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Report to the Honorable Eddie Bernice Johnson, House of 
Representatives:

June 2003:

Equal Employment Opportunity:

Hiring, Promotion, and Discipline Processes at DEA:

GAO-03-413:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-03-413, a report to the Honorable Eddie Bernice 
Johnson, House of Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study:

A 1981 U.S. District Court decision found that the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) had discriminated against African American 
special agents in a number of personnel practices. Over the years, the 
plaintiffs and DEA had agreed to remedies in many of these areas. 
However, minority representatives continued to raise issues in three 
areas—hiring, promotion, and discipline. GAO was asked to examine 
DEA’s current processes for hiring, promoting, and disciplining 
special agents, and provide information about racial, ethnicity, and 
gender differences in these three areas. 

What GAO Found:

During the October 1997 through March 2002 period, African American, 
Hispanic, and white applicants to be special agents passed DEA’s 
medical requirements and interview process at about the same rates. 
However, African American and Hispanic applicants had lower passing 
rates on (1) the test of an applicant’s ability to recall and write 
about a video of a drug-related enforcement action and (2) suitability 
requirements measured through a background investigation and other 
tests. DEA’s hiring procedures are based on criteria in federal 
regulations, professional standards, and standards established by 
subject matter experts. However, DEA had not studied its hiring 
requirements to see why its procedures resulted in different selection 
rates and whether they could be modified to reduce differences while 
maintaining the high standards necessary for special agents. 

There were no statistically significant differences in promotion rates 
among the various racial, ethnic, and gender groups during fiscal 
years 1997 through 2001. DEA has a rigorous and validated competency-
based process that uses job simulations to assess capabilities at the 
target grade level. However, the job-relatedness of a key step 
involving recommending special agents for promotion had not been 
established and our analysis showed that African American and Hispanic 
special agents were recommended for promotion at significantly lower 
rates. Despite differences in recommendation rates, DEA’s promotion 
decisions mirrored the race, ethnic, and gender makeup of the agency’s 
special agent workforce. Additionally, the agency, working with a 
diverse panel of special agents, subsequently developed a revised 
recommendation process. At the time of GAO’s review, DEA and the 
African American representatives were involved in mediation to reach 
final agreement. 

Disciplinary data for fiscal years 1997 to 2001 showed that the 
proportion of African American, Hispanic, and women special agents 
disciplined for misconduct was significantly higher than their 
representation in the DEA special agent workforce. These higher rates 
reflect that African Americans, Hispanics, and women had a 
significantly higher percentage of allegations of misconduct lodged 
against them and that a significantly higher percentage of these 
allegations were substantiated by investigations and resulted in 
disciplinary action. A recent study by an outside contractor found 
DEA’s disciplinary process to be fair and nondiscriminatory, but that 
study only considered African Americans and whites and not women or 
other minority groups.

What GAO Recommends:

GAO recommendations to DEA include

* initiating a process to monitor hiring results to identify 
differences in selection rates among groups, determine why they occur, 
and what, if anything, can be done to reduce the differences while 
maintaining high standards and 

* expanding the study of disciplinary actions taken against African 
American versus white special agents to determine whether discipline 
is administered fairly to all racial, ethnic, and gender groups of 
special agents. 

In commenting on this report, the Acting Administrator of DEA agreed 
with our recommendations and listed a number of actions being taken to 
implement them.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-413.

To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Victor S. Rezendes at 
(202) 512-6808.

[End of section]

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

The Diversity of DEA's Special Agent Workforce:

A Higher Proportion of Minority Applicants Did Not Meet Hiring 
Requirements:

No Statistically Significant Differences in Promotion Rates:

DEA's Discipline Process Has Been Found to Be Nondiscriminatory:

Employee Views on Promotion and Discipline:

Conclusions:

Recommendations for Executive Action:

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

Appendixes:

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:

DEA Special Agent Workforce Diversity:

DEA’s Hiring, Promotion, and Discipline Processes:

Appendix II: Physical Task Test Minimum Requirements:

Appendix III: Competencies in Assessing GS-13 and GS-14 Special Agents
for Promotion:

Performance Rating Competencies for GS-13 and GS-14 Special Agents:

Competencies Measured by Assessment Center Job Simulations:

Interim Special Agent in Charge/Office Head Recommendation Process:

Proposed SAC/Office Head Recommendation Process:

Appendix IV: Comments from the Drug Enforcement Administration:

Tables:

Table 1: Demographic Distribution of the Federal Workforce and Criminal 
Investigators (Special Agents) in DEA, Governmentwide, and the 
Nonfederal Workforce:

Table 2: Demographics of DEA's Special Agent Workforce, 1980-2002:

Table 3: Distribution of DEA Special Agents in Nonsupervisory, 
Supervisory, and SES Positions by EEO Group, September 2002:

Table 4: Demographic Profile of Applicants under BA-98-01 and BA-20-00, 
October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002:

Table 5: Percentage of Applicants Meeting Minimum Requirements under BA-
98-01 and BA-20-00, October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002:

Table 6: Percentage of Applicants Passing Written Assessment under BA-
98-01 and BA-20-00, October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002:

Table 7: Applicant Interview Passing Rates under BA-98-01 and BA-20-00, 
October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002:

Table 8: Applicant Medical Examination Passing Rates under BA-98-01 and 
BA-20-00, October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002:

Table 9: Percentage of Applicants Passing the Physical Task Test under 
BA-98-01 and BA-20-00, October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002:

Table 10: Percentage of Applicants Found Suitable under BA-98-01 and BA-
20-00, October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002:

Table 11: Percentage of Applicants Found Suitable by the 1811 Hiring 
Panel, September 29, 2000, to May 7, 2002:

Table 12: Overall Selection Rates for Applicants for Whom DEA Made 
Hiring Eligibility Determinations under BA-98-01 and BA-20-00, by EEO 
Group, October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002:

Table 13: Demographic Profile of Applicants Who Met Minimum Requirements 
and Applicants Hired under BA-98-01 and BA-20-00, October 15, 1997, to 
March 31, 2002:

Table 14: Special Agents Participating in the SAPP, 1997-2001:

Table 15: Average SAPP Scores, 1997-2001:

Table 16: Frequency of Applicants Appearing on Best-Qualified Lists 
Being Recommended by SACs, 2000-01:

Table 17: Individuals on at Least One Best-Qualified List from Which 
Promotions Were Made and Individuals Selected for Promotion, by EEO 
Group, Fiscal Years 1997-2001:

Table 18: Special Agents Disciplined Compared with Special Agent 
Population, by EEO Group, Fiscal Years 1997-2001:

Table 19: Distribution of Cases of Alleged Misconduct Involving Special 
Agents, by EEO Group, Compared with Workforce Representation, Fiscal 
Years 1997-2001:

Table 20: Cases of Alleged Misconduct Involving Special Agents That 
Resulted in Disciplinary Action, by EEO Group, Fiscal Years 1997-2001:

Table 21: DEA Physical Task Test Minimum Performance Requirements:

Table 22: Performance Rating Competencies for GS-13 and GS-14 Special 
Agents:

Table 23: Competencies Measured by Assessment Center Job Simulations in 
2001:

Abbreviations: 

ARTS: Agent Recruiting and Tracking System:

EEO: equal employment opportunity:

EEOC: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission:

GS: General Schedule:

DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration:

MSPB: Merit Systems Protection Board:

OPM: Office of Personnel Management:

OPR: Office of Professional Responsibility :

SAC: Special Agent in Charge:

SAPP: Special Agent Promotion Program:

SES: senior executive service:

Letter June 10, 2003:

The Honorable Eddie Bernice Johnson 
House of Representatives:

Dear Ms. Johnson:

In 1981, ruling on a class action racial discrimination lawsuit brought 
by African American special agents, a U.S. district court found that 
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)[Footnote 1] had discriminated 
against the agents in a variety of personnel practices. Some 20 years 
have passed since the initial decision, and not all areas covered by 
the court's orders have been finalized, particularly in regard to 
promotions. In your role as Chair of the Congressional Black Caucus, 
minority representatives of DEA's special agents continued to raise 
issues with you about some of the personnel practices at DEA. Based on 
discussions with your office, we agreed to (1) develop information on 
the diversity of DEA's special agent workforce and (2) examine the 
processes DEA has put in place to provide for fair and 
nondiscriminatory hiring, promoting, and disciplining of special agents 
and provide information about racial, ethnic, and gender differences in 
those three areas.

With regard to the diversity of DEA's special agent workforce, we 
developed information by race, ethnicity, and gender for each pay grade 
level. To examine DEA's processes for hiring, promoting, and 
disciplining special agents, we reviewed policies and procedures and 
discussed them with knowledgeable officials and representatives of 
groups representing minority special agents. To identify the results 
that have been achieved, we analyzed data by race, ethnicity, and 
gender generally for fiscal years 1997 through 2001, the 5 most recent 
fiscal years for which data were available, with regard to how 
applicants fared at each step of DEA's hiring process, promotions of 
special agents to the General Schedule (GS) grade 14 and 15 levels, and 
disciplinary actions taken. Our analyses were not designed to prove or 
disprove discrimination; rather, they were designed to provide 
information about race, ethnicity, and gender differences in personnel 
actions. In analyzing hiring actions, we used the 80 percent rule set 
out in the federal government's Uniform Guidelines on Employee 
Selection Procedures. Under the 80 percent rule, a selection rate for a 
racial, ethnic, or gender group that is less than 80 percent of the 
selection rate for the group with the highest rate is considered a 
substantially different rate of selection that usually requires an 
employer to study the job relatedness of selection procedures. To 
analyze differences in promotion and disciplinary actions, we used 
standard statistical techniques. We did our work from September 2001 
through February 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Further details about our methodology are discussed 
in appendix I.

Results in Brief:

The diversity of DEA's special agent (criminal investigator) workforce 
was below overall government workforce percentages but generally 
comparable with the governmentwide population of criminal 
investigators, except for women. In September 2002, whites made up 80.3 
percent, African Americans 8.2 percent, Hispanics 8.8 percent, Asian/
Pacific Islanders 2.2 percent, and Native Americans 0.5 percent of 
DEA's special agents. These percentages compared with governmentwide 
criminal investigator levels of 80.3 percent white, 7.1 percent African 
American, 8.9 percent Hispanic, 2.7 percent Asian/Pacific Islanders, 
and 1 percent Native American. Women were 8.3 percent of special agents 
in DEA but 16.4 percent of criminal investigators governmentwide. 
Minority representation in DEA's special agent workforce resembles an 
inverted pyramid, with proportional representation of minority special 
agents in senior executive service (SES) and supervisory special agent 
positions higher than in nonsupervisory positions. In September 2002, 
minorities represented 36.7 percent of SES special agents, 23.2 percent 
of supervisory special agents, and 18.4 percent of the nonsupervisory 
agents. Women, on the other hand, were 8.8 percent of the 
nonsupervisory special agents, which was more than their representation 
among supervisory special agents (6.6 percent) but less than their 
representation among SES special agents (10.2 percent). Because of the 
relatively low representation of minorities and women in the lower 
ranks of special agents, DEA could face problems in enhancing, or even 
maintaining, diversity in the upper ranks in the near future as 
attrition occurs, especially if DEA experiences a high level of 
retirements like that expected governmentwide. However, DEA does not 
have a clear picture of future workforce trends because the agency has 
not prepared a workforce analysis that takes into account the 
demographics of the workforce, including age, grade, retirement 
eligibility, and expected retirements over the next 5-year or longer 
period.

Our analysis of DEA's hiring decisions showed that a higher proportion 
of minority applicants did not meet the requirements to become a 
special agent at some steps in the hiring process. We found that in 
applying the 80 percent rule, African American men, Hispanic men, and 
Hispanic women had substantially lower passing rates on the written 
test intended to measure the ability to observe and recall details and 
write. In addition, African Americans (men and women) had substantially 
lower rates of being found suitable for hiring as a special agent, 
based on the results of background investigations, psychological 
evaluations, and polygraph tests. Overall, DEA hired 13.7 percent of 
African American applicants, 15.8 percent of Hispanic applicants, and 
22.9 percent of white applicants. The proportion of white applicants 
hired was substantially higher than that of the two minority groups. 
The Uniform Guidelines require employers to study the job-relatedness 
of selection procedures when there are substantial differences in the 
selection rate for any race, ethnic, and gender group. Although DEA's 
hiring procedures are based on criteria in federal regulations, 
professional standards, or standards established by subject matter 
experts, the agency had not studied why its procedures resulted in 
different selection rates and whether they could be modified to reduce 
differences while maintaining high standards.

Our analysis showed no statistically significant differences in 
promotion rates among the various racial, ethnic, and gender groups. 
However, issues regarding promotions of African Americans to GS-14 and 
GS-15 special agent positions remain in litigation because the court 
found in 1999 that DEA's promotion process did not fully comply with 
title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Although DEA has a validated process 
to assess special agents' promotion potential, the 1999 court decision 
found that a subsequent step involving recommendations to the selecting 
authority by the office heads with vacancies of specific special agents 
on the best-qualified lists had resulted in an underrepresentation of 
African American special agents compared with whites, and that this 
step had not been validated. Interim measures modifying the 
recommendation process had not eliminated this situation. Although 
DEA's monitoring and reporting of promotion process results gave 
particular attention to African American special agents, our analysis 
also showed that Hispanics were recommended at statistically 
significant lower rates than white special agents, particularly 
applicants for GS-14 positions. Although DEA has developed a 
recommendation process, the agency and the plaintiffs need to resolve 
issues about implementation and procedures for monitoring the results 
before the proposed process can be put in place. In addition, the court 
must approve the process.

Our analysis of disciplinary data for fiscal years 1997 through 2001 
showed that the proportion of African American, Hispanic, and women 
special agents disciplined for misconduct was substantially higher than 
their representation in the DEA special agent workforce and that this 
difference was statistically significant. During fiscal years 1997 
through 2001, African Americans made up 8.3 percent of the special 
agent workforce but accounted for about 16 percent of the agents 
disciplined. Similarly, Hispanics, while making up 8.9 percent of the 
special agent workforce during the same time period, accounted for 
about 15 percent of agents disciplined. Women, who made up 7.8 percent 
of special agents during fiscal years 1997 through 2001, accounted for 
about 13 percent of agents disciplined. These higher rates reflect that 
African American, Hispanic, and women special agents had a 
proportionately higher number of allegations of misconduct lodged 
against them and that a higher proportion of these allegations were 
substantiated by investigations and resulted in disciplinary actions. 
DEA does not know why these differences exist nor does any study offer 
a reason for them. However, the results of two studies by outside 
contractors, approved by an oversight group and which we found 
methodologically sound, found DEA's disciplinary process to be fair and 
nondiscriminatory. The most recent of these studies, however, compared 
only disciplinary actions of African American and white special agents. 
Disciplinary actions related to other minorities and women have not 
been studied since 1986.

Although there were no statistically significant differences in the 
promotion rates among the racial, ethnic, and gender groups and studies 
found DEA's disciplinary process to be fair and nondiscriminatory, 
minority and women special agents perceived that these processes were 
not fair and had a disparate effect on minorities. The perceptions may 
have been driven in part by a lack of data and other information 
because DEA did not widely share analyses of its promotion and 
discipline processes with the special agent workforce. Sharing such 
data could help special agents formulate informed views about the 
fairness and equity of the promotion and discipline processes.

We recommend that DEA (1) prepare a workforce analysis that takes into 
account expected attrition to guide DEA's recruiting and hiring, (2) 
initiate a process to monitor hiring process results, (3) monitor 
promotion recommendation rates among the racial, ethnic, and gender 
groups, (4) expand the study of disciplinary actions to include all 
racial, ethnic, and gender groups, and (5) share information about 
promotion and discipline processes with its special agent workforce.

In commenting on this report, the Acting Administrator of DEA agreed 
with our recommendations and listed a number of actions DEA was taking 
to implement them.

Background:

Under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,[Footnote 
2] it is unlawful for employers to discriminate against employees or 
job applicants on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin. Other civil rights statutes prohibit discrimination based on 
age or disability.[Footnote 3] Under these laws, it is illegal to 
discriminate in any aspect of the terms and conditions of employment, 
including hiring, firing, disciplinary actions, promotion, pay 
assignments, and training. In addition, for federal civilian employees, 
Executive Order 13087 prohibits discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has 
interpreted the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978[Footnote 4] to 
prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in the federal 
workplace.[Footnote 5]

Intentionally treating people differently on account of their race, 
color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability is called 
"disparate treatment."[Footnote 6] Title VII prohibits not only 
intentional discrimination, but also practices that have the effect of 
discriminating against individuals because of their race, color, 
national origin, religion, or sex. Personnel policies that are neutral 
on their face but have a substantially different though unintended 
affect on a group are said to have a "disparate impact" or "adverse 
impact." In general, the use of any procedure that has an adverse 
impact on the hiring, promotion, or other employment actions of members 
of any race, gender, or ethnic group is considered to be discriminatory 
unless the procedure is shown to be job related and consistent with 
business necessity.[Footnote 7]

Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures:

The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures,[Footnote 8] 
adopted in 1978 by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
the Civil Service Commission (the predecessor agency to OPM), and the 
departments of Justice and Labor, provide a uniform set of principles 
governing use of employee selection procedures and identifying adverse 
impact. The guidelines apply to tests and other selection procedures 
that are used to make employment decisions, including hiring, 
promotion, and discipline.

Under the guidelines, adverse impact is a substantially different rate 
of selection in hiring, promotion, or other employment decisions that 
works to the disadvantage of a race, ethnic, or gender group. 
Specifically, a selection rate for any group that is less than 80 
percent of the selection rate for the group with the highest rate is 
generally regarded as evidence of adverse impact. This is not a legal 
definition of discrimination; rather, it is a rule of thumb or 
guideline that is a practical means of keeping an agency's attention on 
different selection rates in personnel actions and on the procedures 
they use. Tests of statistical significance may be used in lieu of the 
80 percent rule. The guidelines call for adverse impact determinations 
to be made for each racial, ethnic, or gender group.

When adverse impact is identified, the Uniform Guidelines generally 
require employers to conduct validity studies to determine the job-
relatedness of a procedure or its business necessity. The guidelines 
also call for an employer to make a reasonable effort to become aware 
of suitable alternative selection procedures and methods that have as 
little adverse impact as possible and to investigate those that are 
suitable. The guidelines recognize validation strategies of the 
American Psychological Association, and the validation provisions of 
the guidelines are designed to be consistent with the generally 
accepted standards of the psychological profession. One approach is 
"content validity," which determines whether the selection tests and 
measures used are representative of the knowledge, skills, and 
abilities necessary for a job.

Litigation History:

In February 1981, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
ruled on a class action lawsuit, commonly known as the Segar 
case,[Footnote 9] finding that DEA had discriminated against African 
American special agents.[Footnote 10] The court found that DEA's 
personnel practices had an adverse impact on African American special 
agents in terms of salary, grade at entry, supervisory evaluations, 
discipline, and promotions. In addition, the court found evidence of 
disparate treatment in work assignments because of the way in which DEA 
used African American special agents for undercover operations. The 
court found no discrimination in the type of appointments or in 
training of special agents, and found that allegations of harassment 
and reprisal were unsubstantiated. The court did not rule on issues 
relating to hiring that DEA and the plaintiff class had already 
settled.

The court ordered DEA to change its procedures and conduct validity 
studies on those changes in order to provide for effective, 
nondiscriminatory supervisory evaluation, discipline, and promotion 
systems. To oversee the implementation of its orders, two groups were 
established. One is called the "Working Group." Its mission is to help 
ensure that the orders of the court requiring DEA to develop and 
validate nondiscriminatory personnel practices are carried out. The 
Working Group is made up of three industrial psychologists--two from 
OPM and one representing the plaintiff class members. The other group 
is called the "Equal Employment Opportunity Monitoring Committee" or 
Monitoring Committee. Made up of eight African American special agents 
representing plaintiff class members, this committee monitors DEA's 
compliance with the court's orders. The committee also is to help 
facilitate informal resolutions of disputes.

Over the years, all issues raised in the court's findings, except with 
regard to the process for promoting special agents to the GS-14 and GS-
15 levels and creating a career development program, have been resolved 
through court-approved agreements between the plaintiff class and DEA. 
In September 1999, the district court ruled on a motion for compliance 
brought by the plaintiff class that claimed adverse impact in 
promotions of African American special agents to managerial GS-14 and 
GS-15 positions.[Footnote 11] The plaintiffs argued that there were 
disparities in two steps of the multistep promotion process. They 
alleged that one step in the process, called the Special Agent 
Promotion Program (SAPP), which involves assessing candidates' job-
related knowledge and skills through job simulations, had an adverse 
impact on African Americans, thereby decreasing their opportunities to 
be placed on best-qualified lists for promotion. The plaintiffs further 
argued that they were adversely impacted by another step in the 
process, whereby DEA senior executives--special agents in charge (SAC) 
and other office heads--for the offices advertising promotion 
opportunities, recommended a select few from a best qualified candidate 
list to DEA's Career Board, the head of which ultimately makes 
promotion decisions. However, the plaintiffs did not claim that there 
was adverse impact in the ultimate number of promotions. According to 
the court decision, the plaintiffs stated that "some of the expected 
effect of denying African American agents spots on the [SAC/office head 
lists] is not visible in the ultimate number of promotions because the 
Career Board tends to 'overselect' African American agents when they 
appear on [SAC/office head lists], and also when the Career Board 
bypasses the [SAC/office head list].":

In its ruling, the court noted that the use of the SAPP caused an 
adverse impact despite its having been validated. Although the court 
did not conclude that the use of the SAPP violated title VII, it 
ordered DEA to implement a career development program to reduce the 
acknowledged 
disparate impact of the SAPP.[Footnote 12] The court found that the 
process for recommendations made by SACs and office heads did have an 
adverse impact on African American special agents. In its analysis, the 
court said that "the fact that some of the discriminatory effect of the 
use of [SAC/office head recommendations] may not appear in ultimate 
hiring decisions, because the Career Board appears to be more likely to 
select African Americans when they do appear, does not excuse the use 
of a discriminatory device earlier in the process." The court concluded 
that the SAC/office head recommendation process violated title VII, and 
enjoined DEA from using such recommendations in making promotion 
decisions until their use had been validated as job related. As a 
result, DEA suspended promotions to GS-14 and GS-15 special agent 
positions. DEA and the plaintiffs subsequently entered into a court-
approved agreement in January 2000 allowing DEA to temporarily use SAC/
office head recommendations for promotion decisions in accordance with 
certain terms and conditions, until DEA created a permanent, validated 
process for using SAC/office head recommendations.

At the time of our review, DEA, working with the plaintiff class and 
other employees, had developed a recommendation process. The Working 
Group approved this process, which met the requirements of content 
validity as described in the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection 
Procedures.[Footnote 13] A diverse six-person panel of senior managers 
appointed by the DEA Administrator and under the direction of an 
industrial psychologist accomplished validation. In terms of job-
relatedness, panel members first individually reviewed descriptions of 
each competency to be assessed in the SAC/office head recommendation 
process and the weight each competency would receive. The panel then 
analyzed the knowledge, skills, and abilities required for GS-14 and 
GS-15 special agent positions; rated their importance to these 
positions; and individually linked the knowledge, skills, and abilities 
to the competencies.[Footnote 14] The panel members followed the same 
process for tasks required of GS-14 and GS-15 special agents. Final 
agreement between the plaintiffs and DEA, particularly with regard to 
procedures for monitoring the implementation of the recommendation 
process, and approval by the court remained to be accomplished as of 
March 2003.

The Diversity of DEA's Special Agent Workforce:

In September 2002, 4,481 (about 51 percent) of DEA's 8,726 employees 
were criminal investigators (in the 1811 occupational series), better 
known as special agents. Special agents conduct investigations, perform 
surveillance, infiltrate drug trafficking organizations, confiscate 
illegal drugs, arrest violators, collect and prepare evidence, and 
testify in criminal court cases.

Data from DEA showed that in September 2002, whites made up 80.3 
percent, African Americans 8.2 percent, Hispanics 8.8 percent, Asian/
Pacific Islanders 2.2 percent, and Native Americans 0.5 percent of the 
agency's special agents. Women made up 8.3 percent of DEA's special 
agents. The diversity of DEA's special agent workforce was below 
overall government workforce percentages but generally comparable with 
the governmentwide population of criminal investigators, except for 
women whose representation was about half that of criminal 
investigators governmentwide. (See table 1.):

Table 1: Demographic Distribution of the Federal Workforce and Criminal 
Investigators (Special Agents) in DEA, Governmentwide, and the 
Nonfederal Workforce:

Overall federal workforce (September 2002); Asian/Pacific Islander: 
4.5%; African American: 17.6%; Hispanic: 6.9%; Native American: 2.0%; 
White: 69.0%; Women: 44.0%.

Criminal Investigators:

DEA (September 2002); Asian/Pacific Islander: 2.2%; African American: 
8.2%; Hispanic: 8.8%; Native American: 0.5%; White: 80.3%; Women: 8.3%.

Governmentwide (September 2002); Asian/Pacific Islander: 2.7%; African 
American: 7.1%; Hispanic: 8.9%; Native American: 1.0%; White: 80.3%; 
Women: 16.4%.

Nonfederal (1990 census)[A]; Asian/Pacific Islander: 1.0%; African 
American: 11.4%; Hispanic: 6.5%; Native American: 0.8%; White: 80.3%; 
Women: 12.0%.

Source: OPM and DEA.

Note: Racial and ethnic categories include men and women; the women 
category includes women of all races and ethnicities.

[A] Includes accident investigators, police officers, traffic officers, 
police department chauffers, private investigators, detectives, 
criminal investigators, and narcotics investigators.

[End of table]

Table 1 is not a measure of the appropriateness of DEA's diversity but 
rather a comparison of it with other law enforcement groups. The table 
includes another common measure of diversity--the nonfederal law 
enforcement labor force--that is derived from the decennial census and 
includes individuals working in nonfederal law enforcement and 
security-related occupations that OPM, EEOC, and the Department of 
Labor consider comparable to the 1811 occupational series. In addition 
to the governmentwide criminal investigator workforce, DEA compares its 
special agent workforce to the nonfederal law enforcement labor force. 
The overall minority representation in DEA's special agent workforce is 
comparable to the nonfederal law enforcement labor force, although 
there is some variation in the representation of the various minority 
groups. DEA has a lower representation of Native Americans and African 
Americans while having a higher representation of Asian/Pacific 
Islanders and Hispanics. Representation of DEA's women special agents 
is lower, compared with the nonfederal law enforcement labor force. 
However, there are several limitations to these data. First, these 
figures are dated in that they are based on the 1990 census. Figures 
based on the 2000 census will not be available until the fall of 2003, 
according to an official with OPM's Office of Diversity. Additionally, 
the data are based on a wide variety of police, detective, and public 
service occupations that include traffic officers and police department 
chauffeurs as well as criminal investigators and narcotics officers. A 
further problem with the nonfederal law enforcement labor force data is 
that they do not distinguish educational attainment of those working in 
comparable 1811 occupations--DEA requires a 4-year college degree.

Workforce Trends--1980-2002:

Over the last two decades, the overall representation of minorities in 
DEA special agent positions hardly changed, increasing from 19.1 
percent in 1980 to 19.7 percent in 2002, while the representation of 
women increased, from 2.3 percent in 1980 to 8.3 percent in 2002. While 
minority representation in DEA's special agent workforce showed 
increases during the 1980s, it decreased after 1990. Only Asian/Pacific 
Islanders continued to increase throughout the 1980-2002 time frame. 
(See table 2.):

Table 2: Demographics of DEA's Special Agent Workforce, 1980-2002:

Year[A]: 1980; Asian/Pacific Islander: 1.1%; African American: 7.9%; 
Hispanic: 9.5%; Native American: 0.6%; Total minorities: 19.1%; White: 
80.9%; Women: 2.3%.

Year[A]: 1985; Asian/Pacific Islander: 1.2%; African American: 9.2%; 
Hispanic: 9.9%; Native American: 0.8%; Total minorities: 21.1%; White: 
78.9%; Women: 7.2%.

Year[A]: 1990; Asian/Pacific Islander: 1.4%; African American: 10.0%; 
Hispanic: 10.0%; Native American: 0.8%; Total minorities: 22.2%; White: 
77.8%; Women: 7.1%.

Year[A]: 1995; Asian/Pacific Islander: 1.9%; African American: 9.5%; 
Hispanic: 9.7%; Native American: 0.6%; Total minorities: 21.7%; White: 
78.3%; Women: 7.6%.

Year[A]: 2000; Asian/Pacific Islander: 2.1%; African American: 8.2%; 
Hispanic: 8.9%; Native American: 0.6%; Total minorities: 19.8%; White: 
80.2%; Women: 8.0%.

Year[A]: 2002; Asian/Pacific Islander: 2.2%; African American: 8.2%; 
Hispanic: 8.8%; Native American: 0.5%; Total minorities: 19.7%; White: 
80.3%; Women: 8.3%.

Source: Fiscal years 1980-2000, OPM. Fiscal year 2002, DEA.

Note: Racial and ethnic categories include men and women; the women 
category includes women of all races and ethnicities.

[A] As of September for each year indicated.

[End of table]

When looked at from a grade standpoint, minority representation in 
DEA's special agent workforce resembles an inverted pyramid. 
Representation of minority special agents in Senior Executive Service 
(SES) and supervisory special agent (GS-14 and GS-15) positions is 
higher than in nonsupervisory (GS-7 to GS-13) ranks. (See table 3.) In 
September 2002, 36.7 percent of DEA's SES special agents, 23.2 percent 
of supervisors, and 18.4 percent of nonsupervisory special agents were 
members of minority groups. This was particularly noticeable for 
African American and Hispanic special agents. African Americans were 
12.2 percent of SES special agents, 10.4 percent of supervisors, and 
7.5 percent of nonsupervisory special agents, while Hispanics were 22.4 
percent of SES special agents, 10 percent of supervisors, and 8.2 
percent of nonsupervisory special agents. For women, the situation was 
similar in that women made up 10.2 percent of SES special agents, which 
was higher than their representation in the nonsupervisory and 
supervisory ranks. However, their representation in the nonsupervisory 
ranks (8.8 percent) was higher than their representation among 
supervisors (6.6 percent). Table 3 shows the distribution of DEA 
special agents in nonsupervisory, supervisory, and SES positions by 
equal employment opportunity (EEO) group in September 2002.

Table 3: Distribution of DEA Special Agents in Nonsupervisory, 
Supervisory, and SES Positions by EEO Group, September 2002:

Positions: SES:

Positions: Number; Total: 49; Asian/Pacific Islander: 0; 
African American: 6; Hispanic: 11; Native American: 1; 
Total minorities: 18; White: 31; Women: 5.

Positions: Percentage; Total: 100%; Asian/Pacific Islander: 
0.0%; African American: 12.2%; Hispanic: 22.4%; Native 
American: 2.0%; Total minorities: 36.7%; White: 63.3%; 
Women: 10.2%.

Positions: Supervisory--GS-14 and 15:

Positions: Number; Total: 1,009; Asian/Pacific Islander: 19; 
African American: 105; Hispanic: 101; Native American: 
9; Total minorities: 234; White: 775; Women: 67.

Positions: Percentage; Total: 100%; Asian/Pacific Islander: 
1.9%; African American: 10.4%; Hispanic: 10.0%; Native 
American: 0.9%; Total minorities: 23.2%; White: 76.8%; 
Women: 6.6%.

Positions: Nonsupervisory--GS-7 to 13:

Positions: Number; Total: 3,423; Asian/Pacific Islander: 78; 
African American: 256; Hispanic: 282; Native American: 
13; Total minorities: 629; White: 2794; Women: 301.

Positions: Percentage; Total: 100%; Asian/Pacific Islander: 
2.3%; African American: 7.5%; Hispanic: 8.2%; Native 
American: 0.4%; Total minorities: 18.4%; White: 81.6%; 
Women: 8.8%.

Source: GAO analysis of DEA data.

Note: Racial and ethnic categories include men and women; the women 
category includes women of all races and ethnicities.

[End of table]

The implication of the inverted pyramid is that DEA could face problems 
in enhancing, or even maintaining, diversity in the agency's upper 
ranks in the near future as supervisory and SES special agents retire 
or otherwise leave DEA. The extent of future attrition in DEA's upper 
ranks (and at all levels) is unclear because DEA has not performed a 
sufficient workforce analysis. However, if governmentwide estimates are 
any indication, DEA could be facing high levels of attrition. According 
to our estimates, 27 percent of federal criminal investigators on board 
in fiscal year 1998 were expected to retire from fiscal year 1999 
through fiscal year 2006.[Footnote 15]

Our work in the human capital area, as discussed in A Model of 
Strategic Human Capital Management, found that high-performing 
organizations identify their current and future human capital needs and 
then create:

strategies for filling these needs.[Footnote 16] In May 2001, the 
Office of Management and Budget instructed each federal agency to 
provide information on the demographics of its workforce, including 
age, grade, retirement eligibility, and expected retirements over the 
next 5 years, and attrition, including trends in recent retirements 
over the past 5 years.[Footnote 17] Such an analysis could guide the 
development of DEA's recruiting and hiring plans and strategies for a 
diverse special agent workforce. However, DEA's workforce analysis is 
limited to examining attrition data for the previous 24 months to 
estimate the coming year's hiring needs. The agency has not developed 
estimates on the number of its special agents who are or will become 
eligible for retirement or reach mandatory retirement age[Footnote 18] 
over the next 5 years or longer and how this could affect the diversity 
of the special agent workforce at the supervisory and SES levels and 
future recruiting needs. DEA has faced challenges in meeting its 
special agent workforce needs. As we will discuss later in this report, 
in addition to the high percentage of applicants failing to meet DEA's 
hiring standards during the 1997-2002 time frame covered by our review, 
a large number of applicants dropped out of the hiring process. DEA 
officials said that many of them dropped out because of the lengthy 
hiring process, which, the officials said, was averaging about 2 years. 
As a result, DEA was left with a relatively small pool of candidates 
meeting its hiring standards from which the agency could hire. In fact, 
virtually everyone who made it through all the steps in the hiring 
process was offered employment. DEA officials said that it would be 
preferable to have a larger pool of suitable candidates from which the 
agency could select. Because the agency is concerned about having lost 
quality candidates that could have enhanced the agency's skills base 
and diversity due to the long hiring process and not having a larger 
pool of suitable candidates from which to choose, DEA implemented 
hiring process changes in December 2002 in an attempt to reduce the 
time to hire a special agent. In February 2003, the coordinator of the 
hiring project said it was too early to tell the extent to which time 
efficiencies were being realized.

A Higher Proportion of Minority Applicants Did Not Meet Hiring 
Requirements:

DEA's multistep recruitment and hiring process is intended to assess 
whether an applicant demonstrates the competencies, physical and 
psychological fitness, and personal integrity and character required of 
a DEA special agent. Following an initial qualifications review for 
basic requirements like education and citizenship, an applicant must 
pass a written assessment, interview, medical examination, and physical 
task test. An applicant is also subject to psychological testing, a 
polygraph examination, and a background examination, which are used to 
make a suitability determination.[Footnote 19] Using the 80 percent 
rule, we found that a higher proportion of minorities, particularly 
African Americans and Hispanics, did not meet the requirements to 
become a special agent in all the steps in DEA's hiring process except 
for the interview and medical examination steps. Overall, minority 
special agent applicants were selected at lower rates, compared with 
white applicants. The Uniform Guidelines require an employer to study 
the job-relatedness of selection procedures when there are substantial 
differences in the selection rate for any race, ethnic, or gender 
group. DEA's hiring procedures appear job related and consistent with 
the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures in that they 
are based on criteria in regulations, professional standards, or 
standards established by subject matter experts. However, the agency 
had not studied the effects of these procedures on minorities and women 
and whether the procedures could be modified to lessen the differences 
without compromising the high standards necessary to perform the job 
successfully.

Qualifications Review:

As the first step in the special agent hiring process, DEA reviews and 
rates applications[Footnote 20] to determine whether an applicant meets 
minimum requirements for the special agent position--a bachelor's 
degree and specialized skills or substantive experience, especially in 
law enforcement.[Footnote 21] DEA officials said that the experience 
requirement was a barrier to recruiting minority and women college 
graduates with diversified skills.[Footnote 22] As a result, in May 
2000, DEA changed its policy so that applicants with bachelor's degrees 
in special skills areas--economics, accounting, computer science/
information systems, certain foreign languages,[Footnote 23] finance, 
mechanical/electrical/telecommunications engineering, or criminal 
justice--would meet minimum requirements without having additional 
experience.

We reviewed DEA's actions on applications received under the two most 
recent vacancy announcements--BA-98-01 and BA-20-00.[Footnote 24] The 
proportion of minority applicants increased from 27 percent for BA-98-
01 to 31 percent for BA-20-00. Similarly, the proportion of women 
applicants increased, from 12.7 percent under BA-98-01 to 16.4 percent 
under BA-20-00. Table 4 shows the demographic distribution of 
applicants reviewed and rated under both vacancy announcements. We show 
the results separately for BA-98-01 and BA-20-00 because of the revised 
qualifications under BA-20-00.

Table 4: Demographic Profile of Applicants under BA-98-01 and BA-20-00, 
October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002:

BA-98-01; Asian/Pacific Islander: Women: 0.4%; Asian/Pacific Islander: 
Men: 3.2%; African American: Women: 2.4%; African American: 
Men: 10.7%; Hispanic: Women: 1.3%; Hispanic: Men: 8.2%; 
Native American: Women: 0.1%; Native American: Men: 0.7%; 
White: Women: 8.5%; White: Men: 64.5%; Total: Women: 
12.7%; Total: Men: 87.3%.

BA-20-00; Asian/Pacific Islander: Women: 0.6%; Asian/Pacific Islander: 
Men: 3.6%; African American: Women: 3.6%; African American: 
Men: 11.0%; Hispanic: Women: 2.6%; Hispanic: Men: 8.4%; 
Native American: Women: 0.1%; Native American: Men: 0.8%; 
White: Women: 9.5%; White: Men: 59.8%; Total: Women: 
16.4%; Total: Men: 83.6%.

Source: GAO analysis of DEA data.

[End of table]

The extent to which DEA found that applicants met its minimum 
requirements was uneven. Applications from African American women, in 
particular, were much less likely to meet DEA's minimum education and 
experience requirements, even after BA-20-00 changed the criteria for 
awarding credit for special skills. We show the results separately for 
BA-98-01 and BA-20-00 in table 5 below because of the revised 
qualifications under BA-20-00.

Table 5: Percentage of Applicants Meeting Minimum Requirements under 
BA-98-01 and BA-20-00, October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002:

BA-98-01; Asian/Pacific Islander: Women: 62.5%; Asian/Pacific 
Islander: Men: 82.7%; African American: Women: 56.6%; African 
American: Men: 73.6%; Hispanic: Women: 79.1%; Hispanic: Men: 
86.9%; Native American: Women: 70.0%; Native American: Men: 
77.6%; White: Women: 66.9%; White: Men: 75.6%; Total: 
Women: 66.1%; Total: Men: 76.7%.

BA-20-00; Asian/Pacific Islander: Women: 75.8%; Asian/Pacific 
Islander: Men: 85.0%; African American: Women: 56.0%; African 
American: Men: 65.3%; Hispanic: Women: 74.7%; Hispanic: Men: 
79.8%; Native American: Women: 75.0%; Native American: Men: 
72.1%; White: Women: 72.7%; White: Men: 78.4%; Total: 
Women: 69.4%; Total: Men: 77.0%.

Source: GAO analysis of DEA data.

[End of table]

Written Assessment:

Applicants who meet DEA's minimum qualifications requirements must then 
pass a written assessment of their ability to (1) observe and recall 
details, (2) organize the details in a writing sample, and (3) write in 
a grammatically correct manner. The assessment, which consists of 
showing applicants a videotape of a simulated "drug bust" and asking 
them to write a narrative describing what was observed, was developed 
by subject matter experts and tested to help ensure job-relatedness. 
The written assessment is administered, and applicants' narratives are 
first reviewed and rated, in a field division. Later, headquarters 
staff review the narratives, in order to help assure DEA-wide 
consistency with established rating standards.

Because of concerns about low passing rates of African American and 
Hispanic applicants, based on the recommendation of an advisory panel 
of subject matter experts, DEA changed scoring criteria under BA-20-00 
by reducing the number of details from the videotape that applicants 
were expected to recall and identify. At the same time, however, 
responding to senior special agents' concerns that newer special agents 
lacked the writing skills necessary for preparing investigation reports 
and other documents, DEA required that applicants pass all three parts 
of the written assessment, not two, as had been the policy under BA-98-
01. These changes resulted in lower passing rates for all applicant 
groups. However, the passing rates for African American men, Hispanic 
men, and Hispanic women under BA-20-00 were substantially lower 
compared with white women, who had the highest passing rate. In table 6 
below, we show the passing rates separately for BA-98-01 and BA-20-00 
because of the changes to the written assessment under BA-20-00.

Table 6: Percentage of Applicants Passing Written Assessment under BA-
98-01 and BA-20-00, October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002:

BA-98-01; Asian/Pacific Islander: Women: [A]; Asian/Pacific Islander: 
Men: 89.0%; African American: Women: 93.5%; African American: 
Men: 84.6%; Hispanic: Women: 87.5%; Hispanic: Men: 80.3%; 
Native American: Women: [A]; Native American: Men: [A]; 
White: Women: 94.5%; White: Men: 91.9%; Total: Women: 
93.7%; Total: Men: 89.5%.

BA-20-00; Asian/Pacific Islander: Women: [A]; Asian/Pacific Islander: 
Men: 76.4%; African American: Women: 78.9%; African American: 
Men: 71.3%; Hispanic: Women: 64.5%; Hispanic: Men: 63.4%; 
Native American: Women: [A]; Native American: Men: [A]; 
White: Women: 91.8%; White: Men: 82.9%; Total: Women: 
84.2%; Total: Men: 79.2%.

Source: GAO analysis of DEA data.

[A] Small number of applicants precluded meaningful application of the 
80 percent rule.

[End of table]

DEA officials had not studied the effects of the changes to the written 
assessment and were unaware of the lower pass rates. However, they said 
the lower pass rates might be an unintended result of requiring 
applicants to pass all three parts.

Interview:

A panel of three special agents at a field division office interviews 
applicants who pass the written assessment. The interview follows a 
structured format of 21 questions to elicit responses to evaluate an 
applicant's abilities in (1) structuring work activities, (2) 
demonstrating interpersonal skills, (3) tolerating stress, (4) 
evaluating information, and (5) communicating orally. Special agents 
and Office of Personnel staff involved in recruiting developed the 
interview questions and pilot tested them to help assure their job-
relatedness.[Footnote 25] The interview panel rates applicants in 
accordance with established standards and the Special Agent Recruitment 
Unit staff in headquarters later reviews ratings to check that 
panelists adequately documented their assessment and adhered to the 
rating standards.

As table 7 shows, interview-passing rates showed relatively little 
variation, with about 90 percent of all applicants passing.

Table 7: Applicant Interview Passing Rates under BA-98-01 and BA-20-00, 
October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002:

BA-98-01; Asian/Pacific Islander: Men: 87.7%; African 
American: Women: [A]; African American: Men: 92.5%; Hispanic: 
Women: [A]; Hispanic: Men: 89.9%; Native American: Women: [A]; 
Native American: Men: [A]; White: Women: 90.8%; White: Men: 
91.6%; Total: Women: 90.6%; Total: Men: 91.3%.

BA-20-00; Asian/Pacific Islander: Men: 91.4%; African 
American: Women: 85.7%; African American: Men: 89.0%; 
Hispanic: Women: [A]; Hispanic: Men: 82.6%; Native American: 
Women: [A]; Native American: Men: [A]; White: Women: 90.1%; 
White: Men: 90.1%; Total: Women: 88.9%; Total: Men: 89.3%.

Source: GAO analysis of DEA data.

[A] Small number of applicants precluded meaningful application of the 
80 percent rule.

[End of table]

Medical Examination:

Applicants who pass the written assessment and interview are scheduled 
for a medical examination and, if they pass, are scheduled for the 
physical task test. According to DEA's Chief Medical Officer, the 
medical examination follows standards developed by the Federal Law 
Enforcement Medical Program Division of the Public Health Service, 
based on a 1999 survey of the physical demands of a special agent's 
job. Prior to 1999, DEA followed OPM-prescribed medical standards. 
About 95 percent of applicants passed the medical exam and there was 
little difference in the pass rates among the applicant groups, as 
table 8 shows.

Table 8: Applicant Medical Examination Passing Rates under BA-98-01 and 
BA-20-00, October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002:

BA-98-01; Asian/Pacific Islander: Women: [A]; Asian/Pacific Islander: 
Men: 92.2%; African American: Women: [A]; African American: 
Men: 96.0%; Hispanic: Women: [A]; Hispanic: Men: 97.0%; 
Native American: Women: [A]; Native American: Men: [A]; 
White: Women: 96.1%; White: Men: 93.6%; Total: Women: 
96.1%; Total: Men: 94.2%.

BA-20-00; Asian/Pacific Islander: Women: [A]; Asian/Pacific Islander: 
Men: 97.8%; African American: Women: 96.8%; African American: 
Men: 98.0%; Hispanic: Women: [A]; Hispanic: Men: 96.4%; 
Native American: Women: [A]; Native American: Men: [A]; 
White: Women: 99.0%; White: Men: 96.4%; Total: Women: 
98.1%; Total: Men: 96.5%.

Source: GAO analysis of DEA data.

[A] Small number of applicants precluded meaningful application of the 
80 percent rule.

[End of table]

Physical Task Test:

The physical task test is the next step for applicants who have passed 
the interview and medical examination. This test, intended to measure 
an applicant's ability to participate in physical activity during Basic 
Agent Training, consists of six tasks--pull-ups, sit-ups, push-ups, 
shuttle run,[Footnote 26] 2-mile run, and, until March 2003, the 
handgun trigger pull.[Footnote 27] (See app. II for physical task test 
minimum requirements.) According to the Chief of DEA's Health Services 
Unit and the unit's Health Fitness Specialist, the physical task test 
format (except for the trigger pull test) is based on standards 
developed by the Cooper Institute,[Footnote 28] which reports that the 
fitness tests it recommends for law enforcement have been validated 
through scientific research to be job related. With regard to the 
handgun trigger pull, a DEA official formerly with DEA's Firearms 
Training Unit said that the unit developed the trigger pull standard 
based on tests of Basic Agent Training students.

Overall, men had a higher passing rate on the physical task test than 
women.[Footnote 29] African American applicants passed the physical 
task test at rates lower than other groups. In fact, African American 
applicants had a significantly lower passing rate under BA-20-00, as 
table 9 shows.[Footnote 30]

Table 9: Percentage of Applicants Passing the Physical Task Test under 
BA-98-01 and BA-20-00, October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002:

BA-98-01; Asian/Pacific Islander: 73.9%; African American: 66.9%; 
Hispanic: 77.7%; Native American: [A]; White: 81.9%; Women: 73.2%; Men: 
79.8%.

BA-20-00; Asian/Pacific Islander: 78.3%; African American: 64.6%; 
Hispanic: 70.9%; Native American: [A]; White: 81.2%; Women: 64.2%; Men: 
80.5%.

Source: GAO analysis of DEA data.

[A] Small number of applicants precluded meaningful application of the 
80 percent rule.

[End of table]

DEA officials had not studied physical task test trends and did not 
know which test tasks accounted for lower pass rates. The Chief of 
DEA's Health Services Unit and the unit's Health Fitness Specialist 
said that they would examine test results for the physical task test 
components as they look into updating the physical task test to be 
consistent with contemporary standards.

Suitability:

Applicants passing the physical task test are scheduled for polygraph 
and psychological tests and a background investigation to assess their 
character and conduct. DEA special agents trained as polygraphists 
administer the polygraph test in accordance with standardized 
techniques and procedures for conducting polygraph examinations 
established by the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute.[Footnote 
31] For quality assurance, senior polygraphists in DEA headquarters 
review test results, including the audiotape made during each polygraph 
session. For the psychological assessment, a licensed psychologist 
under contract with DEA reviews two validated written psychological 
tests[Footnote 32] and DEA's Life Experiences Inventory completed by 
the applicant, interviews the applicant, and prepares an overall 
assessment, which a DEA psychologist reviews. DEA contracts with OPM to 
do full-field background investigations on special agent applicants in 
accordance with federal regulations.[Footnote 33] The investigation 
develops information through interviews with coworkers, employers, 
friends, educators, neighbors, and other individuals; a personal 
interview with the applicant; and records checks of investigative files 
and other records held by federal agencies, and state and local law 
enforcement and court records. In addition, an applicant is subject to 
a financial review, including a credit bureau check.

The results of the polygraph and psychological tests and the background 
investigation are considered together for a suitability determination. 
Suitability determinations are made in accordance with federal 
regulations[Footnote 34] by the approving official in the Office of 
Personnel or, where there is a question about an applicant's 
suitability,[Footnote 35] by a three-person panel called the "1811-
hiring panel."[Footnote 36] DEA officials said that the panel approach 
helps to assure consistency in applying criteria in cases in which 
there is some question about an applicant's suitability. To come to a 
determination about an applicant's suitability, the three panel members 
must be in agreement. If the approving official or the panel approves 
an applicant, he or she is offered employment.

Our analysis of suitability determinations showed that, overall, DEA 
found 67 percent of applicants, for whom a suitability determination 
was made, suitable to be special agents, with women found suitable at 
higher rates than men. However, the approval rate for African 
Americans--55.2 percent--was substantially lower. (See table 
10.)[Footnote 37]

Table 10: Percentage of Applicants Found Suitable under BA-98-01 and 
BA-20-00, October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002:

Asian/Pacific Islander: 73.9%; African American: 55.2%; Hispanic: 
66.4%; Native American: [A]; White: 68.6%; Women: 74.8%; Men: 66.2%; 
Total: 67.0%.

Source: GAO analysis of DEA data.

[A] Small number of applicants precluded meaningful application of the 
80 percent rule.

[End of table]

The approving official and current and former 1811 panel members said 
that they had not examined the results of their decisions and could not 
explain why African Americans fared worse than other applicants or 
whether specific disqualifying factors predominate among one group. 
They also said that, generally, they were not aware of an applicant's 
race when making their determinations. Since the panel was established 
in 1997, at least one and sometimes two of the three panel members have 
been minorities.

Because the 1811 hiring panel makes about 80 percent of the suitability 
determinations, we developed information about the panel's decisions. 
Our analysis of the panel's data found that the panel approved about 49 
percent of applicants it reviewed, while finding about 36 percent of 
African Americans suitable. (See table 11.):

Table 11: Percentage of Applicants Found Suitable by the 1811 Hiring 
Panel, September 29, 2000, to May 7, 2002:

Asian/Pacific Islander: 50.0%; African American: 36.2%; Hispanic: 
55.3%; Native American: [A]; White: 50.9%; Women: 57.8%; Men: 48.1%; 
Total: 49.1%.

Source: GAO analysis of DEA data.

[A] Small number of applicants precluded meaningful application of the 
80 percent rule.

[End of table]

Data showed that most (82.7 percent) of the applicants whose 
suitability was adjudicated by the panel presented multiple issues for 
adjudication. The most frequently identified issues related to an 
applicant's psychological assessment (60.6 percent of referred files), 
polygraph examination (36.4 percent), driving record (27 percent), not 
being recommended by a SAC (26.5 percent), admissions such as drug use 
on the Life Experiences Inventory (22.4 percent), and credit issues (17 
percent). Among African American applicants, the most frequently 
identified reasons related to the psychological assessment (69.6 
percent), not being recommended by a SAC (34.8 percent), driving record 
(30.4 percent), credit issues (21.7 percent), and admissions on the 
Life Experiences Inventory (17.4 percent). The panel's database did not 
show the basis for its decisions.

Final Hiring Results:

As of March 31, 2002, from the 10,748 applications found to meet its 
minimum requirements under announcements BA-98-01 and BA-20-00, DEA 
hired 793 applicants, while rejecting 3,038 applicants who did not pass 
the written assessment, interview, medical or physical task test, or 
were found unsuitable. The remaining 6,917 applicants had opted out or 
were still in process. Overall, we found that about 20 percent of 
applicants on whom DEA made a final eligibility determination met the 
special agent hiring standards and were selected for training. However, 
we found that minorities met DEA's hiring standards at lower rates than 
white applicants, with African American and Hispanic applicants meeting 
the standards and being selected at substantially lower rates. (See 
table 12.):

Table 12: Overall Selection Rates for Applicants for Whom DEA Made 
Hiring Eligibility Determinations under BA-98-01 and BA-20-00, by EEO 
Group, October 15, 1997, to March 31, 2002:

Asian/Pacific Islander: 18.7%; African American: 13.7%; Hispanic: 
15.8%; Native American: [A]; White: 22.9%; Women: 20.0%; Men:20.3%; 
Total: 20.3%.

Source: GAO analysis of DEA data.

[A] Small number of applicants precluded meaningful application of the 
80 percent rule.

[End of table]

DEA's hiring decisions were somewhat less diverse, compared with the 
pool of applicants that met DEA's minimum education, skills, and 
experience requirements. As table 13 shows, African Americans, 
Hispanics, and women represented a smaller proportion of the special 
agents hired under BA-98-01 and BA-20-00, compared with applicants who 
initially met minimum requirements, while the proportion of whites 
increased.

Table 13: Demographic Profile of Applicants Who Met Minimum 
Requirements and Applicants Hired under BA-98-01 and BA-20-00, October 
15, 1997, to March 31, 2002:

Meeting minimum requirements:

Number; Asian/Pacific Islander: Women: 45; 
Asian/Pacific Islander: Men: 405; 
African American: Women: 232; African American: Men: 1,080; Hispanic: 
Women: 200; Hispanic: Men: 992; 
Native American: Women: 13; Native 
American: Men: 76; White: Women: 876; 
White: Men: 6,829; Total: Women: 
1,366; Total: Men: 9,382.

Percent; Asian/Pacific Islander: Women: 
0.4%; Asian/Pacific Islander: Men: 3.8%; 
African American: Women: 2.2%; African American: Men: 10.0%; Hispanic: 
Women: 1.9%; Hispanic: Men: 9.2%; 
Native American: Women: 0.1%; Native 
American: Men: 0.7%; White: Women: 
8.2%; White: Men: 63.5%; Total: Women: 
12.7%; Total: Men: 87.3%.

Hired:

Number; Asian/Pacific Islander: Women: 3; 
Asian/Pacific Islander: Men: 31; African American: Women: 7; African American: Men: 
72; Hispanic: Women: 12; Hispanic: Men: 
71; Native American: Women: 
2; Native American: Men: 1; White: Women: 
62; White: Men: 532; Total: Women: 
86; Total: Men: 707.

Percent; Asian/Pacific Islander: Women: 
0.4%; Asian/Pacific Islander: Men: 3.9%; 
African American: Women: 0.9%; African American: Men: 9.1%; Hispanic: 
Women: 1.5%; Hispanic: Men: 9.0%; 
Native American: Women: 0.3%; Native 
American: Men: 0.1%; White: Women: 
7.8%; White: Men: 67.1%; Total: Women: 
10.8%; Total: Men: 89.2%.

Source: GAO analysis of DEA data.


[End of table]

DEA offers employment to virtually all applicants who make it all the 
way through its hiring process. Because the agency is concerned about 
having lost quality candidates that could have enhanced the agency's 
skills base and diversity due to the long hiring process (which had 
been averaging about 2 years) and not having a larger pool of suitable 
candidates from which to choose, DEA made reforms to its recruiting and 
hiring process that had been implemented agencywide by December 2002. 
The reforms include giving the field more responsibility for managing 
the hiring process and avoiding time-consuming back-and-forth actions 
between the field and headquarters. For example, field recruiters are 
to conduct criminal history and credit records checks to identify 
unqualified applicants before, rather than after, an application 
package is forwarded to headquarters, in order to reduce the number of 
application packages reviewed. These preliminary records checks will 
also help eliminate the need for costly background investigations when 
an applicant is identified as unqualified, according to DEA. In 
addition, background investigations are to be initiated earlier in the 
process and by field offices, which also are to review the 
investigation results, perform necessary follow-up, and make 
preliminary suitability recommendations. Previously, background 
investigations had been managed by headquarters, which referred follow-
up questions to the field. In addition, suitability determinations will 
be made before security clearance reviews are conducted. This will help 
reduce the security clearance backlog, which had been a major 
contributor to delays in the hiring process, and reduce the need to 
update stale applicant information when suitability determinations are 
made.

No Statistically Significant Differences in Promotion Rates:

DEA's process for promoting special agents to GS-14 and GS-15 positions 
has been in place since 1992. The first step is the Special Agent 
Promotion Program (SAPP), which uses a supervisor's performance rating 
and job simulation exercises at an assessment center to measure the 
candidate's knowledge and abilities to perform at the next grade level 
and determine which applicants for promotion are placed on a best-
qualified list. The SAC or head of an office with a vacancy is asked to 
review the qualifications of best-qualified applicants and recommend 
his or her top choices to DEA's Career Board, the head of which 
ultimately makes promotion decisions. Our analysis showed that although 
African American and Hispanic special agents received promotion 
recommendations at lower rates than white agents, particularly for 
promotions to GS-14, there were no statistically significant 
differences in promotion rates among the various race, ethnic, and 
gender groups.

Special Agent Promotion Program:

The SAPP establishes which GS-13 and GS-14 special agents can compete 
for promotions. The SAPP is an annual process that was developed by an 
outside consultant in response to the 1981 Segar decision. The Working 
Group reviewed and approved its development. From 1997 to 2001, 1,355 
GS-13 and 423 GS-14 special agents participated in the SAPP.[Footnote 
38] Of the GS-13s participating in the SAPP, 25.5 percent were 
minorities--mostly African American and Hispanic--and 7.4 percent were 
women. Among the GS-14s, 28.4 percent were minorities--mostly African 
American and Hispanic--and 8.5 percent were women. Table 14 shows the 
demographics of the GS-13 and GS-14 special agent SAPP participants for 
1997 through 2001.[Footnote 39] In our analysis of promotion-related 
results, we combine men and women for each race because of the small 
number of minority women.

Table 14: Special Agents Participating in the SAPP, 1997-2001:

GS-13.

Participants; Asian/Pacific: Islander: 24; African American: 
152; Hispanic: 161; Native American: 9; White: 999; Total: 1,355; 
Women: 100; Men: 1,255.

Percentage of total participants; Asian/Pacific: Islander: 
1.8%; African American: 11.2; Hispanic: 11.9; Native 
American: 0.7; White: 73.7; Total: 100.0; Women: 
7.4; Men: 92.6.

GS-14:

Participants; Asian/Pacific: Islander: 10; African American: 
56; Hispanic: 51; Native American: 3; White: 303; Total: 423; Women: 
36; Men: 387.

Percentage of total participants; Asian/Pacific: Islander: 
2.4%; African American: 13.2; Hispanic: 12.1; Native 
American: 0.7; White: 71.6; Total: 100.0; Women: 
8.5; Men: 91.5.

Source: SAPP reports for 1997 through 2001.

[End of table]

The SAPP has two components: the performance rating on the competencies 
needed at the next higher grade level and testing at an assessment 
center in which job simulations are used to measure a special agent's 
knowledge and abilities needed at the next level.

In the performance rating, special agents are evaluated on job-related 
competencies (see app. III) on a scale from 1 (unacceptable) to 5 
(exceptional). An agent's most recent supervisor prepares the rating, 
which is reviewed by a SAC or office head to help ensure that 
performance standards are uniformly applied. Data for 1997 through 2001 
show that average performance rating scale scores for SAPP participants 
were nearly uniformly exceptional--almost a perfect 5--for all groups, 
with no statistically significant differences in the scores among the 
various groups. In this regard, the 2001 SAPP report[Footnote 40] found 
that the rating scores did not differentiate between highly effective 
and less effective performers and showed little if any correlation to 
assessment center tests of similar competencies. Because performance 
rating scores for those who participate in the assessment center are 
uniformly high and do little to differentiate among candidates, a 
candidate's assessment center score is the primary determinant of 
promotion competitiveness.

The assessment center replicates a day in the life of a special agent 
through exercises simulating the job at the next higher level. DEA 
conducts two assessment centers each year, one for GS-13s aspiring to 
GS-14 level positions and another for GS-14s aspiring to become GS-15s, 
which are administered under a contract DEA awards annually.[Footnote 
41] The assessment centers consist of role-play, in-basket,[Footnote 
42] and, for GS-14s, oral presentation exercises simulating the job at 
the next higher level to measure a candidate's performance in a variety 
of competencies. In 2001, GS-13 special agents were evaluated on 12 
competencies in assessment center simulations while GS-14 special 
agents were evaluated on 9 competencies. (See app. III.) The original 
job simulations were developed following a content-oriented validation 
strategy consistent with the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection 
Procedures and the Principles for Validation and Use of Personnel 
Selection Procedures.[Footnote 43] This was done by 
detailing special agents' job tasks and the knowledge and abilities 
required to perform those tasks, establishing linkages between job 
tasks and the knowledge and abilities required, and demonstrating 
linkages between the required knowledge and abilities and selection 
procedures.[Footnote 44] The 2001 SAPP report noted that there is 
extensive literature documenting the validity of job simulations for 
predicting supervisory and managerial performance and that simulation 
measures are viewed as having a potentially high degree of content 
validity, thereby reducing the possibility of discrimination.

DEA special agents trained by the contractor serve as assessors. To 
minimize the degree of candidate/assessor familiarity and partiality 
when assigning candidates to assessors, the assessment centers director 
collects familiarity and partiality ratings from assessors to determine 
the extent to which assessors know a promotion candidate and how 
impartially the assessors believe they could evaluate the candidate. 
Another way of fostering fairness is through the representation of 
minorities and women among the assessors. Overall, during the 1997-2001 
period, the proportion of minority and women assessors for both the GS-
14 and GS-15 assessment centers exceeded the proportion of minorities 
and women participating in the GS-14 and GS-15 SAPPs.[Footnote 45] As a 
check on how assessors carry out exercises and developed scores, the 
assessment centers director reviews videotapes of exercises, evaluates 
assessors' notes, and independently scores candidates' performances. In 
addition, the director surveys candidates and prepares a report on the 
results of each assessment center. The report analyzes overall scores 
for each assessment center and scores by competency and exercise, 
comparing the scores of African Americans and whites and, to a lesser 
extent, Hispanics and whites,[Footnote 46] to identify competencies in 
which larger and smaller race/national origin effects were observed and 
suggest possible areas for concentrating test improvement, training, 
and developmental efforts. In this regard, the contractor made a number 
of revisions each year from 1997 through 2001 to the assessment centers 
exercises in an attempt to reduce differences.[Footnote 47]

The Working Group plays an integral role in the assessment centers. 
Working Group members said that they oversee the development of the 
exercises, approve the design of the annual assessment centers, monitor 
the proceedings, and review and approve the overall results. As part of 
their oversight, they said that they meet with participants to get 
their feedback and review videotapes of the role-play exercises to 
determine if they were conducted fairly and properly. They described 
the assessment centers as first-class operations that meet standards 
for fair treatment and valid procedures. They also said that 
differences in scores among groups have not been statistically 
significant and that differences in scores among the candidates are due 
to factors other than the testing procedures. The Working Group members 
said that the strengths of the assessment centers are that the 
exercises appropriately reflect results of job analysis, the assessors 
are well trained, the assessors' ratings and the rating measures are 
reliable, and the process is checked for adverse impact using 
statistical tests. Overall, they said that the assessment center 
process is a valid way of selecting a supervisor because it asks 
candidates to perform supervisory tasks. Moreover, OPM has described 
the SAPP as a "success story" in its use of leadership competencies in 
making supervisory selections.[Footnote 48]

The performance rating and assessment center scores each account for 
half in developing an overall SAPP score for each candidate. As table 
15 shows, white participants generally had somewhat higher SAPP scores, 
although the differences from the other groups were not statistically 
significant, according to the Working Group. Men tended to have higher 
scores in the GS-14 assessment center, but women tended to have higher 
scores in the GS-15 assessment center.

Table 15: Average SAPP Scores, 1997-2001:

Year: GS-14 assessment center:

Year: 1997; Asian/Pacific: Islander: 87.33; 
African American: 83.92; Hispanic: 
80.57; Native American: 
87.50; White: 86.20; Women: 86.18; Men: 85.12.

Year: 1998; Asian/Pacific: Islander: 81.67; 
African American: 82.88; Hispanic: 
83.74; Native American: 
91.00; White: 86.14; Women: 84.11; Men: 85.36.

Year: 1999; Asian/Pacific: Islander: 85.67; 
African American: 82.85; Hispanic: 
85.51; Native American: 
83.00; White: 85.36; Women: 84.44; Men: 85.17.

Year: 2000; Asian/Pacific: Islander: 85.71; 
African American: 82.85; Hispanic: 
81.83; Native American: 
81.00; White: 85.96; Women: 84.13; Men: 85.35.

Year: 2001; Asian/Pacific: Islander: 82.20; 
African American: 83.53; Hispanic: 
82.75; Native American: 
[A]; White: 86.13; Women: 85.06; Men: 85.28.

Year: GS-15 assessment center:

Year: 1997; Asian/Pacific: Islander: [A]; 
African American: 81.08; Hispanic: 
85.32; Native American: 
[A]; White: 86.57; Women: 86.88; Men: 85.32.

Year: 1998; Asian/Pacific: Islander: 84.50; 
African American: 81.75; Hispanic: 
84.80; Native American: 
[A]; White: 86.63; Women: 88.00; Men: 84.81.

Year: 1999; Asian/Pacific: Islander: 82.50; 
African American: 80.45; Hispanic: 
84.50; Native American: 
93.00; White: 86.29; Women: 81.75; Men: 85.41.

Year: 2000; Asian/Pacific: Islander: 92.00; 
African American: 83.90; Hispanic: 
82.75; Native American: 
[A]; White: 85.63; Women: 87.50; Men: 84.82.

Year: 2001; Asian/Pacific: Islander: 81.40; 
African American: 84.87; Hispanic: 
80.09; Native American: 
86.00; White: 85.99; Women: 87.20; Men: 85.14.

Source: DEA.

[A] No member of group participated.


[End of table]

The SAPP scores are used to establish score bands that determine which 
special agents make the best-qualified list for GS-14 and GS-15 
vacancies.[Footnote 49] Under the SAPP, the size of the score band for 
GS-14 positions is 10 points, while the score band for GS-15 positions 
is 11 points. The actual score band for a particular vacancy is 
determined by the applicant with the highest SAPP score. For GS-14 
positions, for example, if the highest-scoring applicant has a SAPP 
score of 95, the score band for that vacancy is 86 to 95; and 
applicants with scores of at least 86 would be placed on the best-
qualified list. Similarly, if the highest-scoring applicant for a GS-15 
vacancy has a SAPP score of 95, the score band for that vacancy is 85 
to 95, and applicants with scores of at least 85 would be placed on the 
best-qualified list.

SAC/Office Head Recommendations:

Once a best-qualified list is assembled for a particular vacancy, it is 
sent to the office with the vacancy to obtain the SAC's (or office 
head's) recommendations for promotion. The SAC's recommendation is 
solicited because DEA believes that he or she is more familiar with the 
requirements of the position to be filled and is in a better position 
to assess candidates' qualifications from their biographical and other 
information. A SAC typically recommends three individuals. The SAC/
office head recommendation process was at the heart of the September 
1999 district court decision that found that the process had not been 
validated and resulted in African American applicants receiving 
recommendations at statistically significant lower rates that whites. 
In addition to not having been validated, there was no format in place 
at the time of the 1999 decision to assure that SACs evaluated 
candidates using knowledge, skills, and abilities relevant to the 
vacant job. Following the court decision, which required DEA to either 
drop the SAC/office head recommendation process or stop making 
promotions to GS-14 and GS-15 special agent positions until the use of 
the recommendations could be validated as job related, DEA and the 
plaintiffs reached a court-approved agreement allowing SAC/office head 
recommendations and promotions under certain terms and conditions until 
a permanent, validated process could be implemented. The interim 
process, which was implemented in January 2000 and was still in place 
as of March 2003, requires that a SAC provide information about why a 
candidate is better suited for the position under consideration, 
including his or her experience and success in job-related competencies 
(see app. III), when making recommendations.

Despite the changes to the process, differences in SAC/office head 
recommendation rates for applicants seeking promotion to GS-14 and GS-
15 positions continued. For GS-14 and GS-15 vacancy announcements that 
resulted in a promotion during fiscal years 2000 and 2001, we analyzed 
the number of times applicants on the best-qualified list received SAC/
office head recommendations, compared with the number of times 
applicants appeared on best-qualified lists. (An applicant can apply 
for multiple positions and appear on multiple best-qualified lists.) We 
found that for promotions to GS-14, African American and Hispanic 
special agents received SAC/office head recommendations at 
statistically significant lower rates than white special agents. For 
GS-15 positions, African American special agents received SAC/office 
head recommendations at statistically significant lower rates than 
whites. Table 16 shows the frequency of applicants on best-qualified 
lists being recommended by SACs, 2000-2001.

Table 16: Frequency of Applicants Appearing on Best-Qualified Lists 
Being Recommended by SACs, 2000-01:

Recommended for: GS-14 promotions; Asian/Pacific: Islander: 28.2%; 
African American: 6.0%; Hispanic: 6.8%; Native: American: 16.7%; White: 
15.2%; Women: 11.7%; Men: 12.9%.

Recommended for: GS-15 promotions; Asian/Pacific: Islander: 33.3%; 
African American: 5.5%; Hispanic: 8.2%; Native: American: [A]; White: 
10.8%; Women: 12.6%; Men: 9.6%.

Source: GAO analysis of DEA data.

[A] Small numbers of applicants do not allow for statistical analysis.

[End of table]

At the time of our review, DEA, working with members of the Monitoring 
Committee and other special agents, had developed a revised 
recommendation process. The Working Group approved the revised process 
and said that it met the requirements of content validity as described 
in the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures. A major 
change under this process requires that a panel of three GS-14, GS-15, 
or SES special agents at the location with a vacancy review and rank 
applicants on a best-qualified list based on job-related competencies 
(see app. III) and any special requirements of the position. The SAC 
would make his or her promotion recommendations from this list, 
providing a comprehensive justification in recommending an individual 
not ranked among the top three applicants. As part of its review and 
evaluation of the proposed process, DEA's plan for oversight of the 
SAC/office head recommendation process included tracking the race of 
each person (1) appearing on a best qualified list, (2) recommended by 
a SAC, and (3) selected for promotion, and report these results 
periodically to the Segar plaintiffs' counsel. However, the plan did 
not specifically include tracking results by gender. At the end of our 
fieldwork, the plaintiffs and DEA were involved in mediation efforts in 
order to reach final agreement on the recommendation process, 
particularly with regard to procedures for monitoring the 
implementation of the process. Approval by the court is required to 
complete settlement on this issue.

Career Board Selections:

Promotion decisions for GS-14 and GS-15 special agent positions are 
made following deliberations by DEA's Career Board. The Career Board's 
11 voting members, who are DEA senior executives, make promotion 
recommendations by majority vote to the Career Board Chair, who 
ultimately has responsibility and authority to make the selection 
decision.[Footnote 50] DEA makes promotion decisions on a position-by-
position basis when vacancies become available, with a best-qualified 
list assembled for each vacancy based on applicants' SAPP scores. 
However, minorities and women do not appear on a substantial portion of 
best-qualified lists because they do not apply for particular vacancies 
or because their SAPP scores are not high enough to place them among 
the best qualified.[Footnote 51]

We analyzed the results of 641 promotions to GS-14 positions and 204 
promotions to GS-15 during fiscal years 1997 through 2001 and found 
that, despite differences in SAC/office head recommendation rates, 
there were no statistically significant differences in the rates at 
which the Career Board selected minorities and women for promotion. Our 
analysis showed only small differences in the rates at which African 
American, Hispanic, and white special agents were selected for 
promotion to GS-14 and GS-15 positions. The numbers of Asian/Pacific 
Islanders and Native Americans eligible for promotion were too small 
for statistical analysis. Although women were somewhat less likely than 
men to be selected for promotion, this difference was not statistically 
significant. Table 17 shows the number of individuals on best qualified 
lists from which promotions were made and the number selected for 
promotion by EEO group for fiscal years 1997-2001.

:

Table 17: Individuals on at Least One Best-Qualified List from Which 
Promotions Were Made and Individuals Selected for Promotion, by EEO 
Group, Fiscal Years 1997-2001:

Promotions to GS-14:

Individuals on best-qualified lists; Asian/Pacific Islander: 
20; African American: 98; 
Hispanic: 95; Native American: 10; White: 740; Women: 
73; Men: 890.

Number selected; Asian/Pacific Islander: 14; 
African American: 64; Hispanic: 65; Native American: 7; White: 491; 
Women: 44; Men: 597.

Percentage selected; Asian/Pacific Islander: 
70.0%; African American: 65.3%; Hispanic: 
68.4%; Native American: 
70.0%; White: 66.4%; Women: 
60.3%; Men: 67.1%.

Promotions to GS-15.

Individuals on best-qualified lists; Asian/Pacific Islander: 
4; African American: 33; 
Hispanic: 41; Native American: 2; White: 241; Women: 25; 
Men: 296.

Number selected; Asian/Pacific Islander: 1; 
African American: 20; Hispanic: 26; Native American: 1; White: 156; 
Women: 14; Men: 190.

Percentage selected; Asian/Pacific Islander: 
25.0%; African American: 60.6%; Hispanic: 
63.4%; Native American: 
50.0%; White: 64.7%; Women: 
56.0%; Men: 64.2%.

Source: GAO analysis of DEA data.

[End of table]

DEA's Discipline Process Has Been Found to Be Nondiscriminatory:

DEA's centralized disciplinary system was put in place in 1984 and, in 
1988, was found to meet the court's requirements for being effective 
and nondiscriminatory.[Footnote 52] The three-tiered system separates 
the responsibilities for investigating an allegation, proposing 
disposition, and making a final agency decision. Our analysis of 
disciplinary data for fiscal years 1997 through 2001 showed that the 
proportion of African American, Hispanic, and women special agents 
disciplined was substantially higher than their representation in the 
DEA special agent workforce. This situation reflects that African 
American, Hispanic, and women special agents had a proportionately 
higher number of allegations of misconduct lodged against them and that 
a higher proportion of these allegations were substantiated by 
investigations and resulted in disciplinary action. Nonetheless, the 
results of two studies by outside contractors, approved by the Working 
Group, found DEA's disciplinary process to be fair and 
nondiscriminatory.

DEA's Validated Discipline System:

DEA's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) is responsible for 
investigating all allegations of integrity violations (illegal or 
improper conduct) and the vast majority of allegations of misconduct 
involving violations of DEA's Standards of Conduct.[Footnote 53] OPR 
investigations are findings of fact and do not contain conclusions or 
recommendations.

The Board of Professional Conduct reviews investigation files in order 
to propose a disposition for a matter.[Footnote 54] In each 
case,[Footnote 55] two board members independently review the 
investigation report, the employee's official personnel record, and how 
similar cases have been handled, and propose a disposition using the 
preponderance of the evidence standard.[Footnote 56] Board members are 
also to consider mitigating and aggravating factors known as the 
Douglas factors--derived from a Merit Systems Protection Board 
(MSPB)[Footnote 57] decision--in determining the appropriateness of a 
disciplinary action.[Footnote 58] The board's chairman reviews their 
recommendations and the investigative file and issues the board's 
proposed disposition. The board can propose that a special agent be 
cleared of alleged charges, receive a letter of caution,[Footnote 59] 
or be disciplined (receive a letter of reprimand, or be suspended, 
demoted, or removed).

The final agency decision is made by one of two deciding officials in 
headquarters using the preponderance of the evidence standard, after 
independently reviewing the proposed action and the investigation file 
and consulting with employee relations specialists and the DEA Chief 
Counsel's office. The deciding officials also apply the Douglas factors 
and other legal precedents. As part of the final decision process, an 
employee is provided the opportunity to review all evidence and make 
written and/or oral responses to the disciplinary charges.

Higher Proportion of African American, Hispanic, and Women Special 
Agents Disciplined:

Our analysis of disciplinary data for fiscal years 1997 to 2001 showed 
that the proportion of African American, Hispanic, and women special 
agents disciplined was substantially higher than their representation 
in the DEA special agent workforce and that this difference was 
statistically significant. During this period, African American special 
agents accounted for 16.2 percent of the agents disciplined, while 
making up 8.3 percent of the special agent workforce; Hispanics were 
15.2 percent of agents disciplined, while making up 8.9 percent of the 
special agent workforce; and women were 12.7 percent of special agents 
disciplined but 7.8 percent of the special agent workforce. Table 18 
shows special agents disciplined, compared with special agent 
population, by EEO group for fiscal years 1997-2001.

Table 18: Special Agents Disciplined Compared with Special Agent 
Population, by EEO Group, Fiscal Years 1997-2001:

Total disciplined; Asian/Pacific Islander: 9; African American: 66; 
Hispanic: 62; Native American: 0; White: 271; Women: 52; Men: 356; 
Total: 408.

Percentage of total disciplined; Asian/Pacific Islander: 2.2%; 
African American: 16.2%; Hispanic: 15.2%; Native American: 0.0%; White: 
66.4%; Women: 12.7%; Men: 87.3%; Total: 100.0%.

Representation in special agent workforce; Asian/Pacific Islander: 
2.0%; African American: 8.3%; Hispanic: 8.9%; Native American: 0.6%; 
White: 80.3%; Women: 7.8%; Men: 92.2%; Total: 100.0%.

Source: GAO analysis of DEA data.

[End of table]

We identified two factors that help explain why a higher proportion of 
African American, Hispanic, and women special agents were disciplined. 
One factor is that a proportionately higher number of allegations of 
misconduct were lodged against African American, Hispanic, and women, 
compared with their representation in the special agent workforce. 
These differences, shown in table 19, were statistically significant.

Table 19: Distribution of Cases of Alleged Misconduct Involving Special 
Agents, by EEO Group, Compared with Workforce Representation, Fiscal 
Years 1997-2001:

Percentage of allegations; Asian/Pacific Islander: 1.5%; African 
American: 12.8%; Hispanic: 13.3%; Native American: 0.1%; White: 72.3%; 
Women: 10.5%; Men: 89.5%.

Representation in special agent workforce; Asian/Pacific Islander: 
2.0%; African American: 8.3%; Hispanic: 8.9%; Native American: 0.6%; 
White: 80.3%; Women: 7.8%; Men: 92.2%.

Source: GAO analysis of DEA data.

[End of table]

The second factor that helps explain why a higher proportion of African 
American, Hispanic, and women special agents are disciplined is that a 
higher proportion of allegations levied against them are found after 
investigation to have merit and lead to disciplinary action. These 
differences, shown in table 20, were statistically significant.

Table 20: Cases of Alleged Misconduct Involving Special Agents That 
Resulted in Disciplinary Action, by EEO Group, Fiscal Years 1997-2001:

Percentage of cases resulting in discipline; Total: 47.0%; Asian/
Pacific Islander: 64.3%[A]; African American: 59.5%; Hispanic: 53.4%; 
Native American: [B]; White: 43.2%; Women: 57.1%; Men: 45.8%.

Source: GAO analysis of DEA data.

Note: Does not include cases administratively closed without a final 
decision.

[A] Although the percentage of cases involving Asian/Pacific Islanders 
resulting in disciplinary action is larger than the figures for African 
Americans, Hispanics, and women, this percentage is not statistically 
different from the percentage for whites.

[B] Small numbers prevented statistical analysis of allegations and 
disciplinary actions.

[End of table]

DEA does not know why nor does any study offer a reason why African 
American, Hispanic, and women special agents had proportionately higher 
numbers of allegations of misconduct lodged against them or why a 
higher proportion of these allegations were substantiated by 
investigations and resulted in disciplinary actions.

Concerns with DEA's Disciplinary Data:

In performing our analysis, we found discrepancies between the 
disciplinary data maintained by the DEA Chief Counsel's office that 
were:

reported to us and data the DEA Office of Equal Opportunity reported to 
the Monitoring Committee. We brought these discrepancies to DEA's 
attention, and significant time was needed to develop corrected data. 
The corrected data showed that data reported by the Chief Counsel's 
office were incomplete while data reported by the Office of Equal 
Opportunity counted some cases twice. Accurate and reliable data are 
important to DEA monitoring its disciplinary process. At the time of 
our review, DEA was looking into but had not developed a process to 
help ensure accurate and reliable reporting of disciplinary data.

Studies Have Found DEA's Disciplinary Process to Be Fair and 
Nondiscriminatory:

Two studies done by outside contractors, which we found to be 
methodologically sound, have found DEA's disciplinary process to be 
fair and nondiscriminatory. The first study, done under a contract 
awarded by the Working Group in order for DEA to comply with the court 
order in the Segar case, analyzed 318 disciplinary cases for the period 
September 1982 through June 1986 to determine whether disciplinary 
action taken was consistent with the offense or offenses committed and 
whether special agents were treated alike regardless of race.[Footnote 
60] Of the 318 cases, 239 cases (75.2 percent) involved white special 
agents, 32 (10.1 percent) involved African Americans, 36 (11.3 percent) 
involved Hispanics, and 11 (3.5 percent) involved other racial/ethnic 
groups. The percentage of African American and Hispanic special agents 
disciplined was higher than their representation in the special agent 
workforce. African Americans, who were 10.1 percent of the agents 
disciplined, made up about 8.5 percent of the special agent workforce 
during the period, and Hispanics, who were 11.3 percent of the agents 
disciplined, made up 10.2 percent of the special agent workforce. Women 
were 3.2 percent of agents disciplined while making up 7.6 percent of 
the special agent workforce.

The study's results, issued in April 1987 and approved by the Working 
Group, concluded that, based on statistical analysis, there appeared to 
be no discrimination against minorities in general, and African 
Americans in particular, with regard to the number of individuals 
recommended for discipline, the severity of the proposed punishment, or 
the severity of the actual punishment carried out as related to the 
severity of the offense. The study also found a strong relationship 
between the severity of the charge and the discipline ultimately meted 
out. The study found that although African American special agents were 
charged on average with more serious offenses than white special 
agents, there were no statistically significant differences in the 
discipline decisions as a function of the severity of the charges. 
Although the study did not identify the cause for African Americans 
being charged with more serious offenses, it raised but did not examine 
whether, race, type of assignment, or small sample size of the study 
could have been factors.

The second study, done at the request of the Monitoring Committee and 
Working Group, examined whether there were differences in the 
discipline administered to white versus African American special agents 
during calendar years 1994-2000.[Footnote 61] Of 365 disciplinary cases 
of special agents during this period, 237 (64.9 percent) involved 
whites, 58 (15.9 percent) involved African Americans, 58 (15.9 percent) 
involved Hispanics, 6 (1.6 percent) involved Asian/Pacific Islanders, 
and 3 (0.8 percent) involved Native Americans. There was no race 
information in 3 cases. In addition, no breakout by gender was 
reported. The study methodology was developed so that the results could 
be applied to any protected group, but because the study was done in 
the context of the Segar case, only discipline administered to African 
American and white special agents was analyzed.

According to the report, issued in August 2001 and approved by the 
Working Group, there were no statistically significant differences in 
the imposition of discipline between African American and white special 
agents for any offense or violation category. The study also concluded 
that the data "decisively and unequivocally" showed no differences 
between African American and white special agents in terms of the 
severity of the punishment administered, which the study said confirmed 
the integrity of the discipline process. Although the data reported by 
the study showed that the percentage of African American special agents 
disciplined (15.9 percent of agents disciplined) was higher than the 
group's representation in the workforce (less than 9 percent), the 
study did not analyze the relationship between the number of African 
Americans disciplined and their representation in the special agent 
workforce.[Footnote 62]

The integrity of DEA's discipline process from a legal perspective was 
also evident in MSPB decisions. Employees can appeal removals, 
demotions, and suspensions of more than 14 days to MSPB and, during, 
fiscal years 1997-2001, MSPB decided the cases of 28 DEA special 
agents.[Footnote 63] Of the 28 cases, MSPB affirmed DEA's actions in 24 
cases (85.7 percent), affirmed some or all of the charges and mitigated 
the penalty in 2 cases (7.1 percent), and reversed DEA's actions in 2 
cases (7.1 percent). In comparison, governmentwide, MSPB reversed 22 
percent of agency decisions in fiscal year 2001. A Justice Department 
review of fiscal year 1997 Justice cases before MSPB found that, among 
department components, DEA had the highest affirmation rate, which was 
attributed to the quality of documentation and evidence supporting 
charges. The report said that DEA's centralized disciplinary system 
provides for impartiality and consistency in developing defensible 
disciplinary actions.

Employee Views on Promotion and Discipline:

As agreed with your office, during our review, we spoke with minority 
and women special agents, including members of the Monitoring Committee 
as well as members of the Hispanic Advisory and Asian-American Advisory 
Committees, to obtain their views on promotion and discipline 
issues.[Footnote 64] Our work has found that high-performing 
organizations promote a diverse and inclusive workforce and have 
workplaces in which perceptions of unfairness are minimized.[Footnote 
65] However, comments of many of the minority and female special agents 
with whom we spoke indicated that they believed trust and fairness were 
lacking with regard to the promotion and discipline processes. For 
example, members of these committees said they perceived that their 
groups were underrepresented in promotions to GS-14 and GS-15 and that 
selection outcomes were frequently based on "who you know." These 
special agents said that candidates, especially in field divisions, may 
have been disadvantaged because of a lack of personal knowledge of an 
agent among the board members. The November 2002 change to increase the 
number of SACs serving as rotating members was made to address this 
concern. Another concern the minority special agents expressed was 
about the board's racial, ethnic, and gender representation. However, 
in January 2003, the Career Board included two African Americans, two 
Hispanics, one Native American, and six whites; one of the members was 
a woman. During the 1997-2002 time frame, the board had a similar 
makeup.

One additional concern of many of the minority special agents with whom 
we spoke was the perceived unfairness in the discipline process. These 
agents said that they believed that minorities were subject to more 
scrutiny and, as a result, were disproportionately investigated for 
misconduct. A number of the agents also said that they perceived that 
there were inconsistencies in punishment meted out, with minorities 
receiving harsher punishment. Our work showed that African American, 
Hispanic, and women special agents had a proportionately higher number 
of allegations of misconduct lodged against them and that a higher 
proportion of these allegations were substantiated by investigations 
and resulted in disciplinary actions. However, the results of two 
studies by outside contractors, approved by an oversight group and 
which we found methodologically sound, found DEA's disciplinary process 
to be fair and nondiscriminatory.

The perceptions minority and women special agents have with regard to 
fairness in promotions and discipline may be driven by an absence of 
data and other information. For example, DEA had not shared the racial 
analysis of its promotion actions or SAC/office head recommendations 
with its special agent workforce, except the Monitoring 
Committee.[Footnote 66] Our analysis of promotions to GS-14 and GS-15 
special agent positions for fiscal years 1997 through 2001 showed no 
statistically significant differences in the promotion rates among the 
racial, ethnic, and gender groups. In addition, DEA only shared the 
results of the 2001 discipline study, which found no statistically 
significant differences in the imposition of discipline between African 
American and white special agents, with the Monitoring Committee. On 
the other hand, although the study methodology was developed so that 
the results could be applied to any protected group, the study was done 
in the context of the Segar case and examined only discipline 
administered to African American and white special agents. However, it 
appears that discipline actions taken against Hispanics were to have 
been included in the study, according to a memo from a former DEA 
Administrator to the Hispanic Advisory Council. Neither council members 
nor DEA officials could explain why this did not occur.

As we discuss in our exposure draft A Model of Strategic Human Capital 
Management, our work in the human capital area has shown that leading 
organizations promote an inclusive workforce by seeking employee input 
and using that input to adjust their human capital approaches.[Footnote 
67] DEA has taken, or plans to take, some steps in this regard. One 
step was that, as DEA's study of a valid SAC/office head recommendation 
process progressed, the agency involved minorities, in addition to 
Monitoring Committee representatives that had been involved, and women. 
Also, the November 2002 changes to the structure of the Career Board 
were based on input from the Monitoring Committee and other special 
agents, and, according to the Administrator's memo announcing the 
change, were intended to bring transparency and greater participation 
to the promotion process. Furthermore, in March 2002, the Administrator 
established an ombudsman office[Footnote 68] to address workplace 
conflicts, facilitate fair and equitable resolutions to concerns, and 
serve as an advisor and information and communications resource. The 
ombudsperson said that she had handled a variety of matters, mostly 
involving special agents, including issues concerning performance 
appraisals and Career Board decisions to reassign agents.

Conclusions:

At some steps of DEA's hiring process, a higher percentage of 
minorities do not meet the requirements to become a special agent, with 
African American and Hispanic applicants hired at substantially lower 
rates compared with white applicants. DEA has not analyzed why some 
groups of applicants have lower passing rates and whether alternative 
procedures could lessen these differences without compromising the high 
standards necessary to perform the job successfully. Furthermore, 
because a large number of applicants drop out or do not meet hiring 
standards, DEA offers employment to virtually all applicants it finds 
suitable, leaving the agency with little choice in whom it hires. DEA 
has not performed a workforce analysis that takes into account expected 
attrition of the special agent workforce, especially due to 
retirements, that could help the agency plan for a sufficiently large 
pool of suitable special agent candidates with diverse cultural and 
skills backgrounds from which it could selectively hire.

Promotions of special agents to supervisory GS-14 and GS-15 positions 
have not shown statistically significant differences among groups. 
However, DEA's rigorous promotion process has been subject to 
litigation surrounding the SAC/office head recommendation process, the 
step in the overall promotion process that had not been validated. DEA 
has since developed a revised recommendation process and proposed a 
monitoring process that the agency and the plaintiffs are discussing to 
reach agreement about and which still must be court approved. However, 
the proposed monitoring process does not take gender into account.

The proportion of African American, Hispanic, and women special agents 
disciplined for misconduct was substantially higher than their 
representation in the DEA special agent workforce. However, two studies 
have found DEA's discipline process to be valid and fair, but neither 
of the studies addressed differences in the rates at which different 
groups were disciplined, and the second study compared only 
disciplinary actions involving African American and white special 
agents. Reliable data would be necessary to carry out a study covering 
all race, ethnic, and gender groups, and our analysis of disciplinary 
actions was delayed by the lack of reliable data. Although DEA 
eventually developed corrected data, the agency has not developed a 
process to maintain accurate and reliable disciplinary data.

Finally, minority and female special agents with whom we spoke 
generally perceived that the promotion and discipline processes lacked 
fairness. Perceptions of unfairness can be almost as corrosive to the 
workplace as actual instances of unfair treatment and can undermine 
trust. Because DEA did not widely share analyses of promotion and 
disciplinary actions with its special agent workforce, agents were 
hindered in formulating informed views about the fairness and equity of 
the promotion and discipline processes. This situation would continue 
under DEA's proposal for monitoring the promotion process because 
reporting of outcomes would be limited to the African American special 
agents plaintiff group.

Recommendations for Executive Action:

We recommend that the Administrator of DEA direct that:

* a process be initiated to monitor the results of decisions at the 
various steps in the hiring process to identify differences in 
selection rates among groups, and where substantial differences are 
found, determine why they occur and what, if anything, can be done to 
reduce the differences while maintaining the high standards necessary 
for the job of special agent;

* a workforce analysis be done, which takes into account retirement 
eligibility, expected retirements, and other attrition, to guide the 
development of DEA's recruiting and hiring plans and strategies;

* the plans to monitor the results of the SAC/office head 
recommendation process by race and ethnicity be expanded to include 
monitoring by gender;

* steps be taken to develop, maintain, and ensure the reliability of a 
discipline database and that the study of disciplinary actions taken 
against African American and white special agents be expanded to 
analyze disciplinary actions against all racial, ethnic, and gender 
groups of special agents; and:

* appropriate, aggregate statistical data on the outcomes of the 
promotion and discipline processes for all racial, ethnic, and gender 
groups are available to its special agent workforce to help special 
agents formulate informed views about the fairness and equity of the 
agency's promotion and discipline processes.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Acting Administrator of 
DEA agreed with our recommendations and said that DEA was acting to 
implement them. (See app. IV for the text of the comments.):

Regarding hiring of special agents, DEA said it will monitor the 
results of decisions at the various steps in the hiring process to 
identify differences in selection rates. DEA's response said that it 
would identify differences among minority groups but did not 
specifically mention gender differences. DEA should examine differences 
in selection rates among all groups, including gender groups. DEA also 
said that it will conduct a study to review each part of the special 
agent hiring process. The study will include analysis of processes used 
by other law enforcement agencies to identify alternative strategies 
that might lessen differences in selection rates.

DEA agreed with our recommendation that a workforce analysis be done to 
guide the development of recruiting and hiring plans and strategies. 
DEA said that it will analyze its workforce to determine the portion 
eligible for, or who anticipates, retirement, and to identify other 
attrition concerns for the agency and use the results to guide the 
development of its recruiting and hiring plans and strategies.

DEA also agreed with our recommendation to monitor the SAC/office head 
recommendation process for all EEO groups, including by gender. DEA 
said that, if it is put in place, its monitoring plan will include 
evaluating results for all demographics of the workforce, including 
race, ethnicity, and gender.

Regarding the reliability of discipline data, DEA said that it agreed 
with our recommendation and had begun an effort to consolidate multiple 
discipline databases. With regard to our recommendation that DEA expand 
the study of disciplinary actions taken against African American and 
white special agents to analyze disciplinary actions against all 
racial, ethnic, and gender groups of special agents, DEA said that it 
will do so.

Finally, DEA concurred with our recommendation to make statistical data 
on the outcomes of the promotion and discipline processes for all 
racial, gender, and ethnic groups available to its special agent 
workforce. DEA said that it will make available aggregate statistical 
data concerning promotion selections and types of misconduct found.

Overall, the actions DEA describes, when fully implemented, should meet 
our recommendations. DEA also provided technical comments, which we 
incorporated in the report where appropriate.

:

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days 
after its date. We will then send copies of this report to the Attorney 
General, the Administrator of DEA, and interested congressional 
committees. We will also make copies available to others upon request. 
In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web 
site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have questions about 
this report, please call me at (202) 512-6806 or Thomas Dowdal, 
Assistant Director, on (202) 512-6588. Key contributors to this 
assignment were Anthony Lofaro, Domingo Nieves, and Gregory Wilmoth.

Signed by:

Sincerely yours,

Victor S. Rezendes 
Managing Director, Strategic Issues:

Signed by Victor S. Rezendes:

[End of section]

Appendixes:

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:

In her letter of May 25, 2001, Congresswoman Eddie Bernice Johnson 
expressed concerns about discrimination in the Drug Enforcement 
Administration's (DEA) hiring, promotion, and discipline processes. 
Based on discussions with her office, we agreed to (1) develop 
information on the diversity of DEA's special agent workforce and (2) 
examine the processes DEA has put in place to provide for fair and 
nondiscriminatory hiring, promotion, and disciplining of special agents 
and the results that have been achieved.

DEA Special Agent Workforce Diversity:

With regard to the diversity of DEA's special agent workforce, we 
developed information by race, ethnicity, and gender for each pay 
grade, using data from the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) 
Central Personnel Data File (CPDF) as of September 1980, 1985, 1990, 
1995, and 2000, and data from DEA as of September 2002. We selected 
these dates to show changes, if any, that had occurred in DEA's special 
agent workforce from around the initial decision of the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia in 1981 with regard to a class 
action racial discrimination lawsuit brought against DEA by the 
agency's African American special agents[Footnote 69] through the end 
of fiscal year 2002. To compare the racial, ethnic, and gender 
composition of the DEA special agent (criminal investigator job 
occupation series 1811) workforce with other criminal investigator 
workforces, we used data OPM provided for criminal investigators 
governmentwide and the nonfederal law enforcement labor force, a 
measure that includes nonfederal law enforcement and security-related 
occupations that are considered comparable to the 1811 occupational 
series by the OPM, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the 
Department of Labor. In addition, we obtained overall federal workforce 
diversity data as of September 2002 from OPM. We determined based on 
our past work[Footnote 70] that the CPDF data are sufficiently reliable 
for the purpose used in this report.

DEA's Hiring, Promotion, and Discipline Processes:

To determine the DEA processes for hiring, promoting, and disciplining 
special agents and the results that have been achieved, we reviewed 
relevant DEA policies and procedures and interviewed knowledgeable DEA 
officials. In addition, we spoke with employee representatives, 
including members of the Monitoring Committee, a court-established 
group of African American special agents representing plaintiff class 
members; the Hispanic Advisory Council; and the Asian-American Advisory 
Counsel. Further, we spoke with the members of the Working Group that 
was established to help ensure that the orders of the court are carried 
out and that DEA's personnel practices are nondiscriminatory. With 
regard to developing information about the job-relatedness of DEA's 
hiring, promotion, and discipline processes, we spoke with DEA 
officials, Working Group members, and contractors who had studied the 
processes and reviewed available studies and other documentation.

In analyzing results, we compared each racial and ethnic group and 
compared men of all races/ethnicities with women of all races/
ethnicities. In addition to this level of analysis, where there were a 
sufficient number of individuals, we analyzed data for men and women 
within each race and ethnic group. In analyzing differences in how 
racial, ethnic, and gender groups fared in DEA's hiring process, we 
used the 80 percent rule set out in the Uniform Guidelines on Employee 
Selection Procedures.[Footnote 71] Under this rule, a selection rate 
for any race, ethnic, or gender group that is less than 80 percent of 
the selection rate for the group with the highest rate is generally 
considered a substantially different rate of selection. In analyzing 
promotion and disciplinary actions, we applied standard statistical 
tests to determine if there were statistically significant differences 
among the racial, ethnic, and gender groups. We used statistical 
techniques in these analyses to be consistent with how other studies of 
DEA's promotion and discipline process were conducted. Our analyses 
generally covered fiscal years 1997-2001, except as noted below, and 
were not designed to prove or disprove discrimination. Rather, they 
were designed to provide information about race, ethnicity, and gender 
differences in DEA's hiring, promotion, and disciplinary actions.

Hiring Results:

We analyzed the results of DEA's screening of special agent applicants 
at each step of the hiring process on applications received under two 
vacancy announcements--BA-98-01, which was open from October 15, 1997, 
through March 7, 2000, and BA-20-00, which opened on May 8, 2000, and 
remained open during our review. We selected these two announcements to 
facilitate an analysis of (1) the effect of changes to eligibility 
criteria and written assessment scoring beginning with BA-20-00 and (2) 
final hiring rates. We examined DEA's screening actions on applicants 
from October 15, 1997, through March 31, 2002, analyzing the data by 
race, ethnicity, and gender. Data we analyzed were provided by DEA from 
the agency's Agent Recruiting and Tracking System (ARTS), which tracks 
applications received, the status of applicants, decisions on applicant 
eligibility at each step of the hiring process, and final hiring 
decision. We examined ARTS data and concluded that the data were 
reliable for our purposes because the disposition of applications 
reconciled with applications processed.

With regard to suitability determinations DEA made on applicants based 
on the results of psychological and polygraph examinations and 
background investigations, we reviewed two sets of data. First, we 
reviewed data recorded in ARTS to provide an overall picture on the 
outcomes of suitability determinations. Because about 80 percent of 
suitability determinations are made by a three-person panel, we 
reviewed data maintained by the panel on its decisions. However, 
because the panel's database had only been initiated for decisions on 
or after September 29, 2000, we only reviewed panel decisions from 
September 29, 2000, through May 7, 2002. To gain an understanding of 
materials the panel considers in making its determinations, we reviewed 
a nongeneralizable sample of applicant suitability determination case 
files.

Promotion Results:

Our analysis of promotions focused on competitive promotions to General 
Schedule grade levels 14 and 15 special agent positions. We reviewed 
three elements of the promotion process: the Special Agent Promotion 
Program (SAPP), which uses performance ratings and job simulation 
exercises to measure knowledge and abilities to perform at the next 
grade level; promotion recommendations that Special Agents in Charge or 
other office heads make to the Career Board, the body that makes final 
promotion recommendations and whose chair makes the final selections; 
and the final selections. We analyzed data by race, ethnicity, and 
gender. With regard to the SAPP, we analyzed data contained in annual 
reports on the SAPP for 1997 through 2001. SAPP results and the reports 
had been reviewed and approved by the Working Group. For 
recommendations and selections, we examined actions related to best-
qualified certificates for vacancies from which promotions were made 
for fiscal years 1997 through 2001.[Footnote 72] We obtained data from 
DEA on the number and demographic profile of applicants on the best-
qualified lists, the number of them who received recommendations, and 
the number selected. Because applicants can appear on multiple best-
qualified lists, we also obtained an unduplicated count of the number 
of applicants on the best-qualified lists and the number who received 
recommendations. To check the reliability of the data DEA provided to 
us, we compared the minutes of Career Board deliberations on promotion 
decisions to data reported to the Monitoring Committee.

Discipline Results:

With regard to disciplinary actions, we analyzed data by race, 
ethnicity, and gender for cases resolved during fiscal years 1997 
through 2001. For these cases, we determined the number and demographic 
profile of special agents against whom allegations of misconduct were 
made, the disposition of their cases, and the nature of disciplinary 
actions taken. However, in performing our analysis, we found 
discrepancies between the data maintained by DEA's Chief Counsel's 
office that were reported to us and the data the Office of Equal 
Opportunity reported to the Monitoring Committee. We brought these 
discrepancies to DEA's attention. After some delay, DEA provided us 
with corrected data. We performed a limited verification of the 
corrected data and found them to be reliable. In addition to our 
analysis of disciplinary data, we reviewed the two studies of DEA's 
disciplinary process performed by contractors as well as a report 
prepared by the Justice Department. In addition, we reviewed the 
disposition of appeals by special agents to the Merit Systems 
Protection Board.

We performed our work from September 2001 through February 2003 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Physical Task Test Minimum Requirements:

The minimum requirements in each of the six tasks that applicants for 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) special agent positions must meet 
to pass the physical task test are shown in table 21.

Table 21: DEA Physical Task Test Minimum Performance Requirements:

Task: Trigger pull[A]; Women: 29 pulls of a handgun trigger in 30 
seconds with stronger hand; Men: same.

Task: Pull-ups (number)[B]; Women: 10; Men: 2.

Task: Sit-ups (number within 2 minutes); Women: 46; Men: 46.

Task: Push-ups (number); Women: 14; Men: 25.

Task: 120-yard shuttle run; Women: No longer than 29 seconds; Men: No 
longer than 26 seconds.

Task: 2-mile run; Women: No longer than 18:45 minutes; Men: No longer 
than 16:30 minutes.

Source: DEA.

[A] Eliminated in March 2003.

[B] The pull-up test for women is performed using a horizontal bar 
mounted 3 feet from the floor and 2 feet from the wall. A woman begins 
the pull-up lying on her back. The pull-up test for men is performed 
using a horizontal bar mounted above the floor and out-of-reach of the 
subject. A man begins the pull-up hanging from the horizontal bar.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix III: Competencies in Assessing GS-13 and GS-14 Special Agents 
for Promotion:

Performance Rating Competencies for GS-13 and GS-14 Special Agents:

In the Special Agent Promotion Program (SAPP) performance rating, 
General Schedule (GS) grade 13 special agents are evaluated on seven 
competencies and GS-14 special agents are evaluated on eight 
competencies, as table 22 shows.

Table 22: Performance Rating Competencies for GS-13 and GS-14 Special 
Agents:

Competency: Written communication; Competencies rated: Yes; 
Competencies rated: GS-14: No.

Competency: Acting as a model; Competencies rated: GS-13: Yes; 
Competencies rated: GS-14: Yes.

Competency: Gathering information and making judgments/decisions; 
Competencies rated: GS-13: Yes; Competencies rated: GS-14: Yes.

Competency: Interacting with others; Competencies rated: GS-13: Yes; 
Competencies rated: GS-14: Yes.

Competency: Monitoring and guiding; Competencies rated: GS-13: Yes; 
Competencies rated: GS-14: Yes.

Competency: Oral communication; Competencies rated: GS-13: Yes; 
Competencies rated: GS-14: Yes.

Competency: Planning and coordinating; Competencies rated: GS-13: Yes; 
Competencies rated: GS-14: Yes.

Competency: Mentoring, developing, and evaluating others; Competencies 
rated: GS-13: Competencies rated: GS-14: Yes.

Competency: Persuading; Competencies rated: GS-13: 
Competencies rated: GS-14: Yes.

Source: DEA Promotion Ratings Scales Booklets for GS-13 and GS-14 
special agents.

[End of table]

Competencies Measured by Assessment Center Job Simulations:

In 2001, GS-13 special agents were evaluated on 12 competencies in SAPP 
assessment center simulations, while GS-14 special agents were 
evaluated on 9 competencies, as table 23 shows.[Footnote 73]

Table 23: Competencies Measured by Assessment Center Job Simulations in 
2001:

Competency: Ability to communicate in writing; GS-13: Yes; GS-14: Yes.

Competency: Ability to communicate orally; GS-13: Yes; GS-14: Yes.

Competency: Ability to expand case to fullest potential; GS-13: Yes; 
GS-14: No.

Competency: Ability to evaluate and develop subordinates; GS-13: Yes; 
GS-14: Yes.

Competency: Ability to integrate information and draw conclusions; GS-
13: Yes; GS-14: Yes.

Competency: Ability to delegate; GS-13: Yes; GS-14: Yes.

Competency: Ability to recognize and establish evidence; GS-13: Yes; 
GS-14: No.

Competency: Ability to effectively utilize cooperating sources; GS-13: 
Yes; GS-14: No.

Competency: Ability to organize, plan, and prioritize activities; GS-
13: Yes; GS-14: Yes.

Competency: Ability to coordinate and monitor work; GS-13: Yes; GS-14: 
[Empty].

Competency: Ability to plan and coordinate enforcement operations; GS-
13: GS-14: Yes.

Competency: Ability to relate effectively with others; GS-13: Yes; 
GS-14: Yes.

Competency: Knowledge of DEA manuals, policies, and procedures; GS-13: 
Yes; GS-14: Yes.

Source: 2001 SAPP report.

[End of table]

Interim Special Agent in Charge/Office Head Recommendation Process:

The interim recommendation process, which was implemented in January 
2000 and was still in place as of December 2002, requires that a 
special agent in charge (SAC) or office head, when making promotion 
recommendations to the Career Board, provide information about the 
personal characteristics, traits, or attributes that make a candidate 
better suited to the position under consideration and how a candidate's 
past or present experiences or demonstrated success makes him or her a 
top candidate. The latter requirement covers seven specific areas:

* directing enforcement and/or investigative-related programs;

* managing, motivating, and mentoring subordinates;

* working in a team environment;

* working individually;

* managing agency resources;

* building and maintaining coalitions; and:

* acquiring or possessing technical knowledge, education, and special 
skills, or training peculiar to or required by the position.

Proposed SAC/Office Head Recommendation Process:

Among the changes under a proposed recommendation process are that 
applicants for promotions would be asked to provide a summary of their 
major accomplishments and how they are best qualified for the position 
applied for, including technical knowledge, education, special skills, 
or training specified in the vacancy announcement, and provide a 
narrative describing their achievements in the following competencies:

* directing enforcement and/or investigative-related programs or other 
appropriate managerial experience in a law enforcement setting;

* managing, motivating, mentoring, and/or training personnel;

* working in a team environment of mutual cooperation and assistance;

* building and maintaining coalitions with other personnel and entities 
internal and external to the agency; and:

* for applicants for GS-15 positions, managing agency resources.

[End of section]

Appendix IV: Comments from the Drug Enforcement Administration:

U.S. Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration:

MAY 02 2003:

Managing Director Victor S. Rezendes Strategic Issues Division:

General Accounting Office 441 G Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20548:

Dear Mr. Rezendes:

This is to provide you with the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) 
formal response to the General Accounting Office's (GAO) recently 
completed draft report, "EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY Hiring, 
Promotion, and Discipline Processes at the DEA" (GAO-03-413). DEA has 
reviewed the draft report and submits the following technical comments 
addressing corrections for accuracy on the facts and findings of this 
report. Technical comments are followed by DEA's response to the 
recommendations of the GAO.

The draft GAO report addressed three major personnel systems at the DEA 
concerning that part of its workforce consisting of Special Agents in 
the General Schedule (GS) 1811 series. The three major personnel 
systems are: (1) the hiring procedures, (2) promotion process, and (3) 
discipline process. Concerning overall diversity, the draft GAO report 
concluded that,

The diversity of DEA's [S]pecial [A]gent ([C]riminal [I]nvestigator) 
workforce was below overall government workforce percentages but 
generally comparable with the governmentwide population of criminal 
investigators, except for women.

GAO-03-413, page 2. According to Table 1: "Demographic Distribution of 
the Federal Workforce and Criminal Investigators (Special Agents) in 
DEA, Governmentwide, and the Nonfederal Workforce a/", DEA notes that 
the Agency was "generally comparable" with the Governmentwide 
population of criminal investigators for Asian/Pacific Islander and 
Hispanic, was not as high as the average for Native American and women, 
but was higher than the Governmentwide percentage for African-
Americans. DEA also notes the average percentage 
of White Special Agents reported in Table 1 was precisely the same for 
the Governmentwide population and the non-Federal workforce.

Hiring Procedures:

Concerning the DEA hiring procedures for Special Agents, the draft GAO 
report contained conclusions that, for fiscal years 1997 through 2001, 
the "proportion of white applicants hired was substantially higher" 
than African-American or Hispanic applicants. For this analysis, the 
draft GAO report relied upon the "80-percent rule" pursuant to the 
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures.':

The draft GAO report did find that the "DEA's hiring procedures are 
based on criteria in federal regulations, professional standards, or 
standards established by subject matter experts." DEA concurs with this 
assessment. The draft report also stated that "the [A]gency had not 
studied why its procedures resulted in different selection rates and 
whether they could be modified to reduce differences while maintaining 
high standards." See GAO-03-413, page 2. As a result of DEA initiative, 
studies were begun before the draft GAO report to examine the hiring 
process for reasons of increasing efficiency, recruitment, and the 
quality of applicants.

Further, there also appear to be fundamental misconceptions in the 
draft report concerning the manner in which applicants are extended 
offers of employment. Applicants are extended conditional offers of 
employment upon meeting minimum eligibility criteria. Applicants are 
presented final offers of employment after they have succeeded in 
passing all phases of the hiring process. The draft report, however, 
critically examined the DEA process of extending final offers of 
employment to applicants, by stating,

DEA officials said that many [applicants] dropped out because of the 
lengthy hiring process, which, they said, was averaging about two 
years. As a result, DEA was left with a limited pool of candidates 
meeting its hiring standards for which the agency could hire. Virtually 
everyone who made it through all the steps in the hiring process was 
offered employment.

GAO-03-413, page 17. This critical assessment is repeated at the end of 
the draft report,

Furthermore, because a large number of applicants drop out or do not 
meet hiring standards, DEA offers employment to virtually all 
applicants it finds suitable, leaving the agency with very little 
choice in whom it hires.

GAO-03-413, page 51.

The Agency's Special Agent hiring process is designed to obtain the 
best qualified candidates for the position of DEA Special Agent. 
Throughout each step of the process, DEA assesses potential applicants 
for compatibility with the position description. Those applicants who 
successfully complete all phases of the hiring process are considered 
to be among the most competitive applicants and are offered employment 
based upon that reasoned justification. The applicants who successfully 
clear all of the processes are deemed to be highly valued and the top 
candidates. As such, language such as "limited pool of candidates" and 
"little choice in whom it hires" are inconsistent with an understanding 
of the structure of the process.

Misconceptions concerning the hiring process were carried over equally 
into the draft report's presentation of the part of the hiring process 
that addresses suitability and security examinations of potential 
applicants. The draft report stated,

In addition, background investigations are to be initiated earlier in 
the process and by field offices, which also are to review the 
investigation results, perform necessary follow up, and make a 
preliminary suitability recommendation.

GAO-03-413, page 29. This statement is not accurate. The hiring process 
contains two processes to assess requirements for the position of DEA 
Special Agent - preliminary records checks followed by a background 
investigation. The revised hiring process allows for field offices to 
conduct criminal history and credit records checks. The preliminary 
records checks eliminate the need for initiating costly background 
investigations. Background investigations are now initiated by field 
offices through the United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM), 
and would not be initiated until applicants complete a medical 
examination and Physical Task Test (PTT). As such, it cannot be fairly 
stated that background investigations are conducted early in the hiring 
process.

Promotion System:

The draft GAO report reviewed the DEA promotion system for Special 
Agents seeking promotion to the GS 14 and GS 15 levels under standard 
statistical techniques.' This current system at DEA consists of (1) the 
Special Agent Promotion Program (SAPP); (2) the interim Special Agent 
in Charge / Office Head recommendation process; and (3) Career Board 
recommendation to the selecting official (Deputy Administrator for 
DEA).

As the GAO notes in the draft report, the development of the DEA 
promotion system resulted from a history of civil litigation in the 
area of equal employment opportunity, and as a result, the Agency 
closely monitors promotion rates to ensure adherence to accepted 
selection procedures. In reviewing the draft GAO report, however, DEA 
is concerned with the description
of the civil litigation history in the opening section entitled 
"Litigation History." The draft GAO report stated,

In its [1999] ruling [in SeQar, et al. v. Reno, et al. 41the court did 
not address whether there was adverse impact in promotions.

GAO-03-413, page 11. The Court, however, did address whether there was 
adverse impact in promotions in the 1999 SeQar decision. In that 
decision, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
examined each stage of the promotion process as members of the class 
action in Segar (hereinafter "Plaintiff Class Members") presented their 
challenges to the Court for adjudication. The Court found that the 
selections which had been recommended by the Career Board resulted in 
no "bottom-line" "disparate impact." DEA considers this to be a 
significant finding.

Because the Agency relied upon the SAC / Office Head recommendations in 
a segment of the larger promotion process, the Court found that the 
recommendation process could be independently analyzed to assess 
disparate impact. Nothing in the SAC / Office Head recommendation 
process, which was the subject of the 1999 decision, however, negated 
the Court's finding that Plaintiff Class Members could not establish 
disparate impact in the resulting selections for promotions.

With this historical backdrop, the draft GAO report found that,

Our analysis showed no statistically significant differences in 
promotion rates among various racial, ethnic, and gender groups.

This conclusion is consistent with the Agency's vigilant analysis and 
monitoring of the promotion process. The draft GAO report also noted 
that, as it concerned that part of the process regarding reliance upon 
a validated SAC /Office Head recommendation process, DEA is 
involved in pending litigation with the Plaintiff Class Members in the 
matter of Segar. As such, implementation of a new SAC / Office Head 
recommendation process to replace the interim process would be 
dependent upon approval by the District Court as either compliant with 
the District Court Order issued in 1999, or through a settlement 
agreement negotiated with Plaintiff Class Members. The parties are 
currently involved in mediation efforts to explore whether a joint 
stipulation can be obtained for the development of a validated SAC / 
Office Head recommendation process. As with most matters subject to 
negotiation, however, the SAC / Office Head recommendation process 
currently being considered in earnest by both parties is undergoing 
evolutionary changes, which may cause it to appear drastically 
different from what the draft GAO report describes. It would be, 
therefore, premature for the DEA or any agency to comment upon it or 
draw any conclusions related to what is substantially still a pending 
process.

Additionally, in the section entitled "Results in Brief," the draft GAO 
report stated,

Although DEA has a validated process to assess [S]pecial [A]gents' 
promotion potential, the 1999 court decision found that a subsequent 
step involving recommendations by office heads of assessed [A]gents for 
promotion had resulted in an underrepresentation ofAfrican-American 
[A]gents, compared with whites, and that this step had not been 
validated. Interim measures modifying the recommendation process had 
not eliminated this situation.

GAO-03-413, page 4-5. This statement contains inaccurate information. 
The 1999 decision in Segar addressed the step in the SAC / Office Head 
recommendation process whereby SAC / Office Heads with the vacancy 
assessed candidates for promotion on the Best Qualified Lists (BQLs). 
The above referenced statement attributes the recommendation to the 
"office head of the assessed [A]gent," which is a reference to the 
senior executive in the candidate's chain of supervision.

Additionally, DEA data comparing the number of recommendations under 
the interim recommendation procedures by Special Agents making a BQL 
that included at least one African American did not indicate a 
statistically significant difference between African-American and 
White Special Agents. The interim procedures, therefore, remain a 
viable alternative for compliance with the 1999 Segar decision. 
However, as with any process affecting the entire workforce, DEA 
continues to monitor the process. Should a new process be instituted at 
the Agency, the oversight plan encompasses an evaluation of all 
demographics of the workforce, including, race, national origin (RNO), 
and gender.

Additionally, for reasons described above, DEA must clarify the 
statement of the draft report, that stated,

At the time of our review, DEA, working with the plaintiff class and 
other employees, has developed and validated a recommendation process.

GAO-03-413, page 12. In the development of the current proposal for a 
SAC / Office Head recommendation system to replace the interim 
procedures currently in place, the EEOMC and DEA worked together with 
the Segar Working Group to assess and refine the proposal. In addition 
to the EEOMC, DEA convened a representative and diverse panel of DEA 
employees to review the proposal. The Segar Working Group provided 
conditional approval of the proposal, based upon inclusion of an 
oversight and monitoring plan. DEA does not have the authority to 
independently "validate" a promotion system. Rather, the members of 
Segar Working Group are the parties' resident experts concerning the 
selection of a validated process which uses job-related criteria to 
make merit based selections. As previously stated, the process is still 
the subject of mediation, and neither party currently seeks its 
approval with the District Court.

Concerning the oversight and monitoring of the SAC / Office Head 
recommendation system, the draft report stated that DEA "had not 
initially considered tracking results by gender." GAO-03-413, page 38. 
This statement is also not accurate. The oversight and monitoring will 
monitor all segments of the workforce.

Furthermore, the draft report references the Career Board 
recommendations to the selecting official as selections by majority 
vote. By crediting the Career Board with selections, the draft report 
contains a fundamental misunderstanding of the DEA selection process. 
The Career Board is a body of senior executives that makes 
recommendations by majority vote to the Chair, who ultimately has 
responsibility and the authority to make the selection decision.

Disciplinary Process:

The draft GAO report reviewed two studies of the discipline process at 
DEA,' and found both to be methodologically sound. The reports that the 
GAO found to be methodologically sound found the disciplinary process 
at DEA to be fair and nondiscriminatory. The draft GAO report, however, 
noted that there was a higher rate of sustained discipline for 
minorities and women as compared to their representation in the total 
workforce during fiscal years 1997-2001.' The GAO used standard 
statistical techniques for its analysis.':

These higher rates reflect that African American, Hispanic, and women 
[S]pecial [A)gents had a proportionally higher number of allegations of 
misconduct lodged against them and that a higher portion of these 
allegations were substantiated by investigations and resulted in 
disciplinary actions. DEA does not know why these differences exist nor 
does any study offer a reason for them.

GAO-03-413, page 5.

For the integrity of the process, the disciplinary process at DEA does 
not restrict or otherwise control the reporting of allegations against 
members of its workforce. The DEA Office of Professional Responsibility 
(OPR) intakes allegations of misconduct from all sources, both internal 
and external to the Agency. Among the sources from which DEA OPR may 
receive allegations are DEA employees, contractors, prosecuting 
attorneys, other law enforcement 
organizations, or private citizens. Additionally, the intake process 
does not include assignment of RNO or gender information to the 
allegations, or processing based on such data. As a Federal law 
enforcement agency, DEA ensures that all allegations are processed 
without regard to RNO or gender, as all allegations are processed. 
Additionally, every complaint received by DEA OPR is reviewed by the 
Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Department of Justice.

DEA notes that the draft report omits the letter of reprimand from the 
discussion of potential disciplinary actions. GAO-03-413, page 41. The 
Agency's Table of Penalties includes issuance of a letter of reprimand 
as a disciplinary action. Unlike a letter of caution, a letter of 
reprimand becomes part of an employee's Official Personnel Folder (OPF) 
for up to two years.

Additionally, in the description of the disciplinary process, the draft 
report did not acknowledge that DEA employees are afforded procedural 
due process, including notice, the opportunity to review all evidence 
upon which the Board relied, and to make oral and written replies.

In conclusion, DEA endeavors to ensure that there is a diverse 
workforce at the Agency. The processes examined in this report will 
undergo additional examination based upon the structured 
recommendations of the GAO. Specifically, the GAO made the following 
recommendations (DEA has provided numbering for easier reference):

"We recommend that the Administrator of the DEA direct that:

1. A process be initiated to monitor the results of decisions at the 
various steps in the hiring process to identify differences in 
selection rates among groups, and, where substantial differences are 
found, determine why they occur and what, if anything, can be done to 
reduce the differences while maintaining the high standards necessary 
for the job ofspecial agent; ":

DEA Response: Concur. DEA will conduct a study to review each part of 
the Special Agent hiring process. The DEA will study the following 
steps in the hiring process for Special Agents:

(a) Minimum qualifying education and experience;

(b) Evaluation of a written test to measure the ability to write, 
observe, and recall details;

(c) Minimum qualifying Physical Task Test (PTT) criteria;' (d) Criteria 
for suitability overall.

The study, which is expected to take at least 18 months, will include 
the following:

(a) Description of process used, history of the process, and analysis 
of other processes utilized by federal and non-federal law enforcement 
agencies in a search for alternative strategies that are equally valid, 
administratively feasible in the DEA environment, but that might have 
lesser impact on groups noted in the GAO Report;

(b) Summary of research literature on the topic, to include review of 
recent job analysis, linkages and analysis of race and national origin 
(RNO) and gender data for each process;

(c) Preparation of content validation reports;

(d) Management assessment of recommendations concerning implementation 
of any new processes; and:

(e) Implementation of revised processes, if any.

Concurrent with the study and subject to available data, DEA continues 
to monitor the results of Agency decisions at the various steps in the 
hiring process to identify differences in selection rates among 
minority groups. DEA also continues to pursue the Affirmative 
Employment Program Plan for overcoming possible barriers within the 
hiring process. After the study has been completed and should new 
processes be implemented, DEA will adjust the monitoring process, as 
necessary, for continuation of appropriate review and assessment.

2. A workforce analysis be done, which takes into account retirement 
eligibility, expected retirements, and other attrition, to guide the 
development ofDEA's recruiting and hiring plans and strategies;

DEA Response: Concur. To guide the development of the recruiting and 
hiring plans and strategies at DEA, the Agency will review the Agency's 
personnel data systems to assess that part of the DEA workforce that is 
eligible for, or anticipate, retirement, and to identify other 
attrition concerns for the Agency. Additionally, DEA understands that, 
as of the date of this correspondence, the Human Resources Office of 
the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) is commissioning a 
workforce analysis for DOJ offices and components. DEA has volunteered 
and been accepted to be the pilot agency for the DOJ workforce 
analysis, which will take into account retirement eligibility, expected 
retirements, and other attrition.

3. Expand the plans to monitor the results of the SAC recommendation 
process by race and ethnicity to include monitoring by gender;

DEA Response: Qualified Concurrence. The use of the Special Agent-in-
Charge (SAC) / Office Head recommendations in the Agency's promotion 
system for Special Agents at the GS 14 and GS 15 levels was the focus 
of civil litigation in Segar, et al. v. Reno, et al,' in 1999. 
Implementation of a new SAC / Office Head Recommendation process is 
dependent 
upon approval by the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia. The parties are currently in mediation concerning development 
of a validated process and appropriate monitoring of that process. 
Should a SAC / Office Head recommendations process be validated at the 
Agency and approved by the District Court, DEA monitoring of the 
results of the proposed process includes an oversight plan that 
evaluates all demographics of the workforce, including, race, national 
origin, and gender.

4. Steps be taken to develop, maintain, and assure the reliability of a 
discipline database and that the study of disciplinary actions taken 
against African-American and white special agents be expanded to 
analyze disciplinary actions against all racial, ethnic, and gender 
groups of special agents; and:

DEA Response: Concur. DEA began an effort in mid-November 2002, to 
consolidate multiple discipline databases at the Agency. Each 
department or office within the DEA that has responsibility for 
investigating, adjudicating, or advising on matters concerning 
discipline" is currently being assessed to identify functional and 
reporting requirements for development of the consolidated database. 
DEA expects the assessment to provide the composite for selection of 
the appropriate information technology system to accomplish the task 
with the requisite amount of file security. The effort, which 
encompasses requirement definition, development of information 
technology, capital planning, testing and accreditation, and 
appropriate notice and comment in the Federal Register, is expected to 
take at least 24 months.

Concerning the study of disciplinary actions taken against Special 
Agents at DEA, two studies have been commissioned. The first study, 
which was obtained by the Segar Working Group, did not find any 
discrimination against minorities in the number recommended for 
discipline or the severity of the discipline proposed or imposed as it 
related to the underlying misconduct. The study, which was issued in 
April 1987 for the period September 1982 to June 1986, reported results 
by race, national origin, and gender.

The DEA commissioned a second study to assess the disciplinary actions 
during the period 1994 through 2000. Again, the study did not support a 
finding of discrimination against minorities in the Agency's 
administration of the disciplinary system. The study, which was issued 
in August 2001, reported results by race and national origin. Analysis 
was conducted of discipline of African-American and white Special 
Agents. The methodology for analysis of the data obtained in this 
recent study, however, was developed for application to any group. 
Accordingly, DEA will revisit the August 2001 study to analyze 
disciplinary actions taken concerning remaining racial, ethnic, and 
gender groups of Special Agents.

Additionally, in October 2002, the DOJ Office of the Inspector General 
(OIG) initiated an audit of the "Review of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration's (DEA) Discipline Process.":

The purpose of this review is to: "Assess the process by which the DEA 
identifies, refers, and investigates employee misconduct, and imposes 
and enforces disciplinary actions in response 
to substantiated employee misconduct allegations." The review is 
pending; however, to date, there have been no indications that the OIG 
has found the process to be unfair.

5. Appropriate, aggregate statistical data on the outcomes of the 
promotion and discipline processes for all racial, ethnic, and gender 
groups are available to its special agent workforce to help special 
agents formulate informed views about the fairness and equity of the 
agency's promotion and discipline processes.

DEA Response: Concur. To the extent that it is consistent with law, 
rule, and regulation, DEA will make available aggregate statistical 
data concerning promotion selections, at a minimum, semi-annually to 
the general workforce. Concerning disciplinary actions, the Agency will 
make available aggregate statistical data concerning the types of 
misconduct sustained on at least an annual basis to the general 
workforce.[NOTE 11]

In sum, DEA concurs with recommendations, but where noted, qualifies 
concurrence on matters dependent upon the outcome of pending 
litigation. DEA will follow up with GAO on a course of action to 
address the recommendations included in this report. In addition, DEA 
has enclosed additional technical corrections to the report language 
that should be made to ensure accuracy. The DEA appreciates the 
opportunity to provide comment to the GAO in these matters.

Enclosure:

Sincerely,	

John B. Brown, III Acting Administrator:

Signed by John B. Brown, III: 

NOTES:

[1] In reviewing each process, DEA notes GAO investigators requested 
discussions with minority members, which became the basis for 
attributing attitudes and sentiments to the entire 1811 workforce. DEA 
was not requested to present a representative sampling of the 1811 
workforce, which would have included individuals from the remaining 80% 
of the 1811 workforce. The Agency remains willing to provide a 
representative sampling of the entire 1811 workforce.

[2] The draft report does not contain an explanation of the GAO's 
selection of the "80% rule" for hiring analysis, and statistical 
significance determinations for analysis of the promotion and 
discipline processes.

[3] The draft GAO report does not explain why investigators chose to 
analyze hiring actions under the 80-percent rule and the promotion 
process under standard statistical techniques.

[4] C.A. No. 77-81 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1999).

[5] The DEA implemented the discipline process that currently exists at 
DEA as a result of Segar v. Civiletti, 508 F. Supp. 690 (D.D.C. 1981), 
affd in relevant part subnom. Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 
1984), cert. denied subnom. Meese v. Seaar, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985).

[6] Percentages for African-Americans: 16% of Agents disciplined to 
8.3 % 
of workforce, Hispanics: 15% of Agents disciplined to 8.9 % of 
workforce, and women: 13% of Agents disciplined to 7.8 % of workforce. 
GAO-03-413, page 5.

[7] The draft GAO report does not explain why investigators chose to 
analyze hiring actions under the 80-percent rule and the discipline 
process under standard statistical techniques.

[8] DEA reviewed the applicant Physical Task Test (PTT) program in the 
summer of 2002. After this program review, DEA conducted market 
research concerning the selection of an outside firm to complete a 
validation study of the PTT for DEA. The market research focused upon 
firms with experience in the completion of validation studies for law 
enforcement agencies and which have the requisite subject matter expert 
in the area of fitness program standards. Should the program undergo 
any modification as a result of the study, DEA will conduct a training 
program for the recruiters and the Physical Task Test Administrators 
(PTTAs).

[9] C.A. No. 77-81 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1999).

[10] Currently, the DEA Human Resources Employee Relations Office, 
Office of Professional Responsibility, Board of Professional Conduct, 
Deciding Officials, and Office of Chief Counsel have responsibility in 
the discipline process.

[11] Due to the small number of disciplinary cases processed each year, to 
report any more frequently would comprise the Agency's responsibilities 
in the area of privacy interests.

[End of section]

(450059):

FOOTNOTES

[1] DEA, an agency within the Department of Justice, enforces the 
nation's controlled substances laws and regulations in the United 
States and worldwide. DEA has 21 domestic field divisions with more 
than 200 offices and 79 foreign field offices in 50 countries. 

[2] 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.

[3] The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 prohibits 
discrimination against individuals who are 40 years of age or older (29 
U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.), the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
prohibits employment discrimination against qualified individuals with 
disabilities in the private sector and in state and local governments 
(42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq.), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals with 
disabilities by the federal government (29 U.S.C. § 791).

[4] 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(10).

[5] An employee or applicant may not file a complaint or lawsuit based 
on sexual orientation discrimination under title VII because that 
statute does not prohibit this form of discrimination. However, an 
aggrieved person may seek redress through administrative processes 
available to federal employees.

[6] Although proof of disparate treatment requires a showing that an 
employer acted with discriminatory motive or intent, discriminatory 
motive may be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment. 

[7] 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).

[8] 29 C.F.R. Part 1607.

[9] Segar v. Civiletti, 508 F. Supp. 690 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd in 
relevant part subnom. Segar v. Smith, 738 F. 2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied subnom. Meese v. Segar, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985).

[10] In 1992, DEA settled a class action lawsuit that Hispanic special 
agents brought alleging discrimination in promotion and assignment 
practices, as well as other terms of employment (Muniz, et al. v. 
Barr). Terms of the settlement, which expired in 1996, included adding 
an additional SES voting member to DEA's Career Board, DEA's commitment 
to the objective of having Hispanic special agents fill this position 
in approximate proportion to their representation in the SES workforce, 
and putting procedures in place regarding wiretap, undercover, and 
temporary assignments. In addition, the settlement recognized that 
since 1984 DEA had promoted Hispanic special agents consistent with 
their representation in the relevant applicant pool and that DEA was 
committed to the objective of promoting Hispanics in rates roughly 
equal to the promotion rates of similarly situated and qualified non-
Hispanics.

[11] Segar, et al. v. Reno, et al., C.A. No. 77-81 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 
1999).

[12] DEA has since developed training and career development manuals 
for GS-13, GS-14, and GS-15 special agents, which the Working Group and 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Monitoring Committee approved for 
issuance.

[13] Uniform Guidelines' standards for content validity include (1) 
conducting a job analysis that identifies the important work behaviors 
required for successful performance of the job in question and their 
relative importance, and also identifies the knowledges, skills, and 
abilities used in work behaviors and the relationship between each 
knowledge, skill, or ability and each work behavior, (2) describing the 
selection procedure, (3) providing evidence showing that the content of 
the selection procedure is representative of important aspects of 
performance on the job for which the candidates are to be evaluated, 
and (4) considering alternative procedures.

[14] The knowledge, skills, abilities, and tasks were developed by an 
outside contractor that performed a job analysis of the special agent 
position. 

[15] U.S. General Accounting Office, Federal Employee Retirements: 
Expected Increase Over the Next 5 Years Illustrates the Need for 
Workforce Planning, GAO-01-509 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2001).

[16] U.S. General Accounting Office, A Model of Strategic Human Capital 
Management, GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002).

[17] OMB Bulletin No. 01-07, May 8, 2001.

[18] Special agents can retire at any age with 25 years of service or 
at age 50 with 20 years of service and reach mandatory retirement at 
age 57.

[19] Applicants meeting minimum eligibility requirements receive 
conditional offers of employment. Applicants passing all phases of the 
hiring process receive final offers of employment.

[20] DEA solicits applicants by recruiting at colleges, including 
colleges with high minority and women enrollments; placing ads in 
publications targeting minority audiences; and reaching out to law 
enforcement organizations, professional associations (e.g., Asian 
American Police Officers Association, National Organization of Black 
Law Enforcement Executives, Hispanic American Police Command Officers 
Association, and Women in Federal Law Enforcement), and advocacy groups 
(e.g., Blacks in Government). In addition, DEA's special agent vacancy 
announcement is posted on USAJOBS, the Web site for federal jobs 
(http://www.usajobs.opm.gov/).

[21] DEA also determines whether an applicant meets other eligibility 
requirements (e.g., must be a U.S. citizen) and has no disqualifying 
criminal or drug use history disclosed on the application form.

[22] In rating applications, DEA had awarded points for education and 
experience. The number of points awarded for a bachelor's degree alone 
did not enable an applicant to meet minimum requirements. Points 
awarded for experience varied based on the type and length of 
experience. For example, more points were awarded for law enforcement 
narcotics and investigative experience, compared with professional/
administrative experience.

[23] The languages are Spanish, Russian, Hebrew, Arabic, Nigerian, 
Chinese, and Japanese, with fluency verified.

[24] BA-98-01 was open from October 15, 1997, through March 7, 2000, 
and BA-20-00 opened on May 8, 2000, and remained open during our 
review. 

[25] The questions are modified periodically to protect the integrity 
of the testing process.

[26] The shuttle requires the applicant to start from a resting 
position on his/her back and jump up and run 60 yards up and back 
around traffic cones set on the floor.

[27] DEA eliminated the trigger pull test based on recommendations from 
the DEA Firearms Training Unit.

[28] The Cooper Institute is nationally recognized for aerobics 
research and work with fitness programs for law enforcement, public 
safety, and the military.

[29] Failure of the initial physical task test is not automatically 
disqualifying. Applicants are given 30 days to retake and pass the 
test. Data we analyzed reflect the latest physical task test results. 

[30] For this analysis, we combined men and women of each race because 
of the small number of minority women.

[31] This institute establishes standards for federal agency polygraph 
programs and trains all federal polygraph examiners. In addition, the 
institute conducts ongoing evaluations of the validity of polygraph 
techniques used by federal examiners and inspects federal polygraph 
programs to ensure compliance with both those techniques and 
procedures. The institute last inspected DEA's polygraph program in 
January 2001 and found the program's policies and procedures were in 
compliance with the standards for a federal government polygraph 
program.

[32] The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2, a test of adult 
psychopathology, and the 16 Personality Factor Questionnaire, a 
personality assessment instrument.

[33] 5 C.F.R. parts 731, 732, and 736.

[34] 5 C.F.R. 731.202.

[35] According to the criteria, factors that may be considered a basis 
in finding an individual unsuitable include misconduct or negligence in 
employment; criminal or dishonest conduct; alcohol abuse; and illegal 
use of narcotics, drugs, or other controlled substances.

[36] The approving official in the Office of Personnel and the two 
permanent members of the 1811-hiring panel have received training in 
making suitability determinations, as have some rotating panel members. 
In addition, during 2002, field division staff began to receive 
suitability determination training. Field divisions make suitability 
recommendations to the Office of Personnel. 

[37] For this analysis, we combined men and women for each race because 
of the small numbers of minority women. We also combined the results 
under both announcements because only about 2 percent of the applicants 
who underwent a suitability review were applicants under BA-20-00. 

[38] To participate in the SAPP, a GS-13 must have 3 years in grade 
while a GS-14 is required to have 4 years in grade. 

[39] Included in these totals are retest candidates. A special agent is 
eligible to take the SAPP again 2 years after his or her last 
participation. Of the 1,355 GS-13 SAPP participants, 406 (30 percent) 
were retest candidates, while 103 (24 percent) of the 423 GS-14 SAPP 
participants were retest candidates. 

[40] 2001 DEA Special Agent Promotional Programs (SAPPs) for Grades 14 
and 15: Revision and Administration. Prepared for the Drug Enforcement 
Administration by Fields Consulting Group, Inc. (McLean, Va.: Sept. 
2001).

[41] The same contractor was involved in the administration of the 
1998-2002 SAPPs.

[42] The in-basket contains contents similar to those that are found in 
the in-basket for the job that is being tested.

[43] Principles for Validation and Use of Personnel Selection 
Procedures was adopted by the Society for Industrial and Organizational 
Psychology, a division of the American Psychological Association, to 
provide guidelines for the evaluation, development, and use of testing 
instruments. 

[44] An updated job analysis was completed in June 2002 and will be 
considered in revising the SAPP for 2003.

[45] Minorities accounted for about 35 percent of assessors in the GS-
14 SAPP, while approximately 26 percent of participants were 
minorities. Women were 8.4 percent of GS-14 SAPP assessors, while 7.4 
percent of participants were women. For the GS-15 SAPP, minorities 
accounted for about 38 percent of assessors versus about 28 percent of 
participants, while women were 9.7 percent of assessors versus 8.5 
percent of participants.

[46] The scores of Asian/Pacific Islanders and Native Americans are not 
analyzed because their small numbers are insufficient for reliable 
statistical analysis, according to Working Group members. The 
Validation and Analysis Unit Chief and Working Group members said 
gender analysis is not performed because early analysis found no 
statistically significant differences between women and men. A Working 
Group member said, however, that analysis of assessment center results 
should include women.

[47] For example, because race/national origin score differences were 
attributed to the in-basket exercises of both assessment centers, the 
in-basket exercises were revised over the 1997-2001 period for both 
assessment centers. Among the revisions were reducing the number of 
items in the in-basket, strengthening the relationship of in-basket 
items to dimensions measured, and increasing the time allowed for the 
exercise. 

[48] U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Supervisors in the Federal 
Government: A Wake-Up Call (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2001).

[49] The score bands are designed to help ensure that candidates having 
similar levels of knowledge and abilities are not penalized because of 
errors of measurement. The use of score bands is based on the rationale 
that the measurement of abilities using predictor tests results in some 
error with each candidate. The measurement error associated with tests 
means that small differences in scores do not allow one to definitively 
say that one candidate will do better than another on a job.

[50] In November 2002, the Career Board was increased from 10 to 11 
voting members. At the same time, the number of SACs sitting on the 
board increased from 4 to 6, each serving time-limited tenures. The 
Administrator said that he made these changes to achieve rotation, 
greater participation, and transparency. 

[51] African Americans were represented on 71.5 percent, Hispanics on 
57.4 percent, and women on 58.2 percent of GS-14 best-qualified lists 
from which promotions were made during fiscal years 1997 through 2001. 
In addition, African Americans were represented on 87.3 percent, 
Hispanics on 81.9 percent, and women on 65.2 percent of GS-15 best-
qualified lists from which promotions were made during this period.

[52] The court approved a stipulation between the parties that the 
disciplinary system met the court's requirements. 

[53] The Department of Justice Inspector General reviews all complaints 
OPR receives and can decide to take the investigative lead.

[54] Investigations involving senior executives are forwarded to the 
Department of Justice for disposition. 

[55] The board also reviews investigations of shooting incidents, 
accidents involving official government vehicles, and damage or loss of 
government property.

[56] The degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person, 
considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find 
that a contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue.

[57] MSPB hears and decides appeals by federal employees of actions 
taken against them by their agencies.

[58] Curtis Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 MSPR 280, 5 MSPB 313 
(1981). The factors include the nature, seriousness, and notoriety of 
the offense; the position of the employee; past work and disciplinary 
record; effect of an offense on the employee's ability to perform his 
or her job; and consistency with the agency's penalty guide.

[59] A letter of caution is nondisciplinary in nature and issued in 
situations in which a charge is not sustained but the employee needs to 
be warned about the appearance of impropriety or situations in which a 
charge is sustained but does not warrant disciplinary action.

[60] A Study of the Drug Enforcement Administration's Current Conduct 
and Discipline System, Advanced Research Resources Organization, 
Bethesda, Md.: Apr. 1987.

[61] Frank J. Landy, Drug Enforcement Administration Discipline System 
Study, SHL Landy Jacobs: Litigation Support Group, Boulder, Colo.: Aug. 
8, 2001.

[62] The situation was similar for Hispanic special agents. Although 
less than 9 percent of the special agent workforce, Hispanics accounted 
for 15.9 percent of the agents disciplined during the study period.

[63] Includes initial appeals and Board reviews of initial decisions 
regarding the same individual.

[64] We recognize that the views of the members of the committees may 
not necessarily represent the views of their constituents. Also, there 
was no group of nonminority special agents to which we could speak. We 
recognize that the views of nonminority special agents could be 
different from the views of the minority agents. 

[65] For a discussion of this and other attributes of high performing 
organizations, see U.S. General Accounting Office, A Model of Strategic 
Human Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 
2002); Human Capital: Practices That Empowered Employees, GAO-01-1070 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 2001); and Human Capital: Key Principles 
from Nine Private Sector Organizations, GAO/GGD-00-28 (Washington, 
D.C.: Jan. 31, 2000).

[66] Because the Segar case had remained under court supervision, DEA 
provided the Monitoring Committee with the results of promotion 
decisions, breaking out the data by African American, white, and other, 
though not by gender. 

[67] GAO-02-373SP.

[68] For additional information about ombudsmen in the federal 
workplace, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: The Role 
of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution, GAO-01-466 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 
13, 2001).

[69] Segar v. Civiletti, 508 F. Supp. 690 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd in 
relevant part subnom. Segar v. Smith, 738 F. 2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied subnom. Meese v. Segar, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985).

[70] U.S. General Accounting Office, OPM's Central Personnel Data File: 
Data Appear Sufficiently Reliable to Meet Most Customer Needs, GAO/GGD-
98-199 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 1998).

[71] The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, adopted 
in 1978 by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Civil 
Service Commission (the predecessor agency to OPM), and the departments 
of Justice and Labor, provide a uniform set of principles governing use 
of employee selection procedures and identifying adverse impact (29 
C.F.R. Part 1607).

[72] The promotion fiscal year begins October 22 of each year.

[73] Competencies were unchanged during the 1997-2001 period, except 
for the 1997 GS-15 SAPP, which included the competency "ability to 
allocate resources."

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