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United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

Testimony: 

Before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services, 
U.S. House of Representatives: 

For Release on Delivery: 

Expected at 1:00 p.m. EDT Tuesday, July 12, 2005: 

Space Acquisitions: 

Stronger Development Practices and Investment Planning Needed to 
Address Continuing Problems: 

Statement of Robert E. Levin, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing 
Management: 

GAO-05-891T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-05-891T, a report to Strategic Forces Subcommittee of 
the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

GAO was asked to testify on problems relating to the Department of 
Defense’s (DOD) space system acquisitions. In doing so, we drew on our 
previous reports related to the causes of acquisition problems, 
underlying incentives and pressures, and potential solutions. 

What GAO Found: 

Our work on the acquisition of space-based capabilities over the last 
several years has been conducted on two levels. First, we have reviewed 
most of the major space system acquisitions to determine their status 
at different points in time. The results are discouraging—systems cost 
more and take much longer to acquire than promised when initially 
approved. In some cases, the justification or business case for the 
system when initially approved is far different from the current 
status, so DOD has had to re-assess the need to acquire that particular 
system and the soundness of its acquisition strategy. 

Second, we have analyzed the common and causal factors for these poor 
acquisition outcomes. Overall, we have found that DOD has been unable 
to match resources (technology, time, money) to requirements before 
beginning individual programs, setting the stage for technical and 
other problems, which lead to cost and schedule increases. 
Specifically: 
* Requirements for what the satellite needed to do and how well it must 
perform are not adequately defined at the beginning of a program or are 
changed significantly once the program has begun. 
* Technologies are not mature enough to be included in product 
development.
* Cost estimates are unreliable—largely because requirements have not 
been fully defined and because programs start with many unknowns about 
technologies. 

We also have reported on cross-cutting factors that make it more 
difficult for DOD to achieve a match between resources and requirements 
for space acquisitions. These include: a diverse array of organizations 
with competing interests; a desire to satisfy all requirements in a 
single step, regardless of the design or technology challenge; and a 
tendency for acquisition programs to take on technology development 
that should occur within the S&T environment. On a broader scale, DOD 
starts more programs than it can afford in the long run, forcing 
programs to underestimate costs and over promise capability. As a 
result, there is pressure to suppress bad news about programs, which 
could endanger funding and support, as well as to skip testing because 
of its high cost. 

One key to success is closing the gaps between available technologies 
and customer needs before beginning an acquisition program. This puts 
programs in a better position to succeed because they can focus on 
design, system integration, and manufacturing. DOD has recently revised 
its space acquisition policy, in part to attain more knowledge about 
technologies before starting an acquisition. However, we remain 
concerned that the policy still allows programs to begin before 
demonstrating technologies in an operational or simulated environment. 

What GAO Recommends: 

DOD has attempted to address its problems in space system acquisitions, 
but, as our reports have indicated, there is still a critical need to 
adopt practices that would assure DOD: 
* Separates technology development from acquisition;
* Adopts evolutionary approaches that pursue incremental increases in 
capability; and
* Guides program start decisions with investment strategies that 
identify (1) overall capabilities and how to achieve them, that is, 
what role space will play versus other air-, sea-, and land-based 
assets and (2) priorities for funding. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-891T. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Robert E. Levin at (202) 
512-3519 or levinr@gao.gov. 

[End of section]

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss DOD's efforts to acquire space-
based capabilities. In fiscal year 2006 alone, DOD plans to spend 
almost $20 billion to develop and procure satellites and other space 
systems. Our work on the acquisition of space-based capabilities over 
the last several years has been conducted on two levels. Mrst, we have 
reviewed most of the major space system acquisitions to determine their 
status at different points in time. The results are discouraging- 
systems cost more and take much longer to acquire than promised when 
initially approved. In some cases, the justification or business case 
for the system when initially approved is far different from the 
current status, so DOD has had to re-assess the need to acquire that 
particular system and the soundness of its acquisition strategy. 
Second, we have analyzed space system acquisitions to identify the 
common and causal factors for these poor outcomes. Overall, we have 
found that DOD has been unable to match resources (technology, time, 
and money) to requirements before beginning individual programs, 
setting the stage for technical and other problems, which lead to cost 
and schedule increases. Moreover, on a broader scale, DOD starts more 
programs than it can afford, creating a set of incentives and pressures 
that invariably have negative effects on individual programs and the 
larger investment portfolio. Our recommendations have been focused on 
getting modifications to the space acquisition policy to ensure that 
decisions are more knowledge-based and holding decision makers 
accountable. Here the results are mixed. We have seen some positive 
changes to the policy, such as a greater emphasis on attaining 
knowledge about technologies, but we remain concerned that the policy 
still allows programs to begin before those technologies are actually 
demonstrated in an operational or simulated environment. 

My testimony today describes the condition we have found in our system- 
focused reviews and lays out the problems across systems and the 
changes that need to be made if DOD is to break the cycle of 
acquisition problems. Let me start by recognizing that developing 
satellites is a very complex task and one which does differ from other 
military systems. However, we have not been convinced that those 
differences merit distinction in how system development and production 
are approached. Nor should those differences ever excuse the Department 
from achieving the outcomes it promises when requesting and receiving 
funding. 

Problems Affecting Space System Acquisitions Persist: 

For decades, space acquisition programs have been encountering large 
cost increases and schedule delays. As a result, DOD has been unable to 
deliver capabilities as promised. This past year alone, for example, 
costs have continued to climb on the Space Based Infrared System High 
(SBIRS-High) program-triggering another Nunn-McCurdy[Footnote 1] review 
and certification of the program and pushing DOD's investment in this 
critical missile warning system to over $9.9 billion, from the initial 
$3.9 billion estimate made 9 years ago. At the same time, programs 
focused on developing new communications satellites are facing cost 
increases and schedule delays, the National Polar-orbiting Operational 
Environmental Satellite System has been restructured and is facing cost 
increases and schedule delays, and unit cost increases for launch 
vehicles have now increased by 81 percent since 2002 due to erroneous 
assumptions about the commercial launch market upon which the program's 
business case was based. 

Taken together, these problems have had a dramatic impact on DOD's 
overall space portfolio. DOD has had to shift scarce resources to 
poorly performing programs and has pushed off starting a new version of 
the Global Positioning System (forcing costs to increase for the 
current version under development). Cost increases have also kept DOD 
from investing more in science and technology efforts that support 
space. We reported recently, for example, that funding for testing of 
space technologies has declined in recent years. It is also important 
to note that, for some programs, DOD is spending considerable sums of 
money-in addition to what was planned or long after it had originally 
anticipated-thus posing additional pressures on its overall investment 
portfolio. DOD originally planned to complete expenditures for SBIRS- 
High in fiscal year 2006, for example, but currently it plans to spend 
about $3.4 billion in fiscal years 2007 through 2013. 

At the same time DOD is facing these problems, it is attempting to 
undertake new efforts-including the Transformational Satellite 
Communications System (TSAT) program and Space Radar program-which are 
expected to be among the most expensive and complex ever, and which DOD 
is heavily relying on in its efforts to fundamentally transform how 
military operations are conducted. In fact, many other weapon systems 
will be interfaced with these satellites and highly dependent on them 
for their own success. 

Figure 1 shows the percent increase in total cost from the initial 
estimate to its most recent, for current major space system 
acquisitions. Systems that have incurred particularly significant cost 
increases include the SBIRS-High and the Global Broadcasting System. In 
addition, relatively newer programs such as the Evolved Expendable 
Launch Vehicle (EELV), Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) 
satellite and the Wideband Gapfiller communication satellites have also 
been experiencing cost increases. In general, the longer a system has 
been in development, the greater the amount of its cost growth. In 
addition, nearly all of the programs have also experienced significant 
schedule delays as well. 

Figure 1: Percent Increase in Program Cost from Initial Estimate to the 
Current Estimate (for major space system acquisitions underway): 

[See PDF for image]

Source: Department of Defense's Selected Acquisition Reports. 

[End of figure]

As figure 2 illustrates, there is a vast difference between DOD's 
budgeting plans and the reality of the cost of its space systems. Over 
the next 10 years, space systems, each year, on average, will cost DOD 
in excess of $1.5 billion more than it had originally planned. 
Moreover, the sum of the percentage cost increases represents an 
additional $20 billion over the combined lives of the programs above. 
This means there is $1.5 billion less that DOD has to spend on other 
priorities annually and tens of billions less available for DOD's 
overall weapons portfolio over time. It is not clear how DOD's budget 
will accommodate these additional costs. 

Figure 2: Comparison between Original Cost Estimates and Current Cost 
Estimates for Major Space Systems Acquisitions Underway: 

[See PDF for image]

Source: Department of Defense's Selected Acquisition Reports. 

[End of figure]

In Table 1 below, we highlight recent findings from our reports. As the 
table notes, many programs are still addressing past mistakes in 
acquisition approaches and contractor oversight as well as technical, 
design, and manufacturing problems. 

Table 1: Highlights of Recent Findings: 

Program: Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites (AEHF):
Recent findings: Unit cost has increased by more than 50 percent. In 
2004, the program experienced cost increases of more than 15 percent, 
which required a Nunn-McCurdy notification to Congress. Schedule 
slippages for launching this communication system have now stretched to 
over 3 years. Our reports have attributed cost increases most recently 
to production problems and changing security requirements. Earlier cost 
increases were attributed, in part, to a rush to start the program, 
changing requirements, and a lack of funding to support an overly 
optimistic schedule. 

Program: Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV):
Recent findings: 
Unit cost increases (for launch vehicles) have increased by 81 percent. 
In 2004, this program experienced cost increases of more than 25 
percent, which triggered statutory requirements to reassess and 
recertify the program. Our reports have found that a chief reason for 
cost increases is a decline in the commercial launch market upon which 
the program's business case was based as well as a reduction in 
anticipated launches. Recently, the two primary contractors-Boeing 
Launch Services, Inc. and Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company-agreed 
to form a joint venture to combine production, engineering, test, and 
launch operations for U.S. government launches. It is argued that this 
will help reduce costs while enabling the government to retain two 
launch systems. 

Program: Mobile User Objective System (MUGS):
Recent findings: This is a relatively new effort: No significant cost 
increases or schedule delays are reported. However, we reported this 
year that early procurement of long lead items before achieving a 
stable design for this Navy communications system could lead to cost 
increases and the program's development schedule remains compressed-
posing risks should software development or other technical or design 
problems be encountered. 

Program: Navstar Global Positioning System II (GPS II):
Recent findings: Total costs of the GPS II modernization program have 
increased by over 20 percent. This is largely due to DOD's decision to 
delay the start of the follow-on GPS III program. Specifically, the 
delay will require DOD to buy additional GPS IIF satellites-so far at 
least 7 more than the program had planned. The launch of the first IIR-
M satellite has been delayed at least 7 months due to production 
problems. 

Program: National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 
System (NPOESS):
Recent findings: Costs have increased by roughly 10 percent due to 
changes to the contract, increased program management costs, and 
increased funds needed to mitigate risks. The program office reported 
that the increases include costs associated with extending the 
development schedule and increased sensor costs. 

Program: Space Based Infrared System High (SBIRS-High). 
Recent findings: This missile warning program has experienced schedule 
slips of at least 6 years and cost increases that have triggered 
legislative requirements to reassess and recertify the program several 
times-most recently this spring. While DOD's total program cost 
estimate was about $3.9 billion, it is now $9.9 billion-nearly a 150 
percent unit cost increase. Our reviews have attributed past problems 
to an acquisition approach that decreased oversight of contractors, 
technology challenges, and software development problems. DOD is 
currently reexamining this program, potential alternatives, and cost 
estimates. 

Program: Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS): 
Recent findings: This is a relatively new effort: No major reported 
cost increases or schedule delays. The initial increment of this 
program, which started in 2002, is composed of two demonstration 
satellites that were built under the previous Space Based Infrared 
System-Low (SBIRS-Low) program. SBIRS-Low had incurred cost increases 
and schedule delays and other problems that were so severe, DOD 
abandoned the effort. The STSS program has experienced system quality 
and system engineering problems with the payload, however, the program 
office still expects early delivery and launch of the satellites. 

Program: Space Radar. 
Recent findings: This is a relatively new effort with no reported cost 
increases or schedule delays. We reported last year that DOD was not on 
a path that would enable it to accumulate knowledge and had not 
formalized agreement on requirements needed to start this technically 
complex and potentially very costly effort. Congress directed DOD to 
keep space radar efforts in technology development so that it would 
accumulate critical knowledge. In January 2005, DOD restructured this 
effort, focusing on developing smaller, demonstrator satellites, 
strengthening its partnership with the intelligence community, and 
revising its acquisition strategy. 

Program: Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT): 
Recent findings: This is a relatively new effort focused on developing 
much more robust communication satellites. It entered the formal 
acquisition phase in 2004 with only one of seven critical technologies 
mature. Due to concerns about the risks such an approach poses, 
Congress reduced funds and directed that the program focus on 
technology development before proceeding further with acquisition 
activities. Although the program started the acquisition program and 
established its acquisition program baseline with immature critical 
technologies, the program director told us that the system development 
contract will not be awarded until critical technologies are mature. 

Program: Wideband Gapfiller Satellites (WGS):
Recent findings: Costs have increased since 2000 and DOD now 
anticipates buying two additional satellites. The launch of the first 
satellite has been delayed by almost 2 years. This program involves the 
purchase of commercial communications satellites for DOD purposes. 
However, we reported that the program encountered design, integration, 
and manufacturing problems due largely to the fact that the program was 
not able to leverage expertise from the commercial sector. This was 
because there was less than anticipated demand for the commercial 
satellite. Conflicts in scheduling for the launch pad also contributed 
to the schedule delay. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data and previous GAO reports. 

[End of table] 

Causes of Space System Acquisition Problems: 

We have analyzed the range of space-based acquisitions over the last 
several years to identify the common and causal factors for these poor 
acquisition outcomes. Overall, we have found that DOD has been unable 
to match resources (technology, time, and money) to requirements before 
beginning individual programs, setting the stage for technical and 
other problems, which lead to cost and schedule increases. Moreover, on 
a broader scale, DOD starts more programs than it can afford, creating 
a set of incentives and pressures that invariably have negative effects 
on individual programs and the larger investment portfolio. 

Match Between Resources and Requirements Seldom Achieved at the Start 
of Acquisition Program: 

Our past work has shown that space programs have typically not achieved 
a match between requirements and resources at program start. In other 
words, the programs did not have the level of knowledge needed to 
assure that they could be completed within expected cost and schedule 
estimates. 

Specifically: 

* Requirements for what the satellite needed to do and how well it must 
perform are not adequately defined at the beginning of a program or are 
changed significantly once the program has begun. 

* Technologies are not mature enough to be included in product 
development. 

* Cost estimates are unreliable-largely because requirements have not 
been fully defined and because programs start with many unknowns about 
technologies. 

There are a range of other resource gaps that DOD faces when it begins 
new space acquisitions. For example, we have reported on deficiencies 
within the space acquisition workforce, contracting strategies that 
support acquisitions, contractor capabilities, as well as funding 
available for testing of space technologies. Nevertheless, unstable 
requirements and immature technologies are the most significant 
contributors to cost and schedule increases, and not just for space 
acquisitions but all DOD weapons acquisitions. 

We also have reported on cross-cutting factors that make it more 
difficult for DOD to achieve a match between resources and requirements 
for space acquisitions. First, space systems may suffer from more 
requirements pressures than other weapon systems because there is 
usually a very broad constituency-contractors, military services, 
civilian users, administrations, and Congress-behind each satellite 
program. This creates challenges in making tough tradeoff decisions. 
The Global Positioning System, for example, not only serves military 
users but also serves civilians, supports various key economic sectors 
such as transportation and communications, and is used by allies. As a 
result, when starting these new systems, space program managers can 
expect to be inundated with competing demands-not just among military 
users-but also among civilian and industry users. 

Second, space acquisition programs have historically attempted to 
satisfy all requirements in a single step, regardless of the design 
challenge or the maturity of technologies to achieve the full 
capability. There is a variety of reasons for this, including a desire 
to include the most advanced technologies onboard satellites, 
particularly in view of the length of time it takes to develop space 
systems. However, this approach invariably increases the technology 
challenges facing programs, and thus, the risk that costly problems 
will be encountered. 

Third, there is a tendency among space system acquisition programs to 
take on technology development that should occur within the science and 
technology (S&T) environment. Reasons for this include the greater 
ability to secure funding for costly technology development within an 
acquisition program versus a science and technology program, a belief 
among the acquisition community that labs in charge of developing space 
technologies do not adequately understand their needs, as well as 
communication gaps between the S&T and acquisition communities. 
Nevertheless, our work has continually shown that allowing technology 
development to carry over into product development increases the risk 
that significant problems will be discovered late in development. 
Addressing such problems may require more time, money, and effort to 
fix because they may require more extensive retrofitting and redesign 
as well as testing. Moreover, when there are many unknowns about 
critical technologies, a program cannot reliably estimate what 
resources will be needed to complete a program-leaving DOD and the 
Congress in a position of committing to large investments without 
knowing how much they will truly cost or how long it will actually take 
for capabilities to be delivered. 

DOD Starts More Programs than It Can Afford in the Long Run: 

There is a widespread belief among DOD and other officials involved 
with space programs that DOD starts more programs than it can afford in 
the long run, forcing programs to underestimate costs and over-promise 
capability and creating a host of negative incentives and pressures. 
Specifically, officials we have spoken with cited the following. 

* Because programs are funded annually and priorities have not been 
established, competition for funding continues over time, forcing 
programs to view success as the ability to secure the next installment 
rather than the end goal of delivering capabilities when and as 
promised. 

* Concurrently, when faced with lower budgets, senior executives within 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air Force would rather 
make across-the-board cuts to all space programs than hard decisions as 
to which ones to keep and which ones to cancel or cut back. 

* Having to continually "sell" a program creates incentives to suppress 
bad news about a program's status and avoid activities that uncover bad 
news. 

* When combined with the high cost of launching demonstrators into 
space, the competition for funding often encourages programs to avoid 
testing technologies in space before acquisition programs are started. 

Our previous reports have found that these pressures are long-standing 
and common to weapon acquisitions, not just space acquisitions. The 
competition within DOD to win funding and get approval to start a new 
program is intense, creating strong incentives to make a weapon system 
stand out from existing or alternative systems. Moreover, overall DOD 
funding constraints put a high priority on appearing affordable, making 
it important for program sponsors to provide cost estimates that will 
fit within the funding constraints. Instead of forcing trade-offs, 
challenging performance requirements-when coupled with other 
constraints, such as cost or the weight of the satellite-can drive 
product developers to pursue exotic solutions and technologies that, in 
theory, can do it all. 

Keys to Overcoming Space Acquisition Problems: 

Our work has shown that fundamental changes are necessary to stem cost 
and schedule increases and enable DOD to field new capabilities more 
efficiently and effectively. The following actions, in particular, 
would assure that DOD can match resources to requirements before its 
starts new programs and that it has an investment strategy in place 
that would prevent it from starting more programs than it can afford. 

Specifically, to better match resources to requirements, DOD should do 
the following. 

* Implement processes and policies that stabilize requirements. Our 
reports over the years as well as many DOD studies have pointed to a 
need to stabilize requirements for all weapons system development. In 
response, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has taken steps to 
strengthen requirements setting department-wide, principally by 
establishing its new Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System (JCIDS). JCIDS is focused on achieving greater across-the-board 
agreement up front on what capabilities need to be achieved and how 
they are to be achieved. Because this system is relatively new, it is 
too early to determine whether it is addressing requirements setting 
problems within DOD. The Air Force has also taken measures to 
strengthen requirements setting for key systems such as SBIRS-High and 
Space Radar, including instituting high-level boards to approve of new 
requirements and processes that ensure the right officials are 
involved. However, we reported on Space Radar in July 2004 that even 
these changes were not ensuring that the intelligence community-a major 
stakeholder in Space Radar-was in agreement with requirements and that 
all stakeholders would be held accountable for their agreements. DOD is 
now working on strengthening its partnership within the Space Radar 
program to avoid this problem. 

* Separate technology development from acquisition. We have previously 
reported that DOD's practice of taking on technology development 
concurrently with product development stands in sharp contrast to that 
followed by successful programs and the approach recommended by DOD's 
acquisition policy for weapon systems. Successful programs will not 
commit to undertaking product development unless they have a high 
confidence that they have achieved a match between what the customer 
wants and what the program can deliver. Technologies that are not 
mature continue to be developed in an environment that is focused 
solely on technology development. Another key to success is employing 
the technique of systems engineering to close the gaps between 
available technologies and customer needs before committing to new 
product development. This puts programs in a better position to succeed 
because they can focus on design, system integration, and 
manufacturing. DOD has made some efforts to address this problem. For 
example, it has recently revised its space acquisition policy, in part 
to encourage programs to attain more knowledge about technologies 
before starting. It has developed a strategy for space S&T to help 
strengthen partnerships between the acquisition and S&T communities and 
assure they are working toward common goals. It has strengthened its 
systems engineering capabilities. Department-wide, DOD has expanded the 
authorities of its Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) 
to help keep technology development out of acquisition programs and 
within the S&T communities. However, we remain concerned that these 
measures will not be sufficient. The space acquisition policy, for 
example, still allows programs to begin before demonstrating 
technologies in an operational or simulated environment. Moreover, DOD 
is still approving new programs like TSAT even when many of their 
critical technologies are still immature. In fact, in our 2005 
department-wide assessment of selected major weapon programs, we found 
that only 15 percent of the programs we assessed began system 
development having demonstrated all of their technologies mature. 

* Adopt an evolutionary development approach for its space systems, 
that is, pursue incremental increases in capability versus significant 
leaps. Our examinations of best practices have found that this approach 
can decrease time and cost for development because it closes gaps in 
unknowns. DOD's space acquisition policy states its preference for 
evolutionary development, and DOD pursued evolutionary approaches in 
the past with GPS. But, more often, it has attempted to achieve 
significant leaps in capability in one step. Moreover, DOD officials 
have told us that they are pursuing evolutionary development for space 
systems, when, in fact, they are beginning programs by challenging 
program managers to achieve significant leaps in capability with the 
intention of abandoning those efforts later in the development cycle 
should too many problems be encountered. This is not a true 
evolutionary approach, as it still leaves DOD facing increased 
technical challenges at the beginning of a program and thus, increased 
risks, and it raises expectations on the part of stakeholders who may 
be unwilling to accept less capability later on. 

* Address other resource shortfalls. As noted earlier, our reports have 
identified other resource gaps that should be addressed by DOD. For 
example, DOD S&T officials cited shortages of staff with science and 
engineering backgrounds and had more concerns about the future since 
their workforces were reaching retirement age. Officials who oversee 
programs cited deficiencies in the program manager workforce- 
particularly when it comes to experience and knowledge in dealing with 
contractors. In addition, funding for testing space technologies has 
decreased, cost to launch experiments have increased, and opportunities 
for testing have been reduced with the loss of the space shuttle, which 
had been partially used for DOD-related technology experiments. DOD 
concurred with our recommendation that it develop plans for addressing 
these shortages. The Congress has also called on DOD to strengthen its 
efforts to revitalize its space workforce, and we are undertaking a 
review for your committee on progress being made by the DOD. 

DOD should also guide its decisions to start acquisition programs with 
an overall investment strategy. Our recent reports on space and other 
weapon systems have suggested that having a department-wide investment 
strategy for weapon systems would help reduce pressures facing 
acquisition programs. For space in particular, a strategy would help 
DOD rebalance its investments in acquisition programs as it continues 
to contend with cost increases from its programs. Moreover, it would 
also help DOD balance investments between S&T and acquisition. This is 
particularly important since DOD is undertaking a range of initiatives- 
collectively known as operationally responsive space-designed to 
facilitate evolutionary development, more testing of technologies 
before acquisition, and ultimately, enable DOD to deliver space-based 
capabilities to the warfighter much faster and cheaper. 

Critical components of an investment strategy would include identifying 
overall capabilities and how to achieve them, that is, what role space 
will play versus other air-, sea-, and land-based assets; identifying 
priorities for funding; and implementing mechanisms that would enforce 
the strategy. While DOD has made revisions to its requirements-setting 
and budgeting processes to strengthen investment planning, it is 
unclear as to how these changes will be implemented over time and 
whether they can serve as a foundation for direction of space S&T and 
acquisition investments. 

In conclusion, there is no question that space acquisition programs are 
encountering cost increases and schedule delays that are having 
negative effects-both in terms of DOD's ability to deliver current 
capabilities as well as its ability to deliver future capabilities. 
Many of these problems are rooted in past mistakes and their impact 
will be felt for years to come. Nevertheless, it is exceedingly 
important that DOD takes whatever midcourse corrections it can and 
ensures it has a foundation in place that puts acquisition programs on 
a better path, particularly since DOD is counting on its future space 
programs to play an increasingly critical role in national security and 
military operations. At this juncture, DOD must still adopt practices 
that better match resources to requirements before starting its 
acquisition programs and decide exactly what role space will play in 
achieving future desired capabilities and what programs merit the 
highest priorities. At the same time, DOD must continue its efforts to 
assure it has the right resources to carry out increasingly technically 
challenging programs-including workforce, funds for testing, less 
costly and more responsive launch systems, and standardized components- 
and that it continue to seek ways to deliver capability much more 
efficiently and effectively. All of these changes will not be easy to 
undertake. They require significant shifts in thinking about how space 
systems should be developed; changes in incentives and perceptions; as 
well as further policy and process changes. As a result, these efforts 
will require strong and sustained commitment from senior executives and 
encouragement from the Congress. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my 
statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that you or 
other members of the Subcommittee may have. 

Scope and Methodology: 

In preparing for this testimony, we relied on previously issued GAO 
reports on assessments of individual space programs, incentives and 
pressures that drive space system acquisition problems, common problems 
affecting space system acquisitions, space science and technology, and 
DOD's space acquisition policy, as well as our reports on best 
practices for weapon systems development. We also analyzed DOD's 
Selected Acquisition Reports to assess cost increases and investment 
trends. We conducted our review between June 23 and July 12, 2005 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Contacts and Acknowledgements: 

For future information, please contact Bob Levin at 202-512-4841 or 
levinr@gao.gov. Individuals making contributions to this testimony 
include Acknowledgments Cristina Chaplain, Maricela Cherveny, Art 
Gallegos, Jean Harker, John Krump, and Nancy Rothlisberger. 

(120472): 

FOOTNOTES

[1] 10 U.S.C § 2433.