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the Next Generation Air Transportation System: Status and Issues' which 
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May 29, 2007: 

The Honorable Mark Udall: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics: 
Committee on Science and Technology: 
House of Representatives: 

Subject: Responses to Questions for the Record; Hearing on JPDO and the 
Next Generation Air Transportation System: Status and Issues: 

Dear Chairman Udall: 

This letter responds to your April 24, 2007, request that we address 
questions submitted for the record by Members of the Subcommittee 
related to the March 29, 2007, hearing entitled JPDO and the Next 
Generation Air Transportation System: Status and Issues. As agreed with 
your Office, in addition to the responses that we provided on May 18, 
2007, to two of the questions you submitted regarding the role of JPDO, 
we are answering the remaining questions submitted by you and by 
Representative Calvert on behalf of the Minority Members of the 
Committee. Our attached responses to these questions are based on our 
previous and ongoing work and our knowledge of the areas addressed by 
the questions. We prepared our responses during May 2007 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Because our 
responses are based on our previously issued products[Footnote 1] for 
which we sought and incorporated agency comments, as well as updates 
that we obtained through interviewing FAA officials and reviewing their 
documentation, we did not seek agency comments on our responses to 
these questions. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Administrator, Federal 
Aviation Administration, and the Director, Joint Planning and 
Development Office. We will make copies available to others on request. 
The report is also available on GAO's Web site at www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions or would like to discuss the responses, 
please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. 

Sincerely yours, 

signed by: 

Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D. 
Director: 
Physical Infrastructure Issues: 

[End of section] 

Enclosure: 

Responses to Post-Hearing Questions for the Record: "JPDO and the Next 
Generation Air Transportation System: Status and Issues" 

Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics: 
Committee on Science and Technology: 
U.S. House of Representatives: 

Hearing held on March 29, 2007: 

Questions for Dr. Gerald L. Dillingham, Director: 
Physical Infrastructure Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 

Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman Mark Udall: 

1. How long should the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) 
exist, and should its role evolve from its current one? If so, in what 
ways? 

JPDO was established to plan and coordinate the development of the next 
generation air transportation system (NextGen) and should exist for the 
duration of those tasks. The basic planning documents that JPDO is 
developing for NextGen are near completion, but further iterations of 
these planning documents will be needed as NextGen technologies are 
developed and implemented. As NextGen has progressed from the initial 
planning to the early implementation phase, JPDO's role has evolved to 
include coordination and facilitation activities, as well as planning 
activities. GAO believes this is a reasonable evolution and a proper 
role for JPDO and is consistent with the language of JPDO's authorizing 
legislation. 

One example of this evolution is the role JPDO has begun to play in 
incorporating NextGen goals and activities into the Air Traffic 
Organization's (ATO) strategic plans. ATO has expanded and revamped its 
Operational Evolution Partnership (OEP) to become the Federal Aviation 
Administration's (FAA) implementation plan for NextGen. The Review 
Board that oversees the OEP is cochaired by JPDO and ATO. If JPDO 
ceased to exist before NextGen was more fully developed, some 
alternative means of planning and coordinating NextGen's development 
would have to be established, which could delay NextGen's 
implementation. Similar developments are expected to occur with other 
partner agencies as JPDO completes a Memorandum of Understanding with 
these agencies. 

JPDO's role could further evolve to include more coordination and 
oversight activities. For example, JPDO could establish a program 
oversight capacity that would enable it to perform such functions as 
(1) harmonizing the enterprise architectures among the partner 
agencies; (2) coordinating the research, development, and systems- 
engineering and integration activities of the cooperating agencies and 
industry; (3) overseeing multi-agency projects; (4) overseeing, with 
FAA, the selection of products or outcomes of research and development 
that would be moved to the next stage of a demonstration project 
through the Joint Resources Council (JRC);[Footnote 2] (5) overseeing 
the fundamental research activities that support the long-term 
strategic investments of NextGen by managing a research portfolio among 
NASA, academia, federally funded research and development centers, and 
industry; and (6) maintaining a baseline modeling and simulation 
environment for testing and evaluating alternative concepts to satisfy 
NextGen enterprise architecture requirements. 

Another example of the evolution of JPDO's role is the organizational 
shift from integrated product teams to working groups. This shift 
reflects the extension of JPDO's role beyond planning to development of 
work products or "outcomes" that will contribute to the early 
development of NextGen and facilitate its implementation. As JPDO 
assumes more responsibility for facilitating NextGen's implementation, 
greater authority and resources would allow it to do more to coordinate 
the efforts of the partner agencies and work with the Office of 
Management and Budget as the principal NextGen point of contact. With 
adequate funding and authority, JPDO could acquire staff with the 
project management and systems engineering skills needed for JPDO to be 
an effective oversight and coordinating office. 

2. Should JPDO be moved out of the Federal Aviation Administration's 
Air Traffic Organization to be given greater visibility and authority? 
For example, should it report directly to the Office of the Secretary 
of Transportation? Why or why not? 

Currently, JPDO is located within FAA and reports to both the FAA 
Administrator and the Chief Operating Officer of ATO. In GAO's view, 
JPDO should not be moved out of FAA. Since JPDO provides the vision for 
the future air traffic control (ATC) system and ATO is to be the 
principal implementer of that vision, the two organizations need to 
continue working closely together. 

However, JPDO's dual reporting status hinders its ability to interact 
on an equal footing with ATO and the other partner agencies. On one 
hand, JPDO must counter the perception that it is a proxy for the ATO 
and, as such, is not able to act as an "honest broker." On the other 
hand, JPDO must continue to work with ATO and its partner agencies in a 
partnership in which ATO is the lead implementer of NextGen. Therefore, 
it is important for JPDO to have some independence from ATO. One change 
that could begin to address this issue would be to have the JPDO 
Director report directly to the FAA Administrator. This change may also 
lessen what some stakeholders now perceive as unnecessary bureaucracy 
and red tape associated with decision making and other JPDO and NextGen 
processes. 

As a part of any change in the dual reporting status of JPDO's 
Director, consideration could be given to the possibility of creating 
the position of Associate Administrator of NextGen and elevating the 
JPDO Director to that post. This would give greater credibility, 
authority, and visibility to this important position. 

JPDO should not report to the Secretary of Transportation because 
placing JPDO in the Secretary's office would remove it too far from the 
implementation and operations of NextGen. 

3. What are the specific roles of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and the Department of Defense (DOD) in JPDO? 

a. Do we know how much DOD plans to spend on NextGen for its 
development and implementation? If so, how much will it be? 

b. Do we know how much DHS plans to spend on NextGen for its 
development and implementation? If so, how much will it be? 

The specific role of DHS in JPDO is to lead the Security Working Group 
and to develop an effective security system for the national airspace 
system (NAS) without limiting mobility or civil liberties. DHS carries 
out this role through its Transportation Security Administration (TSA). 
More specifically, DHS's task, through TSA, is to develop and implement 
a real-time network to share information with appropriate parties about 
passengers, cargo, and aircraft and to create a transparent set of 
security layers that will deliver security without causing undue 
delays, limiting access, or adding excessive costs and time. 

The specific role of DOD in JPDO is to lead the Net-Centric Operations 
Working Group and to establish user-specific situational awareness. 
Situational awareness means that each user of the NAS, including DOD 
and the civilian sectors, has the awareness needed to reach decisions 
through the creation of a combined information network. All users of 
the system will have access to the air transportation system data they 
require for their operations. 

The specific roles of both DHS and DOD in JPDO are related to the "curb-
to-curb" approach to air traffic management that Vision 100 established 
for NextGen. Under this approach, JPDO envisions an expansion of the 
air transportation system that includes airport departures and arrivals 
as well as flights. The JPDO working groups, which evolved from FAA's 
former integrated product teams (IPT), focus on eight strategies, such 
as how to use weather information to improve the performance of the 
NAS. The working groups are composed of personnel from FAA, other 
federal agencies, and the private sector. Each of the working groups is 
headed by a steering committee under both a federal agency--in this 
case, DHS or DOD--and a private sector representative. 

We do not know how much either DOD or DHS plans to spend on NextGen. 
However, we are aware that DOD, FAA, and DHS each plan to provide $5 
million for net-centric (i.e., a continuously-evolving network of 
information sharing and situational awareness) demonstrations. Both DOD 
and DHS also provide a variety of "in-kind" services through personnel 
assigned to the JPDO working groups and through the potential 
leveraging of mission-specific research that could support the 
development and implementation of NextGen. 

4. NextGen technologies will increase flight efficiency by means of 
automated flight operations and reduced separations. 

a. Will this render the system more brittle against disturbances such 
as terrorism and equipment failure and acts of nature? 

b. How will we ensure the continued safe operation of the system in the 
event of such disturbances? 

NextGen technologies will not render the system more brittle than the 
current system. Although no system is 100 percent safe, GAO has not 
seen any data or other information indicating that the planned 
satellite based navigation system is more vulnerable to security 
threats than the current ground based radar system. JPDO's plans call 
for robust security system protocols and firewalls to increase 
protection, as well as sufficient redundancies within the system to 
reduce vulnerabilities and offset any disruptions. Security will exist 
in "layers of defense" designed for early detection of threats from 
terrorism, equipment failure, and natural disasters and will provide 
appropriate intervention. Additionally, although the system will become 
more automated, there will still be opportunities for human 
intervention if the system fails. 

Questions for the Record Submitted by Rep. Calvert: 

Implementation by Other Federal Partners: 

1. In your written statement, when discussing the planning efforts of 
the JPDO partner agencies (exclusive of NASA and FAA), you stated that 
they are not as far along developing implementation plans and 
institutionalizing JPDO goals into their planning documents. Why is 
that? Does this reflect a lack of commitment? 

The current situation does not necessarily reflect a lack of commitment 
on the part of the partner agencies. JPDO partner agencies face 
competing mission and resource demands. In addition, NextGen is an 
extraordinarily complex undertaking, and some agencies are still 
learning to work collaboratively. By contrast, FAA and NASA have a long 
history of working with each other, and the core effort of JPDO is 
within their purview. 

The partner agencies will engage more collaboratively as NextGen's 
processes and mechanisms mature. For example, the Department of 
Transportation (DOT) was recently designated as the Managing Partner 
responsible for ensuring collaboration among the partner agencies in 
implementing NextGen-related research and development. DOT is also 
responsible for submission of the OMB 300 for the NextGen as a 
portfolio project after review by JPDO.[Footnote 3] JPDO's decision to 
develop a Memorandum of Understanding to broadly define the roles and 
responsibilities of the partner agencies is another positive step. 
Additionally, the extent to which Congress provides JPDO with the 
authority and resources it needs for program oversight will affect the 
nature and scope of the partner agencies' collaboration. 

FAA Financing Proposal: 

2. What would be the effect, if any, on the NextGen budget if Congress 
does not enact the Administration's proposed aviation financing reform 
package (ticket taxes; aviation fuel taxes) as part of a new 
authorization, but instead leaves the current ticket and fuel taxes in 
place? 

The current FAA funding structure can provide sufficient funding for 
NextGen--with some caveats. Congress has used the current funding 
structure--excise taxes plus a General Fund contribution--to fund FAA 
for many years. As the number of air travelers has grown, so have 
excise tax revenues. Even though revenues fell during the early years 
of this decade as the demand for air travel fell, they began to rise 
again in fiscal year 2004, and FAA estimates that if the current taxes 
remain in effect at their current rates, revenues will continue to 
increase. According to projections prepared by the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO),[Footnote 4] revenues obtained from the existing funding 
structure will increase substantially. Assuming the General Fund 
continues to provide about 19 percent of FAA's budget, CBO estimates 
that through 2016 the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (Trust Fund) can 
support about $19 billion in additional spending over the baseline FAA 
spending levels CBO has calculated for FAA (the fiscal year 2006 
funding level, with projected growth for inflation) provided that most 
of the spending occurs after fiscal year 2010. How far this money will 
go to fund modernization is subject to a number of uncertainties-- 
including the future cost of NextGen investments, the volume of air 
traffic, the future cost of operating the NAS, and the levels of future 
appropriations for the Airport Improvement Program, all of which 
influence the amount of funding available for FAA. 

However, if the desired level of funding exceeded what was likely to be 
available from the Trust Fund at current tax rates, Congress could make 
changes within the current structure to provide FAA with additional 
revenue. Congress could raise more revenue from airspace system users 
for NextGen or for other purposes by raising the rates on one or more 
of the current excise taxes. Congress could also provide more General 
Fund revenues for FAA, although the nation's fiscal imbalance may make 
a larger contribution from this source difficult. 

JPDO Organizational Authority: 

3. Would GAO recommend any changes to the authorities and resources now 
provided to JPDO to enhance its effectiveness in coordinating the 
partner agencies, and if so, what would they be? 

Yes, providing JPDO with the authority and the resources to establish a 
program oversight capacity would enable JPDO to perform such functions 
as (1) harmonizing the enterprise architectures among the partner 
agencies; (2) coordinating the research, development, and systems- 
engineering and integration activities of the cooperating agencies and 
industry; (3) overseeing, with FAA, the selection of products or 
outcomes of research and development that would be moved to the next 
stage of a demonstration project through the Joint Resources Council 
(JRC); (4) overseeing the fundamental research activities that support 
the long-term strategic investments of NextGen by managing a research 
portfolio among NASA, academia, federally funded research and 
development centers and industry; and (5) maintaining a baseline 
modeling and simulation environment for testing and evaluating 
alternative concepts to satisfy NextGen enterprise architecture 
requirements. 

JPDO will need additional funding and staff to expand its role in 
coordinating the efforts of the partner agencies and working with the 
Office of Management and Budget as the principal NextGen point of 
contact. 

However, JPDO's dual reporting status hinders its ability to interact 
on an equal footing with ATO and the other partner agencies. Therefore, 
it is important for JPDO to have some independence from ATO. One change 
that could begin to address this issue would be to have the JPDO 
Director report directly to the FAA Administrator. This change might 
also lessen what some stakeholders now perceive as unnecessary 
bureaucracy and red tape associated with decision making and other JPDO 
and NextGen processes. As a part of any change in the dual reporting 
status of JPDO's Director, consideration could be given to the 
possibility of creating the position of Associate Administrator of 
NextGen and elevating the JPDO Director to that post. This would give 
greater credibility, authority, and visibility to this important 
position. 

NASA's Role in JPDO: 

4. Traditionally NASA has developed promising technologies to a high 
maturity level, enabling FAA to incorporate them into its air traffic 
control system without too much additional development. Now that NASA 
is confining its development work to a basic level of technical 
maturity, do FAA and the other federal partners have the resources and 
capability to fill this void? 

It is not clear whether FAA and the other federal partners have the 
resources and capability to fill this void. As your question indicates, 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) formerly 
conducted the type of intermediate research and development (R&D) and 
demonstration projects that will be needed for the NextGen program, but 
the funding for these efforts was discontinued when NASA's aeronautical 
research portfolio was restructured to focus more on fundamental 
research. Although FAA has not fully determined the impact of the NASA 
restructuring on the R&D needs for NextGen, some additional R&D funds 
will be needed and are critical for the timely development of NextGen. 
FAA recognizes that this is a critical issue and has already taken some 
action to address it. For example, in the President's fiscal year 2008 
budget request for FAA, funds have been included for developmental and 
transition research in the Facilities and Equipment (F&E) Activity 1 
account. In light of the NASA restructuring, FAA has also undertaken a 
study to assess the nature and scope of its NextGen R&D needs. 
According to JPDO officials, this study will be completed in August 
2007. More work remains to completely assess the research and 
development needs of NextGen and the ability of FAA and the other JPDO 
partner agencies to budget for and conduct the necessary initiatives. 
One way to fill an identified research and development need might be to 
make more use of the resources available at the FAA Technical Center in 
Atlantic City, New Jersey, and the FAA Aeronautical Center in Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma. 

Certification: 

In his statement before the Subcommittee, the President and CEO of the 
Aerospace Industries Association, Mr. Douglass expressed concerns about 
the time required to prototype, validate, and certify new technologies 
required for NextGen, in addition to the time required for rulemakings. 
Do you share Mr. Douglass's concerns? How much of a risk do these 
processes pose to the timely development of NextGen? 

Yes, we share Mr. Douglass's concerns. The time required to prototype, 
validate, and certify a technology can present a significant risk to 
the timely and cost effective implementation of NextGen. We have 
studied the lead times required to prototype, validate, and certify new 
technologies. JPDO or FAA do not currently have sufficient resources to 
prototype, validate, and certify new technologies, and cannot currently 
develop them internally without causing significant delays in the 
implementation of NextGen. In addition, stakeholders have expressed 
concern over the time it takes to develop rules for new equipment and 
the problems caused when equipment is fielded before rules are 
finalized. Any activities that will be required to implement new 
policies, demonstrate new capabilities, set parameters for the 
certification of new systems, and develop technologies will take time. 
Just as important, the time required to prototype, validate, and 
certify a new technology must be balanced against the need to ensure 
the reliability of the technology and the safety of the flying public. 

Accountability: 

6. In his statement before the Subcommittee, Mr. Douglass raised 
concerns about the potential lack of accountability and authority in 
the current JPDO structure, especially with regard to partner agencies. 
He recommends that each partner agency designate a senior-level 
official as the responsible individual for all NextGen-related 
programs. Do you share Mr. Douglass's concerns? Should agencies 
designate a senior program official? 

Yes, we share Mr. Douglass's concerns and further note that these 
fundamental leadership issues are exacerbated by the apparent 
inactivity of JPDO's Senior Policy Committee (SPC). This committee is 
responsible for overseeing the work of JPDO, but has met only four 
times in 3 years and has not convened as a body since November 2005. 
The committee is chaired by the Secretary of Transportation and 
includes senior leaders from the partner agencies and the Director of 
the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. SPC was 
established to provide policy guidance and review; make legislative 
recommendations; and identify and align resources. A more regular 
schedule of meetings and an agenda for SPC could lead to more 
participation and accountability on the part of the partner agencies. 

Additionally, assigning sole responsibility for supporting NextGen to a 
senior official from each agency would be a positive step. As a point 
of contact and coordinator for NextGen activities, that person should, 
within prescribed limits, have access to, and authority from, the SPC 
member from their agency to make decisions and act on behalf of their 
agency. 

Finally, to the extent that the pending Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) between the partner agencies defines the roles and 
responsibilities of each agency, it will, when signed, be a useful 
document for ensuring accountability. 

(540155): 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] GAO, Next Generation Air Transportation System: Status of the 
Transition to the Future Air Traffic Control System, GAO-07-784T 
(Washington D.C.: May 9, 2007); GAO, Joint Planning and Development 
Office: Progress and Key Issues in Planning the Transition to the Next 
Generation Air Transportation System, GAO-07-693T (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 29, 2007); GAO, Federal Aviation Administration: Key Issues in 
Ensuring the Efficient Development and Safe Operation of the Next 
Generation Air Transportation System, GAO-07-636T (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 22, 2007) and GAO, Next Generation Air Transportation System: 
Progress and Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the 
National Airspace System, GAO-07-25 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2006). 

[2] FAA's Joint Resources Council establishes and manages acquisition 
program baselines which define cost, schedule, performance, and benefit 
parameters for programs over the full lifecycle of the program. 

[3] Section 300 of OMB Circular No. A-11, Preparation, Submission, and 
Execution of the Budget (Nov. 2, 2005), sets forth requirements for 
federal agencies for planning, budgeting, acquiring, and managing 
information technology capital assets. 

[4] Congressional Budget Office, Financing Investment in the Air 
Traffic Control System (Washington, D.C.: Sept 27, 2006): 

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