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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT: 

Wednesday, May 9, 2007: 

Next Generation Air Transportation System: 

Status of the Transition to the Future Air Traffic Control System: 

Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D. 
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues: 

GAO-07-784T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-784T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of 
Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The nation’s current air traffic control system is reaching its 
capacity limits as demand for air transportation grows. The Next 
Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) represents a new system 
that will use state-of-the-art technologies and procedures. 
Transitioning to NextGen will require the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) to continue to sustain the current air traffic 
control system while acquiring new systems on schedule and on budget. 
In 2003, Congress authorized the creation of the Joint Planning and 
Development Office (JPDO), housed within FAA, to plan NextGen and 
coordinate the transition. GAO’s testimony focuses on the progress FAA 
is making in implementing businesslike operations that could provide a 
foundation for managing the transition to NextGen, the status of JPDO’s 
planning and facilitation of NextGen, and some key challenges that FAA 
and JPDO need to address in moving toward NextGen. This statement is 
based on GAO’s November 2006 report and recent testimonies as well as 
ongoing work. GAO’s November report recommended that FAA study its 
technical and contract management expertise and that JPDO take actions 
to institutionalize its collaborative practices. FAA and JPDO said they 
would consider our recommendations. 

What GAO Found: 

During the last few years, FAA has made significant progress in 
implementing businesslike operations and procedures for managing and 
acquiring air traffic control systems. These operations and procedures 
have improved FAA’s management of the current system and should better 
position the agency to manage the enormously complex transition to 
NextGen. One outcome of these changes is that FAA has reported 
exceeding its system acquisition goals for the past 3 fiscal years. 
However, further work remains to fully address past problems in 
acquiring systems and institutionalizing changes throughout the agency. 

JPDO has continued to make progress in furthering its key planning 
documents. JPDO has experienced delays in the release of key documents, 
but currently plans to have initial versions of these documents 
released by July 2007. JPDO has been working since 2005 to establish a 
memorandum of understanding between its partner agencies, although as 
of May 4, 2007, the memorandum had been signed by the Departments of 
Transportation and Commerce and NASA, but was not yet signed by the 
Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. JPDO is also working with 
the Office of Management and Budget to establish mechanisms to identify 
NextGen-related projects across the partner agencies and consider 
NextGen as a unified, cross-agency program for funding decisions. 

FAA and JPDO continue to face a number of challenges in moving toward 
NextGen, including questions about FAA’s technical and contract 
management expertise; FAA’s ability to maintain a number of existing 
systems, including monitoring and addressing equipment outages to 
ensure the safety of these existing systems as it transitions to 
NextGen; and conducting necessary human factors research. In addition, 
while JPDO recently estimated that the total federal cost for NextGen 
infrastructure through 2025 will range between $15 billion and $22 
billion, questions remain about which entities will fund and conduct 
the necessary research, development, and demonstration projects that 
will be key to achieving certain NextGen capabilities. Also, JPDO faces 
a continuing challenge in ensuring the involvement of all key 
stakeholders, such as active air traffic controllers and system 
technicians, in its NextGen planning efforts. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-784T]. 

To view the full product, click on the link above. For more 
information, contact Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., at (202) 512-2834 or 
dillinghamg@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today to discuss the 
future of air traffic control modernization. The nation's current air 
traffic control system is reaching its capacity limits as demand for 
air transportation continues to grow each year. The Next Generation Air 
Transportation System (NextGen) represents a transformation to a new 
system that will use satellite-based technologies and state-of-the-art 
procedures to handle the increasing volume of air traffic, while 
further improving safety and security. Transitioning to NextGen, 
however, will require the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to 
continue to operate and sustain the current air traffic control system 
while simultaneously acquiring and deploying the new NextGen systems on 
budget and on schedule. 

In December 2000, President Clinton signed an executive order, and 
Congress passed supporting legislation that, together, provided FAA 
with the authority to create the performance-based[Footnote 1] Air 
Traffic Organization (ATO) to administer and improve FAA's management 
of its current air traffic control modernization efforts. In 2003, 
Congress authorized the creation of the Joint Planning and Development 
Office (JPDO), housed within FAA, to plan for and coordinate a 
transition to NextGen--envisioned as a move from largely ground-based 
radars to precision satellite-based navigation and including digital, 
networked communications; an integrated weather system; layered, 
adaptive security; and more. In addition to FAA, JPDO operates in 
conjunction with multiple federal partner agencies and with the private 
sector to collaboratively conceptualize and plan the NextGen 
system.[Footnote 2] 

The reauthorization of FAA provides an opportunity to examine how the 
agency is managing the transformation to NextGen. My testimony today 
focuses on the following questions: (1) What progress is FAA making in 
implementing initiatives that could provide a solid foundation for 
managing the transition to NextGen? (2) What is the status of JPDO's 
planning and facilitation of the transition to NextGen? and (3) What 
are some key challenges that FAA and JPDO need to address in moving 
toward NextGen? My statement is based on our November 2006 
report[Footnote 3] and recent testimonies[Footnote 4] as well as on- 
going work. We conducted this work in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards. 

In summary: 

* During the last few years, FAA has made significant progress in 
implementing businesslike operations and procedures for acquiring and 
managing air traffic control systems which have improved FAA's 
management of the current system and should better position the agency 
to manage the enormously complex transition to NextGen. However, 
further work remains to fully address past problems in acquiring 
systems and to institutionalize changes throughout the agency. By 
creating the Air Traffic Organization and appointing a chief operating 
officer, FAA established a new management structure and adopted more 
leading practices of private sector businesses to address the cost, 
schedule, and performance shortfalls that have plagued air traffic 
control acquisitions. One outcome of these changes is that for the past 
3 fiscal years, FAA has reported exceeding its system acquisition 
goals. For fiscal year 2006, FAA reported that its critical 
acquisitions were 100 percent on budget and over 97 percent on 
schedule. FAA has also improved its management of the air traffic 
control system through increased efforts to achieve cost savings by 
outsourcing and consolidating facilities. Currently, FAA is seeking 
savings through outsourcing its planned nationwide deployment of a 
critical NextGen surveillance technology. To help sustain progress in 
managing acquisitions and address remaining program risks, FAA is 
working with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to develop goals 
and milestones for FAA to meet in further reducing acquisition risks. 
Despite FAA's progress, however, the FAA administrator's term ends in 
September 2007 and the chief operating officer left in February 2007, 
after serving 3 years. Thus, FAA will have lost two of its significant 
agents for change by the end of September. FAA's new leaders will need 
to demonstrate the same commitment to improvement as the outgoing 
leaders. 

* JPDO has made progress in furthering its key planning documents, but 
continues to face challenges in institutionalizing its collaborative 
practices. JPDO is developing several key documents--a Concept of 
Operations, an Enterprise Architecture, and an Integrated Work Plan-- 
that together form the foundation of NextGen planning. JPDO has missed 
earlier milestones regarding the release of its Concept of Operations 
and Enterprise Architecture. JPDO currently plans to release initial 
versions of all three documents by July 2007. As we noted in November 
2006, JPDO is fundamentally a planning and coordinating body that lacks 
authority over the key human and technological resources of its partner 
agencies. Thus, institutionalizing the collaborative process between 
these partner agencies will continue to be critical to JPDO's success. 
However, JPDO still does not have in place a formal, long-term 
agreement among its partner agencies on their roles and 
responsibilities in planning and facilitating the transition to 
NextGen. JPDO has been working since 2005 to establish a memorandum of 
understanding between the partner agencies, although as of May 4, 2007, 
the memorandum had been signed by the Departments of Transportation and 
Commerce and NASA; the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security had 
not yet signed.[Footnote 5] It will also be important for 
institutionalizing collaboration to incorporate NextGen goals and 
activities into the partner agencies' key planning documents, as FAA is 
currently doing with its Operational Evolution Partnership--FAA's new 
implementation plan for NextGen. JPDO is also working with OMB to 
establish mechanisms to identify NextGen-related projects across the 
partner agencies and consider NextGen as a unified, cross-agency 
program for funding decisions. 

* FAA and JPDO continue to face a number of challenges in moving toward 
NextGen, including determining whether the organizations have the 
adequate and appropriate technical and contract management expertise, 
managing and sustaining the current system, identifying who will 
conduct necessary research and development activities, obtaining stable 
leadership, conducting needed human factors research, and ensuring the 
involvement of all key stakeholders. In November 2006, we recommended 
that FAA examine its strengths and weaknesses with regard to the 
technical and contract management expertise that will be required to 
define, implement, and integrate the numerous complex programs inherent 
in the transition to NextGen. In response to our recommendation, FAA is 
working with the National Academy of Public Administration to explore 
these issues. JPDO recently estimated that the total federal cost for 
NextGen infrastructure through 2025 will range between $15 billion and 
$22 billion. However, questions remain over which entities will fund 
and conduct some of the necessary research, development, and 
demonstration projects that will be key to achieving certain NextGen 
capabilities. According to officials at FAA and JPDO, they are 
currently studying these issues and trying to assess how much research 
and development FAA can assume. Of critical importance in the area of 
NextGen research is human factors research given the fundamental 
changes that NextGen envisions in the roles of air traffic controllers 
and pilots due to automation and changes in surveillance technologies 
and communications. JPDO has suffered from a lack of stable leadership 
and is now functioning under its third director. This issue is 
exacerbated by JPDO's senior policy committee, which has met only four 
times and has not met at all as a formal body since November 2005. 
Finally, JPDO faces a continuing challenge in ensuring the involvement 
of all key stakeholders, such as active air traffic controllers and 
technicians. Our work on past air traffic control modernization 
projects has shown that a lack of stakeholder or expert involvement 
early and throughout a project can lead to costly increases and delays. 

In November 2006, we recommended that the Secretary of Transportation 
direct FAA to undertake a formal exploration of the agency's strengths 
and weaknesses with regard to the technical expertise and contract 
management expertise that will be required to define, implement, and 
integrate the numerous complex programs and systems inherent in the 
transition to NextGen. We recommended that the Secretary direct JPDO to 
take actions to institutionalize the partner agencies' collaboration in 
supporting NextGen, including action on a memorandum of understanding 
among the partner agencies, actions to finalize procedures to leverage 
partner agency resources, and actions to develop procedures for dispute 
resolution. We also recommended that the Secretary direct JPDO to 
determine whether key stakeholders and expertise are not currently 
represented in JPDO planning efforts. FAA and JPDO officials neither 
agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations, but said they would 
consider them. 

Improved, Businesslike Operations Should Better Position FAA to 
Implement and Manage NextGen, but Further Work Remains: 

During the last few years, FAA has made significant progress in 
implementing businesslike processes and procedures for managing and 
acquiring air traffic control systems. This contrasts with the previous 
decade's air traffic control modernization program which was 
characterized by chronic cost and schedule difficulties with systems 
acquisitions. The implementation of these businesslike operations has 
improved FAA's management of the current system and should better 
position the agency to manage the enormously complex transition to 
NextGen. However, further work remains to fully address past problems 
and institutionalize these changes throughout the agency, especially 
given the changing leadership within both FAA and ATO. 

Progress Has Been Made but Further Work Remains to Institutionalize 
Recent Improvements in Management and Acquisition Processes: 

A successful transition to NextGen will depend, to a great extent, on 
FAA's ability to manage the acquisition and integration of multiple 
NextGen systems. In recent years, FAA has made significant progress 
toward improving its management of acquisitions. However, FAA's air 
traffic control modernization program remains on our list of high risk 
programs because of its history of systemic management and acquisition 
problems that contributed to cost growth, schedule slippages, and 
performance shortfalls and the relative recentness of the turnaround in 
the program's performance. The realization of NextGen goals could be 
severely compromised if FAA's improved program management and outcomes 
are not institutionalized and carried over into the implementation of 
NextGen, which is an even more complex and ambitious undertaking than 
past modernization efforts. 

By creating ATO and appointing a chief operating officer (COO) to head 
ATO, FAA established a new management structure and adopted more 
leading practices of private sector businesses to address the cost, 
schedule, and performance shortfalls that have plagued air traffic 
control acquisitions. ATO has worked to create a flatter organization, 
with fewer management layers, and has reported reducing executive 
staffing by 20 percent and total management by 16 percent. In addition, 
FAA uses a performance management system to hold managers responsible 
for the success of ATO. More specifically, to better manage its 
acquisitions and address problems we have identified,[Footnote 6] FAA 
has: 

* undertaken human capital initiatives to improve its acquisition 
workforce culture and build towards a results-oriented, high-performing 
organization; 

* developed and applied a process improvement model to assess the 
maturity of its software and systems capabilities resulting in, among 
other things, enhanced productivity and greater ability to predict 
schedules and resources; and: 

* reported that it has established a policy and guidance on using 
earned value management (EVM) in its acquisition management system and 
that 19 of its major programs are currently using EVM.[Footnote 7] 

One outcome of the implementation of the changes in program management 
and operations is that for the past three fiscal years, FAA has 
reported exceeding system acquisition goals. FAA's goals for fiscal 
year 2006 were to have 85 percent of critical acquisition programs 
within 10 percent of budget, as reflected in its capital investment 
plan, and to have 85 percent of critical acquisition programs on 
schedule. For fiscal year 2006, FAA reported that its critical 
acquisitions were 100 percent on budget and over 97 percent on 
schedule. 

FAA Has Reported Cost Savings through Outsourcing and Facility 
Consolidations: 

FAA has also improved its management of its air traffic control program 
through increased efforts to achieve cost savings by outsourcing and 
consolidating facilities. For example, FAA is outsourcing flight 
service stations and estimates a $2.2 billion savings over 12 years. 
Similarly, FAA is seeking savings through outsourcing its planned 
nationwide deployment of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast 
(ADS-B), a critical NextGen surveillance technology. FAA is planning to 
implement ADS-B through a performance-based contract in which FAA will 
pay "subscription" charges for the ADS-B services and the vendor will 
be responsible for building and maintaining the infrastructure. (FAA 
also reports that the ADS-B rollout will allow the agency to remove 50 
percent of its current secondary radars, saving money in the program's 
baseline. The remaining radars will serve as a back-up system to ADS- 
B.) As for consolidating facilities, FAA is currently restructuring 
ATO's administrative service areas from nine offices to three offices, 
which FAA estimates will save up to $460 million over 10 years. 

We previously reported that FAA should pursue further cost control 
options, such as exploring additional opportunities for contracting out 
services and consolidating facilities. However, we recognize that FAA 
faces challenges with consolidating facilities, an action that can be 
politically sensitive. In recognition of this sensitivity, the 
administration's reauthorization proposal presents an initiative in 
which the Secretary of Transportation would be authorized to establish 
an independent, five-member Commission, known as the Realignment and 
Consolidation of Aviation Facilities and Services Commission, to 
independently analyze FAA's recommendations to realign facilities or 
services. The Commission would then send its own recommendations to the 
President and Congress. In the past, we noted the importance of 
potential cost savings through facility consolidations; however, any 
such consolidations must be handled through a process that solicits and 
considers stakeholder input throughout and fully considers the safety 
implications of both proposed facility closures and consolidations. 

Mitigating Remaining Risks and Institutionalization of Improvements 
Will Continue to Be a Challenge for FAA: 

Sustaining the acquisition progress achieved to date and addressing the 
remaining program risks remains a challenge for FAA. FAA's air traffic 
control modernization program has been on GAO's high-risk list since 
1995. In recent years the agency has made measurable improvements in 
its acquisition processes. GAO acknowledged those improvements in its 
2007 high risk report.[Footnote 8] In 2005, FAA submitted a plan to OMB 
for reducing the risks of cost overruns, schedule slippages, and 
performance shortfalls with goals and milestones for FAA to meet in 
further reducing acquisition risks. FAA expects to complete the risk 
mitigation plan by the end of calendar year 2008. 

Additionally, we have an ongoing study that is examining FAA's 
performance and reporting on its critical acquisitions, including 
applicable performance measures. We are exploring FAA's use of the most 
recently approved cost and schedule baselines, which may have changed 
significantly since the start of an acquisition, to measure and report 
on program performance. Rebaselining acquisitions is an accepted 
practice and there can be valid reasons for doing so, such as when 
changes in a program's requirements fundamentally alter the acquisition 
and make the originally approved schedule unrealistic. Because 
rebaselining resets the cost and schedule variances to zero, however, 
we want to verify that FAA's practice is not masking acquisition 
performance problems and is providing full disclosure to the Congress. 
We expect to issue a report on these issues later this year. 

Institutionalizing Changes Within FAA Will Require Continued Strong 
Leadership: 

It will be important, as FAA begins to implement NextGen systems, to 
maintain critical acquisitions on schedule and on budget to meet the 
goal of transitioning to NextGen by 2025 and to prevent escalation of 
the costs of NextGen. While FAA has implemented many positive changes 
to its management and business processes in recent years, it currently 
faces the loss of key leaders. We reported that the experiences of 
successful transformations and change management initiatives in large 
public and private organizations suggest that it can take 5 to 7 years 
or more until such initiatives are fully implemented and cultures are 
transformed in a sustainable manner.[Footnote 9] Such changes require 
focused, full-time attention from senior leadership and a dedicated 
team. However, FAA will have lost two of its significant agents for 
change--the FAA administrator and the COO--by the end of September 
2007. The administrator's term ends in September 2007; the COO left in 
February 2007, after serving 3 years. For the financial, management, 
and acquisition improvements to further permeate the agency, and thus 
provide a firm foundation upon which to implement NextGen, FAA's new 
leaders will need to demonstrate the same commitment to improvement as 
the outgoing leaders. Because this is a critical time for FAA, the 
agency needs to move expeditiously to find a new COO for ATO. A COO who 
could commit to the current statutory 5-year term also would be useful 
in providing stable leadership at ATO as foundational NextGen systems 
begin to be implemented. 

JPDO Has Made Progress in Planning NextGen, but Continues to Face 
Challenges with Its Organization: 

JPDO has continued to make progress in furthering its key planning 
documents, but still faces challenges in institutionalizing its 
collaborative practices. 

JPDO Has Made Progress Toward Releasing Key Planning Documents, 
although Further Work Remains: 

JPDO's authorizing legislation requires the office to create a multi- 
agency research and development plan for the transition to NextGen. To 
comply, JPDO is developing several key documents that together form the 
foundation of NextGen planning. These documents include a NextGen 
Concept of Operations, a NextGen Enterprise Architecture, and an 
Integrated Work Plan. 

The Concept of Operations is the most fundamental of JPDO's key 
planning documents, as the other key documents flow from it. Although 
an earlier version was delayed so that stakeholder comments could be 
addressed, Version 1.2 of the Concept of Operations is currently posted 
on JPDO's Website for review and comment by the aviation community. 
This 226-page document provides written descriptions of how the NextGen 
system is envisioned to operate in 2025 and beyond, including 
highlighting key research and policy issues that will need to be 
addressed.[Footnote 10] For example, some key policy issues are 
associated with automating the air traffic control system, including 
the need for a backup plan in case automation fails, the 
responsibilities and liabilities of different stakeholders during an 
automation failure, and the level of monitoring needed by pilots when 
automation is ensuring safe separation between aircraft. Over the next 
few months, JPDO plans to address the public comments it receives and 
issue a revised version of the Concept of Operations. 

In addition to the Concept of Operations, JPDO is working on an 
Enterprise Architecture for NextGen--that is, a technical description 
of the NextGen system, akin to blueprints for a building. The 
Enterprise Architecture is meant to provide a common tool for planning 
and understanding the complex, interrelated systems that will make up 
NextGen. According to JPDO officials, the Enterprise Architecture will 
provide the means for coordinating among the partner agencies and 
private sector manufacturers, aligning relevant research and 
development activities, and integrating equipment. JPDO plans to issue 
an early version of its Enterprise Architecture next month, although 
three previous release dates--March 2006, June 2006, and September 
2006--were not met. According to JPDO officials, until the Enterprise 
Architecture is released, precise cost estimates cannot be developed 
and the partner agencies' research plans cannot be coordinated. 

Finally, JPDO is developing an Integrated Work Plan that will describe 
the capabilities needed to transition to NextGen from the current 
system and provide the research, policy and regulation, and acquisition 
timelines necessary to achieve NextGen by 2025. The Integrated Work 
Plan is akin to a project plan and will be critical for fiscal year 
2009 partner agency budget and program planning. According to a JPDO 
official, the office intends to issue its initial draft of the 
Integrated Work Plan in July 2007. 

Figure 1: Key NextGen Planning Documents: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: JPDO. 

[End of figure] 

We have discussed JPDO's planning documents with JPDO officials and 
examined both an earlier version of JPDO's Concept of 
Operations[Footnote 11] and the current version that is out for public 
comment.[Footnote 12] As we previously testified, JPDO is focusing on 
the right types of key documents for the foundation of NextGen 
planning.[Footnote 13] As for the Concept of Operations, the current 
version is improved from the prior version due to additional detail. 
Nonetheless, we believe that it still does not include key elements 
such as scenarios illustrating NextGen operations, a summary of 
NextGen's operational impact on users and other stakeholders, and an 
analysis of the benefits, alternatives, and trade-offs that were 
considered for NextGen. In addition, it lacks an overall description 
that ties together the eight key areas that the document covers. As 
noted earlier, JPDO does plan to release another version of the Concept 
of Operations later this year. 

In fact, JPDO plans further versions of all of its key planning 
documents. We see the development of all three of JPDO's key documents 
as part of an iterative and evolutionary process. Thus, it is unlikely 
that any of these documents will ever be truly "finalized," but rather 
will continue to evolve throughout the implementation of NextGen to 
reflect, for example, the development of new technologies or problems 
uncovered during research and development of planned technologies. 

Finally, while each of the three key documents has a specific purpose, 
the scope and technical sophistication of these documents makes it 
difficult for some stakeholders to understand the basics of the NextGen 
planning effort. To address this issue, JPDO is currently drafting what 
the office refers to as a "blueprint" for NextGen, meant to be a short, 
high-level, non-technical presentation of NextGen goals and 
capabilities. We believe that such a document could help some 
stakeholders develop a better understanding of NextGen and the planning 
effort to date. 

Institutionalizing the Collaborative Process Will Continue to be 
Critical to JPDO's Facilitating NextGen: 

In our November 2006 report, we noted that JPDO is fundamentally a 
planning and coordinating body that lacks authority over the key human 
and technological resources of its partner agencies. Consequently, 
institutionalizing the collaborative process with its partner agencies 
will be critical to JPDO's ability to facilitate the implementation of 
NextGen. JPDO, however, has not established some practices significant 
to institutionalizing its collaborative process. For example, at a 
fundamental level, JPDO does not have formal, long-term agreements 
among its partner agencies on their roles and responsibilities in 
creating NextGen. There is no mechanism that assures that the partner 
agencies' commitment will continue over the 20-year timeframe of 
NextGen or that ensures accountability to JPDO. According to JPDO 
officials, they are working to establish a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU), signed by the Secretary or other high-ranking official from each 
partner agency, which will broadly define the partner agencies' roles 
and responsibilities. JPDO first informed us of the development of this 
MOU in August 2005; in November 2006 we recommended that JPDO finalize 
the MOU and present it to JPDO's senior policy committee for its 
consideration and action. Nonetheless, according to a JPDO official, as 
of May 4, 2007, the MOU has been signed by the Departments of 
Transportation and Commerce and NASA, but remains unsigned by the 
Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. 

Another key method for institutionalizing the collaborative effort is 
incorporating NextGen goals and activities into the partner agencies' 
key planning documents. For example, we noted in November 2006 that 
NASA and FAA had incorporated NextGen goals into their strategic plans. 
These types of efforts will be critical to JPDO's ability to leverage 
its partner agency resources for continued JPDO planning efforts. Even 
more importantly, these efforts will be critical to helping ensure that 
partner agencies--given competing missions and resource demands-- 
dedicate the resources necessary to support the implementation of 
NextGen research efforts or system acquisitions. 

Recognizing that JPDO does not have authority over partner agency 
resources, FAA and JPDO have initiated several efforts to 
institutionalize NextGen. First, JPDO is working with FAA to refocus 
one of FAA's key planning documents on the implementation of NextGen-- 
an effort that also appears to be improving the collaboration and 
coordination between JPDO and ATO. FAA has expanded and revamped its 
Operational Evolution Plan (OEP)--renamed the Operational Evolution 
Partnership--to become FAA's implementation plan for NextGen.[Footnote 
14] The OEP is being expanded to apply to all of FAA and is intended to 
become a comprehensive description of how the agency will implement 
NextGen, including the required technologies, procedures, and 
resources. (Figure 2 shows the new OEP framework.) An ATO official told 
us that the new OEP is to be consistent with JPDO's key planning 
documents and its budget guidance to the partner agencies. According to 
FAA, the new OEP will allow it to demonstrate appropriate budget 
control and linkage to NextGen plans and help ensure that FAA's 
research and development is relevant to NextGen's requirements. 
According to FAA documents, the agency plans to publish a new OEP in 
June 2007. 

Figure 2: New OEP Framework: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: JPDO. 

Note: The concentric rings indicate the nature of initiative 
development from the outer ring (NextGen strategic initiatives), in 
which new programs and concepts are analyzed and demonstrated; to the 
second ring, where decisions are made regarding safety, operating 
policy, performance standards, and certification requirements; to the 
third ring (technical development), where concepts are prototyped and 
investment analysis decisions are made. The progression through the 
rings is not necessarily linear, and a program may be in more than one 
ring at a time. Data communications, for example, is in the technical 
development ring and also in the middle ring as policy and rulemaking 
is considered. The core is divided into three sections, which indicate 
the FAA offices that implement the final NextGen program. 

[End of figure] 

In addition, to further align FAA's efforts with JPDO's plans for 
NextGen, FAA has created a NextGen review board to oversee the OEP. 
This review board is co-chaired by JPDO's director and ATO's vice 
president of operations planning services. Initiatives, such as concept 
demonstrations or research, proposed for inclusion in the OEP now need 
to go through the review board for approval. These efforts are assessed 
for relation to NextGen requirements, concept maturity, and risk. An 
ATO official told us that the new OEP process should also help identify 
some smaller programs that might be inconsistent with NextGen and which 
could be discontinued. Additionally, as a further step towards 
integrating ATO and JPDO, the administration's reauthorization proposal 
calls for the JPDO director to be a voting member of FAA's joint 
resources council and ATO's executive council. 

While progress is being made in incorporating NextGen initiatives into 
FAA's strategic and planning documents, more remains to be done with 
FAA and the other JPDO partner agencies. For example, one critical 
activity that remains in this area will be synchronizing the NextGen 
enterprise architecture--once JPDO releases and further refines it-- 
with the partner agencies' enterprise architectures. Doing so should 
help align agencies' current work with NextGen while simultaneously 
identifying gaps between agency plans and NextGen plans. Also, while 
FAA is making significant progress toward creating an implementation 
plan for NextGen with its OEP, the other partner agencies are less far 
along or have not begun such efforts. JPDO's lack of authority over 
partner agency resources will be minimized as a challenge if the 
partner agencies commit to NextGen goals and initiatives at a 
structural level. By further incorporation of NextGen efforts into 
strategic planning documents, the partner agencies will better 
institutionalize their commitments to JPDO and the NextGen initiative. 

Finally, JPDO has made progress in establishing mechanisms for 
leveraging partner agency resources--another important practice for 
institutionalizing JPDO's collaborative effort. As we noted in our 
November 2006 report, JPDO is working with OMB to develop a process 
that would allow OMB to identify NextGen-related projects across the 
partner agencies and consider NextGen as a unified, cross-agency 
program. We recommended that JPDO develop written procedures that 
formalize agreements with OMB regarding the leveraging of partner 
agency resources and the identification of NextGen-related programs 
within agency budgets. We recently met with OMB officials who said that 
they felt there has been significant progress with JPDO over the last 
year. JPDO is now working on an OMB Exhibit 300 form for NextGen that 
will allow JPDO to present OMB a joint business case for the NextGen- 
related efforts within the partner agencies and will be used as input 
to funding decisions for NextGen research and acquisitions across the 
agencies.[Footnote 15] This Exhibit 300 will be due to OMB in September 
2007 to inform decisions about the partner agencies' 2009 budget 
submissions. 

Ultimately, the success of JPDO will have to be measured in the efforts 
of its partner agencies to implement policies and procedures, conduct 
research, and acquire systems that support NextGen. For example, JPDO 
is currently working to establish a joint weather office involving FAA 
and the Departments of Defense and Commerce. The goal of this joint 
office is to eliminate redundancies in weather research and leverage 
the resources of these partner agencies to implement a joint weather 
product by 2012, according to a senior JPDO official. Similarly, JPDO 
has secured a commitment from the Departments of Defense and Homeland 
Security and FAA to jointly fund the developmental testing of scenarios 
for network enabled operations. 

With regard to implementation of NextGen technologies, JPDO can point 
to its success in collaborating with FAA to fund and speed FAA's 
rollout of two systems considered cornerstone technologies for NextGen: 
ADS-B and System Wide Information Management (SWIM). ADS-B will replace 
many existing radars with less costly ground-based transceivers. SWIM 
will provide an initial network centric capability to all the users of 
the air transportation system. This means that the FAA and the 
Departments of Homeland Security and Defense will eventually share a 
common, real-time, secure picture of aviation operations across the 
airspace system. Identifying such NextGen programs across the partner 
agencies and establishing implementation plans for them in JPDO's 
Integrated Work Plan will be critical going forward to creating 
performance metrics for JPDO. 

FAA and JPDO Continue to Face a Number of Challenges in Moving Toward 
NextGen: 

FAA and JPDO continue to face a number of challenges as they move 
toward the implementation of NextGen systems and procedures, including 
assessing FAA's technical and contract management expertise, sustaining 
the current air traffic control system, identifying which entities will 
handle necessary research and development, addressing JPDO's leadership 
challenges, conducting human factors research, and ensuring the 
involvement of all key stakeholders. 

FAA Needs to Explore Whether It Has the Technical and Contract 
Management Expertise Necessary to Implement NextGen: 

In the past, a lack of expertise contributed to weaknesses in FAA's 
management of air traffic control modernization efforts, and industry 
experts with whom we spoke questioned whether FAA will have the 
technical expertise needed to implement NextGen. In addition to 
technical expertise, FAA will need contract management expertise to 
oversee the systems acquisitions and integration involved in NextGen. 

Recognizing the complexity of the NextGen implementation effort and the 
possibility that FAA may not have the in-house expertise to manage it 
without assistance, we have identified potential approaches for 
supplementing FAA's capabilities. One of these approaches is for FAA to 
contract with a lead systems integrator (LSI). Generally, an LSI is a 
prime contractor that would help to ensure that the discrete systems 
used in NextGen will operate together and whose responsibilities may 
include designing system solutions, developing requirements, and 
selecting major system and subsystem contractors. The government has 
used LSIs before for programs that require the integration of multiple 
complex systems. Our research indicates that although LSIs have certain 
advantages, such as the knowledge, understanding, skills, and ability 
to integrate functions across various systems, their use also entails 
certain risks.[Footnote 16] For example, because an LSI may have 
significantly more responsibility than a prime contractor usually does, 
careful oversight is necessary to ensure that the government's 
interests are protected and that conflicts of interest are avoided. 
Providing the oversight that is needed, however, can be compromised 
when government expertise is lacking. Consequently, selecting, 
assigning responsibilities to, and managing an LSI could pose 
significant challenges for JPDO and FAA. 

Another approach that we have identified involves obtaining technical 
advice from federally funded research and development corporations to 
help the agency oversee and manage prime contractors. These nonprofit 
corporations are chartered to provide long-term technical advice to 
government agencies in accordance with various statutory and regulatory 
rules to ensure independence and prevent conflicts of interest. 

In November 2006, we recommended that FAA examine its strengths and 
weaknesses with regard to the technical expertise and contract 
management expertise that will be required to define, implement, and 
integrate the numerous complex programs inherent in the transition to 
NextGen.[Footnote 17] In response to our recommendation, FAA has 
contracted with the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to 
determine the needed skill mix and the number of those skilled persons, 
such as technical personnel and program managers, that would be 
necessary to implement the new OEP and to compare those requirements 
with current FAA staff resources. According to FAA, the next step in 
this process would be to contract with NAPA or another organization for 
advice on how best to fill any skills gaps and how to proceed with 
management and oversight of the implementation of NextGen. We believe 
this is a reasonable approach that should help FAA begin to address 
this challenge. 

Although FAA Is Now Focusing on NextGen, It Must Continue to Manage and 
Sustain the Current System: 

While FAA works to acquire and deploy NextGen technologies, it will be 
equally important that FAA maintain many existing systems and, for 
those systems that FAA determines should be phased out, that the agency 
do so using a risk-based approach. The adequacy of FAA's maintenance of 
existing systems was raised following a power outage and equipment 
failures in Southern California that caused hundreds of flight delays 
during the summer of 2006. Investigations by FAA and the Department of 
Transportation Inspector General into these incidents identified a 
number of underlying issues, including the age and condition of 
equipment. Nationwide, the number of scheduled[Footnote 18] and 
unscheduled outages of air traffic control equipment and ancillary 
support systems has been increasing. Increases in the number of 
unscheduled outages indicate that systems are failing more frequently. 
It will be critical for FAA to monitor and address equipment outages to 
ensure the safety and efficiency of the legacy systems, since they will 
be the core of the national airspace system for a number of years and, 
in some cases, will become part of NextGen. 

FAA and JPDO Have Begun to Release Early Cost Estimates for NextGen, 
but Questions Remain Over Who Will Conduct Necessary Research and 
Development: 

In our November report, we noted that JPDO had not yet developed a 
comprehensive estimate of the costs of NextGen. Since then, in its 
recently released 2006 Progress Report,[Footnote 19] JPDO reported some 
estimated costs for NextGen, including specifics on some early NextGen 
programs. JPDO believes the total federal cost for NextGen 
infrastructure through 2025 will range between $15 billion and $22 
billion. JPDO also reported that a preliminary estimate of the 
corresponding cost to system users, who will have to equip with the 
advanced avionics that are necessary to realize the full benefits of 
some NextGen technologies, produced a range of $14 billion to $20 
billion. JPDO noted that this range for avionics costs reflects 
uncertainty about equipage costs for individual aircraft, the number of 
very light jets that will operate in high-performance airspace, and the 
amount of out-of-service time required for installation. 

FAA, in its capital investment plan for fiscal years 2008-2012, 
includes estimated expenditures for 11 line items that are considered 
NextGen capital programs.[Footnote 20] The total 5-year estimated 
expenditures for these programs is $4.3 billion. In fiscal year 2008, 
only 6 of the line items are funded for a total of roughly $174 
million; funding for the remaining 5 programs would begin with the 
fiscal year 2009 budget. According to FAA, in addition to capital 
spending for NextGen, the agency will spend an estimated $300 million 
on NextGen-related research and development from fiscal years 2008 
through 2012. The administration's budget for fiscal year 2008 for FAA 
includes a total of $17.8 million to support the activities of JPDO. 

While FAA and JPDO have begun to release estimates for FAA's NextGen 
investment portfolio, questions remain over which entities will fund 
and conduct some of the necessary research, development, and 
demonstration projects that will be key to achieving certain NextGen 
capabilities. In the past, a significant portion of aeronautics 
research and development, including intermediate technology 
development, has been performed by NASA. To its credit, NASA plans to 
focus its research on the needs of NextGen. However, NASA is also 
moving toward a focus on fundamental research and away from 
developmental work and demonstration projects, which could negatively 
impact NextGen if these efforts are not assumed by others. 

In addition, JPDO will need to conduct modeling for NextGen and may 
look to its partner agencies to provide modeling capabilities and 
support. For example, NASA's NAS-wide modeling platform, the Airspace 
Concepts Evaluation System (ACES),[Footnote 21] permits JPDO to, among 
other things, evaluate alternative research ideas and assess the 
performance of competing vendors. According to a JPDO official, this 
capability, which is critical to NextGen research, is eroding as JPDO's 
investment simulation requirements are expanding. As part of its 
fundamental research mission, NASA intends to upgrade to ACES-X (a more 
sophisticated representation of the national airspace system), but not 
for another two years. Until then, JPDO's investment modeling 
capability will be constrained unless the office or another partner 
agency can assume the modeling work. For example, the Department of 
Defense has detailed aircraft models and the Department of Homeland 
Security has detailed models of airport terminals that are relevant for 
JPDO's simulations. This is an issue that needs to be addressed in the 
short-term. 

JPDO faces the challenge of determining the nature and scope of the 
research and technology development necessary to begin the transition 
to NextGen, as well as identifying the entities that can conduct that 
research and development. According to officials at FAA and JPDO, they 
are currently studying these issues and trying to assess how much 
research and development FAA can assume. An FAA official recently 
testified that the agency proposes to increase its research and 
development funding by $280 million over the next 5 years. However, a 
draft report by an advisory committee to FAA stated that FAA would need 
at least $100 million annually in increased funding to assume NASA's 
research and development work, and establishing the necessary 
infrastructure within FAA could delay the implementation of NextGen by 
5 years.[Footnote 22] JPDO's Integrated Work Plan will permit NASA and 
the other partner agencies to assess the research and development needs 
of NextGen, determine funding, and conduct the necessary initiatives. 
The Integrated Work Plan is critical for the timely completion of 
research and testing of proposed NextGen systems and keeping NextGen on 
schedule. 

JPDO's Lack of Stable Leadership and the Authority to Enforce 
Accountability Threaten the Credibility of Organization: 

While basic organizational structure of JPDO has been in place for 
several years (see app. 1), it has suffered from a lack of stable 
leadership. As JPDO begins its fourth year in operation, it is 
functioning under its third director and operated for much of 2006 
under the stewardship of an acting director. The current director of 
JPDO has held the position since August 2006. The Next Generation Air 
Transportation System Institute (the Institute), created to facilitate 
the participation of nonfederal stakeholders in the NextGen effort, 
noted in its recent annual report that JPDO's leadership turnover had 
made it a challenge for JPDO to move out more aggressively on many 
goals and objectives, as the office waited on a full-time director. The 
Institute also stated that JPDO's leadership turnover had limited the 
ability of the Institute's executive committee[Footnote 23] to forge a 
stronger relationship with JPDO leadership and work jointly on 
strategic issues and challenges. These fundamental leadership issues 
are exacerbated by the lack of meetings of JPDO's senior policy 
committee. Although JPDO has been functioning for just over 3 years, 
the senior policy committee has met only four times, and has not met at 
all as a formal body since November 2005. 

In addition to the lack of stable leadership, JPDO's management lacks 
the authority to hold much of JPDO's staff accountable for their 
performance. As we noted in November 2006, JPDO has staffed the various 
levels of its organization with employees from its partner agencies and 
this practice helps to leverage partner agency human resources. 
However, a drawback of such staffing is a lack of real or perceived 
accountability to JPDO. According to JPDO officials, the JPDO workforce 
consists largely of part-time partner agency personnel who have been 
detailed to JPDO and part-time private sector volunteers. Only a few 
permanently-assigned FAA staff have their performance appraised by JPDO 
management, although the director does provide input to the performance 
appraisals of some of the managers detailed to JPDO from partner 
agencies. We have noted in previous studies that improved performance 
has been linked to accountability.[Footnote 24] 

Similarly, although the organizational structure of the Institute has 
been in place for 2 years, the Institute is currently led by an acting 
director while a search is being conducted for the Institute's third 
executive director. Some Institute Management Council (IMC) members 
with whom we spoke believed that this turnover might be indicative of 
problems with the structure of the Institute and a need for greater 
clarity in roles and responsibilities. For example, these IMC members 
noted that there were stresses placed on the Institute's executive 
director resulting from the need to meet the competing demands of the 
IMC, the IMC executive committee, and JPDO management. Other IMC 
members attributed the stresses on the executive director to the lack 
of clarity in the Institute's role. These members noted that while the 
Institute is clearly charged with selecting private sector participants 
for JPDO's work groups, the Institute's role of conducting research for 
the JPDO could be viewed as overlapping with other advisory 
organizations such as RTCA.[Footnote 25] Two IMC members believed that 
the Institute's award of only two research contracts in two years 
illustrates that the Institute is not yet functioning as intended. Some 
IMC members also pointed out that a formal mechanism for providing 
industry input to JPDO on NextGen concepts and issues has not yet been 
fully established, even though this is one of the missions of the 
Institute. Although the Institute is currently seeking a new executive 
director, some IMC members felt that the IMC would do better to first 
try and gain a better understanding of the factors that have led to the 
turnover in the executive director position. 

Human Factors Research Is Critical to Some Fundamental NextGen 
Capabilities: 

Among the central assumptions of the NextGen system is a concept of 
operations that envisions an increased reliance on automation, which 
dramatically changes the roles and responsibilities of both the air 
traffic controllers and the pilots. In such an automated environment 
some of the controller's responsibilities will shift from air traffic 
control to air traffic management and pilots will take on a greater 
share of the responsibility for maintaining safe separation and other 
tasks currently performed by controllers. These changes in roles and 
responsibilities raise significant human factors issues for the safety 
and efficiency of the national airspace system. 

Although JPDO has begun to model how shifts in air traffic controllers' 
workloads would affect their performance, it has not yet begun to model 
the effect of how this shift in workload to pilots would affect pilot 
performance. According to a JPDO official, modeling the effect of 
changes in pilot workload has not yet begun because JPDO has not yet 
identified a suitable model to incorporate into its suite of modeling 
tools. According to a JPDO official, the evolving roles of pilots and 
controllers is the NextGen initiative's most important human factors 
issue, but will be difficult to research because data on pilot behavior 
are not readily available for use in creating models. In addition to 
the study of changing roles, JPDO has not yet studied the training 
implications of various systems or solutions proposed for NextGen. For 
example, JPDO officials said they will need to study the extent to 
which new air traffic controllers will have to be trained to operate 
both the old and the new equipment as the concept of operations and 
enterprise architecture mature. 

JPDO Faces A Continuing Challenge in Ensuring the Involvement of All 
Key Stakeholders: 

Some stakeholders, such as current air traffic controllers and 
technicians, will play critical roles in NextGen, and their involvement 
in planning for and deploying the new technology will be important to 
the success of NextGen. In November 2006, we reported that active air 
traffic controllers were not involved in the NextGen planning effort 
and recommended that JPDO determine whether any other key stakeholders 
and expertise were not represented on its integrated product teams, 
divisions, or elsewhere within the office. Since then, the head of the 
controllers' union has taken a seat on the IMC. However, no active 
controllers are yet participating at the more detailed group planning 
level. Also, aviation technicians do not participate in NextGen 
efforts. Input from current air traffic controllers who have recent 
experience controlling aircraft and current technicians who will 
maintain NextGen equipment is important when considering human factors 
and safety issues. Our work on past air traffic control modernization 
projects has shown that a lack of stakeholder or expert involvement 
early and throughout a project can lead to costly increases and delays. 

In addition, we found that some private sector stakeholders have 
expressed concerns that participation in the Institute might either 
preclude bidding on future NextGen acquisitions or pose organizational 
conflicts of interest. FAA's acquisition process, generally, precludes 
bids from organizations that have participated in, materially 
influenced, or had prior knowledge of the requirements for an 
acquisition. The Institute was aware of this concern and attempted to 
address it through an amendment to its governing document that 
strengthened the language protecting participants from organizational 
conflicts of interest for participation in the NextGen initiative. 
However, while the amendment language currently operates to protect 
stakeholders, the language has never been tested or challenged. Thus, 
it is unclear at this time whether any stakeholder participation is 
being chilled by conflict of interest concerns. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to 
respond to any questions from you or other Members of the Subcommittee. 

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgment: 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Dr. Gerald L. 
Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. Individuals making 
key contributions to this statement include Kevin Egan, Jessica Evans, 
Colin Fallon, Ed Menoche, Faye Morrison, Taylor Reeves, and Richard 
Scott. 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: JPDO's Organizational Structure Facilitates Collaboration, 
but Continues to Evolve: 

In November 2006, we reported that the Joint Planning and Development 
Office's (JPDO) organizational structure incorporated some of the 
practices that we have found to be effective for federal interagency 
collaborations--an important point given how critical such 
collaboration is to the success of JPDO's mission. For example, the 
JPDO partner agencies have worked together to develop key strategies 
for the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) and JPDO 
has leveraged its partner agency resources by staffing various levels 
of its organization with partner agency employees. Also, our work has 
shown that involving stakeholders can, among other things, increase 
their support for a collaborative effort. 

Vision 100 includes requirements for JPDO to coordinate and consult 
with its partner agencies, private sector experts, and the public. 
JPDO's approach has been to establish an organizational structure that 
involves federal and nonfederal stakeholders throughout the 
organization. This structure includes a federal interagency senior 
policy committee. JPDO's senior policy committee is headed by the 
Secretary of Transportation (as required in Vision 100) and includes 
senior-level officials from JPDO's partner agencies. The JPDO board is 
an adjunct to the senior policy committee and is composed of at least 
one senior representative from each of the partner agencies. 

The Next Generation Air Transportation System Institute (the Institute) 
was created by an agreement between the National Center for Advanced 
Technologies[Footnote 26] and the Federal Aviation Administration to 
meet Vision 100's requirement that JPDO coordinate and consult with the 
public. The Institute incorporates the expertise and views of 
stakeholders from private industry, state and local governments, and 
academia. In addition, the Institute arranges for the participation of 
nonfederal stakeholders in JPDO's planning efforts, reviews and selects 
private sector organizations to conduct research studies needed by 
JPDO, and holds public meetings to obtain the views of the aviation 
community. The Institute held its first public meeting in March 2006 
and plans to hold another public meeting in May 2007. The Institute is 
directed by an Institute Management Council (IMC), which consists of 
top officials and representatives from the aviation community. The IMC 
oversees the policy, recommendations, and products of the Institute and 
provides a means for advancing consensus positions on critical NextGen 
issues. An executive committee, consisting of the IMC's two co-chairs 
and three members selected by them, conducts business on behalf of the 
IMC. The Institute is managed on a day-to-day basis by an executive 
director, who reports to the IMC and the executive committee, and works 
closely with JPDO management. 

Recently, JPDO announced they are in the process of implementing 
several structural and operational changes to improve the efficiency of 
the organization (see fig. 3). JPDO's structure used to include eight 
integrated product teams (IPT), which was where the federal and 
nonfederal experts came together to plan for and coordinate the 
development of capabilities for NextGen. The eight IPTs were linked to 
eight key strategies that JPDO developed early on for guiding its 
NextGen planning work. The IPTs were headed by representatives of 
JPDO's partner agencies and include more than 200 nonfederal 
stakeholders from over 100 organizations. 

JPDO recently converted each IPT into a "working group" with the same 
participants as the former IPT, but with each working group led by a 
joint government and industry steering committee. These steering 
committees will oversee the creation of small, ad hoc subgroups that 
will be tasked with short-term projects exploring specific issues and 
delivering discrete work products. Under this arrangement, working 
group members will be free of obligations to the group when not engaged 
in a specific project. According to JPDO officials, they believe the 
working groups will be more efficient and output-or product-focused 
than the former IPTs. JPDO officials noted that they are also in the 
process of staffing a new, ninth working group to address avionics 
issues. 

Figure 3: JPDO New Organizational Chart: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: JPDO. 

Note: There are nine working groups covering aircraft, air navigation 
services, airports, environment, global harmonization, net-centric 
operations, safety, security, and weather. 

[End of figure] 

We believe that these changes could help address concerns that we have 
heard from some stakeholders about the productivity of some IPTs and 
the pace of the planning effort at JPDO. However, it will be important 
to monitor these changes to ensure that the participation of 
stakeholders is neither decreased nor adversely affected. Maintaining 
communications within and among work groups could increase in 
importance if, as work group members focus on specific projects, they 
become less involved in the overall collaborative planning effort. The 
effectiveness of the changes to JPDO's organizational structure will 
need to continue to be evaluated over time. Currently, we have on-going 
study examining the views and concerns of JPDO's federal and nonfederal 
stakeholders about the office and its performance. We expect to issue a 
report on our findings later this year. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] Performance-based organizations are discrete units, led by a chief 
operating officer, that commit to clear objectives, specific measurable 
goals, customer service standards, and targets for improved 
performance. 

[2] JPDO's partner agencies include the Departments of Transportation, 
Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security; FAA; the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA); and the White House Office of Science 
and Technology Policy. 

[3] GAO, Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and 
Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the National Airspace 
System, GAO-07-25 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2006). 

[4] GAO, Federal Aviation Administration: Key Issues in Ensuring the 
Efficient Development and Safe Operation of the Next Generation Air 
Transportation System, GAO-07-636T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2007) 
and GAO, Joint Planning and Development Office: Progress and Key Issues 
in Planning the Transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation 
System, GAO-07-693T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2007). 

[5] According to JPDO, it is not appropriate for the Office of Science 
and Technology Policy, as a White House agency, to sign the MOU. 

[6] GAO, Federal Aviation Administration: Stronger Architecture Program 
Needed to Guide Systems Modernization Efforts, GAO-05-266 (Washington, 
D.C.: Apr. 29, 2005); Air Traffic Control: System Management 
Capabilities Improved, but More can be Done to Institutionalize 
Improvements, GAO-04-901 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004); and 
Information Technology: FAA Has Many Investment Management Capabilities 
in Place, but More Oversight of Operational Systems is Needed, GAO-04-
822 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004). 

[7] EVM is a project management technique that combines measurements of 
technical performance, schedule performance, and cost performance with 
the intent of providing an early warning of problems while there is 
time for corrective action. 

[8] GAO, High Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: 
January 2007). 

[9] GAO, National Airspace System: Transformation will Require Cultural 
Change, Balanced Funding Priorities, and Use of All Available 
Management Tools, GAO-06-154 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 14, 2005). 

[10] Following an introductory section, the Concept of Operations has 
eight sections covering air traffic management operations, airport 
operations and infrastructure services, net-centric infrastructure 
services, shared situational awareness services, security services, 
environmental management framework, safety management services, and 
performance management services. 

[11] Concept of Operations for the Next Generation Air Transportation 
System, version 0.2, July 24, 2006. 

[12] We reviewed JPDO's current Concept of Operations for the Next 
Generation Air Transportation System, version 1.2, dated February 28, 
2007, by comparing it with the IEEE Standard 1362-1998 for concept of 
operations documents. 

[13] GAO-07-693T. 

[14] Prior to expansion of the OEP, the document centered around plans 
for increasing capacity and efficiency at 35 major airports. 

[15] Section 300 of OMB Circular No. A-11, Preparation, Submission, and 
Execution of the Budget (Nov. 2, 2005), sets forth requirements for 
federal agencies for planning, budgeting, acquiring, and managing 
information technology capital assets. 

[16] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat System Risks Underscore 
the Importance of Oversight, GAO-07-672T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 27, 
2007). 

[17] GAO-07-25. 

[18] Scheduled outages occur for scheduled maintenance. 

[19] JPDO, Making the NextGen Vision a Reality: 2006 Progress Report to 
the Next Generation Air Transportation System Integrated Plan 
(Washington, D.C; Mar. 14, 2007). 

[20] FAA has six capital investment programs that it considers 
transformational NextGen programs slated to receive funding in fiscal 
year 2008: ADS-B nationwide implementation, System Wide Information 
Management (SWIM), NextGen Data Communications, NextGen Network Enabled 
Weather, National Airspace System Voice Switch, and NextGen Technology 
Demonstration. In addition, five other programs are slated to begin 
funding in 2009: NextGen System Development, NextGen High Altitude 
Trajectory Based Operations, NextGen High Density Airports, NextGen 
Networked Facilities, and NextGen Cross-Cutting Infrastructure. 

[21] ACES provides a detailed flight simulation environment and an open 
framework to integrate the results of other simulations. This allows 
JPDO to test concepts well before they have to be demonstrated with 
real hardware and people. This platform provides a basis for evaluating 
the timing of many agencies' current budget requests and is a method 
for comparing competitive ideas. 

[22] Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee, Draft 
Report on Financing the Next Generation Air Transportation System 
(Washington, D.C; April 2006). 

[23] The Institute's executive committee is a subset of the Institute's 
governing body, the Institute Management Council. The Institute 
Management Council members represent commercial airline operations, 
commercial pilots, air traffic control technology, air traffic 
controllers, airport operators, business aircraft operations, federal 
advisory committees, universities, and non-profit research 
organizations, small aircraft general aviation, helicopter operations, 
manufacturers of air vehicles and airborne/space-borne and ground based 
equipment, and regional commercial airline operations. The JPDO 
director is an ex-officio member and there are two at-large members. 

[24] GAO, Air Traffic Control Modernization: Status of the Current 
Program and Planning for the Next Generation Air Transportation System, 
GAO-06-653T (Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2006) 

[25] Organized in 1935 and once called the Radio Technical Commission 
for Aeronautics, RTCA is today known by its acronym. RTCA is a private, 
not-for-profit corporation that develops consensus-based performance 
standards for ATC systems. RTCA serves as a federal advisory committee, 
and its recommendations are the basis for a number of FAA's policy, 
program, and regulatory decisions. 

[26] The National Center for Advanced Technologies is a nonprofit unit 
established by the Aerospace Industries Association.

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