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entitled 'Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's International Radiological 
Threat Reduction Program Needs to Focus Future Efforts on Securing the 
Highest Priority Radiological Sources' which was released on March 13, 
2007. 

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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government 
Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

January 2007: 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: 

DOE's International Radiological Threat Reduction Program Needs to 
Focus Future Efforts on Securing the Highest Priority Radiological 
Sources: 

GAO-07-282: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-282, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on 
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the 
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, U.S. Senate 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. and 
international experts raised concerns that unsecured radiological 
sources, such as strontium-90 and cesium-137, were vulnerable to theft 
and could be used to make a dirty bomb. In response, DOE established 
the International Radiological Threat Reduction program to secure high-
risk sources in other countries. GAO was asked to (1) assess DOE’s 
progress in helping other countries secure their high-risk sources, (2) 
identify DOE’s current and planned program costs, and (3) describe 
coordination between DOE and U.S. and international agencies to secure 
sources in other countries. 

What GAO Found: 

Since 2002, the Department of Energy (DOE) has upgraded the security of 
hundreds of sites in other countries that contain radiological sources 
and has achieved noteworthy accomplishments, including removing 
radioactive material in Chechnya. However, DOE has made limited 
progress securing many of the most dangerous sources located in waste 
storage facilities and hundreds of sources across Russia contained in 
radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG). When DOE expanded the 
program from the former Soviet Union to a global effort, it also 
expanded the types of sites that required upgrades. As a result, as of 
September 2006, almost 70 percent of all sites secured were medical 
facilities, which generally contain one radiological source. 
Furthermore, DOE has not developed a long-term plan to ensure that 
security upgrades will be adequately sustained once installed. 

From its inception in 2002 through August 31, 2006, DOE spent 
approximately $108 million to improve the security of sources in other 
countries. However, funding for the program has steadily declined in 
recent years, and future funding is uncertain because the agency places 
a higher priority on securing special nuclear material such as 
plutonium and highly enriched uranium. 

DOE has improved coordination with the Department of State and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to secure sources in other 
countries. DOE, however, has not always integrated its efforts 
efficiently. For example, DOE did not transfer $5 million from its 
fiscal year 2004 appropriation to NRC for strengthening international 
regulatory controls over radiological sources, despite a Senate 
Appropriations Committee report directing DOE to do so. In addition, 
gaps in information sharing between DOE and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) have impeded DOE’s ability to target the most 
vulnerable sites in IAEA member states for security improvements. 

Figure: Recovered RTG Containing Large Amounts of Strontium-90: 

[See PDF for Image] 

Source: DOE. 

[End of Figure] 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is making several recommendations to DOE to better prioritize sites 
to be selected for security upgrades and strengthen program management 
practices, including developing a long-term sustainability plan to 
protect DOE’s investment in security upgrades. In addition, GAO is 
asking Congress to consider providing NRC with authority and a direct 
appropriation to conduct regulatory development activities to help 
improve other countries’ security over sources. DOE said that our 
recommendations were helpful and would further strengthen its program. 
NRC said it would work closely with relevant executive branch agencies 
and IAEA if Congress acts upon our matter for consideration. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-282]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 

[end of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Although DOE Has Improved the Security of Many Sites Worldwide, It Has 
Not Developed a Long-Term Plan to Sustain the Improvements, and Many 
Dangerous Radiological Sources Remain Unsecured: 

DOE Has Spent Approximately $108 Million to Secure Radiological Sources 
Worldwide, but Future Program Funding Is Uncertain because of an 
Increased Emphasis on Securing Special Nuclear Materials: 

Coordination with State and NRC Has Improved, but DOE Still Faces 
Coordination Problems Securing Radiological Sources Worldwide: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Matters for Congressional Consideration: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: DOE's IRTR Program Expenditures, Allocated by Region, as 
of August 31, 2006: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Energy: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

Tables: 

Table 1: DOE-Funded Physical Security Upgrades by Facility, as of 
September 30, 2006: 

Table 2: DOE and Other Countries' Removal of RTGs in Russia: 

Table 3: DOE's IRTR Program Expenditures by Fiscal Year, as of August 
31, 2006: 

Table 4: DOE's Budget by Fiscal Year, as of August 31, 2006: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Countries Receiving DOE-Funded Physical Security Upgrades: 

Figure 2: Location of RTGs Remaining in Russia: 

Figure 3: Replacement Solar-Powered Navigational Beacon Funded by DOE: 

Figure 4: Unsecured Transportation Vehicle Containing Radiological 
Sources: 

Figure 5: Storage Facility Containing RTGs and a Seed Irradiator with 
Holes in the Roof: 

Figure 6: Broken Security Cable at the Oncology Clinic: 

Figure 7: IRTR Program Regional Allocations: 

Figure 8: Storage Facility Containing Secured Radiological Sources and 
Unsecured Spent Fuel: 

Abbreviations: 

ANSTO: Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization: 

DOE: Department of Energy: 

EC: European Commission: 

EU: European Union: 

EWGPP: Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production Program: 

FSU: Former Soviet Union: 

GSSP: Global Search and Secure Program: 

GTRI: Global Threat Reduction Initiative: 

HEU: Highly Enriched Uranium: 

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency: 

IRSRA: Iraq Radiological Source Regulatory Authority: 

IRTR: International Radiological Threat Reduction Program: 

NDF: Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund: 

NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration: 

NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

PNNL: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory: 

RTG: Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator: 

SNRCU: State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

January 31, 2007: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka: 
Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the 
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. and 
international experts raised concerns that unsecured radiological 
sources were vulnerable to theft and posed a significant security 
threat to the United States and the international community. 
Radioactive material, such as cobalt-60, cesium-137, and strontium-90, 
is encapsulated or sealed in metal--such as stainless steel, titanium, 
or platinum--to prevent its dispersal and is commonly called a sealed 
radiological source. Sealed radiological sources are used worldwide for 
many legitimate purposes, such as medical, industrial, and agricultural 
applications. These applications include radiation treatment for cancer 
patients, food and blood irradiation, and oil drilling. However, the 
total number of these sources in use worldwide is unknown because many 
countries do not systematically account for them. It is estimated that 
thousands of these sources have been lost, stolen, or abandoned-- 
commonly referred to as orphan sources. If certain types of these 
sources were obtained by terrorists, they could be used to produce a 
simple and crude, but potentially dangerous, weapon--known as a 
radiological dispersion device, or dirty bomb. 

The amount of radiation emitted by these sources varies based on the 
size and type of the source. For example, teletherapy machines, which 
are used to treat cancer patients and are found in hospitals and 
oncology clinics, contain a single cobalt-60 source ranging from about 
1,000 to 10,000 curies.[Footnote 1] DOE officials have estimated that 
there are approximately 2,000 teletherapy sources located primarily in 
developing nations around the world. Additionally, strontium-90 sources 
contained in large devices known as radioisotope thermoelectric 
generators (RTG), designed to provide electric power to navigational 
facilities such as lighthouses and weather stations, contain between 
25,000 and 250,000 curies. U.S. and Russian officials have estimated 
that there were more than 1,050 RTGs produced and distributed 
throughout the former Soviet Union. These devices present a 
particularly high security risk because of their high levels of 
radioactivity and inadequate protection. The Department of Energy (DOE) 
has reported that the RTGs likely represent the largest unsecured 
quantity of radioactivity in the world. Waste storage facilities also 
pose a considerable threat if left unsecured because any one of these 
facilities can store, at any given time, up to 3 million curies of 
material. 

In 2001, a congressional report directed DOE to use a portion of its 
fiscal year 2002 supplemental appropriation to address the threat posed 
by dirty bombs.[Footnote 2] In response to the congressional 
requirement, the National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA)[Footnote 3] established the Radiological Threat Reduction Task 
Force to identify, recover, and secure vulnerable, high-risk 
radiological sources, budgeting $20.6 million for the program in fiscal 
year 2002. The program initially focused on securing sources in the 
countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) because DOE officials 
determined this region had the greatest number of vulnerable sources. 
In 2003, at the direction of the Secretary of Energy, DOE expanded the 
scope of the program to secure sealed sources worldwide, ultimately 
establishing the International Radiological Threat Reduction (IRTR) 
Program. The program's primary objective is to protect U.S. national 
security interests by (1) implementing rapid physical security upgrades 
at vulnerable sites containing radioactive sources; (2) locating, 
recovering, and consolidating lost or abandoned high-risk radioactive 
sources; and (3) supporting the development of the infrastructure 
necessary to sustain security enhancements and supporting regulatory 
controls, including the development of regional partnerships to 
leverage international resources. In addition, DOE has established a 
program to recover sealed sources produced and distributed in the 
United States, known as the U.S. Radiological Threat Reduction 
program.[Footnote 4] Part of this program's mission is to recover U.S.- 
origin sources on a case-by-case basis that were supplied by DOE to 
other countries under the Atoms for Peace program.[Footnote 5] 

The IRTR program is administered by NNSA with support from multiple 
national laboratories, including Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 
(PNNL), Sandia National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory, Remote Sensing Laboratory, Brookhaven 
National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Los 
Alamos National Laboratory.[Footnote 6] The national laboratories' 
responsibilities include (1) assessing the physical security 
requirements of countries participating in the program, (2) 
recommending specific upgrades to strengthen radiological source 
security, and (3) ensuring that recommended upgrades are properly 
installed. 

IRTR is one of eight programs within DOE's Global Threat Reduction 
Initiative (GTRI). These programs are responsible for identifying, 
securing, and removing and/or facilitating the disposition of high- 
risk, vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials and equipment 
around the world that pose a potential threat to the United States and 
the international community.[Footnote 7] In September 2006, DOE 
reorganized GTRI to consolidate its nuclear and radiological threat 
reduction programs. As a result, the IRTR program was integrated into a 
newly combined nuclear and radiological threat reduction effort that 
focuses on three major geographic areas--North and South America, 
Europe and Africa, and Asia and countries of the former Soviet 
Union.[Footnote 8] As part of this restructuring, DOE issued new 
program guidance assigning priority rankings to the types of sites and 
radiological sources that will be secured in the future. 

The Department of State (State) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) also fund efforts to secure radiological sources in other 
countries, though on a much smaller scale than DOE. State provides 
overall policy direction for U.S. government international radiological 
source security efforts and has broadened international support for the 
International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Code of Conduct, as well as 
guidance on the import and export of radiological sources.[Footnote 9] 
State also provides IAEA with funds to, among other things, conduct 
training, workshops, and advisory missions to improve member states' 
security practices and procedures. NRC has advised and provided 
guidance on the development of programs in Armenia, Georgia, and 
Kazakhstan to improve nuclear regulatory controls over radiological 
sources, including establishing radiological source inventories and 
promoting the development of laws, rules, and regulations governing 
controls over this material. 

In addition to IAEA, the European Commission (EC) also provides 
assistance to countries--primarily those that are candidates or 
potential candidates for joining the European Union (EU)--to improve 
the security of sites containing radiological sources.[Footnote 10] EC 
activities in this area are a component of its efforts to combat 
nuclear terrorism. 

In 2003, we issued a report at your request focusing on U.S. and 
international efforts to secure sealed radiological sources.[Footnote 
11] We recommended, among other things, that the Secretary of Energy 
take the lead in developing a comprehensive plan to strengthen controls 
over other countries' sealed sources. This report (1) assesses the 
progress DOE has made in implementing its program to help other 
countries secure their sealed radiological sources, (2) identifies 
DOE's current and planned program costs, and (3) describes DOE's 
coordination with other U.S. agencies and international organizations 
to secure radiological sources in other countries. To address these 
objectives, we analyzed documentation on the IRTR program from DOE and 
its national laboratories and conducted interviews with key program 
officials. We also visited four countries that are major recipients of 
DOE assistance to improve radiological source security--Georgia, 
Lithuania, Poland, and Russia--to observe how equipment and training 
were being utilized and to discuss the implementation of the program 
with foreign officials. In addition, we analyzed cost and budgetary 
information, conducted a data reliability assessment of the data we 
received, and interviewed knowledgeable program officials on the 
reliability of the data. We determined that these data were 
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. More details 
about the scope and methodology can be found in appendix I. We 
conducted our review from November 2005 to December 2006 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief: 

DOE has improved the security of hundreds of sites that contain 
radiological sources in more than 40 countries since the program's 
inception in 2002. These achievements include the removal of cesium and 
cobalt sources from a waste storage facility in Chechnya and providing 
security upgrades to vulnerable sites in Greece prior to the 2004 
Olympics. However, many of the highest-risk and most dangerous sources 
still remain unsecured, particularly in Russia. Specifically, 16 of 20 
waste storage sites across Russia and Ukraine remain unsecured while 
more than 700 RTGs remain operational or abandoned in Russia and are 
vulnerable to theft or potential misuse. In 2003, when DOE decided to 
broaden the program's scope beyond the former Soviet Union, it also 
expanded the types of sites that required security upgrades. As a 
result, as of September 2006, almost 70 percent of all sites secured 
were medical facilities, which generally contain one radiological 
source. Several DOE and national laboratory officials with whom we 
spoke questioned the benefit of upgrading such a large number of 
medical facilities, while higher priority sites--such as waste storage 
facilities and RTGs--remained unsecured. In addition, DOE's program 
does not address the transportation of radiological sources from one 
location to another, a security measure that DOE and international 
officials have identified as the most vulnerable link in the 
radiological supply chain. DOE has experienced numerous problems and 
challenges implementing its program to secure radiological sources 
worldwide, including a lack of cooperation from some countries and 
access to sites with dangerous material. Furthermore, some high-risk 
countries have not given DOE permission to undertake security upgrades 
at all. Finally, DOE has not developed a plan to ensure that countries 
receiving security upgrades will be able to sustain them over the long 
term. This is particularly problematic, given the number of problems we 
identified during our site visits with the maintenance of security 
equipment and storage facilities funded by DOE. For example in Georgia 
we found that a facility containing RTGs and a seed irradiator--which 
has thousands of curies of cesium-137--had several large openings in 
the roof. In Lithuania, we visited an oncology clinic and observed that 
the security cable, which is used to secure a teletherapy machine's 
cobalt-60 source, had been broken for almost a month. A DOE physical 
security specialist told us that the cable was the most important 
security feature installed by DOE because it triggered an alarm that 
was connected to the source. 

From its inception in 2002 through August 31, 2006, DOE spent 
approximately $108 million to implement its program to secure 
radiological sources worldwide. A majority of the funds spent--$68 
million--was to (1) conduct vulnerability assessments at a variety of 
sites containing radiological sources; (2) install physical security 
upgrades at these sites, such as hardened windows and doors, motion 
sensors and surveillance cameras; and (3) help countries draft laws and 
regulations to increase security and accounting of sources. In 
addition, DOE provided $13.5 million to IAEA to support activities to 
strengthen controls over radiological sources in IAEA member states. 
The remainder, or $26.5 million, paid for program planning activities 
such as developing program guidance documents, hiring private 
consultants, and conducting studies. Russia received almost one-third 
of total DOE funding, which focused primarily on orphan source 
recovery, RTG removal and disposal, and physical security upgrades at 
waste storage facilities. DOE officials told us that securing 
radiological sources in other countries is a lower priority than 
securing more dangerous nuclear materials, such as plutonium and highly 
enriched uranium. As a result, recent budget allotments for 
radiological security activities were reduced, and future funding for 
the program is uncertain. DOE program officials are concerned that DOE 
may be unable to meet outstanding contractual commitments in the 
countries where it has installed more than $40 million in security 
upgrades. To offset anticipated shortfalls in funding, DOE plans to 
obtain international contributions from other countries but efforts to 
date have produced limited results. 

DOE has improved coordination with State and NRC to secure radiological 
sources worldwide. Since we reported on this matter in 2003, DOE has 
involved State and NRC in its international radiological threat 
reduction activities more often and has increased information-sharing 
with the agencies. Additionally, DOE and NRC supported a State-led 
interagency effort to establish the Iraq Radioactive Source Regulatory 
Authority and develop a radiological regulatory infrastructure in Iraq. 
However, DOE has not always integrated its nuclear regulatory 
development efforts efficiently. For example, DOE and NRC disagreed 
about whether, as directed by the Senate Appropriations Committee, DOE 
should have transferred $5 million from its fiscal year 2004 
appropriation to NRC for the purpose of strengthening international 
regulatory controls over radiological sources. Ultimately, the funds 
were not transferred, causing friction between the agencies. In 
addition, DOE has not adequately coordinated the activities of multiple 
programs within the agency responsible for securing radiological and 
nuclear materials in other countries. For example, in Poland we found 
that radiological sources were secured at a storage facility by DOE's 
radiological program while spent nuclear fuel--located next to the 
sources in the same storage facility--had not been secured by DOE's 
nuclear security upgrades program. Polish officials told us they could 
not understand why the separate DOE programs had not coordinated their 
efforts to ensure that all of the material was secured at the same 
time. DOE has generally improved coordination with IAEA to strengthen 
controls over other countries' radiological sources and has developed 
bilateral and multilateral partnerships with IAEA member states to 
improve their regulatory infrastructures. However, significant gaps in 
information-sharing between DOE and IAEA, and with the EC, have impeded 
DOE's ability to target the most vulnerable sites for security 
improvements and to avoid possible duplication of efforts. 

To help ensure that DOE's program focuses on securing the highest 
priority radiological sources, we are recommending that the Secretary 
of Energy and the Administrator of the NNSA, among other things, (1) 
limit the number of hospitals and clinics containing radiological 
sources that receive security upgrades to only those deemed the highest 
risk; (2) accelerate efforts to remove as many RTGs in Russia as 
practicable; and (3) develop a long-term sustainability plan for 
security upgrades that includes, among other things, future resources 
required to implement such a plan. 

Furthermore, if the Congress believes that regulatory infrastructure 
development is the key to the long-term sustainability of radiological 
source security efforts, it should consider providing NRC with 
authority and a direct appropriation to conduct these activities. The 
appropriation would be provided to NRC in lieu of providing the funds 
to DOE or another agency to reimburse NRC for their activities. 

Background: 

The small size, portability and potential value of sealed radiological 
sources make them vulnerable to misuse, improper disposal and theft. 
According to IAEA, the confirmed reports of illicit trafficking in 
radiological materials have increased since 2002. For example, in 2004, 
about 60 percent of the cases involved radiological materials, some of 
which are considered by U.S. government and IAEA as attractive for the 
development of a dirty bomb. Although experts generally believe that a 
dirty bomb could result in a limited number of deaths, it could, 
however, have severe economic consequences. Depending on the type, 
amount, and form, the dispersed radiological material could cause 
radiation sickness for people nearby and produce serious economic, 
psychological and social disruption associated with the evacuation and 
subsequent cleanup of the contaminated area. Although no dirty bombs 
have been detonated, in the mid-1990s, Chechen separatists placed a 
canister containing cesium-137 in a Moscow park. While the device was 
not detonated and no radiological material was dispersed, the incident 
demonstrated that terrorists have the capability and willingness to use 
radiological sources as weapons of terror. 

A 2004 study by the National Defense University noted that the economic 
impact on a major populated area from a successful dirty bomb attack is 
likely to equal, and perhaps exceed, that of the September 11, 2001, 
attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. According to another 
study, the economic consequences of detonating a series of dirty bombs 
at U.S. ports, for example, would result in an estimated $58 billion in 
losses to the U.S. economy. The potential impacts of a dirty bomb 
attack could also produce significant health consequences. In 2002, the 
Federation of American Scientists concluded that an americium 
radiological source combined with one pound of explosives would result 
in medical supervision and monitoring required for the entire 
population of an area 10 times larger than the initial blast. 

The consequences resulting from the improper use of radiological 
sources are not theoretical. Some actual incidents involving sources 
can provide a measure of understanding of what could happen in case of 
a dirty bomb attack. In 1987, an accident involving a teletherapy 
machine containing about 1,400 curies of cesium-137, which is generally 
in the form of a powder similar to talc and highly dispersible, killed 
four people in Brazil and injured many more. The accident and its 
aftermath caused about $36 million in damages to the region (Goiania) 
where the accident occurred, according to an official from Brazil's 
Nuclear Energy Commission. In addition to the deaths and economic 
impact, the accident created environmental and medical problems. For 
example, 85 houses were significantly contaminated and 41 of these had 
to be evacuated. The decontamination process required the demolition of 
homes and other buildings and generated 3,500 cubic meters of 
radioactive waste. Over 8,000 persons requested monitoring for 
contamination in order to obtain certificates stating they were not 
contaminated. 

Although DOE Has Improved the Security of Many Sites Worldwide, It Has 
Not Developed a Long-Term Plan to Sustain the Improvements, and Many 
Dangerous Radiological Sources Remain Unsecured: 

DOE has improved the security of hundreds of sites that contain 
radiological sources in more than 40 countries since the program's 
inception in 2002. However, despite these achievements, such as 
removing dangerous sources from a waste storage facility in Chechnya, 
many of the high-risk and most dangerous sources remain unsecured, 
particularly in Russia. DOE officials told us that the program has 
barely "scratched the surface" in terms of securing the most dangerous 
sources in the former Soviet Union. Specifically, removing dangerous 
sources from 16 of 20 waste storage facilities across Russia and 
Ukraine remain unsecured while more than 700 RTGs remain operational or 
abandoned in Russia and are vulnerable to theft or potential misuse. In 
2003, when DOE decided to broaden the program's scope beyond the former 
Soviet Union, it also expanded the types of sites that required 
security upgrades. As a result, as of September 2006, almost 70 percent 
of all sites secured were medical facilities, which generally contain 
one radiological source. In addition, DOE's program does not address 
the transportation of radiological sources from one location to 
another, a security measure that DOE and international officials have 
identified as the most vulnerable link in the radiological supply 
chain. DOE has experienced numerous problems and challenges 
implementing its program to secure radiological sources worldwide, 
including a lack of cooperation from host country officials. Finally, 
DOE has not developed an adequate plan to ensure that countries 
receiving security upgrades will be able to sustain them once 
installed. 

DOE Has Secured over 300 Sites Worldwide, but Many High-Priority 
Radiological Sources Remain Unsecured: 

Since DOE began its program in 2002, it has taken steps to secure 
radiological sources in more than 40 countries and has achieved some 
noteworthy accomplishments. For example, DOE told us that it has (1) 
facilitated the removal of 5,500 curies of cobalt-60 and cesium-137 
sources from a poorly protected nuclear waste repository in Chechnya, 
the location of continuing political unrest in southeastern Russia; (2) 
constructed storage facilities in Uzbekistan, Moldova, Tajikistan and 
Georgia so that sources can be consolidated at one site to strengthen 
their long-term protection; and (3) increased security at 21 sites in 
Greece prior to the 2004 Olympics, including providing 110 hand-held 
radiation detection devices for first responders.[Footnote 12] DOE 
secured, among other things, facilities with blood irradiators 
containing cesium chloride and a large industrial sterilization 
facility. 

According to DOE, it has neither the resources nor staff to 
comprehensively address and secure the tens of thousands of vulnerable 
radiological sources worldwide on its own. As a result, it has enlisted 
the support of regional partners and IAEA to implement programs to help 
other countries find, characterize and secure their most dangerous 
sources. DOE works with partner countries to identify sites where high- 
risk sources may be located and provides the equipment and training to 
conduct searches. Once the sources have been located, DOE enlists the 
support of IAEA or partner countries to transfer them to a secure 
facility. For example, DOE established a regional partnership with 
Lithuania to facilitate orphan source recovery efforts both in 
Lithuania and in neighboring countries. DOE purchased radiation 
detection equipment and trained Lithuanian specialists to initiate 
orphan source recovery efforts. Lithuania was able to identify 41 
former Soviet military and industrial sites that potentially held high- 
risk radiological sources. Subsequently, Lithuania assisted DOE in 
initiating search and secure efforts in Estonia and Latvia, which 
resulted in the discovery and disposition of orphan sources. 

Despite these achievements, DOE's program has not adequately addressed 
many high-priority sources. In 2003, the Secretary of Energy directed 
NNSA to expand its program to secure radiological sources worldwide, 
which increased both the number of countries targeted to receive DOE 
assistance and the types of sites to be secured. Expanding the program 
into many countries outside of the former Soviet Union--the initial 
focus and attention of DOE's program--resulted in the addition of many 
medical facilities that contained lower priority sources that were now 
being targeted for physical security upgrades. 

A Majority of Sites Secured by DOE Are Hospitals and Oncology Clinics: 

As of September 30, 2006, DOE's program had completed the installation 
of physical security upgrades at 368 sites in over 40 countries. 
However, a majority of sites secured do not represent the highest-risk 
or the most vulnerable sources. Of the total sites completed, 256--or 
about 70 percent--were hospitals and oncology clinics operating 
teletherapy machines used to provide radiation treatment to cancer 
patients. These machines generally contain a single cobalt-60 
radiological source ranging from about 1,000 to 10,000 curies. In 38 of 
the 41 countries--or 93 percent--DOE had upgraded at least one hospital 
or oncology clinic. According to DOE, many of the countries that are 
included in its global program have medical facilities with 
radiological sources. As a result, these facilities were targeted for 
upgrades. In addition to the medical facilities, DOE has completed 
security upgrades at 47 research institutes, 35 commercial and 
industrial sites, and 30 waste storage facilities. Figure 1 depicts the 
countries receiving security upgrades, and table 1 provides a breakdown 
of the total number and types of facilities upgraded by DOE, as of 
September 30, 2006. 

Figure 1: Countries Receiving DOE-Funded Physical Security Upgrades: 

[See PDF for Image] 

Source: GAO analysis of DOE data and Map Resources (map). 

[End of figure] 

Table 1: DOE-Funded Physical Security Upgrades by Facility, as of 
September 30, 2006: 

Site type: Medical; 
Number of sites completed by DOE: 256; 
Percent of total number of sites completed by DOE: 70%; 
Number of countries where this type of site has been completed[A]: 38. 

Site type: Research institutes; 
Number of sites completed by DOE: 47; 
Percent of total number of sites completed by DOE: 13; 
Number of countries where this type of site has been completed[A]: 19. 

Site type: Commercial/Industrial; 
Number of sites completed by DOE: 35; 
Percent of total number of sites completed by DOE: 10; 
Number of countries where this type of site has been completed[A]: 17. 

Site type: Waste storage facilities(Radons)[B]; 
Number of sites completed by DOE: 30; 
Percent of total number of sites completed by DOE: 8; 
Number of countries where this type of site has been completed[A]: 22. 

Site type: Total; 
Number of sites completed by DOE: 368; 
Percent of total number of sites completed by DOE: 100%[C]; 
Number of countries where this type of site has been completed[A]: 41. 

Source: GAO analysis based on DOE data. 

Note: According to DOE, there are about 2,249 sites worldwide that 
would be likely candidates for physical security upgrades. As of 
September 2006, DOE had completed upgrades at about 16 percent of these 
sites. 

[A] Many of the countries received physical security upgrades for more 
than one type of facility. 

[B] Waste storage facilities are specifically identified as Radons in 
the FSU. 

[C] Percentage does not add up to 100 due to rounding. 

[End of table] 

Six national laboratory officials and security specialists responsible 
for implementing the program told us that although progress had been 
made in securing radiological sources, DOE had focused too much 
attention on securing medical facilities at the expense of other higher-
priority sites, such as waste storage facilities and RTGs. In their 
view, DOE installed security upgrades at so many of these facilities 
primarily because the upgrades are relatively modest in scope and cost. 
For example, a typical suite of security upgrades at a medical facility 
costs between $10,000 to $20,000, depending on the size of the site, 
whereas the average cost to remove and replace an RTG in the Far East 
region of Russia is about $72,000 based on 2006 dollars. 

Officials from three of the four recipient countries we visited also 
raised concerns about DOE's focus on securing radiological sources at 
so many medical facilities. For example, staff responsible for 
operating the teletherapy machines in hospitals in Lithuania and Poland 
told us that the cobalt-60 sources contained in the teletherapy machine 
did not pose a significant security risk. In their view, it was highly 
unlikely that the sources could be easily removed from these machines 
and that it would take more than one highly skilled and determined 
intruder to remove the source and transport it out of the facility 
without being detected or dangerously exposed to radiation.[Footnote 
13] In fact, while emphasizing the importance of securing medical 
facilities, DOE officials stated that getting medical and security 
staff to buy into the need for improved security has been a consistent 
challenge for the program. Further, Russian officials told us that 
radiological sources in hospitals did not pose a comparable risk to 
RTGs or lost or abandoned sources. DOE has not offered to fund any 
security upgrades of Russian medical facilities since its funds are 
focused on securing RTGs, Radons, and orphan sources. 

According to five national laboratory officials and security 
specialists, completing upgrades at medical facilities also served to 
demonstrate rapid program progress because the upgrades are completed 
relatively quickly. DOE has relied upon an indicator that focuses on 
the number of sites that have been upgraded, or "sites secured." While 
sites completed is the primary metric used by DOE, the program does 
compile and track several additional activities, including the amount 
of curies secured, countries that receive regulatory assistance, and 
orphan sources recovered. 

In measuring program performance, the Director of IRTR said that the 
number of sites completed demonstrated conclusively that work has been 
completed and represents the best available measurement. In discussions 
with other high-level DOE officials about the program, they 
consistently identified the number of sites upgraded as evidence that 
the program had been achieving results and reducing the threat posed by 
radiological sources overseas. However, PNNL and Sandia National 
Laboratory officials told us that the measurement used by DOE does not 
demonstrate how the program is reducing threats posed to U.S. national 
security interests. In their view, this measurement is one-dimensional 
and does not adequately distinguish lower-priority sites from higher- 
priority sites. 

Hundreds of RTGs Remain Unsecured in Russia: 

DOE has made limited progress removing hundreds of RTGs containing high-
priority sources which, according to DOE, likely represent the largest 
unsecured quantity of radioactivity in the world. These devices were 
designed to provide electric power and are suited for remote locations 
to power navigational facilities such as lighthouses and meteorological 
stations. Each has activity levels ranging from 25,000 to 250,000 
curies of strontium-90--similar to the amount of strontium- 90 released 
from the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident in 1986. As of September 
30, 2006, DOE had funded the removal of about 13 percent of all RTGs 
located in Russia's inventory. Until early 2000, approximately 1,049 
RTGs were in Russia. Of those, approximately 317 RTGs have been removed 
over the past several years, according to DOE and Russian officials. 
DOE funded about 40 percent of those removed (132 RTGs) and Norway, 
France, and Russia funded the removal of the remaining 185.[Footnote 
14] However, an estimated 732 RTGs, representing several million curies 
of radioactivity, remain unsecured. 

A majority of RTGs are located along coastlines in three major regions-
-the Baltic, Artic and Far East. To date, DOE has focused the majority 
of its efforts on removing RTGs along the Arctic coast. However, more 
than 90 RTGs remain operational along the Baltic coast under control of 
the Russian Ministry of Defense, which DOE does not plan to remove. DOE 
officials said that the program will now focus its efforts almost 
exclusively in the Far East because DOE expects other countries to 
remove RTGs from the Baltic region. Figure 2 shows the location of the 
remaining RTGs in Russia, and table 2 summarizes DOE's efforts, along 
with other countries, to remove RTGs in Russia. 

Figure 2: Location of RTGs Remaining in Russia: 

[See PDF for Image] 

Sources: GAO analysis of DOE data and Map Resources (map). 

[End of figure] 

Table 2: DOE and Other Countries' Removal of RTGs in Russia: 

Region: Total estimated RTG inventory in Russia; 
Baltic: 96; 
Far East: 233; 
Arctic: 720; 
Total[A]: 1049[B]. 

Region: DOE removal in fiscal year 2004; 
Baltic: 0; 
Far East: 0; 
Arctic: 63; 
Total[A]: 63. 

Region: DOE removal in fiscal year 2005; 
Baltic: 3; 
Far East: 25; 
Arctic: 24; 
Total[A]: 52. 

Region: DOE removal in fiscal year 2006; 
Baltic: 0; 
Far East: 0; 
Arctic: 17; 
Total[A]: 17. 

Region: Total DOE removals to date; 
Baltic: 3; 
Far East: 25; 
Arctic: 104; 
Total[A]: 132[C]. 

Region: Estimated DOE-partner countries removal; 
Baltic: [D]; 
Far East: [D]; 
Arctic: 185[D]; 
Total[A]: 185[D]. 

Region: Estimated remaining RTGs in Russia; 
Baltic: 93; 
Far East: 208; 
Arctic: 431; 
Total[A]: 732[D]. 

Source: GAO analysis based on DOE data. 

Note: For the purpose of our analysis, we are combining the Northern 
Sea route and White Sea route and labeling them the Arctic region. 

[A] Because Russia has not comprehensively tracked the existing number 
of RTGs, DOE and Russian figures for the total number of RTGs differ, 
as do the number of RTGs recovered. Russian officials have cited 
varying figures regarding the total number of RTGs that exist in 
Russia. Russia has documented that at least 670 RTGs exist throughout 
the Russian Federation territory. However, other Russian sources 
estimated that the number of RTGs in Russia ranges from 605 to 700. 

[B] The total does not include the 16 RTGs removed in other former 
Soviet Union countries (13 in the Ukraine and 3 in Georgia). 

[C] DOE is now engaged in the removal of an additional 27 RTGs in the 
Far East. 

[D] An additional 185 RTGs were removed by DOE partner countries, 
including Russia, Norway, and France. However, the exact breakdown by 
region for these RTG removals was not known by DOE. DOE assumed that 
these 185 RTGs were removed from the Arctic region. 

[End of table] 

DOE officials told us that the Far East region is now a priority for 
RTG removal because Russian Ministry of Defense officials have 
specifically requested DOE's assistance for the Far East and provided 
DOE with a prioritized list of RTGs to be removed. In addition, other 
countries have expressed a willingness to support future RTG removal in 
the Baltic region. For example, according to DOE, in February 2005 
Denmark announced that it had reached an agreement with Russia to 
replace and remove all RTGs in the Baltic region. Other European 
nations, including Germany, have also offered assistance. However, 
Russian officials told us that assistance from Germany has not 
materialized and that Denmark had rescinded its offer to provide 
assistance. Moreover, these officials expressed concern regarding DOE's 
decision to fund the removal of RTGs exclusively from the Far East 
region. In their view, the RTGs in the Baltic are more vulnerable and 
should be removed as soon as possible because of their accessibility 
and proximity to large population centers. According to DOE officials, 
if international funding for removal of these vulnerable RTGs does not 
materialize, IRTR will likely have to fund the Baltic effort. 

According to DOE and Russian officials, RTG removal is complex and 
future efforts will face a number of challenges. No comprehensive 
inventory of RTGs exists and, as a result, the actual number of these 
devices is unknown. RTGs were originally manufactured in Estonia, but 
the company dissolved with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and all 
the records were lost. The Russian organization that originally 
designed them is currently developing a database of known RTGs in 
Russia--with U.S. funding and support--to reconstruct records and 
develop a reliable accounting of the total number of devices produced. 
However, this effort has been ongoing for years and remains incomplete. 
Officials from the Russian organization told us that they lack 
confidence that the precise number and location of RTGs, both in Russia 
and other countries of the former Soviet Union, will ever be known. 

RTGs contain sources with high levels of radioactivity, and their 
removal requires specialized containers for their transport and 
adequate storage capacity to securely house them once removed. Russian 
officials reported that RTG removal had been slowed due to a lack of 
both. To address the need for containers and space, DOE has enlisted 
Canada's support to provide funds to Russia for constructing an 
additional 17 containers for transporting RTGs, bringing the total to 
36. However, this effort is not scheduled to be completed until early 
to mid-2007.[Footnote 15] DOE is also supporting the construction of 
storage facilities at two locations in the Russian Far East, 
Vladivostok and Kamchatka. When completed, the Vladivostok facility is 
expected to house 150 to 200 RTGs. Moreover, a smaller storage building 
is under construction at Kamchatka, which will store RTGs until they 
can be shipped to Vladivostok for permanent storage. According to DOE, 
the Vladivostok facility houses 25 RTGs that were recovered from the 
Russian Far East. By the end of 2006, Vladivostok is scheduled to house 
33 additional recovered RTGs. 

Finally, Russian officials told us that future RTG removal efforts will 
depend on finding a viable, alternative energy source to replace power 
supplied by radiological sources contained in RTGs. DOE has initiated a 
project to provide alternative power sources, including wind and solar- 
powered energy panels to accelerate RTG removal. However these 
replacements are not always viable. For example, navigational 
lighthouses located in northern Russia experience severe weather and 
limited daylight 4 to 5 months per year and cannot rely on solar power 
during the winter months. Russian Ministry of Defense officials have 
stated that the navigational devices are critical and that they will 
not approve removal of any additional RTGs without a viable energy 
source to replace them. Figure 3 shows a navigational beacon with a 
solar-powered replacement energy source funded by DOE that we observed 
during our fieldwork. 

Figure 3: Replacement Solar-Powered Navigational Beacon Funded by DOE: 

[See PDF for Image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

DOE also noted that RTG removal and replacement has been slowed by 
challenges in project negotiation with Russian officials. For example, 
costs of RTG removal and transport have consistently risen as a result 
of increased Russian price demands and the failure of the Russian 
government to contribute funds to the effort. DOE has also experienced 
long delays while waiting for the Russian Ministry of Defense to 
approve the release of information regarding certain RTGs. Inadequate 
funding to support RTG removal has extended the deadline for completion 
from 2014 to 2021. 

As an interim measure to help reduce the risk posed by RTGs that have 
not yet been removed, DOE has equipped a select number of RTGs with 
alarm systems that are remotely monitored via satellite as part of a 
pilot project. Specifically the alarm consists of sensors that monitor, 
among other things, vibrations of the device and the source's movement. 
Because the source is inside the RTG, the alarms on both the device and 
its source emit regular, electronic signals to a regional base station. 
If the signals are interrupted, then the alarm is triggered. As of 
September 2006, DOE had funded the installation of these security 
systems for 24 RTGs in the Baltic region and 20 RTGs in the Far East 
region. According to DOE, the cost of the alarm system is about $5,000, 
and about $8,000 to establish the regional base station. DOE officials 
said they will continue to install security upgrades to RTGs as an 
interim measure, as long as the costs remain at those levels. 

Waste Storage Facilities Need to Be Secured in Russia and Ukraine: 

In addition to RTGs, DOE also has made limited progress securing 
radiological sources stored at waste storage facilities in Russia and 
Ukraine. DOE has determined that the storage facilities in Russia and 
Ukraine are the most vulnerable in the world and pose a significant 
risk, due to the very large quantities of radioactive sources currently 
housed at each site. According to DOE, waste storage facilities can 
store up to 3 million curies of radioactive waste. However, upgrades at 
a majority of these facilities throughout the former Soviet Union, 
particularly in Russia and Ukraine, remain incomplete. To date, 
upgrades at 4 of 15 Radons in Russia have been completed since DOE 
began work in 2002. According to DOE, upgrades are under way at seven 
additional Radons. However, work has been delayed at several of these 
facilities. According to DOE, delays in upgrades to Radons were due in 
large part to delays in the Russian certification process of physical 
equipment for upgrades at these types of facilities. In addition, 
reorganization and managerial changes at the primary Russian agency 
with oversight authority over construction at Radon facilities 
presented challenges for DOE officials trying to gain access to Radons 
for physical security assessments. Furthermore, DOE officials noted 
that progress has been slowed because several Radon managers were 
unwilling to participate in the program until they received assurances 
from DOE that their Radon would receive a level of funding comparable 
to larger Radons. 

DOE has not completed upgrades at any of Ukraine's five Radon sites, 
one of which contains all 13 RTGs recovered in Ukraine. According to 
DOE officials, initiating work at the Radons has been problematic 
because Ukrainian officials have designated some sites as "sensitive" 
and thus denied DOE access to them. As a result, security upgrades have 
been delayed for at least 2 years. In May 2005, Ukraine agreed to 
provide DOE access to two of the five sites, and security upgrades at 
those facilities are under way. DOE plans to complete the remaining 
three Radons by 2010 but have found that Ukraine is impeding access to 
these additional sites. 

In addition, DOE has identified 49 vulnerable waste storage facilities 
worldwide for assistance and has completed work at 26 of these sites in 
several countries, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Lithuania. DOE is also undertaking 
upgrades at 23 additional sites. However, DOE has not addressed sites 
in the following countries: Albania, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Libya, Peru, Serbia, 
and South Africa. It was unclear, based on our discussions with DOE 
officials, when, if ever, security upgrades would be completed in these 
countries. 

Transportation of High-Risk Sources Is a Critical Gap in DOE's Program: 

Although IAEA officials told us that transportation of high-risk 
radiological sources is the most vulnerable part of the nuclear and 
radiological supply chain, DOE determined that source transport is 
generally outside the scope of the program. Some DOE officials have 
expressed concern about the lack of security during the transport of 
radiological sources and questioned whether transportation should be a 
component of DOE's program. For example, a May 2005 DOE analysis 
concluded that DOE was addressing transportation security on an ad-hoc 
basis, and the existing method of providing transportation security had 
serious limitations. The analysis also noted that DOE's current 
approach is resource limited and lacked a commitment to integrate 
transport security into all countries participating in the program. 
According to DOE's 2003 program guidelines, DOE will fund 
transportation security upgrades only in Russia and Uzbekistan because 
the United States had international agreements with these countries to 
provide liability coverage when transporting radiological sources. As a 
result, DOE security specialists were not pursuing transportation 
security-related projects with the majority of countries participating 
in the program. However, DOE noted that its national laboratories were 
working with the U.S. Department of Transportation, IAEA, and key IAEA 
donor states to strengthen transportation security regulations and 
procedures to reduce the risks of theft or diversion of nuclear and 
other radioactive materials in transit. 

In every country we visited, host country officials identified the 
transportation of sources as a critical vulnerability and a priority 
for security upgrades. Moscow Radon officials told us that 
transportation security had emerged as one of their top priorities. DOE 
has, in fact, provided a fleet of transport vehicles for the Moscow 
Radon, including guard vehicles, escort vehicles, and cargo trucks for 
transporting both liquid and solid waste. However, Radon officials told 
us that they also needed a reliable communication system to ensure the 
security of sources in transit. Consequently, the Moscow Radon funded a 
satellite-linked cell phone to facilitate communication and to monitor 
vehicles that transport radiological sources. However, at another Radon 
site we visited in Russia, a similar communications system did not 
exist. Moreover, officials from this site told us that their fleet of 
transportation vehicles was about 30 years old and needed to be 
replaced. These officials stated that they requested funds from DOE for 
the vehicle replacement but were told that no funds were available. 

Another aspect of transportation security concerns equipment containing 
small, easily transportable sources--typically weighing less than 25 
pounds with an average radioactivity level of several curies. DOE 
estimates that about 10,000 of these smaller sources exist in several 
different countries. Specifically these sources, such as americium and 
beryllium, are used in the oil and gas industry for exploration 
purposes. According to DOE, these sources routinely move from one base 
camp to another with limited security, making them vulnerable to theft 
and potential misuse. We saw first-hand how vulnerable these sources 
were during our visit to one industrial facility where we observed a 
truck used to transport a cesium-137 source to a remote gas exploration 
site. Host country officials showed us how easy it would be to remove 
the sources from the truck as they were being secured with a simple 
lock. In addition, country officials told us that although some trucks 
are equipped with mobile phones, many areas along transportation routes 
are remote, and the phones often have no signal. Figure 4 shows an 
unsecured truck used to transport radiological sources. 

Figure 4: Unsecured Transportation Vehicle Containing Radiological 
Sources: 

[see PDF for Image] 

Source GAO. 

Truck compartment that holds sealed sources during transport. 

[End of figure] 

DOE has taken some steps to address this problem, but agency officials 
said that securing mobile sources is too costly and should be the 
responsibility of private industry. In this regard, DOE initiated 
efforts with U.S. industry partners to identify better ways to secure 
sources that have industrial applications and are frequently in 
transit. In February 2006, DOE attended a forum with NRC and the 
Society for Petroleum Engineers to discuss security issues and develop 
best practices within the industry to better control radiological 
sources used overseas for industrial purposes.[Footnote 16] 

DOE Has Revised Its Criteria for Site Selection and Increased the Level 
of Upgrades Required to Secure Certain Sites and Sources: 

In September 2006, as part of the broader reorganization of its Global 
Threat Reduction Initiative, DOE established new guidance for selecting 
sites to receive physical security upgrades. Under the new guidance, 
DOE has combined its radiological and nuclear material security efforts 
to develop a single threat reduction strategy. This integrated strategy 
prioritizes security efforts, based most importantly on the 
attractiveness of the different types of radiological and nuclear 
material and (1) their proximity to U.S. strategic interests, such as 
military bases overseas or commercial ports; (2) external threat 
environment within the country; and (3) internal site vulnerability, 
which measures existing physical protection on site. This new criteria 
also increased the level of the design basis threat required to secure 
each type of material. For example, sources having a curie level 
exceeding 1,000 could have the same priority for security upgrades as 
certain amounts of plutonium or highly enriched uranium. As a result, 
RTG security remains a high priority, while in DOE's view, some medical 
radiological sources could also be considered a high priority. However, 
when we asked DOE officials in September 2006 about the relative 
priority of medical sites, they said all of the sites that were 
upgraded under the old guidance would still be considered high priority 
under the new criteria. 

DOE's previous guidance, developed in 2003, based site selection on a 
minimum threshold level--measured in curies--of radiological sources 
present at a particular location.[Footnote 17] In addition, the 
guidance factored in other conditions such as the location of the site, 
the security conditions of the site, and evidence of illicit 
trafficking in the country. According to DOE, in a presentation made to 
us in September 2006, this guidance gave equal treatment to all sites 
within countries receiving security upgrades. This guidance did not 
clearly discriminate between the different types of sites secured and 
whether they were considered to be the highest priority. For example, 
securing a waste storage facility, which can contain up to three 
million curies, was given the same weight as securing an oncology 
clinic with one source containing 1,000 curies. Security measures 
recommended for radiological sources were based on a threat scenario of 
one outsider penetrating the facility, equipped with a handgun while 
working with one complicit insider. However, the new guidance 
significantly increases the threat by advancing a more intense 
scenario, including six outsiders with automatic weapons and 10 
kilograms of explosives working with one complicit insider. As a 
result, DOE officials said that future upgrades to secure radiological 
sources will have to be strengthened to meet the new protection levels. 
Additional enhancements at some sites are now being considered to 
address a more robust design-basis scenario. 

Numerous Problems and Challenges Impeded DOE's Efforts to Secure High- 
Priority Radiological Sources at High-Risk Radiological Sites: 

DOE experienced numerous problems and challenges during program 
implementation that impeded its efforts to secure radiological sources. 
As a result, some projects were delayed, and in some extreme cases, DOE 
was unable to implement its program at all. DOE said it was limited in 
its ability to enhance physical protection in several countries because 
IRTR is a voluntary program. For example, high-risk countries such as 
Nigeria and Turkey were unwilling to cooperate to implement security 
upgrades. In addition, Mexico declined DOE upgrades, although DOE had 
identified several vulnerable sites. While Mexico has continued to 
decline physical security assistance, Mexican officials have since 
agreed to accept regulatory infrastructure development assistance. 

In targeting countries to receive assistance, DOE developed a 
prioritization model that ranked countries as high, medium, and low 
risk.[Footnote 18] To date, DOE has initiated work in 49 of the 
countries identified as priorities for assistance. Our analysis showed 
that DOE attempted to initiate efforts to secure radiological sources 
in 31 high-priority, 17 medium-priority and one low-priority country. 
Consequently, about 40 percent of countries receiving assistance do not 
represent the highest-priority countries. According to DOE officials, 
medium and low-priority countries---more than one-third of the total in 
DOE's program--were selected because these countries had expressed a 
willingness to receive assistance. 

We found a variety of problems and challenges that affected DOE's 
ability to implement its program in several of the countries targeted 
for assistance. These included, among other things, problems with 
foreign contractor performance and lack of adequate physical 
infrastructure to support security upgrades. DOE officials said that 
various combinations of these and other impediments resulted in delays 
implementing security upgrades in about 75 percent of all countries 
participating in the program. DOE also stated that many of these 
problems were identified and corrected during quality assurance visits 
by DOE inspection teams. 

Contractor performance emerged as a key challenge. Six DOE officials 
told us that contractor performance and selection of reputable, 
reliable in-country contractors was critical to successful project 
implementation. DOE asserted that it has to maintain flexibility in 
selecting foreign contractors because most of the countries do not 
follow normal Western business practices. In DOE's view, problems 
arising from contractor performance resulted from "security culture" 
and language barriers, which caused miscommunication. Some problems we 
found with reliable in-country contractors included the following: 

* In Bulgaria, a contractor installed steel security doors--which 
protected radiological sources--with the hinges on the outside of the 
door. As a result, a potential transgressor could have unhinged the 
door and accessed the sources; 

* In Kazakhstan, a contractor provided security manuals and procedures 
for newly installed equipment in English instead of the native 
language. As a result, DOE officials found that the hospital staff had 
not changed the security codes and were not well versed in proper 
security procedures; and: 

* In Georgia, hospital staff told us that the contractor did not train 
them on operating the alarm systems. 

DOE did, however, report working with competent contractors in Poland, 
Lithuania, and Egypt that resulted in timely project implementation. 
DOE project managers for these countries told us that contractors 
conducted adequate training and followed up with security upgrades 
maintenance. 

Several DOE officials told us that implementing security upgrades also 
presented challenges due to inadequate physical infrastructure. In 
these countries, the types of challenges included lack of reliable 
electricity, a backup power source, and telecommunications at sites 
containing radiological sources. For example, in both Nicaragua and 
Tanzania, DOE officials said that frequent power outages diminished the 
detection capability of security alarms installed and that neither 
country had a backup source of power to operate the security alarms and 
security lighting provided by DOE. 

DOE Has Not Developed a Plan to Ensure the Long-Term Sustainability of 
Physical Security Upgrades: 

DOE has not developed an adequate comprehensive strategy to better 
ensure that physical security upgrades that have been installed, and 
the security training that has been provided, will be effectively 
sustained over the long term. DOE's current guidance states that DOE 
will sustain upgrades by providing countries with a 3-year warranty on 
newly installed security equipment and preventative maintenance 
contracts, as well as providing training on newly installed equipment 
for operational staff at the sites. However, DOE has not formulated a 
long-term sustainability plan that identifies expected completion dates 
for each country, including an exit strategy, and approaches for 
sustaining upgrades, including how host countries will financially 
continue maintenance of upgrades following DOE warranty expiration. In 
fact, a senior DOE official told us that responsibility for drafting 
and implementing long-term sustainability should be that of the host 
country. Furthermore, DOE has not adequately addressed the lack of 
regulatory infrastructure to provide oversight of source security in a 
majority of countries to receive DOE assistance. 

DOE officials responsible for program implementation said that they 
were uncertain that security upgrades installed would be sustained by 
countries once DOE assistance was no longer available. In fact, our 
analysis showed that these officials had confidence that the security 
upgrades would be sustained in only 25 percent of the countries. 
Specifically, officials pointed out that countries, such as Bangladesh 
or Tajikistan, would be unlikely to sustain upgrades because they do 
not have the resources to maintain the equipment and have not 
identified or allocated funding to maintain them beyond the 3-year 
warranty period. In addition, several host-country officials with whom 
we met expressed similar concerns. For example, hospital administrators 
in three countries told us that hospital budgets were already strained 
and that they could not be certain that funding would be available once 
the warranties expired. Moreover, hospital administrators told us it 
was difficult to estimate the level of resources needed to sustain the 
upgrades because DOE had not provided them with future maintenance 
costs. 

Several sites that received DOE upgrades have already experienced 
maintenance problems. For example, in Georgia, we found that a storage 
facility containing RTGs and a seed irradiator--which has thousands of 
curies of a cesium-137 source--had several large openings in the roof. 
When we asked host government officials about the cause of the 
openings, they stated that a recent storm had shifted the metal sheets 
covering the storage facility's roof. The officials did not state when 
the roof would be fixed or how funds would be allocated for the repair. 
In addition, we found that surveillance monitors were not being used at 
a medical facility. In fact, according to the hospital staff, the 
monitors, which were not broken, had been turned off for several days. 

In Lithuania we visited an oncology clinic and observed that the 
security cable, used to secure a teletherapy machine's cobalt-60 
source, had been broken for almost a month. According to a DOE physical 
protection specialist, the cable was the most important security 
feature because it triggered an alarm directly connected to the 
teletherapy machine's "head," which contains the radiological source. 
According to DOE, this was subsequently corrected as part of program 
assurance procedures. In addition, in Poland, we visited a research 
facility containing a 22,000 curie irradiator. We observed that the 
motion detection device in the room housing the irradiator was not 
working because of the high level of radioactivity present. According 
to the in-country contractor, the device had been disabled at least 
three times since the equipment was installed about a year earlier. 
Figure 5 shows the temporary storage facility with large openings in 
the roof, and figure 6 shows the broken cable at the oncology clinic. 

Figure 5: Storage Facility Containing RTGs and a Seed Irradiator with 
Holes in the Roof: 

[See PDF for Image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 6: Broken Security Cable at the Oncology Clinic: 

[See PDF for Image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

In addition to maintenance problems, we also found that a lack of 
adequate training on newly installed equipment further raised questions 
about the long-term success of the program. According to the hospital 
staff at a facility in Georgia, they had not received adequate training 
from the in-country contractor on how to operate the installed alarm 
systems. We found similar problems in other countries we visited. For 
example, at some of the hospitals, security codes allowing entry into 
rooms where sources were located had not been changed on a regular 
basis. Also, at one medical site, more than 50 staff had access to the 
security code for a room storing a radiological source of about 1,250 
curies. A DOE physical security specialist reported that the security 
code had not been changed from the default settings in at least three 
FSU countries. Furthermore, this specialist noted that staff in charge 
of protecting the equipment had copied security access codes onto 
checklists that were readily accessible to unauthorized staff in about 
15 countries. 

According to DOE, another key element of sustaining security of sources 
is having an organized, competent guard force. In general, the guard 
force serves as a critical communications link between the facility 
staff and the response force. We found that several of the 49 countries 
did not possess adequate guard or response forces, and in several 
cases, the guard forces in these countries were untrained and unarmed. 
Specifically, at one site that DOE upgraded, the guard with whom we 
spoke was unarmed and had no viable form of communication in the case 
of an emergency. At the same site, the guard told us that he shared 
responsibility for site security with an individual who served as a 
guard on a part-time basis in exchange for being able to live at the 
site. Moreover, we found that the absence of a reliable source of 
electricity made it difficult to complete and ensure the sustainability 
of alarms and motion detection devices in some of the countries 
receiving upgrades. For example, both Ecuador and El Salvador have 
limited telephone line access. As a result, according to DOE, the local 
guard forces could not be contacted immediately after an alarm was 
triggered at a site containing radiological sources. Consequently, 
security alarms installed in lesser developed countries may have 
marginal long-term impact. 

At some of the facilities we visited, there appeared to be a well 
trained guard force equipped with flashlights, radios, walkie-talkies, 
or cell phones. However, we also found that even at locations where 
improved security systems were in place, only a single guard was 
present and had no reliable method of contacting a response force. In 
these types of situations, according to DOE, the site is very 
vulnerable to theft. At one facility in Lithuania, we were told that 
the police were located about 30 minutes from the site. At that 
facility, we observed that the guards were not equipped with guns, and 
officials were not sure they were always present. However, DOE did fund 
remote monitoring equipment, which allowed the local police force to 
view the site 24 hours per day from the police station. 

According to IAEA experts and at least five DOE and NRC senior level 
officials, a strong and independent nuclear regulatory authority that 
is able to provide effective radiological source oversight is critical 
to program sustainability. A key function of a nuclear regulatory body 
is to establish procedures for the control of radiological sources, 
including the development of a basic registry of sources. The absence 
of reliable registries in many countries impeded DOE's ability to 
identify a comprehensive list of sites to upgrade. Also, the absence of 
such a list complicates DOE's ability to determine when it has 
completed its program in a particular country. More specifically, DOE 
physical security specialists told us that sources that had been 
identified and inventoried at various hospitals were subsequently moved 
to another location within the facility or are no longer being used. 
Consequently, some of the upgrades that DOE installed had limited 
security impact, or DOE has had to fund additional upgrades for the 
same source. 

We previously reported that DOE was focusing its source security 
program too narrowly on physical security upgrades and not taking into 
account respective countries' long-term needs to develop better nuclear 
regulatory infrastructures.[Footnote 19] DOE recognized the critical 
role of regulatory infrastructure development midway through the 
program and subsequently added a small regulatory infrastructure 
development component that is designed to support the creation and 
strengthening of effective and sustainable national regulatory 
infrastructures. DOE officials told us that the department's regulatory 
infrastructure development efforts are meant to complement the more 
comprehensive efforts of IAEA. In 1994, IAEA established a "model 
project" program to enhance countries' regulatory capacity, and the 
program was available to any member state upon request. IAEA continues 
to provide a variety of regulatory infrastructure support services and 
training to both member and nonmember states to support radiological 
source security and safety. 

The director of the IRTR program said that the long-term impact of 
DOE's program would likely have been enhanced had there been a stronger 
regulatory infrastructure in place to support the recommended security 
upgrades efforts in many of the countries. However, many countries 
participating in the IRTR program--specifically lesser developed 
countries--lack an independent regulator. According to IAEA, as many as 
110 countries worldwide lacked the regulatory infrastructure to 
adequately protect or control sealed sources as of 2003. 

DOE Has Spent Approximately $108 Million to Secure Radiological Sources 
Worldwide, but Future Program Funding Is Uncertain because of an 
Increased Emphasis on Securing Special Nuclear Materials: 

As of August 31, 2006, DOE spent approximately $108 million to 
implement the IRTR program. This money was spent to, among other 
things, conduct vulnerability assessments at a variety of sites 
containing radiological sources and to install physical security 
upgrades at these sites, such as hardened windows and doors, motion 
sensors and surveillance cameras. Russia received almost one-third of 
total DOE funding--about $33 million--which focused primarily on orphan 
source recovery, RTG removal and disposal and physical security 
upgrades at waste storage facilities. However, one-fourth of total 
expenditures--about $26.5 million--paid for program planning activities 
such as development of program guidance documents, hiring private 
consultants, and conducting studies. The program has also carried over 
large balances of unspent, unobligated funds each fiscal year since its 
inception in 2002, because of, among other things, large supplemental 
appropriations at the onset of the program and systemic delays in 
project implementation. DOE officials told us that securing 
radiological sources in other countries is a lower priority than 
securing more dangerous nuclear materials, such as plutonium and highly 
enriched uranium. As a result, DOE reduced funding for radiological 
security activities and future funding for the program is uncertain. 
DOE program officials are concerned that DOE may be unable to meet 
outstanding contractual commitments to maintain the more than $40 
million in upgrades already installed. 

DOE Expenditures Have Focused Primarily on Physical Security Upgrades 
and Recovering Lost or Abandoned Sources; However, About $26.5 Million 
Has Been Spent on Program Planning Activities: 

As of August 31, 2006, DOE had spent about $108 million to implement 
the IRTR program. A majority of this money--$68 million--was spent to 
(1) physically secure sites containing radiological sources; (2) 
locate, recover, and dispose of lost or abandoned sources; and (3) help 
countries draft laws and regulations to increase security and 
accounting of sources. In addition, DOE provided $13.5 million to IAEA 
to support activities to strengthen controls over radiological sources 
in IAEA member states. However, one-fourth of the total budget--about 
$26.5 million--was spent on program planning activities not directly 
attributed to a specific country, such as hiring private consultants, 
and building a database for international law enforcement officials. 
Table 3 provides a breakdown of DOE program expenditures. 

Table 3: DOE's IRTR Program Expenditures by Fiscal Year, as of August 
31, 2006: 

Dollars in thousands. 

Physical security upgrades; 
FY 2002: $0; 
FY 2003: $4,348; 
FY 2004: $10,497; 
FY 2005: $15,210; 
FY 2006 (through August 31, 2006): $12,840; 
Total (and percentage of total): $42,895 (40%). 

Orphan source recovery[A]; 
FY 2002: 0; 
FY 2003: 878; 
FY 2004: 8,069; 
FY 2005: 9,633; 
FY 2006 (through August 31, 2006): 4,342; 
Total (and percentage of total): 22,922 (21). 

Regulatory infrastructure support; 
FY 2002: 0; 
FY 2003: 0; 
FY 2004: 375; 
FY 2005: 757; 
FY 2006 (through August 31, 2006): 913; 
Total (and percentage of total): 2,045 (2). 

IAEA; 
FY 2002: 3,000; 
FY 2003: 684; 
FY 2004: 4,170; 
FY 2005: 5,098; 
FY 2006 (through August 31, 2006): 460; 
Total (and percentage of total): 13,412 (13). 

Strategic development; 
FY 2002: 3,821; 
FY 2003: 3,524; 
FY 2004: 5,436; 
FY 2005: 5,466; 
FY 2006 (through August 31, 2006): 3,702; 
Total (and percentage of total): 21,949 (20). 

All other program activities[B]; 
FY 2002: 0; 
FY 2003: 0; 
FY 2004: 2,582; 
FY 2005: 1,327; 
FY 2006 (through August 31, 2006): 596; 
Total (and percentage of total): 4,505 (4). 

Total; 
FY 2002: $6,821; 
FY 2003: $9,434; 
FY 2004: $31,129; 
FY 2005: $37,491; 
FY 2006 (through August 31, 2006): $22,853; 
Total (and percentage of total): $107,728. 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOE. 

[A] Includes Russia Orphan Source Recovery and Global Search and Secure 
programs (GSSP). 

[B] Includes DOE-funded consultant reports and development of program 
protocol, guidelines, and standards. 

[End of table] 

Physical security upgrades to secure sites containing radiological 
sources accounted for the largest program expenditure--almost $43 
million. The majority of DOE-funded upgrades were at hospitals and 
oncology clinics. DOE also funded upgrades at other types of facilities 
that utilize or store radiological sources and materials, including 
waste storage facilities, commercial and industrial facilities, and 
other research institutes. While DOE estimates that costs for each 
facility type range from $15,000 to secure a medical facility to 
$50,000 to secure a waste storage facility, actual expenditures for 
securing sites varied based on factors such as regional labor rates, 
conditions of existing infrastructure, and remoteness of location. 

DOE officials stated that cost estimates of upgrade projects included 
vulnerability assessments, equipment costs and installation, and 
warranty contracts covering equipment maintenance for three years. DOE 
physical security specialists conducted vulnerability assessments to 
identify security weaknesses at facilities, including adequacy of the 
local guard force, exposed windows and doors, and access to sources. In 
some instances, mostly at lower-risk sites, DOE authorized contractors 
responsible for equipment installation to conduct these assessments 
with direction from DOE. The contractors provided DOE with reports and 
photographs that summarized findings and proposed recommended upgrades. 
Types of upgrades installed varied based on assessment findings and 
host country laws and policies, but standard equipment packages 
consisted mostly of hardened windows and doors; motion sensors and 
alarms; access control systems, such as coded keypads or swipe card 
entry; security cameras; and video monitoring. At some sites, DOE also 
provided guard forces with enhanced communication equipment, including 
radios and mobile panic buttons that send emergency signals to local 
police or security companies. Installation costs also included training 
for on-site personnel that would be responsible for operating the 
equipment. 

Costs of physical security upgrades also included 3-year warranty 
contracts that cover maintenance costs, such as the cost of remote 
monitoring and spare parts. DOE officials told us that contracts are 
negotiated with contractors responsible for equipment installation and 
require that countries receiving assistance assume the costs of 
sustaining the equipment no later than three years after the upgrades 
have been installed. For the duration of the warranty period, DOE 
estimated that, on average, it would cost $40,000 per country, per year 
to maintain equipment.[Footnote 20] This estimate includes sending one 
DOE team per country, per year to conduct assurance visits, any 
equipment contractors have to replace, and costs of remote monitoring 
systems. 

DOE also spent $23 million to provide countries with radiation 
detection equipment and training to locate and recover lost or 
abandoned radiological sources and secure them in interim or permanent 
storage facilities. DOE has two programs to support orphan source 
recovery efforts--the Russian Orphan Source Recovery program, which is 
focused solely in Russia, and the Global Search and Secure Program, 
which includes search and recovery efforts in other countries receiving 
DOE assistance. More than 80 percent of orphan source recovery 
expenditures were spent in Russia--about $19 million. To support GSSP, 
DOE spent $4 million in 11 countries--Azerbaijan, Croatia, Estonia, 
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Philippines, Romania, 
Tajikistan, and Tanzania. These funds were spent primarily to provide 
countries with (1) standard packages of equipment such as hand-held 
radiation detection monitors and characterization instruments to 
properly identify recovered sources; (2) training workshops on the 
appropriate use of the equipment; and (3) physical security upgrades at 
some facilities storing recovered or disposed sources. 

In addition, DOE spent about $2 million in ten countries (Bulgaria, 
Colombia, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Moldova, Philippines, 
Thailand, and Vietnam) to help develop national standards and 
regulations for the control and accounting of radiological sources. A 
majority of these funds were spent in the United States--$1.8 million-
-to develop a set of security-based regulations to be utilized by 
countries with limited resources and inadequate radiological source 
inventories. Once countries drafted an initial set of regulations, DOE 
experts reviewed drafts and provided feedback and proposals for 
improvement. DOE also provided training workshops and seminars on 
appropriate regulatory inspection practices for radiological source 
controls and accounting. In particular, DOE has been working with 
regional partners, such as the Australian Nuclear Science and 
Technology Organization (ANSTO), to implement many of its regulatory 
development activities.[Footnote 21] For example, DOE and ANSTO have 
conducted regulatory development training workshops for countries 
located in East Asia and the Pacific region. 

DOE also provided about $13.5 million to IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund 
to support efforts to strengthen controls over sources with IAEA member 
states, including technical training on fundamental principles and 
objectives of radiological source security. IAEA established the fund, 
which consists of voluntary budget contributions from other countries, 
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.[Footnote 22] The 
fund is designed to improve nuclear security in IAEA member states by 
helping countries to protect their nuclear and radiological materials 
and facilities. Specifically, DOE funded IAEA missions that carried out 
safety and security assessments at sites identified by member states 
containing vulnerable radiological sources. Additionally, DOE 
contributions to IAEA supported training conferences and other advisory 
services. DOE funds also enabled IAEA to transport several high-risk 
sources to secure storage facilities and provide conditioning equipment 
to prepare recovered sources for disposal. 

Finally, DOE spent one-fourth of total program expenditures--about 
$26.5 million--on activities not directly attributed to a specific 
country. Specifically, these costs included, among other things, 
program planning activities such as the development of program guidance 
documents. For example, DOE hired an outside contractor to conduct a 
review of the radiological source security program and to help DOE 
develop a plan to guide future efforts. The contractor spent several 
months interviewing agency officials and program staff to assess the 
strengths and weaknesses of the program and the level of DOE 
coordination with State, NRC, and IAEA. The final report provided 
recommendations to improve coordination with other U.S. agencies and 
within DOE. In addition, DOE spent $1.5 million of these funds to 
facilitate an information exchange with Interpol, an international 
agency that coordinates the law enforcement activities of the national 
police bureaus in each of its member states, in order to obtain 
information about international arrests involving theft or smuggling of 
radiological materials. DOE's intent was to provide Interpol the 
capacity to contribute law-enforcement data into DOE's database, which 
contains country-specific information regarding, among other things, 
criminal activity. Funds provided to Interpol paid for computers and 
software and the salaries for two staff located at Interpol 
headquarters in Lyon, France, to set up and operate the database for 
two years. A DOE program manager expressed concern about whether 
providing funds to Interpol would provide tangible results or increase 
the effectiveness of the radiological sources program. This program 
manager questioned whether the Interpol project contributed to the 
program's core objectives of securing the highest risk, highest 
priority sources in other countries. 

A senior DOE official told us that these funds--identified by DOE as 
strategic development and program integration funds--were established 
at the onset of the program and were intended to carry out activities 
not directly related to country-specific physical security upgrade 
projects and initiatives. This official added that in the early stages 
of the program, expenditures of this type focused primarily on 
strategic planning, developing program technical documents and 
processes, conducting studies, and developing a database of regional 
country information to support program objectives. 

While DOE assistance was spread among 49 countries, Russia received the 
largest amount, $33 million, nearly one-third of total program 
expenditures. DOE's cost manager for the IRTR program reported that 
expenditures in Russia supported three primary program components: (1) 
orphan source recovery efforts ($18.5 million); (2) RTG removal and 
disposal, including alternative energy source development ($7 million); 
and (3) physical security upgrade projects, including waste repository 
sites ($7.5 million). The 13 other FSU countries received a total of 
about $11 million, with Ukraine being the largest recipient, receiving 
about $3.5 million. In addition, about 65 percent of DOE expenditures 
in FSU countries was spent in these countries for services, equipment, 
and materials that were used to improve physical security. 

By comparison, DOE spent significantly less outside the FSU, and 
expenditures in these countries were both modest by comparison and 
disproportionately spent in the United States by DOE's national 
laboratories for labor, travel, equipment and overhead costs.[Footnote 
23] For example, the 35 non-FSU countries received a total of about $17 
million, or just 28 percent of total country-specific 
expenditures.[Footnote 24] Two-thirds of funds spent for non-FSU 
countries were spent in the United States. Furthermore, five countries 
in Africa received no in-country expenditures. Although many countries 
in Africa have been defined as high-risk by DOE, countries in this 
region received a total of about $1.3 million, about two-thirds the 
amount spent in one European country--Poland. While expenditures in 
South America were more evenly divided between in-country costs and 
funds spent in the United States, the region received only about $3.5 
million spread among 12 countries.[Footnote 25] Figure 7 provides a 
regional breakout of these expenditures. Additionally, see appendix II 
for more details about regional and individual country expenditures for 
fiscal years 2002 through 2006. 

Figure 7: IRTR Program Regional Allocations: 

[See PDF for Image] 

Source: GAO analysis of DOE cost data. 

[End of figure] 

DOE Has Consistently Carried Over Large Balances of Unspent and 
Unobligated Funds: 

As of August 31, 2006, DOE had carried over almost $23 million in 
unspent or unobligated funds for the IRTR program from previous years. 
Moreover, the program consistently carried over a substantial uncosted 
balance each fiscal year throughout the life of the program. For 
example, for fiscal years 2003 through 2005, the program carried over 
uncosted funds totaling $27.4 million, $34.1 million, and $22.4 
million, respectively. According to the program's director, a majority 
of carryover balances were due to, among other things, large 
supplemental appropriations at the onset of the program and delays in 
implementing security upgrade projects. As we reported in 2004, large 
carryover balances are not uncommon in DOE nuclear nonproliferation 
programs--especially in Russia--because of, among other things, 
difficulties in negotiating and executing contracts and the multiyear 
nature of programs.[Footnote 26] Table 4 shows DOE total budget and 
uncosted balances for fiscal years 2002 through 2006.[Footnote 27] 

Table 4: DOE's Budget by Fiscal Year, as of August 31, 2006: 

Dollars in thousands. 

Fiscal year: 2002; 
Appropriated funds: $20,555; 
Funds obligated: $11,799; 
Funds unobligated: $11,756; 
Total expenditures: $6,821; 
Uncosted obligations: $4,978; 
Uncosted balance forward[A]: $16,733. 

Fiscal year: 2003; 
Appropriated funds: 38,000; 
Funds obligated: 15,463; 
Funds unobligated: 21,359; 
Total expenditures: 9,433; 
Uncosted obligations: 6,030; 
Uncosted balance forward[A]: 27,389. 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
Appropriated funds: 36,000; 
Funds obligated: 48,020; 
Funds unobligated: 17,235; 
Total expenditures: 31,128; 
Uncosted obligations: 16,892; 
Uncosted balance forward[A]: 34,127. 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
Appropriated funds: 24,800; 
Funds obligated: 49,681; 
Funds unobligated: 10,219; 
Total expenditures: 37,492; 
Uncosted obligations: 12,189; 
Uncosted balance forward[A]: 22,407. 

Fiscal year: 2006 (through Aug. 31, 2006); 
Appropriated funds: 24,078; 
Funds obligated: 33,977; 
Funds unobligated: 11,832; 
Total expenditures: 22,853; 
Uncosted obligations: 11,125; 
Uncosted balance forward[A]: 22,957. 

Total; 
Appropriated funds: $143,433; 
Funds obligated: [Empty]; 
Funds unobligated: [Empty]; 
Total expenditures: $107,727; 
Uncosted obligations: [Empty]; 
Uncosted balance forward[A]: [Empty]. 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOE. 

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding. 

[A] Uncosted balance forward is equal to funds unobligated plus 
uncosted obligations. 

[End of table] 

DOE's Budget for Radioactive Source Security Has Been Reduced, and 
Future Program Funding Is Uncertain: 

DOE has significantly decreased IRTR program funding since 2003, and 
DOE officials expect further reductions over the next several years. 
Specifically, DOE's internal budget allotments for the IRTR program 
have gone from a high of $38 million in fiscal year 2003 to $24 million 
in fiscal year 2006. According to a senior DOE official, priorities 
within GTRI, which funds DOE's nuclear and radiological threat 
reduction efforts, have shifted, and future funding will be redirected 
to, among other things, securing special nuclear material, such as 
plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU). In particular, DOE has 
assigned the highest budget priority to three specific GTRI elements 
that address the threats posed by an attack using an improvised nuclear 
device: the (1) Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors 
program, (2) Russia Research Reactor Fuel Return program, and (3) 
Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel program. The goal of the 
Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors program is to get 
research reactors around the world to convert from HEU to low enriched 
uranium with conversion of all U.S. civilian research reactors to be 
completed by 2014. The Russia Research Reactor Fuel Return and Foreign 
Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel programs are designed specifically 
for returning HEU to the United States or Russia and are expected to be 
completed by 2013 and 2019, respectively.[Footnote 28] 

In contrast, other GTRI elements, including the IRTR program, do not 
have presidential commitment dates for completion and, as a result, are 
lower priorities for funding. DOE's Principal Assistant Deputy 
Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, told us that DOE 
initially placed a high priority on securing radiological material and 
the Secretary of Energy made a personal commitment to this activity. 
More recently, because of budget reductions affecting the entire 
agency, DOE has had to review and evaluate program priorities. This 
official noted that while the likelihood of a dirty bomb attack is much 
greater than a nuclear attack, the consequences in terms of loss of 
life and the overall catastrophic impact of the latter would be much 
greater. He also noted that, if given a choice, he would place more 
emphasis on securing radiological sources in the United States than in 
other countries. In his view, there is still a significant amount of 
work to be done to secure radiological sources in the United States. 

Future anticipated reductions in funding for the IRTR program will have 
significant implications for the amount of sources that can be secured 
in other countries. DOE's initial target for program completion was to 
secure 1,500 high-priority sites in 100 countries by 2014. This goal 
assumed that the program would receive $25 million per year over the 
life of the program. DOE officials told us that currently projected 
budget reductions may jeopardize the program's ability to fund even the 
existing warranty contracts applied to physical security upgrades 
already installed. Moreover, DOE has not determined the extent to which 
the program will fund warranties for future upgrade projects meaning 
countries will need to assume greater financial responsibility for 
sustaining upgrades. However, DOE officials who are responsible for 
project implementation told us they lacked confidence that a majority 
of countries would be able to maintain upgrades without further DOE 
assistance, mostly because many recipients do not have adequate 
resources. For example, DOE officials responsible for project 
implementation said that neither Ukraine nor Tajikistan, where DOE has 
spent a total of about $3.5 million, has identified resources for 
radiological source security once DOE warranties expire. 

In addition, DOE has not fully addressed the cost implications of the 
increased levels of physical security required by the new design basis 
threat assigned to radiological sources under GTRI's reorganization. 
Although DOE's new program guidance says that the radiological security 
upgrades strategy will continue to focus on inherently sustainable, low-
cost upgrades, it specifically states that the revised threat scenario 
significantly increases the threat that physical security upgrades must 
withstand. As a result, the new guidance states that upgrades will need 
to be significantly enhanced to meet the new threat level. DOE 
officials have raised concerns regarding DOE's ability to sustain low-
cost upgrades already installed. In light of the program's ongoing 
budget reductions, the new guidance raises further concern regarding 
DOE's ability to sustain the increased cost of enhanced upgrades for 
future projects. 

To offset anticipated shortfalls in funding, DOE plans to seek 
international contributions to secure radiological sources in other 
countries. DOE officials said that several countries, including, 
Canada, Japan and Norway, have inquired about contributing funds 
directly to GTRI but that, until recently, DOE had no authority to 
accept direct financial support from international partners for GTRI 
activities or to use funds received outside of the normal 
appropriations process. In October 2006, Congress authorized DOE to 
enter into agreements, with the concurrence of State, to receive 
contributions from foreign countries and international organizations 
for IRTR and other GTRI programs, and to use those contributed funds 
without fiscal year limitation.[Footnote 29] Additionally, Russian 
officials told us that because of the importance of the IRTR program, 
they are interested in providing increased financial commitments to 
secure radiological sources. In particular, the Deputy Head of the 
Russian Radon waste storage facilities, known officially as the Federal 
Agency for Construction and Utilities, told us that the organization 
would be willing to make a sizeable contribution to Radon upgrades. DOE 
officials stated that international source security is not the sole 
responsibility of the United States government and that increased 
foreign cooperation will be necessary to complete program objectives. 

Coordination with State and NRC Has Improved, but DOE Still Faces 
Coordination Problems Securing Radiological Sources Worldwide: 

DOE has improved coordination with State and NRC to secure radiological 
sources worldwide. Since we reported on this matter in 2003, DOE has 
involved State and NRC in its international radiological threat 
reduction activities more often and has increased information-sharing 
with the agencies.[Footnote 30] However, DOE has not always integrated 
its efforts efficiently and coordinated efforts among the agencies have 
been inconsistent. Moreover, DOE has not adequately coordinated the 
activities of multiple programs within the agency responsible for 
securing radiological and nuclear materials in other countries and, at 
times, this has resulted in conflicting or overlapping efforts. DOE has 
improved coordination with IAEA to strengthen controls over other 
countries' radiological sources and has developed bilateral and 
multilateral partnerships with IAEA member states to improve their 
regulatory infrastructures. DOE funding to IAEA has supported, among 
other things, IAEA missions to assess the safety and security of sites 
containing radiological sources and IAEA-sponsored training programs 
and regional workshops focusing on radiological source security. 
However, significant gaps in information-sharing between DOE and IAEA, 
and with the European Commission, have impeded DOE's ability to target 
the most vulnerable sites for security improvements and to avoid 
possible duplication of efforts. 

DOE Has Improved Efforts to Coordinate Its Program Activities, but 
Governmentwide Coordination Is Inconsistent: 

In recent years, DOE has improved coordination with State and NRC and 
has taken steps to work more collaboratively with U.S. agencies to 
secure radiological sources in other countries. An example of improved 
U.S. coordination is the interagency effort to establish a radiological 
source regulatory infrastructure in Iraq. Since 2003, with the support 
of DOE and NRC, State has led the effort to establish the Iraq 
Radioactive Source Regulatory Authority (IRSRA) and develop a 
radiological regulatory infrastructure in Iraq. State and DOE provided 
IRSRA with equipment, training, technical assistance, and funding to 
help the new agency assume increased responsibility for establishing 
radiological source regulations and procedures consistent with 
international standards.[Footnote 31] Specifically, with funding and 
logistical support from DOE, State coordinated several meetings in 
Amman, Jordan, in 2004 and 2005 to provide IRSRA personnel training by 
IAEA staff. These meetings resulted in the development of new Iraqi 
laws and regulations for the regulation, transport, import and export 
of radiological sources, including physical security requirements. DOE 
experts reviewed draft Iraqi laws and regulations for their relevance 
to the security of radiological sources, and NRC provided guidance for 
developing import and export controls for radiological sources. State 
also funded procurement of mobile radiation detection equipment so that 
Iraqi regulatory personnel can survey various cities to search for 
orphaned radiological sources. This equipment, provided by DOD's 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, included radiological handling, 
measurement, and protective equipment, such as radiation meters, 
respirators, and protective clothing. Hand-held radiation equipment 
from DOE has also been transferred to Iraqi agencies for border 
monitoring. DOE experts also trained IRSRA officials and personnel on 
how to conduct vulnerability assessments. 

Finally, to financially support IRSRA's efforts, State provided a 
portion of $1.25 million in funding from its Nonproliferation and 
Disarmament Fund (NDF),[Footnote 32] to IAEA for training and other 
assistance to IRSRA, including an IAEA review of Iraq's draft laws and 
regulations.[Footnote 33] State also used a portion of this funding to 
purchase a specially equipped vehicle that can be driven through 
neighborhoods to detect unsecured radiological sources. DOE and State 
officials told us that although the Iraq project is a unique 
circumstance, it is an example of improved U.S. government coordination 
to strengthen controls over radiological sources and could provide a 
model for future efforts. 

Although coordination among the agencies has improved, these efforts 
have been inconsistent and there is no comprehensive governmentwide 
approach to securing radiological sources overseas. We reported in 2003 
that DOE's efforts to secure sources in other countries had not been 
well coordinated with those of other U.S. agencies. Specifically, DOE 
had not fully coordinated with State and NRC to leverage program 
resources, maximize available expertise, avoid potential duplication of 
efforts, and help ensure the program's long-term success. We also 
recommended that DOE take the lead in developing a comprehensive 
governmentwide plan to strengthen controls over sources in other 
countries. In response to our report, DOE hired a consultant to 
determine, among other things, whether gaps exist in agency program 
activities with respect to securing radiological sources worldwide and 
what role and responsibilities DOE should assume in coordinating U.S. 
government efforts. 

In December 2004, the consultant reported that although DOE had 
addressed many of its issues with State and NRC, more effective 
coordination was needed. Moreover, the consultant stated that the lack 
of effective coordination among these agencies posed the greatest 
potential for conflict, as a result of differing mandates and 
conflicting philosophical approaches to radiological source security. 
Specifically, effective and systematic coordination between U.S. 
agencies has been impeded at times because individual agency missions 
differ and, as a result, agency efforts have been, at times, at odds 
with one another. For example, the consultant reported that NRC had 
expressed concern that DOE's regulatory infrastructure development 
activities infringed on a decades-long NRC function. Furthermore, DOE 
is primarily concerned with security of sources while NRC has 
traditionally focused more on safety issues related to the use of 
sources. The report also concluded that the debate between DOE and NRC 
over the importance of the safety versus the security of radiological 
sources had negatively impacted effective coordination between the two 
agencies. 

DOE, State, and NRC have differed on, among other things, funding and 
implementation of regulatory infrastructure development activities in 
other countries. For example, in May 2003, NRC's Office of 
International Programs sought $5 million in appropriated funds to 
assist its regulatory counterparts in the FSU and countries of central 
and eastern Europe to enhance (1) existing laws, rules, and regulations 
governing use of radiological sources; (2) mechanisms used to track 
radiological sources, such as databases and registries; and (3) day-to- 
day regulatory oversight of sources. NRC stated in its request that 
DOE's physical security enhancements would not likely be sustained in 
the medium to long-term absent clear, enforceable regulatory 
requirements. Moreover, NRC sought to assist DOE by providing 
assistance to regulatory authorities in the FSU, where a majority of 
DOE's efforts were focused at the time. 

NRC officials noted that the biggest challenge they have faced has been 
identifying adequate, reliable, and predictable funding to support 
international assistance activities. NRC, unlike other U.S. government 
agencies, has largely relied upon other agencies--Departments of State, 
Energy and Defense--to support its international programs and is 
required by law to recover about 90 percent of its annual budget 
authority through licensing and inspection fees assessed on the U.S. 
nuclear industry. Furthermore, the U.S. nuclear industry has raised 
concerns about using NRC funds to support international assistance. 
Despite these funding limitations, NRC has a long history of supporting 
regulatory strengthening efforts in the countries of central and 
eastern Europe and the FSU. These efforts have included training other 
countries' regulators in all aspects of licensing and inspection 
procedures and developing a control and accounting system for nuclear 
materials. 

In July 2003, the Senate Appropriations Committee directed that $5 
million out of certain amounts appropriated to NNSA be made available 
to NRC for bilateral and international efforts to strengthen regulatory 
controls over radioactive sources that are at the greatest risk of 
being used in a dirty bomb attack.[Footnote 34] In September 2003, 
according to the Director of the NRC Office of International Programs, 
NRC and the Director of DOE's International Materials Protection, 
Control and Cooperation program reached an initial agreement in 
principle, whereby DOE would provide NRC with $1 million per year for 5 
years to conduct regulatory activities in countries outside of Russia. 

According to DOE officials, the funds were never transferred because 
the Senate withdrew the direction to allocate the funds to NRC during 
conference negotiations because the House did not provide comparable 
language in its report. DOE officials added that the provision 
directing the transfer to NRC did not appear in the final conference 
report and was not included in the appropriation legislation. 
Furthermore, these officials added that DOE was directed by guidance 
received from House Energy and Water Development Subcommittee staff to 
not transfer the funds. According to a senior NRC official in the 
Office of International Programs, the conference report included a 
joint explanatory statement, which directed that allocations set forth 
in the House and Senate reports "should be complied with unless 
specifically addressed to the contrary in the conference report and 
statement of the managers."[Footnote 35] NRC asserts that this 
reinforced the intent of the original Senate report, and that without 
language to further clarify or to state otherwise, NRC should have 
received the funding as originally directed by the Senate 
Appropriations Committee. The conference report does not specifically 
address this funding issue.[Footnote 36] 

In addition, in 2003, NRC requested $1 million from State to support 
radiological source-related regulatory strengthening activities in 
Ukraine. Specifically, NRC proposed to develop a national registry of 
radiological sources and strengthen Ukraine's overall radiological 
source-related laws, rules, and regulations. NRC chose Ukraine because 
of its relatively large inventory of high-risk radioactive sources; the 
stability of its existing nuclear regulatory infrastructure; and NRC's 
long-standing history of assisting Ukraine's nuclear regulatory 
authority, the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine (SNRCU). 
NRC requested funding for the Ukraine project from State's 
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. The total cost of the project 
was estimated at $2.2 million. 

The original proposal, as approved by State, stated that the project's 
aim was to establish key elements of a national system to provide long- 
term security of high-risk radioactive sources in Ukraine by utilizing 
NRC's overall expertise and experienced contractor personnel. 
Furthermore, the proposal stated that because NRC and its contractors 
had been involved in an identical program in Armenia for the previous 2 
years the effort in Ukraine would capitalize on those experiences, 
utilizing much of that background data and materials. However, managers 
for NDF projects ultimately decided that State would not use NRC 
resources and would undertake and manage the project itself, even 
though the agency had no prior experience in directly supporting 
regulatory infrastructure development in Ukraine. According to a State 
official, the agency made this decision because, among other things, 
NRC planned to hire a contractor--the Ukrainian State Scientific and 
Technical Center--to manage the project, which would have increased the 
project's overall cost by about 20 percent.[Footnote 37] 

State officials said that their approach departed from that which was 
originally envisioned by NRC in the original proposal in many respects. 
However, the NDF has always reserved the right to implement its 
projects as it deems appropriate. These officials added that State 
chose to work directly with the Ukrainian regulator instead of the 
State Scientific and Technical Center because, among other things, the 
approach streamlined oversight and accountability for project 
performance and reduced overhead expenses. According to the NDF manager 
of the Ukraine project through October 2005, the Ukraine project 
experienced significant delays. However, State officials told us the 
project is currently on track. Following a November 30, 2006 meeting 
with State officials to discuss our draft report, State provided us a 
letter from the Deputy Chairperson for SNRCU dated December 4, 2006. 
The letter states that SNRCU views the Ukraine project as one of the 
most successful and efficient international assistance projects between 
the United States and Ukraine and that the project was implemented in 
the shortest possible time period. 

Finally, State and NRC raised concerns when DOE with IAEA developed a 
set of draft regulations on the physical security of radiological 
sources. Although the draft regulations had not been through a formal 
IAEA review process, DOE had intended to distribute them during IAEA- 
sponsored training workshops to assist member states to strengthen 
regulatory controls over their sources. Specifically, NRC officials 
expressed significant concerns that DOE was planning to distribute 
unofficial guidance to countries that was in conflict with U.S. 
regulations. In a December 2004 memorandum to the Deputy Director 
General of Nuclear Safety and Security at IAEA, NRC stated that 
publishing interim guidance that had not been reviewed in advance, and 
as a result may need to be substantially modified, was neither 
efficient nor effective. State officials told us that their chief 
concern was the manner in which any such guidance would be construed 
abroad. These officials added that many of the specific problems 
associated with the original DOE draft guidance lie with internal 
issues regarding the process for reviewing security documents at IAEA. 
In addition, they said that concerns over the development of IAEA 
guidance on security of radioactive sources, which preceded development 
of the draft regulations, are long standing and that State has worked 
consistently with IAEA to develop and implement a consistent process 
for preparation and review of security guidance similar to the 
established process used by IAEA to develop safety guidance. 

Following informal discussions with State and NRC, DOE did work with 
the agencies to ensure that draft guidance was consistent with 
established domestic and international guidance and protocols. IAEA has 
since proposed a new Nuclear Security Series and review process, and 
the DOE draft regulations will now support a new IAEA Security Series 
document entitled "Security of Radioactive Sources," which was 
coordinated with State and NRC. 

Our 2003 report concluded that DOE has the primary responsibility for 
helping other countries to strengthen controls over their radiological 
sources. We recommended that DOE take the lead in developing a 
comprehensive governmentwide plan to accomplish this goal. In addition, 
DOE's consultant report stated that DOE, in its view, is the only U.S. 
government agency with the resources to focus solely on international 
source security. Similar to our recommendation, the consultant report 
recommended that DOE take the lead in adopting an interagency, site- 
specific approach to international radiological source security, 
including development of a long-term strategy that leveraged resources 
and leadership of other agencies. DOE officials said the department has 
not implemented these recommendations to initiate and lead a 
governmentwide plan for the security of radiological sources in other 
countries because it does not have the mandate to instruct other U.S. 
agencies on how to conduct their efforts, and other agencies' programs 
are not within DOE's control. However, DOE is currently taking steps, 
as part of the GTRI reorganization, to address several coordination 
issues within the department, including establishing regional points of 
contact to interface with other U.S. agencies to coordinate interagency 
efforts. 

DOE's Efforts Have Not Been Well-Coordinated within the Department, and 
Program Overlap Has Led to Inefficiencies: 

The 2004 consultant report also concluded that DOE had not adequately 
coordinated the activities of multiple programs within DOE that are 
responsible for securing radiological and nuclear materials in other 
countries. As a result, these programs often worked at cross-purposes. 
For example, we visited a site in Poland that housed several nuclear 
facilities including a radiation waste management plant and Poland's 
nuclear research reactor. Country officials managing the site told us 
that DOE had conducted vulnerability assessments of each of the 
facilities, one of which stored several high-risk radiological sources 
as well as spent fuel from the research reactor. Although the material 
was collocated in the same storage facility, we observed that the 
sources had been secured in a locked cage by the IRTR program, but the 
spent fuel had no security and was being stored unprotected in 
underground canisters. Figure 8 shows secured radiological sources 
collocated with unsecured spent fuel contained in underground storage. 

Figure 8: Storage Facility Containing Secured Radiological Sources and 
Unsecured Spent Fuel: 

[See PDF for Image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Polish officials told us that installation of DOE physical security 
upgrades at the site had been inconsistent and not adequately 
coordinated by DOE. Furthermore, security officials that had installed 
the physical security upgrades told us that the overall security in the 
facility was inadequate, given the types of nuclear and radioactive 
material being housed there. The director of the site said that he 
expressed concern to DOE about the lack of security of the spent 
nuclear fuel and requested similar upgrade improvements. However, he 
said that it was his understanding that DOE's radiological program was 
only authorized to fund radiological source security upgrades and not 
the security of spent nuclear fuel, which was the responsibility of 
DOE's nuclear security upgrades program. 

The director of the facility, and his staff, said that it was unclear 
to them why DOE could not concurrently secure nuclear and radiological 
material stored at the same site and what can and cannot be secured by 
different DOE entities. The director added that it sends the wrong 
signal to host country officials when DOE programs have such different 
security approaches and time frames for implementing security upgrades. 
Subsequent to our visit, DOE sent a letter to Polish government 
officials in March 2006 offering to return to Poland and provide 
further DOE technical and financial support to protect the nuclear 
material stored at the facility. 

Within the IRTR program, different components of the program are led 
primarily out of two DOE national laboratories, and we found that the 
laboratories, at times, applied different approaches to securing 
radiological sources. For example, according to a senior DOE program 
manager, each laboratory employs its own physical security specialists 
and in turn, applies its own approach to conducting vulnerability 
assessments and selecting physical security upgrades. During our site 
visits, we observed that similar types of facilities varied in terms of 
the types of upgrades installed and that security measures were not 
standardized. For example, we toured numerous oncology clinics and 
found that, although they housed the same equipment and radiological 
sources, they had received different upgrades as a result of 
assessments conducted by different laboratory security specialists. 
Specifically, teletherapy units in certain countries had fiber optic 
cables attached to the sources that sent alarm signals if the device 
was tampered with. Security specialists traveling with us at those 
sites told us that the cable was the key security feature for this type 
of device. However, during a meeting with a senior security specialist 
from a different laboratory, we were told that his teams do not install 
fiber optic cables as part of security upgrades to the same devices 
because the cables can break. 

We also found that DOE's IRTR program components are not well- 
coordinated. For example, more than one program manager told us that 
DOE had not consistently coordinated its orphan source recovery efforts 
or regulatory infrastructure development assistance with physical 
security upgrades. According to officials responsible for managing the 
majority of the program's physical security upgrade projects, IRTR 
program managers did not coordinate efforts that resulted in multiple 
visits to the same country. In their view, this caused confusion within 
the recipient countries because country officials had difficulty 
understanding why some parts of the same DOE program were being 
addressed separately. Officials from Sandia National Laboratories, the 
lead for GSSP, told us that projects were often implemented 
independently from physical security upgrade projects and that Sandia 
did not routinely coordinate its efforts with those of PNNL prior to 
initiating search and secure activities. PNNL officials, who brought 
this matter to our attention, concurred and stated that GSSP officials 
did not routinely consult with their physical security specialists 
prior to visiting countries with which PNNL had already established 
relationships. 

Furthermore, according to PNNL officials, DOE's regulatory 
infrastructure development team had visited several countries without 
coordinating with the physical security upgrade teams. According to a 
DOE program manager, host country officials were frequently uncertain 
whether these two components were part of the same program. According 
to PNNL, this fragmented approach created confusion and required them 
to explain to country officials that the program components were meant 
to complement one another. The lead official for regulatory 
infrastructure development activities told us that future visits would 
be better planned to ensure that an integrated approach to source 
security was undertaken. 

Finally, we found coordination problems between IRTR and the U.S. 
Radiological Threat Reduction program, which is primarily responsible 
for domestic source recovery efforts, including repatriating U.S.- 
origin radiological sources in other countries. U.S. Radiological 
Threat Reduction program officials said there have been limited 
opportunities to share information or to assess the potential to 
coordinate international source recovery activities so as to leverage 
DOE resources. For example, the domestic program recently discovered a 
large quantity of unsecured radiological sources in South America. The 
sources were no longer in use and were inadequately secured. Officials 
managing DOE's domestic program informed IRTR mangers of the finding 
and the location of the sources. However, IRTR officials declined to 
immediately secure the sources because the country where they were 
discovered, which is considered high risk, is not scheduled for IRTR 
upgrades until 2011. As a result, the sources will remain unsecured 
until the international program completes upgrades in this country. 

In our discussions, DOE officials recognized that coordination within 
the department needed to be improved and that a comprehensive and 
consistent approach to threat reduction efforts between its nuclear and 
radiological programs should be established. They acknowledged that it 
was inefficient for multiple DOE teams to visit the same sites as part 
of different programs to address multiple threat reduction activities. 
To that end, DOE's recent reorganization of GTRI is designed to create 
a more streamlined structure that is organized geographically to 
address all threat reduction activities more effectively. Specifically, 
DOE plans to increase efficiency and improve coordination by (1) 
integrating multiple GTRI programs working in the same country or at 
the same sites; (2) redistributing workloads across the radiological 
and nuclear programs; and (3) improving relationships with host country 
officials by tailoring comprehensive strategies and incentives to more 
effectively meet unique country-specific conditions. 

Despite Some Improvements, Critical Information-Sharing Gaps between 
DOE and IAEA Have Impeded DOE's Efforts to Target the Highest Priority 
Sites for Security Upgrades: 

DOE has improved coordination with IAEA in recent years to strengthen 
controls over other countries' radiological sources and has developed 
several successful bilateral and multilateral partnerships with 
countries around the world to support and share the agency's 
international efforts. IRTR's director told us that these partnerships 
have helped to foster increased awareness of the security of sources 
through country-specific training and regional workshops. For example, 
with the assistance of IAEA, DOE has established a partnership with the 
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization through which 
DOE has increased opportunities to conduct physical security 
assessments and strengthen regulatory inventories of radiological 
sources in Southeast Asia. Specifically, ANSTO has identified and 
facilitated communication with several high-risk countries, which has 
helped DOE gain access to countries that DOE had difficulty initiating 
contact with, like Vietnam. DOE has also provided funding to support, 
among other things, IAEA-sponsored training programs and regional 
workshops focusing on radiological source security. 

DOE also coordinated with Russia and IAEA as part of the Tripartite 
Initiative to conduct physical security assessments and install 
upgrades at 102 sites in 13 FSU countries--Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The objective of the 
Tripartite Initiative was to improve the security of dangerous 
radioactive sources in the FSU. We noted in our 2003 report that, in 
its early stages, the Tripartite Initiative was not well planned, that 
initial efforts were ad hoc, and a more systematic approach to program 
activities was needed.[Footnote 38] However, an IAEA official recently 
told us that coordination with DOE has improved significantly as the 
program evolved. 

Despite the success of the Tripartite Initiative, critical information 
gaps exist between DOE and IAEA that impede DOE's ability to target the 
most vulnerable sites and countries for security improvements. First, 
according to DOE, IAEA has not shared with them, the countries that 
IAEA considers the most in need of security assistance. Second, 
although DOE funds IAEA appraisal missions--known as Radiation Safety 
and Security Infrastructure Appraisals--to assess the weaknesses in 
radioactive source security in IAEA member states, IAEA does not 
provide DOE with the findings of these missions because member state 
information is considered country-sensitive and confidential. The 
objective of these missions is to evaluate, among other things, the 
quality of regulatory controls countries exercise over their 
radiological sources. Results of the appraisals are formalized into 
action plans that provide the framework for subsequent IAEA assistance 
to improve the security of sources. Because IAEA does not provide DOE 
with the results of the missions, DOE is unable to effectively 
prioritize those sites that the missions identified to be most 
vulnerable. DOE officials told us that the lack of country-specific 
information has been an ongoing problem that limits DOE's ability to 
effectively leverage its resources to maximize program impact and 
effectiveness. 

We also found that little coordination exits between DOE and the 
European Commission, which has resulted in the potential for overlap in 
assistance and duplication of efforts. Specifically, the EC provides 
financial support through IAEA, and on a bilateral basis, to secure 
radioactive sources in countries that are candidates for EU membership. 
EC officials told us that no formal communication exists with the 
United States on matters related to radioactive source security 
assistance, and as a result, each is largely unaware of the specific 
sites and locations the other is securing, or whether recipient 
countries are receiving too little or too much assistance. DOE 
officials told us that coordination with the EC has been conducted 
primarily at IAEA donor meetings. 

The EC has coordinated with IAEA to provide assistance to its member 
states to improve control over radiological sources. Specifically, the 
EC works jointly with IAEA on several action projects to strengthen the 
security of radiological materials used for nuclear and non-nuclear 
purposes, including upgrading regulatory infrastructures, installing 
physical security upgrades and, as appropriate, disposing of vulnerable 
radiological sources. As a result of these efforts, the EC has worked 
with IAEA in several regions, but has focused primarily on the 
Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East, Africa, and Mediterranean 
countries. 

Conclusions: 

DOE has achieved noteworthy accomplishments in improving the security 
of radiological sources at hundreds of sites in more than 40 countries. 
We recognize that DOE faces a considerable challenge in securing other 
countries' most dangerous radiological sources, given the number of 
these sources and their widespread dispersal. However, when DOE decided 
to expand its program beyond securing sites in Russia and the FSU, it 
diverted a significant portion of its limited program funding away from 
securing the highest priority and most dangerous radiological sources. 
Instead of focusing increased attention on these highest priority 
threats, such as RTGs, DOE allocated significant program funding 
resources to securing medical facilities that, in our view--as well as 
several DOE officials associated with the program--pose considerably 
less threat to U.S. security interests. While many of the RTGs cannot 
be removed until alternate energy sources are developed to replace 
them, removing as many RTGs as possible, or securing them until they 
can be removed, should be a critical component of DOE's radiological 
threat reduction efforts. 

We believe that DOE's current reorganization of its nuclear and 
radiological threat reduction efforts is a step in the right direction 
toward improving the management of the program. However, there are 
still many significant management issues that need to be addressed and 
resolved. DOE has not paid adequate attention to the long-term 
sustainability of the equipment, which could jeopardize the significant 
investment made to improve the security of radiological sources in many 
countries. The security equipment and upgraded storage facilities 
funded by DOE will require a long-term commitment by the countries to 
help ensure their continued use and operation, and it is not clear to 
us that a sustained stream of funding will be made available by DOE or 
by recipient countries to maintain and/or replace aging or defective 
equipment. Moreover, there are continuing concerns that many of the 
countries do not have adequate nuclear regulatory infrastructures in 
place to promote sustainability. Without a comprehensive sustainability 
plan that adequately addresses a country's ability to reliably install 
and maintain upgrades and provide adequate oversight for source 
security, DOE risks losing a significant portion of its investment to 
improve the security of radiological sources in many countries. 
Furthermore, DOE's decision to increase physical security requirements 
for sites selected for upgrades, based on revised threat protection 
criteria, may have significant cost implications for a program that is 
already facing severe budget reductions. This raises concerns because 
DOE has not adequately evaluated the increased costs associated with 
its elevated threat protection criteria. 

This may also be an opportune time for DOE to streamline the program, 
particularly in light of budget reductions. We question, for example, 
how certain program activities, such as the development of the Interpol 
database, directly contribute to the program's core mission of securing 
radiological sources in other countries. There are other management 
issues that require DOE's attention. First, DOE has not developed 
meaningful performance measurements to demonstrate the extent to which 
the radiological threat has been reduced as a direct result of its 
efforts, including measuring the impact of training and distinguishing 
between the types of sources secured. Second, we recognize the pool of 
reliable contractors to implement security projects and provide 
adequate training may be limited in some countries. However, many 
project delays could be avoided in the future if DOE developed specific 
selection criteria or a set minimum standard for foreign contractor 
qualifications. 

Improving radiological source security is a shared responsibility. 
DOE's investment has been significant and reflects a commitment to 
addressing the problem. However, DOE should not underwrite the majority 
of the costs on behalf of the international community. Specifically, 
certain EU accession candidates and FSU countries, most prominently 
Russia, should be willing to contribute more resources to improve the 
security of dangerous and vulnerable sources in their own countries. In 
addition, DOE now has the authority to accept foreign contributions for 
GTRI programs from other interested countries, such as Canada, Japan, 
and Norway. However, gaps in communication between DOE and 
international partners, such as IAEA and the EC, significantly impede 
effective global radiological threat reduction. 

Finally, developing foreign countries' nuclear regulatory organizations 
is a well recognized and critical component in strengthening 
radiological source security worldwide. NRC has a long- standing 
history of promoting regulatory controls in the FSU and should, in our 
view, play a more prominent role in this regard. DOE's refusal to 
transfer $5 million from its appropriations to NRC to conduct 
regulatory development activities, despite the direction of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, underscores NRC's limited ability to provide 
international assistance, while reliant on funding from other agencies. 
Most of the coordination problems we identified between NRC and other 
agencies could have been avoided if NRC had its own stream of 
predictable and reliable funding for international regulatory 
development, rather than having to rely on DOE or State for funds. 
However, without a direct appropriation, NRC will continue to depend on 
other agencies for funds, thus increasing the likelihood that similar 
problems will occur in the future. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To help ensure that DOE's program focuses on securing the highest 
priority radiological sources and sites, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear 
Security Administration take the following two actions: 

* Limit the number of hospitals and clinics containing radiological 
sources that receive security upgrades to only those deemed as the 
highest-risk, and: 

* To the extent possible, accelerate efforts to remove as many RTGs in 
Russia and, as an interim measure, improve the security of those 
remaining until they can be removed from service. 

Furthermore, we recommend that Secretary of Energy and the 
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration take the 
following seven actions to improve program management: 

* Develop a long-term sustainability plan for security upgrades that 
includes, among other things, future resources required to implement 
such a plan; 

* Reevaluate program activities and eliminate those that do not 
directly contribute to securing the highest priority radiological 
sources in other countries; 

* Conduct an analysis to determine the projected costs associated with 
increased security upgrades in light of newly proposed threat 
protection criteria and limit the number sites to receive increased 
security upgrades until such an analysis has been completed; 

* Establish meaningful performance measurements that demonstrate real 
risk reduction and go beyond a quantitative listing of the number 
countries and sites that have received physical security upgrades; 

* Apply a more rigorous approach to foreign contractor selection to 
help reduce potential project delays in the future; 

* Seek assurances from recipient countries that plans are in place to 
maintain security-related equipment and facilities funded by the United 
States; and: 

* Develop strategies to encourage cost sharing with recipient 
countries, including Russia and EU accession countries. 

Finally, in an effort to improve coordination, the Secretary of Energy 
and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, 
in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, should work with IAEA and European 
Commission officials to consider ways to systematically improve 
information sharing to maximize and leverage resources and 
institutional expertise. 

Matters for Congressional Consideration: 

If the Congress believes that regulatory infrastructure development is 
the key to the long-term sustainability of radiological source security 
efforts, it should consider providing NRC with authority and a direct 
appropriation to conduct these activities. The appropriation would be 
provided to NRC in lieu of providing the funds to DOE or another agency 
to reimburse NRC for its activities. Should the Congress decide to do 
so, NRC's efforts need to be fully coordinated with those of State, 
DOE, and IAEA. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided DOE and NRC with draft copies of this report for their 
review and comment. DOE provided written comments, which are presented 
as appendix III. NRC's written comments are presented as appendix IV. 
NRC also provided technical comments, which we incorporated in the 
report. NRC neither agreed nor disagreed with our matter for 
congressional consideration, which would provide NRC with the legal 
authority and a direct appropriation to conduct international 
regulatory activities for radiological source security. However, NRC 
stated that if Congress acts upon our matter for consideration, NRC 
would work closely with State, relevant executive branch agencies, and 
IAEA to implement the program. 

In its written comments, DOE agreed with our conclusion that the 
department faced a considerable challenge in securing other countries' 
most dangerous radiological sources, given the number of these sources 
and how widely dispersed they are. Furthermore, DOE stated that 
enormous amounts of dangerous material have not been secured, although 
the IRTR program has achieved a great deal of threat reduction in a 
short period of time. DOE stated that the recommendations were very 
helpful and would further strengthen its program. 

DOE also noted that it had measures in place--as a result of its 
reorganization of GTRI--to address program challenges and concerns that 
we raised, such as site prioritization; quality assurance/ 
sustainability; coordination; and transportation. We recognized in the 
report that the reorganization of the program was a step in the right 
direction toward improving program management. However, as we noted in 
our report, many significant management issues still need to be 
addressed and resolved despite the reorganization. That is why we 
believe it was important to offer recommendations to improve program 
management and source prioritization efforts. 

In other comments, DOE stated that the IRTR program uses a number of 
factors to determine priority levels for the sites it selects to 
upgrade in addition to the amount of radioactivity contained in 
radiological sources. These other factors include (1) known terrorist 
threat in the country/region; (2) current level of security at the 
site; and (3) the proximity of the site in relationship to potential 
strategic targets of U.S. interest. In our report, we stated that site 
selection was based on a number of factors, including those 
specifically noted by DOE in its written comments. We also pointed out 
in our report that DOE's guidance on site selection has not clearly 
discriminated between the different sites secured and which sites were 
to be considered the highest priority. We are encouraged that DOE is 
explicitly linking its prioritization guidelines to a site's proximity 
to potential strategic targets of U.S. interest. However, it remains to 
be seen how consistently DOE will apply this criteria to its site 
selection process in the future. In a related comment, DOE stated that 
it will continue to accelerate RTG recoveries but must also address 
high priority medical and other sources. In our view, this action by 
DOE would be consistent with the key conclusions and recommendations in 
our report. Our recommendations specifically state that DOE should, to 
the extent possible, remove as many RTGs in Russia and limit the number 
of hospitals and clinics containing radiological sources that receive 
security upgrades to only those deemed to be the highest risk. 

With regard to quality assurance and program sustainability issues, DOE 
stated that it employs a standard process that ensures quality 
assurance for the security equipment that it installs. This process 
includes, among other things, conducting post-installation visits by 
technical experts for the purpose of assuring that all equipment and 
systems are installed as agreed upon. DOE also noted that despite these 
measures, it would further investigate its process to identify and 
implement additional improvements. We think DOE should take these steps 
because, as discussed in our report, we identified several problems 
with malfunctioning equipment and other maintenance problems at sites 
containing radiological sources. DOE also noted that it has a short- 
term sustainability program for every site that it upgrades that 
includes a 3-year warranty as well as preventative maintenance 
contracts and training for operational staff. DOE believes that we 
should revise the report to indicate the existence of the 3-year 
warranty. Our report recognizes that DOE's program guidance calls for 
preventative maintenance contracts and training. We also noted that DOE 
provides a 3-year warranty, and we gave DOE credit for providing this 
coverage. Our main point remains--which DOE explicitly agreed with-- 
that DOE has not developed a long-term sustainability plan for the 
equipment it has installed. Nevertheless, we clarified our report 
language, as appropriate, to state that DOE does have a short-term 
sustainability plan but has not developed a long-term plan to maintain 
the security upgrades completed. 

Regarding coordination, DOE cited numerous examples in its written 
comments of close cooperation with other U.S. government agencies, 
other DOE elements, and international partners on matters pertaining to 
international radiological source security. We believe the report 
fairly characterized DOE's coordination efforts in each of these areas. 
Specifically, we noted that DOE had improved coordination with State 
and NRC since we reported on this matter in 2003 and has increased 
information-sharing with the agencies. In addition, we believe our 
characterization of coordination problems within the department is 
correct. Our evaluation was based on information provided by an 
independent consultant's report as well as our own analysis of 
conditions we found within the department pertaining to inconsistent 
and, at times, inadequately coordinated efforts by different DOE 
programs responsible for threat reduction activities in the same 
country. As we noted in the report, DOE officials recognized that 
coordination within the agency needs to be improved and that a 
comprehensive and consistent approach to threat reduction efforts 
between nuclear and radiological threat reduction activities should be 
established. We also noted in the report that DOE's September 2006 
reorganization of its GTRI efforts is designed to create a more 
streamlined structure that is organized along three geographic regions, 
which could improve program coordination. 

On a related matter, DOE stated that we should have given IAEA an 
opportunity to review and address some of the issues raised in our 
report about limited information sharing, which impeded DOE's ability 
to target the most vulnerable sites and countries for security 
improvements. Since this information was provided to us by DOE 
officials, it is unclear to us what benefit would have been achieved by 
providing a draft of this report to IAEA for review and comment of 
DOE's views. Our report notes that DOE has, despite some information- 
sharing problems with IAEA, improved coordination with the agency in 
recent years to strengthen controls over other countries' radiological 
sources. 

Finally, with regard to transportation of sources, DOE commented that, 
among other things, it had been working with the U.S. Department of 
Transportation, IAEA, and key IAEA donor countries to strengthen 
transport security regulations. We added this information to our report 
based on DOE's comments. DOE also stated that it was working with 
Russia to enhance the security of radioactive materials, including 
providing cargo trucks and escort vehicles for the Moscow waste storage 
facility. We had already recognized this fact in the report. More 
broadly, however, we believe that the report accurately and fairly 
depicts the limitations of DOE efforts regarding transportation 
security. A primary source of information for our observation came 
directly from a DOE analysis--cited in the report--which concluded that 
the department was addressing transportation security on an ad-hoc 
basis and that the existing method of providing transportation security 
had serious limitations and lacked a commitment to integrate transport 
security into all countries participating in the IRTR program. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. We will then send copies of this report to the 
Secretary of Energy; the Secretary of State; the Administrator, 
National Nuclear Security Administration; the Chairman, Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; 
and interested congressional committees. We will also make copies 
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be made 
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have questions concerning this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on 
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report include 
Erika D. Carter, Glen Levis, Mehrunisa Qayyum, Keith Rhodes (GAO's 
Chief Technologist), and Jim Shafer. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Gene Aloise: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

We focused our review primarily on the Department of Energy (DOE), 
since it is the lead federal agency for improving the security of 
radiological sources worldwide and provides significant funds for that 
purpose. We also performed work at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) and Department of State (State) in Washington, D.C., which also 
provide assistance to help other countries secure their sealed 
radiological sources. In addition, we reviewed program-related 
activities and interviewed program officials from Argonne National 
Laboratory in Argonne, Illinois; the Los Alamos National Laboratory in 
Los Alamos, New Mexico; Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in 
Richland, Washington; Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New 
Mexico; the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, 
Austria; and the European Commission (EC) in Brussels, Belgium. We also 
met with nongovernmental organizations, including, the Council on 
Foreign Relations and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
In November 2005, we attended the Trilateral Commission meeting held in 
the United Kingdom, which discussed international approaches to 
securing radiological sources against terrorism. 

We visited four countries to determine how DOE has implemented its 
program to secure radiological sources overseas. We selected these 
countries based on several criteria, including where DOE has spent the 
most funds since 2002. Overall, these four countries represented about 
$37.4 million, or about 35 percent, of overall program expenditures. We 
selected Lithuania and Poland since, among other reasons, DOE officials 
told us that these were model countries in securing radiological 
sources and implementing effective physical security upgrades. Also, we 
selected Russia and Georgia because they received significant program 
funds, totaling about $34.2 million of the $107.7 million. In addition, 
thousands of radiological sources are located in these two countries. 
In the case of Russia, it contains the majority of RTGs worldwide and 
operates 44 percent of all Radons in the former Soviet Union. 

During our review, we observed physical security upgrades at all types 
of sites: medical, industrial, research, storage facilities, and RTGs. 
For instance, we visited numerous medical and industrial sites 
throughout Lithuania and Poland. Specifically in Lithuania, we visited 
the Radiation Protection Center, Vilnius Oncology Institute Clinic, 
Klaipeda City Hospital, the Kaunas Oncology Clinic, and Saiuliu 
Oncology Hospital, as well as the Lithuanian Institute of Physics and 
the Maisiagala Repository. In Poland, we visited the Regionaine 
Centreem Kriwodawstwa I Krwiolecznictwa (Children's Hospital) as well 
as the Glowny Urzad Miar (Main Measurement Office), Polytechnic 
Institute of Lodz, Radioisotope Center (Polatom), Geofizyka Krakow, 
Radioisotope Waste Management Plant in Swierk, Technical University 
Institute of Applied Radiation Chemistry, and the Technical Institute 
of Applied Physics. At each location, we interviewed facility staff who 
were responsible for implementing radiological source security 
procedures and using the monitoring equipment funded by DOE. Facility 
staff included--but was not limited to--doctors, clinical technicians, 
and other medical support staff. At each site, we met with local guards 
to determine how well they were trained and equipped. We also 
interviewed host country contractors who were responsible for 
installing and maintaining physical security upgrades. 

We also met with host government officials in both countries. In 
Lithuania we met with officials from the Ministry of Economy; RATA 
(Lithuanian Radioactive Waste Management Agency); the Radiation 
Protection Center (nuclear regulatory organization); and the Ministry 
of Environment. In Poland, we interviewed officials from the National 
Atomic Energy Agency (Poland's nuclear regulator), the Department of 
Environmental Hygiene, and the Ministry of Health. 

We also visited Russia and Georgia to obtain a first-hand look at waste 
facilities that contain radiological sources. Specifically, we visited 
the Moscow Radon site at Sergiev Posad, located about 90 kilometers 
from Moscow and the St. Petersburg Radon site, located about 80 
kilometers from St. Petersburg. While in Russia we also met with the 
key federal agencies responsible for radiological source management and 
oversight. Specifically, we met with several high-level officials from 
Rostechnadzor, Russia's nuclear regulator (the Federal Environmental, 
Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service of Russia); the Federal 
Agency for Construction and Utilities; and the Department for Nuclear 
and Radiation Safety at the Federal Atomic Energy Agency. Additionally, 
we interviewed directors of both the Moscow and St. Petersburg Radon 
facilities; officials of the IBRAE Institute (Russian National Academy 
of Sciences); and directors of VNIITFA (Russian National Technical 
Physics and Automation Research Institute), the designer of RTGs. 
Moreover, after meeting with officials from the Kurchatov Institute, 
which is primarily responsible for the RTG removal, we visited three 
sites where RTGs had been removed and replaced with alternative energy 
sources. 

In Georgia, we visited the Mtsheta national repository located at the 
Institute of Physics near Tbilisi, Georgia, as well as Georgia's 
temporary national storage facility that stores many high-risk 
radiological sources, including six RTGs and a seed irradiator. 
Regarding Georgia's medical sites, we also visited the National Cancer 
Center of Georgia and the Kutaisi Oncological Center and interviewed 
staff and guards who were responsible for source security. We met with 
officials from the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service of the Ministry 
of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources (Georgia's nuclear 
regulator), the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Department, the Institute 
of Radiobiology, and the Chamber of Control. 

To assess the progress of DOE's efforts to help other countries secure 
their sealed radiological sources, we obtained and analyzed 
documentation on DOE's International Radiological Threat Reduction 
Program (IRTR), including project work plans for each country and 
program activity; strategic planning documents; and internal briefings. 
For example, we reviewed DOE's Action Plan to Secure and Control 
Foreign-Origin Source Materials for Radiological Dispersal Devices 
(April 2003), and Programmatic Guidelines for Site Prioritization and 
Protection Implementation (September 2006). We supplemented the 
documentation with interviews with senior level DOE officials 
responsible for implementing the IRTR program. 

To specifically determine the status of efforts across the 49 countries 
receiving DOE's assistance, we reviewed DOE's Project Management 
Information System database to construct a summary table that included 
factors, among other things, the number of sites completed; host 
country agencies and international organizations involved in 
radiological source security; and program accomplishments and 
challenges. To identify challenges DOE faces in securing sources in 
other countries and to assess sustainability efforts, we collected and 
analyzed (1) IRTR program trip reports for all countries participating 
in the program, and (2) testimonial evidence obtained from project 
managers, security specialists, and contracting officers to identify 
all programmatic and management challenges. Furthermore, we performed a 
comprehensive review and analysis of trip reports from fiscal year 2004 
through fiscal year 2006. 

To assess current and planned program costs of U.S. programs that 
provide assistance to secure radiological sources in other countries, 
we reviewed budget documents from DOE and NRC detailing program 
expenditures from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2006. We 
obtained responses from key agency database officials to a number of 
questions focused on data reliability, covering issues such as data- 
entry access and the accuracy and completeness of the data. For DOE 
specifically, to determine how much DOE had budgeted and spent through 
August 31, 2006, to secure radiological sources in other countries, we 
reviewed element of cost reports detailing program expenditures by 
country, national laboratory, and program objective per fiscal year to 
determine the amount spent in-country and the overall carryover of 
unspent and unobligated funds. Furthermore, to determine planned 
program costs for DOE, we reviewed DOE's congressional budget request 
for fiscal year 2007 and met with senior DOE officials to learn about 
DOE's plans for addressing reduced program funding. Follow-up questions 
were added whenever necessary. Caveats and limitations to the data were 
noted in the documentation, where necessary. We determined that the 
data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report, based 
on work we performed to ensure the data's reliability. 

To assess the extent to which coordination has occurred within DOE as 
well as on an interagency basis, we obtained and analyzed documents 
from DOE, NRC, and State regarding their radiological threat reduction 
and nonproliferation activities. We interviewed several senior 
officials at NRC, including the Senior Advisor for Nuclear Security, a 
senior foreign policy advisor for the Office of International Programs, 
and a Senior Engineer. At State, we interviewed several high-level 
officials, including the Senior Coordinator for Nuclear Safety from the 
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. We also reviewed 
State, NRC, and DOE documents regarding Iraq work to highlight 
interagency coordination. To address the level of coordination with 
international organizations, we met with senior officials at the 
International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Commission, 
including the Director of Nuclear Safety, and a senior official from 
the External Relations Directorate, respectively. Finally, we met with 
the Director of the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Centre from the 
Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority to learn about NRC's role in 
providing regulatory assistance to Armenia. 

We performed our review in Washington, D.C., and other locations, from 
November 2005 to December 2006 in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: DOE's IRTR Program Expenditures, Allocated by Region, as 
of August 31, 2006: 

[End of section] 

Dollars in thousands. 

Former Soviet Union. 

Recipient Country: Russia; 
U.S. Costs: $10,451; 
In-country costs: $22,721; 
Total spent: $33,172. 

Recipient Country: Ukraine; 
U.S. Costs: 1,490; 
In-country costs: 2,000; 
Total spent: 3,490. 

Recipient Country: Lithuania; 
U.S. Costs: 736; 
In-country costs: 588; 
Total spent: 1,324. 

Recipient Country: Georgia Republic; 
U.S. Costs: 359; 
In-country costs: 662; 
Total spent: 1,022. 

Recipient Country: Kazakhstan; 
U.S. Costs: 327; 
In-country costs: 519; 
Total spent: 846. 

Recipient Country: Uzbekistan; 
U.S. Costs: 282; 
In-country costs: 490; 
Total spent: 772. 

Recipient Country: Moldova; 
U.S. Costs: 344; 
In- country costs: 441; 
Total spent: 785. 

Recipient Country: Azerbaijan; 
U.S. Costs: 214; 
In-country costs: 557; 
Total spent: 771. 

Recipient Country: Kyrgyzstan; 
U.S. Costs: 329; 
In-country costs: 282; 
Total spent: 611. 

Recipient Country: Tajikistan; 
U.S. Costs: 321; 
In-country costs: 204; 
Total spent: 525. 

Recipient Country: Latvia; 
U.S. Costs: 223; 
In- country costs: 28; 
Total spent: 251. 

Recipient Country: Armenia; 
U.S. Costs: 172; 
In- country costs: 26; 
Total spent: 198. 

Recipient Country: Estonia; 
U.S. Costs: 114; 
In- country costs: 44; 
Total spent: 158. 

Recipient Country: Belarus; 
U.S. Costs: 247; 
In- country costs: 223; 
Total spent: 470. 

Recipient Country: Subtotal; 
U.S. Costs: $15,609; 
In-country costs: $28,785; 
Total spent: $44,395. 

Africa. 

Recipient Country: Ethiopia; 
U.S. Costs: $91; 
In- country costs: $0; 
Total spent: $91. 

Recipient Country: South Africa; 
U.S. Costs: 69; 
In-country costs: 0; 
Total spent: 69. 

Recipient Country: Kenya; 
U.S. Costs: 15; 
In- country costs: 0; 
Total spent: 15. 

Recipient Country: Nigeria; 
U.S. Costs: 104; 
In- country costs: 0; 
Total spent: 104. 

Recipient Country: Morocco; 
U.S. Costs: 306; 
In- country costs: 322; 
Total spent: 628. 

Recipient Country: Tanzania; 
U.S. Costs: 237; 
In- country costs: 131; 
Total spent: 368. 

Recipient Country: Libya; 
U.S. Costs: 2; 
In- country costs: 0; 
Total spent: 2. 

Recipient Country: Subtotal; 
U.S. Costs: $824; 
In-country costs: $453; 
Total spent: $1,277. 

Europe. 

Recipient Country: Poland; 
U.S. Costs: $538; 
In- country costs: $1,387; 
Total spent: $1,925. 

Recipient Country: Bulgaria; 
U.S. Costs: 442; 
In- country costs: 419; 
Total spent: 861. 

Recipient Country: Greece; 
U.S. Costs: 397; 
In- country costs: 259; 
Total spent: 656. 

Recipient Country: Serbia; 
U.S. Costs: 138; 
In- country costs: 177; 
Total spent: 315. 

Recipient Country: Albania; 
U.S. Costs: 332; 
In- country costs: 6; 
Total spent: 338. 

Recipient Country: Subtotal; 
U.S. Costs: $1,847; 
In-country costs: $2,248; 
Total spent: $4,095. 

Latin America. 

Recipient Country: Colombia; 
U.S. Costs: $401; 
In-country costs: $913; 
Total spent: $1,314. 

Recipient Country: Panama; 
U.S. Costs: 114; 
In- country costs: 100; 
Total spent: 214. 

Recipient Country: Peru; 
U.S. Costs: 210; 
In- country costs: 176; 
Total spent: 386. 

Recipient Country: Nicaragua; 
U.S. Costs: 72; 
In- country costs: 45; 
Total spent: 117. 

Recipient Country: El Salvador; 
U.S. Costs: 82; 
In-country costs: 67; 
Total spent: 149. 

Recipient Country: Chile; 
U.S. Costs: 201; 
In- country costs: 110; 
Total spent: 311. 

Recipient Country: Ecuador; 
U.S. Costs: 158; 
In- country costs: 152; 
Total spent: 310. 

Recipient Country: Argentina; 
U.S. Costs: 124; 
In-country costs: 9; 
Total spent: 133. 

Recipient Country: Brazil; 
U.S. Costs: 90; 
In- country costs: 15; 
Total spent: 105. 

Recipient Country: Honduras; 
U.S. Costs: 122; 
In- country costs: 20; 
Total spent: 142. 

Recipient Country: Guatemala; 
U.S. Costs: 104; 
In-country costs: 42; 
Total spent: 146. 

Recipient Country: Bolivia; 
U.S. Costs: 101; 
In- country costs: 66; 
Total spent: 167. 

Recipient Country: Mexico; 
U.S. Costs: 0; 
In- country costs: 0; 
Total spent: 0. 

Recipient Country: Subtotal; 
U.S. Costs: $1,779; 
In-country costs: $1,715; 
Total spent: $3,494. 

Asia-Pacific. 

Recipient Country: Indonesia; 
U.S. Costs: $244; 
In-country costs: $359; 
Total spent: $603. 

Recipient Country: Philippines; 
U.S. Costs: 235; 
In-country costs: 196; 
Total spent: 431. 

Recipient Country: Vietnam; 
U.S. Costs: 112; 
In- country costs: 2; 
Total spent: 114. 

Recipient Country: Bangladesh; 
U.S. Costs: 161; 
In-country costs: 43; 
Total spent: 204. 

Recipient Country: Subtotal; 
U.S. Costs: $752; 
In-country costs: $600; 
Total spent: $1,352. 

Middle East. 

Recipient Country: Iraq; 
U.S. Costs: $4,250; 
In- country costs: $206; 
Total spent: $4,456. 

Recipient Country: Afghanistan; 
U.S. Costs: 607; 
In-country costs: 0; 
Total spent: 607. 

Recipient Country: Yemen; 
U.S. Costs: 68; 
In- country costs: 48; 
Total spent: 116. 

Recipient Country: Jordan; 
U.S. Costs: 188; 
In- country costs: 56; 
Total spent: 244. 

Recipient Country: Egypt; 
U.S. Costs: 955; 
In- country costs: 526; 
Total spent: 1,481. 

Recipient Country: Turkey; 
U.S. Costs: 146; 
In- country costs: 1; 
Total spent: 147. 

Recipient Country: Subtotal; 
U.S. Costs: $6,214; 
In-country costs: $837; 
Total spent: $7,051. 

Recipient Country: Total; 
U.S. Costs: $27,025; 
In-country costs: $34,638; 
Total spent: $61,664. 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOE. 

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Energy: 

NNSA: 
Department of Energy: 
National Nuclear Security Administration: 
Washington, DC 20585: 

January 17, 2007: 

Mr. Gene Aloise Director: 
National Resources and Environment: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20584: 

Dear Mr. Aloise: 

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) appreciates the 
opportunity to review the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) 
draft report, "Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's International 
Radiological Threat Reduction Program Needs to Focus Future Efforts on 
Securing the Highest Priority Radiological Sources." We understand that 
this work was done at the request of the Senate's Subcommittee on 
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal workforce, and the 
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs. 

We appreciate the fact that GAO has incorporated changes that add 
clarity to the original draft report. Equally, we appreciate the fact 
that GAO recognizes that we have achieved noteworthy accomplishments in 
improving the security of radiological sources at hundreds of sites in 
more than 40 countries. As is acknowledged, we have: 

* secured or recovered radioactive sources at over 430 facilities in 43 
countries under this program since 2002; 

* removed radiological sources from war-torn Chechnya; 

* improved security in Greece prior to the 2004 Olympics; 

* created secure storage facilities in Uzbekistan, Moldova, Tajikistan, 
and Georgia; 

* removed or secured, in cooperation with our international partners, 
more than 30% of the radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) 
located in Russia; 

* agreement to obtain international funding (e.g. Government of Canada) 
to accelerate RTG security efforts in Russia; 

* improved coordination with the Department of State and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) to secure radiological sources worldwide 
(the most prominent example was the cooperation and radiological 
sources in Iraq); and 

* improved coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) and developed several successful bilateral and multilateral 
partnerships to enhance physical protection of vulnerable radioactive 
material at various sites around the world. 

As you note, radioactive sources provide substantial medical, 
industrial, and agriculture benefits and are, therefore, in widespread 
commercial use throughout the world. We agree with the assessment that 
we face a considerable challenge in securing other countries' most 
dangerous radiological sources given the number of these sources and 
how widely dispersed they are. We further recognize that we have 
achieved a great deal of threat reduction in a short period of time but 
that there remains an enormous amount of dangerous material left to 
secure or eliminate. 

Nonetheless, GAO has identified areas that it believes need to be 
further addressed, such as prioritization, quality assurance/ 
sustainability, coordination, and transportation. It is important to 
note that we already have in place substantial measures to address each 
of these areas. For example, during the past several months the Global 
Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) undertook a major program assessment 
aimed at establishing new prioritization guidelines for securing and 
recovering vulnerable nuclear and other radioactive material around the 
world. GTRI has further improved coordination by organizing the program 
regionally by country. 

Regarding GAO's belief that we need to further address prioritization, 
we note that: 

* NNSA and its international partners have made substantial progress by 
securing 742 sites. All of these sites are of the highest priority and 
contain vulnerable radiological sources. Specifically NNSA or its 
partners have completed security upgrades affecting: 

- 374 of 1,062 (35%) of the RTGs: 

- 30 of 69 (43%) of the waste repositories: 

- 82 of 229 (36%) of the research institutes and commercial/industrial 
sites: 

- 256 of 1,951 (13%) of the medical facilities: 

* Total curies of radioactivity are just one of several critical 
factors that the program uses to determine priority. The others are (1) 
known terrorist threat in the country/region, (2) current level of 
security at the site, and (3) the proximity of the site to potential 
strategic targets of U.S. interest. The majority of large scale 
terrorist attacks to date have been at U.S. assets (embassies, military 
bases/ships, etc.) or western hotels and transportation systems in 
Africa, Middle East, Asia, and Europe using locally purchased/stolen 
materials to minimize the risk of detection prior to the attack. 

* Because of this, specific types of medical sources are highly 
attractive to would-be terrorists. GAO's report highlights a 1,400 
curie medical source in Brazil that killed 4 people, caused widespread 
panic, and resulted in $36 million in decontamination costs. 

* Recent research conducted by Sandia National Laboratories, as you 
know, documents the ease with which a medical teletherapy source could 
be stolen within minutes and helps to validate the significance of this 
risk. 

* As GAO states, it is the small size, portability and potential value 
of sealed radiological sources that make them vulnerable to misuse. At 
the same time, as GAO recommends, NNSA will continue to accelerate RTG 
recoveries but the program must also address these high priority 
medical and other radioactive sources. 

Regarding your belief that we need to further address quality 
assurance/sustainability, we note that: 

* Our standard protection upgrade implementation practice ensures 
quality assurance. This is accomplished by (1) having the contract for 
the development of a protection upgrade design reviewed and approved by 
NNSA physical protection experts prior to payment for the design 
document; (2) insisting the approved design document is a precondition 
to proceeding with procurement of protection equipment and 
installation; (3) conducting post-installation visits by our technical 
experts for the purpose of assuring all equipment and systems are 
installed as agreed upon in the design document (if installations are 
performed incorrectly, payments are withheld until corrections are 
made). We will further investigate this process to identify and 
implement additional improvements. 

* GTRI already has a short-term sustainability program for every site 
that includes a 3-year warranty as well as preventative maintenance 
contracts and training on newly installed equipment for operational 
staff at the sites. In order to ensure effective long-term security 
upgrades at facilities around the world, we agree with the 
recommendation to expand this into a long-term sustainability plan of 
the security measures. However, the draft report should be revised to 
accurately reflect the existence of a 3-year warranty plan for each 
site, but note that additional work needs to be done to develop a long-
term sustainability plan. This phrase should be added in the Executive 
Summary and on pages 1, 8, 10, 11 and in the title on page 29. We are 
currently re-examining our sustainability policies and procedures to 
assure ourselves that security upgrades can and will function 
effectively over the long term, especially in those countries that lack 
reliable communications and electric power systems. 

Regarding your belief that we need to further address coordination, we 
note that NNSA is closely cooperating with elements of the Department 
of Energy (DOE), other Government Agencies, and international partners. 
For example, we: 

* worked closely with the NRC and the Massachusetts Department of 
Public Health's (MDPH) Radiation Control Program in removing 
radioactive materials from Massachusetts in December 2006; 

* teamed with other elements of our organization to secure and recover 
large quantities of orphaned nuclear materials and radioactive 
materials in Iraq under Project Maximus in 2004; 

* continue to work closely with the Department of State and NRC to 
develop and implement physical protection programs internationally; 

* are closely cooperating and coordinating with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Specific programs include: successful 
Tripartite Initiative with the IAEA and the Government of the Russian 
Federation to identify, locate and secure disused and orphaned sources 
in the Former Soviet Republics, including the recovery of a large 
quantity of vulnerable radioactive sources from Chechnya this past 
year; and teaming with the Department of State to assist the IAEA in 
development and implementation of a major upgrade to its Radiological 
Authority Information System (RAIS); 

* provide technical experts to support the IAEA's Office of Nuclear 
Security's programs to assist countries in the areas of regulatory 
infrastructure support, physical protection training and inspections; 
providing technical experts to assist the IAEA in the recovery of 
vulnerable at risk radioactive sources; 

* are teaming with the IAEA and the Government of South Africa to 
recover and disposition sixty-eight (68) disused or orphaned sources 
from other African countries to mitigate security concerns; assisting 
the IAEA and the Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa (NECSA) in 
development of a mobile Spent High Activity Radioactive Source (SHARS) 
conditioning facility to aid in the recovery of vulnerable, high-risk 
orphaned and disused sources around the world. This system is scheduled 
to be used to recover several high activity sources in Africa during 
the first quarter of 2007; 

* are teaming with the Government of Australia and the IAEA in securing 
and recovering vulnerable high risk radioactive sources in Southeast 
Asia. 

As an indication of the importance and effectiveness of our RTG 
security and recovery program, the Government of Canada is preparing to 
provide NNSA approximately $2 million to augment the work currently 
being done by GTRI to secure and recover RTG's in Russia. 

Regarding your belief that we need to further address transportation, 
we note that: 

* Our national laboratories have been working with the U.S. Department 
of Transportation, the IAEA's Office of Nuclear Security, and key IAEA 
Donor States to strengthen transport security regulations and 
procedures to mitigate the risks of theft or diversion of nuclear and 
other radioactive materials in transit. 

* We have also been working bilaterally with the Government of the 
Russian Federation to enhance the security of radioactive materials 
during their transport from the end-user's site to a location of final 
material disposition. Because the vast majority of all waste shipments 
within the Russian RADON system are handled by the RADONs located at 
Sevgayeo Posad and Leningrad, most of the funds we provided to upgrade 
transport security within Russia, including cargo trucks and escort 
vehicles, were expended in support of shipments to and from these two 
sites. 

NNSA acknowledges the efforts made by the GAO report to reinforce the 
importance of NNSA's nuclear and radiological security programs in 
support of U.S. national security. GAO's independent validation of our 
successes and recommendations for further strengthening of our efforts 
is very helpful. We believe, however, that the IAEA should have had the 
opportunity to review and address some of the allegations made by this 
report concerning the close cooperation and coordination of programs we 
have maintained with the IAEA over the past several years. 

Should you have any questions related to this response, please contact 
Richard Speidel, Director, Policy and Internal Controls Management at 
202-586-5009. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Michael C. Kane:  
Associate Administrator for Management and Administration: 

cc: William Tobey, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation: 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001: 

January 10, 2007: 

Mr. Gene Aloise: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Aloise: 

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am 
responding to your e-mail dated December 20, 2006, requesting NRC 
review and comment on your draft report, "Nuclear Nonproliferation: 
DOE's International Radiological Threat Reduction Program Needs to 
Focus Future Efforts on Securing the Highest Priority Radiological 
Sources" (GAO-07-282). I appreciate your providing the NRC the 
opportunity to review this draft report, the time and effort that you 
and your staff have invested in reviewing this important topic, and the 
care that you have taken to ensure that your report is accurate and 
constructive. Although the report is not focused principally on NRC 
activities, it does recognize NBC's contribution to this important 
effort. 

With regard to the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) 
recommendation that the United States Congress consider providing the 
NRC the authority and direct appropriation to conduct international 
regulatory infrastructure development in support of the long-term 
sustainability of radiological source security efforts, the NRC notes 
that this recommendation would expand its current program of 
international assistance in regulatory controls over sources. NRC 
already has a modest program to strengthen the regulation of sources in 
countries such as Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. This program seeks 
to ensure that the national regulator has a sustainable nuclear 
regulatory infrastructure that includes a legislative mandate to 
control sources, resources and skilled personnel, and the means to 
implement the guidance in the International Atomic Energy Agency's 
(IAEA) Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radiological 
Sources. If Congress implements GAO's recommendation, NRC would work 
closely with the Department of State, relevant Executive Branch 
agencies, and IAEA to expand the NBC's present program. In addition, 
the NRC believes that the direct funding must be sufficient on an 
annual basis to expand and sustain the short and long-term efforts of 
the program. Because NRC is required by law to recover most of its 
budget through fees to licensees and applicants, funding for these 
activities should be exempt from NBC's fee recovery requirements. 

In addition to NBC's comment on GAO's recommendation, I have enclosed 
additional comments related to enhancing the clarity and accuracy of 
statements in the body of the report. Should you have any questions 
about these comments, please contact Ms. Melinda Malloy, at (301) 415- 
1785, of my staff. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Luis A. Reyes: 
Executive Director for Operations: 

Enclosure: 
As stated: 

[End of section] 

(36042) 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] A curie is a unit of measurement of radioactivity. In modern 
nuclear physics, it is defined as the amount of substance in which 37 
billion atoms per second undergo radiological disintegration. In the 
international system of units, the becquerel is the preferred unit of 
radioactivity. One curie equals 3.7 x 1010 becquerels. 

[2] H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 107-350, at 431 (2001). 

[3] NNSA is a separately organized agency within DOE that was created 
by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. 
No. 106-65 (2000), with responsibility for the nation's nuclear 
weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs. 

[4] GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs Better Information to Guide Its 
Expanded Recovery of Sealed Radiological Sources, GAO-05-967 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2005). 

[5] The Atoms for Peace Program was established in the 1950s for the 
purpose of promoting peaceful domestic and international exploration, 
development, and advancement of nuclear energy. Under the auspices of 
the program, DOE and its predecessor agencies provided many countries 
with sealed radiological sources. 

[6] DOE manages the largest laboratory system of its kind in the world. 
The mission of DOE's 22 laboratories has evolved. Originally created to 
design and build atomic weapons, these laboratories have since expanded 
to conduct research in many disciplines--from high-energy physics to 
advanced computing. 

[7] In addition to the IRTR program, GTRI consists of the U.S. 
Radiological Threat Reduction, the Reduced Enrichment for Research and 
Test Reactors, the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return, the U.S. 
Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance, Emerging 
Threats and Gap Materials, Global Research Reactor Security, and BN-350 
programs. 

[8] The countries of the former Soviet Union include Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and 
Uzbekistan. 

[9] The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive 
Sources serves as a guide in developing policies, laws, and regulations 
on maintaining the safety and security of radiological sources. It is 
not, however, legally binding. The code, which was revised in 2003, 
includes, among other things, enhanced requirements for the security of 
sources. As of December 2006, 88 countries, including the United 
States, had committed to implement the code. Further, in September 
2004, IAEA's Board of Governors approved new guidance on the import and 
export of sources, which is designed to help countries ensure that high-
risk sources are supplied only to authorized end-users. As of December 
2006, 37 countries, including the United States, had committed to 
implement the import/export guidance. 

[10] The EC manages foreign assistance programs for its 27 EU member 
states. 

[11] GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International Assistance 
Efforts to Control Sealed Radiological Sources Need Strengthening, GAO-
03-638 (Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2003). 

[12] The hand-held radiation detection equipment was provided under 
DOE's Cooperative Radiological Instrument Threat Reduction program. 
This program is designed to help DOE's international radiological 
threat reduction program to ensure that other countries' law 
enforcement officials are provided with the necessary equipment and 
training to detect and mitigate radiological security threats. 

[13] Sandia National Labatories determined that a source could be 
easily removed from a teletherapy machine using basic tools and 
drawings. 

[14] Norway has committed to securing an additional 77 RTGs along the 
Arctic coast, including the Kola Peninsula. Specifically, Norway agreed 
to remove 30 RTGs in 2006, 30 in 2007 and 17 in 2008. 

[15] According to DOE, this is part of a larger funding commitment by 
Canada for $2 million to support radiological source security in 
Russia. 

[16] DOE identified the Society for Petroleum Engineers, which is an 
organization that represents petroleum companies' engineers and petro- 
physicists. Its membership includes both service operators, like 
Chevron and British Petroleum, and service providers, like Halliburton. 

[17] DOE identified 10 radioisotopes of concern: americium-241, 
californium-252, cesium-137, cobalt-60, curium-234, iridium-192, 
plutonium-238, plutonium-239, radium-226, and strontium-90. 

[18] In targeting countries to receive assistance, DOE first assessed 
the vulnerability of radiological sources in 191 countries. Based on 
this assessment, DOE determined that 100 of these countries were a high 
priority and were targeted for assistance. Within the 100 countries, 
DOE further refined the priority list and ranked countries as either 
high, medium, or low priority. 

[19] GAO-03-638. 

[20] Number of sites and types of upgrades installed vary per country, 
and warranty costs may vary accordingly. 

[21] ANSTO operates Australia's nuclear facilities and conducts nuclear 
research for the Australian government. 

[22] For more information on IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund, see Nuclear 
Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards and Nuclear 
Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed, GAO-06-93 
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2005). 

[23] DOE noted that some of the FSU countries that received DOE 
assistance had comparatively larger infrastructure problems than that 
of several non-FSU countries and, in some cases, higher labor rates; 
and therefore, project implementation costs in the FSU countries were 
proportionally higher. 

[24] Of the $107.7 million in total program expenditures, $61.7 million 
could be traced to specific country-related expenditures. 

[25] DOE also has funds budgeted to be spent in Mexico, but to date, no 
funds have been expended. 

[26] GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Effort to Close Russia's 
Plutonium Production Reactors Faces Challenges, and Final Shutdown Is 
Uncertain, GAO-04-662 (Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004). 

[27] In December 2006, DOE provided GAO with cost data updated as of 
the end of fiscal year 2006 reflecting total program expenditures as 
$113.8 million and total carryover as $17.7 million. 

[28] For more information on these programs, see GAO, Nuclear 
Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of 
Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors, GAO-04-807 
(Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2004), and GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: 
DOE Needs to Consider Options to Accelerate the Return of Weapons- 
Usable Uranium from Other Countries to the United States and Russia, 
GAO-05-57 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2004). 

[29] John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, 120 Stat. 2083, § 3113 (2006) (codified at 
50 U.S.C. § 2569). Contributions from foreign countries to DOE's 
nuclear nonproliferation programs are not without precedent. Section 
3135 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2005 authorized the Secretary of Energy to accept 
international contributions for the Elimination of Weapons-Grade 
Plutonium Production Program (EWGPP). Pub. L. No. 108-375, 118 Stat. 
2170 (2004). Since fiscal year 2005, the EWGPP has received $25.5 
million from the United Kingdom, Canada, Netherlands, and the Republic 
of Korea to support the closure of Russian plutonium production 
reactors by building or refurbishing replacement fossil fuel plants. 

[30] GAO-03-638. 

[31] For more information on U.S. efforts to secure radiological 
sources in Iraq, see Radiological Sources in Iraq: DOD Should Evaluate 
Its Source Recovery Efforts and Apply Lessons Learned to Future 
Recovery Missions, GAO-05-672 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2005). 

[32] According to senior State officials, NDF is designed to permit 
rapid response to unanticipated or unusually difficult, high-priority 
requirements such as efforts to (1) halt the proliferation of nuclear, 
biological, and chemical weapons, their delivery systems, related 
technologies, and other weapons; (2) destroy or neutralize existing 
weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and conventional 
weapons; and (3) prevent the diversion of weapons-related scientific 
and technical expertise of the former Soviet Union. 

[33] In 2005, State also provided DOE $1.24 million from NDF to support 
DOE's search and secure program. These funds paid for the deployment of 
radiological detection and characterization equipment to several 
countries to search, locate, and consolidate high-risk radiological 
sources. 

[34] See S. Rep. No. 108-105, at 117 (July 17, 2003), accompanying S. 
1424, the Senate version of the Energy and Water Development 
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2004. 

[35] See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-357, at 45 (Nov. 7, 2003). 

[36] Although a committee report is not legally binding, it is viewed 
as expressing the will and intent of the relevant congressional 
committees. 

[37] NRC officials told us that for projects in Ukraine, NRC typically 
provides the regulatory expertise and contracts directly with the State 
Scientific and Technical Center to manage the completion of project 
tasks. 

[38] GAO-03-638. 

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