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Report to the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

June 2005: 

Defense Acquisitions: 

Resolving Development Risks in the Army's Networked Communications 
Capabilities Is Key to Fielding Future Force: 

GAO-05-669: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-05-669, a report to the Honorable Jerry Lewis, 
Chairman, House Committee on Appropriations: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Army has embarked on a major transformation of its force. Central 
to this transformation is the Future Combat Systems (FCS), a $108 
billion effort to provide warfighters with the vehicles, weapons, and 
communications needed to identify and respond to threats with speed, 
precision, and lethality. 

Establishing reliable, robust communications and networking 
capabilities is key to FCS‘s success. Each of the systems integral to 
the FCS communications network—the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), 
the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), and the System of 
Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE)—rely on significant 
advances in current technologies and must be fully integrated to 
realize FCS. Given the complexity and costs of this undertaking, GAO 
was asked to review each of these key development efforts to identify 
any risks that may jeopardize the successful fielding of FCS.

What GAO Found: 

Each of the programs for developing FCS’s communications network is 
struggling to meet ambitious sets of user requirements and steep 
technical challenges within highly compressed schedules. As currently 
structured, the programs are at risk of not delivering intended 
capabilities for the first spiral of FCS, slated to start in fiscal 
year 2008.

The JTRS Cluster 1 program—a program to develop radios for ground 
vehicles and helicopters—began development with an aggressive schedule, 
immature technologies, and a lack of clearly defined and stable 
requirements. As currently designed, the radio will only have a 
transmission range of only 3 kilometers—well short of the required 10 
kilometers—and will not meet security requirements for operating in an 
open networked environment. The program’s struggle to mature and 
integrate key technologies has contributed to significant cost and 
schedule growth. A recent review of the program concluded that the 
current program structure is not executable, and in April 2005, DOD 
directed the Army to stop work and notify the contractor that it was 
considering terminating the contract.

Meeting requirements for JTRS Cluster 5 radios—miniaturized radios, 
including those that soldiers carry—is even more technically 
challenging given their smaller size, weight, and power needs. The 
smallest of these radios weighs only about 1 pound, compared with 84 
pounds for Cluster 1 radios. Several programmatic changes and a 
contract award bid protest have further slowed program progress. The 
Army is considering options for restructuring the program to meet the 
needs of FCS and address the technical issues encountered in the 
Cluster 1 program.

The Army does not expect to fully mature the technologies for WIN-
T—communications equipment that supports an expanded area of 
battlefield operations and interfaces with JTRS radios—when production 
begins in March 2006. Moreover, the compressed schedule assumes nearly 
flawless execution and does not allow sufficient time for correcting 
problems. Significant interdependencies among the critical technologies 
further increase overall program risk. The program was directed to 
deliver networking and communications capabilities sooner to meet near-
term warfighting needs and synchronize with the restructured FCS 
program. A plan for how to develop and field WIN-T capabilities sooner 
to address FCS needs remains undetermined.
 
According to Army network system integration officials, SOSCOE—the 
operating software to integrate the communications network—may not 
reach the necessary technical maturity level required to meet program 
milestones. In addition, top-level FCS requirements are still evolving 
and have not been translated into more detailed specifications 
necessary for writing SOSCOE software. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is making recommendations aimed at reducing development risks so 
that FCS is provided with enabling communications and networking 
capabilities. If FCS proceeds without these capabilities, critical 
aspects of the FCS network will remain undemonstrated. In commenting on 
this report, the Department of Defense indicated it has begun taking 
actions to address our recommendations.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-669.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Paul L. Francis at (202) 
512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

JTRS Cluster 1 Began System Development without Requisite Knowledge, 
Resulting in Cost and Schedule Problems: 

Technical Challenges and Program Changes Have Impeded Cluster 5 
Progress: 

Ambitious WIN-T Acquisition Approach Puts Program At Risk of Cost and 
Schedule Growth: 

SOSCOE Development at Risk because of Software Maturity and Evolving 
Requirements: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: JTRS Cluster 1 Cost and Schedule Variance: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Future Communications and Networking Capabilities Compared 
with Current Capabilities: 

Table 2: A Comparison of Size, Weight, Power, and the Number of Stored 
Waveforms for Selected Cluster 5 and Cluster 1 Radios: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: FCS Network Components: 

Figure 2: FCS Spirals' Timeline: 

Figure 3: Knowledge-Based Development Compared with JTRS Cluster 1 
Development: 

Figure 4: JTRS Current Cluster 1 Size, Weight, and Power Compared with 
Helicopter Requirements: 

Figure 5: Knowledge-Based Development Compared with JTRS Cluster 5 
Development: 

Figure 6: Interdependencies among Cluster 5 Critical Technologies: 

Figure 7: Knowledge-Based Development Compared with WIN-T Development: 

Figure 8: Cost Performance of JTRS Cluster 1 and Waveform Development 
from August 2003 to January 2005: 

Figure 9: Schedule Performance of JTRS Cluster 1 and Waveform 
Development from August 2003 to January 2005: 

Abbreviations: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

FCS: Future Combat Systems: 

GHz: gigahertz: 

JNTC-S: Joint Network Transport Capability-Spiral: 

JTRS: Joint Tactical Radio System: 

MHz: megahertz: 

SOSCOE: System of Systems Common Operating Environment: 

WIN-T: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical: 

[End of section]

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

June 15, 2005: 

The Honorable Jerry Lewis Chairman: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

To counter the complex set of battlefield threats that have emerged 
since the Cold War, the Army has embarked on a major transformation of 
its force. Central to this transformation is the Future Combat Systems 
(FCS) program, a large and difficult effort to develop a suite of new 
manned and unmanned ground and air vehicles, sensors, and munitions 
linked by a new information network, with a total cost of at least $108 
billion. FCS will depend on this network to provide Army warfighters 
and commanders with the high-quality data and real-time communications 
needed to identify and respond to threats with speed, precision, and 
lethality. Indeed, the network's performance is what makes the FCS 
concept work--superior information enables the FCS vehicles to be 
lethal and survivable despite weighing a fraction of what today's 
vehicles weigh. Continuously providing the quality and volume of 
information necessary for the force to operate seamlessly together 
places significant demands on the network components. The components 
must generate high power, work at long range, and be reliable while 
conforming to the tight physical constraints of the small FCS systems. 

Four key systems are integral to the FCS communications network: 

* Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 1, which is developing 
radios for ground vehicles and helicopters;

* JTRS Cluster 5, which is developing small radios, including those 
that soldiers carry;

* Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), which is developing 
a high-capacity communications network for higher-level command units; 
and: 

* System of Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE), which is 
being developed as part of the FCS program and is the operating 
software that integrates the communications network. 

If JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE do not work as intended, battlefield 
information will not be sufficient for FCS units to operate 
effectively. JTRS Cluster 1 and Cluster 5 radios and new advanced 
networking waveforms[Footnote 1] are expected to provide the warfighter 
with a high-capacity, high-speed information link to access maps and 
other visual data, communicate on-the-move via voice and video with 
other units and levels of command, and obtain data directly from 
battlefield sensors. WIN-T is expected to provide military commanders 
access to intelligence, logistics, and other data critical to making 
battlefield decisions and supporting battlefield operations. 
Collectively, JTRS and WIN-T are estimated to cost over $34 billion to 
develop and produce, above the $108 billion cost of FCS. SOSCOE is the 
interface that allows all the systems to communicate with one another. 
The Army plans to begin fielding the full set of FCS systems to brigade-
size units in 2014. However, the Army also plans to field FCS 
capabilities to the current force incrementally through spirals. The 
first FCS spiral is scheduled for the 2008-2010 timeframe and 
emphasizes enhanced communications and network capabilities. 

Because JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE all rely on significant advances in 
current technologies and capabilities and must be fully integrated to 
realize FCS, there are substantial risks to this effort. Given the 
complexity of this undertaking and the size of the investment, you 
asked us to review each of these key development efforts to identify 
any risks that may jeopardize the successful fielding of FCS's 
communications and networking capabilities. 

We conducted our review from January 2004 through May 2005 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. To 
assess the development risks of each system, we obtained and reviewed 
relevant documents, including program acquisition reports, technology 
readiness assessments, test and evaluation plans, cost performance 
reports, and other information. We also met with various program and 
agency officials and obtained in-depth briefings on the system 
development efforts. More details about our scope and methodology are 
in appendix I. 

Results in Brief: 

The JTRS Cluster 1 program began development several years ago with an 
aggressive schedule, immature technologies, and a lack of clearly 
defined and stable requirements. Since then, the program has continued 
to struggle to mature and integrate key technologies and has been 
forced to make major design changes. For example, the Cluster 1 design 
does not generate sufficient power or meet size and weight constraints. 
Consequently, the radio's projected range is only 3 kilometers--well 
short of the 10 kilometer range required. In addition, the radio design 
is not sufficient to meet security requirements for operating in an 
open networked environment. These factors have contributed to 
significant cost and schedule problems that led the Army in December 
2004 to propose restructuring the program by adding $458 million and 24 
months to the development effort. However, recently the Department of 
Defense (DOD) directed that work on the Cluster 1 radios be stopped 
while an assessment is conducted to determine the future of the 
program. In addition, the Army is concerned about the contractor's 
ability to develop the radios and notified the contractor that it was 
considering a contract termination. At this point it is not clear what 
the outcome will be and what impact this will have on the future of the 
program. Consequently, it is unlikely the Cluster 1 radios will be 
available for the start of the first spiral of the FCS network, slated 
for fiscal year 2008. This is especially critical for FCS, as Cluster 1 
is to provide what has been called the backbone of the FCS network--a 
Wideband Networking Waveform that will serve as the main conduit of 
information to and from Army tactical units. 

The JTRS Cluster 5 program has also experienced technical challenges 
and program changes that have impeded progress. Meeting requirements 
for JTRS Cluster 5 radios is even more challenging than for Cluster 1, 
given Cluster 5 radios' smaller size, weight, and power needs. For 
example, the smallest of these radios, which weigh only about 1 pound 
each, compared with 84 pounds for Cluster 1, are not going to be able 
to provide the power and cooling needed for the Wideband Networking 
Waveform. In addition, the program will require a new networking 
waveform, the Soldier Radio Waveform. Several programmatic changes and 
a contract award bid protest have also slowed progress of the Cluster 5 
program. Furthermore, in light of unresolved technical issues with the 
Cluster 1 program, DOD has initiated an assessment to restructure the 
Cluster 5 program. Consequently, Cluster 5 small form radios needed for 
the first spiral of FCS may not be available in time. The Army is 
seeking ways to accelerate program deliveries. 

The WIN-T program also began with an aggressive schedule and immature 
technologies. None of the critical technologies will be fully mature at 
the time production begins in March 2006. The tightly compressed 
schedule assumes nearly flawless execution and may not allow sufficient 
time for correcting problems. In addition, significant 
interdependencies among critical technologies further increase overall 
program risk. Any delay in maturing an individual technology may hinder 
the program's ability to achieve its performance objectives-- 
specifically, on-the-move communications. Other critical program 
issues, such as deciding on a suitable airborne platform to achieve on- 
the-move communications, remain unresolved. More recently, the program 
shifted its focus to deliver networking and communications capabilities 
sooner to meet near-term warfighting needs while continuing to support 
the restructured FCS program. A plan for how to develop and field WIN- 
T capabilities sooner to address FCS needs remains undetermined. 

SOSCOE faces the dual challenge of a software development that is high- 
risk and evolving requirements. According to Army program officials, 
SOSCOE software may not reach the necessary technical maturity level 
required to meet program milestones. In addition, top-level FCS 
requirements are still evolving and have not been translated into more 
detailed specifications necessary for writing SOSCOE software. As a 
result, it is unclear whether SOSCOE will be sufficiently developed to 
support the first spiral of FCS beginning in fiscal year 2008. 

Given the criticality of these four systems to the performance of the 
FCS network, this report makes recommendations to the Secretary of 
Defense aimed at reducing their development risks so that they provide 
the first spiral of FCS with enabling communications and networking 
capabilities. In commenting on a draft of our report, DOD generally 
concurred with our findings and recommendations. As part of its 
comments, DOD provided some information on actions it has begun to take 
to address each of our recommendations. While these actions should help 
strengthen the management of JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE, we remain 
concerned that a demonstration of FCS's communications and networking 
capabilities will not be known for some time. Until these capabilities 
are demonstrated, investment in FCS platforms and systems carries 
substantial risk. 

Background: 

Over the last decade, the Army has begun to transform its warfighting 
capabilities to more effectively counter a broad and complex set of 
potential threats. According to Army officials, the transformation is 
the most comprehensive change in the Army in over a century, and will 
affect all aspects of its organizations, training, doctrine, 
leadership, and strategic plans as well as its acquisitions. Through 
this transformation, the Army expects to establish a force that 
provides both the lethality and survivability of today's heavily 
armored units and the deployability and responsiveness of today's 
lighter combat units. As envisioned, the future force will operate very 
differently than forces have in the past. It will function in smaller, 
more agile and deployable modular brigade combat teams (composed of 
roughly 3,000 to 4,000 personnel) that can react quickly to changing 
missions and circumstances. To be effective, force components-- 
soldiers, platforms, weapons, and sensors--must be "net-centric," that 
is, closely linked and able to operate seamlessly together. 

The transformation involves two major, interrelated acquisitions: (1) 
development of new advanced communications and networking systems-- 
computers, software, and a wireless tactical internet--to acquire, 
exchange, and employ timely information throughout the battlespace and 
(2) development of a new generation of battlefield vehicles, weapons, 
and sensors. The Army has taken initial steps toward transformation 
through its Digitization and Stryker programs. Under the Digitization 
program, the Army installed computers, software, and interfaces to 
communications systems on Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and 
other vehicles in selected units that enable both in-theater and higher 
commands to share battlefield data with lower-level units. The Stryker 
program introduced a new family of vehicles expected to make units more 
lethal, mobile, and survivable than today's light forces. In addition, 
the Army has initiated a major restructuring of its force into modular 
brigade combat teams--brigade-sized units that will have a common 
organizational design. 

FCS is the culminating stage in the Army's ongoing transformation to a 
lighter, more agile and capable force. It is a large and complex 
development effort to provide a networked family of weapons and other 
systems for the future force. Establishing reliable, robust 
communications and networking capabilities is essential to FCS. Without 
these capabilities, the lighter, more decentralized units would be 
vulnerable to enemy attack. 

Currently, the armed forces have limited communications and networking 
capabilities on the battlefield, making it necessary to patch together 
or reroute information through multiple radio, data terminal, and 
network systems to get critical information to the warfighter and 
commanders. Current "dial-up speed" data rates further delay forces' 
ability to identify, assess, and respond to time-critical targets. 
FCS's networked on-the-move communications for voice, data, video, and 
imagery are expected to be a revolutionary improvement over current 
communications capabilities (see table 1). 

Table 1: Future Communications and Networking Capabilities Compared 
with Current Capabilities: 

Capability: Interoperability; 
Current: Numerous unique systems, noninteroperable; 
Future force: Small number of systems, interoperable. 

Capability: Mobility; 
Current: Point-to-point, with limited mobility; 
Future force: Mobile and integrated network operations. 

Capability: Data rate; 
Current: Low data rate--mostly voice; 
Future force: High data rate--voice, data, video, imagery that can 
communicate simultaneously. 

Capability: Range; 
Current: Mostly line-of-sight, limiting performance in urban settings, 
mountainous terrain, and other complex environments; 
Future force: Expanded to include beyond line-of-sight. 

Capability: Links; 
Current: Single network thread to fixed/relocatable operations centers; 
Future force: Network integrated warfighting platforms with mobile 
operations centers and seamless connectivity from foxhole to the 
Pentagon. 

Capability: Speed; 
Current: Dial-up speed; 
Future force: Broadband speed. 

Capability: Security; 
Current: Susceptible to interception and detection by adversaries; 
Future force: Multiple levels of security with reduced probability of 
interception and detection. 

Capability: Efficiency; 
Current: Circuit-switched, spectrum inefficient; 
Future force: Packet-switched, spectrum efficient. 

Capability: Flexibility; 
Current: Defense unique/proprietary technology--inflexible; 
Future force: Open-systems architecture-- drawing on universal Internet-
Protocol-based commercial technology, flexible, standards-based. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

[End of table]

The FCS communications and networking capabilities are being designed 
around five components: 

* Platforms and sensors: Under FCS, the Army is developing new 
warfighting systems, including manned and unmanned aerial and ground 
vehicles that will provide and use intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance information. 

* Applications: Software applications will support battlefield command 
functions, including command and control, logistics support, training, 
and modeling and simulation. 

* Network services: SOSCOE will be the network-centric operating 
system, or middleware, that enables the integration of separate FCS 
communications software packages, independent of their location and the 
technology used to develop them. The Army likens the SOSCOE 
architecture to Microsoft Windows, but many times larger. SOSCOE 
represents about 10 percent of the more than 30 million lines of FCS 
software code. 

* Transport systems: Transport systems--primarily JTRS and WIN-T--will 
provide wireless communication capabilities to transport information 
within the FCS network and the broader DOD-wide network. 

* Standards: Standards implement DOD-wide policies and doctrine 
developed by offices such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Networks and Information Integration, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
Two critical objectives of these standards are net-centric operations 
and inter-service interoperability. 

Figure 1 shows a representation of the five FCS network components. 

Figure 1: FCS Network Components: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

JTRS is a software-reprogrammable radio that is intended to operate 
with many different legacy radio systems and provide the warfighter 
with additional communications and networking capabilities--including 
seamless interoperability and increased data throughput--to 
simultaneously access maps and other visual data, communicate via voice 
and video with other units and levels of command, and obtain 
information directly from battlefield sensors. A key component of JTRS 
is developing waveforms to operate with legacy radios as well as new 
waveforms to provide advanced networking capabilities, such as the 
Wideband Networking Waveform. The Wideband Networking Waveform 
represents a new, critical capability for DOD. The development of the 
Wideband Networking Waveform is intended to address many of the current 
limitations associated with DOD tactical wireless networking, including 
line-of-sight limitations that cause many network partitions, unique 
network monitoring systems, and predefined security enclaves that 
require hardware for each security level. The waveform is expected to 
provide data rates of 5 megabits per second or more--hundreds of times 
faster than existing communications systems--and facilitate the routing 
of large amounts of information among users anywhere in the 
battlespace. 

DOD has structured the JTRS development effort into several programs 
clustered by requirements. The JTRS Cluster 1 program is developing 
radios for ground vehicles and helicopters to equip the current force 
as well as FCS. The program is expected to cost $15.6 billion to 
develop and acquire over 100,000 Cluster 1 radios. The JTRS Cluster 5 
program is developing handheld and manpack radios for soldiers as well 
as several smaller varieties of radios for use in weight-and power- 
constrained platforms--such as Unattended Ground Sensors and 
Intelligent Munitions Systems. The program is expected to cost $8.5 
billion to develop and acquire over 300,000 Cluster 5 radios. 

The WIN-T program is developing communications equipment that supports 
an expanded area of battlefield operations and interfaces with JTRS 
radios to connect warfighters and command centers, including joint, 
allied, and coalition forces, providing commanders with access to on- 
the-move communications--that is, continuously updated, real-time 
multimedia information from dispersed locations throughout the theater. 
It will replace existing communications networks that have limited 
capacity to support on-the-move communications. Leveraging advanced 
commercial technologies that enable mobile communications, the WIN-T 
system includes data routing and switching hardware, computers, video 
and teleconferencing equipment, high-capacity line-of-sight radios and 
satellite terminals--all of which make up a tactical operation center's 
communications element. WIN-T is being developed in three blocks, with 
each block adding capabilities. Based on current plans, Block 1 is 
projected to cost approximately $10 billion; Blocks 2 and 3 have yet to 
be funded. 

The SOSCOE software will reside within each FCS platform's integrated 
computer system and provide a number of services for the users of the 
integrated computer system. These services include interoperability 
services, information assurance services, and communications services. 
SOSCOE will enable integrated management of the network and will allow 
systems within the network to access sources of information. The Army 
estimates that SOSCOE software development will be completed in 2011. 
The Army plans to field the SOSCOE software in increments to align with 
the overall FCS software builds and planned FCS spirals. 

When FCS began system development in May 2003, the JTRS and WIN-T 
programs were under way with schedules that aligned with FCS planned 
fielding. However, the Army restructured the FCS program in July 2004 
to address development risks. The restructuring added 4 years to 
develop the platform systems and established an evaluation unit to 
demonstrate FCS capabilities. Even though the restructuring provided 
additional time to the program, it also emphasized developing FCS 
capabilities in spirals and accelerating the development of the network 
into the current force. The Army now plans to test and field its FCS 
capabilities incrementally between 2008 and 2014 through four spirals. 
A 2-year period of testing will precede the actual fielding of 
capabilities in each spiral. The Army has defined the initial spiral of 
FCS around the capabilities needed by the current force, to include the 
main components of the communications network--JTRS Cluster 1 and 5 
radios and the wideband waveforms, some form of WIN-T communications 
capability, and SOSCOE. The capabilities for the other FCS spirals will 
be defined over time. Figure 2 shows the FCS spirals' timeline. 

Figure 2: FCS Spirals' Timeline: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

JTRS Cluster 1 Began System Development without Requisite Knowledge, 
Resulting in Cost and Schedule Problems: 

The JTRS Cluster 1 program began system development and demonstration 
in 2002 with an aggressive schedule, immature technologies, and a lack 
of clearly defined and stable requirements. These factors have 
contributed to significant cost and schedule problems that the program 
has not recovered from. The program has not been able to mature the 
technologies needed to produce radios that generate sufficient power as 
well as meet platform size and weight constraints and has been forced 
to make design changes to accommodate evolving security requirements. 
Because of cost, schedule, and performance problems, in December 2004, 
the Army proposed restructuring the program by adding $458 million and 
24 months to the development schedule. However, recently DOD directed 
that work on the Cluster 1 radios be stopped while an assessment is 
completed to determine the future of the program. In addition, because 
of increased concern about the contractor's ability to develop the 
radios, the Army notified the contractor that it was considering 
contract termination. At this point it is not clear what the outcome 
will be and what impact this will have on the future of the program. As 
a result, it is unlikely JTRS Cluster 1 radios will be available for 
the first FCS network spiral, slated to begin in fiscal year 2008. FCS 
and other users dependent on Cluster 1 radios, such as Army 
helicopters, will have to rely on legacy radios to fill the gap. 

Accelerated Schedule Incompatible with System Immaturity: 

Prior to the start of system development in 2002, the JTRS Cluster 1 
schedule was accelerated 27 months to meet the Army's plan to modernize 
its helicopters with various technological upgrades including advanced 
communications. Cluster 1 proceeded into the system development and 
demonstration phase with none of the program's 20 critical technologies 
sufficiently matured and with requirements not clearly defined-- 
contrary to best practices and DOD guidance.[Footnote 2] Although many 
of the technologies had been used in other radio applications, 
significant technical advances were nonetheless required for developing 
key components of the radio. The program's acquisition strategy, for 
example, highlighted technology risks associated with the following 
requirements: 

* Wideband Networking Waveform: As the core of the JTRS networking 
capability, the Wideband Networking Waveform is to operate across a 
wide range of radio frequency spectrum, 2 megahertz (MHz) to 2 
gigahertz (GHz), and provide increased routing and networking 
capabilities. The Wideband Networking Waveform must also be compliant 
with the Software Communications Architecture, which demands a modular 
approach to waveform design, imposing much greater processing and 
memory requirements. This is especially critical for FCS, as the 
waveform is to provide what has been called the backbone or main 
conduit of the FCS network. 

* Security: The JTRS radio set is intended to operate applications at 
multiple levels of security. For it to do so, developers not only have 
to be concerned with traditional radio security issues but also must be 
prepared to implement the features required for network and computer 
security. This will require development of new technologies, obtaining 
certification through a rigorous process by the National Security 
Agency, and accommodating an expected growth in security requirements. 

* Interference mitigation: Prior to JTRS, tactical radios were largely 
designed for single channel and single band operations. Because JTRS 
radio sets will operate multiple channels---as many as eight channels-
--simultaneously within the same radio set, developers must ensure that 
communications over one channel do not interfere with communications 
over another, because such interference would degrade the quality of 
service and limit the radio's high data rate capability. 

The accelerated acquisition strategy compressed the development cycle 
and allowed little time for testing prior to key development decisions. 
For example, the schedule called for making the initial production 
decision for selected platforms immediately following an early 
operational assessment of a partially functioning prototype of the JTRS 
radio in surrogate vehicles (see fig. 3). This is in contrast to the 
knowledge-based approach captured in best practices, which advocates 
making production decisions based on an assessment of production- 
representative prototypes in a realistic environment. Historically, 
programs that must define requirements, develop technology, and design 
products concurrently have experienced cost increases and schedule 
delays. While the Army recognized the risk of moving forward with 
immature technologies, it expected that emerging technologies in radio 
software technology would enable it to develop the critical 
technologies and integrate them into the product quickly. 

Figure 3: Knowledge-Based Development Compared with JTRS Cluster 1 
Development: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Despite the Army's expectations to leverage current and emerging radio 
technologies, the critical technologies for the JTRS Cluster 1 radio 
have generally not matured. The program is also struggling to derive 
detailed specifications for Cluster 1 requirements. Despite the lack of 
mature technologies and detailed specifications, the Army held the 
program's critical design review--the point at which design stability 
is to be achieved and demonstrated--in December 2003. However, with the 
requirements still evolving, the program expects to make several costly 
hardware and software design modifications. For example: 

* The current processing and memory capacity of the Network INFOSEC 
Unit, which contains the operating software, is insufficient to support 
full systems operation, including waveform processing, enhanced 
security, and power management. The program plans to double the Network 
INFOSEC Unit's capacity from 256 megabytes of memory to 512 megabytes, 
which will require changes to the hardware design. 

* The National Security Agency has recently determined that the current 
design is not sufficient to meet security requirements to operate in an 
open networked environment. Specifically, particular versions of JTRS 
radios will be used by allied and coalition forces, requiring the Army 
to release specific source code of the software architecture to these 
forces. To address the release, the National Security Agency has 
required changes to the security architecture. While the program has 
not finalized or funded the changes, the current plan is to separate 
the networking and radio functions into two separate processors. 

Size, Weight, and Power Requirements for Key Platform Users Have 
Presented a Significant Challenge for Cluster 1: 

A key technical challenge in developing the Cluster 1 radio is meeting 
the size, weight, and power requirements for ground vehicles and 
helicopters. To realize the full capabilities of the Wideband 
Networking Waveform, including transmission range, the Cluster 1 radio 
requires significant amounts of memory and processing power, which add 
to the size, weight, and power consumption of the radio. The added size 
and weight are the result of efforts to ensure electronic parts in the 
radio are not overheated by the electricity needed to power the 
additional memory and processing. Thus far, the program has not been 
able to develop radios that meet size, weight, and power requirements, 
and the current projected transmission range is only 3 kilometers--well 
short of the 10-kilometer range required for the Wideband Networking 
Waveform. As a consequence, more unmanned aerial vehicles may be needed 
to relay information. Intended ground vehicle users have accepted a 
deviation in the design--to have some of the radio's hardware mounted 
separately outside the vehicle--with the expectation that the 
contractor will develop a better solution later on. However, deviations 
were not accepted for the helicopters because it would necessitate 
major design changes to the aircraft and adversely affect the aircraft 
modernization schedules. Unlike ground vehicles, aviation platforms are 
limited in their ability to compromise on size, weight, and power 
issues because of the difficulty in maintaining equilibrium while 
airborne. The Cluster 1 radio's size, weight, and peak power 
consumption exceeds helicopter platform requirements by as much as 80 
percent (see fig. 4). 

Figure 4: JTRS Current Cluster 1 Size, Weight, and Power Compared with 
Helicopter Requirements: 

[See PDF for image]--graphic text: 

Bar graph with six items.

JTRS size; 
Performance requirements for aviation: 3,379 cubic inches; 
Size, weight, power (September 2004): 5,826 cubic inches. 

JTRS weight; 
Performance requirements for aviation: 115 pounds; 
Size, weight, power (September 2004): 207 pounds. 

JTRS peak power consumption; 
Performance requirements for aviation: 1,364 watts; 
Size, weight, power (September 2004): 2,444 watts. 

Source: Department of Defense. 

[End of figure]

To meet the JTRS size, weight, and power requirements and realize the 
full capabilities of the Wideband Networking Waveform, significant 
technology advances in power amplification and cooling are essential. 
The Army has initiated science and technology development efforts to 
address these issues, but it will take time to evolve the technologies 
to an acceptable level of maturity. In addition to conducting other 
research, the Army is evaluating technologies associated with a 
communications and navigation system that was being developed as part 
of the Comanche helicopter program. The Army approved further 
development of this system and plans to integrate it into the JTRS 
system and conduct a demonstration of its capabilities later this year. 
However, the Army will not be able to deliver Cluster 1 radios to 
support the helicopter fielding schedules and will have to purchase 
legacy radios instead. 

The FCS program is exploring solutions to meet a key transportability 
requirement that FCS vehicles must be limited to 19 tons in order to be 
airlifted by a C-130 transport aircraft. To meet this transportability 
requirement, the program recently proposed significant size and weight 
reductions for vehicle components, including communications equipment. 
While Cluster 1 currently has no size, weight, and power requirements 
for the systems to be fielded in FCS, the JTRS radios may require 
further redesign to meet FCS's aggressive weight requirements. Such a 
reduction would likely have a significant impact on the design of JTRS 
radios for the FCS vehicles. 

Cluster 1 Has Experienced Significant Cost and Schedule Growth: 

Since the program entered systems development, in 2002, the contractor 
has overrun cost estimates by $93 million--nearly 28 percent above what 
was planned (see app. II). Although the program attempted to stabilize 
costs by adding approximately $200 million to the contract in January 
2004, costs continued to grow steadily thereafter. In addition, the 
contractor has increasingly fallen behind schedule and has had to 
devote more resources than originally planned. In January 2005, the 
prime contractor estimated that the total costs for the Cluster 1 radio 
and waveform development would be $531 million more than what was 
originally budgeted, reaching about $898 million at completion. 
However, according to program officials, since contract award, the 
prime contractor has not demonstrated strong cost estimating and cost 
management techniques, and it is difficult to estimate with any 
confidence what the overall program is likely to cost. Key issues 
driving the cost growth are unanticipated complexity associated with 
developing the hardware, Wideband Networking Waveform, and other 
software. As a result, the unit costs for early prototypes have 
increased from the prime contractor's original proposal. According to 
one DOD official, until the requirements' specifications are 
stabilized, cost and schedule problems are likely to continue. For 
example, according to the Defense Contract Management Agency, meeting 
the design changes for security requirements is expected to cost an 
estimated $80 million. 

Future of Cluster 1 is Uncertain: 

In light of the technical problems and cost growth, the Army in 
December 2004 delayed the initial production decision, which was 
scheduled for the third quarter of fiscal year 2005, and proposed to 
add $458 million and 24 months to the program. Before carrying out this 
restructure, the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the Army 
in January 2005 to stop work on portions of the Cluster 1 development 
and focus on preparing for an early operational assessment of the 
radio, which was intended to test the basic functionality of pre- 
engineering development models of the radio.[Footnote 3] In April 2005, 
however, the Army suspended the operational assessment and notified the 
contractor that it was considering contract termination. This action 
was taken based on initial findings of an assessment of the Cluster 1 
program conducted by a newly established JTRS Joint Program Executive 
Office, which concluded that the current program structure is not 
executable and the contractor's ability to develop the radio is 
questionable. 

At this point it is not clear whether the contract will be terminated 
and what impact a termination would have on the future of the program. 
The Joint Program Executive Office is expected to complete its 
assessment of the program, and a Defense Acquisition Board review will 
be held at the end of fiscal year 2005 to determine the future of the 
program. Program officials anticipate a new program acquisition 
strategy will evolve, with greater emphasis on developing the radio in 
blocks. If development resumes, it is anticipated that there will be 
start-up delays--3 to 12 months, according to agency officials-- 
associated with restaffing the contractor's development team and 
bringing the team up the learning curve. 

Adding to the program's uncertainty is the impact of pending 
requirements on program cost and schedule. According to agency 
officials, the program will likely be tasked with new requirements from 
key stakeholders. For example: 

* To meet FCS requirements for accessing intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance data on the battlefield, FCS will need a new network 
data link operating in the radio frequency range above 2 GHz. According 
to the Army, developing the new network data link is expected to cost 
approximately $170 million. Furthermore, additional costs are likely 
because the new network data link may require changes to the already 
challenging JTRS Cluster 1 radio design--which operates over a large 2 
MHz to 2 GHz range--to operate at an even higher frequency. An analysis 
of alternatives is currently under way to determine how best to meet 
this requirement. According to FCS officials, a decision on the new 
network data link is needed by the end of the year to keep the FCS 
program on track. 

* To comply with the standards of the Global Information Grid, DOD has 
directed all systems to transition to the use of Internet Protocol 
Version 6 in the future. Cluster 1, which has been designed with 
Version 4, not only will need to upgrade but will need additional 
hardware and software to ensure Version 4 and Version 6 systems can 
interoperate. Reconciling security requirements for Version 6 is also 
expected to be a challenge. 

Given the many program uncertainties, it is unlikely that JTRS radios 
will be available to support intended users: the first increment of the 
FCS network slated for fiscal year 2008, Stryker Brigade Combat Team 
ground vehicles, and helicopters. The Army plans to purchase legacy 
radios, which have limited capabilities, for the Stryker Brigade Combat 
Teams and helicopters. According to Army officials, FCS is planning to 
experiment with early prototypes of JTRS radios and the Wideband 
Networking Waveform, but they will not know when the fully capable 
Cluster 1 radios would be available until after the program is 
restructured at the end of fiscal year 2005. In addition, because of 
ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army has 
purchased a large number of legacy radios over the past few years. The 
fielding of so many new radios to the current force may call into 
question the affordability of replacing them prematurely with JTRS 
sets. The Army is assessing JTRS fielding plans in light of the 
additional investments in legacy radios and JTRS Cluster 1 cost, 
schedule, and technical problems. 

Technical Challenges and Program Changes Have Impeded Cluster 5 
Progress: 

As with the Cluster 1 program, radio size, weight, power, and data- 
processing requirements have presented significant technical challenges 
for the JTRS Cluster 5 program, which is developing a series of radios 
much smaller than those for the Cluster 1 program. Several programmatic 
changes and a contract award bid protest have contributed to 
disruptions in the progress of the Cluster 5 program. As a result, the 
Cluster 5 program is no longer synchronized with the FCS program. The 
Army is currently assessing the feasibility of accelerating the 
development of selected small form Cluster 5 radios. However, in light 
of the unresolved technical issues with the Cluster 1 program, the JTRS 
Joint Program Executive Office has initiated an assessment to 
restructure the Cluster 5 program into increments. In the event that 
Cluster 5 radios are not available, the Army plans to use surrogate 
radios for the initial spiral of FCS. In addition, users depending on 
the Cluster 5 radios, such as the Army's Land Warrior program, have 
decided to move forward with surrogate radios. 

Technical Challenges Have Impeded Cluster 5 Program Progress: 

Meeting requirements for Cluster 5 radios is even more challenging than 
for Cluster 1 because of their smaller size, weight, power, and large 
data-processing requirements. For example, a one-channel handheld 
version of the Cluster 5 radios has a maximum weight specification of 2 
pounds and a volume of 40 cubic inches (see table 2). A two-channel 
manpack radio has weight and volume of 9 pounds and 400 cubic inches, 
respectively. A one-channel small form radio weighs about 1 pound and 
occupies 40 cubic inches. In comparison, a Cluster 1 two-channel radio 
weighs 84 pounds and occupies 1,732 cubic inches. Despite their extreme 
size and weight limitations, Cluster 5 radios are still required to 
store multiple waveforms. For instance, manpack radios will be required 
to store at least 10 waveforms, handheld sets 6 waveforms, and the 
small form sets 2 waveforms. 

Table 2: A Comparison of Size, Weight, Power, and the Number of Stored 
Waveforms for Selected Cluster 5 and Cluster 1 Radios: 

Cluster: Cluster 5; 
Radio type: two-channel manpack; 
Size in cubic inches: 400; 
Weight in pounds: 9; 
Number of stored waveforms: 10; 
Power in watts: 20. 

Cluster: Cluster 5; 
Radio type: one-channel handheld; 
Size in cubic inches: 40; 
Weight in pounds: 2; 
Number of stored waveforms: 6; 
Power in watts: 5. 

Cluster: Cluster 5; 
Radio type: one-channel small form; 
Size in cubic inches: 40; 
Weight in pounds: 1.2; 
Number of stored waveforms: 2; 
Power in watts: N/A. 

Cluster: Cluster 1; 
Radio type: two-channel; 
Size in cubic inches: 1,732; 
Weight in pounds: 84; 
Number of stored waveforms: 10; 
Power in watts: 838. 

Source: Army documents. 

Note: N/A = not available. 

[End of table]

The Cluster 5 program began system development and demonstration with 
immature technologies, especially those related to the handheld and 
smaller variants because of the limited size, weight, and power 
allowances (see fig. 5). According to the Army, the requirements for 
two-channel small form radios--wideband radio frequency capabilities up 
to 2500 MHz, thermal management and packaging, and complex security 
architecture--all introduce unique technological challenges. Cluster 5 
program officials had expected to leverage technology from the Cluster 
1 program. However, the Cluster 1 technologies have not matured as 
anticipated. Program officials stated that backup technology will be 
identified as a part of a risk mitigation plan. 

Figure 5: Knowledge-Based Development Compared with JTRS Cluster 5 
Development: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

The JTRS Cluster 5 program has identified six critical technologies as 
follows: 

* Microelectronics: Microelectronics addresses the processes for 
producing and packaging the electronic circuits and systems that make 
up the Cluster 5 radios. Miniaturization technology and 
microelectronics components are critical to the feasibility of Cluster 
5 radios because of their extremely small size. 

* Environmental protection: Environmental protection describes the 
technologies, tools, or design considerations necessary to protect the 
radios from potentially harsh effects of the operational environment, 
including, for example, lightning, short-duration force impacts, or 
radioactive contaminants. 

* Power management: One of the greatest challenges in designing and 
implementing the Cluster 5 radios is the management and conservation of 
the limited amount of available battery power. Power management refers 
to the set of technologies that facilitate a reduction in energy 
consumption or an increase in battery capacity with the goal of 
obtaining longer operating time and a reduced battery size and weight. 

* Multichannel architecture: Multichannel JTRS radios are required to 
provide multiple, independent channels to simultaneously transmit and 
receive information using different waveforms. The compact size of the 
Cluster 5 radios and requirement for simultaneous multichannel 
operation present a co-site interference mitigation challenge. 

* Antennas: Cluster 5 JTRS radios are required to transmit and receive 
multiple waveforms over the large frequency range 2 MHz to 2.5 GHz and 
are further required to transmit and receive two separate waveforms 
simultaneously with a maximum of three antennas. The requirements 
impose unique technical challenges for both antenna and radio designs. 

* Security: Cluster 5 security framework must support Multiple Single 
Levels of Security to allow the processing of information with 
different classifications and categories. It also must support an over- 
the-air download capability of waveforms, which will entail large 
software files. It has yet to be demonstrated in a relevant 
environment. 

The Cluster 5 radios are required to store and operate the Wideband 
Networking Waveform. This will provide high data rates and networking 
capabilities for mobile forces. The full Wideband Networking Waveform 
requires significant amounts of memory and processing power, which may 
not be available for the Cluster 5 radios. According to the program 
office, the principal challenge in operating the Wideband Networking 
Waveform on Cluster 5 radios stems from the significantly smaller size, 
weight, and power requirements when compared with those for Cluster 1, 
as well as safety and heat considerations for the soldier. Because of 
the difficulties in overcoming these challenges, the Cluster 5 program 
is seeking to ease the waveform's requirements and reduce the power 
demands of the software. 

The Cluster 5 program is also developing another new, wideband waveform 
called the Soldier Radio Waveform. Although less powerful than the 
Wideband Networking Waveform, it is expected to provide the needed 
network services for battery-powered radios with limited power and 
antenna size such as the handheld and the small form varieties. Cluster 
5 radios with the Soldier Radio Waveform will enable squad-level 
communications and interoperability with other radios and work on a 
network based on the Wideband Networking Waveform. The Soldier Radio 
Waveform is expected to be available in 2008. However, the development 
of this waveform is being managed as a science and technology effort by 
the Army's Communications-Electronics Research Development and 
Engineering Center until it is matured and can be transitioned into the 
JTRS program. To support the first FCS spiral in the 2008-2010 
timeframe, the Army has acknowledged that it may have to use an early 
version of the Soldier Radio Waveform and a surrogate radio to operate 
the waveform. Compounding the challenges in developing the waveform is 
the Army's assessment that developing the Soldier Radio Waveform's 
network manager is high risk and has yet to be funded.[Footnote 4] 
Without the network manager functionality, the Soldier Radio Waveform 
will not be able to interface with the Wideband Networking Waveform. 

A number of JTRS Cluster 5 technologies are interdependent (see fig. 6) 
that, in our opinion, can exacerbate the technical and program risks of 
moving forward with immature technologies. For example, power 
management is dependent upon microelectronics, multichannel 
architecture, antennas, and security. A lag in the development of any 
of these technologies could result in a lag in the development of power 
management. 

Figure 6: Interdependencies among Cluster 5 Critical Technologies: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Because of the criticality of the size, weight, and power challenge 
faced by all variants of the JTRS radios, the program office is 
pursuing various solutions to the problem. The program, for example, 
hopes to benefit from the Army's science and technology research on 
developing wideband power amplifiers and advanced passive cooling 
technology. 

Cluster 5 Schedule No Longer Synchronized with FCS Schedule: 

Several programmatic changes have significantly affected the Cluster 5 
schedule, and the program has focused on delivering manpack radios for 
the near term and handheld and small form radios later. However, the 
availability of small form JTRS radios is of greater importance to FCS 
because they are needed for the planned fielding of three core systems 
in FCS spiral 1. The Army has concluded that the small form radios may 
not be able to meet the FCS schedule and may need to use surrogate 
radios to support the first FCS spiral. 

In May 2003, the responsibility for developing the JTRS handheld and 
manpack radios was shifted from the Special Operations Command to the 
Army because of difficulties in resolving differences over requirements 
and funding among the services. At the same time, the Acting Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics noted 
that the Cluster 5 capabilities would have to be delivered in at least 
two spirals and set an expectation that the Army would deliver 
prototype handheld and manpack radios in the third quarter of fiscal 
year 2005 and low rate initial production would begin by the fourth 
quarter of fiscal year 2006. 

In May 2004, the Army Acquisition Executive approved the Cluster 5 
program for the system development and demonstration phase of 
acquisition. The Army Acquisition Executive moved the Cluster 5 
handheld radios to spiral 2, and it delayed the delivery of the spiral 
1 prototype manpack radios to the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2005 
and the low-rate initial production manpack radios to the first quarter 
of fiscal year 2007. The Army awarded the Cluster 5 contract in the 
middle of July 2004, but had to issue a stop-work order to the 
contractor by the end of July because of the filing of a bid protest by 
the losing contractor. The bid protest was not upheld, but the program 
was delayed another 3 months while the protest was decided. 

In authorizing the May 2004 Cluster 5 program's entry into the system 
development and demonstration phase, the Army Acquisition Executive 
noted the criticality of the JTRS Cluster 5 radio and directed that a 
review be conducted to assess the plans for the spiral 2 portion of the 
program. At a minimum, the review was to assess development schedule 
synchronization, technical performance expectations, integration and 
performance risks, waveform development, maturity, baseline, and 
program affordability. The review was scheduled for the spring of 2005. 
However, because of the ongoing cost, schedule, and technical problems 
with the Cluster 1 program, the JTRS Joint Program Executive Office has 
begun a broader assessment of the Cluster 5 program. On the basis of 
the initial findings of the assessment, development work on the Cluster 
5 spiral 1 radios has been suspended because the office determined that 
key waveforms being developed as part of the Cluster 1 program would 
not be delivered to Cluster 5 when needed. According to the JTRS Joint 
Program Executive Office, a restructuring of Cluster 5 spiral 1 and 2 
is being developed, and it will identify more well defined and 
executable increments. 

While the Cluster 5 manpack and handheld radios are important 
deliverables, of greater urgency for the first spiral of FCS is the 
availability of the small form Cluster 5 radios. These radios will be 
embedded in a variety of sensors and weapons systems. In fact, three 
FCS core systems--Unattended Ground Sensors, Intelligent Munitions 
Systems, and the Non Line of Sight Launch System--need Cluster 5 small 
form radios to support their planned inclusion in the first FCS spiral 
scheduled for the 2008-2010 timeframe. The Army has concluded that the 
schedule for the small form radios is not synchronized with the FCS 
schedule and has asked the contractor for a plan to accelerate 
deliveries. The Army has acknowledged that it may have to use surrogate 
radios, which have limited capabilities, if the Cluster 5 small form 
radios are not available to support the initial fielding of the three 
FCS core systems. In addition, other users depending on the Cluster 5 
radios, such as the Army's Land Warrior program, have decided to move 
forward with surrogate radios. 

Ambitious WIN-T Acquisition Approach Puts Program At Risk of Cost and 
Schedule Growth: 

The WIN-T program entered the system development and demonstration 
phase with only 3 of its 12 critical technologies close to full 
maturity. None of the critical technologies will be fully mature at the 
time production begins in March 2006. Because there are significant 
interdependencies among critical technologies, any delay in maturing an 
individual technology further increases overall program risk. WIN-T has 
gone through a number of program changes, including shifts in the 
program's focus. In the fall of 2004, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense approved the Army's proposal to combine the work of two 
contractors to facilitate early delivery of WIN-T capabilities to the 
warfighter while continuing to focus on the restructured FCS program. A 
decision has recently been made not to accelerate the program or 
develop capabilities sooner. It remains unclear what WIN-T capabilities 
will be provided to the first FCS spiral. The changes, along with 
existing technical challenges, put the program at risk of cost and 
schedule overruns and failure to achieve performance objectives. 

Uncertainties about Technology Development Persist: 

During WIN-T's 32-month systems development and demonstration schedule, 
the program must mature 9 of its 12 critical technologies. Although 
risk mitigation plans were developed in mid-2003 for the 9 immature 
technologies, a program review sponsored by the Army in July 2004 
concluded that the plans lacked sufficient detail. Eight backup 
technologies have been identified, but they are less robust and only 3 
are close to full maturity. Relying on these substitutes may degrade 
network performance resulting in reduced operational capability. 

Contrary to best practices under knowledge-based development, the 
program will continue technology development concurrently with the 
product development and demonstration phase (see fig.7). The tightly 
compressed schedule also assumes nearly flawless execution and may not 
allow sufficient time for correcting problems. For example, the 
combined testing to demonstrate system performance and operational 
functionality is slated to occur just 1 month after critical design 
review. With immature technologies, it will be difficult, at best, to 
demonstrate the system's design stability and determine whether the 
system can be produced affordably and work reliably. In fact, WIN-T 
program officials may be unable to conclude a reliable operational 
capability of on-the-move communications until the system is 
demonstrated in an operational environment early in fiscal year 2009-- 
long after production begins. 

Figure 7: Knowledge-Based Development Compared with WIN-T Development: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

The significant interdependencies among WIN-T's critical technologies 
exacerbate the technical and program risks of moving forward with 
immature technologies. For example, the on-the-move satellite 
communications technologies rely on wideband waveforms, antennas, and 
other technologies to achieve their performance objectives. Therefore, 
a lag in the development of any of these technologies may result in a 
lag in the overall development of mobile communications technologies-- 
a critical component of the operational concept for WIN-T. 

Dependence on External Programs May Hinder the System's Performance: 

Not only is the program faced with technical challenges, but its 
dependence on other programs puts the WIN-T program at risk. WIN-T's 
ability to significantly improve upon current communications 
capabilities relies on demonstrating integrated network operations and 
the ability to work on the move. The WIN-T system depends on other 
programs to provide needed capabilities. Although separate from the WIN-
T program, changes or delays in these external programs may impair WIN-
T's ability to perform. 

For WIN-T, unmanned aerial vehicles are fundamental to the program as 
they route information and extend transmission range that ground 
systems are constrained by--preserving network reliability, 
connectivity, and mobile throughput. Citing their capacity to fly at 
high altitudes, program officials have identified two platforms to 
support WIN-T, the Extended Range Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
or the High Altitude Airship. However, one is not adequately funded for 
a dedicated communications capability, and the other is still in the 
concept development phase. Therefore, a study is under way to assess 
the consequence of not having unmanned aerial vehicles and its 
resulting effect on the network. It is unclear whether the issue will 
be resolved in time for the upcoming development test/operational test 
event. The program plans to use a surrogate plane, but it is unknown 
whether this will adequately assess network reliability and critical on-
the-move communications. 

Central to the WIN-T operational effectiveness is the development of a 
software-programmable radio and wideband waveforms. Together, the radio 
and waveforms are expected to allow warfighters to receive large 
volumes of data while moving around the battlefield at increasing 
speeds. However, given the uncertainty of whether a JTRS radio would be 
available to support WIN-T, the program plans to develop its own high- 
capacity radio, operating above the 2 GHz radio frequency range. To 
meet FCS requirements, the WIN-T radio is expected to run above 2 GHz 
with two new waveforms--a net-centric waveform and a high-capacity 
waveform--and the existing Global Broadcast Service waveform. In 
particular, these waveforms enable distribution of intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance data to provide a more detailed 
picture of the battlefield. To address the need for waveforms operating 
above 2 GHz, the Office of the Secretary of Defense is conducting an 
assessment to identify solutions. However, the results of the study may 
not be available by the critical design review. 

Program Has Undergone Several Strategy Changes: 

Since the WIN-T program was conceived nearly 5 years ago, the program 
strategy has shifted several times. Originally, the program focused on 
designing a network that would meet current force needs. In 2002, the 
program was realigned to focus on a network that would support future 
force needs. Two contractors were to work independently on designing 
the future force network architecture, and the program office would 
select the better of the two. The contractors were given significant 
flexibility in designing the network architecture and developing system 
performance specifications. Two years later, with the global war on 
terrorism and military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, WIN-T was 
directed to focus on developing and fielding network capabilities to 
meet both current and future force needs. To expedite completion of the 
architecture's design, the Army eliminated competition between the two 
contractors in September 2004. Army officials believe that the combined 
team provides a stronger technical solution by taking the best elements 
of each contractor's proposed architecture and maintains some 
competition because over 50 percent of the work will still be competed 
among sub-contractors. In fact, the contractors working together 
completed the network architecture by January 2005--a year earlier than 
previously planned. According to Army officials, the early completion 
of the network architecture allows other Army programs, particularly 
FCS, to stabilize their network designs earlier than planned. 

In conjunction with the WIN-T program's shift in focus to address both 
current and future force needs, the Army fielded a separate program, in 
2004, a beyond-line-of-sight communications network to units deployed 
in Iraq: the Joint Network Transport Capability-Spiral (JNTC-S). 
Although an improvement over past capabilities, JNTC-S is stationary -
-units must come to a standstill and set up their satellite equipment 
to communicate. In contrast, WIN-T is expected to maintain satellite 
connection--regardless of distance, weather conditions, or terrain--- 
while units are in motion. Currently, the Army is assessing how best to 
transition JNTC-S to WIN-T. In addition, the Army is assessing whether 
the WIN-T program can be modified to address the restructured FCS plan 
to field communications and networking capabilities in spirals. Army 
officials concede that, based on available technologies and resources, 
WIN-T block 1 performance requirements may need to be scaled back to 
meet the FCS spiral 1 time frame. For example, the data rate 
requirements for block 1 WIN-T--which calls for an unprecedented data 
throughput rate of 256 kilobits per second while units are moving at 25 
miles per hour--may need to be reduced. Although the Army has decided 
not to accelerate development of WIN-T, it is unclear when plans to 
migrate from the JNTC-S program and address FCS needs will be 
completed. 

SOSCOE Development at Risk because of Software Maturity and Evolving 
Requirements: 

The Army assesses SOSCOE as high-risk. SOSCOE software may not reach 
the necessary technical maturity level required to meet FCS milestones. 
In addition, FCS system-level requirements are still being defined, 
which could affect the SOSCOE design. Consequently, it is unclear 
whether SOSCOE will be sufficiently developed to support the initial 
fielding of FCS beginning in fiscal year 2008. 

SOSCOE Software Availability and Maturity are High-Risk: 

Because SOSCOE software will tie together FCS systems, support battle 
command applications, and enable interoperability with current and 
future forces, it is the fundamental building block upon which a 
substantial portion of FCS will be built. Thus, delays in SOSCOE 
software development could affect FCS' ability to meet production and 
fielding milestones. Since the start of system development, the Army 
has assessed SOSCOE software availability and maturity as high-risk. 
According to program officials, SOSCOE development does not require 
"cutting edge" software technology. However, there are some aspects of 
particular service families that are more challenging than others and 
result in an overall SOSCOE development effort that varies in 
complexity. The key to SOSCOE development is the "threading model," 
which is intended to allow an interface between different subsystem 
operating systems. The high risk is derived from the fact that SOSCOE 
may not reach the necessary technical maturity level required to meet 
program milestones. 

The SOSCOE risk mitigation strategy is to develop and deliver the 
software in increments to provide the functionality required by SOSCOE 
users when they need it. Specifically, the SOSCOE software is scheduled 
for delivery in a series of seven software builds between the end of 
2005 and 2011. FCS functionality will increase with each successive 
software build. The Army will need about one-half of the SOSCOE 
software in time for the fielding of the initial FCS capability in 
fiscal year 2008. If the software risks materialize, the SOSCOE build 
plan may have to be modified, deferring some functionality to later 
software builds. 

FCS Program Requirements Are Still Evolving: 

Higher-level FCS specifications are still evolving nearly 2 years after 
the program started development. As in most engineering efforts, FCS 
requirements are first defined at a general or high level. Once these 
are defined, more detailed specifications that flow down to the 
subsystem level are derived. It is the specifications that provide the 
details necessary to design subsystems like SOSCOE. In the case of FCS, 
very few specifications have flowed to SOSCOE, as higher-level 
specifications are still being defined. The lack of specific 
requirements flow-down could affect the SOSCOE software build needed to 
support the first FCS spiral. 

In addition, program officials are concerned that SOSCOE will have 
difficulty meeting emerging requirements without significant cost and 
schedule impacts. Costs are likely to grow as SOSCOE is reworked to 
meet new requirements, or applications software is reworked to 
accommodate the limitations of SOSCOE. Further, if design assumptions 
underlying SOCOE during the spiral 1 and 2 builds are wrong, because of 
incomplete technical information, requirements for future software 
builds might not be met or the software could require extensive rework, 
resulting in cost and schedule problems. 

FCS Restructuring Reduced SOSCOE Development Concurrency: 

As part of the original FCS schedule, a DOD-level Network Maturity 
Milestone Decision was scheduled for 2008 to assess demonstrated 
communications and networked functions. The demonstration was to verify 
the performance of FCS software, including SOSCOE. The purpose of the 
demonstration would have been to provide confidence that all networked 
operations software would meet initial operational capability 
objectives and to use the results of the milestone decision to initiate 
long-lead production for the network equipment. However, the 
restructuring of the overall FCS program allowed the reduction of the 
high concurrency in the SOSCOE development and fielding schedule. The 
development schedule has now been extended to 2011. The DOD-level 
assessment of demonstrated network capabilities will be deferred until 
the formal FCS production milestone decision in 2012. 

Conclusions: 

Although DOD and the military services have produced the best armed 
forces in the world, their effectiveness in carrying out military 
operations has been hampered by communications and networking systems 
that lack interoperability and have limited capacity to transfer 
information where and when it is needed. The Army's efforts to develop 
JTRS, WIN-T, and the SOSCOE as components of the network are essential 
to overcoming these limitations. However, to achieve the desired 
capabilities, not only must each program be successfully executed, but 
because the programs are interdependent, they must be closely 
synchronized. In particular, the successful fielding of FCS 
capabilities is critically dependent on the outcome of the JTRS and WIN-
T programs. If they do not work as intended, there will not be 
sufficient battlefield information for the future force to operate 
effectively. 

As currently structured, the JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE programs are at 
risk of not delivering intended capabilities when needed, particularly 
for the first spiral of FCS. They continue to struggle to meet an 
ambitious set of user requirements, steep technical challenges, and 
stringent timeframes. While the Army's restructuring of the FCS program 
last year into spiral increments was a positive step, the first spiral 
may not demonstrate key networking capabilities. The first spiral of 
FCS should provide a meaningful demonstration of the networking 
capabilities that can then serve as a basis to support further 
development of the future force. In particular, demonstrating the 
capability of the Wideband Networking Waveform is important, given that 
the design of FCS vehicles and systems in later spirals is predicated 
on this capability. It is reasonable that such a demonstration should 
include JTRS with the Wideband Networking Waveform, WIN-T, and basic 
capability from SOSCOE. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Since (1) an enhanced Army communications network is critical for a 
successful transformation to FCS and (2) JTRS, including the advanced 
wideband waveforms, WIN-T, and SOSCOE are the key pillars of the 
communications network, the timing of the first FCS spiral should be 
based on when the pacing capabilities to be provided by JTRS and WIN-T 
will be demonstrated. Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Defense: 

* establish low-risk schedules for demonstrating JTRS, WIN-T, and 
SOSCOE capabilities;

* synchronize the FCS spiral schedule with such schedules for JTRS, WIN-
T, and SOSCOE; and: 

* develop an operational test and evaluation strategy that supports an 
evaluation of network maturity as part of FCS spiral production 
decisions. 

In addition, in light of the delays in JTRS Cluster 1 and the 
criticality of the Wideband Networking Waveform for FCS, we recommend 
the Secretary of Defense assess whether a greater priority should be 
placed on demonstrating the Wideband Networking Waveform on a JTRS 
radio prototype over other Cluster 1 capabilities in the remainder of 
the Cluster 1 development program. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In its letter commenting on a draft of our report, DOD concurred with 
our findings and three of our recommendations and partially concurred 
with a fourth recommendation. (DOD's letter is reprinted in app III.) 
As part of its comments, DOD provided some information on actions it 
has begun to take to address each of our recommendations. While these 
actions should help strengthen the management of JTRS, WIN-T, and 
SOSCOE, we remain concerned that a demonstration of FCS's 
communications and networking capabilities will not be known for some 
time. Until these capabilities are demonstrated, investment in FCS 
platforms and systems carries substantial risk. DOD also provided 
technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. 

Regarding our first recommendation--that the Secretary of Defense 
establish low-risk schedules for demonstrating JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE 
capabilities--DOD concurred, noting (1) that its newly established JTRS 
Joint Program Executive Office is evaluating the condition of each JTRS 
product line and will make recommendations to ensure effective control 
of cost, schedule, and performance and (2) that the Army is managing 
risks associated with WIN-T and SOSCOE and the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense is applying the appropriate level of oversight. While the 
actions being taken by DOD and the Army will help, it remains unclear 
whether they will be sufficient to ensure JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE--the 
critical components of the enhanced communications network--are 
successfully executed. We remain concerned that the requisite knowledge 
needed to effectively manage program development risks has not been 
sufficiently developed. A low-risk fielding schedule for each of the 
components should set the pace for the Army's transformation to FCS. 

Regarding our second recommendation--that the Secretary of Defense 
synchronize the FCS spiral schedule with the fielding schedules for 
JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE--DOD partially concurred, but stated that "the 
Army's strategy for spiraling out FCS technology is not constrained to 
any one particular element of the program. The strategy aims to make 
available mature and military useful system capability in increments, 
leveraging opportunities to integrate new and mature technology with 
current force capability." DOD further stated that "the FCS spirals 
will make use of technologies as they become available or leverage the 
use of surrogate applications where they apply." DOD also noted that 
the Army did not define the first FCS spiral around the main components 
of the communications network, but around the capabilities needed by 
the current force. While we agree with DOD that mature and military 
useful capabilities should be fielded as expeditiously as possible, we 
believe that the first spiral should demonstrate meaningful 
capabilities for FCS. In particular, we believe that the first spiral 
of FCS should demonstrate critical networking capabilities, and that 
its schedule be predicated on demonstrating core capabilities, such as 
the JTRS Wideband Networking Waveform. Progress made on these 
capabilities should guide the future investments, such as on ground 
vehicles that depend on network performance. In addition, reliance on 
surrogate applications has the potential to result in costly 
replacement of the surrogate applications once the target applications 
are fully mature. 

Regarding our third recommendation--that the Secretary of Defense 
develop an operational test and evaluation strategy that supports an 
evaluation of network maturity as part of FCS spiral production 
decisions--DOD concurred, stating that FCS will initially field a mix 
of both new and legacy communications and network capabilities, and 
that iterative operational test and evaluation will be stressed to 
ensure strong capability verification and validation. DOD also noted 
that network maturity will be assessed at each spiral's production 
decision. While it is appropriate to assess network maturity at each 
spiral's production decision, to measure progress in developing the FCS 
communications network, these assessments will need to culminate in a 
full demonstration that the network will perform as intended before 
committing to produce equipment for FCS units of action. 

Finally, regarding our fourth recommendation--that the Secretary of 
Defense assess whether a greater priority should be placed on 
demonstrating the Wideband Networking Waveform on a JTRS radio 
prototype over other Cluster 1 capabilities in the remainder of the 
Cluster 1 development program--DOD concurred, noting that the newly 
established JTRS Joint Program Executive Office is assessing the JTRS 
Cluster 1 development path and that the development of the Wideband 
Networking Waveform will be included in the assessment. 

As agreed with your office, unless you announce its contents, we will 
not distribute this report further until 30 days after the date of this 
letter. At that time, we will send copies to the Chairmen and Ranking 
Minority Members of other Senate and House committees and subcommittees 
that have jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities for DOD. We will 
also send copies to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the 
Army, and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will 
also be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-2811, or Assistant Director John Oppenheim at 
(202) 512-3111. Major contributors to this report were Ridge Bowman, 
Subrata Ghoshroy, Karen Sloan, Hai Tran, Paul Williams, and Candice 
Wright. 

Sincerely yours,

Signed by: 

Paul L. Francis, Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

[End of section]

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the development risks associated with the Joint Tactical 
Radio System-Tactical (JTRS) Cluster 1, JTRS Cluster 5, and WIN-T 
programs, we obtained briefings on acquisition plans, analyzed 
documents describing the maturity of critical technologies, and 
interviewed project and product officials from the Warfighter 
Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Program Management Office, Fort 
Monmouth, New Jersey. To determine the status of JTRS waveforms, we 
obtained briefings on wideband waveform development efforts and 
interviewed officials from the JTRS Joint Program Office, Arlington, 
Virginia. We also reviewed selected acquisition reports, technology 
readiness assessments, test and evaluation plans, defense acquisition 
executive summaries, and acquisition decision memorandums for 
individual programs. To obtain information related to the planned use 
of JTRS Cluster 1 radios in rotary wing platforms, we interviewed 
officials from the Program Executive Office, Aviation, Arlington, 
Virginia. To obtain information related to JTRS Cluster 1 contract 
performance data, we interviewed Defense Contract Management Agency 
officials in Anaheim, California, and obtained cost performance reports 
and other cost analysis documentation. 

To assess cost and schedule performance for JTRS Cluster 1 and waveform 
development for the period between August 2003 and January 2005, we 
used cost and schedule variances reported in contractor cost 
performance reports. Results were presented in graphical form to 
determine the period's trends. We also obtained likely cost at the 
completion of the prime contract from the reports. We confirmed that 
the prime contractor's earned value management system had been 
validated by the Defense Contract Management Agency. The cost and 
schedule results include both prime and subcontractors. The development 
of the waveforms was included in our analysis of Cluster 1 because, 
although the effort is managed separately under the Joint Program 
Office, it is being executed under the same contract. 

To determine the development risks associated with the System of 
Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE), we obtained briefings on 
fielding plans, analyzed documents describing SOSCOE software 
availability and maturity, and interviewed project officials from the 
Project Manager for FCS Network Systems Integration, Fort Monmouth, New 
Jersey. We also attended FCS in-process reviews and a board of 
directors meeting in St. Louis, Missouri, organized by the Program 
Manager, Unit of Action. 

To obtain the perspective of organizations that provide policy 
guidance, oversight, and technology support for the JTRS, WIN-T, and 
Future Combat Systems (FCS) programs, we interviewed officials from the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Networks and Information 
Integration, Arlington, Virginia; Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, Arlington, Virginia; and, the 
Army's Communications-Electronics Research, Development and Engineering 
Center, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. 

Our review was conducted from January 2004 through May 2005 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section]

Appendix II: JTRS Cluster 1 Cost and Schedule Variance: 

Since Cluster 1 entered systems development, in 2002, the contractor 
has overrun cost estimates by almost $93 million--nearly 28 percent 
above what was planned. We used contractor cost performance reports to 
assess the prime contractor's progress toward meeting the Army's cost 
and schedule goals during the period August 2003-January 2005. The 
government routinely uses such reports to independently evaluate the 
prime contractor's performance. Generally, the reports detail 
deviations in cost and schedule relative to expectations established 
under the contract. Deviations are referred to as variances. Positive 
variances--activities costing less or completed ahead of schedule--are 
considered as good news, and negative variances--activities costing 
more or falling behind schedule--as bad news. 

Although the program attempted to stabilize cost growth by adding 
approximately $200 million to the contract in January 2004, the cost 
variance continued to decline steadily thereafter.[Footnote 5] Key 
issues driving the cost growth are unanticipated complexity associated 
with developing the hardware, Wideband Networking Waveform, and other 
software. As a result, the unit costs for early prototypes have 
increased from the prime contractor's original proposal. In January 
2005, the prime contractor estimated that the total costs for the 
Cluster 1 radio and waveform development would be $531 million more 
than was originally budgeted, reaching about $898 million at completion 
(see fig. 8). However, the program office noted that, since contract 
award, the prime contractor has not demonstrated strong cost estimating 
and cost management techniques. 

Figure 8: Cost Performance of JTRS Cluster 1 and Waveform Development 
from August 2003 to January 2005: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Cluster 1 has also experienced unfavorable schedule variance. Figure 9 
indicates that the contractor increasingly fell behind schedule during 
the period August 2003-January 2005. If a program is not only overrun 
in costs, but is also behind schedule, additional costs can be expected 
because of potential schedule slippage or from acceleration of the 
effort to finish on time. The schedule variance stabilized briefly 
after the program rebaselined in January 2004, but then it continued to 
increase again. [Footnote 6] By January 2005, the value of planned work 
that the contractor was behind schedule was about $25 million. Delays 
in software build completions, software/hardware integration, and the 
delivery of key technologies to the waveform developers have 
contributed to schedule problems. 

Figure 9: Schedule Performance of JTRS Cluster 1 and Waveform 
Development from August 2003 to January 2005: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

[End of section]

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: 
NETWORKS AND INFORMATION INTEGRATION: 
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON: 
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000: 

JUN 9, 2005: 

Mr. Paul L. Francis: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
US General Accounting Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Francis,

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) draft report "Resolving Developmental Risks in 
the Army's Networked Communications Capabilities Is Key to Fielding 
Future Force," dated May 6th, 2005 (GAO Code 120283/GAO 05-669). 

The DoD has reviewed the findings of the report and appreciates the 
efforts of the GAO staff to present objective viewpoints regarding Army 
Networking capabilities and dependencies for the Future Combat System. 
We have reviewed the draft report and with the consideration of the 
enclosed comments concur with the findings and recommendations. 

My point of contact for GAO Code 120283/GAO 05-669 is COL Randall 
Conway, Communications Programs Directorate. He can be reached at 703- 
607-0277 or via email at randall.conway@osd.mil. 

Sincerely,

Signed for: 

Ronald C. Jost: 
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3 Policies, Programs and 
Space Programs): 

Enclosure: As Stated: 

GAO DRAFT REPORT DATED MAY 6, 2005 GAO-05-669 (GAO CODE 120283): 

"DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: Resolving Development Risks in the Army's 
Networked Communications Capabilities Is Key to Fielding Future Force"

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE GAO RECOMMENDATIONS: 

RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
establish low-risk schedules for demonstrating JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE 
capabilities. (p. 32/GAO Draft Report): 

DOD RESPONSE: DoD concurs with the recommendation. The newly 
established JTRS Joint Program Executive Office is evaluating the 
condition of each JTRS product line and will make recommendations to 
the USD (AT&L) to ensure effective control of cost, performance, and 
schedule. The Department acknowledges that there are additional risks 
associated with WIN-T and SOSCOE. The Army is managing that risk and 
OSD is applying the appropriate level of oversight. Additionally, the 
JPEO JTRS recently began discussions with the FCS program to determine 
their dependencies on JTRS. These discussions will be a recurring event 
to insure coordination of these key net-centric programs. Some specific 
comments regarding SOSCOE, JTRS, and WIN-T follow: 

RE: Establishing low-risk SOSCOE schedule: 

SOSCOE has four integration phases, each supported prior to integration 
by analysis, modeling and simulation, assessment and experimentation. 
Each Integration Phase is comprised of an Engineering Iteration (EI), 
Integration and Verification Iteration (IVI) and Spiral Out (SO). Thus, 
a low risk schedule is achieved through successive integration phases. 
Furthermore, Spiral Out products will be developed over a minimum of 2 
engineering iterations. 

RE: Establishing a low-risk JTRS schedule: 

The JPEO is de-risking JTRS plans. FCS will be using pre-EDM cluster 
one and cluster five radios in the first spiral out. The pre-EDM 
Cluster five plan is to have the pre-EDM radios run SRW INC 1.0. The 
pre-EDM and EDM units will be produced by different contractors to 
reduce risk. SRW will be demonstrated this summer (2005). 

RE: Establishing a low-risk WIN-T schedule: 

DASD-NII in cooperation with PM WIN-T established a WIN-T IIPT with 
Systems Engineering, Network, Test WIPT and other WIPTs reporting to 
the IIPT. OSD-NIT will work with WIN-T to assure design and schedule 
integrity as well as execution of appropriate risk management 
processes. 

RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
synchronize the FCS spiral schedule with such schedules for JTRS, WIN- 
T, and SOSCOE. (p. 32/GAO Draft Report): 

DOD RESPONSE: DoD partially concurs with the recommendation. The Army's 
strategy for spiraling-out FCS technology is not constrained to any one 
particular element of the program. The strategy aims to make available 
mature and military useful system capability in increments, leveraging 
opportunities to integrate new and mature technology with current force 
capability. Program synchronization efforts are an ongoing process that 
will ensure that FCS spirals are effectively supported by the minimum 
essential functionality of JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE. The FCS spirals 
will make use of technologies as they become available or leverage the 
use of surrogate applications where they apply. The FCS Network IIPT 
and WIPT will continue to review FCS progress and establish a Milestone 
C for every FCS Spin out and FCS end-state. Program synchronization 
will also be examined by the DASD NII led acquisition WIN-T IIPT. 
Further, OASD NH and Army G6 led task force will be established to 
assure synchronization of FCS and WIN-T and their interoperability with 
complementary programs. 

RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
develop an operational test and evaluation strategy that supports an 
evaluation of network maturity as part of FCS spiral production. (p. 
33/GAO Draft Report): 

DOD RESPONSE: DoD concurs with the recommendation. In recognition that 
FCS will initially field a mix of both new and legacy communications 
and network capabilities, DoD will stress iterative operational test 
and evaluation that ensures strong capability verification and 
validation. Also, NH plans to convene an FCS Network WIPT in addition 
to a Net Centric Review in conjunction with each Milestone C decision 
to assess network maturity. System and user test results will be 
evaluated at each Milestone C decision for each FCS spiral. 

RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
assess whether a greater priority should be placed on demonstrating the 
Wideband Networking Waveform on a JTRS radio prototype over other 
Cluster I capabilities in the remainder of the Cluster 1 development 
program. (p. 33/GAO Draft Report): 

DOD RESPONSE: DoD concurs with the recommendation. The newly 
established JTRS Joint Program Executive Office is assessing the JTRS 
Cluster 1 development path and will recommend to the USD (AT&L) a re- 
prioritization of development efforts to maximize resource investments 
and satisfy user needs. Development of the Wideband Networking Waveform 
will be included in the assessment. The JPEO also agrees that force 
transformation is directly related to providing IP mobile adhoc 
networking to the warfighters. This will include working with the 
requirements community to develop common approaches across all domains. 

TECHNNICAL COMMENTS: 

Page 10, last paragraph: "The Army has defined the initial spiral of 
FCS around the main components of the communications network,.."

DOD RESPONSE: The Army defined the initial spiral of FCS around the 
capabilities needed by the current force, to include the requirement to 
satisfy U.S. Landmine Policy. 

Page 26, paragraph 2: "Recently, the Army directed the program to 
determine whether capabilities can be developed sooner to address the 
needs of the current force and the restructured FCS program. A plan for 
how to do this remains undetermined."

DOD RESPONSE: This is no longer an accurate statement. The decision has 
been made not to accelerate the program. 

Page 28 and 29, 3rd and 1st paragraphs: "However, given the uncertainty 
of whether a JTRS radio would be available to support WIN-T, the 
program plans to develop its own high capacity radio, operating above 
the 2GHz radio frequency range. To meet FCS requirements, the WIN-T 
radio is expected to run above 2GHz with two waveforms-one both net 
centric and high capacity and the other the existing Global Broadcast 
Service waveform. ....to address the need for waveforms operating above 
2 GHz, the Office of the Secretary of Defense is conducting an 
assessment to identify solutions. However, the results of the study may 
not be available by the critical design review."

DOD RESPONSE: There are two waveforms that WIN-T is developing to 
support the Communications on the Move (COTM) requirement. The first 
waveform is called the Net-Centric Waveform and is Ka/Ku SATCOM based. 
The other waveform is called the High Capacity Networking Waveform and 
is line-of-sight based. Additionally, WIN-T will use the GBS broadcast 
receive only waveform. 

Page 29, paragraph 2: "to expedite completion of the architecture's 
design, the Army eliminated competition between the two contractors in 
September 2004. ... On the other hand, without competition, the 
government has less assurance that cost and schedule risks will be 
sufficiently controlled."

DOD RESPONSE: Competition was not entirely eliminated. Over 50% of work 
share is still competed among sub-contractors. 

FOOTNOTES

[1] A waveform is the representation of a signal that includes the 
frequency, modulation type, message format, and/or transmission system. 
In general usage, the term waveform refers to a known set of 
characteristics, for example, frequency bands (VHF, HF, UHF), 
modulation techniques (FM, AM), message standards, and transmission 
systems. In JTRS usage, the term waveform is used to describe the 
entire set of radio functions that occur from the user input to the RF 
output and vice versa. A JTRS waveform is implemented as a reusable, 
portable, executable software application that is independent of the 
JTRS operating system, middleware, and hardware. 

[2] To help avoid cost and schedule overruns, best practices and DOD 
guidance call for achieving a high level of technological maturity 
before allowing new technologies into product development. 

[3] The early operational assessment was originally scheduled for 
August 2004 but was rescheduled for December 2004 as a result of the 
Over Target Baseline in January 2004. Because of further technical 
challenges, the assessment was postponed to April 2005. 

[4] Network management is execution of a set of functions required for 
controlling, planning, allocating, deploying, coordinating, and 
monitoring the resources of a telecommunications network. 

[5] The program attempted to stabilize the contractor cost variance by 
initiating an over-the-target baseline (OTB) in January 2004. An OTB is 
a reprogramming effort or "recovery plan" that adds budget to a 
contract for either future work or in-process work when the original 
objectives cannot be met. The primary purpose of an OTB is to improve 
managerial control over the execution of the remaining work in a 
project. A project manager may conclude that the baseline is no longer 
adequate to provide valid performance measurement information relative 
to the remaining work and therefore consider initiating an OTB. 

[6] The OTB added 4 months to the acquisition schedule. 

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