Summary

U.S. special operations forces consist of highly capable, elite military personnel who are trained to address critical national security objectives. Their versatility, quick deployment, and capabilities make the forces ideally suited for today's security environment, in which significant dangers are posed by regional conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and transitional threats. The Defense Department needs to ensure that special operations forces are ready to carry out their intended missions and are used in ways that capitalize on their unique capabilities. This report discusses (1) whether general agreement exists on the priorities for the use of special operations forces by the regional commanders in chief and the forces' unit commanders; (2) the pace of force operations and how force units' senior officers and enlisted personnel view the impact of that pace on readiness, morale, and retention; and (3) whether opportunities exist to reduce that pace in those cases where it is perceived to be degrading the readiness of special operations forces.

GAO noted that: (1) SOF is considered an essential element for achieving U.S. national security objectives; (2) in general, there is a common understanding of and agreement on primary SOF mission priorities between the commanders in chief (CINC) and SOF unit commanders assigned to each of the CINCs, and the CINCs often consider SOF their force of choice for many diverse combat and peacetime missions; (3) however, there is some disparity on the priorities for collateral activities for SOF, such as embassy support and antiterrorism activities; (4) little reliable data are available on the frequency and types of SOF missions that would allow an analysis of SOF missions relative to CINC priorities and regional strategy requirements, and historical data on deployment days for all SOF elements are not available; (5) nevertheless, responses to GAO's questionnaire from almost 200 senior-level officers and enlisted personnel in SOF units indicated that they believe the deployments of SOF units have increased to the point that SOF readiness has been, or threatens to be, degraded; (6) specifically, 60, 56, and 86 percent of the Army, Navy, Air Force respondents to GAO's questionnaire, respectively, said they believe readiness has been, or threatens to be, adversely affected by the current level of unit deployments; (7) in addition, SOF unit leaders believe that SOF are performing some missions that could be handled by conventional forces; (8) opportunities exist to reduce the perceived high pace of operations, according to responses to GAO's questionnaire; (9) there may be opportunities to use conventional forces instead of SOF for some collateral missions, such as embassy support, and for missions that are already the responsibility of conventional forces, such as combat search and rescue; (10) however, without basic, reliable, quantifiable information on the nature and extent of actual SOF missions, the way in which SOF personnel are deployed, and the impact of unit deployments on SOF readiness, the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) cannot identify such opportunities to achieve the appropriate levels of deployment and ensure that SOF are properly used; and (11) therefore, GAO believes that action is needed to complete a system that will allow the: (a) pace of SOF operations to be measured and assessed relative to national security objectives and SOF training needs; and (b) identification of the factors that cause SOF personnel to be deployed in excess of established deployment goals.