Summary

This report reviews the readiness implications of moving the maintenance workloads of the Alameda Naval Aviation Depot in California to two remaining depots in Florida and Texas. Both the Navy and Air Force experienced difficulties in transferring the workloads. Although these problems resulted in some production delays and increased costs, the impact on readiness was limited. The problems and difficulties experienced in this move are not inherent in workload transfers and can be avoided or substantially reduced through improved planning and management. GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense share among the military services the lessons learned from closing and transferring workloads from Alameda and other depots.

GAO noted that: (1) the transfer of Alameda's depot maintenance workloads to the Jacksonville and San Antonio depots was not executed in the most efficient manner; (2) both receiving depots experienced production delays and increased costs, but they could not be quantified; (3) there was an impact on reported unit readiness; however, it was not widespread; (4) based on the Navy's and Air Force's experience in moving the Alameda workloads, several lessons learned have been identified to mitigate future workload transfer problems; (5) according to Navy and Air Force officials, the delays and increased costs were attributable to a variety of factors, including competing priorities between the gaining and losing facilities, unidentified equipment and retooling requirements, lack of spare parts in the Navy supply system, limited Air Force access to Navy parts supply system, outdated technical data, personnel equipment certification requirements, and shortfall in skilled Alameda workers accepting transfers to the receiving depots; (6) officials noted that the Alameda workload transition was further complicated by the subsequent decision to close the San Antonio Air Logistics Center; (7) GAO's examination of readiness reports submitted before, during, and after the transition period for 114 Air Force and Navy units using the engines, shows that the transition problems encountered in moving the maintenance workloads to Jacksonville and San Antonio had minimal impact on equipment readiness; (8) of the 57 Navy units examined, only 2 reported lowered equipment readiness rates based on depot maintenance problems with the transferred engines; (9) according to Navy officials, extraordinary steps, including the removal of engines from nonoperational aircraft, were taken to minimize the impacts of transition problems on reported equipment readiness; (10) none of the 57 Air Force units GAO reviewed reported adverse readiness impacts from the transition of engine maintenance workloads; (11) maintenance workloads can be transitioned without impacting equipment readiness if the transition is properly planned and effectively implemented; (12) while detailed plans were prepared to move the workloads from Alameda to Jacksonville and San Antonio, problems arose during the transitions' implementation phase; and (13) Air Force and Navy officials offered several lessons learned to mitigate these problems in future workload transitions.