAUL CANTERBURY, GULF WAR VETERAN, ASHLEY, OH;
MICHAEL STACY, GULF WAR VETERAN, INOLA, OK; STAFF SGT. MARK
ZELLER, GULF WAR VETERAN, FORT RUCKER, AL
Col. Roman. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, distinguished
members of the subcommittee, my fellow veterans, I am Gilbert
D. Roman, Colonel, U.S. Army, retired, Reserve. I thank you for
the opportunity to be here today.
I would like to start out with a newspaper item quotation,
a very brief one, taken from the Army Times, 1994. It says,
``Sick Gulf Vets Wary, Wait for Treatment.'' It goes on to
quote, ``We are committed to the treatment of the veterans of
the Persian Gulf conflict who are experiencing problems as a
result of their service,'' said Edwin Dorn, Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness. ``We are determined to
fashion compensation for those who are too sick to work.'' Army
Times, March 1994.
We are still waiting, sir. I am greatly saddened by recent
newspaper accounts of what is not occurring in the dialog and
discussion on this issue, because I see a continuing pattern of
official DOD misinformation and negligence tantamount to
malfeasance in office for ignoring testimony and documentation
referring to the use or presence of chemicals and other
biological agents our reports indicate were found in the
theater of operations during Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
I arrived in the theater of operations on January 6, 1991--
by the way, that would happen to be my birthday--after
volunteering to serve in the Persian Gulf and being brought on
active duty in December 1990. My primary responsibility as
Colonel, Medical Service Corps, was the Deputy Commander of the
311th Evacuation Hospital----
Mr. Shays. Colonel, could you just slow down a little bit?
We are not going to rush you.
Col. Roman. Are you sure?
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Col. Roman. OK.
Mr. Shays. Let me just say something to all of you. We
learned early on that you are voices in the wilderness, with
very few people listening.
Col. Roman. Thank you. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. And we decided that in almost every instance we
would begin our hearings listening to those voices. So you are
a very important voice, and you take your time.
Col. Roman. I took very serious that 5 minutes, though,
that we were given.
Mr. Shays. Well, I want to explain to you, we would like
you to have been aware of the 5 minutes. If you run over, we
are just going to turn the light back on.
Col. Roman. Thank you, sir. My primary responsibility as
Colonel, Medical Service Corps was as the Deputy Commander of
the 311th Evacuation Hospital. I was responsible for
operations, logistics, and security. In secondary assignments I
was also the public affairs officer and liaison to the Ministry
of Health in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, where the 311th
was physically located.
We were also near Al Dafra and Al Bateen Air Force Bases
where the United States Air Force flew daily sorties north.
Also flying out of Al Bateen were daily air shuttles called the
``Star Shuttle,'' which were either C-130's or C-141's that
flew daily shuttles to Riyadh, Dharhan, King Khalid Military
City, and other points in the Gulf operations.
During several of the official visits to these strategic
military cities there were frequent SCUD attacks in SCUD Alley
during which I often heard the chemical alarms. When I asked if
these alarms meant chemicals, and I was a colonel, I was told
that the chemical alarms had malfunctioned. I do not think they
malfunctioned that often, sir.
My first time in Riyadh, I became ill. I was treated for
nausea, headaches, vomiting, diarrhea, and a high temperature.
My commander, a physician, was with me and treated me for the
symptoms, which appeared to be food poisoning. There was
nausea, headache, vomiting, and--I am bleeding; and the reason
I am bleeding, sir, is because I have precancerous polyps--
excuse me--that have not been treated in my nasal passages and
colon. But if I can continue, I would appreciate it.
Mr. Shays. You may continue, and you may slow down.
Col. Roman. I am slowing down.
Mr. Shays. And we can also go to another witness and then
come back to you.
Col. Roman. If I can just continue, I will be finished in a
few minutes.
Mr. Shays. I just want to emphasize to you, though, just
feel free to slow down.
Col. Roman. OK.
Mr. Shays. We just want to hear every word you have to say.
Col. Roman. Thank you, sir. This nausea, headache,
vomiting, and flu-like symptoms continued throughout the time I
was in the Persian Gulf, and I continued to treat it like food
poisoning, with Immodium and 800 milligrams Motrin, the Army's
blessed answer to all pain.
The rashes I had over my body while I was in the Gulf I
thought were normal and expected, since I spent most of my days
in the sand, wind, and the sun with all the attendant fleas,
flies, and other desert parasites. A calamine lotion-like
substance served to sooth but not relieve or get rid of the
severe rashes that I experienced.
Life in the theater of operations was a constant adrenalin
rush, with 3 or 4 hours of sleep in between. Headaches I began
to experience attributed to fatigue and the lack of sleep were
actually other things, as I found out later.
Upon returning home to the States and my discharge from
active duty, I returned home, and the symptoms I experienced in
the Persian Gulf continued after I got there, and they got
progressively worse.
In 1993, I registered myself with the Washington, DC
Veterans Hospital after receiving an invitation from the VA to
come in for an examination because I was a Persian Gulf vet.
The Washington, DC VA noted----
Mr. Towns. Mr. Chairman, may I make a suggestion that we
allow him to go to the restroom and then return and allow
someone else to testify and then let him come back and
continue?
Col. Roman. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. I think that is a good suggestion.
Col. Roman. I apologize. I just have not been able to stop
these nosebleeds for a number of years now.
Mr. Shays. You know, you are apologizing to us, and we
should be apologizing to you. Thank you, Colonel. We will see
you back here. Mr. Canterbury.
Mr. Canterbury. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. We welcome your testimony; and, again, I just
want to say we are in no rush.
Mr. Canterbury. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. So we welcome your testimony. You may begin.
Mr. Canterbury. Thank you. Hello. My name is Paul
Canterbury, and I want to thank you for allowing me to come and
testify before you.
Mr. Shays. I am sorry to interrupt. I want you to move the
mic a little closer to you, and I want you to bring it down
just a speck. There you go. Thank you.
Mr. Canterbury. I served in the U.S. Army at Fort Hood, TX
from 1989 to 1992 in Delta Company, 57th Signal Battalion. I
was sent to the Middle East as a private from September 1990 to
April 1991. In August 1990, myself and my company went on alert
and spent over 24 hours painting vehicles with the CARC paint,
and I remember the fruity smelling odor. For several days after
painting the battalion's vehicles, I felt very nauseous.
We were shipped to King Abdul Aziz Port. I stayed there for
about 2 to 3 weeks. The facilities were pretty disgusting,
filthy. There were not enough restrooms and showers to
accommodate the amount of people who had to utilize them. They
were not properly cleaned either.
On the port that I was at, food and water was rationed out
to us. After a couple of weeks on the port, I began
experiencing nausea, headaches, and diarrhea.
During the convoy to our first site in the desert, my
condition became worse, with vomiting, migraines, and diarrhea.
While setting up camp, I passed out and was taken to a field
hospital and treated for what was then said as dysentery and
dehydration. I was treated with pills and an IV.
After Christmas, my communication team supported the 18th
Airborne Corps Main, where we were sent to King Khalid Military
City, just days before the air campaign. KKMC was where I first
heard chemical alarms and SCUD alerts. Hours before the air war
started, we began taking the bromide tablets. During the first
hours of the air war, we traveled in MOPP-4 at night to a city
called Rafha, just miles from the Iraqi border.
I continued to take the bromide tablets for a total period
of 8 to 9 days, three times a day, in front of a
noncommissioned officer. At Rafha, we experienced many chemical
alarms, and after the alarms were sounded, my platoon sergeant
and my platoon leader would call for a private to unmask to see
if it was all clear. I was one of those privates, and we were
told we were expendable.
Sometime during this period, I was driving through Hafa-
Albotin the day a SCUD landed. A soldier gave us the sign
``GAS, GAS, GAS.'' I noticed a rainbow in the sky, and I
questioned what that rainbow was caused from. Today, I still do
want to know what it is, sir.
A day or two prior to the ground war, I went to Rafha to
receive a shot. I was handed a piece of paper to sign and
release the Army or the Government--I am not sure which--of any
and all adverse side effects. The paper stated it was an
experimental drug, which I do not remember the name. I was not
allowed to refuse the shot. I was not allowed to receive the
paper, but I was allowed to refuse to sign it.
After the shot was administered, I began noticing heart
palpitations and tunnel vision. When the ground war started, we
convoyed to Iraq and established a site. We were told by our
first sergeant to turn in all live ammunition, and the only
ones allowed to have it would be the guard points. Because of
my lack of knowledge of the dangers of depleted uranium on
destroyed tanks, armored vehicles, and bunkers, I did not
protect myself with my MOPP gear while climbing on and in them.
In April 1991, I returned to Fort Hood, TX, and numerous
times I reported to the troop medical clinic, complaining of
heart palpitations, migraines, severe diarrhea, and muscle
spasms. No tests were run, and I was always told to take a
couple of days off and bed rest. Prior to getting out of the
Army and my ETS physical, I stated those same problems I went
to the TMC for.
They had me wear a heart monitor, and the results were that
my heart was beating faster than normal, and I was told that it
was nothing to worry about.
After I left the Army in 1992, I moved my family to Ohio. I
first went to the VA Clinic in Columbus, OH, June 1994, to sign
on the Persian Gulf Registry Exam. Upon completion of the exam,
the attending physician stated to me, and I quote: ``There is
nothing wrong with you. It is all stress-related.''
I believed him, and I thought from his opinion and my
family's comments that there was nothing wrong with me. I later
found out from a patient rep that the physician for the Persian
Gulf Registry Exam had set various appointments for me, which
my records indicate a no-show for all set appointments. To the
best of my knowledge, I do not remember him setting those
appointments for me. I was not aware of them.
As time went on, my symptoms had been increasing in number
and seemed to be getting worse. I did nothing medically until
July 1996, when I returned to the VA Clinic for another, a
second Persian Gulf Registry Examination. After that time, a
primary physician was established. She then started setting
appointments, lab work, CAT scan of head, heart monitor, et
cetera.
The problems I have had with the VA Clinic, outpatient
clinic in Columbus, OH are numerous. One, not receiving test
results. My appointments with my primary physician started out
at about every 2 weeks, then they started going every couple of
months. I had a problem with my physician personally walking me
to the mental health clinic like I am a crazy person and I
cannot find my own way.
I have a problem with a psychologist trying to hypnotize me
for pain control. Stare at a black dot on the wall and listen
to this tape.
On one occasion, after telling my physician my health has
gotten worse, she told me this: Your lab work is normal. There
is nothing to treat. There is no diagnosis. I can give you
Tylenol or Motrin for your pain, but please note, before this
time, she had been prescribing me meds such as Solodac and
Hyproxin for my pain.
In November 1996, I admitted myself to the VA Hospital in
Chillicothe, OH to get help for my health problems, depression,
and suicidal tendencies. They diagnosed me with PTSD and
Dysthymic Disorder.
In December 1996, I tried to commit suicide because of my
declining health problems, which everyone said there was
nothing wrong with me, and the breakup of my marriage. I was
admitted to Knox County Community Hospital's psych ward for
about a week.
In January 1997, I returned to my primary physician again,
explaining everything that had happened, and I told her I had
not worked for quite a while, and she said she could not give
me a work excuse to turn in; she could not provide me with one.
I asked for a referral to another medical facility, and she
said she could not do that, either.
On my very first appointment with the physical therapist,
she diagnosed me with fibromyalgia by having me push my arms
this way, pull my arms that way, same with my feet. I do not
see how this is possible.
In March 1997, I experienced bad blurred and double vision,
and I went to an optometrist. His diagnosis was hypertropia,
large vertical muscle imbalance, esophoria at near,
accommodative deficiency. And vision therapy was recommended
for treatment, prescription sunglasses, and bifocals.
May 12, 1997, I went to the VA Hospital in Washington, DC,
and had numerous tests done on me, which I do not have the
results of as of today. May 12 to 14, 1997, I went to
Georgetown University Medical Center for further studies. No
results as of today.
I was told that I would be at the VA Hospital in
Washington, DC, between 10 to 14 days, but I was only there 6,
2 of which were on the weekend, and the first day nothing was
done.
When I joined the Army, I signed a contract with the United
States stating that if anything happened to me in an act of a
war, peacekeeping process, what have you, if I die, if I become
ill during my time in service, the United States would take
care of me. I fulfilled my portion of that contract; now it is
time for you to fulfill your portion of the contract.
In closing, I would like to say, due to the time
restraints, I was not able to provide you with all the
information I have knowledge of. Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Canterbury follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Canterbury. Mr. Roman.
Col. Roman. Sir, I am ready.
Mr. Shays. OK. And I am going to emphasize again----
Col. Roman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays [continuing]. The only time restraint we have now
would be self-imposed by you.
Col. Roman. OK.
Mr. Shays. So I want you to really take it slower.
Col. Roman. Thank you, sir. One of the reasons I started
talking a little fast was because I felt the blood starting to
come, and I was trying to get it over with before I start--
well, anyway, thank you very much. I will continue. If I could
pick up right from where I left off, I would appreciate it.
Mr. Shays. I am going to ask you just to slow down a second
and tell me where were you. Do we have the same document you
have? What page are you on?
Col. Roman. I am on page 3----
Mr. Shays. OK.
Col. Roman [continuing]. And I am down at the last
paragraph, and I am not giving it all; I have cutoff some of
it.
Mr. Shays. You cutoff some of the better parts, frankly.
Col. Roman. I was afraid, trying----
Mr. Shays. OK.
Col. Roman. OK. I think what I will do, sir, because I
think I was bleeding all over myself at the time that I was
talking earlier, is pick up just at the second paragraph on
page 3, if I may.
Mr. Shays. That is fine.
Col. Roman. And say to you that my first time to Riyadh, I
became ill, was treated for nausea and headaches and vomiting,
diarrhea, and a high temperature.
My commander, who was a physician, was with me, and he
treated me for the symptoms which appear to be like food
poisoning. This nausea, headaches, and vomiting-like symptoms
continued throughout the time I was in the Persian Gulf, and I
continued to treat it like food poisoning, with Immodium and
800-milligram Motrin. As I indicated, it really is the Army's
blessed answer to all pain because it works, at least for pain.
Rashes, I had over my body while I was in the Gulf, I
thought they were normal and expected, since I spent most of my
days in the sand and the field, wind and sun, with all the
attendant fleas, flies, and other desert parasites. I used a
calamine lotion-like substance which served to sooth but did
not relieve or get rid of the severe rashes that I experienced.
Life in the theater of operations was a constant adrenalin
rush, with 3 to 4 hours' sleep in between. Headaches I began to
experience, I attributed to fatigue and the lack of sleep. Upon
returning to the States and my discharge from active duty, I
returned home like thousands of other United States soldiers,
and the symptoms I had experienced in the Persian Gulf
continued after I returned home and got progressively worse, as
a matter of fact.
In 1993, I registered myself into the Washington, DC
Veterans Hospital after receiving an invitation from the VA to
come in for an examination if I was a Persian Gulf vet. The
Washington, DC VA noted a number of problems, including sleep
apnea--and short-term memory loss, hearing loss, and they
recorded all the ailments I had indicated to them, including my
flu-like symptoms, swelling in my hands, knees, and ankles,
respiratory problems, and severe headaches.
No treatment was offered. Rather, the VA Hospital billed me
for my supposed free examination and ended up attaching my next
year's meager tax return for money I owed them for an
examination that I was offered, which I was requested to take
by the VA. So I do not know why I was being billed, but I could
not fight it enough. They kept fighting it back, and they sent
it over to the IRS, and they took the money out of my return.
I went back to Denver in 1994 and registered at the Denver
VA Hospital, where instead of requesting my examination files
from the Washington, DC VA, I underwent a second complete re-
examination, with, I might add, similar results.
Then, in 1995, the United States Army sent me a letter to
report to Fitzsimmons Army Medical Center if I was suffering
any ill effects from the Persian Gulf war. Once more, I
underwent a complete examination, from blood to MRI, and
everything in between. The results this time were much clearer.
The Army doctors found out again that I had chronic fatigue,
precancerous nasal and colon polyps, chronic skin rashes and
hives, which have not been tied to a cause yet, sleep apnea--
respiratory illness of mysterious origin, short-term memory
loss, flu-like symptoms which would come and go, lasted for 6
weeks, and chronic arthritis of the joints.
The young Army doctors tried to treat me and had scheduled
me for an operation to remove the polyps from my nose. Had they
done that, maybe I would not be bleeding, but the colonel in
charge of the Persian Gulf examinations advised me that they
could not treat me because it was not determined that I had
been injured or had received that particular illness in the
Persian Gulf.
To date, although I now have had three official VA and Army
examinations since 1993, I still continue to receive requests
for more and more information from the VA Claims Office in
Phoenix, AZ. Materials I send them are never acknowledged as
received, and the telephone numbers that are given are not to
any VA-recognized exchange, and the name given for contact is
not a true VA employee; at least the number that answers at
IRS, by the way, is not the name of the VA office I have tried
to reach.
Frustration is a word that does not begin to explain the
feeling of being in the system 4 years now with no real contact
from a person, just requests for more and more information. It
is particularly maddening when I personally sent my records
from the VA hospitals and the Army to them for evaluation, yet
when I called them in the winter of 1997 in Phoenix and left a
message via a third party to advise me of what records they
had, they sent me back a written message that said they were
requesting my records from the VA hospitals in Washington, DC,
and in Denver.
I thought they were evaluating me at that time, but without
those records, how could they have been evaluating me?
1996 was not a good year for me. I was hospitalized three
times and was treated by my private physician for a respiratory
ailment. I could not walk more than 25 steps without having to
stop, out of breath and fatigued. This ailment, which was life-
threatening, would not allow me to lie on my back to sleep, as
I would begin to drown, or at least it would feel like I was
drowning, when my lungs were filling up with fluid.
I was forced to sit up to sleep and was constantly fatigued
due to the lack of sleep and no energy. My cardiologist in
Denver, Dr. Peter Steele, diagnosed me as having cardiomyopathy
with congestive heart failure. The onset of symptoms, he said,
``which would suggest that possibility that this was induced by
a source in the Middle East during the Gulf war.'' ``What is
clear,'' Dr. Steele stated, is that ``he served in the Middle
East and that he has a cardiomyopathy.'' He goes on to say that
I would submit that this may well be a part of the Gulf War
Syndrome; I attach a letter for your convenience from Dr.
Steele.
Last December 1996, I was examined by Dr. William
Baumzweiger, and I misspelled the name. For the record, it is
B-A-U-M-Z-W-E-I-G-E-R. He is a neurologist at the Los Angeles
Veterans Hospital. After a 3-hour examination, Dr. Baumzweiger
advised me that I had suffered severe neurological damage while
in the Persian Gulf and had, in fact, suffered brain stem
damage as well. Dr. Baumzweiger further advised me that my
neurological damage was as severe as he had seen and was, in
fact, caused by exposure to unknown chemical agents while in
the Persian Gulf.
He also advised me that I probably would not live as long
as I would have had I not been in the Persian Gulf and that
unless I took 1 year off to do nothing but recuperate, I would
most likely be a candidate for a heart transplant within 3 to 5
years.
Dr. Baumzweiger also concurred with Dr. Peter Steele's
diagnosis of cardiomyopathy caused by my service in the Middle
East during the war. He suggested that this cardiomyopathy may
well be a part of the Gulf War Syndrome.
Incidentally, while I was in Dr. Baumzweier's office, he
was summoned into the chief neurologist's office. Upon his
return, he informed me that he was no longer authorized to
treat Persian Gulf vets. When I asked him why, he advised me
that his findings had not coincided with the VA's on the
reasons for Gulf war vets' illnesses; therefore, he was asked
to not treat Persian Gulf vets anymore.
Mr. Shays. Col. Roman, you are under oath right now, and
you are saying that while you were having this examination,
this doctor left and then came back, and, to the best of your
recollection, this is precisely what he said, almost what he
said, or maybe something like that?
Col. Roman. He advised me exactly what I just said.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Col. Roman. And I also saw or happened to see the letter
that he had from the chief neurologist where he was asked not
to treat Persian Gulf vets anymore. I just glanced at it. They
had it on the table there, and I saw it. He was somewhat
distressed, by the way, at the time.
The still-too-recent memory of the Vietnam veterans and
Agent Orange casts a pall on the ongoing denial by the same
bureaucracies who continue to deceive Persian Gulf veterans.
Didn't we learn anything from the Agent Orange debacle? Must we
be condemned to remaking the same mistakes with our Persian
Gulf veterans?
Ironically, on November 2, 1994, the President signed a
Veterans Benefits Improvements Act of 1994, Public Law 103-446.
This law authorized the Department of Veterans' Affairs to pay
service-connected compensation to Persian Gulf veterans who are
suffering from chronic disabilities resulting from undiagnosed
illnesses. And I think ``undiagnosed illnesses'' here is the
key, since the precedent had already been made to Agent Orange
victims who, after many, many years a compensatory fund was
created for them by the U.S. Congress. This occurred after a
study by the Centers for Disease Control failed to establish a
link between Dioxin absorption to any serious Vietnam-veteran
malady.
Two and a half years after this law went into effect, the
information letter I received from Secretary of Veterans'
Affairs Jessie Brown still has not borne fruit for most of my
fellow Persian Gulf veterans. Lip service and voluminous
correspondence from the VA is all that has resulted for most of
us.
A bullet from an AK-47, a land mine, a mortar shell, or
grenade would all cause trauma to the body or death. How
different are these weapons of war to those invisible, but
equally devastating, mortar weapons of war in the form of
lethal chemicals and biological agents? Answer: There is no
difference in the effect; it just takes a little longer to
cause the casualty.
I am going to add to you that on the question that you
asked me, Mr. Chairman, I did have a retired Major, Denise
Nichols, fax a letter that I wrote on that particular issue to
Dr. Baumzweiger, and I gave her in writing what had happened on
that particular day so that I had it on the record.
I believe that every Gulf war veteran who has suffered the
effects of a chemical-biological-warfare weapon should be just
as eligible for the Purple Heart as those wounded by
conventional weapons. The wounds might look different, but the
effect is the same.
Thank you for allowing me to testify today.
[The prepared statement of Col. Roman follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Colonel. Colonel, we are going to be
asking questions as soon as we hear from Mr. Stacy, who is
next, and Staff Sgt. Zeller.
Mr. Stacy.
Mr. Stacy. Thank you. I would like to say it is an honor
for me to be here today. My name is Michael J. Stacy. I was a
loader on an M1A1 main battle tank. I was exposed to depleted
uranium and various other toxins, including possible chemical
and biological agents. First, I would like to thank God; my
wife; daughters, Haskell and Suzanne Dixon; Dan Fahey; the
Military Toxins Project; and all of our family and friends.
Before deploying, I was in prime physical condition. I
weighed 185 pounds, served with the 2nd Armored Company. I
served with Alpha Company, 2nd Armored Division, Forward. I
served in the Gulf from December 30, 1990 to May 6, 1991. I did
get the anthrax shot, as well as others. I did take the PB
pills three times a day. We kept the same chemical suits, even
though it was opened 1 month before the war started. We took
our protective gear off before we crossed the border into Iraq.
We had the RAD meters. They looked like a wrist watch, but only
key personnel were issued these.
In a report from the U.S. Army Ballistics Research Lab,
dated December 1989, test results showed that soldiers who came
into contact with contaminated vehicles could inhale
resuspended depleted uranium dust or ingest depleted uranium
via food intake, cigarette smoking, et cetera, prior to not
washing hands and face. It was a very unclean environment over
there.
Also, I have a letter here from the Office of the Secretary
of Defense. It is dated May 30, 1997 and signed by Bernard
Rostker. Prior to fielding the M1A1 tank and the munitions
containing depleted uranium, controlled-burn tests were
conducted in the United States to determine the hazards of
depleted uranium burning at high temperatures. Such a high
temperature would have to be sufficient to melt steel.
In the event of such a fire, a small fraction of the
material may be dispersed into the atmosphere as the depleted
uranium oxide fume or smoke and hence could be inhaled by the
persons situated immediately down wind of an accidental fire or
explosion involving depleted uranium ammunition. We saw tanks
that were melted, that burned hot enough to melt steel.
I was involved in more than one friendly fire incident
while I served in the Gulf. Our tanks had depleted uranium
armor. I slept on the tank, over the blowout panels. We spent
90 percent of our time on the tanks. We were never warned of
any health risks of depleted uranium. I climbed on and in
tanks, trucks, and bunkers after they were hit with depleted
uranium to inspect damage. We were never warned of the health
risks. We knew we were shooting depleted uranium, but we were
never warned of the health risks.
We went back through the battlefields after the war. I
first got sick while in the Gulf, with headaches, nausea, chest
pains, stomach cramps, and diarrhea. We assumed that it was
from the water that we were drinking. We were told to go on a
48-hour fast, but under the operating conditions, we were
unable to do that, so we just dealt with our condition.
My wife miscarried soon after returning to the Gulf. At
that time, we did not know who to go to. She was 1 month
pregnant. We did not report this incident, to my knowledge.
We returned to the States. My wife's health got worse. My
health got worse. I have been diagnosed with multiple--I have
multiple, undiagnosed illnesses: chronic fatigue, chest pain,
joint pain, swelling of the joints, upper respiratory problems,
sinus problems, and severe memory loss.
The VA has denied me for testing of depleted uranium. The
VA has denied me for further testing. The VA still said all of
my problems are from PTSD. We gave the Iraqi POWs when we
captured them better treatment than the VA provides for myself.
I believe my declining health is due to the shots taken before
and in country, the PB pills, depleted uranium, and possible
chemical and biological agents.
This has been a disgrace to me, my family, my unit, and the
soldiers who died over there. Something needs to be done before
my wife dies, before I die, or any other Gulf war vets die. I
would also like to say, my wife weighed 127 pounds before I
deployed to the Gulf. She was an ornery, mean, Oklahoma girl.
Since my return, she has weighed under 100 pounds. She has
dropped under 80 pounds. We were told by the doctor at the
Indian Hospital in Claremore, OK, it would be in my best
interest to have her committed to an insane asylum. They said
they cannot find any reason why she is sick.
My daughter was born before the Gulf. She is displaying
some symptoms. She has got aching bones and sinus problems. So
was everybody I was around when I got back. I watched my wife's
grandfather. His health severely declined. I believe it was
because I spent lots of time with him. He passed away this
spring--cancer. It ate up his whole body. His immune system
failed.
My wife's mother-in-law; we lived with them when we soon
returned from the Gulf. They started developing upper
respiratory problems, other ailments since. They have moved to
Nashville now. We are no longer around them. Her health has
seemed to improve.
I feel abandoned. I feel mistreated. My wife has suffered
the brunt of this illness. My wife sits behind me. She has lost
all pride, all dignity--but supports and believes in me. I have
been told for too long that it is all related to stress, and I
will not take that any longer.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stacy follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Shays. Mr. Stacy, thank you. I would like to ask you.
You did not read much of your testimony. On page 2 of the
testimony I have, I have a typed sheet. Do you have that typed
testimony?
Mr. Stacy. No, sir. Sir, I am 40 percent disabled. I
receive $467 a month. I left the Post Office after 3 years. My
house payment is $500 a month. I do not even have money to
drive or put gas in my car. We are literally starving to death.
We receive no help from nobody. I was unable to get this typed.
I was lucky to be able to get my written testimony typed and
sent to you whenever I did.
Mr. Shays. So the testimony we are looking at, we retyped
ourselves.
Mr. Stacy. I believe so, sir.
Mr. Shays. Well, I just feel inclined to ask you to read
what we have on page 2, the typed sheet. Do you have it? It
starts on January 21.
Mr. Stacy. Talking about on January 21?
Mr. Shays. I would like you to read that page.
Mr. Stacy. On January 21, 1991, which, sir, I would like to
say every bit of this came from my diary, is true, to the best
of my knowledge. Some information may be incorrect, but
everything written in my diary was written at that date.
``On January 21, 1991''--also a day I will never forget, my
22nd birthday--``we rolled toward Iraq. We prepared for war and
waited and waited and waited and waited and waited. Then it
started, February 16, 1991. A company from our brigade made
contact. They shot a truck and a berm with TOW missiles and had
a couple of small gun fights. February 17, war hit home, and we
lost a Bradley to enemy fire, a rocket-propelled grenade. Two
killed, four badly wounded. The bombing continued, so heavy at
times, you could not sleep for days.
``We crossed the border for good on February 24, 1991. When
we crossed, we were in MOPP-4; after we crossed, we went to
MOPP Level 0, and then repackaged our MOPP suits, the same ones
we opened in base camp back in early January 1991, and had worn
on numerous training expeditions and had repackaged each time,
unaware that they were useless after their initial opening. On
the same day, February 24, 1991, we came under attack from
enemy artillery, some of which exploded in the sky over us and
created a white cloud, which then disintegrated over us.
``We had thought it was a marker, so we moved. This
continued all day until our artillery knocked them out for
good.''
Sir, would you like for me to continue?
Mr. Shays. Yes, I would like you to continue.
Mr. Stacy. ``February 25, 1991, we started making contact
as we were moving toward Iran. February 26, 1830 hours, we
rolled out onto a small battlefield, a place I will never
forget. There were trucks, tanks, BMPs, and troops. We freely
engaged the enemy until 4:15 a.m. I heard `Cease fire, cease-
fire, cease-fire. There are friendlies to the front.' Before
the third `cease-fire,' we had already engaged them, shooting
an American M1A1 from the 3rd Armored Division. We shot them
six times. We provided rescue efforts, but their ammo was
cooking off, exploding, so we abandoned any further rescue,
backed up 100 meters, set up a perimeter, and waited until
dawn.
``That night, we lost an M1A1 and a Bradley Fighting
Vehicle tofriendly fire. Eight buddies from my battalion were
dead, and wewere responsible for killing them.''
Would you like me to continue, sir?
Mr. Shays. If you do not mind. This is your testimony, and
I just hink it is important.
Mr. Stacy. ``The first depleted uranium penetrator we fired
was on January 27, 1991. We fired Sabot and Heat.'' ``Sabot''
is a de-
pleted uranium penetrator, and the ``Heat'' is high explosive.
``We fired three of each to battle sight our main gun. After we
fired our first Sabot round, we knew then the DU penetrator was
the round of choice. I think a full combat load for an M1A1
Heavy is 56 rounds. There is a certain load plan you follow, so
many Sabot and Heat in your main ammo storage area and so many
of each in your secondary storage area. I was the loader on my
tank, and after we fired our first DU penetrator, our platoon
switched the ammo. Put all DU penetrators in the main storage
area, put the heat rounds in secondary storage. We were told, I
quote: `Shoot 'em while you got 'em.' The DU penetrators were
so devastating that we used them for everything, tanks, trucks,
light-armored vehicles, bunk-
ers--everything but the troops. We found out very fast that the
de-
pleted uranium penetrators were 1,000 times more devastating
than we expected. When a bunker was shot with the DU penetra-
tor, just the percussion from the round will kill any troops in
the area. We wanted to shoot the good stuff and as much as
possible.
``We were at war, with the best equipment out of all the
Coalition Forces. No law, no rules, engage at will. My Platoon
alone,'' these numbers are all estimated; no numbers are exact.
I was just a pri-
vate in the Gulf; I only knew what I was told. ``Fired
approximately 120 DU penetrators, with 4 tanks per Platoon.
Thirty penetrators fired per tank, plus another 3 penetrators
to battle sight our main gun, on January 27. Plus another 3
penetrators on January 28, 1991. That is approximately 36
depleted uranium penetrators each tank fired. There are 12
tanks per Company, 4 Companies per Bat-
talion, we had two battalions on line, the 2nd Armored Division
and 3rd, that is a total of 96 tanks. Plus we were attached to
the 1st Infantry Division. They are a mechanized battalion with
un-
known numbers of Bradleys, which fired 30-millimeter DU rounds.
So as you can well expect, we were constantly in contact with
this ammo.''
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Stacy.
Mr. Stacy. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Shays. Is there anything else of your testimony you
want to read us, or shall we go to Staff Sgt. Zeller?
Mr. Stacy. No, sir. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Sgt. Zeller.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Yes, sir. Gentlepersons, this is about a
grunt's life, blood, sweat, and tears. Some of you up here will
not under-
stand this. I am not a good speaker, but was blessed with the
gift of gab. I thank you for the opportunity to speak, and I
hope the money spent for me coming here will change my present
position.
Possible causation: Service in the Gulf war due to combat
in the theater. Nuclear radioactive weapons and atomic energy
plants. Depleted uranium, microwave technology kill zone
creating electric storms. We had electric storms in the desert,
sir, that the lightning went this way--OK--and that is
explainable.
Destroyed power plant at Quasyr Hammid and Al Anbar Atomic
Research Space Center. OK? And that is documented. Biological
weapons: cholera, anthrax, botuluum microtoxin. Chemical
weapons: cyclo sarin/sarin, soman, tabun, mustard, blister
blood. Prophylactic drugs, serums, and vaccines, malarian
drugs. PB (pyridostigmine bromide); it causes damage to number
6 chromosome. My children are susceptible at third generation
to come out being deformed.
Specific oil-based adjuvants: NTTTP, squalene, Vax Syn,
Vacinae, Type C Retrovirus, Canary Pox Virus, Glycoprotein 120
and 160 Antigens; oil fire environmental factors.
They are now recognizing Exxon Valdez Syndrome,
leshamenasis, ultraviolet-light overexposure, malaria;
Mohammed's Revenge, which is a rare bacterium that is very
pathogenic.
Questions: Plausible denial, true or false? I am it, sir. I
have been in SOCOM, Special Operations Command. Something is
wrong when all the resources are spent on history, how we got
sick, instead of cures for it, if any. Diagnoses have been
made, but no treatments are being utilized or considered.
I would like to point out that Congress is being wrongfully
briefed by the leadership of the investigation. Could agencies
in the Government utilize national security titles to develop
and research without notice? Could this national security title
provide them protection from within to continue the facade?
From the registration data base in California to the
investigation team in Virginia, what is their purpose and
command? At the end of the command, why is there a logistics
expert and not a doctor of medicine? Is the data base to cure
or to count, sir? Why are they not using subject matter experts
like us Gulf war sick and wounded to get the most eyewitness
accounts? I volunteer for the investigation team.
Can it be that the truth or the cure is intentionally being
ignored for the purpose of protocol protection? Are the studies
conducted for a possible cure to our disease process or for
reinventing the intelligence already available? Does research
take time, and is this a delay so we never find a possible cure
or remedy? Can the cure be purposely hidden as not to expose
the cause of the effect? The cure is the effect and will
inevitably expose the cause to this Gulf War Syndrome.
Is the cause reflective of some unethical decision or
practice? We have come back on our word many times in the
investigation process. Why not consider the possibilities?
Cause: If your word is changed several times, either you are
lacking knowledge or intentionally diverting the information.
Can we hold supposed national security in such high degree as
to allow our brave soldiers denied causation? National security
is to protect the Nation. It seems as though we are taking
individuals' protection to a new height.
Will this protection continue until every last vet is dead
and gone, or will the priorities be recognized? Human life is
too precious a resource to be sacrificed for the good of a few
men's securities. What gives the person not in harm's way the
power to make these decisions? Considerations: If they had done
this, it might have been better.
This is brief, due to time limit on testimony. Most Gulf
war veterans are not actually interested in cause of illness,
just being cured or at least being acknowledged as having the
physical illness. The below items may make the search for a
cure more readily available. We know a lot of these things
about this illness, but most of it is considered not conclusive
or left at that. We need to take restrictions off valuable
information and consider it for cause.
All I want to do is to see my grandchildren grow up,
because this illness is not over with me. And my five boys at
least deserve this. Koch's Postulate: Define the pathology.
This is doctor talk, sir, that I looked up. Define the
pathology. Isolate suspect ideology agent. Reintroduce that
agent into host. Reproduce the pathology. Naturally, we cannot
do this with humans; however, we can back track and use
information which is out there to build our case.
Cardinal rule in science: ``Occam's Razor.'' Entities
should not be multiplied unnecessarily, or, more succinctly,
the simplest of competing theories be preferred to the more
complex. Definitions: What is the disease process? Systemic
autoimmune disease process; neurological disease process.
Environmental illness infectious disease. Chemical-
characterized disease process. Biological-characterized disease
process. Radiological characterized disease process.
What do we know? All forms of immune disease are being
recognized.
Next one. From the central nervous system two peripheral
neuropathies are being recognized: cholinergic crisis due to PB
tablets. That also happens with nerve agent. Oil well smoke and
spill Exxon-Valdez Sickness is being recognized. The
chemicals----
Mr. Shays. Sergeant, let me just interrupt a second.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir, yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. I want to make sure that I learn from what you
are saying. I am having a hard time knowing--I got the first
part of your testimony. I am in left field now in this part of
your testimony. Tell me your point in going through this list.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. The point is, sir, on the definitions,
for example, like, I went all the way up to Walter Reed----
Mr. Shays. Right.
Staff Sgt. Zeller [continuing]. And they said, well, this
sounds like lupus, but they did not do anything for it. Well, I
went home and did my homework, sir, and I read lupus; and what
I have wrong with me, sir, is to a ``T'' lupus. And there are
ways to test for lupus and find out for sure, and why haven't
they done it, sir?
Mr. Shays. OK. It is important for me that you be allowed
to continue and do what you want to do.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir, yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. And then I just need to tell you what I think it
will be helpful for the committee afterwards, but maybe I could
tell that to you now as well. We need to know a little bit
about your experience in the Gulf because we have others who
testify, we are trying to see where there are similarities.
I mean, for instance, the first two witnesses talked about
the alarms going off. The military has consistently told us the
hundreds, if not thousands of times, the alarms went off, they
were false; and yet we have people who will come to this
committee, sometimes off the record, and say that is simply
garbage, that those alarms were not false; they detected low-
level chemicals. And we are building a case, and we need to
make sure we are doing that.
It is important for me that you continue because this is
important to you, and, therefore, it is important to me.
Afterwards, I am going to have you come back and describe a
little of your experience. OK?
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir, yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Feel free to continue.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Radiological characterized disease
process. What do we know? All forms of autoimmune disease are
being recognized, from central nervous system to peripheral
neuropathies are being recognized. Oil well smoke, chemical
chiasma, as well as isolated reports in theater not considered
official are being recognized. Rad Haz Al Anbar, Quasyr Hammid
Atomic Power Plant, and depleted uranium 235 are now being
recognized.
Quasyr Hamid, sir, was an atomic energy plant that was
bombed by the Coalition. Cholinergic crisis due to
pyridostigmine bromide also nerve agent. And it talks about the
receptors and how they work in motors, causing contractions in
the muscles, secretion-causing glands to secrete. I have got
all these things, sir. Inhibitory causing most organs to become
quiescent. Well, sir, this diarrhea and stuff that we have that
is really gross, well, the intestinal tract becomes quiescent,
and that is why we have this happening to us.
And it goes on and goes on, and then final on this, before
I get to who I am, the chain of command to the Commander-in-
Chief, I have solicited them, sir, and I thank you so much for
letting me come here because I have not gotten anything but a
wall that I cannot climb, sir.
Another thing, sir, is it talks about this cholinergic
crisis, and it talks about the body, and I have got military
reports, the cover sheets for them, and it says that if you
take pyridostigmine bromide for more than 8 days constantly,
and I took over six packs of 22 or 24 in a pack of those
pyridostigmine bromides because they told us to take them and
never told us to stop, so----
Mr. Shays. Sergeant, they did not tell you; they ordered
you to take them.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. They said, you do
it, or you die, that type of order. The 101st is expecting no
mercy, sir. But it says here, body will dysfunction; it causes
permanent injury through the blood-brain barrier, and it says
it in the reports.
Sir, I just want to finish this, and I want to say that
this Iraqi protection prisoner program, taxpayers' money, I
regret to be treated like the enemy. I watched C-141's, and I
watched Iraqis get on the aircraft and come home, here in the
United States, sir. OK.
This is only the beginning of the information out in the
field. God help us and our families. P.S.: We are like Teenage
Mutant Ninja Turtles, if you are familiar. I have five boys
that teach me about them.
Sir, my name is Mark James Zeller, and I went through basic
training in 1986, and I got my Aircraft Armament School in
1987. I went from there, in February 1988, to Fort Bragg, NC,
and was assigned to 1st SOCOM. I participated in Operation
Prime Chance I, Prime Chance II, Praying Mantis, and Earnest
Will, Persian Gulf-Kuwaiti Oil Tanker Security Force. April
1989 to present day, Fort Rucker, Delta Company, 2/2nd 229th. I
participated in Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Desert
Calm.
Sir, these are all in the same geographic area. My
involvement in this geographic area dates back to the late
1980's. While assigned at Fort Rucker, NC, we assisted Kuwait
and Iraq with their oil flow to the rest of the world, because
the common enemy was Iran. The common enemy, Iran, discontinued
their actions after we built Iraq up with military might, but
Iraq changed their minds after defeating Iran. The operations I
list above are continuations to the present day to include this
committee meeting today.
The Persian Gulf war is not officially over, sir. I do not
know if you realize that. My tour of duties at Fort Bragg were
temporary duty missions with 90-day intervals. During this
time, I lived off the economy and only got sick from Rift
Valley Fever from eating uncooked lamb meat in a souk, or
ancient, mall-like area, downtown.
I was honestly protected less from the environment during
this mission because it was all stuff provided by host nations.
What I mean is USDA and grading of health is not as controlled,
and green tracers were a fact from the Iranian Government.
So why do I get only Rift Valley Fever and come home well
as to be expected? In addition, PTSDs should have surfaced then
under stress of Special Ops. Why am I now sick as can be with
Gulf War Syndrome?
Let me try to explain my maneuvers and experiences now
during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Duty: Aircraft Armament
Technician, AH-64 Apaches. Assigned, 2/229th Attack Helicopter
Regiment, Fort Rucker, AL, June 1990, aka 2/101st AHR after
deployed. OPCON to the commander of 101st Air Assault Division,
Fort Campbell, KY, August 1990, via deployed to Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia. Arrived, Dhahran International Airport, August
1990. Moves--``moves,'' sir, meaning going from one FOB to
another of forward operating base.
Moves, FOB Eagle I or King Fahd International Airport
between August 1990 to December 1990. Explored the FOB
Tranquility Area, readied all aircraft for deep attack mission.
Key personnel got wrist watches with no face on them and
strange, smoke-screen operation was conducted at King Fahd
International Airport.
Sir, that wrist watch, I do not know this gentleman. I did
not know him until we got in the hotel, and we just started
gabbing. A long story short: He has the same claims I have.
This wrist watch, on the back of it, they are told not to take
them off. I peeled it back on one of the females that was in
our unit, a medic, and it said ``PRC Radiac 27'' on the back.
OK? So I know it is a Radiac meter.
And there were people that came along, and they had this,
like, board thing they put over it, and they were able to
register whatever it was, but they never told us what the
registrations were, what was going on, and so forth and so on.
It was the circle with the ``A'' in the middle, Third Army. It
was a test-activity group.
Smokescreen operations was conducted at King Fahd
International Airport. The wrist watches were Radiac monitors
labeled on back, and why we needed them, I do not know. They
were picked up from key personnel, March 1991, and the smoke
screen is still a mystery to all of us to this day. We were
only told it was something they were testing. I got really sick
after being at FOB Tranquility, so for the first time I came
back to the airport with a 104 fever, sweats, chills, and loose
stools, if I may say that, sir. It is pretty disgusting. I got
a real bad reaction to medicine given by a flight surgeon after
being seen.
FOB Tranquility or West Nariya, North AxZil-Fi-Frontier,
December 1990. I started taking pyridostigmine pills for the
prevention of nerve agent poisoning in the event Iraq chose to
use it. I was only told it would help me survive, not that it
could have side effects or kill you and that it was
experimental. I took more than 60 of these pills.
Sir, I must also add about those pyridostigmine situations,
there were people dying, dropping dead on Taplin Road, and if
you cannot find records of it, I cannot either, but I remember
the National Guard unit in Florida that had the dolphins on
their Blackhawks, and whatever that regiment is, you will be
able to figure it out, and they will be able to tell you about
these people.
Mr. Shays. Let me just say, that is now part of your
testimony.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Roger that, sir. A radio message----
Mr. Shays. Sergeant?
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir?
Mr. Shays. I do not want you to be casual.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir, yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. You were saying ``dropping dead.'' You just mean
collapsing out of fatigue?
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Well, cholinergic crisis, sir, causes
the nerves----
Mr. Shays. No, no. That is not what I asked. You made a
statement that people walking on the street----
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Their hearts stopped, sir. That is what
they said. They said their heart stopped, is the way they died.
Mr. Shays. OK. And you are saying that you know for a fact
that they were dead?
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. How many soldiers are you talking about?
Staff Sgt. Zeller. What I was told, down the Taplin was,
like, 125 people had adverse effects from these PB tablets.
Mr. Shays. What I am going to ask you to do is we are going
to have a vote, and we are going to have a second vote after. I
am going to ask you to finish your testimony in the next 3 or 4
minutes, and then we are going to go vote, and then we are
going to ask questions.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir, yes, sir. A radio message came
down, go to MOPP Level 4, full protective gear; SCUD has been
fired in your vicinity and is down wind, contaminant to your
vicinity. That night, a few M-8 alarms went off, but it was
told to be all clear. I began to leak blood out of my ears on a
pillow every morning, just spots; nosebleeds; lip began to
split. Sir, my lip split all the way up to my nose, and the
center of my tongue started splitting. I do not know what it
was, sir, but it happened. They tried to say it was
dehydration, but I do not see how it was dehydration for that
to be happening.
Headaches, pounding in the ears, eyes sore. My hair felt
like something was pulling it out, and I urinated a lot. I hope
I am allowed to say that. FOB Eagle II, or King Khalid Military
City, Al Qaysumah/Hafar Al Batin-Frontier, January 1991. On
guard duty around midnight to the west of our position SCUD
missile is shot down.
Next morning, before stand-to, some more M-8 alarms go off,
but it was ignored. Also received these injections said to be
benefit of my health. One was called gamma globulin, and the
other two were coined ``NUC Juice'' and ``Bot Tox/Anthrax
Vaccine.'' I stepped up to receive my shots with shot records
in hand, and only GG was annotated, so I objected to the other
two shots. The flight surgeon took me immediately to the
commanding officer, who showed me the blue book and told me,
``Take them or be court-martialed.''
I felt really sick after the shots, became really tired,
and could sleep through anything, including allied bombing over
the border. FOB G-Day, or North Samah/South Al Julaydak-
Frontier, January 1991. This is a rally point for ground
convoys to assemble for insertion into Iraq.
MSR Dakota to Virginia. Many practices were held prior to
the actual day. We were instructed to go to MOPP Level 4
because we will be entering a known contaminated area. A man
was seen on a fence who died instantly, and animal herds, no
flies around, alive. SCUD missile found next to road south of
Samah. M-8 alarms connected to vehicles went off and paper was
changing colors. Drive on, was the order. I began to get
lesions all over my body. I told by medical personnel it is
because of the lack of hygiene under these conditions.
FOB Cobra, or North Tukayyid/North Quiban Layyah/South Al
Busayyah.
Mr. Shays. Sergeant, I am going to ask you to pick the
best, most important part of what remains because we do need
to----
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Yes, sir. Upon arriving in Cobra, we
received artillery that produced proofs of off-white dust. Air
Force A-10 aircraft, 10 foot off deck, flew overhead after
calling rear for support and leveled a flat-top mountain north
of Quiban Layyah. I began to have pinkish conjunctivitis,
blurred vision, thick spit, tasted metal, no hunger, ears,
fingernails bled. I slept a lot when not working, and hands and
feet felt like ants crawling on them.
I had an incident where I was driving, could see, hear, et
cetera, but could not move all of a sudden. I ran into a sand
ditch, and hitting the steering wheel shook me out of it. The
prisoners that I was able to talk to said they were sick and
tired. I was starting to worry at this point because it sounded
like they had what I had. Alarms and paper were turning colors
during the whole time.
Fire Base Viper----
Mr. Shays. Sergeant, you are not going to be able to read
the whole thing through, so just pick the part that you think
in the end----
Staff Sgt. Zeller. OK. This is Dhahran/Kasmeeyah, and there
were more dead animals, POWs, very sick ones, I may add, MPs
holding them, with inoperable radio and no water or food, left
behind by their unit because movement; MPs told to stay and
guard them by their commander. We gave them what food and water
we had and called to the rear National Guard Fills--that means
people that were put in their unit were helping out convoy
police. On the road past that, Tallil, were bunkers with SCUD
trucks next to them on the left.
When we were coming back out of the country, sir, at Fire
Base Cobra, where we came back to the same fire base we came
from----
Mr. Shays. Excuse me. We are going to have to go. We have 3
minutes before----
Staff Sgt. Zeller. OK, sir.
Mr. Shays. I am going to interrupt you and just say one
last point before we go. During Watergate, when Martha Mitchell
was describing absurd things that were happening, everyone
thought she was crazy, and everyone around her was sane. When
she talked about all these crazy things that were happening
around her, she happened to have been right, and I just say
that to some of our audience who may hear some things that
sound a little strange, but may in the end it may be very
right. We are going to recess.
[The prepared statement of Staff Sgt. Zeller follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[Recess.]
Mr. Shays. My hope is that we can have a candid dialog, in
which we will learn more about your experiences in the hope of
coming to this ultimate goal of properly diagnosing,
effectively treating, and fairly you and our other veterans.
That is the motive of this committee.
Now, we want to properly diagnose, effectively treat, and
fairly compensate. Now, some of what I have heard today, I
understood; some of what I heard, I did not quite understand.
One thing, though, I will say to you: It wrenches my heart to
think that you have so little faith in the DOD, the Department
of Veterans' Administration, in the doctors that have looked at
you, that you then start the process of trying to figure out
what is wrong with you because you do not think the doctors
are, and that wrenches my heart.
And we have had other veterans who have come and testified.
When I was going to vote--I have come to this conclusion. I am
tired of the DOD telling us that the alarms were false alarms.
I have just come to conclude that I cannot accept that anymore.
And the reason is that those alarms did not go off
basically before the war; they went off during the war. They
did not go off when they were exposed to all other things, but
when the war started, these alarms started to go off. I cannot
reconcile the loss of data, and so your testimony of the alarms
going off and so on are not unimportant to me. I am not going
to accept anymore the DOD position that these are false alarms.
I just do not accept it.
Col. Roman. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. They are going to have to prove to me that they
are false before I accept them. I obviously discounted a long
time ago the DOD's position that held us back for 4 years, that
if you did not basically show acute signs of chemical exposure,
that if you were exposed to low-level exposure that was not,
therefore, acute, in the end there is no harmful result from
that. We know in this country, working with chemicals, low-
level exposure leads to illness and death. So I do not accept
that and I did not accept a long time ago.
Now, all of you are heroes, all of you, and you served our
country with distinction, and I believe your testimony will
help us get the answers you want. Now, one of the lines of
questions that I want is, I want to know--again, some of you
have said on this record, if you were in any area of the
operation where the alarms went off, and I want to know those
experiences, and I want to know how you reacted to it. I want
to know what you did and how you reacted to it. Col. Roman, I
will start with you.
Col. Roman. I was in SCUD Alley there in Riyadh the first
time I saw a SCUD. They trained us to put on our gas mask
equipment in 14 seconds, from the time you pop it out of your
container until you put it over your head and tie it real
quick. I think the first time I saw a SCUD, I had it down to
about 7 seconds, maybe shorter than that, and at that point in
time the alarm did, in fact, go off. After the Patriot struck
the SCUD, the chemical alarm started going off, and five or six
times subsequent to that or after that, about the same things
happened.
Mr. Shays. Was that the first time the alarm went off,
after the war had begun?
Col. Roman. After the war had begun.
Mr. Shays. So you did not hear alarms before the war.
Col. Roman. Oh, no, sir, only when the SCUDs were in the
air.
Mr. Shays. Now, that is conceivable that the alarm went
off, though, because of the SCUD and not because of a detector.
Is that correct?
Col. Roman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Col. Roman. I did not hear them go off at any other time
personally unless there was a SCUD attack. And on one
occasion--no, two occasions, I heard the alarms go off while I
was in the Dhahran, but also it was after the SCUD attack.
Mr. Shays. Did you have confidence in the gear that you
wore? Did you feel that if you were, in fact, exposed to
chemicals, that the gear would do the job it was required to
do?
Col. Roman. That the what, sir?
Mr. Shays. Did you have confidence that the protective
gear, when you went into MOPP-4, that when you put this
protective gear on, that it would do the job?
Col. Roman. We were not given that MOPP gear, sir. We had
our chemical masks with us at all times, but we did not have
access to the MOPP gear when I was----
Mr. Shays. So you just had the masks.
Col. Roman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. No other equipment?
Col. Roman. No, sir.
Mr. Shays. OK. And did you take PB?
Col. Roman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. For how many days?
Col. Roman. The required number of days and the required
number of dosage.
Mr. Shays. Were you warned that it was an experimental drug
for that purpose?
Col. Roman. No, sir.
Mr. Shays. Were you asked to take it, requested to take it,
or what?
Col. Roman. No. It was given to us. In the Army you are
given something to take like that as part of your equipment or
as part of your dosage, and you take it without question.
Mr. Shays. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Canterbury. Sir, I remember the first time I
experienced chemical alarms sounding and SCUD alerts was when
just days prior to the air campaign starting. I was at King
Khalid Military City when this occurred, and I remember during
those alarms we immediately donned our masks, got into
protective gear, MOPP-4.
Mr. Shays. So you had protective gear.
Mr. Canterbury. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Shays. And you put it on. Let me first go back to you,
Col. Roman. How many times did you end up putting the mask on
during the operation before?
Col. Roman. I remember having the mask on only on two
occasions. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. How many times, Mr. Canterbury?
Mr. Canterbury. I am going to guesstimate probably about
eight, total.
Mr. Shays. So it happened enough times that you are not
quite sure of the count.
Mr. Canterbury. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Shays. In any of those experiences of the first two of
you did you feel, taste, or react to those alarms? Did you see
anything, did you feel anything, and did you have any effect?
Colonel.
Col. Roman. No, sir. I could not say that I felt anything
different or saw anything different.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Canterbury. The same, sir.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Canterbury. I cannot really honestly say.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Mr. Stacy.
Mr. Stacy. Sir, to my knowledge, we at one time----
Mr. Shays. First off, how many times did you hear an alarm?
Mr. Stacy. Sir, I did not hear an alarm. At one time, the
only people I saw the whole time I served in the Gulf was the
16 men in my company. I am unaware of anybody that was testing
for chemicals. We did not test for chemicals. We did not have
any fear of chemicals. As soon as we crossed the border was the
last time we had our protective gear on.
Mr. Shays. But you had the protective gear with you.
Mr. Stacy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. And you never heard any alarms?
Mr. Stacy. No, sir.
Mr. Shays. And in terms of you took the pill, the PB, Mr.
Canterbury, you took the prescribed doses?
Mr. Canterbury. Yes, I did, sir. I took it for probably a
period of 8 to 9 days.
Mr. Shays. Did you take it voluntarily, under order?
Mr. Canterbury. Under order and in the presence of a
noncommissioned officer.
Mr. Shays. Now, the purpose of the noncommissioned officer
was to what?
Mr. Canterbury. To ensure that the younger enlisted were
taking those pills.
Mr. Shays. It was not to just help you figure out how to
take it; it was to make sure you took it.
Mr. Canterbury. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Shays. Were you warned by anyone that it was an
experimental drug?
Mr. Canterbury. No, sir, not that drug.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Stacy.
Mr. Stacy. Sir, I would like to add, we did go past a
blown-up ammunition dump, and we did find rounds that were
suspected to be chemical. We took the pills. I never asked any
questions because I believed in my chain of command, I believed
we were doing the right thing, and I wanted to survive in case
there was chemicals used on us.
Mr. Shays. So you were not warned that it was an
experimental drug.
Mr. Stacy. No, sir.
Mr. Shays. OK. And since you did not hear any alarm in the
course of the operations that you were involved in, did you
come into areas where others had the masks on?
Mr. Stacy. No, sir. We had very little contact with any
other people. We were in the tanks, so we would not be able to
hear any alarms if they did go off. The NBC NCO from my unit, I
never saw him until the war was over and we were ready to
deploy back to Germany.
I do not know if they were testing. I know that we did not
test. There is one tank out of our platoon that is designated
to test for chemicals and they did not test. I was under the
assumption that we were trying to either save the materials for
testing or that we were not in the fear of any chemicals.
Mr. Shays. I know others are going to question you on
depleted uranium. I am going to come back on that issue. As
someone who was involved in sending you to Kuwait, we rejoiced
in the fact that there were so few who lost their lives; and,
frankly, much of what we heard was the battle from the air and
what occurred there.
You have had very vivid description of the battlefield as
it took place, and it was something that I do not think enough
Americans have an appreciation of because there were some units
that were never really involved in the battle directly to the
intensity you were.
Mr. Stacy. Sir, that was the only skirmish that we had
encountered that was of any significance to myself or any of
the other soldiers. To my knowledge, now this engagement, the
night engagement I am talking about, first of all, we were on a
200-kilometer attack into Iraq, 36 hours nonstop, no sleep. It
was at night. We were already tired. To my knowledge, we did
not even move 5 miles. We rolled out there at 6:30 p.m., and it
was 4 a.m., when the friendly fire incident did occur, and we
stopped and sat in the battlefield until daylight and moved
from there.
Mr. Shays. Well, we are going to come back, just to talk to
you about depleted uranium. So you did take the pill. You were
not warned that it was an experimental drug.
Mr. Stacy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Stacy. Sir, I would like to also say, we did take
another pill. I did not know what it was. I have been told by
another soldier in my unit they were malaria pills. I am not
sure of that, though.
Mr. Shays. Let me go to Sgt. Zeller. Sgt. Zeller, did you
hear any alarms go off?
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir, the ones I admitted to in this
testimony, and then, like I said before, the ones that were
connected to the vehicles who were convoying, they just went
off all the time. And before we did the convoy, we were told to
go to MOPP Level 4, and do not take it off until you go to the
river, and we literally lived in them. And, sir, I just want to
let you know something, that I was a chemical NCO, not fully
schooled trained to have the MOS but enough trained to be a
battalion NCO.
The long story short is, sir, those cry-backs with the
suits in them with all the charcoal all over them, that we
looked black as night after we wore them, those things only
last 12 hours, sir, and the one I testified to when I was up at
Eagle, OK, and I was on guard duty--no, not guard duty, but in
Tranquility, and they said SCUD is in the vicinity, we ripped
the bags open and wore the suits. Twelve hours later, we should
have gotten new suits, sir. We wore those suits all the way to
Basra. We went all the way up to Basra and then back, cutting
off the Republican Guard.
Mr. Shays. How many days was that?
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir, that had to be at least 2 months.
We worked that long, and we sweat our tail feathers off in
them. There was no more charcoal left with them, but we still
had nothing else. We had no other skin.
Mr. Shays. I know you have it in your testimony, but I want
it part of this questioning when we refer back to the record.
How many times did the alarm go off that you recall?
Staff Sgt. Zeller. While driving all the time, it would
just like go off, and whoever's alarm went off, they would
stop, and then they would go and they would reset it and then
we would drive along and then keep going.
Mr. Shays. Well, let me ask you this. Did you have the
alarm before when you were driving, and did it go off?
Staff Sgt. Zeller. No, sir. It did not go off while we were
on the other side of the border.
Mr. Shays. So when you were on the other side of the border
driving----
Staff Sgt. Zeller. When we crossed----
Mr. Shays. Hear my question. Hear my question.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir.
Mr. Shays. You had the alarm in this vehicle for a while.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. No, sir. We did not put them on until we
were entering.
Mr. Shays. You did not turn on the alarm.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. We did not hook them to the vehicles
until we were entering Iraq----
Mr. Shays. OK.
Staff Sgt. Zeller [continuing]. Because they had knowledge
of contamination.
Mr. Shays. So it would really be pointless for me to make
an assumption that the alarm did not go off before because you
did not have them hooked up.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Well, they were hooked up to a ground
point. On our perimeter we would set up a camp, and we would
have them on the outskirts of our perimeter, and each company
was at the outskirts of the perimeter, and they had
responsibility for theirs, and they had responsibility for
theirs, and it was set up strategically so if the wind blew
this way and took something, that one would go off, and all the
message----
Mr. Shays. So those alarms did not go off, but when you
mounted them on the vehicle----
Staff Sgt. Zeller. They were going off all the time when we
were driving, sir.
Mr. Shays. OK. Well, that would lend argument to the fact
that they would have been false alarms on the vehicles. It was
not like you had been driving with them on the vehicle before
and not going off.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir, I would challenge that for the fact
that we saw dead animals and so forth.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. And they did not have a bullet in them.
Mr. Shays. OK. I am going to just end with that, and we are
going to go. We have plenty of time here. The dead animals; I
am wondering if this is becoming folklore here. I would like to
have any of you who saw dead animals, did you see dead animals
sometimes with flies and sometimes without? Did you see humans
dead with flies, without? Can any of you respond? I will start
with you Sgt. Zeller.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir, the flies were like epidemic.
Mr. Shays. They were everywhere.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Everywhere, but when we found these
herds, they were nowhere to be found, or they would be laying
on the animal dead, deader than a door nail.
Mr. Shays. What would be laying on the animal?
Staff Sgt. Zeller. The fly.
Mr. Shays. So if you saw flies on the animal, they were
dead flies?
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Right, sir, on the animal. I mean, why
would the flies not be there, and they are everywhere else----
Mr. Shays. OK.
Staff Sgt. Zeller [continuing]. That might be clean
possibly?
Mr. Shays. And then when you saw them, they were dead. That
is something you saw. Correct? If you saw----
Staff Sgt. Zeller. They were on the side of the road, sir.
I mean, you would be jogging, and then all of a sudden you
would see a flock of animals deader than a door nail.
Mr. Shays. OK. And you did not see gunshot wounds.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. No, sir. No bombs dropped, no nothing.
The area we went through, sir, was like the 82nd, 24th, and
101st. We all went through an area that was called, like, a
spearhead move. We were not supposed to even be known that we
were there. We jumped over the top of Taplin Road. We moved up
Taplin Road, and supposedly Saddam did not know we were going
to be there because he moved all his men down toward Kuwait.
Mr. Shays. Yes. OK.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. So it was one of those, like, blitzkrieg
situations, and we were a part of that. So----
Mr. Shays. I hear you. Mr. Stacy, any dead animals without
flies or dead flies?
Mr. Stacy. Sir, the dead that we saw, we were mounted on
the tanks. We did not stop and investigate. We just assumed
everything that we saw dead as a casualty of the war.
Mr. Shays. And you do not have any story about flies not
being on them. That was not something----
Mr. Stacy. We did not investigate, sir.
Mr. Shays. I understand.
Mr. Stacy. Until the war was over with, that is when we
started going on clearing missions, but at that time we were in
a different location, and I did not witness any of that.
Mr. Shays. OK. And when you did the clearing mission at the
end, you did not witness any of that?
Mr. Stacy. Not to my knowledge, sir. I have memory loss,
and it is hard to recollect some things.
Mr. Shays. Listen, I do not expect you are going to always
have an answer that you are going to know or that I am going to
like; I just want it on this record. OK?
Mr. Stacy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Let me just ask the two of you gentlemen, and
then we will get to Mr. Sanders, did you see dead animals? Did
you see humans? Were there flies? Weren't there flies?
Col. Roman. I have no experience, Mr. Chairman, with the
dead animals. The only flies I saw were on myself usually.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Canterbury. Sir, I experienced both dead sheep and
human bodies. I, like the sergeant down here, was up near the
Taplin, and that is where I experienced the sheep, and I did
not see any flies on those sheep.
Mr. Shays. And at the time did you notice it? Was it that
interesting, or was it later on that people--I am just
wondering if we are reconstructing this later.
Mr. Canterbury. No, sir.
Mr. Shays. Did you notice it then?
Mr. Canterbury. I remember discussing it with fellow
soldiers at that point in time. We were just right across the
street from the Taplin that the sergeant speaks of, and there
were a lot of sheep herding around that area, and just days
prior to ground war is when I saw, I personally saw the dead
sheep with no flies. As far as humans, I saw a lot, but I was
in a convoy, and I did not have time to look to see. OK? Sir?
Mr. Shays. Yes, sir.
Mr. Canterbury. There is something that I want to re-
emphasize about the chemical alarms.
Mr. Shays. Yes, sir.
Mr. Canterbury. You asked, what did you do when chemical
alarms would go off? We would get into our MOPP-4 gear.
Something that bothers me a lot is the fact that I was a
private over there, and I was expendable. I was forced to take
my mask off to see if it was all clear. It bothers me when this
French detection team is 2 miles up the road that could come
down and check out the area to see if it is all clear, but
instead, because my lieutenant and my platoon sergeant were
uncomfortable in their protective gear at 100-some-degree
temperatures, they would grab a private, take off your mask.
Mr. Shays. When they said that, did they keep their mask
on?
Mr. Canterbury. Yes. They kept their mask on, and there
were times when a couple of us privates----
Mr. Shays. Yes, sir.
Mr. Canterbury [continuing]. Basically said, we are not
taking our masks off. And they threatened with court martials
and threatened to have NCOs come over and take the masks off of
you. I had my mask removed, and I am going to tell you right
now, I took a sergeant's mask off with me.
Mr. Shays. So your testimony before this committee is that
you were ordered to take off your mask and you did not and then
a sergeant attempted to take it off and you took his mask off
with you.
Mr. Canterbury. Along with it, as he was taking mine off,
sir. I am sorry.
Mr. Shays. That needs to be part of the record.
Mr. Canterbury. There is no regard for human life there,
and this is my life he was playing with.
Mr. Shays. I would like to think that that was an unusual
experience in the war. We have never had anyone else testify to
that, but I think it is very important that you made it part of
the record.
Col. Roman. I would like to think, sir, that that would
have been an isolated incident as well because as a member of
the officer corps and having been a former enlisted person
myself, an NCO, the men always came first.
Mr. Canterbury. Not a private.
Mr. Shays. Pardon me?
Mr. Canterbury. Not a private.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Sanders, you have as much time as you would
like.
Mr. Sanders. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will be
reasonably brief. I would just like to ask all of you if you
could just respond.
As you know, or may know, the official position of the
Presidential Advisory Committee in trying to understand Persian
Gulf war illness is that they did not believe that chemicals
played a role in the illness and believed that the primary
cause was stress, that stress is the cause of Persian Gulf
illness. Could you give me your observation on their
conclusion? Just, Colonel, if you would start and just go down
the line. Do you agree with that conclusion?
Col. Roman. I do not. I am not certain how trained medical
personnel could come to that conclusion, much less a committee
or a commission such as has been appointed by the White House
to investigate this. I think that everyone who goes to war or
who is in combat has some form of a trauma or a stress;
however, to put the blame on trauma or stress like that is
ridiculous.
It goes way beyond, I think, a conclusion that most normal
people would have, and it particularly concerns me because it
also obliterates the obvious, and that is that, in fact,
chemicals and biological warfare weapons were found in the Gulf
after the war, and that has become a matter of congressional
testimony in the Congressional Record, so I cannot understand
how they come to that conclusion.
Mr. Sanders. Thank you.
Mr. Canterbury. Sir, my opinion about stress is that I do
believe that stress can have a reaction on the human body, but
as far as it having a reaction the way it is having on me, I
doubt it, sir. I doubt it very much. There has got to be
something more to my ailments, my illness, whatever, however
you want to put it, sir. There has got to be.
Mr. Stacy. Sir, I agree with him also. I have had some
anger problems, but I would like to say----
Mr. Sanders. So have we all.
Mr. Stacy. Well, sir, to be honest and to be blunt, we are
trained killers, defenders of this country. You cannot expect a
soldier to take his training and to use that training and to
come back the peaceful man that he once was. The things that
you do in combat, I can only say that it is like hell. That is
what hell is going to be like.
Now, I agree, my health is not because of stress. I have
tried the counseling and everything else. It has not helped any
at all.
Mr. Sanders. Sergeant.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir, yes, sir. Sir, I was in SOCOM
before this mission. OK? And you are pedigreed. You are taken
care of. Your every need you ever needed was done. You never
had to do anything but get in an aircraft and deploy. When you
would come back, you would get that same old brief. It is
called a ``down brief.'' You are told about zoning. You are
told about PTSD, so forth and so on. So, sir, I was somewhat
educated. OK? And that is why I have been so argumentative, all
the way up to Walter Reed about them trying to say that I have
frustration.
No, I have aggravation, and the aggravation is caused by
the U.S. military using plausible denial on me to cover the
protocol.
Mr. Sanders. The bottom line is you do not believe that
stress is the source of it.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. No, sir, because I was trained on every
deployment prior to that.
Mr. Sanders. OK. Let me ask my second question, and that
is--and the chairman has already gone over this a little bit--
there have been a number of studies, including one from the DOD
actually, which suggest that pyridostigmine bromide, in
combination with other chemicals, can cause perhaps problems.
Could you just very briefly tell us in your own personal
observations with PB reactions that you may have had and what
you have heard from your comrades about that. Colonel, did you
want to start on that?
Col. Roman. Sir, I would love to answer the question if I
had enough detail or information. I am not qualified to make
that.
Mr. Sanders. Thank you. If that is the case, that is the
answer that we want. Private?
Mr. Canterbury. Sir, I did not know about bromide tablets
until I got into the Persian Gulf region, and I do not know
enough about it to form an opinion also.
Mr. Sanders. OK. Your own personal observations of what
people may or may not have--if you do not know, then that is
the answer that we want. We do not want you to say what you do
not know. Private?
Mr. Stacy. That is the same here, sir. I took the pills,
but I cannot recollect any effects I had from them. The shots,
I know I had gotten sick from one of the shots. There was too
many things going on to be concerned about the effects of any
pills. We were under a lot of stress. We were tired, et cetera.
Mr. Sanders. OK. Sergeant?
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir, I will be happy to give you what I
have. I knew nothing about them. I will be honest with you. I
did not get interested in them until some people were talking
about them having adverse effects. So I studied them and I
asked all the right people and they gave me this cholinergic
crisis. So I can tell you now I know all about them, and every
one of my symptoms that I have can be given to that. I have
endocrine problems. I have nerve problems.
Mr. Sanders. But in terms of your observations when you
were over there in the midst of all this stuff----
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir, I did not think nothing of it; I
was thinking of my job. I am the gun bunny on helicopters, and
it is a tough job.
Mr. Sanders. OK. My next question actually is for Private
Stacy; and, Private, you indicated to us that right now your
family is in serious financial straits. Why are you not
receiving compensation that might be due to you because of your
wartime condition?
Mr. Stacy. I have been denied, sir. I have been denied
undiagnosed illnesses. I have a claim pending for chronic
fatigue. It has been pending for 2 years. My records are being
shuffled back and forth from Nashville, TN, to Muskogee. They
believe that all of my complaints are due to stress. I have a
copy of my medical records, which I do not have on me now. But
the doctor does say in my records, I believe the patient is
exaggerating symptoms, I believe the patient has been coached,
and I believe he is here to try to get increased disability.
Mr. Sanders. OK. My last question, maybe I will start with
you, Private, again, is you mention memory loss. In my own
State of Vermont, we have run into folks who are suffering the
same problem. Can you talk a little bit about what that is like
and how that compares to----
Mr. Canterbury. Are you addressing me, sir?
Mr. Sanders. I was talking to Private Stacy. I want anybody
who feels comfortable to answer that. Talk to me a little bit
about----
Mr. Stacy. I will answer that, sir. I was unaware I had
memory loss because I could not remember that I was forgetting.
Whenever questions are asked me, I can recall incidents.
Certain details, I did not focus on because I was more
concerned about my wife and my daughter and coming home. My
diary is real sketchy. I was not concerned about any of those
things.
I did not realize I had memory loss until my wife started
putting little notes up and stuff. And it is just little stuff,
sir, just little things, going back and forth, trying to get
something done around the house. I go back and forth, forget
what I was doing, just little things that I am not even aware
of.
Mr. Sanders. OK. And is this different than before you went
over?
Mr. Stacy. Yes, sir. I have changed. My friends, nobody
wants to be around me. They think I am crazy. They think I am
talking about this Gulf war illness, that there is no such
illness. It would be easier to convince people that I was
abducted by aliens than I got sick in the Gulf.
Mr. Sanders. OK. Would anybody else like to comment on
memory loss?
Col. Roman. Yes, sir, I would.
Mr. Sanders. Colonel.
Col. Roman. In my two VA evaluations and my one U.S. Army
evaluation of myself at Fitzsimmons, two out of the three
doctors who examined me who were certified to examine me for
that particular question indicated in their notes that I have
short-term memory loss, and I am not sure, quite frankly,
whether it is because of my advancing age or because of
something that occurred in the Gulf, but the neurologist, Dr.
Baumzweiger, as I said earlier, did indicate that my short-term
memory loss, at least a good portion of it, is due to
neurological damage, perhaps brain-stem damage.
Mr. Sanders. Anybody else want to comment on the issue of
memory loss? Sergeant.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir, I have got, like, I will give you
an example that happened here. I forgot to pack my head gear
coming here or I forget my keys or my wife asks me to do
something, and I will go through the entire day, get home, and
she said, Well, where is this? or What did you do with this? or
How come you did not do that? And I am, like, I forgot. And it
is very aggravating, sir.
Mr. Sanders. Colonel, let me go back to one point that you
just made. You indicated that you visited a physician in L.A.
at the Veterans----
Col. Roman. At the VA, yes, sir.
Mr. Sanders [continuing]. Who examined you and concluded
that you were suffering from nerve damage as a result of
chemical exposure?
Col. Roman. His exact words, sir, to be for the record
would be that I had severe, neurological damage as a result of
my service in the Gulf war. Perhaps chemicals or whatever you
contracted over there was responsible for your nerve damage,
but something occurred over there while you were there.
Mr. Sanders. He determined that you had nerve damage as a
result of your service.
Col. Roman. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sanders. And he later indicated to you that the VA no
longer wanted him to be treating----
Col. Roman. At that particular time, he had finished his
examination at 12 o'clock. It started at 9. He was summoned by
the chief neurologist. He came back half an hour later somewhat
in distress. He indicated that he was no longer authorized or
allowed to treat Gulf war veterans because--he felt it was
because that his conclusions or his findings that he was coming
up with were not the same or expected findings that the VA
expected him to find.
Mr. Sanders. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, we have heard
that tale once or twice before, I think, as well. Mr. Chairman,
that is the extent of my questions at this time. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Just a few more questions, not many.
I would like to know if each of you are registered in either
the VA Health Registry and/or the Comprehensive Clinical
Evaluation Program.
Col. Roman. Yes, sir. I am registered with both the VA in
DC and the VA in Denver and the U.S. Army's program when they
had me on their register as well.
Mr. Shays. I am sorry. Mr. Towns, you came back. I am
sorry. I am going to go right to Mr. Towns. I am used to your
being right here.
Mr. Towns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will try to be
brief.
Mr. Shays. You can have as much time as you want.
Mr. Towns. Thank you. Let me begin by first saying, do any
of you know whether other people in your units have experienced
the same symptoms that you have? Colonel.
Col. Roman. Thank you, sir. Sir, I have been in touch with
a number of people in my unit, a small number, because they are
scattered throughout the country, and at least three of the
people that I have been in contact with have registered with
the VA; and, in fact, a couple of them were being treated at
the VA--correction--the Fitzsimmons Army Hospital while I was
there back in 1995, but I have not made any effort to find out
what the rest of them were doing. There was 400 people I was
serving with.
Mr. Stacy. Sir, I have only been in contact with one other
member of my unit since I have been out. He in turn states that
he has been in contact with several other members. He states
that he is experiencing some of the symptoms that I
experienced. He has also stated that there are two other
members from my unit who have been very ill for several years
now and have been, the way he described it, on their death bed.
They have not been able to come out of their bed for a couple
of years now.
Mr. Towns. Stacy, you were in a pretty small unit.
Mr. Stacy. Sir, I have heard rumors, but I will stick to
fact. Fifty percent of the soldiers I have contacted, which I
have not contacted over 10, are sick. The other 50 percent,
which I was in denial for years--I believed the VA, I believed
the doctors, and it is too hard of a battle to go and fight the
VA. It is hard to accept the fact that this condition is going
to ultimately be my end. Denial is a big problem with this.
Mr. Towns. Just for the record, let me just make certain.
How many were in your unit?
Mr. Stacy. Let's see. There are 12 tanks in a company, 4
men per tank.
Mr. Towns. Forty-eight?
Mr. Stacy. Yes, sir. I have only contacted less than 10. A
few are sick. One soldier lost a kidney. He had his liver
patched and his spleen due to an accident playing softball.
When he goes to the VA, they are able to tell him that these
problems are because of these losses or organs, and he accepts
that. Another soldier from my unit had a healthy child, to the
best of my knowledge, and does not want to even speak about
anything in the Gulf. He is in denial about it. He does not
want to hear it. We had two soldiers that left the Gulf before
combat even started, complaining of health problems.
Another soldier, I have got another friend that is not
sick; still he is in the reserves, but he left over a month
before we did. Another soldier is sick, and that is about all
that I know.
Mr. Towns. OK. Thank you very much, Mr. Stacy. Sgt. Zeller.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir, I know of an officer that I rode
everywhere around the desert with, and I am here to tell you
that he came down with something where they pumped him full of
steroids, they pumped him full of this paquenele or whatever,
and then the last-ditch effort was they finally got off their
dukeses after he went after the hospital commander to send him
to Walter Reed. And he had this very strange situation where
they did plasma parises on him and stuck him with several
liters of sandaglobulin, which is like giving him a brand-new
immune system.
And I have come to some information most recently about
autoimmune disorders. That is why I have come up with that as
one of the things. This guy was suffering from autoimmune
symptoms, for some unknown reason. He was diagnosed with poly--
CDIP--something poly something-neuropathy, chronic inflammatory
poly-neuropathy or something like that.
He was diagnosed with Guillaume-Barre. OK? Guillaume-Barre;
I looked it up, and the only way you can get that is vaccines.
OK? He was told at Walter Reed not to ever say anything about
his problem because it cost beaucoup dollars for him to have
anything like this done to him and that it would be way too
much to do for everybody that is in the Army.
Sir, I am here to tell you that we were everywhere
together. We drank out of the same water holes. We ate from the
same logistics points and so forth and so on, and I think I am
a little more heartier than he is, but he was sick with this,
and I will be more than happy to give you his telephone number
and let you call him and let him tell you his horror story, and
it was about money. Walter Reed said it was about money. So I
can give you a for-real.
And then the other situation, sir, that is really grave, I
was drawn out. OK? In September 1995, I was working on a
helicopter accident that happened at Fort Rucker, and I was
investigating it, and Bethesda Naval Research Center called me
and said I had to come forward or else, and I had no choice. I
mean, I have been in where I was hiding, because I had seen it
off in 1991. I had seen it when I filled out a DA-4700,
demobilize/remobilize work sheet for Southwest Asia, and I put
down all my problems then. OK? That was July 1991.
The long story short is this form was produced April 1991.
Now, tell me if someone does not know something is going on. I
have this form here. I will be happy to show you this form that
I filled out. It has an NCO that signed me off, so it is
official, and if you call him up, I am sure he will say, Yes, I
did sign this guy off, and I did tell him it was only for a
data base. We are not interested in taking care of you right
now.
So when I started going to sick call and I had doctors
telling me that you are riding sick call that you are trying to
do something, so forth and so on, giving me all these
ridiculing-type remarks, which I am not into, I started hiding.
And there are soldiers hiding. There are people hiding because
they do not want ridicule. They do not want to be treated like
a second-class citizen for this ailment that they have,
whatever it might be. It could be several things.
Mr. Towns. Right. Thank you.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir, yes, sir.
Mr. Towns. Colonel, do you want to add something?
Mr. Shays. Could we put on the record, if I might?
Mr. Towns. Sure.
Mr. Shays. The people you suggest who were hiring are
active military personnel who do not want to have to deal with
this within the military system. Is that correct? You are not
talking----
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Well, they have seen everybody----
Mr. Shays. Listen to my question.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir, yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. What I am asking is, just for the record to make
sure we know the difference, you are not suggesting that
soldiers who have left active duty are necessarily hiding. You
are talking right now, for the purposes of responding to Mr.
Towns, you are responding to the fact that active military
personnel, some in particular, chose to hide rather than come
forward within the military system.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Because I do not want to get kicked out,
sir. I needed my job.
Mr. Shays. I just want the answer.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir, yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. And I understand that.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir, yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. And I am not critical of it; I just want to
understand it.
Col. Roman. Fine. Mr. Towns.
Mr. Towns. Good point, Mr. Chairman. Yes.
Col. Roman. Thank you. I think I have been very
conservative in my responses, and I am very careful in what I
say, and so I would like to add for the record that to answer
your question about the former people that I worked with or do
I know about anybody else who was ill, I would like to answer
into the record that Dr. Stuart Hiatt, H-I-A-T-T, who is an
M.D. of his position, a surgeon, who was in top shape and could
run 1 mile in about 4\1/2\ minutes, 5 minutes at the age of 50,
went to the Gulf war was a volunteer.
He was my former commander, and he got there, was there 3
or 4 days, and they had to air lift him out of there. He did
not see combat. They had to air lift him out of the Gulf. He
went back into Fitzsimmons for examination, and they kept him 3
or 4 months after the war for unknown symptoms, unknown
ailments in San Antonio.
I believe if you got his records, as a matter of fact this
particular committee hearings, that you would be able to find
out a whole lot more than I know about it at this point in
time, but when you get a man who is in the prime of his life,
and he gets to the Gulf and 3 days later he is air lifted out
for unknown ailments and it is nothing to do with his physical
fitness, because he is fit, then that is a problem.
Mr. Towns. Right. Let me ask you another question. How many
of you have children? Do all of you have children?
Col. Roman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Canterbury. Yes, sir.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Yes, sir.
Mr. Towns. Have you seen any problems with your children?
Col. Roman. I am not, sir. My children are adults, and they
have children.
Mr. Stacy. Sir, I would like to say, my daughter was born
before I deployed, and she is having some problems. And I would
also like to say, my wife and daughter did have a Gulf War
Registry Exam in Jackson, MS.
Mr. Canterbury. Sir, I have three children, one boy, two
girls. My youngest was conceived after I came home from the
Persian Gulf. All three of my children complain about their
arms and their legs and different muscles in their body
hurting. My youngest daughter has respiratory problems, and
that is about the extent that I am aware of at this point in
time, but for them to come to me basically every time I see
them and complain that their arms and their legs hurt, I mean,
I know children have growing pains, but they should not be
complaining about them, almost on a daily basis.
Mr. Towns. Yes. Do you want to add?
Mr. Stacy. Sir, these veterans and children, they are
casualties of this war. Something should be done for them also.
Mr. Towns. Thank you very much, all of you, for your
testimony. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman, and I just want to go
through--some of you responded, but I want all of you to
respond in this part of the record.
I started out asking you, Col. Roman, and you told me you
were registered in both the VA Health Registry and the DOD
Comprehensive Clinical Evaluation Program; you were in both.
Col. Roman. Yes, sir, both with the VA and with the U.S.
Army sent out a letter and asked me to be registered. I am. I
believe the CDC also sent out something to me to fill out as a
questionnaire type, and I filled that out as well.
Mr. Shays. Very good. Mr. Canterbury.
Mr. Canterbury. Sir, I have been registered on the Persian
Gulf Registry Examination twice. I am registered on the DOD
Health Registry.
Mr. Shays. Private Stacy.
Mr. Stacy. Sir, I am also on the Gulf War Exam Registry. I
did an updated data sheet. My doctor told me that they do not
know what is wrong. They have run all the tests. I did request
to go to the hospital there in Houston, TX for further tests,
and they denied me that. As a matter of fact, it is not even in
my records that I requested that.
Mr. Shays. Sgt. Zeller.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir, I have been on it because Bethesda
Naval Research called me September 1995. Since that time, I
have had two different incidence, at Seaside, CA, where the
registration is, where they told me that I was not registered.
Somehow the data base, they switched computers or something
like that, so I have had to, like, reapply twice.
And one of the situations was when I was calling the
investigation team and, like, research team, the one you call
and you tell where you were and what you did and so forth,
which is a lot like the one I told here, they said in
Washington that we have no registry of you. That was the second
time this happened, and then I called California, and they told
me that is crazy; we have you here.
So, in other words, California sort of lost me once, and
then Washington was not in the groove with California. And,
furthermore, my children and my wife have been on that since
November or December 1995, when the guys that said tell your
story, they said it is significant enough to put your whole
family on this because there could be a possibility that they
might have something wrong with them, too.
Well, since 1995, sir, not one of my relatives, until I
went off on them most recently, was being seen, and the one
they took was, like, superficially looked at, sir.
Mr. Shays. Now, all four of you had symptoms during the
war. Is that correct?
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir, yes, sir.
Mr. Stacy. Yes, sir.
Col. Roman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Canterbury. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. All four of you had it.
Col. Roman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stacy. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Shays. I want to know, in simple terms, what your
diagnosis was and if any treatment was provided.
Col. Roman. For myself, sir, it occurred when I was in
Riyadh and I was traveling with my commander at the time, who
happened to be a physician. He did not happen to be; he is a
good physician. And I got real sick, started vomiting, and----
Mr. Shays. Right now, I just want to know what your
ultimate diagnosis was and what your treatment was.
Col. Roman. He diagnosed it at that point in time as food
poisoning; not knowing anything else, that is what it was.
Mr. Shays. But that was onsite.
Col. Roman. Onsite. That is right.
Mr. Shays. But once you went to the VA, what was the
diagnosis that you were given?
Col. Roman. I have given the VA and Fitzsimmons stool
samples, when I am in the process of flu-like symptoms, and
they have never found any kind of parasite or anything else
that would cause me to have that kind of an illness.
Mr. Shays. You went to the VA. Correct?
Col. Roman. Yes, sir. After the war.
Mr. Shays. And after the war, what was your diagnosis?
Col. Roman. They have not diagnosed it.
Mr. Shays. OK. Private Canterbury.
Mr. Canterbury. Sir, are you asking what the diagnosis was
in the Gulf or at the VA?
Mr. Shays. At the VA.
Mr. Canterbury. At the VA, I have been diagnosed, as far as
I know of, with fibromyalgia and migraines. I am not service-
connected, and that is it and I have gone through three
different hospitals. I cannot get results from tests, sir.
Mr. Shays. Private Stacy.
Mr. Stacy. Sir, I was undiagnosed also. I would also like
to say, for the past year I have been pushed and pushed toward
mental health. I am 30 percent service-connected for PTSD. I
would not pursue that any further until just here recently
because we were just starving to death. I would not accept the
fact that it was PTSD, but all of my symptoms are undiagnosed.
Mr. Shays. So, in other words, for you to get some kind of
compensation, that is the one you have to accept.
Mr. Stacy. Yes, sir, and I would not do it. We have been
starving for 1 year. Our family and friends, if it was not for
them and God, we would not have made it.
Mr. Shays. Sgt. Zeller.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir, if I may, I need to say it this
way. They are trying to do my MEB now because I have caused so
much of a ruckus. The long story short of it is it all happened
when I tried to solicit the President, tried to call him and
talk to him possibly.
Mr. Shays. Well, I do not think you are going to accomplish
much doing that, and that is no disrespect to the President.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Right, sir.
Mr. Shays. So I want you to answer my question, then.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Well, the question is, they asked me----
Mr. Shays. I am going to interrupt you. I am sorry.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir, yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. I am going to give you a chance to make your
point, but I want the answer first, the answer to: what is your
diagnosis?
Staff Sgt. Zeller. They did not give me one. They asked me
what my most significant illnesses are, and that is all they
want to focus on, sir. I cannot say it any other way. I am
confused. I am not a doctor.
Mr. Shays. No. I just want to know if they had given you--
--
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir, yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. They have not given me one.
Mr. Shays. I did say I would let you make your point. What
is the point you want to make?
Staff Sgt. Zeller. The point is that, I mean, they focus on
the significant illnesses and make them insignificant, and then
I wind up just like this man here, living in Appalachia with
five sons, starving to death, sir.
Mr. Shays. Because you are not being allowed to re-enlist.
Your worst fear has come true. Your worst fear was that you
came forward, you came forward, and you are not being allowed
to re-enlist, so you are out. You are presently an active
member of the Armed Services.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir, yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. But you will be inactive when?
Staff Sgt. Zeller. As soon as they get the MEB together
because I am fussing because there is nothing on there like
what is happening to me.
Mr. Shays. Let me just conclude by asking, is there any
question that I should have asked you that you wanted on the
record? I will start with you, Colonel Roman. Is there any
question that you wish we had asked or any one that you were
prepared to answer that we should have asked?
Col. Roman. No, sir. I think you have been quite thorough.
Mr. Canterbury. I cannot think of any at this time, unless
you could ask me--give me some time to think about that.
Mr. Shays. Well, the record will be open, and so you will
be allowed to submit additional.
Mr. Stacy. Not at this time also, sir. Thank you very much.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir, this book right here I think has a
lot to do with the situation, and I do not know how you can get
a copy, because I could not get it in any book store, but I
think you might really want to take a peek at this. I do not
know if that is a question, but maybe, Staff Sgt. Zeller, can I
look at your book? I would be happy to show it to you, sir.
I am sorry, sir, but this book right here dates back to my
original----
Mr. Shays. If that is the question you wanted me to ask,
Sergeant, may I look at your book?
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Certainly, sir.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I would like to.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Sir, yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. One of the things that we think we can learn is
to learn what has happened with the civilian population in
Iraq. When we blew up the 21 to 36 potential sites--that number
is classified, but when we blew up whatever number it was, the
document said that the plumes would go away from the troops,
not toward them. We know that some of the plumes went toward
our troops, not away. But we then ask the question, well, if
they went away from our troops, where did they go? And we
suspect some went to civilian populations in Iraq.
The problem the Iraqi people have is they have a leader who
is not about to admit that his stockpiling--think of this
extraordinarily potentially wealthy country that instead of
going toward war could have gone toward peace and used its
resources. They had one of the highest educated communities.
Women were given tremendous rights, these Arab women, and yet
you have a country that has many sites that were blown up and
had stores of chemicals, potentially biological agents, and we
have reason to believe that many Iraqi citizens have been
impacted.
And if we could learn what has happened to them, we might
learn a little bit more about what has happened to all of you.
I thank all four of you for being here, and your testimony
was extraordinarily valuable, and I know that there have been
one or two references to not feeling a sense of pride and the
love for your country, and you have the greatest country in the
world, and you are going to see that to be true, if you do not
feel it now; but you should also feel pride in your service to
your country. And I hope our paths cross often in the future.
Col. Roman. Sir, I thought for the record I would like to
interrupt and say that I did serve in the Gulf, and I served in
Honduras during the Contras-Nicaragua situation, and I have a
lot of pride, and I would do it again. I would not hesitate at
all. I do not have any problem with the Army or the VA, except
that we are not being treated. Treat us.
Mr. Shays. OK. A good way to end. Thank you. Thank you,
gentlemen.
Mr. Stacy. Thank you.
Mr. Canterbury. Thank you.
Staff Sgt. Zeller. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Shays. We will take our next panel. You are free to go.
Col. Roman. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Shays. Now, my understanding is that panel 2, that part
of panel 2 is not available right now. Dr. Rostker has to go
somewhere. OK. Dr. Rostker, why don't you just tell me what
guidance you want to provide?
Mr. Rostker. I need to be at the Pentagon for about 45
minutes, starting at 1:30.
Mr. Shays. I think what we will do is go with panel 3 and
then come to Panel 2.
Mr. Rostker. And I will come right back as soon as I can,
sir.
Mr. Shays. Doctor, you have been very cooperative with this
committee, and so we are happy to accommodate you.
Mr. Rostker. Thank you very much.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. And I appreciate the VA for
accommodating Dr. Rostker. We will go with panel 3, and that is
Dr. Garth Nicolson, the chief scientific officer, Institute of
Molecular Medicine; Mr. Leonard Dietz, a physicist and research
scientist, retired; and Dr. Durakovic--am I saying that
correctly?
Dr. Durakovic. Correct.
Mr. Shays. OK. Well, my assistant said it correctly, and I
copied him. Dr. Durakovic, chief nuclear medicine science
(former), Wilmington, DE.
We are going to ask all four of you to stand up, and we
will swear you all in. Would you raise your right hands,
please?
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. Please be seated. For the record, all four have
responded in the affirmative. Can we go in the order in which I
called you? Basically, we will start with you, Dr. Nicolson,
and we will work our way down.
STATEMENTS OF GARTH NICOLSON, CHIEF SCIENTIFIC OFFICER,
INSTITUTE FOR MOLECULAR MEDICINE, ACCOMPANIED BY NANCY
NICOLSON, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, INSTITUTE FOR MOLECULAR
MEDICINE; LEONARD DIETZ, PHYSICIST AND RESEARCH SCIENTIST; AND
ASAF DURAKOVIC, FORMER CHIEF, NUCLEAR MEDICINE SERVICE,
WILMINGTON, DE
Mr. Nicolson. I am Garth Nicolson, the chief scientific
officer of the Institute for Molecular Medicine, a nonprofit,
private institute in Irvine, CA. I am also a professor of
internal medicine and a professor of pathology and laboratory
medicine. I am joined here by my wife, Dr. Nancy Nicolson, who
is the chief executive officer of the Institute for Molecular
Medicine. She has degrees in physics and molecular biophysics.
We got involved in this issue when our stepdaughter
returned from her service in the Gulf. She was a crew chief on
a Blackhawk helicopter in the 101st Airborne, and she developed
the unusual signs and symptoms that we know as Gulf War
Syndrome, or we prefer, Gulf war illnesses, illnesses because
we think there are a variety of different illnesses that make
up this syndrome. In my first figure--those of you that have
written testimony can follow it; the panel, I think, can follow
it as well and hopefully they can see it--our hypothesis has
been all along that our soldiers were exposed to combinations
of chemical, radiological, and biological agents during their
service in the Gulf.
We are particularly interested in the combinations of
multiple chemical and biological agents. The reason we are very
interested in the biological agents, particularly those that
cause chronic illnesses, is that this is the only way that you
can adequately explain the illnesses passing to immediate
family members, spouses, and children. We will come back to
this.
Mr. Shays. Doctor, I am going to have you just slow down
when you talk just a little bit.
Mr. Nicolson. All right.
Mr. Shays. I am going to put the clock on. I will let you
go another round.
Mr. Nicolson. OK. In this figure are shown the signs and
symptoms of Gulf war illnesses. You might notice that it is
very complex. It involves 20 to 40 different signs and
symptoms, and this, I think, has confused the diagnosis of this
particular group of illnesses for some time; and as you have
heard, many of the soldiers that testified before you were
given the category of ``undiagnosable illnesses,'' or they were
put in the category of ``stress-related illnesses'' or Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder.
We do not feel that Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder is a
major cause of the Gulf war illnesses. We think that it is
caused by combinations of chemical and biological agents that
produce these very complex signs and symptoms. We do not see
how it could be produced any other way.
Now, in this figure we have compared the 650 soldiers that
we examined or received information on with civilians who had
Chronic Fatigue Syndrome or Fibromyalgia; and as you can see,
the signs and symptoms shown here in the red bars compared to
the light-blue bars are almost identical, meaning that these
veterans probably did not have unidentifiable illnesses; they
probably had Chronic Fatigue Syndrome--Fibromyalgia-like
illnesses.
Now, these illnesses can be caused by a combination of
different types of exposures, and we found recently with
Chronic Fatigue Syndrome that biologic agents, such as chronic
microorganisms, can cause these same illnesses. In fact, of the
three candidates of microorganisms that are most likely to
cause illness like this, viruses, bacteria, and bacteria-like
microorganisms called myco-plasmas, we were attracted to the
fact that mycoplasmas might be underlying at least some of the
signs and symptoms of Gulf war illness.
Now, the reason is this type of microorganism can cause
virtually all of the different signs and symptoms that I showed
in the previous figure. In addition, the species of mycoplasma
that we found predominantly in the Gulf war illness patients is
a very unusual species of mycoplasma called Mycoplasma
fermentans. This particular mycoplasma has the property that it
can actually enter cells, and when it enters cells, it can
cause havoc with the metabolism of the cell and can cause
unusual signs and symptoms because it can colonize or go into
virtually any tissue or organ.
When it gets in certain locations, like the synovial cells
of the joints, it can cause an arthritis-like condition. In
fact, aching joints and joint problems, or arthritic
conditions, are very common, probably one of the most common
signs and symptoms of Gulf war illness. And the reason that may
happen is that as these microorganisms leave the cell, they
take a piece of the plasma membrane with it, and in doing so
they can stimulate an immune response against the host antigens
that were carried on the mycoplasma as it left the cell. Thus,
some of the autoimmune signs and symptoms can be explained by
this type of microorganism.
We have developed new diagnostic techniques based on the
techniques of molecular biology, and we have been able to
diagnose Gulf war illness in several hundred patients as due to
this type of microorganism plus other potential infectious
agents as well. We have found in our study 45 percent of the
veterans that we tested, and in some cases their immediate
family members were symptomatic, for this type of mycoplasmal
infection.
We have looked now at nondeployed forces, and we find it in
less than 4 percent of subjects, so there is a significant
difference depending on whether they were deployed to the
Persian Gulf and have the illness.
Now, the important thing is that this type of illness can
be treated. It can be treated with multiple cycles of
antibiotics; and, in fact, we found five different antibiotics
that are effective, and these different antibiotics can be used
in different combinations and different sequences of 6 week
therapeutic treatments. The whole therapy can take over a year.
We are dealing with very slow-growing microorganisms that are
only moderately sensitive to antibiotics, and this is why it
takes so long.
There is some information that I have listed here,
nutritional requirements, and other recommendations that I will
not go into now. We have been working with Dr. Bill Rae in
Dallas and Dr. Charles Hinshaw in Wichita, and Dr. Jim Privatra
in California on the nutritional requirements that are
important.
This is what happened when we looked at 170 soldiers with
Gulf war illness. Seventy-six of these proved to be positive
for mycoplasmal infections. Seventy-three of them underwent the
antibiotic therapy, and as you can see, after the first 6-weeks
of therapy none of them recovered. They all relapsed with the
usual signs and symptoms, but after subsequent therapy some of
them recovered so that after five or six cycles of therapy,
most of them had recovered from the illness.
Now, when I mean ``recovery,'' that does not necessarily
mean they are ``cured,'' but they could return to active duty
and undergo the physical requirements of their service. Now,
that is with 73 patients, and that represents patients from
every service in our armed forces except the Coast Guard.
And, finally, in the last figure that I am going to show
and discuss briefly are what are the potential or possible
origins of these chronic microorganisms. The first source that
we have heard already is they could have been in the vaccines
as contaminants, for example. It is not uncommon that these
small, bacteria-like microorganisms like mycoplasmas can
contaminate vaccines.
First, vaccines in the Gulf were given, multiple
vaccinations were given simultaneously, and this is not the
effective way to vaccinate someone. By giving all these
multiple vaccines at once, you tend to immunosuppress an
individual, and that could have made them susceptible to
endogenous agents. Second, agents in the environment that were
in the sand or in the water or so on, now mycoplasma can
survive for some time in the sand, and Professor Luce
Montagnier in Paris has indicated that these types of agents
can persist in the environment.
The third point, which has been brought up, is that the
plumes from the destruction of chemical-biological-warfare
factories and bunkers that were destroyed during and after the
war could contain these infectious agents, and they could have
blown back across our lines. I think that this is also very
likely. For the SCUDs. Some of the units that we have looked at
were under repeated SCUD attack, and they now have health
problems, and some of these SCUDS may have been equipped with
CBW warheads or chemical or biological warheads to deliver
these agents.
The Iraqis were operating under Soviet War Doctrine. We
know that. That has been admitted by our intelligence. They
would tend to mix agents, chemical plus biological together in
an offensive attack; and if they did this, then this could
explain the complex signs and symptoms that we see in Gulf war
illnesses.
I thank you for the chance to address the panel and will be
willing to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nicolson follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Mr. Dietz.
Mr. Dietz. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank
you for inviting me to share with you my concerns about
depleted uranium and its possible connection to Gulf War
Syndrome.
I first became concerned about the health consequences of
depleted uranium in the fall of 1979, when I worked at the
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory in Schenectady, NY. The
laboratory was operated by the General Electric Co. for the
Department of Energy. While troubleshooting a radiological
problem, my colleagues and I accidentally discovered depleted
uranium aerosols collected in environmental air filters exposed
at the Knolls site.
The source of the uranium contamination was the National
Lead Industries Plant in Colonie, 10 miles east of the Knolls
site, near Albany, NY. National Lead was fabricating depleted
uranium penetrators for 30-millimeter cannon rounds. We also
discovered depleted uranium in air filters exposed at the
Kesselring site in West Milton, NY, where crews for the nuclear
Navy are trained, 26 miles northwest of the National Lead
plant.
This is by no means the maximum fallout distance for
uranium aerosols. The 26-mile radius surrounding the city of
Albany corresponds to more than 2,000 square miles where this
fallout was occurring.
In January 1980, I wrote an unclassified report documenting
the mass spectrometer measurements we made, and it was recently
obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, and a photocopy
has been given to this committee.
Totally unrelated to the discovery of depleted uranium in
Knolls-site air filters, in February 1980, a court order by New
York State, citing public health reasons, shut down National
Lead for exceeding a New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation monthly radioactivity limit of 150 microcuries for
airborne emissions. This corresponds to less than 1 pound of
depleted uranium metal, equivalent to 1.4 of the small
penetrators used in aircraft 30-millimeter cannon rounds.
New York State health officials understood that exposure of
its citizens to even small amounts of depleted uranium was
harmful; therefore, they stopped it.
Consider what happened in the Gulf war. Uranium metal is
pyrophoric, and when a high velocity depleted uranium
penetrator hits a tank, its leading end ignites and burns
explosively, forming aerosol particles of uranium oxide that
are mostly 5 micrometers or less in size. By the way, five
micrometers equals two-ten-thousandths of an inch.
These particles become airborne and, like dust, can be
spread far and wide by wind action. Their fallout range is
virtually unlimited. Uranium microparticles can be inhaled and
ingested easily, and that makes them dangerous to human health.
Radioactive contamination from depleted uranium is permanent
for friend or foe; it does not diminish with time. All three
uranium isotopes in depleted uranium are radioactive and
produce alpha particles. Prolonged bombardment of lung tissue
by alpha particles is known to cause cancer.
During 4 days of ground fighting, at least 300 tons of
depleted uranium munitions were fired. An army report
describing research and hard-target testing states that up to
70 percent of a depleted uranium penetrator can become
aerosolized when it hits a tank. Even if only 2 percent of the
uranium burned up, then at least 6 tons of depleted uranium
aerosol particles were generated. This is a huge amount, much
of which would have become airborne over the battlefields. This
amount in 4 days is more than 10,000 times greater than the
maximum airborne emissions of depleted uranium allowed in the
air over Albany in 1 month.
In a given region of a battlefield, hundreds of kilograms
of micrometer-sized depleted uranium particles were generated
suddenly by cannon fire from United States airplanes and tanks
at formations of Iraqi armor. Thermocolumns from burning tanks
and vehicles carried aloft these localized plumes of uranium
particles and dispersed them far and wide by wind action over
the battlefield.
Then unprotected U.S. service personnel inhaled and
ingested quantities of depleted uranium particles into their
lungs and bodies. They were never told about the health dangers
of uranium particles. They were given no means to protect
themselves.
Unprotected medical and other personnel were exposed to
inhaling uranium dust from the uniforms of wounded allied and
Iraqi soldiers. This massive exposure to depleted uranium
aerosol particles on the battlefield raises many questions
about depleted uranium and how it might have caused at least
some of the health problems now being experienced by Gulf war
veterans.
``Uranium and all its compounds are highly toxic, both from
a chemical and a radiological standpoint.'' This quotation is
from the Handbook of Chemistry and Physics, which has been a
widely used reference text for generations of scientists and
engineers: Chronic exposure to small concentrations of uranium
is known to cause kidney failure. Depleted uranium is more than
99 percent Uranium-238, just a single isotope, and is always
accompanied by two decay daughters that emit penetrating
particles and gamma rays.
As gamma rays and energetic beta particles become absorbed
in body tissue, they will traverse hundreds of body cells,
potentially causing damage to genetic material in the nuclei of
living cells. A biokinetic model developed by the International
Commission on Radiation Protection explains how uranium
microparticles can enter the body and spread to vital organs.
This model shows that an acute intake of uranium particles can
result in urinary excretions of uranium for several years
afterwards.
After the war, many thousands of service personnel entered
Iraqi tanks and armored vehicles that had been destroyed by
depleted uranium penetrators, looking for souvenirs. They
became contaminated. Others collected spent penetrators and
made amulets from the dense, heavy-uranium metal. Wearing these
amulets about their bodies, they unwittingly subjected
themselves to penetrating gamma radiations from the uranium
isotopes and the two decay daughters of Uranium-238.
They were not told that uranium is dangerous to health.
After the war, 27 soldiers in the 144th Army National Guard and
Supply Company worked on and in 29 U.S. combat vehicles that
had been hit by friendly fire and become contaminated with
depleted uranium. They worked for 3 weeks without any
protective gear before being informed that the vehicles were
contaminated.
In July 1991, the ammunition storage area at the United
States Army base in Doha, Kuwait caught fire and burned. Four
M1A1 tanks with depleted uranium armor were destroyed, along
with 660 tank rounds and 9,720 35-millimeter, depleted uranium
rounds. More than 9,000 pounds of depleted uranium burned up in
the fire. U.S. troops were exposed to depleted uranium during
the fire and subsequent cleanup operations. They wore no
protective clothing or masks during or after the fire.
Approximately 3,500 soldiers were based here. Some of the
soldiers reported cleanup consisted of using brooms and their
bare hands. This is something that would make a qualified
radiological worker shudder.
Twenty-two veterans still retain depleted uranium shrapnel
in their bodies as a result of friendly fire incidents. They
have become subjects for the first medical studies to assess
health risks related to depleted uranium.
The promotion and sale of depleted uranium munitions to the
armies and air forces of many nations guarantees that in future
conflicts thousands of soldiers on both sides will inhale and
ingest acute doses of uranium aerosols, and many in tanks or
armored vehicles struck by depleted uranium penetrators will
receive dangerous amounts of nonremovable uranium shrapnel in
their bodies.
It has been reported in The Nation that the Department of
Veterans' Affairs conducted a Statewide survey of 251 Gulf war
veterans' families in Mississippi. Of their children conceived
and born since the war, an astonishing 67 percent have
illnesses rated severe or have missing eyes, missing ears,
blood infections, respiratory problems, and fused fingers. The
causes of these birth defects should be investigated.
The human cost of using depleted uranium munitions in
conflicts is not worth any short-term advantage if it
permanently contaminates the environment and results in
irreparable damage to our service personnel and causes genetic
defects in their offspring.
Speaking as a World War II veteran, I am troubled about the
health of Gulf war veterans and the seeming lack of concern
shown by the Department of Veterans' Affairs and the Army. They
have refused to investigate the role of depleted uranium as a
possible cause of Gulf War Syndrome.
In concluding, I urge this committee to make it possible
for a truly independent investigation of depleted uranium to
occur, because it was a major chemical and radiological poison
that troops were exposed to during the Gulf war. Investigations
should be undertaken by scientists and medical doctors not
associated with the Department of Defense and who are
knowledgeable about heavy metal and radiological poisons and
their effects on human health. Gulf war veterans must also have
a voice in organizing this effort. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dietz follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much. Dr. Durakovic, you have the
floor.
Dr. Durakovic. Mr. Chairman, I welcome and am grateful for
this opportunity to testify today.
I am a doctor of medicine with a specialty in nuclear
medicine, and I also have a doctorate, Ph.D., in nuclear
biophysics. My entire scientific and professional life has been
dedicated to radioisotope toxicology, in which capacity I
served the Government of the United States for over 17 years,
being the head of the Nuclear Medicine Department at Walter
Reed Hospital, working for the Defense Nuclear Agency, and
later for the VA system.
In 1991, 24 veterans were referred to my clinic in
Wilmington, DE from the Ventnor Clinic in New Jersey because
they were contaminated with uranium in the Persian Gulf. If it
was not for my clinic that encountered that population of 24
patients, perhaps we would not be sitting here discussing
medical effects of uranium in the Persian Gulf because that was
the first referral of the veterans who qualified for the
Nuclear Medicine Clinic. Most of them in different parts of the
country were seen by general practitioners who have hardly any
expertise in handling internal contamination.
So due to the lucky circumstances, those patients were seen
by me at Wilmington VA Hospital, and I took their story very
seriously, indeed, because my exposure to uranium contamination
previous to that time was only with experimental animals,
because I did lots of research in the experimental animals
dealing with transuranium elements, plutonium, americium, and
so on. My works had been published 25 years ago on uranium and
transuranium elements.
These soldiers presented with a host of clinical symptoms,
ranging from respiratory ailments to renal disease. Some of
those patients underwent several surgical procedures to handle
their kidney problems. Their problems also included hepatic,
gastrointestinal, and endocrine disease. Therefore, I simply
focused my attention to the probability of symptomatology
related to the endogenous incorporation of uranium in those
patients, for which reason I took the very simple route of
attempting etiological diagnoses in those unfortunate patients.
Out of 24 patients, I dealt directly with 14 of them
because 10 did not show up for my follow-ups. My first line of
action was to send them for the objective evaluation of the
whole-body counting of radioactive uranium. Since our facility
did not have the capacity to deal with the whole-body counting
of endogenously incorporated radioisotopes, I sent them to the
VA Hospital in Boston, where there was a whole-body counter,
unfortunately outdated and not sensitive.
Those patients underwent the whole-body counting with
inconclusive results. I suggested to the doctors of the VA
Hospital in Boston to improve their methodology by buying more
sensitive crystal, which they applied to the Department of
Defense, and soon after, the work was discontinued under
unexplained circumstances.
Since whole-body counting did not yield any information
about the etiological cause of my patients' symptomatology, I
suggested to the VA system that we go for another line of
action about etiological diagnosis of their problems. I
suggested that the patients be sent to Sandia National Lab in
New Mexico, where I am very familiar with their work of uranium
in the lungs. That has never been done.
Furthermore, I suggested that urine samples be sent to the
Radiochemistry Lab in Aberdeen, MD, and samples were collected,
but they never reached Maryland, and they never reached
Aberdeen Proving Grounds, so urine analysis is nonexistent. In
the case of my 24 patients, there was only 1 urine sample that
was analyzed, with inconclusive evidence.
So I consider it very mysterious, the disappearance of the
samples of the urine, which were very carefully collected and
supposedly sent to Aberdeen Proving Grounds by the VA Hospital
in Wilmington, DE.
The third action that I proposed to the Veterans'
Administration was to do biopsy samples of the bone tissue of
those patients because we know that uranium can be easily
detected by autoradiography or even by visualization of a
single atom of uranium, which is a big atom, about one Angstrom
in size. It can be seen by the specialized microscopic
analysis.
None of my recommendations was ever followed, and not a
single patient referred to me has been analyzed for the
etiological cause of their symptoms. Every conceivable road
block was put in my line of management of those patients. I was
ridiculed. There were road blocks, and there were obstacles
throughout 7 years of my attempt to properly analyze the
problems of those patients. I have to quote to you, although it
is not my vocabulary or my dictionary, that the chief of staff
of my hospital said it is ``half-assed research.'' And it was
openly and obviously discouraged that any work done with them.
Nevertheless, there was a Uranium Registry in our hospital,
which consisted of taking blood pressures, temperatures, and
the pulse rates, and perhaps in some cases, of the lung x rays,
which really is far away from proper analysis of the patients
for the deeply incorporated uranium.
My plan of management has failed because of the total
absence and total lack of interest on the part of the Veterans'
Administration to do anything for those unfortunate patients,
to analyze why they suffer from the host of the symptoms and
what might be the role of uranium in the misery of those
patients. Why it was done, I do not know; but I do know that I
received several telephone calls from the Department of Defense
suggesting to me that this work will not yield any meaningful
information and should be discontinued. I have telephone
numbers of the references if you desire to see them.
Lost records is another thing, because samples of the urine
disappeared but also the records of those patients disappeared,
and they were found much later when pressure was put on the VA
Hospital.
Now, we are facing a big dilemma in the political,
scientific, and professional environment of the United States
of America. Is uranium responsible or a real objective cause of
a part of the disease of the Persian Gulf veterans, or is it
not? The question is very simple, and it can be very simply
addressed.
The only thing to do is to do a proper, objective,
expensive analysis of the samples of those patients, which has
to be conducted not by the charlatans which are present in the
Veterans' Administration's offices with the big names of the
Gulf veterans uranium groups and clinics and so on and which
are populated by people who have no basic knowledge of
radiation toxicology, nuclear medicine, or internal
incorporation of radioactive uranium.
Now, if uranium is analyzed by these objective methods, we
will be able to say whether those patients are related to
uranium in their symptomatology or they are not. The studies
are very expensive, but I think our country owes it to the
veterans who served in the Gulf.
I was a commander of the 531st Army Detachment in the time
of Desert Shield. At that time, when I was deployed for the
Desert Shield operation, everybody knew my qualification as
being an international expert for uranium and transuranium
elements. Nobody volunteered to me the information that my
expertise might be needed in the Gulf because of the possible
use of depleted uranium shells.
I am not questioning it, but I am just saying that we can
easily answer the question of the relationship between uranium
and the Persian Gulf sickness if we take this issue seriously
and if we analyze in this country what is the probability of a
connection between uranium and the symptoms.
This country has the capacity. It has sophisticated
laboratories. It has professional people who are at the highest
level of expertise, and there is absolutely no excuse not to
proceed with my method of management.
Total lack of etiological diagnosis, in my opinion, is a
shame for all of us because I know for a fact that the soldiers
of 144th Transportation Company of New Jersey who worked on
those tanks in Saudi Arabia, they never have been informed
about the probability of radioactive isotopes in their
environment. They never wore protective clothing, never wore
the masks, and never wore the dosimeters.
Battle-damage assessment team came in the summer of 1991 to
Saudi Arabia, and they were dressed like astronauts, having
sophisticated detecting instruments and detecting 0.6 to 1 Rad
in one single measurement in those tanks, which is a very high
dose. But the veterans were not informed that they were in a
radioactive environment.
I am going to conclude my statement at this point with an
emphasis that oppression has been exercised in the Veterans'
Administration system against professionals like myself who
wanted to come to the end of the story, and I am going to quote
President Thomas Jefferson, who said: ``I swear upon the altar
of God eternal hostility toward any oppression over the mind of
man.''
I think we should take heed of the great President
Jefferson, and try to eliminate obstacles to the proper
diagnostic management of the Gulf veterans who have been
exposed to depleted uranium. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Durakovic follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Shays. I thank all three of our panelists. We have
really not focused in on, and this is the 10th hearing we have
had, on biological agents or depleted uranium for a variety of
reasons. So this is somewhat new territory for us.
My understanding of depleted uranium in the theater is that
we see it in two ways. We see it in the shells, the
projectiles. The depleted uranium was almost really the spear
on the shell that penetrated the armament and then when it
could penetrate through the shell itself, would explode and
cause the damage.
And my other understanding is that the depleted uranium is
also used on the armament, in particular of the tanks and some
of the other vehicles in the theater. So far, am I on target?
Dr. Durakovic. Yes.
Mr. Shays. Now, depleted uranium is the term we use.
Describe to me where we get the depleted uranium.
Dr. Durakovic. Well, first of all, I really do not deal
with terminology like depleted uranium because, as a medical
doctor, I deal with terminology of uranium.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Dr. Durakovic. All isotopes of uranium, 238, 235----
Mr. Shays. I am going to have you slow down.
Dr. Durakovic. I am sorry. All isotopes of uranium, 238,
234, 235, are alpha-emitting, radioactive isotopes.
``Depleted'' really means a concentration of Uranium 235 and
234 in the entire bulk of uranium, which has to be enriched to
the point of utilization in nuclear weapons or nuclear
reactors. Uranium exists all over the planet Earth as uranium
ore. As we know, we live in a radioactive environment, but that
Uranium 238 is not capable of producing and sustaining a
reaction that would feed reactors for nuclear weapons. For that
reason, it has to be enriched by Uranium 235 and 234.
``Depleted uranium'' simply means a concentration of highly
fissionable Uranium 235 and 234 is diminished to a certain
level in the specific bulk of uranium, if I can be as simple as
I have been.
Now, we are talking about radioactive isotopes with a long
half-life and alpha-particle radiation. Alpha particles are the
heaviest particle produced in nuclear reaction, and in the case
of uranium, we deal with an incredible phenomenon that is
unique in the history of mankind.
I am very grateful for your question because it leads us to
a better understanding of the problem. Uniqueness of uranium
incident in the Gulf war is that it is the single, largest mass
contamination by a single isotope. Hiroshima and Nagasaki was
mass contamination with 440 radioisotopes which are produced in
a nuclear explosion. We know that Chernobyl is not a nuclear
weapon; it is reactor producing about 440 radioactive isotopes.
So these are mass-contamination scenarios in which many
isotopes are implicated.
The Gulf war is the first case in the history of mankind
where we have one single isotope responsible for mass
contamination. What happens in the bodies of the human beings
or animals where uranium enters? Whatever----
Mr. Shays. I do not want you to go that far yet. I just
want to understand. Mr. Dietz, am I saying your name correctly?
Is it Dietz?
Mr. Dietz. Pardon me?
Mr. Shays. Am I saying your name correctly when I refer to
you as Mr. Dietz?
Mr. Dietz. Yes.
Mr. Shays. I am about as big a generalist as you can get.
My daughter knows more than I know on these issues. I guess
that should not be surprising; she is a high school student. I
just want to first understand kind of the framework I am
working in. Maybe depleted uranium just has--my concept of
depleted uranium is basically the uranium that comes out of a
nuclear plant after it has spent nuclear energy. Now, is that
what--I should not be thinking----
Mr. Dietz. The depleted uranium arises from the gaseous-
diffusion plant when the natural uranium, which is also more
than 99 percent Uranium 238, is transformed by chemical action
into uranium hexafloride and then passed through barriers; and
this is a physical process for enriching the U-235.
Mr. Shays. But is depleted uranium that basically exists
because it was used for something else first?
Mr. Dietz. That is right.
Mr. Shays. OK. It is a waste material, in a sense, of
something else.
Mr. Dietz. I think a way to picture this visually is to
think of a stream of uranium hexafloride gas going through the
diffusion plant. The enriched goes in one direction, and the
tails, what is called the ``tails,'' which is the depleted
uranium, goes in the opposite direction.
Mr. Shays. That value of depleted uranium, is it is
extraordinarily dense?
Mr. Dietz. It is 1.7 times as dense as lead.
Mr. Shays. But not as heavy or----
Mr. Dietz. Well, the density would be the grams per cubic
centimeter.
Mr. Shays. So it would be a heavier material. I guess what
I am getting to--I do not guess; I am--depleted uranium is
relatively inexpensive, expensive?
Mr. Dietz. We have in storage now I think something like
600,000 metric tons of depleted uranium in the form of
hexafloride.
Mr. Shays. The bottom line is it is very cheap.
Mr. Dietz. It is coming out our ears.
Mr. Shays. And the military determined that depleted
uranium had tremendous strategic value to them in the sense
that it was a material that could penetrate most of the
armament.
Mr. Dietz. The uranium is a very dense material. It can be
hardened by adding three-quarters-of-a-weight percent of
titanium to it to make it superhard, made into a long, thin rod
fired at very high velocity so that when it hits a solid object
like a tank armor, which is basically mainly iron, it undergoes
almost an instant, very high rise in temperature, and because
of its pyrophoric nature, it starts to burn or oxidize
extremely rapidly, almost explosively, and when that happens,
you get these micrometer-sized particles. A 5-micrometer
particle can be breathed into your lung and can stay there for
many, many years.
Mr. Shays. But the Army has it in its shells for
penetration, but it also has it on the vehicles themselves for
armament. Correct?
Mr. Dietz. Well, it is the optimum penetrator.
Mr. Shays. OK. It is a penetrator, but it also is a
stronger material for shield.
Mr. Dietz. Tungsten is a substitute, but it does not have
the pyrophoric nature of uranium. What happens is that
``pyrophoric'' means that when it burns, it----
Mr. Shays. You are telling me something I am not up to yet.
I do not want you to get ahead of me here.
Mr. Dietz. OK.
Mr. Shays. I just asked a question. The simple question
was--I want to get on to the next one. It is not a big answer.
Mr. Dietz. OK.
Mr. Shays. It is used as a shield on our vehicles as well.
Correct?
Mr. Dietz. Yes.
Mr. Shays. OK. So you have it used as a penetrator and as a
shield. Now, in the course--this is your area of expertise.
When the Army sought to do this, when we moved in this
direction and we saw the value of it, certainly the issue of
safety was looked at then, what got by us, if, in fact,
depleted uranium is the threat that you consider it to be?
What I am trying to just nail down--see, I guess I am
looking for motives here, and if I were in the military and I
considered this an absolute essential use, I might be a little
less inclined to see if there was a negative associated with
it; and if there was a negative associated with it, I might
want to not just come to grips with it because the implications
can be quite significant.
I may be going down a road that I am going to say goes
nowhere, but I am willing to just consider this for a second.
So all I am asking you now--you are both experts in the field.
Correct? You knew depleted uranium was used for military
purposes. Was there a group within the scientific community
that said this ain't a good idea?
Mr. Dietz. I do not think so. I do not know who made the
decision to use depleted uranium munitions, because all the bad
things about uranium from a health standpoint were known long,
long before the Gulf war began. I think it is used basically
because it----
Mr. Shays. I know why it is used. I want to know how it got
to be used, and I want to know if we went through a process,
and you are not going to be able to answer that question----
Mr. Dietz. I do not think I can.
Mr. Shays [continuing]. That we went through a process of
determining that it was totally safe. I just want to determine
whether you have the capability on your expertise to answer
that question. Are you aware of the process that got us to the
point where we used depleted uranium? If you are----
Mr. Dietz. I am not aware of the historical----
Mr. Shays. OK. That is fine.
Dr. Durakovic. I am aware of it, and that is one of the
reasons why we have a free United States of America today. In
the 1940's German scientists suggested to Hitler to use uranium
for the production of nuclear weapons in their research. Hitler
used it because he was convinced by his generals that uranium
can be used as an armament in the German tanks, and they,
indeed, used uranium from the mines of Yoachimstaal in
Czechoslovakia in the German area, and they used that uranium
to reinforce the German shielding of their tanks.
So, use of uranium in the shielding of the tanks is not new
at all; it goes back 50 years.
Mr. Shays. OK. That is good to know. Are our soldiers--hold
on 1 second. What I think I am going to do is do a little more
research myself on how we got to where we use it. My antenna
goes up when I get into an issue like this because the
implications of what you gentlemen are saying have tremendous
consequence.
If, in fact, our soldiers have been harmed by depleted
uranium, that potentially says a lot about what we have to look
at, and it says a lot about protocols within the military. One
of the protocols we know in the military is that they did not--
it is my understanding; I may be corrected later on, but they
did not notify our soldiers of the consequence of depleted
uranium, and now they are, but they did not then. And some of
this boggles my mind, I mean, if that is the case.
So let us just get a little bit more to your expertise
here. Have both of you treated or examined Persian Gulf
veterans? Mr. Dietz, you have not.
Mr. Dietz. No.
Dr. Durakovic. I have examined the veterans; yes, they were
my patients.
Mr. Shays. OK. Mr. Dietz, your point was to show us--in
your testimony you gave us other examples of depleted uranium
where there was a concentration of it and the consequences of
that, and your testimony, as I gather, is to say that was bad.
What we have here in the concentration of depleted uranium in
the Persian Gulf was even worse. Is that a fair?
Mr. Dietz. Yes. It is many orders of magnitude worse than
the problem at Albany.
Mr. Shays. And that leads you to come to what conclusion?
Mr. Dietz. The only conclusion that I can come to is that
this is a truly wonder weapon. The analogy that can be given is
that it is as effective against destroying tanks as a machine
gun was in World War I against infantry soldiers.
Mr. Shays. OK. We know that, but we also know it has a
negative side effect.
Mr. Dietz. I am sorry?
Mr. Shays. We also know there is a negative side effect.
Mr. Dietz. Absolutely. There is a negative side, and I
think the military is overlooking the negative side.
Mr. Shays. OK. Well, maybe what I will do is Mr. Sanders
will get into other areas, and then I will come back.
Mr. Sanders. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I share your
concerns about depleted uranium, and that is a whole, huge
issue which I think we need to get into, but what I would like
to do is just speak to the Nicolsons for a moment.
Dr. Nicolson, one of the interesting aspects of your
testimony is that you talk about actual treatment, and we have
not heard a whole lot of that discussion here. Now, as I
understood from your testimony, you said that you have treated
several hundred Persian Gulf vets. Am I correct in remembering
that?
Mr. Nicolson. Several hundred have been treated. We do not
do the treatment ourselves. We are a diagnostic institute. We
do the diagnosis. We go to the primary-care physicians who then
treat the patients and we do followups with the primary-care
physicians.
Mr. Sanders. Based on your diagnosis?
Mr. Nicolson. Based on the diagnostic tests that we
perform.
Mr. Sanders. OK. And can you tell us the results of the
treatments of the people that you referred to primary
physicians, how successful or not successful have those
treatments been?
Mr. Nicolson. I actually showed you some of that data. We
have in press in a medical journal the results from 170
patients. Seventy-six of the patients were positive----
Mr. Sanders. ``Positive'' meaning production of symptoms?
Mr. Nicolson. Positive for the infection that we have
discovered, the mycoplasmal infection. Seventy-three underwent
treatment. Of the 73 that underwent treatment, 58 are now
considered to be recovered and are now back on active duty.
They may not be cured from this illness, but at least they have
recovered to the point where they can perform at their level
for their job description.
Mr. Sanders. So what you are saying is, in terms of the
treatment that you have recommended, 58 out of 73 have seen
significantly positive results.
Mr. Nicolson. That is correct.
Mr. Sanders. Now, given the fact that we have an estimated
70,000 vets who are hurting, that is a pretty interesting and
important result. Have those results been confirmed by others?
I mean, are people going to argue with me and say, no, that
that is not the case?
Mr. Nicolson. The diagnostic results have been confirmed by
a certified diagnostic laboratory, Immunosciences Laboratories,
in California. We are in the process or arranging to train DOD
scientists to perform the types of tests that we perform.
Mr. Sanders. OK. Now, given the fact that everybody in the
DOD and the VA is concerned about this problem, what has their
response been to your approach and the apparent, what you are
telling us, very strong, positive success that your diagnosis
has had? Is that being replicated elsewhere now?
Mr. Nicolson. I would say they first ignored us or
ridiculed us. Then I think our success, particularly the
patients that went to the Walter Reed program and did not
recover from their illnesses, but began to recover on these
multiple cycles of antibiotic therapy.
They have begun to take a renewed interest, I think, in
what we are doing, and it is still, I guess, at that point now
that they are very interested in the types of tests that we are
running and the types of therapies that are allowing not only
the soldiers, the veterans to recover, but their family members
who are symptomatic--we have a large frequency of illness in
families of Gulf war veterans as well.
Mr. Sanders. After this panel testifies, we are going to be
hearing from the VA and the DOD, and I am going to ask them
specifically how they have responded to your work. What are
they going to tell me?
Mr. Nicolson. Well, I think they will tell you that both
Nancy and I have addressed the DVA and the DOD in Washington
several times over the span of a few years. They have taken an
interest in what we are doing. They are making plans to send
individuals out to our laboratories to be trained in this, but
they have also tried to perform some of their own tests, but
unfortunately they are using 1960's technology in their own
tests that they are performing, and I do not think they are
going to come up with anything. This is not the approach that
is necessary.
We want to bring them up to speed to use state-of-the-art,
diagnostic procedures for these types of illnesses. They are
very difficult to diagnose.
Mr. Sanders. So am I hearing you say that they are
interested in the work that you are doing, but they have not in
their own labs been able to replicate what you have done?
Mr. Nicolson. They have not shown up in our laboratories
yet. When they show up, we can train them, and then we can make
sure that they replicate the type of data that we are finding
routinely. We have trained diagnostic laboratories, and they
are replicating our data, so I do not think it could be said
that it has not been replicated. It has not been replicated by
DVA and DOD scientists--that is true--because they have not
come to be trained.
Mr. Sanders. In your judgment--let me ask you this. Who is
treating, in this country today, how successful are we in
general in treating Persian Gulf illness? Is the VA and the DOD
successful? Do they have any protocol which seems to be
working?
Mr. Nicolson. I think you will have to ask the DOD and the
DVA that question. It is my feeling from discussions with
various physicians who are now treating Persian Gulf war
veterans and their family members, using the protocols that we
have established as effective, is that they are gaining ground
in this area, but I have to again stress that this is a subset
of patients. This is not every patient, because as you have
heard, some patients may have radiologic exposure, some may
have chemical exposure, some may have biologic exposure, or
combinations of them.
And, in fact, some of the veterans who have testified to
this committee earlier have come to us, we have tested their
blood, and they have turned out to be positive and their
spouses who are now ill have turned out to be positive and
their children who are now ill have also turned out to be
positive.
Mr. Sanders. In talking to veterans in Vermont, and I think
the answer around the country would be the same, what they are
saying is that we are hurting, and even if there is not 100-
percent guarantee that a new type of treatment might work, if
it is not going to hurt us more we would be willing to gamble.
Let us see what is going on out there.
So my first question in that regard is, are there side
effects? Is your treatment and approach risky? Can it cause
additional problems?
Mr. Nicolson. The approaches that we have proposed are
standard medical procedure for the treatment of chronic
infections. They are really no different than the treatment of
Lyme Disease, for example, and other chronic infection. So I
would say that these are pretty standard procedures. The
antibiotics that we recommend are pretty standard antibiotics.
Not every antibiotic will work, so it is not a placebo effect.
Mr. Sanders. I mean, we understand not everything works for
everybody, but if somebody were to say, in response to your
treatment, ``Well, we do not want veterans to be guinea pigs.
You know, we do not want vets to be sent there and come back a
lot sicker than when they started.'' How do you respond to
that?
Mr. Nicolson. Well, I think if they are tested and they are
found to be positive for these chronic mycoplasmal infections,
and they have systemic or system-wide infections, they should
be treated. That is standard medical procedure.
Mr. Sanders. And, in your judgment, they are not going to
be, no matter what the result may be, they are not going to be
worse off than when they started.
Mr. Nicolson. Well, from what we have seen, they slowly
recover.
Mr. Sanders. Right. But what I am trying to get at is if
somebody argued--I mean, there are treatments out there--if
somebody was dying of AIDS, for example, and we tried a radical
therapy, it is possible that that might accelerate their death
pattern. Correct? But one might say, Well, what is the risk?
The person was going to die anyhow. What I am suggesting is
that what I am hearing you saying is you do not see that your
treatment will make people worse off.
Mr. Nicolson. No. I mean, the only thing that we see in our
treatment is that there is a transient worsening of the signs
and symptoms due to the Herxheimer Response, and this is a very
common response when an individual who has a chronic infection
is on antibiotics, and that usually passes within a few weeks,
and then they start to slowly recover. But the whole therapy
can take up to a year. There are multiple cycles of antibiotics
required.
Mr. Sanders. Can you give me some examples of people or
kinds of treatments, perhaps other than your own approach,
which seem to be having some success?
Mr. Nicolson. Other than the approach that we are taking?
Mr. Sanders. Yes.
Mr. Nicolson. Well, for individuals who have their primary
problem as chemical exposures, there are a number of treatments
to rid these chemicals from the body. There are a number of
treatments to block the effects of the chemicals and so on. For
those that have biologic exposures, we have to identify what
type of agent is involved; otherwise, we really do not know the
approach to use. If we identify a particular microorganism that
is involved, whether it is virus or a bacteria-like
microorganism, then the treatment is really quite different.
If it is, for example, a mycoplasmal infection, or a
bacterial infection, then there are certain antibiotics which
are fairly standard procedures for use against these types of
infection. So we are really not talking about anything that is
out of mainstream medicine.
Mr. Sanders. In your judgment, and I know this may be a
little bit askance, a little bit aside from your area of
expertise, do you believe in the concept of multiple chemical
sensitivity?
Mr. Nicolson. Yes, I do, and we have seen examples of that
actually; but this is not a concept that is well accepted by
everyone in the medical profession.
Mr. Sanders. Right. We are more than aware of that.
Mr. Nicolson. Nancy also wanted to mention something.
Mr. Sanders. Nancy, did you want to----
Mrs. Nicolson. Well, the Multiple Chemical Sensitivity
Syndrome does not explain the contagion that affects the
families. Now, it is possible, if family members came in
contact with gear that was brought back by a veteran and if the
family member came in contact with such gear, they could
develop multiple chemical sensitivity, but that does not
explain the numbers of soldiers becoming sick.
So you would have to look for a biological agent, whether
it would be endogenous to the area in the Middle East, because
there are probably combinations of agents there, or as a result
of some of the weapons that we have been told Iraq possessed.
And we have to deal with the fact that given the mindset of the
Iraqi Government at the time, they would have used multiple
weapons in combination.
So it is a horrible concept to have to deal with. I feel
that our Defense Department has been backed into a corner
because this is the aftermath of years of cold war policies.
What was then the Soviet Union and the other superpowers were
engaged in biological weapons research. In fact, in the early
1980's, John Deutch recommended the buildup of biological
weapons in the United States.
So what I am saying now is that we need to get past the
cold war. We need to acknowledge that there is a strong
possibility that many governments were involved in weapons
research like this and that no one is going to win this war
unless we are bold enough, like the eagle on the flag, to come
forward. I believe the United States will lead the way, and
other countries will follow suit. I think it is time to stop
blaming the Defense Department of this country and other
countries, but it is the fear factor, the honor, and the
embarrassment, and we still have a problem.
The International Monetary Fund noted last week that there
is a 20 percent increase in chronic, infectious disease around
the world. This is going to have economic repercussions. So the
nitpicking that has gone on in the scientific community has to
stop. I think the onus is on the scientific community who went
ahead with ill-advised experiments. I am sure the scientists
assured the military sector that they could control weapons
like the biologicals, but the fact is they cannot. Of all the
weapons involved, the biological weapon is the most serious. It
is difficult to detect, impossible to contain.
So it is my feeling that we can conquer this problem if the
Defense Department would be allowed to tell the truth, and that
is the problem. They are in a very difficult position because
of outmoded policies and because of embarrassment.
Mr. Sanders. The bottom line, what you are saying is that
you believe that the increase in infectious diseases is related
to the work done on biological weapons.
Mrs. Nicolson. Partly in relation to testing of biological
weapons around the world. Those of us in the science community,
know who they are. We know which scientists have done this.
They are afraid to come forward because they really thought
they were doing the right thing at the time, but the science
community needs to be scrutinized. I blame the global science
community for this problem because they should never have
developed these weapons. It is very simple.
You have what was then the Soviet Union, which was actively
engaged in biological weapons research, it forced us to follow
this race because no one was thinking. No one was thinking. So
I think we need better cooperation between the defense science
sector and the civilian science sector, and I think pointing
fingers and assessing blame is not the way to go. We have to
take care of our soldiers and the people on this planet.
Mr. Sanders. Mr. Chairman, let me just end my line of
questioning just by asking the Nicolsons this question. It
would seem to me, given the fact that so many people are
hurting, that we would, or that the DOD and the VA would
actively be searching out and engaging those people who are
involved in a variety of treatments to see if any of those
treatments are successful. And we could understand some
treatments may not work, but it would seem to me so long as
these treatments did not do any more harm to the patient, that
we would want to look at as many people and as many ideas as
possible.
Now, I have the impression that that has not been the case.
I think what I keep hearing from the DOD and the VA is we do
not know, that this is not peer reviewed; no, that is not good;
no, this is not good; no, that is not good; but we will
continue going along the route we are going, even though we do
not have any particular understanding, and we do not have any
particularly effective treatment.
Am I misstating, do you think, the----
Mr. Nicolson. No. That is exactly my perception as well. I
mean, there has been far too much criticism and not enough
cooperation. We need to get beyond that point of simply
criticizing those people that come up with preliminary evidence
and so on. We were criticized quite extensively initially when
we started to get involved in this issue that we did not have
extensive data. Well, we had absolutely zero support from the
Federal Government, so we used entirely our own funds to
collect the research data that we collected. So we had really
no financial help whatsoever.
All of the studies we published, including the medical
journal articles were done without any Government support
whatsoever.
Mr. Sanders. Have you received up until this day any
financial support from the Federal Government?
Mr. Nicolson. Oh, yes. I currently receive financial
support. I have a grant from the U.S. Army, for example, but it
is for breast cancer research.
Mr. Sanders. No. I am talking about not breast cancer. I am
talking about this----
Mr. Nicolson. No, not one nickel. In fact, we put in a
proposal in 1995 for this type of study, and they cut the
budget by 89 percent, and they did not give it a fundable
priority; so even if it were funded, we could not have done the
work on 11 percent of the requested budget.
Mr. Sanders. Are you aware of many researchers who are
looking at alternative approaches beyond stress, for example,
who are receiving funding? There have been a number of
breakthroughs, it seems to me, but are those people receiving
the help that they need from the Government, or are they having
to do it with private source? Ross Perot, for example.
Mr. Nicolson. Well, they are having to do it with private
sources of funds. For example, James I. Moss, a scientist in
Florida, the first one to show that combinations of different
chemicals could produce neurologic syndrome----
Mr. Sanders. He was fired from his job at the Department--
--
Mr. Nicolson. No, he was not fired from his job. He
received word the other day that his grant that he put in to
DOD would not be funded. So they have taken the tactic that
they will squeeze us to the point that we cannot do the work
that we should be doing.
Mr. Sanders. Would you be prepared to have your work
submitted to significant controls?
Mr. Nicolson. We have already agreed to do that. I was at a
meeting called actually at the behest of Congressman Norman
Dicks. Major General Leslie Berger, the commanding officer at
Walter Reed Army Medical Center, convened a meeting on December
23rd of last year. I was at that meeting and spoke to the
Persian Gulf War Research Group and the rest of the individuals
who were interested in this, and at that meeting it was decided
that they would send scientists and physicians out to our
institute to learn the techniques that we were doing, and we
would set up a validation study. Well, we have not heard from
them since January.
Mr. Sanders. Six months have come and gone.
Mr. Chairman, we hear this over and over again. I cannot
sit here in judgment and tell you whether the Nicolsons are
right or not right. I do not have the background to do that,
but it seems to me that if people are treating and claiming to
have success, that the DOD and the VA would be falling all over
themselves to try to determine whether, in fact, this analysis
and proposed treatment is working or not, and that we are doing
that for everybody in this country who is coming up with
different ideas.
So I would just conclude by thanking, and I am sorry to
have ignored you. I do not mean to suggest that your work is
not significant, but I did want to focus on this aspect of it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. I think really what we are doing is you are
focusing on the biological, and I am just going to be focusing
a little bit more on depleted uranium.
I want to know the difference between, say, depleted
uranium fragments that might be in a soldier's body versus
inhaling, digesting the particles, which I would tend to say
would be more dust almost--not gas because they are still
particles, but they are almost invisible in some ways. Describe
to me the difference in terms of its impact on the health of
the soldier. Both of you may do that.
Mr. Dietz. I am not a medical doctor, so I really cannot
comment on that.
Mr. Shays. Why don't you start, though, by just prescribing
me the scientific difference between the fragment and the
particles?
Dr. Durakovic. The difference between inhalation, for
instance, ingestion, or embedded particles like shrapnel boils
down to the same phenomenon in the body, and that is the
release of uranium from the site of incorporation into the
bloodstream. In my opinion, it is exceedingly more dangerous to
be exposed to uranium in the inhalational pathway than by the
shrapnel or the embedded particle for several reasons.
Reason No. 1 is that the embedded particle or shrapnel is
protected from the rest of the body fluids by the formation of
the fibrous capsule, which is the scar tissue. Scar tissue
would contain the particle at the place of its incorporation,
and the uranium from the particle would not have early access
to the bloodstream. Subsequently, it would not have an early
access to the target organs, which are kidneys, liver, and
skeleton.
In the event of inhalation, a high amount in percent of
uranium is taken to the bloodstream from the lung tissue, and
these are really invisible bullets. They are invisible bullets
consisting of alpha particles, two protons and neutrons which
are bombarding the internal environment of the organism,
leading to breakdown of the tissue, necrosis or the death of
the tissue, malignant changes like cancer, leukemia, malignant
tumors, and genetic malformations in generations to come.
My answer to your question, sir, is this. Regardless of the
pathway of contamination, the ultimate fate of uranium is going
to be determined by the organ of incorporation. In the case of
embedded particles like shrapnel, I believe it is less likely
that the henomenology of uranium will be as extensive as the
inhalational pathway because simply more radioactive material
will have access to the bloodstream through inhalation but not
through the ingestion because ingestion is a relatively safe
way of being contaminated with uranium, since only a couple of
percent of uranium are absorbed in the gastrointestinal tract.
So my conclusion is that the single most important way of
adverse effects of uranium would be by the inhalational
exposure, which was the case in the Persian Gulf.
Mr. Shays. But if the Army were doing studies, and, Mr.
Dietz, this question I would ask you as well. Mr. Dietz.
Mr. Dietz. Yes.
Mr. Shays. The question I am asking, I am interested in
knowing, if you were doing a study of its impact, it is one
thing to say, well, you have this shell, and you have this
depleted uranium; here it sits. It strikes me that the kind of
study that you need to ultimately do is to determine what
happens when this shell is exploded, what happens, what is the
effect of the heat on the shell. Is it in fragment form, or is
it in particle form?
Are either of you aware of any studies--you may not be--
that the DOD has done in regards to--I asked it before; I am
asking it again, to be very clear--are either of you aware of
any studies that DOD has done on depleted uranium by its use?
In other words, not in its form before use but in its form
after its use.
Dr. Durakovic. I am aware of that.
Mr. Dietz. I am not aware of it.
Dr. Durakovic. I am aware of the study that DOD sponsored
with the Armed Forces Radiobiological Research Institute in
Bethesda. There was a study on experimental animals which was
presented a couple of months ago at a scientific meeting in the
form of an abstract where embedded uranium in the form of the
shrapnel was incorporated----
Mr. Shays. That is fragments.
Dr. Durakovic. Fragments. That is correct.
Mr. Shays. What about particles?
Dr. Durakovic. Inhalation pathway. No, I am not aware of
any study by the DOD or the VA.
Mr. Shays. And, Dr. Nicolson and Nicolson both, what I am
hearing from your testimony, one of the things I am hearing is
that the biological agents would be the one way you would
explain the potential health problems from one family member to
another.
Mr. Nicolson. We think this is really the only way you can
explain it, except for an odd occurrence of someone coming in
contact with a souvenir or a pack from Desert Storm or
something like that that was contaminated.
Mr. Shays. That would be the only way basically. Either
they came in contact with something that may have been
contaminated by chemicals or by biologic agents.
Mr. Nicolson. Predominantly biologic agents would explain
the illness passing into the family members and health care
workers. Nancy wanted me to mention the fact that when we
looked at a nonscientific sample of veterans, nonscientific
because we have not looked at entire units; a lot of the
individuals come to us. But a lot of these individuals served
behind the lines, either from the deep insertions into Iraq,
such as the Airborne and Special Forces units that we worked
extensively with, or the units that were in a support role,
command and control, transportation, and so on back behind the
lines that were under SCUD attack and other means.
Except for the Marine Corps, we have not seen a lot of
patients from the mechanized infantry or armored units. The
exception is the Marines, and they were in a very contaminated
environment in Kuwait, and so I feel that they had multiple
exposures of chemical, radiological, and biological; and, in
fact, some of the soldiers I mentioned that testified to this
committee previously and those that had very severe neurologic
signs and symptoms, we have been able to show that they are
infected with one of these biological agents. They are going to
be undergoing therapy, and their families are also infected
with the same agent.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I am just going to end with you, Dr.
Durakovic. I want to be clear on what the symptoms were from
the Gulf war veterans that you examined.
Dr. Durakovic. There were multiple symptoms which really
cannot be summarized into any logical picture. The symptoms
encountered in my patients were primarily respiratory symptoms,
including pharyngitis, tracheobronchitis, and in some cases,
pneumonia. In endocrine diseases, several patients had thyroid
alterations, gastrointestinal symptoms ranging from severe
diarrheas to dehydration, vomiting, nausea, hepatic symptoms,
and renal symptomatology. Some of my patients underwent several
surgical procedures because of kidney problems. Prior to the
Gulf war they did not have any kidney problems.
So, my answer to your question is that there is really no
simple answer to this question because symptomatology ranged
from the respiratory to the renal syndrome in very different
organic systems.
Mr. Shays. Is there any question that any of you wish we
had asked that you would want to answer? We will start with
you, Dr. Nicolson.
Mrs. Nicolson. I really do not have one at the moment.
Mr. Shays. Well, that is all right. It just would be one
that really was right at the tip of your tongue.
Mr. Nicolson. It will probably come back. We did touch upon
a subject which I think we need to spend a little bit of time
on, and that is the family members. This is something that has
been avoided and denied officially, that the family members are
now actually involved with illness. But it is very hard to deny
when young children have the diagnosis of failure to thrive,
rashes all over their bodies, and not doing well because of
chronic fatigue, fibromyalgia, and other problems.
It is hard to deny the fact that these people are sick,
that spouses are sick with this illness and so on. And I think
that the biggest tragedy that has happened as a result of our
experience is the denial that this type of illness can spread
to family members. And, again, there was an official
counterattack when we first came out and did our study of the
veterans' wives and other family members instead of which we
felt would have been the opposite. Here is a problem. It is
obviously a problem. Let's try to find the solution to this
problem, not just attacking the messengers.
Mrs. Nicolson. I do have one point. You have asked about
the problem in the civilian population of countries like Iraq.
We have received communications on this, and, of course, I am
not in the intelligence community, so it would be hard for me
to provide documentation. But I have many friends in Jordan and
in just about every country in the Middle East, and they have
contacted us from various clinics, and told us that there is a
problem in the civilian populations of Kuwait, where they
estimate 15 to 20 percent of the adult population is suffering
from a variety of signs and symptoms, and indirectly we have
received communications from people in Iraq that there is a
major problem there via Jordan, some clinics there.
So that would explain the possible release by a variety of
ways that we try to cover of an infectious agent, because it is
a civilian problem. It is like a time bomb. It goes off. It is
not an acute problem because I believe our soldiers were
covered for the acute agents, so there is a problem, and some
body, maybe the World Health Organization, needs to address it
and release the data so that we can better deal with it.
Mr. Nicolson. In fact, we are on our way to Europe to do
just that. We will be meeting with representatives from the WHO
and from several countries that have an interest in seeing this
issue resolved.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Mr. Dietz, is there any question you
wish we had asked you?
Mr. Dietz. Any question which I would like----
Mr. Shays. Is there any question you wish we had asked you
that you would have liked to have responded to?
Mr. Dietz. I think we have covered everything quite well,
and offhand I cannot think of any.
Mr. Shays. I appreciate your testimony as well as the
Nicolsons'.
Doctor, any question you wish we had asked?
Dr. Durakovic. I only wish to express my thanks for this
opportunity.
Mr. Shays. Well, it is our opportunity, and we thank all
four of you for coming to testify. I know you had to wait
through the first panel, and I appreciate you being there. So
all of you are free to go, and thank you very much.
We are really now coming to the second panel. I appreciate
in particular the Department of Veterans' Affairs for their
willingness to have the panels switched.
We have Dr. Thomas Garthwaite, Deputy Under Secretary for
Health, Department of Veterans' Affairs, accompanied by Dr.
John Fuessner, Chief Research Officer, Department of Veterans'
Affairs, accompanied by Dr. Frances Murphy, Director of
Environmental Agents Services, Department of Veterans' Affairs.
And Dr. Bernard Rostker, Special Assistant for Gulf War
Illnesses, Department of Defense, is back. I appreciate you
being back, and he is accompanied by Dr. Gary Christopherson.
And is there anyone else who might respond to questions,
because if so, I am just going to ask them to stand as well.
What I would like all of the panelists to do is, if they
would stand, as you know, we swear all our witnesses in, and
anyone else who might be that is accompanying you, and we will
only introduce them if they then end up testifying; but if
whoever else might be potentially responding. Thank you all for
your patience. Raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Again, I want to thank all of you.
First, I would like to thank again the Department of Veterans'
Administration for being here for the first panel, listening to
our veterans, being willing to fit into Dr. Rostker's schedule.
And, Dr. Rostker, we appreciate you coming back.
Dr. Rostker. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Shays. What we will do, Dr. Garthwaite, I think we will
start with you. And, again, we have a 5-minute timeframe, but
we really are more interested in your testimony, and so if you
go over, I could care less. In other words, I care more that
you give the testimony that you want to give, than about the
time.
STATEMENTS OF THOMAS GARTHWAITE, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR
HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS' AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN
FUESSNER, CHIEF RESEARCH OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS'
AFFAIRS AND FRANCES MURPHY, DIRECTOR OF ENVIRONMENTAL AGENTS
SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS' AFFAIRS; BERNARD ROSTKER,
SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR GULF WAR ILLNESSES, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, ACCOMPANIED BY GARY CHRISTOPHERSON, ACTING PRINCIPAL
DEPUTY FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS; COL. HERSHELL WOLFE, ASSISTANT FOR
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, ASA,
ILNC; AND COL. ERIC DAXON, RADIOLOGICAL HYGIENE STAFF OFFICER,
AEPI, U.S. ARMY
Dr. Garthwaite. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have this
opportunity to discuss VA programs for Gulf war veterans.
Accompanying me today are Dr. Frances Murphy, who heads our
Environmental Agents Service, and Dr. John Fuessner, who heads
our Research Service.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Fuessner, I am sorry I pronounced your name
so badly.
Dr. Garthwaite. As you requested, my focus today is on our
efforts to help Gulf war veterans who may have adverse effects
as a result of exposure to chemical warfare agents, depleted
uranium, and smoke from oil well fires. While we must learn
from the exceptions, it is important to remember the rule as
well.
Since 1991, when we developed the VA Registry Program, more
than 66,000 Gulf war veterans have completed Registry
examinations. We have provided more than 1.8 million ambulatory
care visits to about 200,000 unique Gulf war veterans, and more
than 20,000 Gulf war veterans have been hospitalized at VA
Medical Centers. An additional 400 veterans have been evaluated
at our specialized referral centers, and more than 75,000
veterans have been counseled at our vet centers. The majority
of veterans have been helped by our efforts.
With regard to chemical warfare agents, we continue to
believe that additional research is needed with regard to the
effects of low-level exposures to chemical warfare agents on
human health. The VA has been working to advance scientific
understanding of this area.
Our recent efforts include the following:
First, the Research Working Group has intensified its
efforts to fund research related to health effects of low-level
exposures to chemical warfare agents. New studies will address
exposure to nerve agents alone or in combination with other
toxins.
Second, the VA organized and sponsored an international
symposium on the health effects of low-level exposure to
chemical warfare nerve agents. The conference allowed
investigators from around the world to share research findings
and to discuss strategies for future research.
Third, VA funded three new toxicology fellowships and five
new occupational medicine residency positions. These
fellowships begin next week. We anticipate that we will be able
to increase this number in future years, although concern has
been raised by some program directors concerning the market for
trainees after the fellowship. We anticipate that these actions
will increase the interest in research on chemical exposures.
Finally, we have altered our research focus to increase the
studies which focus on clinical outcome.
With regard to depleted uranium, research on the human
health effects of depleted uranium exposure in military
occupations is limited, especially regarding depleted uranium's
potential chemical toxicity. Two DOD-sponsored research
projects currently under way are looking into this. In VA, the
VA depleted uranium followup program at the VA Medical Center
in Baltimore is a clinical surveillance program for
identifying, characterizing, and following individuals who
retain depleted uranium fragments from the Gulf war.
With regard to smoke and other toxins released from oil
well fires, it is clear the Gulf war troops were exposed to
potentially harmful environmental hazards during the Gulf war.
The most obvious challenge was smoke from hundreds of oil well
fires in eastern Kuwait in January 1991 set by retreating Iraqi
forces. Some of the fires lasted until October 1991.
A coordinated, concerted effort has been made by the
Department of Defense, Environmental Protection Agency,
Department of Health and Human Services, and the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to evaluate the health
effects from these fires. Based on data collected from March
through December 1991, the concentration of pollutants were
within the U.S. air standards except for particulates and
occasionally sulfur dioxide. Levels measured were similar to
those in U.S. cities such as Houston and Philadelphia.
No cases of illness resembling those observed in Gulf war
veterans were seen among firefighters in Kuwait nor among oil
well fighters who have spent years experiencing similar
exposures. Research efforts investigating the potential health
effects of oil well fire exposure are ongoing.
Finally, with regard to enhancing our clinical programs, we
continue to aggressively pursue enhancements to our clinical
programs for Gulf war veterans. For example, we have
implemented service evaluation and action teams in every one of
our health care networks. These teams consist of clinicians,
patient representatives, and patients who review and act to
correct individual and systematic problems for Gulf war
veterans.
While these teams are new, I recently reviewed their first
submission of meeting minutes, and I believe that these teams
will be a positive method to identify and fix many problems as
well as an excellent way to identify common problems which can
be fixed programmatically.
Second, we have piloted new care models including primary
care teams, which develop expertise in caring for Gulf war
veterans. This new model facilitates the education of providers
about recent developments in Persian Gulf illness, improves the
coordination of care, and enhances patient satisfaction.
Third, we have developed a method to oversample Gulf war
veterans in our patient satisfaction survey process. This
should allow us to have statistically valid assessments of the
satisfaction with care of Gulf war veterans.
Fourth, we have had our medical inspector review the
adequacy of registry examinations. These results have
demonstrated a significant improvement in both accuracy and
completeness of those examinations.
And, fifth, we believe that health outcomes are an
important measure for all veterans and will be part of all
health care in the future. We do not believe that it is done
well in the VA or in any health care system that we know of. We
have developed and tested a standard, data-gathering instrument
that was originally developed by the Health Care Financing
Administration. It is called the SF-36. We have tested it
already in 32,000 veterans, and we will continue to use that
into the future.
As an effort to enhance our understanding of the health of
Persian Gulf veterans, we will also oversample Persian Gulf
veterans with this instrument to see if we can describe better
the current health status of these individuals.
In conclusion, we continue to make progress involving our
research and clinical programs regarding Gulf war illness. We
remain committed to meeting the challenges of understanding the
causes of Gulf war illness and of providing the most effective
treatment to Gulf war veterans.
We continue to welcome your feedback and advice on how we
might be more responsive to the veterans we serve, and we will
be happy to answer any of your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Garthwaite follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Doctor. Dr. Rostker. You look like
you were in prayer. Has it been a long day?
Mr. Rostker. It has been a long week, sir.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is my pleasure
to be here again today and continue our dialog concerning the
Department of Defense inquiry into Gulf war illnesses. I have a
rather long statement, and I would request that it be placed in
the record. I also sent the committee chairman this morning a
letter concerning our ongoing interactions with Dr. Garth
Nicolson, and I would like to bring that to the Chair's
attention.
On December 23, 1996, DOD and the Department of Veterans'
Affairs representatives met with Dr. Nicolson to discuss the
mycoplasma laboratory test verification project in association
with members of the National Institutes of Health's National
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. This meeting was
followed by conference calls on January 21 and March 20, 1997
to discuss straw-man protocols, several electronic mail
communications in a telephone conversation on March 24, 1997
between Dr. Engles and Dr. Nicolson.
At that time, Dr. Nicolson agreed to the project protocol.
The final protocol has been written and approved by DOD and HHS
scientists and Dr. Nicolson. The protocol will use four
laboratories which will test the agreement for various
conventional reaction tests and Dr. Nicolson's nucleoprotein
gene tracking. Blood from 30 Gulf war veterans with unexplained
physical symptoms will be used for the comparative studies.
Veterans' blood will be used because of the high mycoplasma
detection rates reported by Dr. Nicolsons in the studies.
The result from Dr. Nicolson's laboratories and from the
three new labs will be statistically compared. This protocol
fits the criteria for establishing the validity of a new
diagnostic test and the ability to produce and replicate
results.
Currently, contracts are being written for the four study
laboratories. This process should be completed within 2 weeks.
Once contracts are awarded, we anticipate the timeframe for
laboratory data collection and analysis will be another 6
months.
In addition, on our Gulflink home page, there is a
solicitation by Walter Reed for volunteers to participate in
this program. The reason for the most recent delay was
contracting procedures, and since this contract will be a sole-
source contract rather than taking the time for a competitive
contract, certain stand-off protocols had to be established
until the contract can be awarded. But we understand from the
contracting organizations that the contract should be awarded
within the very near future.
In terms of my prepared remarks, I would like to summarize
some major points. As you know, the committee asked me to
concentrate my remarks today on three areas of concern: low-
level chemical exposure, oil well fires, and depleted uranium.
I am accompanied here today by experts that will be able to
augment my testimony if the committee wants to get into further
technical details not covered by my remarks, Colonels Wolfe and
Daxon from the Army and Dr. Jack Heller from Chipham. In
addition, Gary Christopherson, the Acting Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, is also here
if the committee wants to discuss the recent GAO report.
All three areas the committee asked me to discuss today are
under active and, I might say, continuing investigation by my
office. In all areas we are pursuing two lines of inquiry, what
does science say and what happened in the Gulf. In answering
these questions, we are building on the research base that the
DOD has already developed and pushing back the frontiers for
our knowledge through new research and analysis.
Potential exposure to low-level, chemical agents continues
to be an important area of investigation. One case that has
gotten a lot of attention for the potential of lower level chem
are the detections by the Czech and French chemical detection
equipment. These detections occurred during January 1991 in
northern Saudi Arabia. United States technical experts
described the principal detection claims by the Czechs as
credible, although the source of the chemical is still unknown.
Most importantly, we believe, the Czechs continued to use
their sensitive equipment throughout the war, but no further
detections were reported. We are continuing to investigate this
case. In fact, a team will be visiting France and the Czech
Republic this summer to discuss these detections and the issue
of low-level chem exposures and the sensitivity of the Czech
equipment with the Czechs this summer.
A second area of concern has been the results of coalition
bombing during the same period of time, January 1991. The CIA
published a study in September 1996 that examined the worst
possible case for fallout reaching U.S. troops. The CIA reports
said that the analysis and computer models indicate chemical
agents released by aerial bombing of chemical warfare
facilities did not reach United States troops in Saudia Arabia.
To improve our confidence in the results of the original
plume analysis, DOD is working with new models that will
further analyze the possible effects of a bombing campaign. The
DOD experts in meteorology and modeling from the Navy Research
Laboratory and the Defense Special Weapons Agency and the Navy
Surface Warfare Center will continue our look at the bombing
campaign.
Another claim for possible source of low-level chemical
contamination to United States troops is the destruction of the
ammunition supply point at Khamasiyah. I think you know that
DOD and CIA recently completed a series of small-scale
demolition tests designed to assist in developing the models to
be used to assess the potential fallout from Khamasiyah. The
questions we are most interested in are who may have been
exposed to chemical agents in Khamasiyah and to what extent
they may have been exposed.
During those tests, we blew up 32 foreign-made, 122-
millimeter rockets with warheads filled with simulants. The
tests provided fundamentally new information on what may have
been vaporized versus what may have been spilled into the
ground. Additionally, we have undertaken a series of
evaporation tests to determine how nerve agent disperses in the
soil and in the woods of the crates that were at the site. This
work will be incorporated in our analysis of fallout, which is
due in late-July.
Another area of investigation is the Kuwait oil well fires.
The setting of these fires first were detected on January 24,
1991, and the number of fires increased until it reached a
daily peak of 730 in late February. The emission from these
fires had the potential to cause acute-and-chronic health
effects. Our soldiers were exposed to heavy smoke and
byproducts. Research thus far has not indicated, however, that
the exposure to oil well smoke has caused acute health impacts
to our troops.
We have also contacted the firefighters that participated
in extinguishing the fires, and our conversations with them
reveal an absence of symptoms that are reported by our
veterans. To date, we have found no apparent health problems or
long-term effects from exposure to the oil well fires in
Kuwait.
Depleted uranium is another area we are investigating. DU
is approximately half as radioactive as natural uranium found
in the soil and poses no significant external radiation risk to
soldiers. The major toxic problem with DU is from its chemical
properties. As a heavy metal, it can concentrate in the liver,
bones, and kidney, as does mercury, lead, and tungsten; and
tungsten is significant here because it is often spoken of as a
replacement for DU in munitions.
The problem basically is DU dust generated when DU burns,
and it may be ingested and present a health hazard. Soldiers
with the greatest potential for harmful effects of DU are those
who are in a vehicle when the vehicle is hit by a DU round.
Twenty-nine combat vehicles--15 Bradley, and 14 Abrams tanks--
were contaminated in this manner. DU from other Abrams tanks
hit all of the Bradleys and eight of the Abrams. Five of the
Abrams tanks were contaminated when DU munitions burned in on-
board fires. Its on-board DU emissions contaminated the final
Abrams after being hit by a Hellfire missile.
In addition, 50 soldiers were injured in the Doha
Ammunition Dump incident, and it is unknown how many may have
ingested DU dust. The Baltimore Veterans' Affairs Medical
Center is conducting health service for individuals who were in
U.S. Army vehicles when they were struck by DU rounds.
Currently, 33 individuals are being evaluated, including 16
with DU shrapnel in their body. The Health Surveillance Program
has shown that those who have retained shrapnel identified
radioactively are excreting increased amounts of uranium,
indicating that the metal particles are not entirely inert.
So far, analysis of the first round of examinations has
shown no evidence of adverse health effects associated with the
absorption of uranium.
We recognize that we have been deficient in not properly
training all soldiers to the risks of DU armor and munitions.
The Army has developed a three-tier training program to meet
the needs of every soldier, from the soldier on the battlefield
to the technical that works with DU.
There is an axiom that states: On the modern battlefield
what can be seen can be hit, what can be hit can be killed.
That turns out to be a good axiom for the United States, but
was not an appropriate axiom for the Iraqis, largely because of
the use of DU both as a penetrator and as a protective shield.
U.S. forces using 105-millimeter and 120-DU Sabot rounds
routinely obtained first-round kills of Iraqi T-72 tanks at
ranges in excess of 2 miles.
And I think Col. Wolfe has with us a mockup of a Sabot
round, and I think he is prepared to just talk about that for a
moment.
Mr. Shays. Was he sworn in?
Mr. Rostker. Yes, he was.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Colonel. I appreciate that. That is
the actual size of the----
Mr. Wolfe. Yes, sir. This is the 120-millimeter----
Mr. Shays. Let me ask you this. Now, we want to make sure
the transcriber can pick you up. OK. That is good. That is
good. Identify yourself for the record.
Mr. Wolfe. Sir, I am Col. Wolfe, with the Assistant
Secretary of the Army's Office.
Mr. Shays. Colonel, it is nice to have you here.
Mr. Wolfe. Thank you, sir.
This is the 120-millimeter Sabot round, the Abrams main
battle tank; and the misconception is that this entire round is
the depleted uranium. That is not so. It is primarily the
penetrator that you see here. We refer to it as the ``dart,''
and this is what we have been talking about all day long, is
where depleted uranium goes. There is a similar round that has
been developed for the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, again, with a
small depleted uranium dart.
Mr. Shays. How many of those shells are in a tank? That is
not classified, is it?
Mr. Wolfe. I cannot answer that, sir. I am not----
Mr. Shays. You do not know if it is classified?
Mr. Wolfe. I am not an armored officer, so I do not know.
Mr. Shays. The size of it is quite interesting.
Mr. Wolfe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Wolfe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rostker. When the round is fired, part of the casing
stays. The back part of the casing stays in the tank and is
ejected, the front casing falls away, and what flies through
the air is simply the dart. Somebody said we have returned to
the arrows of our forbearers.
What this dart does effectively is provide a certain,
first-shot kill to American gunners, and even in the testimony
this morning, there was, again, a recounting of the superb
performance of the DU round. That really does protect our
troops by making sure that they get that first shot in and that
that is an effective first shot.
Moreover, we use DU as protective armament, and the tanks
that had the DU presentation, that DU never failed and was
always effective against the Iraqi chemical, high-explosive
rounds. The only thing that can penetrate a DU armor is another
DU penetrator.
Mr. Shays. I do not understand when you said ``chemical.''
Mr. Rostker. The normal tank round is a shaped-charge
explosive, and it generally went out often as a tandem charge
so there would be an explosion to defeat the armor and then a
second explosion to burn through and hit the turret. But it was
a chemical round; it was an explosive round. The dart in this
DU projectile we have talked about is a penetrator. It is known
as a ``kinetic round,'' meaning it is the force of the
projectile, and the round is 1.6 times more dense than lead,
and it has such penetrating power, that it often went into the
Iraqi tank and out the other side.
It flies true, and so with the superior performance of the
Abrams tank, the M1 tank, it was able to engage T72 tanks at
ranges that they could not engage, providing a sure, first-
short kill. There are numerous accounts of the war, however,
where Abrams tanks were ambushed, where the T72's got within
400 meters, firing rounds, and they did not defeat the Abrams
tank providing presentation for our troops. There is one
account, even in the middle of the summer, where an Iraqi tank
hid behind an earthen berm, and the DU penetrator went right
through the earthen berm, found the tank on the other side, and
blew the turret off the tank.
Increasingly, DU, because of its high effectiveness, has
been the recipient of an Iranian-run disinformation campaign.
United States intelligence agencies have intercepted message
traffic, diplomatic message traffic within Iraq or from Iraq
directing their diplomats to engage in a disinformation
campaign concerning DU, and that assessment has been
declassified and is on Gulflink.
Mr. Shays. Your point in this, so I do not have to come
back to it, is that it is your sense that the Iraqis want to
call into question the environmental safety of the uranium in
our shells and in our protective----
Mr. Rostker. And the North Koreans are doing the same now
also. After the Rico Committee Report, the Iraqi Embassies were
told to downplay the conclusions concerning low-level chemical
exposure, that there was no danger from chemicals, no fallout,
no persistence, but that the real pollutant on the battlefield
and the cause for illness was DU.
Mr. Shays. We accept that as part of the record, but I hope
you understand that this committee will be examining this.
Mr. Rostker. Absolutely, and that is why I have asked and
they have declassified the assessment, and it is available on
Gulflink.
Mr. Chairman, let me just end by saying the Department of
Defense remains committed to providing appropriate care for our
veterans, to understanding what occurred in the Gulf, and to
make the necessary changes to our policies, procedures,
equipment, and doctrine to protect our current and future
force. Thank you very much, sir.
I believe Mr. Christopherson would like to make a
statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rostker follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Shays. Sure. And let me say, before we begin the
questions, if those accompanying you just want to make a
statement, we are happy to hear them. Yes, sir?
Mr. Christopherson. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. A
lot of the questions you raised earlier with both panels of
witnesses had to do more in depth with health. I thought I
would just cover a couple of brief points, and then we could
come back to more questions.
One is I think it is important to understand, as we have
looked back at the Gulf war, it has been a very quick
recognition mistakes were made. Things did not go as well as
they could have been, and I think it is important for us to
understand that that is now clearly the position and that is
clearly where we see life being at this point.
The second thing I think, which is important for you, is
that a lot of the lessons have been learned. It is learned from
the point of view of what we do on the battlefield. It is
learned in terms of how we approach research and clinical. I
would also argue, we are still learning as we go along.
The third thing is that a lot of changes are being made,
and we could talk more about them as you wish. One is I think
the idea of the clinical program that both VA and DOD have put
into place is a program that we intend to have available for
future situations as well; therefore, to be ready to intervene
much earlier than in the Gulf war.
The second thing is what you are seeing now in terms of
what we deployed in Bosnia and currently in Southwest Asia is
again an attempt to take surveillance out much earlier,
predeployment, during a deployment, and post-deployment kind of
work to learn much more about what is happening out there, give
us better exposure data to bring back and better records to
bring back.
I think, with respect to the research, we are working very
closely with VA have built a better research model for peer
review, getting it out there, looking at different kinds of
treatments. We have done a number of things now. We have
committed about $27 million to research this year, a very
multifaceted kind of approach to look at issues, low-level
chem, environmental hazards, a number of other areas.
With respect to DU, I think I will defer to Bernie on that,
other than the fact that that is an issue that we obviously
also have some concern about in terms of what the health
consequences may be and how much we still do not know yet and
need to learn.
On the low-level chem, we have research in place. We have
asked the Institute of Medicine to take a look at our clinical
programs to make sure that if there were more than one chemical
on the battlefield, whether or not we would have picked it up
in our clinical program, and they have given us positive
feedback, saying they believe it would have. They have also
indicated obviously some things we could refine for the future
that would make it even stronger.
On the biological infectious side, as indicated by Dr.
Rostker, we are clearly looking at the Nicolsons' work. We will
fund that. We have our people ready and trained to do so. We
are working with independent laboratories as well to make sure
that there is really a good, independent look and not a feeling
that we, in quotes, have done it unfairly in terms of DOD. The
area of infectious disease is an area that is of high interest
on the part of the Department of Defense, an area where we are
launching a rather major initiative, along with the Centers for
Disease Control and others as well.
In ending--just again our assurance that our job here is to
take care of our troops. We intend to do that. We will do that,
both for now and into the future. We have a very key
obligation. One of the great learning experiences out of the
Gulf war is how we better protect our people in the future and
a lot of areas in that as well. For that, I will defer for the
questions from you.
Mr. Shays. One of the things that we really have not
touched on is the GAO report. The inside-the-beltway discussion
of this was that some were eager to have the GAO validate the
VA and the DOD's work, and much to the surprise of some, was
that it did the exact opposite. I guess the question is, one,
will you agree with some of the criticisms; and, two, if you
agree with them, do you feel you have changed or no longer are
deserving of that criticism?
One of the criticisms is that too much of the research that
is done on Gulf war illnesses is devoted to stress and Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder, PTSD. Would you explain--my
understanding, about a third of all research is, in fact, on
this area, and would you explain why; first, if it is true,
and, second, why?
Mr. Feussner. There are several--I think that there is a
major emphasis on the research in the context of brain and
nervous system disorders, that is, along with general health
types of research initiatives, that is the major research focus
to this date. That includes an array of research that deals
with stress and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, deals with
issues related to cognitive impairment, deals with issues
related to Peripheral Neurological Disease, et cetera.
So, in the sense that all of brain and nervous-system
disorders are lumped together, that is a major focus. I am not
sure that it is correct to categorize most of that as relating
to stress; however, there has been interest in the
neurobiological aspects of stress and stress as a modulator of
various responses to other insults, and that kind of research
continues.
Mr. Shays. I need to be clear and on the record as to
whether the VA rejects Dr. Joseph's point to this committee
that there was no acute exposure to chemicals and, in essence,
low-leverage exposure is not harmful; and, therefore, chemicals
exposure should not, in essence, be considered of major
concern. I want to know how the VA basically responds to that.
His quote was: ``Current accepted medical knowledge is that
chronic symptoms or physical manifestations do not later
develop among persons exposed to low levels of chemical nerve
agent if they did not first exhibit acute symptoms of
toxicity.'' Now, I need to know if that is--I am going to be
asking DOD if that is the operational use still, and I need to
know the VA, if they buy into that or if they have finally
rejected that.
Dr. Garthwaite. I do not think we buy into it. I would
think we do not know what the risk is, but we are keeping an
open mind. We do not believe there are any reasonable, valid
human studies of those kinds of exposures, so to conclude
anything, we think, would be premature.
Mr. Shays. OK. I am not making my question clear enough.
The bottom line to his point was that if you did not see acute
manifestations, that you would then not later see chronic
effects from chemicals. That was a basis for why the VA did not
spend time looking at chemical exposure, because you accepted
the DOD's view that there was no acute exposure, and if there
was not acute and therefore low level, it would not result in
chronic harm later on.
I want to know if we can take Dr. Joseph, who was the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, if we can
put that in the trash can and know that that is not a guiding
principle of either the DOD or the VA.
Dr. Garthwaite. I think that is his opinion. We do not
believe that there is any scientific data on which to base an
opinion about whether exposure to low levels could lead to a
chronic disease or not in humans. There is very little data
from studies in animals, either.
Mr. Shays. Why don't we forget about any concern of low-
level exposure in this country? Get rid of OSHA, say, OSHA, you
are not needed anymore because we do not care about low-level
exposure to chemicals.
Dr. Garthwaite. I am not communicating well. We believe
that because there is no data, we need to know whether----
Mr. Shays. I am going to come back to you, Doctor.
Mr. Rostker. We would not necessarily--that is not our
position today, as you stated. We are funding research in low-
level chem. We have not ruled it out.
Mr. Shays. I would like you to say what is not your----
Mr. Christopherson. Let me elaborate on that.
Mr. Shays. I just want to say this to me, is like--before
we go out--this is something we should be able to discard
quickly.
Mr. Christopherson. We have to agree. Let me go back. It is
a need to understand the context of what you said and what it
meant, because that is important.
Mr. Shays. And I am willing to be clear on this, but I do
not want to get into the mind game----
Mr. Christopherson. No, no, no.
Mr. Shays [continuing]. Where Mr. Deutch says publicly that
our troops were not exposed to offensive use of chemical when
he knew our troops were exposed to defensive. Because he used
that clever word of ``offensive,'' we made an assumption that,
therefore, our troops were not exposed to chemicals. So----
Mr. Christopherson. Right.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Christopherson. What his statement was saying was,
based upon the best scientific knowledge which is out there--it
actually still is out there at this moment in time--the
conclusion you would have is that you do not have chronic
without acute in terms of the chemical exposure. Now, the key
thing is there, and that was, by the way, still the best
knowledge. It is very thin; that is the problem with it.
That is why we have said, while that is essentially true as
a current statement of what the information is, you cannot base
long-term judgments on that. That is why we said instead two
things. One, the Institute of Medicine said, help us to figure
out in our clinical programming in case it is out there, we
miss something.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Christopherson. The second thing, we went out there and
said, let us go ahead and start to fund some low-level chemical
research because we have got to fill in this rather thin body
of knowledge. The concern that you are raising back there about
and this whole issue of why was not low-level chemical picked
up a long time ago, we sort of put in the context of
combinations, I think, of things.
It is not that statement of judgment or anyone else. What
it is, is a combination of no direct evidence, my understanding
is, off the battlefield, combined with the fact that the best
knowledge that was available out there was that you generally
have to have an acute exposure; and, therefore, people have
thought, this does not seem to be the most promising lead, and
there may be other more promising leads.
Going back to your EPA point, the germ of the point that is
made there is that you are looking at generally longer term
exposures at low level as opposed to a short-term exposure. The
other assumption is generally that the exposure in the Gulf
would be of relatively short duration.
If you think back, for example, to what the witnesses said
this morning, they were generally talking about, at the most,
there would be eight alarms going off, which is generally
indicating, even if there had been some exposure during that
time, it would probably have been over a relatively short
period of time, maybe 8 days, 2 days, and this kind of thing
there, which again is very different than sort of the pesticide
issue, which is something the British especially are focusing
on.
Mr. Shays. I am going to let Mr. Sanders get on this issue
before we go on to the next one.
Mr. Christopherson. Sure.
Mr. Shays. I do not mean to be--I do not want to strain
gnats and swallow camels here, but when you say this is our
best knowledge, the word ``best'' has such a great sense to it.
The best knowledge may have been meaningless because your best
knowledge may just be absolutely dumb and stupid. And so you
can say, ``Of the dumb-and-stupid knowledge we have, this is
the best, but it is still dumb.''
Mr. Rostker. You are reading it as in plain English as
quite a declarative statement. We would not be happy making
that statement as a declarative statement today.
Mr. Shays. The problem is the VA used this statement as a
basis for a failure to look at low-level exposure.
Mr. Rostker. And I think we are talking about history here,
not necessarily where we are today.
Mr. Shays. And that is why I want to be certain. I just
want to make sure that we are not trying to, in a sense,
satisfy us, but in your heart of hearts, you still buy into
this.
Mr. Rostker. It was not the applicable statement today.
Today, we are funding research to better understand low-level
chem. We are more modest in our statements in terms of our
understanding. We have a range of activities going on to better
assess what science is telling us and push back the frontiers
of science, so that would not be--it is not an applicable
statement today and not a limiting statement for our program
today.
Mr. Christopherson. But, again I want to come back. That
declarative in nature, which is what you have described, was
not the case even back then. In the first place, our moving
forward on funding low-level chemical was under the watch of
Dr. Joseph. Our movement in that direction was a request to the
Institute of Medicine for them to look at our clinical protocol
was also to Dr. Joseph. That is why I say----
Mr. Shays. What about Dr. Joseph? It was what?
Mr. Christopherson. Under his tenure.
Mr. Shays. Well, by then we had Khamasiyah, and you all on
a Friday afternoon at 4 o'clock let the world know that maybe
we had exposure. So I am just not impressed with that comment.
Let me just go back to the VA, and then I will let you
talk. I just want to know where the DOD is. I just need to now
know where the VA is. What I hear you saying, so then you
correct me, where I start out is may be faulty from your
viewpoint.
I start out from the fact that in my life as an American
citizen, and as a State legislator, I have been taught to be
concerned with low-level exposure, and I have been taught that
low-level exposure leads to chronic illness. In my world as an
American citizen and as a former State legislator and as a
Member of Congress, I pay attention to OSHA, and I empower OSHA
not to allow American citizens to be exposed to--low-level
exposure to chemicals. That is my world, and what I am hearing
you say is, well, that may be true, but if it is low level, it
has got to be over an extended period of time.
What I totally reject and am comfortable rejecting is that
it has to be acute and if it is acute, it cannot be chronic,
because I have never seen anything that would make someone be
allowed to make that statement.
Dr. Garthwaite. I believe the correct thing to say is we
agree with you, and----
Mr. Shays. I want you to state it in your own words.
Mr. Feussner. Yes. I think what I would similarly agree and
say, that I think it is clear that we have insufficient
information to know what the possible long-term sequelae of
low-dose exposures are, and I think we need to do additional
research to explore that.
I think in some ways we have spoken with our actions when
we sponsored the international symposium associated with the
Society of Toxicology meeting in Cincinnati in March. We began
planning that meeting in September 1996 and invited the
international community to help us specifically with the issue
of low-level chemical agent exposures, and I think we need
additional research to explore the sequelae of possible low-
level exposures.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Sanders.
Mr. Sanders. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
all very much for coming, and I apologize for having to miss
some of your testimony.
Let me ask for some rather specific responses to my
questions. In December 1996, in the final report of the
Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Illness, the
following statement is made, and I quote: ``Current scientific
evidence does not support a causal link between Gulf veterans'
illnesses and exposures while in the Gulf region to the
following environmental risk factors assessed by the Committee:
pesticides, chemical and biological warfare agents, vaccines,
pyridostigmine bromide, infectious diseases, depleted uranium,
oil well fires, and smoke and petroleum products.''
That is from the Presidential Advisory Committee. Today, in
late June 1997, do you agree with that finding, or do you find
that incomplete and inaccurate? Dr. Rostker, or if anybody else
wants to respond.
Mr. Rostker. Well, as you know, we have discussed several
times my inquiries are looking at what science says, and I have
great respect for the PAC and the process they went through. I
certainly am considering that, but in my organization I am
reserving judgment, final judgment on all of these. I have
research going on on every one of the issues that you have
raised, and that research continues. I wish it was completed so
I could be definitive in my answer. I can only tell you that
the research continues in my organization.
Mr. Sanders. OK. In so many words, what the PAC was saying
is that we see no substantial scientific evidence to suggest
that there is an environmental factor in Persian Gulf illness.
Rather, we believe, bottom line, that it is stress related.
That is not the conclusion? Dr. Murphy, I can continue reading,
but I believe that that is--but, please, if you disagree with
me, I have got the document here.
Dr. Murphy. Let me try to restate it because I think that
the words that I used have a different meaning to scientists
than they might to the general public. They said that there was
no current evidence of a causal relationship. That is probably
the highest scientific standard that we would meet in
discussing that, so there is no evidence that those agents at
this point caused the illnesses to Persian Gulf veterans.
Mr. Sanders. That is correct. That is what they said.
Dr. Murphy. They have not ruled out doing further research.
Mr. Sanders. I know, but let me ask you, can you respond to
that? Do you agree with that? Do you believe that there is no
current scientific evidence which sees a causal relationship
between environmental----
Dr. Murphy. There is no rigorous, scientific----
Mr. Sanders. No rigorous. All right.
Dr. Murphy [continuing]. Investigation that proves a cause-
and-effect relationship between the illnesses of Persian Gulf
veterans and those agents. That does not mean that the VA has
not given them very serious consideration and does not believe
that the investigations need to continue at this point. We are
trying to develop the scientific evidence that would allow us
to make that scientific, causal link.
Mr. Sanders. What I have concerns with, Dr. Murphy and
everyone else, is when you will finally begin to accept
evidence. I am not a scientist. I have other things to do other
than research Persian Gulf illness, but I sent a letter out to
Dr. Lashoff of the Presidential Advisory Committee, listing a
dozen, separate studies which show a link. If you would like, I
can list them for you, although I suspect that you are familiar
with them, including two studies funded by the DOD itself.
Now, the concern that I have, and let me jump right to the
GAO report, and this comes from the summary of it by the New
York Times. The GAO report found that the program announced by
the Pentagon lacks a coherent approach, and because of flaws in
methodology and focus ``is not likely to identify the potential
causes of the illness.''
In other words, what they are saying is there are a dozen
different studies here which would respectfully disagree with
you, Dr. Murphy. They suggest that there is a causal link. When
is enough enough? When do we begin to say, yes, there may be
something there; we want to develop treatment based on these
studies? I am amazed. Let me give you just two examples, Mr.
Chairman, of things which really fascinate me.
The New York Times, April 17, 1996, headline: ``Chemical
Mix May Be Cause of Illness in Gulf War.'' What the article
primarily deals with is the work that you are familiar with
done by Dr. Haley and Dr. Abodonia from Duke, and Haley is from
the University of Texas. OK? They describe it, and they say,
well, these investigators have suggested that there is a
synergistic effect between pyridostigmine bromide, et cetera.
Then they go to a comment from the Department of Defense.
The Department of Defense said that the new report raised
``some interesting hypotheses,'' but the Department had ``no
direct knowledge of the details of the work.'' Do you know what
amazed me? What amazed me is less than a year before, the
Department of Defense had done research which came up with
exactly the same conclusion at Fort Detrick on rats. Is that
true? I hope you know that. That is your own research.
Mr. Christopherson. Yes. What you have got there, there
is--and, again, this research, as you know, has been funded--
there is research looking right now at the synergistic effects.
There are early suggested results that say, in fact, those
things do occur. The problem is that what you have seen there,
if I may finish for a second here, is it is the first step, and
it has to do with how you do sort of the first researchers say,
``OK. Could there possibly be under the most severe of
circumstances there?'' That is Step 1. Step 2 then comes down
to initial funding researchers say, ``Does it occur under real-
life situation?'' That is the additional funding and research
we need to do.
What you have got then, kind of going back to Dr. Murphy's
point there, is there are a number of areas that we are looking
at right now which are suggestive of potentials of relationship
to Gulf war illnesses. They do not yet stand the rigor of tests
yet, so they are suggestive we need to pursue----
Mr. Sanders. All right, but 1 second. I understand that,
but you see, that is always the argument. Let me just pick up,
Mr. Chairman, because I found this absolutely fascinating.
New York Times, Wednesday, May 14th, headline: ``Study
Links Memory Loss to Nerve Gases in Gulf.'' Do you know who
paid for the study? We did. OK? First paragraph: The Defense
Department said today the Pentagon-sponsored research have
produced ``important results'' suggesting that exposure to low
levels of nerve gas, Mr. Chairman, and some pesticides can lead
to memory loss, a common complaint among veterans of the 1991
Persian Gulf war. This is your study.
Now, what really fascinated me about this article, if you
go down three-quarters of the article, and it said: In its
statement today, the DOD said, ``These initial findings require
replication of the species, including nonhuman primates, before
it could be possible to draw larger conclusions, the
experiments, et cetera, on nonprimates laboratory, et cetera.
The Pentagon also questioned whether the experiments in which
the rats were injected with the chemicals over a 2-week period
offered many clues to the health problems of the veterans. This
route of administration and duration of exposure does not
parallel any known human exposure to troops.''
That is what the DOD said. Do you know what the researchers
said? Dr. Pendergast is on your payroll. You know what he said.
He said, I do not think it is too early to draw conclusions.
``The type of exposure regime that we employed in the animals
and the type of exposures that are troops experienced in the
Gulf are analogous, and they types of memory deficits that we
have seen in the animals and those reported in Gulf war
patients are extremely similar.''
In other words, you are almost disowning or separating
yourself or minimizing the result that your own researchers
got.
Here is the point: The GAO says that there is no focus. It
would seem to me that if I had a dozen different studies all
over the country done by reputable scientists, including some
of your own, that suggest that there is a chemical link, I
would be jumping on the stuff, I would be funding the stuff, I
would be funding the stuff, I would be bringing these people
together, and I would be working with a sense of urgency. I
would not be going along, da-da-da.
There may have been some major breakthroughs. Am I
qualified enough to tell you whether these breakthroughs are
substantial? I am not, and I certainly agree with you. But what
really upsets me is that I read you a quote where a study done
paralleled your own study, and you do not even acknowledge and
say, ``Yeah, that parallels what we did a year ago, and we are
really working frantically hard because we have 70,000 veterans
who are hurting, and we are going to leave no stone unturned.''
Do you have a sense or urgency? Are you really going after
these issues?
Mr. Christopherson. Yes. Mr. Congressman, absolutely yes.
Let me be very clear. It is extremely important to us. We have
the doctors and nurses and the researchers, as part of what we
fund here in Health Affairs, and the rest of the Department
take this extremely seriously and have since day one. We have
clearly been very active, especially in the last 2 years.
Should we have started earlier? That is a different question.
Yes, we should have. We already admitted that that is a
shortcoming of the whole thing.
It is clear we are funding research as fast as much money
as we have to do so----
Mr. Shays. Doctor, you are starting to talk as fast as this
guy. Because he is a Congressman, I did not want to ask him----
Mr. Christopherson. I can probably outdistance him.
Mr. Shays. I did not want to tell him to slow down, though
I was tempted, but if you would slow down.
Mr. Christopherson. I will slow down. What we are doing
right now is we are pushing--you have got to remember, by the
way, there are a lot of different theories out there we are all
trying to work through simultaneously. A lot of things have
promise, whether it is the plasma kind of issue there, whether
it is the issues around the combinations and, therefore, you
might go down that road, leave no doubt that there is a serious
commitment to try and find the answer.
There are two reasons for this. One is because the Gulf war
veterans who are trying to figure out how to take care of them
today. I heard the same tragic stories you heard a few hours
ago in terms of their--we take these to heart, and leave no
doubt about that.
The second thing, we have got to be worried. We have got
future deployments to worry about, and we have got to figure
out what we are going to do there, and we need to know what we
need to change, if anything, to make sure that is better there.
What we have got to do now is we also owe it to the troops to
do two things: Pursue aggressively and make sure it is good
research. What we cannot afford to do is go down wrong paths,
start doing treatments that do not make sense. On the other
hand, if it makes sense, we cannot afford not to do it, and
that is the fine line we keep moving down as we move forward
very aggressively.
But no doubt, we are the ones who pushed forward the $27
million and pushed the research out.
Mr. Sanders. All right. Let me just ask you. Let me quote
from Dr. Rostker's prepared statements. Currently over $2.5
million has been allocated to research involving health effects
of low-level chemical warfare agents, et cetera. All current
projects will be completed in the year 2000.
I mean, you know, is that a sense or urgency, in the year
2000, 3 more years?
Mr. Christopherson. I think what you run into, we
unfortunately are living within some of the rules and
regulations unfortunately of how you do grants. We are not
happy with it either.
Mr. Sanders. Then break the rules. You know, one of the
problems that we have right now--let me finish. All right? And
I would like some answers to this question, too. My
understanding is that around this time you are releasing about
$8 million in grants. Is that correct?
Mr. Christopherson. Correct.
Mr. Sanders. You are going to announce who is not getting
it. I do not know who is getting it. By the time you have
announced requests for proposals and you have peer reviewed and
you are getting the money out, in my estimate it is going to be
a good year. Is that a fair estimate or more than that?
Mr. Christopherson. It is probably in that range, yeah. It
takes that time to get it out, unfortunately.
Mr. Sanders. But why? In other words, the point that I am
getting and why I myself no longer believe, in all due respect,
that the DOD and the VA should be given this responsibility, is
it should not take that long if we are dealing with a sense or
urgency.
All right. Let me ask you this question.
Mr. Shays. Do you want to just respond, though?
Mr. Sanders. Why does it take a year when you have 70,000
people who are hurting? Why can't you move it faster?
Mr. Christopherson. The issue--we are caught between two
pressure points, and Congress is part of that, where it is part
of our own two pressure points. On the one hand, we are told to
move forward as fast we can, which we would like to. We are
also told to make sure you are doing peer-reviewed research
that is going through--we are caught between two things, and
then also make sure----
Mr. Sanders. The chairman is much more polite than I am
when he says I should be patient. He is right. I love the word
``peer review.'' You know why I like the word ``peer review''?
I will tell you why. As you know, and as Ed Towns, I think,
appropriately mentioned before, the whole issue of multiple
chemical sensitivity is highly controversial. You have honest
and good people on both sides of the issue.
Mr. Christopherson. Yes.
Mr. Sanders. I am not here to denigrate anybody. I happen
to believe in it; honest, sincere people do not. Who do you
have who is peer reviewing these proposals who believes and
knows something about multiple chemical sensitivity? Give me
the names of the experts.
Mr. Christopherson. I cannot. In the first place, I do not
get down that deep into that part of it there. We use the
American Institute of Biological Science as our peer-review
organization that what goes out there and does that.
Mr. Sanders. Well, here is the problem, you see. I do not
mean to be facetious about it.
Mr. Christopherson. I understand. I understand. We get
along well, and we are working together on this issue. Do you
agree? We have disagreements on other issues, Republican,
independent, so forth and so on. In the world people look at
issues in a different way. I read the response of your folks to
one of the proposals that came through, and it was absolutely
insulting to the fellow who wrote the proposal.
In other words, if you do not have people on your staff who
understand and believe in multiple chemical sensitivity, that
every approach that is brought forth will never get peer
reviewed, in some cases these researchers will be seen as
quacks or frauds. Right? I am arguing and have seen from the
beginning, from day one, we do not have people who believe in
multiple chemical sensitivity, and I am not even blaming you.
There is a whole segment of medicine that does not believe in
it.
I think you do not believe in it, and that is fair enough.
But there are people who do believe in it who believe that you
are way behind the time, who are desperate for solutions, and
who want to see some attention given to those folks who do
believe in the concept, and I do not think you have the
capability of doing it.
I am sure you have wonderful scientists, but tell me the
name of one of those scientists who has developed a treatment
that is effective for Persian Gulf illness so that he or she
can stand in a position of peer reviewing of the research. Who
are the people who have developed the treatment and the
understanding? Can you give me the names? You do not have
anybody. Is that right?
Mr. Christopherson. Again, this external peer-reviewed
stuff. This is not--we are not talking about inside-the-shop
kind of thing. The American Institute of Biological Science,
which we run this through, is designed to be impartial to a
wide range of theories. They are not to be either against or
for multiple chemical sensitivity. It really is meant to be a
neutral place out there to look at these issues and to be open
on the question of what may make good sense, either from
researching causes or researching treatments.
The difficulty is, and correct me if I am wrong, that the
issue of multiple chemical sensitivity is hotly debated.
Mr. Christopherson. Correct.
Mr. Sanders. I have spoken before--it must have been 500
doctors in a room in Texas, and you know what? Every one of
them believed and works with the concept of multiple chemical
sensitivity. And I have met doctors who have said that these
people are frauds, that what they are doing is absolutely
outrageous, and we have nothing to do with them. Both groups of
people, I suspect, are honest.
I think that the VA and the DOD have sided with those
groups of people who do not believe in multiple chemical
sensitivity, so I am asking you--for example, I would mention
that Dr. Claudia Miller, who does believe in multiple chemical
sensitivity--I do not want to speak for her. She applied for a
grant. She went way up the bureaucratic ladder. The DOD awarded
her the grant, and lo and behold, she never got the money; it
was called back.
Dr. Mya Shayevetz, who worked for the VA in Northampton,
MA, went along the bureaucratic ladder. She treated people
based on multiple chemical sensitivity. Suddenly, she did not
get any money as well.
Who do you have that is key on your staff who believes in
multiple chemical sensitivity? Please answer that.
Mr. Chairman, I do not hear much of a response.
Mr. Christopherson. I cannot point to someone who is a
believer in there. What I will indicate to you is that I am
being neutral on it. I do not have a strong feeling one way or
the other. I do not have an opinion one way or the other in
that process there. But if the issue is, as you said, there is
a very sharp debate out there----
Mr. Sanders. Yes.
Mr. Christopherson [continuing]. And that debate continues.
It has been part of our discussion. We have talked about the
Institute of Medicine. We have added special sessions talking
about that because we are open and trying to look at what makes
sense, as long as they are good science, and that is the key
issue.
Mr. Sanders. But that is the problem, and you know it, and
I know it, that there are many people who say that the whole
issue of multiple chemical sensitivity is bad science. Right,
Dr. Murphy? Aren't there some people who are saying that?
Dr. Murphy. There are people who say that.
Mr. Sanders. I think I have heard people say that. OK?
Maybe some people in this room have said that. What about Dr.
Haley? Is his work important? Is he going to work with you? Is
he going to get funding from you?
Mr. Christopherson. Dr. Haley is important to us, as both
we and Dr. Phil Landrigan, who reviewed his piece there,
consider his work important. He has identified a number of key
areas to look at. The question is, it has to be taken some next
steps to figure out where----
Mr. Sanders. Is he going to get funding to get research?
Mr. Christopherson. I do not know at this point. Again, the
funding part, I cannot speak to.
Mr. Sanders. Who can speak? Again, when the GAO talks about
lack of focus, that is what they are talking. You cannot talk
to funding. You are telling us that you are going to do
research, but you cannot tell us what line of research is going
to get funding. Dr. Rostker, do you want to help us out here?
Mr. Rostker. Yes. I think in the process you are talking
about specific researchers--in the peer review process----
Mr. Shays. Let me say this. One thing is very important. I
do not want you to leave without feeling you get to answer a
question.
Mr. Sanders. Absolutely.
Mr. Shays. So he is really a nice guy, and you can tell him
you want to respond to it.
Mr. Christopherson. In the peer-review process it would
really be appropriate as policy and senior people to get down
and dictate which researcher is being funded and which is not,
and I might say that the intervention that we have done in the
case of Dr. Nicolson's research is somewhat unique.
But I look at the focus issue in broader terms, and we went
out in this year's allocation of funds through the interagency
organization we have with the VA and explicitly went out to
fund research in the area of low-level chem because we felt
that this had been neglected and that we needed more answers.
And so I look at that in terms of the broad focus of the
research as distinct from picking the individual research
topics.
Mr. Sanders. Let me respectfully disagree with you. What we
are involved in, and please tell me if you disagree with me, is
a major controversy over the causation of illness. I happen to
believe--I have seen it; I work with people--I believe in the
concept of multiple chemical sensitivity. There are many people
who do not.
What I am suggesting, and I think there is no question
about this, that unless you have scientists and physicians who
believe in that concept, that every single time a research
grant comes forward based on a diagnosis of multiple chemical
sensitivity, the result is going to be, sorry, these people at
best do not know very much; at worst, they are frauds.
It cannot be otherwise, and I would say that the evidence
indicates up until this point that you have not been
sympathetic to the concept of multiple chemical sensitivity. I
have asked you if you could tell me--I know the names of some
of these people, and I would like you to tell me that they are
on board. Is Dr. Miller playing a key role as a peer reviewer?
I do not think so.
Dr. Murphy. Dr. Miller is on the VA Federal Advisory
Committee. She is on our Persian Gulf Expert Scientific
Committee, and we solicit her advice through that mechanism.
Mr. Sanders. Yes. Believe me, I do know that, and I do know
that her grant was rejected. Can you give me the name of any
major researcher who believes in multiple chemical sensitivity
who has gotten help from either VA or DOD? Is there any?
Dr. Murphy. Yes. East Orange Environmental Hazards Research
Center has a project ongoing, looking at the issue of multiple
chemical sensitivity, and the researchers from East Orange are
actively involved in the investigation of MCS in Gulf war
veterans at this point.
Mr. Sanders. Do you know some of the names offhand?
Dr. Murphy. Howard Kipen. Dr. Howard Kipen is the principal
investigator.
Mr. Sanders. OK. My last question gets down to Dr.
Nicolson, and then I am going to get the mic over there. As I
heard him--Mr. Chairman, correct me if I misheard him--he
indicated he had not been hearing from you guys for a number of
months, that originally there was some contact.
Mr. Rostker. Yes. I put that in the record. We had a number
of interactions through March. In March, the protocols were
agreed upon, and because this was going to be a sole-source
contract, the DOD rep was advised that what we needed to do was
work through the paper work. We have made sure that the money
is there----
Mr. Sanders. Right.
Mr. Rostker [continuing]. And that we expect a contract to
be awarded to the four laboratories within the next 2 weeks,
and those laboratories then will be--and I went over the
protocol roughly. Those laboratories then will be trained.
Three hundred samples will be drawn. We have already put out a
public announcement seeking volunteers to provide blood samples
for this research, and we are looking for the research to take
about 3 months, which the majority of the time would be
training and certifying the labs in the three techniques.
Mr. Sanders. And what is Nicolson's relationship to this
work?
Mr. Rostker. He will be contracted with to supervisor the
instruction and certification of the labs in his technique.
Mr. Christopherson. And also he will be involved in also
training people in his technique----
Mr. Sanders. OK.
Mr. Christopherson [continuing]. So they will understand
what he has got, and then they will go back.
Mr. Sanders. So he will on day one write off and say these
guys are trained, they are doing the work----
Mr. Rostker. That is correct.
Mr. Sanders [continuing]. And we feel good about this, and
then we will see the results of that work.
Mr. Rostker. And then the independent lab, we are going to
have one of our labs and an independent lab both to look at
this.
Mr. Christopherson. A given sample will be sent to several
labs. In some cases a sample may be sent several times to a
lab, and they will see if there is corroboration between the
techniques and between different labs using the same technique.
Mr. Sanders. I yield, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Just to give you an idea, I do
believe we will get you out of here before 4, just to give you
a sense.
I just want to, because there was an interruption--not an
interruption, but we went in a slightly different direction, I
am going to say that I am not interested when you all appear
before me in the future to know what your view is on Dr.
Joseph. I am basically accepting on the statement in terms of
low-level exposure and what it means and does it ultimately
lead to acute symptoms or chronic symptoms--excuse me.
I am going to basically go under the assumption, unless you
tell me differently, that you are taking a position of
neutrality on that issue. You are basically saying you would
either say yes or no, or are you going to say that you believe
that low-level exposure can lead to chronic conditions in the
future? I would like to have you just tell me where you are on
that level, but I at least know you are rejecting that it does
not.
Mr. Christopherson. To be clear, we are open on the issue.
We are at this point essentially about as neutral as you can
get, given sort of the weighing of information, enough so that
we are willing to go out and fund research in this area, enough
so that we are willing to ask some very tough questions of our
clinical program.
Dr. Garthwaite. I think the same.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Rostker, how many sites were there in
Kuwait--excuse me--in Iraq and the Kuwait theater that we
suspected had either biological and chemicals in them, be they
manufacturing or depots?
Mr. Rostker. There were many bombing lists, and targets
came on and off the bombing lists based upon the latest
information and in some cases the latest fad because things
like the shape of a bunker became an indicator to the
intelligence analysts of whether or not there may or may not
have been chemicals in there. I think the maximum number was
something like 34 if you took the intersection of all the
lists. About 34 was the maximum number that DIA carried.
Mr. Shays. And how many of those were blown up?
Mr. Rostker. The manufacturing plants were blown up. The
chemical and biological sites were targeted, but it is not
clear what was blown up. What we clearly understood after the
war was a great deal of the munitions were not in the bunkers
but were out on the desert. In fact, the majority of the
munitions at Khamasiyah were not at Bunker 73, but were either
in the pit or the 6,000 chemical rounds that were simply out in
the desert under a tarp, so that what was attacked, whether we
hit or did not hit the bunker, was no indication of the amount
of chemical munitions we would have detonated.
And, in fact, after the war, when we were able to get into
some of these sites because we had occupied that area, like
Telio and Ananzarea, the bunkers we thought had chemical
munitions did not have chemical munitions.
Mr. Shays. Has the U.N. completed site visits of all----
Mr. Rostker. The U.N. has done site visits, but the U.N.'s
purpose of doing site visits----
Mr. Shays. You interrupted me.
Mr. Rostker. I am sorry, sir.
Mr. Shays [continuing]. Of all these sites?
Mr. Rostker. No, sir. The U.N.'s purpose of doing site
visits is to investigate the Iraqi claims in their declaration
statements. There are a few places where the Iraqis, based upon
their own intelligence--excuse me--the UNSCOM, based upon their
own intelligence, asked to be taken, and, to the best of my
knowledge, they turned out in each case to be a conventional
site. And, again, they were looking for S-shaped bunkers or 12-
frame bunkers and the like. Khamasiyah and Ananzerea were two
of the sites that were declared to UNSCOM----
Mr. Shays. Both sites were in the Kuwait theater?
Mr. Rostker. Yes. The Kuwaiti theater----
Mr. Shays. Our soldiers were in both sites.
Mr. Rostker. Yes, but the Kuwaiti theater is sometimes
confused with Kuwait, which it is not; it extends past Kuwait,
precisely.
Mr. Shays. The theater where our troops were?
Mr. Rostker. The Kuwaiti theater was a map reference before
the war which included southern Iraq, and it had no
relationship to where the troops finally went. So some people
get hung up on whether it was in or not in the Kuwaiti theater.
That is really a technicality. We are talking about Iraq and
Kuwait. The area we have absolute knowledge on is Kuwait
because that is where we stayed after the war.
Mr. Shays. Does the DOD and do you, either one, have
knowledge of any sites still being called hot sites that you
cannot visit?
Mr. Rostker. Not that I know of, no.
Mr. Shays. It is your testimony that you have no knowledge
of any site being still considered a hot site.
Mr. Rostker. No, sir, either by us or by UNSCOM.
Mr. Shays. Are you aware of any classified material that
either speaks to--let me see how I can ask this question. Are
there classified reports about these sites, any of the 34
sites?
Mr. Rostker. That are outstanding. No, I do not.
Mr. Shays. Have you seen every classified report----
Mr. Rostker. I believe so, and there is another check to
this, if I might, Mr. Chairman. A totally independent group
under the direction of Walt Yako, the Special Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight, has been
carrying out a parallel intelligence investigation of
Khamasiyah and any other similar sites in Iraq, and I have
reviewed their preliminary reports, which had full access to
our data and CIA's data, and there were no other sites that
were, as you would call, ``hot.''
Mr. Shays. Are there any, to your knowledge, Inspector
General reports or reports by the GAO that call into question
or review the protective gear that our troops used in Kuwait--
excuse me--used in that battle?
Mr. Rostker. The protective gear?
Mr. Shays. Masks?
Mr. Rostker. Say that again, sir.
Mr. Shays. Masks?
Mr. Rostker. There were concerns about masks fitting, and
we have gone to a new, universal mask.
Mr. Shays. Have you seen any classified reports that cannot
be released to the public that discuss the validity and
integrity of either the M-40 or M-17?
Mr. Rostker. No, sir.
Mr. Shays. Have you seen any reports?
Mr. Rostker. No, sir.
Mr. Shays. Do you know of any reports existing that discuss
them?
Mr. Rostker. No. In fact, we just made a report to the
President's Advisory Committee on MOPP gear, and those issues,
they were not in our data base, and we saw none of that. Now,
we were focusing on the war, but, to the best of my knowledge,
no, sir.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Rostker, it is my sense that you are being
given an opportunity to look at that which is classified.
Mr. Rostker. Oh, absolutely.
Mr. Shays. And it is your testimony before this committee
that you have not seen or are not aware of any Inspector
General's reports discussing the integrity of the masks used by
our soldiers.
Mr. Rostker. I am not, but I certainly will poll my staff
and provide a clarification of that if I am in error, and that
would include anything that we would have seen, either
classified or unclassified.
Mr. Shays. Let me get into this issue of the GAO report
that deals with the health and treatment of our soldiers. I get
a sense that basically we are not able to properly diagnose
and, therefore, effectively treat our soldiers because we do
not really know yet what ails them as far as the VA is
concerned and as far as the DOD is concerned. Is that correct?
And nodding a head is not going to get in the transcript.
Mr. Rostker. Certainly, for the undiagnosed diseases.
Mr. Shays. But bottom line is there are tens of thousands
of soldiers who have an undiagnosed disease or illness. Is that
correct?
Dr. Murphy. The treatment approach that we have taken is
the approach that civilian doctors in VA and DOD doctors would
take across the country, there are lots of nonveterans who have
undiagnosed symptoms also----
Mr. Shays. Lots of what?
Dr. Murphy. Unexplained symptoms.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Murphy, I am going to interrupt you a
second, and then I am going to let you answer the question. But
I just want to make sure, in the course of you answering the
question, I forget what my question was, and my question was, I
thought, fairly simple, that is basically is it true that we
have--well, I will say it differently now because I forgot how
I asked it, but it is my sense that we have tens of thousands
of soldiers who have illnesses who the VA and the DOD, in the
case of those who are active servicemen, who have no diagnosis.
Is this correct? I just want to know the answer to that.
Dr. Murphy. Yes.
Mr. Shays. It is correct. OK. Now, Dr. Murphy, if you want
to tell me there are people in the private sector as well who
have undiagnosed illnesses, I concede that. Is that your point
you want to make?
Dr. Murphy. The point that I was trying to get to, sir, and
I apologize for being so wordy, was that we often treat
symptoms, and we do have very effective treatments for many of
the common symptoms of Gulf war veterans. I will admit that
there are groups of symptoms, people who have Chronic Fatigue
Syndrome and fibromyalgia, where some of our currently used
therapies are not as effective as we would like them to be, and
one of the approaches that we need to take is to improve some
of the therapeutic approaches.
Mr. Shays. Hasn't it been the testimony of the VA and maybe
the DOD that it is very difficult to diagnose chemical exposure
and difficult to----
Dr. Murphy. Yes.
Mr. Christopherson. Yes, it is.
Mr. Shays. OK. So, I mean, we have a lot of soldiers, men
and women, who feel that they are sick and are very frustrated
that the VA is not treating them, though your testimony, Dr.
Murphy, is you are attempting to treat whatever symptoms you
see. And this really gets to areas that Representative Sanders
was involved in his questioning of you.
I am trying to put myself in the mind of a veteran. It is 6
years after the war, and we are not into treatments, except
maybe for some symptoms. We are still into raw, general kinds
of research, and we are into research that may not come to
fruition until 2002 and beyond. That would scare the hell out
of me if I was a veteran, and so I want to get into the concept
of how are you treating our soldiers. One way is to try to
treat the symptoms.
Do you monitor the health of our veterans? A veteran comes
in and they are sick and they have this level, you ask them to
come in 6 months later and say, ``We wanted to see if you are
getting better or worse''?
Dr. Garthwaite. Sure. I think that individual physicians
and individual care givers monitor the health of the
individuals they are treating, and their followup examinations
are based on what they think that is. Other than research
studies, I know of no systematic approach to studying health
outcomes of all patients on a continuous basis as a health care
system, per se, other than the research studies. As indicated
in my testimony at the beginning----
Mr. Shays. Can I interrupt you there? This may be basic to
you, but it is not basic to me. If I am a doctor and I am
trying to get at what their problem is, and to me it is still a
big mystery and to them it is frightening as can be, why would
it have to be a research project? Why couldn't it just be the
VA saying, ``Hey, we want to know how you are doing''?
Dr. Garthwaite. We do do that. Each provider does that. If
I am your doctor and you come to me for your diabetes, say, and
I see you, then I will write your prescription for insulin,
educate you how----
Mr. Shays. But you have identified----
Dr. Garthwaite [continuing]. And you will come back to see
me, and I will----
Mr. Shays. No, no, no. I am interrupting you only because
there you identified an illness and a treatment. I am talking
about the people that are ill but you cannot identify quite
what the problem is, and I am interested to know, are you
saying, well, are you getting sicker, or are you getting
better?
Dr. Garthwaite. Or identify an illness or not.
Mr. Shays. Listen, do I make an assumption that the VA, if
they cannot diagnose their problem, says they are not sick?
Dr. Garthwaite. I do not believe we do.
Mr. Shays. OK. So it is right for me to say, OK, you
acknowledge they are sick. You do not quite know what it is.
You might think it is, you know, something in their head, but
they are sick, and it has had a manifestation on them.
What I am trying to get to is, though, I thought one of the
points the GAO was making in their study was that you are
really not monitoring the health of the veteran.
Dr. Garthwaite. But we cannot go to a computer data base
and say, for all Persian Gulf veterans they had X amount of
health, whatever the measure is, 4 years ago, and today they
have Y health.
Mr. Shays. Bernie is a veteran that comes to see you. If he
is not well, do you call him in 6 months later? You have told
him you do not know what his problem is.
Dr. Garthwaite. Sure. Individually, yes, yes.
Mr. Shays. Do you have a protocol that does that?
Dr. Garthwaite. We--now 75 percent of all of our veterans
are enrolled in primary care, which means they have an assigned
doctor doing proactive----
Mr. Shays. Dr. Garthwaite, do you have a protocol that gets
these veterans back in? I just want to know.
Dr. Garthwaite. No, no protocol.
Dr. Murphy. We do not have a protocol, and the reason we do
not have a protocol is that the therapy and the followup needs
to be tailored to the individual veteran. Clearly, there are
some people who need to be seen every couple of weeks or every
month. Some might be seen every 3 months, some every 6 months,
depending on the severity of their illness and how well they
are responding to----
Mr. Shays. But the problem is you may not know how----
Dr. Murphy [continuing]. The treatments they are being
given.
Mr. Shays. I am sorry. The problem is you may not know how
well they are 6 months later because you have not seen them,
and they may say, ``Why the heck am I going to go back to the
VA? They tell me it is in my head, or they say they simply do
not know.''
What big incentive is there for them to go back unless you
proactively--I mean, this is maybe a poor analogy, but when we
do case work for someone, we are trying to institute a process
where we do not have the answer for Mr. Brown--I am not talking
about health--something that is bothering him--it might be the
IRS or something else. We then try to just maybe call them up a
little later and say, ``How are you doing?'' and in the
process, they say, well, we got a letter from the IRS that we
did not get, and we know things have gone along better, or we
got three more letters from the IRS, and we say, ``Why didn't
you call us back?'' They said, ``Well, we did not know if you
could really be helpful'' or whatever. But there is not active,
proactive protocol that----
Dr. Garthwaite. I think that is somewhat individual. We do
have it now at every VA Medical Center a call-in line. We have
assigned, like I say, 70-some percent of our patients, probably
more than that because we are about to do another survey, but
of our patients in primary care they have teams, they know who
their providers are, and they know how they can get in touch
with their principle physicians and other health-care
providers.
So I think we do that on an individual basis. I think the
GAO's criticism was: do we have it on a systematic basis and
can we statistically show that to them.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Rostker, the GAO's recent report recommends
that clinical progress of veterans should be monitored to
promote better treatments and provide direction to research
agenda. It also recommends that the diagnosis for stress and
PTSD be refined. First, I will ask you, Dr. Garthwaite, do you
agree with that recommendation?
Mr. Rostker. Let me ask my colleague from Health Affairs to
respond.
Mr. Shays. OK. Why not start with you? I am sorry.
Dr. Garthwaite. I missed the last part of it.
Mr. Shays. Because I said to Dr. Rostker--I am sorry. I
would like both of you to answer. The GAO's report recommends
that clinical progress of veterans should be monitored to
promote better treatment and provide direction to the research
agenda. It also recommends that the diagnoses for stress and
PTSD be refined. What do you think of that recommendation?
Mr. Feussner. Yes. I would agree with that recommendation,
and last fall the Cooperative Studies Program in VA funded a
trial on trauma-related PTSD, a treatment trial involving
approximately 350 veterans. Last fall, we funded another study,
a multi-site study looking at seeing if we cannot come up with
a computerized neurodiagnostic scheme--``protocol'' is the word
I want--that would allow these diagnostic methods to not only
be made efficient, more straightforward, but also make them be
useful in a computerized fashion.
Mr. Shays. OK. So the recent GAO report recommends that the
VA and the DOD monitor the treatment outcomes of sick Gulf war
veterans. Are you saying you are doing this, you intend to do
this, or you do not know quite how to do it?
Mr. Feussner. I am sorry. I thought your question was about
PTSD.
Mr. Shays. Well, that was the second part of it.
Mr. Feussner. We plan to monitor----
Mr. Shays. Let me just say this to you. If you do not have
the resources, that is an issue. There are certain limits that
you have.
Mr. Feussner. Yes.
Mr. Shays. But in the end, I want to know the answer to the
question.
Dr. Garthwaite. I would just say, as I have stated in my
initial testimony, we believe that we should be monitoring
health outcomes for all veterans. We believe all health-care
systems should do it. We believe that insurance companies are
asking all health-care systems to do it. We do not know of any
health-care systems that do it in a systematic fashion. We have
surveyed 32,000 veterans, using a form and a questionnaire that
we think gets at health status. We plan to implement that----
Mr. Shays. Is this an unrealistic recommendation?
Dr. Garthwaite. No. We do not know that it is unrealistic
or not. We believe that we need the information for all
veterans, and we need it especially for Persian Gulf veterans,
so we are going to pursue it, irregardless.
We will not get a 100-percent sample because of the large
numbers we deal with, but we will get a significant sample, and
we will aim to better understand what the functional status of
veterans are over time. We have a goal of improving that over
time as well, and we are holding our managers accountable.
Mr. Shays. The bottom line is that some veterans may be
getting sicker, and we do not know it, and they may just choose
to not come back to the VA.
Let me just ask you as well, Dr. Christopherson.
Mr. Christopherson. Let me do the latter point first, on
the issue of the PTSD. That was a report which was requested
and funded by us by the Institute of Medicine to look at our
programs there. We do agree with it. We already indicated to
ILM we agreed to it and that we are proceeding down that road
to fix it.
The second thing, on the issue of the monitoring, it is
difficult to do, as Dr. Garthwaite has indicated there. We are
committed to trying out some processes. We have already gone
out looking for some people to fund to, in quotes, help us to
look at a monitoring process. Essentially what you would be
looking at is to run some samples down through some particular
kinds of--to look at, for example, a particular set of
illnesses, for example, some of the undiagnosed or difficult-
to-diagnose kind of categories, and see whether we see some
progress in those kinds of areas.
It is difficult to do. I think no one should sort of
preclude it is not, but we are committed to doing that.
Mr. Shays. OK. Let me just do one area, and then Mr.
Sanders is going to come back, and that is the issue of
depleted uranium. Dr. Rostker, are you aware of any studies
that call into question or raise questions about the health
consequences of depleted uranium?
Mr. Rostker. Let me refer to Dr. Daxon, who is really quite
an expert on that.
Mr. Shays. OK. And if you get into anything classified----
Mr. Rostker. I understand.
Col. Daxon. Between the DOD and the DOE, we have been
studying the health effects of uranium since we started the
Manhattan Project in 1945. There is a wealth of information,
both on inhalation toxicology and general toxicology of acute
exposures to uranium.
Mr. Shays. So this is not new stuff here.
Col. Daxon. No.
Mr. Shays. If that is the case, how come we have not warned
our soldiers about the negative consequences of depleted
uranium?
Col. Daxon. Sir, I think the GAO report was accurate when
it talked about what happened after the Persian Gulf war. We
were relatively good about telling the people that actually
touched the weapons or touched the tanks. That was relatively
good. What we missed was in an actual combat situation,
depleted uranium was going to be ``touched'' by a whole range
of different soldiers. That population, we missed, and that is
the population we are trying to train now.
Mr. Shays. Well, let me just say this to you. I think you
even missed the people who were handling the shells and so on,
because they jumped into blown-out tanks and so on. So I guess
I call into question whether you have even done that.
What do you have now to notify our soldiers? You have a
video of some kind. Do you want to describe that?
Col. Daxon. Yes, sir. I cannot describe it. I am not the
person that put it together or saw it, but it is basically a
tier-1 training video that describes general procedures and
precautions that are required that we are recommending
currently for entering vehicles and dealing with vehicles that
are contaminated with depleted uranium.
Mr. Rostker. We shared the video with your staff earlier,
and if I might be so bold, it is a very informative video. I
think it is very well put together, and I would encourage you
to see it.
Mr. Shays. So the bottom line is, though, that is something
we are doing now, but we did not do earlier.
Mr. Rostker. Yes. In fact, just now, and it needs to be
promulgated through the field, and I will take the
responsibility to make sure that those recommendations go not
only to the Army, but to the Marine Corps and the other
services.
The problem here, as I understand it, is not dealing with
the shells as we showed them to you; they are quite safe. The
issue is when they potentially can vaporize, and then the
uranium dust, that dust----
Mr. Shays. Well, we know they vaporize. We know that 70
percent of it vaporizes.
Mr. Rostker. That is right. And the dust does not travel
far because it is so heavy, but as you climb over the vehicles
and the like, more precautions should be taken to a wider
population than we appreciated.
Mr. Shays. That contrasts a little bit with Mr. Dietz, who
suggests that it travels quite far, and his testimony was that
this was a tremendous, high concentration. You were here for
his testimony. Could you respond to it?
Col. Daxon. Yes, sir, I was.
Mr. Shays. And, sir, again, I just did not catch your name.
Col. Daxon. It is Col. Eric Daxon.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Colonel.
Col. Daxon. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. OK. I guess the issue is it would not go for
hundreds of miles, but will it last for hundreds of years, the
concentration. But let me ask you to respond to Mr. Dietz's
comments in particular, his testimony, how you reacted to his
testimony?
Col. Daxon. Sir, the key thing with the toxicity of
anything, to include radiation, is not only was it there, but
how much was there. The Army has done a great deal of studying
in determining how much of these aerosols are present at what
distance from tank impacts, DU fires, and those sorts of
things.
These studies started in the early 1970's. There were two
National Materials Board studies that were done that are
independent of DOD. The first was done in the early 1970's that
basically gave the green light to using depleted uranium.
Mr. Shays. Right.
Col. Daxon. Then there was a second--the DOD conducted a
study, and then there was a second National Materials Science
Board and two other studies. They all addressed the issue of
aerosolization and how far the aerosols go when a tank is
struck or when several tanks are struck.
Mr. Shays. Colonel, I want to say for the record, we may
even decide that it can be quite dangerous, but still decide
that we need it, because the alternative is worse.
Col. Daxon. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. If I am a soldier and I am in a tank, I want a
shell that I know is going to do the job, but I just want to
know the negative consequences. The more we have gotten into
this, the more I have come to realize that if you are a
soldier, you have shortened your life, even if you come back.
No, I do not mean just on this; I mean on all the challenges
that you face in warfare. I believe that in the serving of your
country you also put yourself at tremendous health risk, some
of it tremendously unavoidable.
But are those studies based on fragments or particles?
Col. Daxon. Sir, the early studies that were done were
primarily looking at particulates, and there is a wealth of
data on inhalation of uranium particulates. We have done it
with the actual uranium-milling industry. There are a lot of
studies that have been done on that.
Mr. Shays. Would that be available for us to give to others
to look at?
Col. Daxon. Yes, sir. Absolutely. This is available in the
open literature.
Mr. Shays. OK. Then let me just--is there any--because I do
not want to get off this--were there any studies that suggested
that the depleted uranium could be harmful to our troops?
Col. Daxon. Sir, the key thing is, for all of this stuff,
both with radiation and chemical toxicity, the key thing is the
amount, the chemical form, and where it came in.
Mr. Shays. OK. But I am going to ask my question, unless it
is classified information.
Col. Daxon. No, sir. I will answer it directly. In the AEPI
report that we put together there is a significant hazard for
people that are inside a vehicle while the penetrator is being
penetrated, while the tank is being penetrated by a DU
penetrator.
Mr. Shays. Yes. Well, it is also going to blow up as well.
Col. Daxon. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. But in terms of the----
Mr. Shays. That is the least of their problems at that
moment.
Col. Daxon. Yes, sir. But we have studied this because we
wanted to be careful. In terms of the amount of uranium that
would be inhaled, you can get milligram quantities if you are
inside the vehicle while it is being penetrated by a DU
penetrator.
Mr. Shays. Well, I thank you.
Mr. Sanders, thank you for your patience.
Mr. Sanders. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me start off with Dr. Rostker, but anyone else can jump
in. We had a conference in Vermont last month, and I met with a
number of veterans who are hurting, and if they asked me how
they should conclude the performance of the VA and DOD after 6
years in terms of diagnosing the problem and treating the
problem, Dr. Rostker, what would we say? And I am sure that you
do not have all the money that you want, but you have got a few
million bucks there. You have a lot of researchers. What would
we say after 6 years? What is the grade that we give the VA and
the DOD on this?
Mr. Rostker. I think that is a very difficult question to
answer in one. To a veteran who has an unknown diagnosis, I can
be quite certain, because I saw the same people on my 11-city
swing, that they clearly are unhappy and angry and would give
us a failing grade.
The question is, what can we do about improving that,
particularly for the veteran that we truly do not have a
diagnosis? I am reminded of one of the angry veterans on
television who said that if he were in charge, he would lock up
all the admirals and generals and would not let them out of the
room until they gave the answer of why he is sick.
We do not have that answer. I am not sure we will ever get
the answer for the individual, but we certainly are trying to
understand what happened in the Gulf and to apply and push back
the frontiers of science so we can, to the best of our ability,
treat them.
Mr. Sanders. Dr. Rostker, actually I was on a radio show
today, and somebody was a little bit harsher. He suggested
hanging, but not just putting them in jails.
Let me ask you this. Without for 1 second impugning the
sincerity and the hard work and the patriotism and your desire,
there is no reason that I can possibly believe that everybody
up there in the entire DOD and VA want the answer to this
question as much as Chris and I and everybody else on this
committee. Right? We all do.
But sometimes we reach a conclusion that for whatever
reason--maybe it is the system; maybe it is your bureaucracy;
maybe that somebody can move, and it takes you a year to get
out a grant--that is the system. We all have to work under
systems. Is it possible that you guys are not going to be the
agency to do it and that maybe we want to look outside of the
VA and the DOD based on 6 years of not particularly effective
work, without impugning anyone's sincerity? You know,
businesses make these decisions every day, politicians.
Mr. Rostker. I think there are a lot of parts to the
problem, and one would be the medical. Are we funding the right
medical projects? You have raised some concerns. Remember that
we put out RFPs, we go through standard practices, et cetera.
The same claims have been made, can we be trusted to assess
what happened in the Gulf, and let me address that because that
is really the primary concern of my office. We have an
absolutely vital stake in that. Moreover, we have the expertise
in that in ways that no other organization can possibly have.
You cannot put an organization that starts and will have a
clean slate on DU and then not have the kind of expertise that
I have behind me, if you will.
I think, in terms of the investigations that went on in the
Gulf, some of the same questions you asked today of the
veterans, that we are doing a job that is, I hope, credible but
certainly expansive. We are not limited by funding. I am not
limited largely by the bureaucracy within DOD, and we are truly
leaving no stone unturned to try to understand what happened in
the Gulf.
Now, that is only part of providing the problem, but it is
an important part as seen by even your own methodology here in
the way you are approaching the problem. You are asking
questions about, as you did today, correctly so, about what the
soldiers saw in the Gulf and what happened in the Gulf. Very
important, and it is critical for the future; and so in that
regard, I think DOD is the only organization that can do that
portion of the research.
Mr. Sanders. I would just suggest, I mean, clearly the
function of the Department of Defense is to win wars, and, for
example, most people observe and believe that in the Persian
Gulf, the Department of Defense functioned very well. They
achieved a major victory in a short period of time. Whether
that same agency is designed to come up with a solution and
treatment for a strange disease, I have my doubts about that. I
think those are two separate things. Let me ask you----
Mr. Rostker. Congressman, may I respond?
Mr. Sanders. Sure.
Mr. Rostker. A couple of things you have to keep in mind.
In the first place is when this is all said and done, when the
Gulf war and where maybe history down there, DOD, and I would
argue, VA health side, have got to be able to answer the
questions.
They have got to do two things. They have got to show they
can take care of people. We have 6 million beneficiaries-plus,
about 8 million eligibles we take care of every day through our
whole system, families, retirees, active duty. This is not just
a test around the Gulf war illness issue; this is a test of
whether we can take care of people generally.
We have unique situations here with the Gulf war,
especially--and, again, you have got to parse this out a little
bit. If you are looking for are we doing a good job in dealing
with the cancers and the heart and the other kinds of problems
there--by the way, a lot of what the illnesses are, by the way,
are in those categories. It is the illnesses that are hard to
figure out that is the issue here.
I think what we have always said from day one is we have
never claimed any exclusive club in terms of trying to find the
answer. We believe we have been part of it. I think that is
what it is. We have always been welcome to other parties, and
that is why we pulled in ILM and a lot of other parties to help
us figure some of these things out.
It is also why when we go out in the research side of
life--in the early days, we did a lot of research intramural, I
mean, inside the building, using our people, because we had to
get something started, going fairly quickly. We have now turned
on that. We have said, no, let's go outside. Let's poll people
from the outside.
Mr. Sanders. You lead me to my next question.
Mr. Feussner. Before--may I answer your other question?
Mr. Sanders. Yes.
Mr. Feussner. I would just like to have three points to
make. The first is that we have had inputs from the National
Institutes of Health, the Institute of Medicine, the
international research community, Federal and non-Federal
investigators, so we have asked and involved almost anyone on
the planet that can inform the process.
The second issue is that we do have some additional
expertise in patient-centered research. A large part of our
research is patient centered, not exclusively laboratory based.
And then the third issue is the tradeoff between the time
that might be lost by getting up to speed again or making a
transition.
Mr. Sanders. Let me just, actually taking off from both of
your responses, you recently made grants--I believe there was a
pool of some $8 million. Is my memory correct?
Mr. Feussner. Correct.
Mr. Sanders. When will that be made public? We have tried
to find out who received the grants. I was curious. I did not
have success.
Mr. Feussner. What is happening right now, and there are a
couple of sets of grants, by the way, that are in process, each
on different points. One point is that in the final
negotiations with the people who have won the grants to sort of
work through the contracting procedures, and that is a close
hold until that process is done, so that is coming out. That
should be out, I think--Fran, you may know better than I when
our research----
Dr. Murphy. The AIBS has reviewed the proposals to review
for scientific merit. They have been prioritized by the Persian
Gulf Veterans Coordinating Board, and it is really now in the
hands of the people who award the grants.
Mr. Sanders. When will we know who received the grants?
Dr. Murphy. Several months.
Mr. Feussner. Yes. The last set is----
Mr. Sanders. Several months, did you say, Doctor?
Mr. Feussner. Right. Within the next 2 months. The reason
is because it does take time to get through there. We have got
to sort out--again, if we are going to do this right, 2 months
it does take. We are committed to getting this money out this
summer, and we will get it out this summer.
Mr. Sanders. OK. Apparently you have notified some people
that they have not received grants.
Mr. Shays. I am just going to interrupt the gentleman a
second to say that he has as much time as he wants. I just need
to say I was a little off on my time before, but I do not have
more questions, and if you----
Mr. Sanders. I will be finished in a few minutes.
Mr. Shays. OK. You have as much time as you want, but it
will be helpful to----
Mr. Sanders. So I am hearing that we will not know for sure
who received the grants, Dr. Murphy, not until a couple of
months. Is that what I am hearing?
Dr. Murphy. Yes.
Mr. Christopherson. There are a couple of sets of grants
coming through. That is why the people you may be referring to
may be in one of the earlier grant phases as opposed to the
current one we just talked about.
Mr. Sanders. OK.
Mr. Christopherson. There are two grant sets, and the
earlier set, those probably would be knowing by now that they
had, but I am talking about the latest set where they would not
yet know that.
Mr. Sanders. OK. Would you be so kind as to send me, for
both sets of grants, who the peer reviewers are? Is that public
information?
Dr. Murphy. The peer review is done by the American
Institute of Biologic Science [AIBS] under a contract to the
DOD, and they would hold those lists.
Mr. Sanders. They would hold those lists?
Dr. Murphy. Yes. DOD could request that information from
them.
Mr. Sanders. Come on, I should think that the U.S. Congress
and the public has a right to know who reviewed the grants. Am
I missing something here? That is very public knowledge. I
would like--Mr. Chairman, I think this is an issue here of
concern to me, because I want to make sure that the people who
are reviewing these grants have an open mind with regard to
multiple chemical sensitivity.
Mr. Shays. Sure, sure.
Mr. Sanders. And if I am going to find that they are all
hostile, then I think that we have a very bad process. I would
like to know who they are.
Mr. Christopherson. My hesitancy was only because this is
not--I have not been involved in that part of the process. I am
just not sure. I want to make sure I do not give you an
incorrect answer. We will get back to you very quickly.
Mr. Shays. Yes. If we could have it be part of the record,
and you can get----
Mr. Christopherson. One way or the other, we will get back
to you. If we can make it available, if there is not some
reason, awfully good reason not to, we will get it back to you.
Mr. Sanders. Yes.
Mr. Christopherson. The answer is yes, if at all possible.
Mr. Shays. When would you be getting back to us?
Mr. Christopherson. This is the issue of----
Mr. Shays. I said ``when.'' When would you be getting----
Mr. Christopherson. I forget the answer to the question. I
just do not know the answer.
Mr. Shays. I understand you do not have the answer.
Dr. Murphy. This should not take a long period of time.
Mr. Christopherson. No, no.
Mr. Shays. What is that?
Dr. Murphy. It should not take a long period of time.
Mr. Shays. So by next Wednesday you could get back to us?
Dr. Murphy. Yes.
Mr. Sanders. Good. Thank you very much.
Mr. Christopherson. That is reasonable.
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Mr. Sanders. The next question is, Col. Roman, when he was
testifying, mentioned a Dr. Baumzweiger at the L.A. VA
Hospital, and he indicated that that gentleman was not asked--
the physician was not asked to continue treating Gulf war
veterans, and that physician had made a diagnosis that Col.
Roman suffered nerve damage which may have occurred at the
Persian Gulf. Does anybody know anything about that, or can you
get us some information on that?
Dr. Garthwaite. We can give you more information. Dr.
Baumzweiger was a neurology fellow who was working under the
supervision of a staff neurologist at a particular medical
center within the UCLA program, so there is some confusion in,
I think, the patients and so forth, but we can give you lots of
detailed information if you would like.
Mr. Sanders. Can you get that information to this
committee?
Dr. Garthwaite. Sure.
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Mr. Sanders. OK. Let me ask you a question while we are on
nerve damage. There are at least two studies that have been
done, one by Jamal Hanson, and others, I believe, done in Great
Britain, and one by Dr. Haley which suggest that there is
actual brain damage--not brain damage, nerve damage for certain
Gulf war veterans.
Do you have a thought on that, and have you done any
research which suggests that there is actual nerve damage,
which then would take us out of the realm of the theoretical,
and we would have some very concrete answers to some of the
problems our vets are facing?
Dr. Murphy. The tests that they used were standard,
neurologic tests, and if you look at the results of both Dr.
Haley's research and Dr. Jamal's research, the results were
within the normal range for those individual patients, and only
by grouping the results and doing a statistical analysis was
there any abnormality found. In fact, very few patients were
examined with those techniques by Dr. Haley's group. It was
less than a half dozen, and there were total a total number of
14 patients in Dr. Jamal's study.
Individual veterans evaluated, using either the DOD or the
VA protocol, have had similar tests, and a small number of them
have shown abnormalities, but as a group, that is not a
consistent finding.
Mr. Sanders. Is this an area of research that you are
exploring?
Dr. Murphy. There are currently ongoing research studies
looking at both nerve muscle and brain function that are being
funded. The GAO report and also our annual report on research
lists those for you.
Mr. Sanders. But what I am hearing you saying is that based
on the evidence that you have put together so far, you have not
seen any abnormal numbers of people. Is that what I hear you,
or did I not hear you say that?
Dr. Murphy. There has been no consistently found objective
abnormality on neurophysiologic testing. In small numbers of
patients during clinical evaluations we have found evidence of
abnormality.
Mr. Sanders. I am not exactly sure what that means. You
have found something, but you think it is not statistically
relevant. Is that----
Dr. Murphy. We have not been able to tie the abnormal
results from our clinical tests to any specific exposure or to
their Gulf service, and we do not believe that the research at
this point conclusively shows that there are any objective,
neurologic tests that are indicative of Gulf war illnesses.
Mr. Sanders. OK. Mr. Chairman, my last question deals with
pyridostigmine bromide. At, I believe, our last hearing, there
was a gentleman--what was his name, the pharmacologist from
Maryland? Dr. Tom Teidt, who is a pharmacologist from the
University of Maryland? OK. Was at the University of Maryland,
now lives in Florida, sat exactly where you are sitting now,
Dr. Murphy, and gave us a very frightening description of what
he believed to be the dangers associated with PB and its use in
a hot climate where there is stress and so forth.
I do not know if you are familiar with his testimony. Is he
off the wall, is he right, and what work are you doing on that
issue?
Mr. Christopherson. The issue of PB and stress, and some of
the issues that are raised around there are a concern of us as
well. We are looking at that research. We are looking at other
research as well that raises a question about whether stress,
for example, can exacerbate and create additional problems
there. Again, the data is not clear, but, again, it is worth
looking at because, again, PB has been very important,
obviously especially when you are dealing with exposure to
nerve gas or potential exposure there.
What we are doing right now is--so the answer is, yes, we
are concerned about it; yes, we are taking a look at it. So
far, it is not anything that tells us that for sure we should
stop doing it, but it says we need to think about it as part of
the total equation.
Here is an important point, I think, when you look at the
PB issue. It is true about PB and what we know or do not know
yet today on it, and the issue comes down to the following,
which is, in the first place, you do not want to do any kind of
treatments, pretreatments, vaccinations you do not have to. PB
is clearly in that category there.
When you look at PB and how we used it in the Gulf war or
how we might use it in the future in terms of there--it will be
a very tough test, by the way, should we ever use it again in
the future there--it is going to come down to you had better
make sure you know which nerve gas you think is going to occur
there; and, second, you are going to weigh these ``relative
risks'' between the two things, and it is going to be a very
tough discussion the next time we face this issue as to am I
more worried about the soman, what is in PB, or am I more
worried about the relative risks in terms of that, and we do
not yet know all the answers.
Mr. Sanders. But my point was, and somebody correct me if I
am wrong, I think he almost used the expression ``poisoning our
own,'' in other words--and I am not saying that he is right or
not.
Mr. Rostker. What my colleague is saying, in plain terms,
is that we are a learning organization and that we are not as
sanguine about PB as being as benign as we thought it was 6
years ago.
We are very interested in the research of PB, whoever funds
it. We are pulling together a reassessment. That is one of the
things that my office is doing. There are very important
doctrinal issues. Clearly, in a soman environment, PB has a
unique capability. We have to think through the risks here and
the warning, and we are gaining knowledge about PB that is not
falling on deaf ears.
Mr. Sanders. In other words, and he was very somber, and,
frankly, very scary, and what I am hearing you say is you are
not dismissing his statement.
Mr. Rostker. No.
Mr. Christopherson. Absolutely not.
Mr. Rostker. This is very serious. This is like the DU in
terms of there is an advantage, but there is a cost.
Mr. Christopherson. Correct.
Mr. Rostker. This is a different kind. DU may be of a
smaller magnitude, frankly----
Mr. Christopherson. Correct.
Mr. Rostker [continuing]. But this is clearly stuff we want
to know a lot more about----
Mr. Christopherson. Correct.
Mr. Rostker [continuing]. And we want to make sure we know
it now rather than face a decision in another Gulf.
Mr. Sanders. Well, not only in another Gulf, but in
understanding the problem that we have today. Is that correct?
Mr. Rostker. Absolutely.
Mr. Christopherson. Correct.
Mr. Rostker. Now, some of that is independent on the issue
of treatment and diagnosis and the like, but we are very much
trying to understand better than we had the issue of
pyridostigmine bromide. And I might say we are bringing in data
and experiences not only from our country, but from other
countries that have done this, particularly the Brits in some
earlier testing they did with chemical agents in people.
Mr. Sanders. So what I am hearing you saying, and I do not
want to put words in your mouth--you said it--is that you are
very concerned and regard it as a very----
Mr. Rostker. We have not drawn a conclusion, but we are
actively putting the pieces together to put us in a position to
be better informed and draw some conclusions.
Mr. Sanders. And some of the very serious concerns raised
by others----
Mr. Rostker. Absolutely.
Mr. Sanders [continuing]. Are thoughts that you are taking
seriously.
Mr. Rostker. Absolutely.
Mr. Christopherson. Correct.
Mr. Sanders. Did anyone else want to comment on PB?
Mr. Feussner. Yes. I would like to echo that. I think one
of the intriguing observations that the new research is
producing is the effect that stress can have on presentation
of----
Mr. Rostker [continuing]. The brain area.
Mr. Feussner. Yes. And, again, when some folks think of
stress, they think of psychological stress, but stress has
neurotransmitter and neuroendocrine sequelae, and this is
actually an example of how stress can perhaps create a problem
that might not otherwise have occurred.
Mr. Sanders. If my memory is correct, and somebody up here
can correct me if I am wrong, I mean, it was almost like a
macabre joke that PB, under stress, and God knows, everybody at
war is in stress, and in heat can bring forth a negative
reaction; and on top of that, if PB is administered after one
is exposed to chemical warfare agents, it could be a very bad
effect. Does that make----
Mr. Christopherson. But I think the key thing that has
changed in this equation, which is what we have all been
referring to here, is the issue of the blood-brain barrier and
the question under stress you can cross there. That was a new
piece of information. That is what has caused people to go back
and take another look at this.
Now, we are still not sure what it means because while it
says it can happen, it still does not tell you what the effects
might be.
Mr. Sanders. Right.
Mr. Christopherson. And we have got to figure that out
because, again, it is not like the issue is, well, we will just
stop using PB and that is the end of the question. You still
have this relative-risk issue you have to sort of work through,
and we are doing that.
Mr. Sanders. OK. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thank all of
you.
Mr. Shays. I just have one last question, because I looked
at my notes and realized that we had information that the Armed
Forces Radiological Research Institute, AFRRI, conducted a
study in fiscal year 1994 for about $1.7 million, and in fiscal
year 1995 less than $1 million, on the hazards of DU. The
results were that it was a threat to our troops. The research
stopped in fiscal year 1995 and the results were not released.
Colonel, it is a matter of public record, and we would love
you just to quash it or sustain it, one or the other. First
off, is my information accurate about the study being
conducted?
Col. Daxon. Yes, it is.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Col. Daxon. I actually put the study together.
Mr. Shays. Oh, good. Then you are the man to ask.
Col. Daxon. Yes, sir. I am no longer there, but the study
is still ongoing. It is addressing all aspects, and we are
focusing on the imbedded fragments because that is where we
have some doubts still. The research is being published in the
open literature. As we speak, the research is still being
continued.
Mr. Shays. So there was no result of that it was a threat
to our troops.
Col. Daxon. The research is not done yet, sir.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Col. Daxon. I hate to draw conclusions when the experiment
is not finished.
Mr. Shays. There were no conclusions drawn that it was a
threat to our troops.
Col. Daxon. At this point, no, sir, none that I am aware
of.
Mr. Shays. Let me thank all of you because you have been
tremendously patient. I guess I should give you the same
privileges----
Col. Daxon. Sir, could I?
Mr. Shays. Yes, sir. Do you want to say something?
Col. Daxon. Yes, sir, I do. The position of AFRRI and the
DOD is not that DU doesn't present a hazard. AFRRI at this
point has not found any hazards that were not expected at this
juncture. It is not our position that there are no hazards
associated with DU.
Mr. Shays. No. I think we all agree there are hazards, but
you did not come to a preliminary finding that it was a threat
to our troops.
Col. Daxon. No, sir.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Col. Daxon. I can check that and get with the director of
AFRRI to make sure that is still current.
Mr. Shays. I think it would be good to have you--in fact,
we would like an answer one way or the other, not just no
answer. We would like you to either confirm your statement,
which is on the record, or disqualify it, and get back to us by
Wednesday.
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Col. Daxon. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. OK. Let me say that is there a question that we
should have asked that you would have liked us to have asked?
Yes.
Mr. Rostker. Two points. On the issue of the MOPP gear, you
asked specific questions about specific reports that I do not
know of, and I will check; but let me say there was critical
assessments of every piece of the MOPP gear and that we have
moved substantially over time to a new mask. There was
testimony today about the layer of carbon, the newest
overgarments following the British have the carbon integrated
into the fiber. It lasts longer. The issue today about it
lasting only 12 hours was 12 hours in a saturated environment.
The garment itself can last for a much longer period of time.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Rostker, I need to say on the record that I
am aware of two reports that are classified that I would like
to talk to you about.
Mr. Rostker. OK.
Mr. Shays. And, Dr. Murphy.
Mr. Rostker. I have one additional thing, if I might. You
also raised the question of the alarms.
Mr. Shays. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rostker. And we just put together a small briefing for
the PAC that we gave them earlier this week on the M-8 alarm,
and I would like to make that available to you.
Mr. Shays. What is the bottom line?
Mr. Rostker. The bottom line is that a known interferant
that would set off the alarms and provide false positives
includes gasoline vapors and diesel-fuel exhaust. So the
description of them turning it on on the trucks in a convoy and
the alarms going off all the time is absolutely predictable,
given the known interference.
Mr. Shays. Let me just say, though, Dr. Rostker, that we
have testimony that far more of them occurred after the war
than before and that there was no noticeable difference in
terms of environment.
Mr. Rostker. Except for the oil fires and the like, which
also were involved. The proper procedure is to, if an M-8 goes
off and they MOPP'd as they described, is then to do an all-
clear based upon a 256 kit. We are investigating all of the
256-kit positives that we can find.
Mr. Shays. I feel that I need to state on the record that
individuals have contacted this committee who will--I guess I
cannot say that; they have not done it yet. Let's just leave
this issue open. OK? We will leave it like that.
Mr. Rostker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Garthwaite.
Dr. Garthwaite. Sir, just a couple of things. To the
veterans out there, I would urge them to get a Persian Gulf
Exam if they have not gotten one; and in relation to their
frustration, I will remind all of us that we declared war on
cancer, and although we have won some skirmishes, that is an
ongoing war, and it has been going on for many years.
The science is very difficult, very complex, and not a
simple process, and it is not for lack of trying. And we are
all frustrated. I think many of us in medicine are in medicine
because we hope to be able to make a difference and to get some
answers for some of these diseases.
Second, I think, we appear before you with a great sense of
humility. When I went to medical school, ulcers were definitely
caused by too much acid. Today, we can tell you that they are
definitely caused by bacteria. So what is very clear today may
not be as clear in the future.
And the third thing is about peer review. I would just like
to say that it is human beings doing the best they can to judge
other human beings, and I think that the point that was made,
that there may be somewhat of a systemic bias of peer review
for new and more radical ideas is very possible and plausible,
and we should take that into account as we think about peer
review.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Thank you. Let me just thank our
court reporter, Ted Fambro. Also, I would like to thank Denise
Nichols for taking care of our veterans, picking them up--the
four of them did not live here--and making sure they had a
square meal last night.
I would also like to thank my director of this committee,
Larry Halloran, and Bob Newman, who staffs and deals with Gulf
war illnesses; also, Mr. Sanders' staff, Don Edwards and
Cynthia Welgess; and also the minority staff, Cherri Branson;
and to say to the witnesses you have been very helpful. You
have been extraordinarily patient and tolerant, and it
certainly speaks well for your concern about this issue, and we
do appreciate that very much.
With that, we will call this hearing adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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