Summary

GAO provided information on the status of the Army's conversion to its Army of Excellence (AOE) force structure developed in 1983, focusing on the: (1) progress made in correcting force structure weaknesses; (2) remaining problems; and (3) lessons the Army should apply in developing its future force structure.

GAO found that the: (1) task force that conducted the study employed various mechanisms to economize on force structure and pare down 1.17 million personnel spaces to 998,700; (2) Army Training and Doctrine Command schools and centers developed specific AOE designs within task force allocations; (3) lack of documentation regarding the AOE methodology contributed to continuing questions about AOE designs; (4) Army had converted about half of its force structure to the AOE designs as of 1989 and projected complete conversion by 1996; (5) Army did not increase its combat-to-support ratio and failed to achieve a consensus on the adequacy of its support forces; (6) Army did not standardize light forces due to its inability to convert the National Guard infantry divisions; (7) Army increased its leader-to-led ratio by creating more and smaller units focusing on single weapons systems; (8) Army did not effectively manage the Logistics Unit Productivity Systems (LUPS) program and many LUPS units were experiencing equipment and personnel shortages that could delay conversions; (9) Army planned to reexamine its increased use of host nation support in light of recent events in Europe; (10) AOE restructuring effort raised some major concerns about the future size of the Army, extent of Army resources during peacetime, and future role of the reserves; (11) Army needed to explore all options for economizing on force structure and filling its personnel requirements due to increasing budgetary pressures; and (12) Army needed to effectively manage its force structure initiatives to avoid wasted efforts and resources.