Summary

During the Persian Gulf War, a number of U.S. combat vehicles were contaminated by depleted uranium after being struck by munitions or when ammunition stored on board was ignited by accidental fires. Although the Army does not know the full extent to which personnel were exposed to depleted uranium--a radioactive, chemically toxic metal--GAO discovered that at least several dozen U.S. soldiers, some unknowingly, either breathed it in, ingested it, or were hit by contaminated shrapnel. Army and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) officials believe, however, that the exposure levels did not exceed allowable limits set by NRC. Although the Army's policy is to minimize individuals' exposure to radiation, it has not effectively educated its personnel about the hazards of depleted uranium contamination or about proper safety measures. What little information is available is not widely disseminated. The military has begun to test crew members who were injured in Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting vehicles contaminated by munitions hits, along with an Army National Guard unit that claimed exposure while working with contaminated vehicles in the Persian Gulf, but the Army has no plans to medically evaluate other personnel who might have been exposed. The Army still lacks a formal plan to ensure that contaminated vehicles are decontaminated, disposed of, and repaired in an efficient way. These issues may also be relevant to the other services.

GAO found that: (1) the Army does not know the full extent of DU radiation exposure during the war, but several dozen or more soldiers were exposed to DU primarily through inhalation, ingestion, or shrapnel; (2) the Army and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission believed that combat personnel were not exposed to radiation levels that exceeded acceptable exposure limits; (3) DU protective methods may be inadequate during combat and life-threatening situations; (4) the Army did not sufficiently educate its personnel and disseminate information concerning the hazards of DU exposure; (5) DU educational training was limited to Abrams tank personnel, munitions handlers, and explosive ordnance disposal personnel; (6) the Army and the Department of Veterans Affairs have begun testing injured Army National Guard personnel and Abrams and Bradley crew members who could have been exposed to DU radiation; (7) the Army lacked adequate plans for evaluating other personnel who could have been exposed to DU, including those involved with DU-contaminated vehicle recovery; and (8) the Army had inadequate facilities and no formal procedures to decontaminate, dispose of, or quickly repair DU-contaminated vehicles.