AIRMAN-SCHOLAR

A Journal of Contemporary Military Thought

The Character of a Professional:
Integrity, Courage, Competence, Commitment

Cover Photos

Upper Left— (August 4, 1999) The 10th Mountain Division assumed command of Task Force Eagle, Multi National Division (North), from America's "First Team," the 1st Cavalry Division. The 1st Cav. Div completed a ten month tour in Bosnia-Herzegovina conducting peacekeeping duties in support of Operation Joint Forge. Maj. Gen. James L. Campbell replaced Maj. Gen. Kevin P. Byrnes as Commander Task Force Eagle, Bosnia-Herzegovina. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Stanley R. Cwalina, Jr., 982 SIGNAL COMPANY) EAGLE BASE, TUZLA, BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, Yugoslavia.

Upper Right— (April 23, 1999) Soldiers from Antigua perform checkpoint security on Caribbean Community soldiers who are acting like civilians demanding food at Tekama, Guyana. This activity is in support of exercise Tradewinds '99, an effort to train the Caribbean Community in disaster relief, and to continue peacekeeping operations and humanitarian aid. (U.S. Army photo by Spec. Sean A. Terry, 55th SIGNAL COMPANY) TEMERHI, Guyana.

Lower Left— (June 20, 1999) U.S. Navy Chaplain Cmdr. Patrick Hahn, Chaplain Corps (CHC), leads a field prayer service at the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Forward Operating Base near Cernica, Kosovo. Elements of the 26th MEU deployed from ships of Amphibious Readiness Group 2 in support of NATO peacekeeping duties in Kosovo. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Seth Rossman) DONJA BUDRIGA, KOSOVO, Yugoslavia.

Lower Right— (April 2 , 1999) B-1B Lancers were forward deployed to RAF Fairford, U.K., in support of NATO Operation Allied Force in the former republic of Yugoslavia. The Lancer can carry up to 84 Mk-82 conventional 500-pound bombs [or] 30 CBU-87 cluster bombs. (U.S. Air Force photo by SrA Jeff Fitch) RAF FAIRFORD, United Kingdom.

Photos and supporting text are from the DoD Imagery Server at http://dodimagery.afis.osd.mil/dodimagery/html

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FROM THE EDITOR

The National Character and Leadership Symposium

From 3 to 5 March 1999 the US Air Force Academy hosted the 6th Annual National Character and Leadership Symposium, sponsored and organized by the Academy Center for Character Development. The theme of the conference was "Integrity First: Courage, Competence, and Commitment -- The Character of a Professional." The symposium featured over 60 presentations, panels, and other activities with a host of presenters and panelists from across the country.

The gathering produced a mosaic of ideas and concerns, blending stories about character under fire with intellectual investigation about the essence of character of the highest order, plus much in-between. The symposium also combined contemporary problems with traditional concerns and demonstrated to those in attendance the dynamic yet timeless nature of the character issue. The literary themes of Stephen Crane, author of *Red Badge of Courage,* were explored as was the interplay of character and technology; Marines and SEALS explained their duties while scholars debated the righteousness of the military mission. Among the most heavily attended sessions were panels given by Hugh C. Thompson and Lawrence Colburn, recipients of the Soldier's Medal for their heroism, courage, and ethical conduct in saving Vietnamese civilians from certain death at My Lai in 1968. Their comments and the reflections of others in attendance brought back to many the terrors of war, the cruelty possible from man, and the domestic strife and uncertainty of the Vietnam years, while at the same time demonstrating that single acts of courage and high principle can help all to understand better the meaning of humanity and the absolute need for high character and personal integrity in the military service. These lessons have continued value in our more settled and prosperous era, but one still full of difficult and ambiguous circumstance.

This issue of *Airman-Scholar* is drawn primarily from papers presented at the symposium. It begins, however, with two short articles concerning the events at No Gun Ri during the Korean War where several hundred South Korean civilians may have been killed by U.S. forces. Author and former Secretary of the Navy James Webb highlights the dilemmas of leaders and soldiers thrust into the chaos of early-war, while noted journalist and foreign correspondent Charles Lane emphasizes the need for full disclosure of the tragedy. The discussion reminds us again about why we continue to examine character and leadership issues in the military. Both articles were first printed in national publications and we greatly appreciate the permissions granted to reprint them. *Airman-Scholar* continues with "A Virtuous Warrior in a Savage World" where Col Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. explores the dilemma of the warrior of character confronting unscrupulous enemies in future conflicts. Three articles follow that probe the interface of character and integrity with more everyday situations: Dr. Marvin Berkowitz explores the concept of character development in the military; Lt Col Bill Rhodes the need for risk-taking in character development; and, Dr. William Gibson "A Warrior's Quality of Devotion." The edition concludes with Mick Fekula's reflection on how to teach character, deciding that different approaches are needed for the different levels of societal interaction.

Airman-Scholar has set the modest goal of two issues a year, with one printed during each academic semester. Please read our plans for the spring issue at the end of this volume and consider submitting an article for publication. *Airman-Scholar* hopes to be **your journal** while keeping to our charter of providing a forum for academically stimulating articles of significant interest and utility to the military service. CK

The Bridge at No Gun Ri

James Webb

I do not know what happened to the civilians at the bridge near the village of No Gun Ri, although it seems clear from recent Associated Press reports that many of them died in the early days of the Korean War as their country was being ripped apart by a communist invasion and the U.S. Army was thrown into disarray.

An official investigation into the incident, in which members of the U.S. Seventh Cavalry Regiment are alleged to have gunned down hundreds of Korean refugees, is forthcoming. Piercing questions will be asked, and from the gauzy memories of five decades ago some answers will be given. Did the refugees die from American bombs and bullets? If so, were the deaths deliberate? If they were, were they the result of battlefield realities that left them caught in the middle? Were the American soldiers ordered to keep refugees off the road and away from the bridge so that a retreating army could move south before it was annihilated? Were the refugees attempting to move, by day or night, into the American perimeter? Or were the American soldiers simply having a little target practice, shooting off precious ammunition to see if they might kill a woman here and a kid there as the world was falling down upon their heads?

And another question, of present-day interest: Is some team of lawyers trying to squeeze millions out of a long-ago tragedy of the sort that seems always to accompany battles fought where other people live?

Far More Brutal

For all the talk of civilian casualties in Vietnam, the war in Korea was far more brutal. More than two million Korean civilians perished during the three years of fighting, amounting to some 70% of the overall death toll. The massive, sudden invasion from the north flattened every major city, threw hundreds of thousands of refugees onto the roads, and left little time for American and South Korean forces to reconstruct firm lines of defense. A retreat was underway in 100-degree heat as the military sought to regroup far to the south, around the port city of Pusan. North Korean soldiers dressed in the white robes of farmers frequently mixed among the refugee columns in order to disrupt American and South Korean units. The Army's logistical lines were extended and often interrupted. Hospital care and even medevacs for the wounded were usually out of the question. Whole companies ceased to exist, and officer casualties were particularly high.

The casualty figures provide the starkest evidence of the intensity and confusion of that first month. In July 1950 the U.S. Army lost 2,834 soldiers killed (including those who died while captured or missing) vs. 2,486 wounded, probably the highest killed-to-wounded ratio since the Civil War. (Ratios by the end of the war were one killed for every four wounded.) We do know that during this period American aircraft deliberately strafed columns of refugees on the roads. We know also that the soldiers at No Gun Ri were given orders that no refugees were to cross their lines, and that they were to fire at those who attempted to do so, using "discretion in the case of women and children."

Such orders, excised from the chaos that created their necessity, fall heavily on the minds and consciences of those who have never been called upon to make the Hobson's choice of combat: Do I protect my men and lose my innocence? Or do I keep my innocence and lose my men? This thin, unbreachable line separates those who went to war from those who stayed behind. America is a lovely place to have such debates as we sit in brightly lit offices next to our computers under the whir

of air conditioners and HEPA filters and sip on herbal tea or Snapple. What is a war crime? On whom shall we pass judgment as we peer back through the mists of history? Were civilians killed? Is that enough for condemnation? What standard shall we in our wisdom erect for those who had little hope of even seeing tomorrow when the world turned suddenly ugly and they pressed their faces far into the dirt while the mortars twirled overhead and the bullets kicked up dust spots near their eyes?

So, test yourself. Your men are dying. The lines are shrinking. You are running out of food and even ammunition, trying to hold a position for a day or two as your army shrinks ever nearer to Pusan. Civilians are everywhere, thousands upon thousands of them. They are starving and they are afraid, and some of them are in fact not civilians. They clog the roads as the trucks and jeeps stall in the heat, trying to wend past them. They want to go to Pusan, too. They want to sleep inside your perimeter. They need your food. They dream of your protection. But the only true protection you can give them is to defeat the invading enemy. If you take even 10, you will be unable to care for your own people. And if you take 10, you will be besieged by 10,000. You have a mission to perform. But they are desperate, and you cannot speak their language. They are going to swarm your perimeter. When they come, what do you do?

Is deliberately killing a civilian a war crime? It certainly wasn't when we fire-bombed Dresden and Tokyo, taking hundreds of thousands of lives in the name of "breaking the enemy's will to fight." Perhaps the greatest anomaly of recent times is that death delivered by a bomb earns one an air medal, while when it comes at the end of a gun it earns one a trip to jail.

Protocols of War

And yet, most importantly, we are a nation founded on Judeo-Christian principles that we proudly carry to the battlefield. The wanton use of force, and especially the deliberate killing of any soldier or civilian who is under one's actual control, is indeed a crime. This was the distinction in My Lai, for despite the unassailable fact that most of the villagers killed in the massacre were part of a highly organized Communist cadre, they were under the physical control of the soldiers who killed them. In other circumstances, had any of these same villagers ignored the rigid protocols of war understood by both sides, such as moving near an American perimeter at night, running from a combat patrol or signaling with lamps after dark, they would have been killed with impunity. Every American who fought in such highly contested civilian areas has his own memories. Few of them are happy. But wars in populated areas cannot be fought without such rules.

Those who struggled daily-and nightly-with these incredible moral distinctions were rewarded upon their return from Vietnam with the same vitriol that is now being directed at the soldiers who fought at No Gun Ri. One hopes for a greater sense of wisdom as the facts are assessed and judgments are made. Otherwise, the only lessons seem to be: Make sure you fight in a popular war. Make sure you use bombs instead of bullets. And make sure you win.

*The Honorable James H. Webb Jr. is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and served as a Marine in Vietnam. He was U.S. Secretary of the Navy from 1987 to 1988. Mr. Webb has authored numerous books including **Fields of Fire** and **A Sense of Honor** (Prentice-Hall, 1978 and 1981 respectively), and most recently **The Emperor's General** (Broadway Books, 1999).*

Wounded

Charles Lane

It was only last year that Americans marked the thirtieth anniversary of the My Lai massacre, that horrible incident on the morning of March 16, 1968, during which U.S. Army soldiers deliberately gunned down hundreds of defenseless men, women, and children in a South Vietnamese village. That war crime was incompletely prosecuted; its meaning is still bitterly debated among an American public divided to this day over the war in Vietnam.

And now another Asian village, the Korean hamlet of No Gun Ri, has emerged from the shadows of military history to claim a place next to My Lai in the catalog of the Army's shame. According to a superbly documented Associated Press story that drew on declassified American materials as well as on eyewitness accounts from both Korean survivors and veterans of the Army's Seventh Cavalry Regiment, U.S. troops were ordered to machine-gun hundreds of refugees from No Gun Ri during the frantic early days of the Korean War. The most agonizing part of the story is that the survivors and the victims' relatives have been pressing their claims for justice for decades, only to be silenced by the South Korean government or brushed aside by the Pentagon. As recently as 1997, the U.S. Armed Forces Claims Service told the Koreans, inaccurately, that there was "no evidence" that the Seventh Cavalry had even been in the vicinity on the day in question.

Justifiably concerned about the implications for U.S.-South Korean relations, the Clinton administration has ordered a thorough investigation that, with luck, will produce a full and accurate account of what happened. What's perhaps even more important, though, is that the United States comes clean about the half-century-long cover-up of this awful event.

But let's also hope that this won't turn into an occasion to besmirch the entire Korean War effort or otherwise tilt the discussion of the U.S. role in the cold war. Horrible as it ap-

pears to have been, the No Gun Ri massacre does not invalidate the U.N.-sanctioned American effort to roll back a North Korean invasion, which, if successful, would have subjected the entire Korean peninsula to a long dark night of official murder and economic deprivation.

Rather, the No Gun Ri investigation should be an occasion to reflect seriously on the causes of war crimes; the mitigating factors, if any, that should be taken into account when evaluating them; and the appropriate means for ensuring accountability, even long after the fact.

Clearly one mitigating factor at No Gun Ri was the sheer chaos of the situation surrounding the ill-trained and hastily deployed American troops. They found themselves desperately trying to maneuver along roads clogged with refugees--refugees their commanders told them might well be North Korean soldiers in disguise. James Webb, the secretary of the Navy under Ronald Reagan who served as a Marine officer in Vietnam, has already decreed in *The Wall Street Journal* that these factors should be enough to absolve the Seventh Cavalry. He even comes close to implying that deliberately killing the refugees might have been acceptable, if morally gut-wrenching, if the alternative was losing American soldiers, especially since "the only true protection [the United States] can give the [South Koreans] is to defeat the invading enemy."

Webb is right to weigh the American action against the possible alternatives, but, even so, he goes too far. The order to shoot the refugees, who, contrary to what Webb implies, were already basically confined by the U.S. forces under a bridge, was clearly illegal. "No refugees to cross the front line," the order read. "Fire everyone trying to cross lines. Use discretion in case of women and children." Soldiers are bound to follow only lawful orders; indeed, they are duty-bound to disobey unlawful ones. The accounts published by the A.P.

and others make clear that several American soldiers did, indeed, refuse to shoot at the women and children, just as Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson, a helicopter pilot, intervened to stop the slaughter at My Lai. Fear is a powerful factor in every soldier's mind; it can even mitigate culpability in some circumstances; but in a civilized Army it cannot be permitted to trump individual conscience.

Webb has a stronger point when he notes the hypocrisy of focusing on the up-close killing at No Gun Ri instead of on the basically intentional aerial slaughter of civilians at Dresden and Tokyo. All I can say is, Two wrongs don't make a right. But Webb's provocative comparison does have implications for such recent events as our intervention in Kosovo. Many fault the United States for having attacked Serb forces, government offices, and factories only from 15,000 feet and above, a policy that surely contributed to the deaths of dozens of Kosovar refugees who were mistaken for Serb troops on the ground, as well as many Serb civilians. But, given the extraordinary accuracy of the weaponry the United States employed whenever possible and the lengths to which pilots went to avoid inflicting civilian casualties, damage due to the 15,000-feet-and-above policy cannot fairly be called a war crime. The air war in Yugoslavia was anything but another Dresden. Also, one lesson of No Gun Ri is that, if the United States had gone in on the ground in Kosovo, heavy civilian casualties might also have taken place, especially given the foreseeable difficulty of sorting Serb paramilitaries from the civilian Serb population.

But, if Webb errs on the side of post hoc absolution, there is little point in taking an overly prosecutorial attitude toward the men of No Gun Ri. North Korea started the whole thing. And those who are principally responsible on the U.S. side--the senior planners who put American troops into such an untenable position in the first place, along with the field commanders who gave the hasty, unconscionable order to shoot refugees--are mostly dead. The applicable U.S. law provides that Korean War vets who are now civilians could not be prosecuted for their actions during wartime (though the rule was recently changed to permit such prosecution of former soldiers in the future). But even if it were possible, what purpose would it serve to haul the soldiers who followed

the terrible order into court now? It would certainly be unfair to those who have finally broken their silence to tell what happened.

The government's approach to this issue must be premised on the healing power of truth, full disclosure, and, where appropriate, official remorse. The investigation should be a thorough, no-holds-barred affair; it should name names. If, as seems likely, the story is confirmed, the result should be generous compensation, as well as official written apologies, for the families of the victims. But there should also be medals for the Americans who refused to fire on the refugees, just as Thompson was finally decorated last year for his heroic effort to stop My Lai.

For its role in saving South Korea from North Korean Stalinism, this nation need never apologize. But our strength can also be demonstrated through our willingness, however belated, to acknowledge that that effort, along with other battles of the cold war, was not an unblemished one. Indeed, without a full accounting for No Gun Ri, we risk undermining the legitimacy of American efforts to bring today's real war criminals to book.

*Charles Lane is a journalist and author of numerous articles on political and social issues. As a foreign correspondent for **Newsweek Magazine**, he covered the wars in Central America, Operation Just Cause in Panama, and conflicts in the Balkans. Mr. Lane is currently Editor-at-Large of **The New Republic.***

A Virtuous Warrior in a Savage World

Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr©

I. INTRODUCTION

Divining the nature of future war is always problematic.[1] President Eisenhower warned that "Every war is going to astonish you in the way it has occurred, and in the way it is carried out."[2] The United States must, of course, be prepared to meet a wide range of contingencies. Paramount among them would be a threat posed by a "peer competitor," that is, a state capable of battling the United States with comparable forces employing largely orthodox tactics. Although it is almost certain that one will arise in the future, no nation exists today that can challenge America *symmetrically* as a peer competitor would.

In the meantime, it seems prudent to focus on more immediate near-term threats. These include regional adversaries and other kinds of opponents with limited objectives. Some of them may try to offset American power by conducting a brutal campaign of savagery and intimidation I call "neo-absolutist" war. This paper will explore how and why a postmodern "Genghis Khan" might pursue such a strategy, and, even more importantly, explain what a "virtuous warrior," the Sir Galahad[3] of tomorrow's conflicts, might do to meet that challenge.

Asymmetrical Warfare

Judging from its defense literature, the United States recognizes that new kinds of threats are emerging. A myriad of documents are replete with warnings about foes who will try to engage it asymmetrically. In broad terms, *"asymmetrical"*[4] warfare describes strategies that seek to avoid an opponent's strengths; it is an approach that focuses whatever may be one sides comparative advantages against their enemy's relative weaknesses.[5] In a way, seeking asymmetries is fundamental to all warfighting. But, in the modern context, asymmetrical warfare emphasizes what are popularly perceived as unconventional or non-traditional methodologies.

For most potential adversaries, attacking the United States asymmetrically is the only reasonable warfighting strategy. The Gulf War was an object lesson to military planners around the globe of the futility of attempting to oppose America in any other fashion. Moreover, symmetrical, high-tech war against the United States military would present enormous training, logistical, and resource requirements to whomever might attempt it, and today these are "demands that few societies can meet."[6]

The Technological Focus

In the United States, asymmetrical warfare is frequently conceived in technological terms. *Joint Vision 2010*, the "operationally based template"[7] as to how America will fight future wars, states that "[o]ur *most vexing* future adversary may be one who can use technology to make rapid improvements in its military capabilities that provide asymmetrical counters to US military strengths...."[8] [emphasis added] Consistent with that analysis, weapons of mass destruction and information warfare are often proffered as illustrations of the asymmetrical warfare genre.[9]

Focusing on technology is characteristically American. Historians Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski declare that since the mid-nineteenth century (but particularly in the twentieth century) the United States has relied upon "increasingly sophisticated technology to overcome logistical limitations–and to match enemy numbers with firepower."[10] Our fixation on technology continues today. *Joint Vision 2010*, for example, centers on the question of how to "leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting."[11]

Accordingly, the U.S. military is an enthusiastic disciple of the much-ballyhooed Revolu-

tion in Military Affairs (RMA). The RMA seeks to produce radically more effective militaries through the widespread application of emerging technologies, especially advanced computer and communications systems.[12] Much of the new weaponry, however, seems optimized for high-tech, peer-competitor war. In other words, it is aimed principally at a form of warfare that is *symmetrical* as opposed to the far more likely challenge of a regional opponent who wages war *asymmetrically*.

Despite the experience of Vietnam, Somalia, and elsewhere where technically-inferior foes triumphed, Americans are still disposed to see all difficulties–even the complex challenge of war–as technical problems subject to engineered solutions.[13] But consideration of war as a technological or engineering problem is a dubious proposition. The engineer's culture is an "aggressively rational one" where technical problems are solved with a logical application of scientific principles."[14] War, however, is something different. Marine Lt General Paul K. Van Riper explains:

> Technology permeates every aspect of war, but the science of war cannot account for the dynamic interaction of the physical and moral elements that come into play, by design or by chance, in combat. War will remain predominately an art, infused with human will, creativity, and judgment.[15]

Neo-Absolutist War

This essay argues that the asymmetries that the U.S. military will find "most vexing" are based not on technology, but on psychology. It contends that many future opponents will accept that they cannot match the quality or quantity of the American military machine and will instead aim to wage what might be characterized as "neo-absolutist war." Neo-absolutist war is war without rules or scruples. It is a vicious, strategically-oriented form of conflict that extends across the spectrum of warfare. It differs from more traditional "total war" by, among other things, the propensity of the aggressor to focus not on destroying military forces, but rather on shattering the opponent's will *by any means possible*, including methods that defy recognized standards of acceptable behavior in war.

Those who wage neo-absolutist war clearly

understand that while war presents technical problems, it is not itself one. Like General Van Riper, they see it as a contest of human wills that transcends the logic of the physical sciences. But unlike General Van Riper and others steeped in the mores of international law, they do not feel bound by such norms. Their attitude might be described by reference to popular depictions of the ruthlessness of the Mongol conqueror, Genghis Khan. Just as he savagely massacred the "population of one city in order to persuade others to surrender without a fight,"[16] Adherents of neo-absolutist war would not hesitate to use brutality and atrocity as deliberate military strategies, especially if they allow them to avoid decisive, force-on-force collisions with the U.S. armed forces.

Although American military leaders cannot resort to the tactics of neo-absolutist war, they must nevertheless be prepared to deal with those that do. Accordingly, this article will grapple with how best to prepare to prevail in such difficult circumstances while at the same time remaining true to the ideals of the virtuous warrior. It will not enumerate the many strategies that might be used to avoid such conflicts altogether. Rather, this effort will try to identify pragmatic considerations for U.S. military leaders already engaged with a neo-absolutist opponent. In short, it will attempt to provide guidance for the inevitable time when the virtuous warrior, the Sir Galahad model, meets the next Genghis Khan.

II. THE FACE OF FUTURE WAR

The U.S. armed forces traditionally analyze war in Clausewitzean terms, viewing it as a violent extension of a Westernized notion of politics. But this paradigm is now under siege. In his 1993 book, *The History of Warfare*, the eminent military historian John Keegan deconstructs the Clausewitzean thesis on a number of points, including the fact that war existed prior to what is known today as "politics." Keegan contends that war is rooted in culture, not politics.[17] Complementing Keegan's proposition is that of Harvard political scientist, Samuel P. Huntington.

Clash of Civilizations

In a seminal (and much-debated) article first published in 1993 and expanded into a book in

1996, Huntington argued that future conflicts will likely be clashes between civilizations with fundamentally different psychological orientations and value sets than those of the West. Huntington maintains that ideas such as "individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, [and] the separation of church and state" define the West.[18] What is important about Huntington's work is that he reminds us that the rest of the world does not necessarily share these values. Thus, no one should expect that they will think the same way as Americans about many subjects, including war. Just this past year, Lt General Li Jijuan of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, observed that "[e]ach civilization has its own notion of war which cannot help but be influenced by its cultural background."[19]

The New Warrior Class

Future conflicts, therefore, may well be clashes between civilizations whose moral, political, and cultural norms differ markedly from those of the United States. Within some of these civilizations another disturbing phenomena is brewing, one with major implications for the United States military. It is described in a fascinating piece by Ralph Peters, then an Army major, which appeared in the summer, 1994, issue of *Parameters*. In it, Peters delineated what he calls "The New Warrior Class," a multitude which he contends "already numbers in the millions." Peters says that in the future:

> [America] will face [warriors] who have acquired a taste for killing, who do not behave rationally according to our definition of rationality, who are capable of atrocities that challenge the descriptive powers of language, and who will sacrifice their own kind in order to survive.[20]

Along similar lines Professor Keegan observes that the post-Cold War world is experiencing in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Somalia, central Asia and elsewhere the re-emergence of "warrior" societies. These are peoples, he says, that are psychologically distinct from the West, and whose young are "brought up to fight, think fighting honorable and think killing in warfare glorious." A warrior in such societies,

Keegan wrote in 1995, "prefers death to dishonor and kills without pity when he gets the chance."[21]

The Warrior Code of Honor

It is tempting, but profoundly erroneous, to over-generalize about these groups by concluding that they are wholly morally depraved. Certainly some members of their warrior castes are simply evil human beings. However, as Michael Ignatieff points out, warrior codes of honor, though they vary, exist in virtually every culture and "are among the oldest features of human morality."[22] While such codes frequently provide similar sets of moral etiquette with respect to the conduct of war, they "appl[y] only to certain people, not others."[23] Ignatieff further explains by noting that "[w]e in the West start from a universalist ethic based on ideas of human rights; they start from particularist ethics that define the tribe, the nation, or ethnicity *as the limit of moral concern.*"[24] [emphasis added] Thus, even otherwise virtuous societies (or an analog described by one analyst as "streetfighter" nations)[25] may nevertheless participate in appalling (to us) behavior because they deem those they victimize as being outside their favored group and, hence, unworthy of humane treatment.

Ignatieff concedes that the disintegration of states in recent years often carries with it the destruction of "the indigenous warrior codes that sometimes keep war this side of bestiality."[26] In any event, military leaders may find themselves confronting opponents–irregulars, terrorists, or even transnational criminal organizations, for example–that do not have, and never have had, *any* moral anchor in a warrior's code of honor. What is important, however, is to understand the potential military ramifications of fighting adversaries with differing legal, cultural, or moral norms.

For instance, some adversaries may see these differences as a source of strength *vis-à-vis* the United States. Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., the Commandant of the Army War College, argues that in future conflicts an enemy may perceive his comparative advantage against the United States in the "collective psyche and will of his people."[27] In turn, this generates an obvious question, i.e., how will an enemy attack America's psyche and will? The answer makes Americans and others in the West uncomfortable because it raises the spec-

ter that basic Western values, the very things Huntington sees as defining the West, are in fact the asymmetries that future adversaries will most probably exploit.

III. VALUE-BASED ASYMMETRICAL STRATEGY

The United States has already seen how an enemy can carry out a value-based asymmetrical strategy. For example, one of the things that America's enemies have learned in the latter half of the 20th century is to manipulate democratic values. Consider the remarks of a former North Vietnamese commander: "The conscience of America was part of its war-making capability, and we were turning that power in our favor. America lost because of its democracy; through dissent and protest it lost the ability to mobilize a will to win."[28] By stirring up dissension in the United States, the North Vietnamese were able to advance their strategic goal of removing American power from Southeast Asia. Democracies are less-resistant to political machinations of this sort than are the totalitarian systems common to neo-absolutists.

Exploiting the Casualty-Aversion Phenomenon

Other elements of America's value system may likewise be vulnerable. Two related aspects of post-Vietnam and post-Gulf War America are illustrations. The first is the growing aversion in both the electorate and in the uniformed ranks towards incurring virtually *any* friendly casualties in most military operations.[29] Consider that the deaths of 18 Rangers during a mission in Somalia in October 1993 were enough to derail U.S. policy there, even though from a purely *military* standpoint the raid achieved its objectives and the U.S. losses were minuscule compared with those of the enemy.[30]

What proved to be particularly effective, however, was the barbaric treatment of the body of a United States soldier. The widely-televised images of it being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu helped destroy the public support that the U.S. military needed to succeed in Somalia. Consistent with a neo-absolutist approach, the Somalis made no attempt to hide the savagery of their act. Significantly, because of the success this behavior enjoyed, Americans should expect more of it, especially as new communications technologies greatly enhance the accessibility of international media organizations.[31]

The second aspect, which William Boyne points out "is unusual in history,"[32] requires wars to be won with "a minimum number of casualties inflicted on the enemy."[33] The rapid end to the Gulf War following televised pictures of the so-called "Highway of Death" illustrates the new ethical and political environment. Notably, this can occur even where the enemy losses are inflicted without violating legal or moral norms.

There is another, darker side to the casualty aversion phenomena that may have been inspired by an unintended consequence of the bombing of Baghdad's Al Firdos bunker during the Gulf War. Unbeknownst to coalition targeteers, that underground command and control facility was also being used to shelter the families of high Iraqi officials. After the devastating attack which destroyed the bunker, pictures of hundreds of bodies of women and children being pulled from the wreckage were broadcast worldwide. This caused U.S. leaders–concerned about adverse public reaction to the noncombatant deaths–to virtually end further raids on the Iraqi capital.[34]

Though the decision to forego further operations against Baghdad had little effect on the outcome of the war, the precedent is important. The United States response to the unexpected results of the Al Firdos bombing quite obviously suggests to some opponents a cheap and reliable method of defending against U.S. strikes: cover the target with noncombatants.[35]

Exploiting the American Military Ethos

Such unconscionable behavior creates complications for high-minded U.S. forces. As *Joint Vision 2010* asserts, "moral strengths" and "high ethical standards" are central to the American military ethos.[36] This fact, however, makes the U.S. military susceptible to tactics that aim to manipulate their innate respect for human life. For instance, Somali warlords used women and children as human shields against coalition forces during the intervention of the early 1990s. Human shield tactics also enabled the Serbs to discourage strikes by U.S. and other NATO planes by the simple expedient of chaining captured UN troops to potential targets.[37] Other nations can be similarly affected by the exploitation of noncombatants. During the war in

Chechyna, for example, insurgents offset their technological inferiority by threatening civilian hostages which forced the Russians to meet various demands.[38]

Several potential adversaries appear prepared to use noncombatants to blunt U.S. power. Libya threatened to surround the reported site of an underground chemical plant with "millions of Muslims" in order to ward off attacks.[39] Most recently, when Western military action seemed imminent, Saddam Hussein inundated his palaces and other buildings with noncombatant civilians in order to discourage air strikes by Western forces sensitive to the effect on their publics of civilian deaths, regardless of the circumstances.[40]

Deputy Secretary of Defense Dr. John J. Hamre accepts the Falcon presentation from Cadet Wing Commander Cadet First Class French during the 6th Annual National Character and Leadership Symposium.

The upshot is that future enemies may consider humanitarian concern for noncombatants as yet another asymmetry on which they can capitalize in ways Americans consider unthinkable. As already noted, a neo-absolutist will do almost anything if it complicates or adversely affects America's use of its military strength. Indeed, Analyst James F. Dunnigan cautions that "[i]f the opponents are bloody-minded enough, they will always exploit the humanitarian attitudes of their adversaries."[41]

IV. A SCENARIO

A fictionalized account of how an adversary might use a range of value-based asymmetries to confront the United States is laid out in the 1996 essay, *How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007*.[42] This scenario begins by optimistically assuming that the United States procures and deploys all kinds of high-tech weaponry. It also assumes that methodologies are developed which protect critical American military and economic facilities from physical terrorist attacks as well as cyber-subversion.

With that backdrop, the article recites a tale where a regional adversary, though technologically-inferior, nevertheless seeks to defeat the United States. The enemy relentlessly wages neo-absolutist war and engages in a number of despicable strategies designed to present American forces with legal and moral conundrums. For example, the adversary disperses military assets into civilian areas in the hopes of causing collateral damage that he can trumpet to the world media. He uses human shields and hostages on aircraft and vehicles, and buries military depots under schools, hospitals, and even POW camps, all in the hopes of dissuading attacks by compassionate Americans concerned about the fate of those who might be unintentionally killed. In order to besiege us emotionally, the enemy tortures women POWs to try to stir up domestic political controversy. He launches computer, economic, and other attacks against less well-defended Mexico in hopes of creating emotionally-charged border problems as refugees surge north. He also diverts attention–and energy–from the area of the conflict by striking the American homeland through the spread of "mad cow" disease in the cattle industry, the release of destructive pests in farm areas, the placement of AIDs-infected needles on beaches, and by the creation of environmental disasters through the scuttling of oil tankers off the coasts. Because vital government and commercial buildings are well-protected, the enemy switches his targets for terrorism to exposed but politically potent communities of elderly people.

Although the opponent in *High-Tech War* possessed a crude nuclear device, he had no means of delivering it against sophisticated U.S. defensive systems. Undeterred, the enemy covertly placed a device in one of his own cities and secretly detonated it to coincide with a conventional U.S. air attack. In the ensuing confusion the enemy makes it appear to the world's media that it was an American bomb, and that it had been unnecessarily used against them. The enemy succeeds in creating a debilitating international backlash against the U.S. military effort in the region. The cumulative effect of all of these actions exhausts the U.S.'s energy and determination. America eventually

concedes defeat.

Is this scenario outrageous? Of course it is. But as has already been shown, a number of clues support a conclusion that several potential adversaries apparently are contemplating (or have even employed) one or more of the tactics the article discusses. Moreover, there is every indication that adversaries will continue to do so in the future. How should the virtuous warrior respond to such deliberate savagery?

IV. PRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS

Devising successful strategies against neo-absolutist opponents may be the most difficult challenge facing 21st century military leaders. Make no mistake about it, there is no checklist or sequence of pre-planned steps applicable to every permutation of this kind of antagonist. Military leaders may find themselves battling some opponents who are little more than bands of criminals, while others may be the professional military forces of sovereign states. Each of these foes will require a tailor-made response. Nevertheless, there are some broad considerations that pragmatic military leaders may wish to keep in mind as they develop responses to this new type of war. Specifically:

(a) Get inside your adversary's head.

In order to deal with the Genghis Khans of the world, the virtuous warrior must understand how they think. In the United States military in general, and the Air Force in specific, heavy stress has been placed on discerning an opponent's physical assets in an order of battle sense, that is, counting the number of planes, ships, and tanks and so forth. Capabilities thus represented are important, but in fighting neo-absolutist enemies, it is equally if not more important to understand their intentions, as well as their culture and values. Technical intelligence gathering systems like satellites simply do not tell you all you need to know about foes who do not rely on the physical strengths of their forces for victory.

Accordingly, the virtuous warrior should emphasize human intelligence that provides insight into the mind of the enemy. In addition, more political-military affairs officers skilled in analyzing the thinking of people from societies other than our own are needed. A study released in 1997 by the Air Force Academy's Institute for National Security Studies reveals that "there are serious, long-standing flaws in the way the military services, and the Air Force in particular, provide political-military affairs officers to fill the vital needs that exist."[43] Individual officers have a responsibility as well. They must school themselves in the history, politics, economics, sociology, and anthropology of potential opponents. This is a lifetime responsibility that spans all career fields.

All of this information is necessary to overcome what is a critical but common mistake when confronting opponents from other cultures. In particular, Americans persistently seem to assume that other peoples think basically the same as they do. Edward L. Rowney, a retired flag officer and former United States arms control negotiator, commented recently that:

> Our biggest mistakes stem from the assumption that others are like us, when in fact, they are more unlike than like us. We insist on ascribing to others our cultural traits, not recognizing that we have different objectives due to our unique historic backgrounds and sets of values. In short, "We fail to place ourselves in the other person's moccasins."[44]

When this obtuseness towards the mindset of our adversaries is allowed to affect military strategies, asymmetries result. H.R. McMaster argues in his book *Dereliction of Duty*, for example, that the graduated application of airpower during the Vietnam War–intended to signal our resolve to support South Vietnam yet do so in a way that the United States believed demonstrated restraint–wholly misperceived North Vietnamese thought processes. McMaster contends:

> Graduated pressure was fundamentally flawed….The strategy ignored the uncertainty of what was ***the unpredictable psychology of an activity that involves killing, death, and destruction***. To the North Vietnamese, military action, involving as it did attacks on their forces and bombing their territory, was not simply a means of communication. Human

sacrifice in war evokes strong emotions creating a dynamic that defies systems analysis quantification.[45] [emphasis added]

Analogously, Americans often seem to take for granted that other cultures share their preoccupation with money matters. They think that adversaries will engage in the same sort of cost-benefit approach to issues that they often do. In reality, ideological, ethnic, religious, and other imperatives may subordinate financial considerations in a given situation. This is one reason that economic sanctions are so seldom effective. Although from the U.S. perspective intransigence in the face of economic collapse seems nonsensical, such conclusions only illustrate ignorance of the motivations of those from societies different from the U.S.

Misreading what motivates others can be costly. During the Somalia operation a $25,000 reward was announced for the capture of Mohamed Farah Aideed on the allegation that he was behind attacks on UN peacekeepers in June of 1993. Not only was it utterly unsuccessful, it led to further intransigence by Aideed and his supporters.[46] What might have worked in the Somalia effort, a classic example of a warrior society willing to engage in neo-absolutist war, is a more strategic approach.

(b) Think strategically.

Thinking strategically is vital to any military operation, but especially when it involves a belligerent waging neo-absolutist war. Regrettably, strategic thinking appears to have, in the words of renowned RAND analyst Carl Builder, "gone into hiding" in the U.S. military–overwhelmed it seems by tactical and operational orientations.[47] Builder sees strategic thinking as incorporating the "grand idea that military power can sometimes be brought to bear most effectively and efficiently when it is applied directly towards a nation's highest purposes without first defeating defending enemy forces." Parenthetically, it is somewhat ironic that the strategic flame has dimmed in the Air Force as it was the concept of strategic bombing–not air superiority or close air support–that justified, and continues to justify, the Air Force's separate existence as an independent service.[48]

Achieving national objectives without defeating enemy forces is exceptionally attractive when confronting a neo-absolutist foe. It denies him the opportunity to effectively close with U.S. forces where he can cause the bloodshed–or the threat of bloodshed–that so often serves his purposes. Importantly, not all strategic applications of military power necessarily involve the use of force. The 1948 Berlin airlift serves as a model. By blockading the land route to the city, the Soviets thought they could force the Allies to yield by starving the city's noncombatant population. A confrontation with powerful Soviet ground forces was avoided by the success of the massive airlift, "a strategic victory of the first order."[49]

Airpower can also be applied against warrior societies provided the strategic thinking that underlies it is complemented by a thorough understanding of the culture and the situation. In fact, airpower might have been more usefully employed in Somalia had this been the case.[50] Many Somalis were pastoral nomads driven into urban areas by the starvation produced by drought and civil war.[51] This migration destroyed the decentralized, elder-based social organization of their rural areas and forced Somali refugees to align themselves with one of the five major clans in the larger towns, especially Mogadishu. This process concentrated power into the hands of a few clan leaders and provided them with a large pool of desperate people completely dependent upon them for basic needs.

Beginning in August 1992, the U.S. military, organized as Joint Task Force (JTF) Provide Relief, airlifted food to various sites where C-130 transports could safely land.[52] Although this ended the famine in those locations, it did little to de-urbanize refugees wary of distancing themselves from their food source. Starting in December of 1992, a series of UN, and UN-supported, military operations sought to secure land routes to food distribution points. They were ultimately unsuccessful as U.S. and UN forces became tactically engaged against the clan leaders and their citified cadres of fighters. In the aftermath of a disastrous October 1993 Ranger raid in Mogadishu, American forces withdrew and eventually UN forces followed.

How might strategic thinking have made things different in this confrontation with the very type of warrior society Ralph Peters de-

scribes? JTF Provide Relief commanders who, incidentally, were Marine Corps officers, wanted to expand the airlift effort to include airdrops into areas where C-130s could not land. While the effort to secure land routes would continue, this strategy would help stem the urbanization and encourage those already in the cities to return to their homes in outlying areas. This would diminish the power of the city-based clan leaders and assist in the restoration of the power that local elders traditionally held in less-populated areas. It was hoped that eventually the Somalis would be weaned from dependence upon relief supplies as the people regenerated indigenous food production with the end of the drought.

Such a strategy gets to the heart of the issue by supplying food directly to the people while at the same time creating pressure on the clan leaders to come to some agreement before their power base completely eroded. With agreement between the warlords, Somalia might have had a chance to start the long road to recovery. However, the strategy was never carried out in a significant way for two main reasons: 1) opposition by non-governmental organizations insistent upon control of and credit for relief operations; and 2) Air Force bureaucratic opposition related to airdrop procedures that placed unattainable demands on the proposal. This missed opportunity nonetheless suggests how a creative strategic plan might resolve situations involving violence-prone warrior societies.

Strategic military actions can, of course, involve the use of force. Airpower doctrine, as detailed in Colonel John Warden's masterpiece on air warfare,[53] calls for achieving victory by striking the enemy's vital core or "center of gravity."[53] This is "strategic" in that destruction of that center of gravity does not necessarily require the defeat of the enemy military forces or, for that matter, even attacking military forces at all. But how does the virtuous warrior do that if the enemy covers the relevant targets with innocent noncombatants? The fact that such targets might still be lawfully and ethically attacked (depending upon the results of proportionality analysis)[54] is not always helpful if doing so creates an adverse public reaction that undermines the mission. Unfortunately, such places are often precisely the ones that neo-absolutists ensure are filled with civilians. This is not an unsolvable problem, however.

The answer lies in supplementing strategic thinking with consideration of B.H. Liddell Hart's concept of the *indirect approach*.[55] This may require thinking somewhat counter-intuitive to the currently in-vogue concept of attacking fewer but more high-value targets with precision weapons. While an enemy's asymmetrical advantage may be his indifference to casualties *vis-à-vis* our sensitivity to them, the United States also enjoys asymmetrical advantages, not the least of which is its relative wealth.

Though the concept of "attrition warfare" is wildly unpopular among the Vietnam generation of military leaders, the application of overwhelming resources has been a hallmark of the American way of war this century.[56] In certain situations, perhaps like that of Iraq, it continues to have merit. While Saddam Hussein may be able to stock critical targets with noncombatants in the hopes of inducing high-visibility collateral losses, there are still thousands of lesser targets that are not–and could not be–shielded in that way. Although individually they may not be important, a *synergistic* effect can be obtained if sufficient numbers of them are destroyed. By nibbling around the margins, a "functional kill" might be thus obtained *indirectly* even though what is presumed to be the most important component remains untouched. True, this is a costly and time-consuming process, but it is an option that complicates and degrades the enemy's neo-absolutist strategy.

The indirect approach can also be effective if applied to exploit an adversary's fears. During the 1982 Malvinas/Falklands War, the British employed a Vulcan bomber to raid the Port Stanley airport. While the actual attack had little military consequence, the very use of the strategic weapon caused the Argentineans, fearful that their capital was vulnerable, to divert key fighter assets to protect Buenos Aires. How would this work with a Saddam Hussein? However hostile he may be to the United States, what he and other Iraqis fear is Iran, the nation with whom they fought a bitter eight-year war in the 1980s. Thus, for example, instead of attacking targets in populous Baghdad where Hussein has his human shields, grinding away at his forces on the Iran border may more effectively pressure him because it creates a potential vulnerability that exploits his worst fears. By practically foreclosing his opportunity to use human shields to pro-

duce collateral casualties, it also serves the interests of the virtuous warrior.

(c) Control your emotions and those of your troops.

It is perfectly understandable that even a virtuous warrior confronted with some atrocity will have a visceral reaction. This is especially true when the victims are fellow comrades-in-arms. It is critical in such situations, however, to avoid over-reacting. Part of controlling emotions under those circumstances is being able to distinguish between actions that have a bona fide *military* effect from those whose effect is primarily psychological and political. In the long run, savage behavior is usually unproductive in a purely *military* sense. During the Gulf War, for example, Iraq used Scud missiles as a terror weapon. Although there were some tragic losses, the military effect in terms of the overall campaign was, as General Schwarzkopf insists, virtually nil.[57]

What military impact the Scuds did have was not caused by their destructive power *per se*, but rather by the inefficient (and ultimately futile) diversion of resources they caused.[58] While that effort was designed to halt the launches, the lesson for military leaders is to carefully assess the military utility of a given response in comparison to the resources it absorbs. In any event, it is essential to suppress the human desire to exact immediate *retribution*, especially when doing so diverts energy from the main military mission. Whenever possible and prudent, postpone the necessary accounting for a time when time and resources are available for that important, but secondary task.

The threat of terrorism is a principal weapon of the neo-absolutist adversary. Terrorist threats cover a wide range of possibilities. The attack on United States Air Force personnel at Khobar Towers,[59] for example, was appalling, but even more horrifying is the specter of one employing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Yet these too must be kept in perspective. Even a terrorist act involving WMD is not likely to actually defeat the United States. Martin van Creveld has pointed out that terrorism has never succeeded in the West because the nature of modernity is that it provides redundancies that give advanced societies resil-

iency against the sort of sporadic attacks that terrorists carry out, even though individual incidents might be quite costly.[60] It does not appear that any entity short of a peer competitor (at least in a nuclear sense) could mount a sufficiently comprehensive attack to physically vanquish a nation like the United States.

This is not to denigrate the horrific potential of any act of terrorism, but rather to put it in context. Troops and the public need to understand that however terrible the act, the *military* impact is almost certainly much less than the psychological. Military leaders should, therefore, prepare both military forces and their citizenry to expect this kind of behavior and to expose it for what it is, a deliberate strategy designed to weaken U.S. will, create disruption, and erode discipline in the ranks.

It is essential that discipline be maintained in neo-absolutist conflicts. The My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War is an example of what can happen when American troops involved in a brutal war become undisciplined.[61] Do not dismiss My Lai as a freak anomaly limited to the Vietnam conflict. Sadly, atrocities seem to be an enduring feature of war. Stephen Ambrose notes that:

> When you put young people, eighteen, nineteen, or twenty years old, in a foreign country with weapons in their hands, sometimes terrible things happen that you wish never happened. This is a reality that stretches across time and across continents. It is a universal aspect of war, from the time of the ancient Greeks up to the present.[62]

What is worrisome today is how emerging technologies might exacerbate the potential for indiscipline. Specifically, new communication capabilities are designed to substitute for various *in situ* command and supervisory levels. Furthermore, a revolutionary new battlefield strategy is under development called "infestation tactics."[63] Employing advanced communications systems to coordinate large numbers of small infantry teams assaulting the same objective, the "most revolutionary aspect" of the new concept is that the infantryman does not rely on his personal weapon to engage the enemy, but will instead call in a wide range of

deadly support fires.[64]

Quite obviously, whatever havoc troops were able to wreak with their personal weapons at places like My Lai, that awful potential will be greatly increased in the future, particularly where the command and supervisory structure that might intervene is, by design, less robust. The impact of technology is not just a concern for ground commanders. *Aviation Week & Space Technology* reports that senior American officials are worried about the effect of the absence of clear rules concerning information warfare.[65] They believe that "Once soldiers and airmen start dying in a war, the young computer-literate officers and enlisted men are going to start making their own efforts to crack enemy computer systems."[66] Such free-lance efforts can create serious problems. For example, a computer virus loosed on an enemy might have "unintended consequences and come back and cripple friendly computers."[67]

This latter point is significant because it illustrates how indiscipline can directly impact military operations. The impact on military operations is a vital teaching point for law of war training because it best impresses upon troops how the

USAF Academy Vice Superintendent, Colonel Brian A. Binn (on the left), and Commandant of Cadets, Brigadier General Stephen R. Lorenz (center-right) meet with cadets during the 6th Annual National Character and Leadership Symposium.

military effort will be undermined when violations occur. Surprisingly, this connection is seldom made. Lt Col David Grossman in his new book on the psychology of killing, observes that during none of the law of armed conflict training sessions that he attended during his career were the *military* repercussions of war crimes made clear to the troops.[68] He used as an example the stupidity of killing POWs. Doing so simply forces the enemy to fight desperately rather than surrender, and denies friendly forces the opportunity to gain valuable intelligence information.[69]

The commission of atrocities, at least by Western militaries, is plainly corrosive of military effectiveness. Historian Richard Overy

notes that during World War II German soldiers on the Eastern front were told that they no longer had to follow the law of armed conflict in the war against the Soviets.[70] Whatever might have been the short term benefits of the legitimization of illicit acts, the "criminalization" of warfare proved disastrous over time. Overy explains:

> The criminalization of warfare produced a growing indiscipline and demoralization among German forces themselves. The German army shot fifteen thousand of their own number, the equivalence of a whole division....Desertion or refusal to obey orders increased as the war went on, and the law of the jungle seeped into the military structure itself. The struggle for survival had a remorseless logic. The regime imposed ever more draconian terror on its own forces to keep them fighting until the very end of the war....[71]

Troops should be taught that no matter how provocative the enemy atrocity, yielding to the passion it evokes and committing an illegal act of vengeance only serves the adversary's purposes. Although neo-absolutist societies may tolerate brutality committed by their forces, American society does not. Indeed, American public support can be eroded by the mere *perception* of violations of the law of war. Professors W. Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou explain:

> In modern popular democracies, even a limited armed conflict requires a substantial base of public support. That support can erode or even reverse itself rapidly, no matter how worthy the political objective, if people *believe* that the war is being conducted in an unfair, inhumane, or in-

iquitous way.[72] [emphasis added]

Thus, United States forces that violate the law of war do more than just dishonor themselves, they jeopardize the success of the entire military effort. In short, while the moral and ethical underpinnings of the law of war are obviously important, they must be matched by pragmatic, purely *military* rationales. These do, in fact, exist for virtually every aspect of the law of war. It behooves the virtuous warrior to emphasize such explanations during training because they are the ones that will most likely make sense to troops fighting to survive in the terror of combat. Likewise, it is wise to dispel the myth–and it really *is* a myth–that the law of war is an invention of lawyers and politicians. In truth, it was an innovation generated by warriors, for warriors.[73]

(d) Be innovative.

As discussed, technology is not a panacea for the problems of neo-absolutist war. Still, it would be a mistake to overlook its innovative potential. After all, analysts Ronald Haycock and Keith Neilson note that "technology has permitted the division of mankind into ruler and ruled."[74] At any rate, technology is one of America's principal asymmetrical advantages. And that technological advantage is manifest in the array of precision guided munitions (PGMs) that makes the U.S. arsenal second to none.

Joint Vision 2010 touts "precision engagement" as a means to "lessen risk to [United States] forces, and [to] minimize collateral damage."[75] PGMs have the dual advantage in the context of neo-absolutist war. They reduce collateral damage and, because of their accuracy, they decrease the number of attackers required to go in harm's way to strike a given target.[76] In short, unlike other high-tech armaments (*e.g.*, nuclear weapons) that provide military advantages but political liabilities, PGMs uniquely seem to offer both military efficiency and an unparalleled opportunity to seize the moral high ground so conducive to maintaining the necessary public support.

Other technologies offer advantages similar to those of PGMs. The advocates of "information operations"[77] and cyberwar[78] contend that twenty-first century conflicts can be fought virtually bloodlessly in cyberspace. In a cyberwar scenario depicted in a 1995 *Time* magazine article, a United States Army officer conjured up a future crisis where a technician ensconced at a computer terminal in the United States could derail a distant aggressor "without firing a shot" simply by manipulating computer and communications systems.[79] In a similar vein, the proponents of a growing plethora of "nonlethal"[80] technologies argue that a range of adversaries can be engaged without deadly effect.

Collectively, these innovative technologies, if properly applied, give American military leaders new tools to frustrate a neo-absolutist strategy because they allow the application of military power in a way that minimizes risk to friendly forces, noncombatants and, very often, the enemy forces themselves. All of this furthers the interest of the virtuous warrior to whom such considerations are important.

However, several cautions are in order. None of the new technologies can eliminate every hazard to noncombatants or, for that matter, anyone else. Quite obviously, even the most accurate PGM endangers a "human shield." Additionally, most of the so-called "non-lethal" technologies, items like rubber bullets, sticky foam, and so forth, are deadly to at least some persons.[81] Even the relative harmlessness of the data manipulation suggested in the *Time* article can have fatal consequences to noncombatants reliant upon computer-dependent equipment. While these new systems do have the potential to lower the risk of casualties in particular situations, neither military leaders nor civilian decisionmakers should be seduced into thinking that technology permits engaging *any* adversary risk-free.[82]

There are some potential uses that do show special promise of low lethality. High technology, and especially advanced information systems, might be most effective if it is geared towards countering the cult of personality intrinsic to the leadership cadre of many neo-absolutist groups. Critical to their hold on power is their ability to project and maintain an image of omnipotence. To counter that image, media expert Chuck De Caro recommends employing what he calls "softwar." He defines softwar as the "hostile use of television to shape another nation's will by changing its view of reality."[83] Key to its utilization, he says, "is ripping an adversary's control of com-

munication away from him and then turning it against him so that he can have nothing but ignominious defeat."

Ignominious defeat is defeat in which the vanquished becomes an object of ridicule, embarrassment, or revulsion to his former supporters. Imposing ignominious defeat on a adver-

Captain Pat Castle of the Academy's Chemistry Department accepts the Malham M. Wakin Character Development Award from Lieutenant General Tad J. Oelstrom, USAFA Superintendent. Captain Castler was one of four team members from the Chemistry Department cited for efforts to emphasize ethics across the curriculum.

sary and his cohorts is often more desirable than actually killing them because it denies them the opportunity to perpetuate their legacy by becoming "glorious" martyrs. Consequently, softwar aimed at ignominious defeat is especially advantageous because it roots out the underlying power base and discourages those who might otherwise replenish the ranks–all of which increases the chances of a more lasting peace.

Seizing control of the enemy's mass communications facilities in order to employ softwar might be accomplished, according to De Caro, by a combination of physical attacks and high-tech cyber subversion. Once control is obtained, the populace can be fed either accurate information previously denied them, or altered information. In either case, the action serves to change the enemy citizenry's view of their erstwhile leaders.

How might a softwar plan involving *altered* information work? Thomas Czerwinski, then a professor at the School of Information Warfare of the National Defense University, postulated one scenario when he asked: "What would happen if you took Saddam Hussein's image, al-

tered it, and projected it back to Iraq showing him voicing doubts about his own Baath Party?"[84] Clearly, the problems of internal control are multiplied. Anything that causes dissension or otherwise gnaws away at the control so necessary for neo-absolutist leaders is helpful to the virtuous warrior. Moreover, the systems needed to accomplish this are hardly science fiction.[85] The movie *Wag the Dog* depicted in a fictional setting the ability to manipulate public perception using today's technology.[86]

Beyond waging softwar, ignominious defeat can be brought about by bringing malefactors to justice in a court of law. This is not always instinctive to even virtuous warriors. Following World War II President Roosevelt and Churchill initially wanted to summarily execute the Nazis leadership.[87] It was the savvy Soviets, however, who prevailed upon them to conduct the Nuremberg trials. The trials succeeded in documenting to the German people the full horror of Nazi evil. This proved to be an expurgating event, one which left relatively few vestiges of pro-Nazi sentiment in postwar Germany. Ignominious defeat was enhanced by the fact that the Nazis were not permitted to wear accoutered military uniforms, and several were forced to suffer the humiliation of execution by hanging instead of a soldier's death by firing squad.

Such punishments are not always necessary to impose ignominious defeat. In South Africa, for example, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is empowered to grant amnesty to those who confess their crimes and plead for forgiveness. It is the required process of supplication which achieves the ignominious defeat. The purpose of ignominious defeat, it must be emphasized, is to facilitate where feasible a fundamental psychological transformation of the neo-absolutist inclinations of the larger group. Again, lasting peace can only occur when the society waging neo-absolutist war undergoes seismic change.

Another technique using information innovatively that might further such a transformation was pioneered by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in the former Yugoslavia. There the ICRC developed a video to teach what was essentially the law of war to the warring parties. What differentiated this effort from more traditional programs is that rather than referring to the Geneva Conventions as such, the admonitions were characterized more generi-

cally as a "warrior's" responsibilities. Elsewhere, the ICRC has developed booklets for the Middle East in which provisions of the Geneva Conventions were "matched with bits of traditional Arab and Islamic wisdom."[88] Such culturally-specific efforts might be used overtly–or covertly–against the ranks of certain adversaries who might be resistant to anything perceived as being of Western origin. It should not be overlooked that a few of the adversaries practicing neo-absolutist strategies might actually be unaware of the laws of war. Ideally, the impetus for ignominious defeat would come from forces *internal* to the enemy society itself.

(e) Demonstrate commitment and resolve.

Dealing ignominious defeat to a neo-absolutist adversary by holding them accountable requires both commitment to the rule of law and the resolve to make the sacrifices necessary to see that it is honored. If that accountability must be imposed by *external* forces, this can involve danger to the enforcers. In Bosnia critics say that United States commanders have avoided the "hazardous task of arresting major war criminals" because they are "terrified of taking risks."[89] This risk aversion is a permutation of the previously discussed casualty aversion. While much of the impulse for casualty aversion is external to the military, much of it does originate from within the ranks–yet another vestige of the Vietnam War.[90] Many in uniform believe that lives were needlessly lost in the war in Southeast Asia and are determined to avoid putting military personnel at risk unless absolutely necessary.

This has led to conflicts with civilian policymakers, as illustrated by a much-reported episode between Madeline Albright, then ambassador to the UN, and General Colin Powell, who was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time. Frustrated over the military's reluctance to become involved in Bosnia, Ambassador Albright asked General Powell, "What is the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?"[91] Powell reported that he nearly had "an aneurysm," and explained to Ambassador Albright about the need for clear political goals before a military intervention. Powell (and others) have been roundly criticized in some quarters for reluctance to support the use of force in various circumstances.[92]

Without question, military leaders should be wary of involvement in situations where troops are put in jeopardy. At the same time, however, it is imperative that the military avoid creating the perception that it is unwilling to undertake risky missions. The comments of columnist William Pfaff should be of concern to military professionals:

> Congressional opinion *reinforces the military leadership's* reluctance in recent years to assign missions to American soldiers that involve serious risk to their lives....Dangerous missions have been left to the professionals of other countries....The American uniform is dishonored by this claim to privilege.[93]

Moreover, it is interesting to note that Dr. Charles Moskos, the nation's foremost military sociologist, observes that casualty aversion did not arise until the advent of the all-volunteer force.[94] Uniformed professionals need to ask themselves whether the military's altruistic ethos is being replaced by an occupationalism that lays undue weight (perhaps unconsciously) on self-preservation over mission accomplishment. This tendency may be exacerbated by the treatment of Brig General Terry Schwalier. General Schwalier's promotion to major general was quashed following the bombing of Khobar Towers during his tour as commander. Schwalier was punished *not* because he failed to accomplish his mission of enforcing the no-fly zone in Southern Iraq, but rather because he had allegedly failed to take sufficient steps to protect his forces against terrorism.[95] Perceptions about this case have dangerous potential.

If military forces become obsessed with their own protection at the expense of mission accomplishment, they are in great danger of becoming "self-licking ice cream cones" with no hope of defeating neo-absolutist opponents. Neo-absolutists must be confronted with powerful military forces who relentlessly seek them out with a seeming indifference to their own fate. The qualities necessary to do so are not readily apparent in modern Western societies. In considering the war in Chechyna, a textbook neo-absolutist conflict, Professor Keegan contends:

> [I]n truth, most people in Western societies make bad soldiers. More and more, the successful armies that survive...depend upon selectively recruited military units that cultivate a strong warrior spirit that is exclusive, proud and fierce. For regular armies, the difficulty will be to find enough individuals with warrior abilities–something that the Chechens imbibe with their mothers' milk.

The virtuous warrior must not allow a neo-absolutist enemy to doubt the resolve of U.S. forces or their willingness to put themselves in harm's way. In order to have the kind of military it needs for this new kind of warfare, military leaders should be unapologetic about the centrality of self-sacrifice to the American version of the warrior's code. Catch phrases like "people are our most important asset" too often are misconstrued into a notion that people are the first priority. They are not, and should never be. Successful mission accomplishment must always be the top priority. And this can–and will–frequently cost lives, perhaps many lives.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This short essay hardly begins to answer all the questions that will arise as military leaders confront adversaries who refuse to conform their conduct to accepted norms of international law and behavior. Moreover, it would be exceptionally unwise to underestimate the ability of opponents to continue to develop innovative asymmetrical methodologies to undermine our military efforts. In short, as Eisenhower implies, we should expect the unexpected.[96]

In addressing the difficulties posed by the neo-absolutist opponent it is clear that there is no single, "silver bullet" solution to these very complex problems. What is required is a creative but reasoned and holistic analysis of all approaches. To stimulate imaginative responses to this new form of warfare, the wise commander will encourage an environment not merely tolerant of out-of-the-box thinking, but one that rewards it, even in those instances when a fresh approach is not as successful as hoped.

This essay has argued that ultimately war is a contest of wills. The challenge for the "virtuous warrior" is recognizing the elements

of moral force that underlie a combatant's will to continue a conflict. Those elements may vary from opponent to opponent, but the ones applicable to the U.S. will likely remain relatively unchanged. The fundamentals of our concept of a virtuous warrior reflect the basic humanitarian values of the American character and these are immutable.

Unquestionably, the virtuous warrior in future conflicts may find himself or herself under tremendous pressure to compromise those values. Goaded perhaps by the impact of a horrendous atrocity there is a temptation to embrace the 18th century German concept of *Kriegsraison*. It asserts that military necessity of sufficient weight justifies any action, including violations of the law of war, especially if they will shorten the conflict.[97] In reality, this flawed end-justifies-the-means type of thinking is little different than that embraced by adherents of neo-absolutist war. It invites a descent into savagery and brutality that will sustain an endless cycle of violence that makes the restoration of real peace virtually impossible. Similarly, the wrongheaded, "we must burn the village in order to save it," mentality that emerges from such thinking is extremely counterproductive and self-defeating in the context of American culture–as is evident from the collapse of public support for the Vietnam War following revelations of such conduct.

What this paper has tried to demonstrate is that it is possible to successfully confront evil without becoming evil. Indeed, the virtuous warrior should understand that honoring the precepts of chivalrous and humane warfare in the face of the contrary behavior provides him or her with a potent weapon. In his examination of World War II Professor Overy observes that the Allies "belief that they fought on the side of righteousness equipped them with powerful moral armament," and that became one of the main reasons for their victory. The power of that idea is no less true today.

Virtuous warriors should, in fact, *promote* their compliance with legal and ethical norms as a *strength* of their warfighting strategy. The moral high ground obtained by doing so pays many dividends. For their part, adversaries weighing a neo-absolutist strategy ought to understand that inhumane behavior offends American sensibilities in a unique way. Other cultures may view neo-absolutist strategies as just another way of waging war, but Americans con-

ider them and those that use them as evil and, perhaps even worse, cowardly. American attitudes towards those they perceive as evil and cowardly are harsh and unforgiving, as the whopping public support for the death penalty amply demonstrates.

Without doubt, waging neo-absolutist war against the United States–requiring as it does a near-perfect understanding of the complexities of American popular opinion–is an exquisitely perilous enterprise. The consequences of miscalculation are enormous, as American power has terrifying possibilities. Once aroused, it can be chillingly effective and sensationally devastating; there are few things more dangerous than a provoked America. It is not without irony that it may be the virtuous warrior's last responsibility in some future conflict to ensure that even a vanquished "Genghis Khan" and whatever remains of his clan receives treatment that honors this nation's highest ideals.

Men who take up arms against one another in public war do not cease to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to God.

Instructions for the Armies of the United States
General Order No. 100, April 24, 1863

NOTES

[1] The author has discussed elements of this essay in previous papers including, *Asymmetrical Warfare and the Western Mindset,* presented on Nov. 20, 1997 in Cambridge, MA, to *The Role of Naval Forces in 21st Century Operations* conference sponsored by the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy at Tufts University, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, and the Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy; *Technology and the Twenty-first Century Battlefield: Re-complicating Moral Life for the Statesman and the Soldier,* presented on Feb. 6, 1998 in Annapolis, MD, to the Ethics and the Future of Conflict Working Group meeting sponsored by the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs; *Organizational Change and the New Technologies of War,* presented on Jan. 30, 1998 to the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics, at the National Defense University, Ft McNair, Washington, D.C., and *21st-Century Land Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths*, Parameters, Autumn 1997, at 27.

[2] *As quoted by* Stephen E. Ambrose, Americans at War (1997), at 195.

[3] Sir Galahad, Sir Lancelot's son in Arthurian literature, is considered to represent the ideal of knightly chivalry. In Sir Thomas Malory's Le Morte D'Arthur, a sword that legend held could be removed only by the best knight in the world was freed by Sir Galahad.

[4] *See, e.g.,* Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010 (1996), William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America (September 1997).

[5] Other authorities define asymmetrical warfare somewhat differently. For example, in its unclassified report on the exercise STRATEGIC FORCE `96, the Air Force discussed the issue as follows:

> The symmetrical battles have classically pitted steel against steel in slow wars of attrition. Asymmetrical warfare departs from this thinking. Asymmetrical warfare avoids traditional force-on-force battles. Asymmetrical warfare favors pitting your strength against an enemy's strength or weakness in a nontraditional and sometimes unconventional manner.

Department of the Air Force, Strategic Force (1997), at 8.

[6] Geoffrey Parker, *The Future of Western Warfare*, Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare (Geoffrey Parker, ed., 1995), at 369.

[7] Joint Vision 2010 *supra* note 4, at ii.

[8] *Id.* at 10-11 (emphasis added).

[9] *See, e.g., Id.,* at 11 (information technologies); QDR *supra* note 4, at 4 (NBC [nuclear, biological, and chemical] threats, information warfare); and the National Military Strategy, *supra* note 4, at 9 (WMD and information warfare).

[10] Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense (2d ed., 1994) xii . General George S. Patton, Jr.'s comments typify the classic American view:

> The Americans, as a race, are the foremost mechanics of the world–It therefore behooves us to devise methods of war which exploit our inherent superiority. We must fight the war by machines on the ground, and in the air, to the maximum of our ability....

As quoted by Colin S. Gray, *U.S. Strategic Culture: Implications for Defense Technology*, Defense Technology (Asa A. Clark IV and John F. Lilley eds., 1989), at 31, *citing* George S. Patton, Jr., War as I Knew It 345 (1947; Bantam *reprint* 1980).

[11] Joint Vision 2010, *supra* note 4, at 1.

[12] For a discussions of "the revolution in military affairs" in the information age *see generally*, *Select Enemy. Delete.*, The Economist, March 8, 1997, at 21; Eliot A. Cohen, *A Revolution in Warfare*, Foreign Affairs, March/April 1996, at 37; Andrew F. Krepinevich, *Cavalry to Computers: The Pattern of Military Revolutions*, The National Interest, Fall 1994, at 30; and James R. Fitzsimonds and Jan M. Van Tol, *Revolutions in Military Affairs*, Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1994, at 24.

[13] *See,* Robert N. Ellithorpe, *Warfare in Transition? American Military Culture Prepares for the Information Age*, a presentation for the Biennial International Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, MD, October 24-26, 1997, at 18 ("American military culture historically emphasized scientific approaches to warfare to the point of holding an almost mystical belief in the power of technology to solve the challenges of war.") (Unpublished paper on file with author).

[14] Robert Poole, Beyond Engineering (1997) at 209.

[15] Lt General Paul K. Van Riper, *Information Superiority*, Marine Corps Gazette, June 1997, at 54, 62.

[16] John Childs, *Genghis Khan*, The Dictionary of Military History 305 (Andre Corvisier, ed., English ed., rev. 1994).

[17] *See* John Keegan, A History of Warfare (1993). Harry Summers maintains that Keegan makes a false distinction between "politics" and "culture." *See* Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., USA (Ret.), The New World Order (1995) at 40-42.

[18] Huntington's original thesis (first published in 1993), together with thoughtful critiques have been published. *See* Council on Foreign Relations, *The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate* (1996). Huntington has expanded his thesis to a book-length treatise entitled The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996).

[19] Lt General Li Jijaun, *Traditional Military Thinking and the Defensive Strategy of China*, LeTort Paper No. 1, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (Earl Tilford ed., Aug. 29, 1997), at 1.

[20] Ralph Peters, *The New Warrior Class*, Parameters, Summer 1994, at 24.

[21] John Keegan, *The Warrior's Code of No Surrender*, U.S. News & World Report, Jan. 23, 1995, at 47.

[22] Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honor 116-117 (1997).

[23] *Id.* at 117.

[24] *Id.* at 6.

[25] Dan Cordtz, *War in the 21st Century: The Streetfighter State,* Financial World, Aug. 29, 1995, at 42 (discussing "[w]ill the U.S. be ready to fight enemies who don't play by the traditional rules?").

[26] *Id.*

[27] *As quoted by* James Kittfield, in *The Air Force Wants to Spread Its Wings*, National Journal, Nov. 8, 1997, at 2264.

[28] *As quoted in How North Vietnam Won the War*, The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 3, 1995, at A8.

[29] *See generally*, Thomas L. Friedman, *"No-Dead War" Poses Problem for U.S.*, Omaha World-Herald, Aug. 25, 1995, at 24, and Chris Black, *US Options Seem Fewer as Military Avoids Risk*, Boston Globe, July 23, 1995, at 12. This trend has led Edward Luttwak to argue that an even greater investment in technology is required because modern democracies simply cannot tolerate casualties. *See* Edward Luttwak, *Post-Heroic Armies*, Foreign Affairs, July/Aug. 1996, at 33.

[30] Somali casualties were estimated to be in "the hundreds." *See* James L. Woods, *U.S. Decisionmaking During Operations in Somalia*, Learning from Somalia (Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., 1997), at 164.

[31] Douglas Waller, a *Time* magazine correspondent observes:

> The same technology that is revolutionizing the way the Pentagon fights wars is also changing the way the media covers them. The media can now provide viewers, listeners and even readers almost instant access to a battlefield. With lighter video cameras, smaller portable computers, cellular phones, their own aircraft, and worldwide electronic linkups, the media can report on any battlefield no matter how remote and no matter how many restrictions the Defense Department tries to place on coverage.

Douglas Waller, *Public Affairs, the Media, and War in the Information Age*, a presentation for the War in the Information Age Conference, Tufts University, Nov. 15-16, 1995 (unpublished paper on file with author).

[32] Walter J. Boyne, Beyond the Wild Blue: A History of the Air Force 1947-1997, at 7 (1997).

[33] *Id.*

[34] *See* Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The General's War: The Inside Story of Conflict in the Gulf 324-326 (1996).

[35] U.S. Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 110-31, *International Law—The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations* (1976) provides as follows:

> The term noncombatant includes a wide variety of disparate persons...civilians (who are not otherwise lawful or unlawful combatants, combatants who are hors de combat (PWs and wounded and sick), members of the armed forces enjoying special status (chaplains and medics), and civilians accompanying the armed forces.

Id., paragraph 3-4.

[36] Joint Vision 2010, *supra* note 4, at 28 and 34.

[37] See Lt Col Thomas X. Hammes, *Don't Look Back, They're Not Behind You*, The Marine Corps Gazette, May 1996, at 72, 73 (discussing the military implications of chaining hostages to targets). Hostage taking was not clearly prohibited until after World War II. *See* H. Wayne Elliot, Lt Col, USA (Ret.), *Hostages or Prisoners of War: War Crimes at Dinner*, 149 Mil. L. Rev. 241 (Summer 1995).

[38] *See* Stephen Erlanger, *Russia Allows Rebels to Leave with Hostages*, New York Times, June 20, 1995, at 1.

[39] *See Libyans to Form Shield at Suspected Arms Plant*, Baltimore Sun, May 17, 1996, at 14.

[40] *See* Barbara Slavin, *Iraq Leaves U.S. Few Options*, USA Today, Nov. 14, 1997, at 13A.

[41] James F. Dunnigan, Digital Soldiers: The Evolution of High-Tech Weaponry and Tomorrow's Brave New Battlefield (1996) at 219.

[42] *See, e.g.*, Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., *How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007*, The Weekly Standard, Jan. 29, 1996, at 22.

[43] James E. Kinzer and Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, *Political-Military Affairs Officers and the Air Force: Continued Turbulence in a Vital Career Specialty*, Institute for National Security Studies, Occasional Paper 13, April 1997, at 35.

[44] Edward L. Rowney, *Tough Times, Tougher Talk*, American Legion Magazine, May 1997, at 24, 25-26.

[45] H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty 327 (1997) [emphasis added].

[46] *See* John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope 120 (1995).

[47] Carl H. Builder, *Keeping the Strategic Flame*, Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ), Winter 1996-97, at 76.

[48] *Id.* at 77-78.

[49] Colonel Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, 10 Propositions Regards Airpower 13 (1995).

[50] *See generally*, HIRSCH AND OAKLEY, *supra*, note 46, at 3-16. *Cf.* Somalia: A Country Study (Harold D. Nelson ed., 1981) and Learning from Somalia (Walter C. Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst eds., 1997), at 85.

[51] Andrew S. Natsios, *Humanitarian Relief Intervention in Somalia*.

[52] The author served as the Staff Judge Advocate and Plans and Policy Officer for Joint Task Force Provide Relief from November 1992 through January 1993.

[53] Colonel John A. Warden, II, USAF (Ret.), The Air Campaign (1989).

[54] Essentially, the concept of proportionality requires commanders to refrain from attacks when it "may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the direct and concrete military advantage anticipated." *See* AFP 110-31, *supra* note 35, at paragraph 5-3c(1)(b)(I)(c).

[55] B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (1991).

[56] *See, e.g.*, John Ellis, Brute Force (1990).

[57] H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero 417-419 (1992).

[58] In essence, Saddam is practicing his own version of an indirect strategic approach.

[59] Nineteen airmen were killed and scores injured by the blast, the perpetrators of which are still not yet publicly identified. The most comprehensive public study (albeit opinionated) is the report by journalist Matt Labash. *See* Matt Labash, *The Scapegoat*, The Weekly Standard, Nov. 24, 1997, at 20.

[60] Martin van Creveld, Technology and War 307-308 (Rev. Ed., 1991).

[61] *See generally*, Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 309-316 (1977).

[62] Stephen E. Ambrose, Americans at War (1997) at 152.

[63] *See* Captain Michael R. Lwin, USA, and Captain Mark R. Lwin, USMC, *The Future of Land Power*, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Sept. 1997, at 82, 83.

[64] *Id.*

[65] David A. Fulgham, *Computer Combat Rules Frustrate the Pentagon*, Aviation Week & Space Technology, Sept. 15, 1997, at 67.

[66] *Id.*

[67] *See* Pat Cooper and Frank Oliveri, *Air Force Carves Operational Edge In Info Warfare*, Defense News, Aug. 21-27, 1995.

[68] Lt Col Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society 203-205 (1996).

[69] *Id.*

[70] Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won 302-305 (1st Am. ed., 1996).

[71] *Id.* at 304.

[72] W. Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou, The Laws of War xxiv (1994).

[73] *See, e.g.*, Major Scott R, Morris, *USA The Laws of War: Rules by Warriors for Warriors*, The Army Lawyer, Dec. 1997, at 4.

[74] Ronald Haycock and Keith Neilson, Men, Machines, and War xii (1988).

[75] JV 2010, *supra* note 4, at 21.

[76] Benjamin S. Lambeth argues:

> [P]ossibly the single greatest impact of the technology revolution on airpower and its effectiveness relative to other force components is its capacity to save lives through the use of precision attack to minimize noncombatant and friendly fatalities by the substitution of technology for manpower and the creation of battlefield conditions in which land elements, once unleashed, can more readily do their jobs because of the degraded capabilities of enemy forces.

Benjamin S. Lambeth, *Technology and Air War*, Air Force Magazine, Nov. 1996, at 50, 53. *See also* Lt Col Edward Mann, *One Target, One Bomb*, Military Review, Sept. 1993, at 33; contra *see, e.g.*, Sean D. Naylor, *General: Technology is No Substitute for Troops*, Air Force Times, Mar. 3, 1997, at 26 (*citing* remarks by General John Sheehan, USMC, then Commander-in Chief of U.S. Atlantic Command).

[77] There are many possible definitions of information operations but a common official definition is that used by the Air Force, that is, "actions taken to gain, exploit, defend, or attack information and information systems." Air Force Doctrine Document 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*, Sept. 1997, at 44 [hereinafter AFDD-1]. This definition is almost identical to that once used by the Air Force to describe information warfare. *See* Captain Robert G. Hanseman, USAF, *The Realities and Legalities of Information Warfare*, 42 A.F. L. Rev. 173, 176 (1997), *citing* USAF Fact Sheet 95-20 (Nov. 1995).

[78] Cyberwar suggests a form of warfare more holistic, strategic, and manipulative of information in its concept than the "information operations" definition set forth in note 77 *supra.* AFDD-1 notes the following:

> In describing information operations, it is important to differentiate between "information in war" and "information warfare." The second element, information warfare, involves such diverse activities as psychological warfare, military deception, electronic combat, and both physical and cyber attack.

AFDD-1, *Id.* For an excellent cyberwar scenario, *see* John Arquilla, *The Great Cyberwar of 2002,* Wired, Feb. 1998, at 122.

[79] He visualized the foe's phone system brought down by a computer virus, logic bombs ravaging the transportation network, false orders confusing the adversary's military, the opponent's television broadcasts jammed with propaganda messages, and the enemy leader's bank account electronically zeroed out. All of this is expected to cause the adversary to give up. *See* Douglas Waller, *Onward Cyber Soldiers,* Time, Aug. 21, 1995, at 38.

[80] The Department of Defense defines these weapons as follows:

> Weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or material, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment. Unlike conventional lethal weapons that destroy their targets principally through blast, penetration and fragmentation, non-lethal weapons employ means other than gross physical destruction to prevent the target from functioning. Non-lethal weapons are intended to have one, or both, of the following characteristics: a. they have relatively reversible effects on personnel or material, b. they affect objects differently within their area of influence.

Nonlethal Weapons: Terms and References, USAF Institute for National Security Studies, Colorado Springs, CO, (Robert J. Bunker ed., July 1997), at ix *citing* Department of Defense Directive 3000.3, *Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons,* July 9, 1996.

[81] Larry Lynn, Director, U.S. Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, says that "there is no such thing as nonlethal of course." *See One on One,* Defense News, Feb. 19-25, 1996, at 30.

[82] *See also* Thomas E. Ricks, *Gingrich's Futuristic Vision for Re-Shaping the Armed Forces Worry Military Professionals,* Wall Street Journal, Feb. 8, 1995, at 16 (contending that "many of the supporters of the military who lack firsthand experience–believe that gadgets can somehow substitute for the blood and sweat of ground combat.")

[83] E-mail to the author dated Feb. 20, 1998.

[84] *As quoted by* Peter Grier, *Information Warfare,* Air Force Magazine, Mar. 1995, at 35.

[85] *See* Dennis Brack, *Do Photos Lie?,* Proceedings, Aug. 1996, at 47.

[86] In the fictionalized story in the movie Wag the Dog (1997) a Hollywood movie producer was retained to create a "war" via the manipulation of images and pass it off as an actual event.

[87] *See* Joseph E. Persico, Nuremberg: Infamy on Trial 8 (1994).

[88] *See* Ignatieff, *supra* note 22.

[89] William Drozdiak, *Passivity Tempers U.S. Progress in Bosnia,* Washington Post, Dec. 21, 1997, at 1.

[90] *See* note 29, *supra,* and accompanying text.

[91] *As quoted by* Colin Powell, My American Journey 576 (with Joseph E. Persico, 1995). Powell reported his response:

> I thought I would have an aneurysm. American GIs were not toy soldiers to be moved around on some sort of global game board. I patiently explained that we had used our armed forces more than two dozen times in the preceding three years for war, peacekeeping, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance. But in every one of those cases we had had a clear goal and had matched our military commitment to the goal. I told Ambassador Albright that the U.S. military would carry out any mission it was handed, but my advice would always be that the tough political goals had to be set first. Then we would accomplish the mission.

Id. at 576-577.

[92] *See, e.g.,* Richard H. Kohn, *Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations,* The National Interest, Spring 1994, at 3.

[93] William Pfaff, *America's Peace Strategy Lets Others Pay the Price,* Baltimore Sun, July 17, 1997, at 11.

[94] Conversation with the author, Oct. 1997, Baltimore, MD.

[95] *See* note 59 *supra.*

[96] *See* note 2, su*pra,* and accompanying text.

[97] *See* AFP 110-31, *supra* note 35, at paragraph 1-3a(1).

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BIOGRAPHY
*Col Charles Dunlap Jr, is Staff Judge Advocate for 9th Air Force/United States Central Command Air Forces, Shaw Air Force Base, SC. He has written numerous articles on national security affairs appearing in publications such as **Airpower Journal**, **Air Force Times**, and **Peacekeeping & International Relations** to name but a few. In 1994 he received the ABA Military Law Committee's Writing Award. Colonel Dunlap has made presentations at a variety of forums including the Air War College, USAF Special Operations School, National War College, Naval Postgraduate School, Duke University, Brookings Institution, and many other institutions of higher learning. He served as a consultant for the HBO movie, **The Enemy Within**, and is currently working with the BBC on a series about future conflict.*

Beyond Honor: Understanding Military Character Development

Marvin W. Berkowitz

Our scientific power has outrun our spiritual power. We have guided missiles and misguided men.

Reverend Martin Luther King

It is not difficult to justify allocating resources to character development at the United States' service academies. The need is apparent. As we train America's future officers, whether land-, air-, or sea-based, it is clear that producing technically proficient but morally flawed officers is potentially catastrophic. Military history is rife with examples of immoral warriors creating terrible disasters. As former president Theodore Roosevelt argued, "to educate a person in mind and not in morals is to educate a menace to society." What greater menace than to arm that person and give them control over forces of destruction? Fortunately, that is the exception rather than the rule, because the US military has long understood this problem and has made character a centerpiece in military training. Here at the US Air Force Academy, this history is only decades old because the Academy is only decades old. But at West Point, the "long gray line" reaches back centuries and is imbued with a tradition of honor and character. So why do we need to examine military character development? Essentially because the idea and practice of character development in the military has been somewhat myopic and narrow. For a long time, character was simply understood as honor. There is much that the fields of philosophy, psychology, theology, and education have to offer to enrich how we understand character and how we foster it.

LIMITATIONS OF HONOR

Each of the service academies has an honor code. Whereas they are not identical, they are nonetheless very similar. They all include three or all four of the following proscriptions: do not lie; do not steal; do not cheat; do not tolerate others lying, stealing, or cheating. The main point of variation is the fourth proscription (tolerance) which some service academies include and others do not. The honor code is the centerpiece of character development at the service academies; in fact, historically, it typically has been the predominant, if not sole, aspect of character. It is ubiquitous. It is typically inculcated from the day the cadet or midshipman first sets foot on the academy grounds. And it is highlighted and taught throughout the four years of academy training. Furthermore, it serves to foster character by being managed and implemented by the cadets and midshipmen themselves. They run the honor system. They teach it. They administer the judicial process. In this way they are held responsible for training and implementation, although it is a small percentage of them who actually experience the honor system in this way. For most, they experience it simply as recipients of honor training.

There are a number of limitations of the honor system as the core of character development, which is why we must expand our understanding of character "beyond honor." First, the scope of the honor codes is limited. They deal with, at most, four proscribed classes of behavior. They do not, for example, deal with psychological abuse or prejudicial treatment. When we think of honor in a broader sense, we see it used to connote much more than these four taboos. We call judges "your honor" implying their sense of justice, fairness, and impartiality. When a man and woman create an unplanned pregnancy out of wedlock, we often hear the phrase "do the honorable thing" implying taking responsibility for the consequences of one's actions. The honor codes at the military academies include none of these connotations.

Second, it is proscriptive rather than prescriptive. It lists the "don'ts" rather than the

Cadet Amanda Hutchison meets with Hugh Thompson and Lawrence Colburn at the Character and Leadership Symposium. Both received the Soldier's Medal for courageous actions at My Lai in 1968.

"do's." Now that is really a bit unfair. At USAFA, for example, there is an honor oath that accompanies the honor code: "Furthermore I resolve to do my duty and to live honorably, so help me God." Admittedly, this is positive, but it is still rather vague. Duty remains to be defined and we have already defined honor as not lying, stealing, cheating or tolerating. At USMA, the honor code has been appended with a series of prescriptions, or rules of thumb for honorable living. This is a step in the right direction, but a fuller explication of prescriptive character is still warranted.

Third, it is unclear how effective the honor code actually is. A recent study of colleges with honor codes revealed that cheating has more than tripled from 1961 to 1991. More than 1 in 8 students helped another cheat on a test in 1991 and more than 1 in 4 collaborated on an individual assignment. Now these were not specifically military academies, but the point is clear. Honor systems may not even prevent those few behaviors that they target. Part of this is due to high school students who "de-couple" academic dishonesty from character. Nearly every high school student will tell you that being a person of good character is important to them; however, more than 70% report having cheated in the past year. It is this mindset with which the honor system has to contend.

Fourth, the honor code does not tell us what kind of person, or officer, to be. It is basically behaviorally oriented. It describes four behaviors to avoid. One could be sadistic and fulfill the honor code. One could be selfish and fulfill the honor code. One could be cowardly and fulfill the honor code. One could be a braggart and fulfill the honor code. Character is about the kind of person one is, not merely the behaviors in which one does or does not engage.

It is worth noting some additional limitations and challenges to the honor systems of the service academies. First, whereas the service academies intend the honor systems to be owned and run by cadets and midshipmen, those cadets and midshipmen do not always perceive them that way. They often do not feel ownership and perceive the officers at the academies to be in charge of the honor systems. Second, those few cases that are overturned lead to cynicism. When the Secretary of the Air Force, or his peer in the other services, overturns a decision, and even worse does not offer a substantive justification for doing so, the fall-out is quite destructive. Without clear justifications, cadets and midshipman (and officers) are prone to attribute undesirable motives to such actions; such as nepotism, influence peddling, cronyism, etc. Third, cadets and midshipmen are reticent to find more advanced peers guilty. If a defendant in an honor case is about to graduate and be commissioned, honor boards frequently do not find him or her guilty despite clear evidence to that effect. Fourth and last, the toleration clause that USAFA and USMA include is quite problematic. This is extremely difficult for young men and women to enact. Furthermore, it jeopardizes new cadets who may immediately observe honor violations by peers who have not yet internalized the code and thereby requires them to either report or to already have violated the code at the very outset of their military careers.

FROM HONOR TO CHARACTER

So what do we need to do? We need a richer understanding of character than simply honor as defined by the service academies. The goal is to produce officers of good character. This entails more than honor and therefore demands a larger perspective. A larger per-

spective will likely generate a more complex conception of the goals of character development and education, which will, in turn, demand a more varied and comprehensive approach to character development. We have already seen why character is so important at the academies. Hence we need to make character central to the development of tomorrow's military leaders. As former President Dwight D. Eisenhower implored, "May we pursue what's right—without self-righteousness. May we know unity—without conformity. May we grow in strength—without pride of self."

What is character? The Character Education Partnership, the preeminent professional organization for character education, defines it as "knowing the good, desiring the good, and doing the good." From the perspective of ethical philosophy it can be construed as respect for persons, maximizing the general good, and/or living a life of virtue. Character is reflected in the way one lives one's life and how one treats oneself and others. It is a general moral assessment of a person. Much of this may seem abstract and hard to grasp. Let us consider an example. Respect for persons is a central philosophical tenet. Hugh Thompson, for his actions as an Army Warrant Officer at My Lai during the Vietnam War received the Soldier's Medal. He alone recognized the immorality of the massacre of unarmed civilians and responded accordingly. When later asked why he chose to confront his fellow soldiers and stop the massacre he replied "it is easier to kill someone who is not human than someone who is human. I always saw (the Vietnamese) as human beings." In other words, it was his intrinsic respect for the worth of human beings that let to his heroism. As he noted, many soldiers did not share his view of the Vietnamese citizens.

Now it is actually a bit distortive and unfair to suggest that the service academies have limited their understanding of character to their respective honor codes. In 1993, the USMA retitled its previous annual "honor conference" the "ethics in America" conference. USAFA, USNA, and USMA have all now established Centers for some richer understanding of honor, whether it is termed "leadership" or "character" or carries some other rubric. USMA is a good

example as it has just evolved from a purely "honor" program run by a single Captain to a new center with numerous staff, headed by Colonel Michael Haith as Director. USAFA and USNA had already taken this step, with USAFA establishing its Center for Character Development in 1993, and its current Director, Colonel Mark Hyatt, has committed to an extended tour of duty in that position.

As the institutions committed more fully and focally to character development, their understandings of character have also developed. USAFA has elaborated a complex definition of character in its "eight outcomes." In a condensed version they are: forthright integrity, selflessness, commitment to excellence, respect for human dignity, decisiveness, responsibility, self-discipline/courage, appreciation of spirituality. Clearly, this covers much more of the character domain than the four honor proscriptions do. This richer understanding is also manifested in the move toward establishing core values. Each of the service academies has identified core values. Indeed, the first three USAFA outcomes are the Air Force core values. As a composite, the joint service academies' core values are commitment, courage, duty, excellence, honor, integrity, loyalty, respect, service. Again, this list offers another rich understanding of military character.

If a cadet or midshipman is commissioned by one of the service academies, and as an officer does not lie, cheat or steal, but demonstrates cowardice in combat and systematic prejudice as a leader, we have clearly failed in our task of producing an officer of good character. If however that cadet or midshipman embodies the composite list of core academy values or the eight USAFA outcomes, we can feel more secure in our success. Simply creating a list of characteristics is not sufficient, however. We still need to understand those characteristics. They need to be "fleshed out." After all, what does it mean to have integrity or to show respect? This is where philosophy, theology, and psychology can help and where the education and training rubber meets the rhetoric road.

As an example, at USAFA we have revisited the eight outcomes and tried to elaborate each one in terms of accepted psychological

concepts. This analysis is too long for this discussion, so we will simply rely on an example. The first USAFA outcome and first AF core value is forthright integrity. The full description of forthright integrity is

> Officers with forthright integrity who voluntarily decide the right thing to do and do it. Officers with forthright integrity voluntarily decide the right thing to do and do it in both their professional and private lives. They do not choose the right thing because of a calculation of what is most advantageous to themselves, but because of a consistent and spontaneous inclination to do the right thing. Their inclination to do right is consistently followed by actually doing what they believe they should do and taking responsibility for their choices. In other words, persons of integrity "walk their talk."

An analysis of this description yields a complex set of characteristics of integrity. There are at least (1) choosing the right action, (2) doing the right action, (3) consistency of motivation, and (4) consistency across domains. From a psychological standpoint, these characteristics can be understood as including moral knowledge (knowing what is right), moral reasoning (figuring out what is right), moral values (caring about what is right), moral identity (thinking of oneself as a moral person), moral behavior (doing what is right), and moral personality (an ongoing internal motivation to do what is right). This example is intended to demonstrate the psychological complexity of even a single character outcome. In examining all eight, we have identified 34 discreet psychological concepts that comprise character as understood at the USAFA. Clearly then, understanding character at USAFA (or any of the other service academies) is much more complex than simply listing a short set of behavioral proscriptions as in their honor code.

A PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTION OF CHARACTER

Psychologists and educators are also grappling with how to understand and define character. One summary definition would be *a general estimate of an individual's capacity to function as a moral agent*. This suggests that one's character is intrinsic and holistic. It is part and parcel of the kind of person you are. However, this still leaves open the question of what it takes to function as a moral agent. Elsewhere, I have tried to answer this from the point of psychology, by identifying seven elements of the moral person. A competent moral agent must (1) engage in **moral behavior** (do the right thing), (2) hold **moral values** (care about the good), (3) have mature **moral reasoning** (be able to figure out right and wrong), (4) experience **moral emotions** (feel appropriate remorse, guilt, sympathy, empathy, shame, etc.), (5) have important **moral personality** traits (a consistent tendency to act in moral ways), (6) have a strong **moral identity** (consider being a good person as central to one's self-concept), and (7) have a set of **meta-moral characteristics** (characteristics that support moral function but are not in themselves moral; that is, they can also be used for immoral purposes – e.g., self-discipline).

Now, while this is a fairly complex model of the moral person, it helps understand that character cannot be understood simply. To be a good person (or a good officer) is not a simple thing. It cannot be achieved merely by memorizing a list of "don'ts" and then avoiding those few behavioral categories, as is suggested by the honor codes at the service academies. To further complicate matters, other psychological models exist. One relevant one, for example, differentiates moral from social conventional domains. The moral domain is that which deals with universal matters of justice and harm and lead to intrinsic consequences. Stealing, for example, falls in the moral domain because it is universally wrong, cannot be made acceptable by legislation, and causes automatic harm and injustice to others by depriving them of their rightful property. This is in contrast to the social conventional domain. This deals

with consensual matters of social regulation that are arbitrary and can be altered by social agreement. Forms of address (Sir, Ma'am) or dress (always wear a hat outdoors and never wear a hat indoors) are examples. They are used for social regulation, adhered to very strongly (in the military), but could be changed at any time by the proper authority. There are many religious conventions that follow the same pattern (e.g., days of worship, dietary laws, dress codes, etc.). They are very strongly held, followed closely, but could be (and have been) changed by appropriate religious authorities. It is important to understand whether the goals of character development are dealing with true matters of ethics and morality or with social conventions. It would be appropriate for the corps, wing, etc. to advocate for changes in dress codes, but not to delete stealing from the honor code.

SOURCES OF CHARACTER

If a character development initiative, whether at a service academy or a public elementary school, is going to be successful, the processes that impact on character development need to be identified and understood. Clearly, the predominant factor in an individual's character development is the family, especially parenting. When cadets or midshipmen enter their respective service academy, they embody the effects of their family background. But their character has also been shaped by other factors. Peer relations are important, especially beginning in the pre-teen years. The cultural context in which they experienced their families and peer relations also has an impact, as does the media which they have consumed relentlessly for two decades. Non-normative events that are unique to an individual's life (parental death, winning the lottery, serious illness, etc.) also may alter the development of character, but, by their very nature, these are less common. Of course, schooling is very important. There is currently a groundswell of interest in promoting character education in America's schools, just as the service academies consider this a high priority. Whether schools deliberately implement character education initiatives or not, they will nonetheless impact on students' character devel-

opment, for better or for worse. Those that do an enlightened and intentional job of it will have the most positive impacts. Those that neglect it may do damage to character development.

More than a century and half ago, Alexis de Tocqueville came to America to see what this upstart experiment in democracy was all about. He toured the country and studied its citizens. He was interested in why America seemed to be such a great country and at such a young age (it was then less than half a century old). He concluded that "America is great because she is good, but if America ever ceases to be good America will cease to be great." Our success as a nation, de Tocqueville felt, was due to the good character of our citizens. How can we continue to produce citizens of good character? Or more relevantly, how can we continue to produce officers of good character at our service academies?

To answer this question, we need to first examine post-secondary education in general as a potential source of character development. Then we can look more particularly at military post-secondary institutions. Recent research has demonstrated that adolescents' attachments to family and school are two of the strongest predictors of positive character development and the avoidance of risky behaviors. Both family and school can be examined globally and in terms of specific components. To look at post-secondary education, we can do both as well. Globally, we are interested in an institution-wide culture that supports and fosters character development. This is similar to what is referred to as "corporate culture" or "moral atmosphere." The institution has to be committed to character development and all of its stakeholders have to endorse and enforce that agenda.

More specifically, Lt. Colonel Michael Fekula and I have recently offered a five component model of post-secondary character education. First, and perhaps most obviously, colleges and universities (including service academies) must teach about character. This may be done in the traditional curriculum. USAFA requires an ethical philosophy course. USNA has a more practice based course that mixes philosophy with case studies. Or this may be done simply by espousing values, as the service acad-

emies do with their core values and honor codes. Additionally, guest speakers, symposia, and publications may be used to teach students about character and related issues.

Second, colleges and universities (and their members) must display character. All members of the institution must model character. When cadets and midshipmen perceive that officers at their service academies do not hold themselves to the same ethical (or military) standards as they demand of cadets, this is more than mere disillusionment or frustration. It undermines character development because it de-legitimizes the character messages of the institution. At service academies, it is important to emphasize that cadets and midshipmen serve as important role models for more junior cadets and midshipmen. Because students do much of the military (and other) training at these institutions, it is imperative that the upperclassmen serve as positive role models for the lowerclassmen. It is not merely the individuals who must model character, it is the institution itself as a social entity. Undergraduates are quite sensitive to the behaviors and policies of their respective colleges and universities. If these institutions, for example, preach against alcohol abuse, yet accept funds from alcohol manufacturers and advertise their products at university events and serve alcohol at university functions, then the students begin to perceive hypocrisy and the institution loses its moral authority.

Third, colleges and universities must demand character. They must set clear standards, communicate those standards clearly and widely, monitor adherence to those standards, enforce the standards, and offer supports to students who have difficulty meeting the standards. These standards should apply to academic and non-academic spheres. The service academies tend to do this relatively well, most notably through their honor systems. But they often fall short in dealing with other areas of cadet and midshipmen behavior. And they do not always apply the standards fairly and consistently.

Fourth, students must be given opportunities to practice character and to apprentice in roles that demand character. They can do this through participating in institutional governance; e.g., student government, residence hall councils, etc. At the service academies, there is no shortage of such opportunities as cadets and midshipmen actually run many of the operations of the institutions, in preparation for military leadership. Community service is another avenue for practicing character. This may be done in academic service learning venues. Or it can be done in simple volunteer service activities. Cadets and midshipmen frequently engage in volunteer service either informally or through formal institutional opportunities. Finally, experiential learning is a popular means of practicing character. Academic units, military training units, and other mission elements have begun to rely more and more on adventure based learning and other forms of experiential learning. In fact, at the service academies, through military training, such opportunities are probably necessary; for example, in parachute jump training, survival training, etc.

Fifth, and last, colleges and universities need to provide opportunities for reflection. Students need to take time to think about their goals and values, their relevant behaviors and plans and strategies, their relationships, etc. They may be required to do this through service learning activities or mandated journals. They may do so in a relationship with a mentor. Or they may do so in discussions of current events, case studies, or other character relevant topics.

If colleges and universities want to be effective character education institutions, then they need to seriously consider how they are implementing these five components. These components, as I have demonstrated, apply as directly to the service academies as they do to civilian colleges and universities. In some cases, we have seen how the service academies might have a special application of a component, e.g., the need for peer role modeling. However, in the broad strokes, the model applies equally to both military and civilian institutions of higher learning.

IMPEDIMENTS TO SERVICE ACADEMY CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT

The service academies put more effort and resources into character development than almost any other institutions of higher education in the United States. Nevertheless, they still face certain obstacles in achieving their character goals. It is to some of those obstacles that I will now turn.

Officers who do not demonstrate good character. Cadets and midshipmen are like any other students in that they scrutinize their teachers and officers and look critically for flaws. When they see officers who do not follow military etiquette, who lie, or who otherwise demonstrate behavior that is deemed unacceptable for cadets and midshipmen, they become cynical about the character agenda of their service academy and branch of military service. At USAFA, we offer ethics and character training to all staff through our Academy Character Enrichment Seminars (ACES). To date, about 2000 officers, enlisted, civilian staff, and cadet leaders have participated in this day long off-site training program. It is necessary that all staff buy into the character agenda of the institution and then embody it.

Ownership of honor system. As already noted, cadets and midshipmen are skeptical about the degree of their control of their respective honor systems, especially their judicial aspects. Felt ownership is critical to commitment. The service academies need to work hard to demonstrate to cadets and

Dr. Clifford Christians, University of Illinois at Urban-Champagne, Dr. Larry Hickman, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, Dr. Carl Mitcham, The Pennsylvania State University, and Dr. Story Musgrave, NASA Astronaut participate in a panel discussion on Character and Competence.

midshipmen that the honor systems are truly cadet and midshipmen honor systems. If they see themselves as puppets of the officers, if they perceive the system as a form of oppression of cadets by officers, or if they see the system as a toy they are allowed to play with until someone of higher rank decides it needs to be used differently, then the system does not work as intended.

The "Hidden Curriculum". It has been said that we often can't see the forest for the trees. In other words, we miss the macro-level variables because we focus on the micro-level variables. This analysis has focused on the latter, but we need to emphasize how important the overall "corporate culture" is in character development. The institution must be committed holistically to the enterprise of character development. As we have already noted, the service academies tend to do this better than most institutions of higher education. However, when such macro-level analyses are done, one often uncovers what has been called the "hidden curriculum" or the unofficial agenda or norms of the institution. In some sense, we are back among the "trees" but these are not trees that are obscuring the view of the forest, rather they are invisible trees that we don't see, yet markedly impact our mission. A perfect example of this at the service academies would the informal norms among cadets and midshipmen. If they believe that honor is not to be taken seriously, other than when being explicitly tested on it, or that toleration (at USAFA and USMA) may be the official rule but peer loyalty, in reality, trumps it, then all of the good work of honor education officers is wasted. If the official rule is no drinking on base, or no underage drinking, but the cadet or midshipman unofficial rule is simply "don't get caught," then alcohol education is futile. If the institution enforces rules about respect for women or minorities, but clusters of prejudiced cadets and midshipmen reinforce bigotry among the wing,

brigade, or corps, then human relations training will be severely impaired. Hence we need to (1) understand what cadets and midshipmen value and believe and (2) directly address discrepancies between the official values of the institution and the informal peer norms that exist in the wing, corps, or brigade.

Justice and consistency. An important rule of thumb for parenting for character is to be fair and consistent in dealing with moral matters. This applies equally well to education, even at the post-secondary level. When sanctions and punishments are seen to be inconsistent or biased, the system loses its legitimacy and is perceived as the enemy of the cadets or midshipmen. It is impossible to prevent some transgressions escaping detection, but when they are detected and not treated similarly, then cadets and midshipmen no longer feel the same push to support and adhere to the values undergirding the system.

Inverse slope of responsibility. At the service academies, it appears outwardly that the heaviest weight of rules, regulations, and expectations falls on the most junior members of the institution and that this weight is gradually lifted as one progresses through the hierarchy. So new "doolies" or "plebes" or "basics" feel the greatest oppression of expectations to adhere. As one moves from the first through fourth year of service academy training, there is more freedom. And the perception is that commissioning brings with it even further freedoms, and so on. This may suggest to the cadet or midshipmen that (1) strict adherence to honor codes (after all, they only apply until commissioning) and military regulations is required of relatively junior members of the particular military service and (2) that the goal of advancement in the military is to transcend or outgrow the strict requirements imposed on novices. Rank brings privilege and freedom from military regulation. This is a very harmful message to military character development.

Officer enforcement. Cadets and midshipmen, in giving examples of why they may not take character mandates as seriously as we would want, point to the laxity of officer enforcement of those rules as well as rules of military etiquette, etc. Officers ignore cadets

or midshipmen who come to class out of uniform, or who bring food to class, or fail to salute, etc. The received message is that the institution professes to require adherence to such rules, but based on behavioral evidence obviously does not really take them so seriously.

CONCLUSIONS

Character is critical to the development of military officers. It therefore needs to be a pillar at the service academies (indeed USAFA considers character, along with academics, athletics, and military performance, to be one of its four pillars). Honor is a critical element in military character; however, honor is only a piece of what character entails. We therefore need to move beyond honor to a richer understanding of character; and in doing so we need to rely on philosophy, theology, education, and especially psychology. We also need to understand that character development is a science with a (admittedly nascent) technology. To be effective as character educators, we need to understand normative conceptions of morality and psychological mechanisms of character development. Finally, we need to consider what impediments might exist at the service academies, because such impediments undercut our well-intentioned efforts at producing officers of character. The service academies are indeed models for others who wish to foster character development. They take it very seriously and commit significant resources to it, but the job is far from complete.

BIOGRAPHY

Dr. Marvin W. Berkowitz is the inaugural Sanford N. McDonnell Endowed Professor of Character Education at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. Before arriving at UMSL, he was the inaugural Ambassador Holland H. Coors Professor of Character Development at USAFA. He earned his PhD in Life-span Development Psychology at Wayne State University. He has authored approximately 50 book chapters and journal articles, and edited the books **Moral Education: Theory and Application** *(1985), and* **Peer conflict and Psychological Growth** *(1985).*

Freedom, Risk, and Character[1]

Lieutenant Colonel Bill Rhodes

Developing virtue requires us to accept some risks. This is because developing good character is in large part developing virtuous ways of *choosing*, and since the experience of choosing is free, bad choices must be possible. This in turn means that institutional character development efforts must tolerate some risks of permitting unethical behavior in the service of developing ethical character.

Before proceeding to show this, let me illustrate the point by way of an analogy. Consider the process of learning to fly an airplane. In the early stages of learning to fly, the student is permitted only a limited amount of freedom by the instructor. This is for the best, of course. But if the instructor never ceases to prevent mistakes, the student will never learn to fly. As the student's knowledge and aeronautical skill increase, the instructor's interference decreases. This is because the instructor has imparted some of her capability to the student. As the process continues, the instructor permits the student to land the aircraft. After that skill is learned, the instructor may solo the student.

Now flight instructors have a tough job. They must relinquish control of an aircraft in which they are flying to become the passenger of an aeronautical neophyte. Those first few landings with the student in control will be hard on all concerned. But if she weren't allowed to land the airplane by herself, the student would not develop much. Solo flight never comes unless the instructor relinquishes control.

Now let's add a little conceptual groundwork regarding the development of good moral character. First, let me note that I take character to mean a set of dispositions to choose in certain ways. These dispositions may, of course, be admirable or otherwise. Most of us have dispositions of both sorts. More, I assume that character can change-- indeed, I assume that one can change one's own character. I also take it as given that institutional character development efforts can as-

sist in changing character for the better, but they cannot change character *for* a person.

For my purposes character development does not mean hardwiring a certain behavioral repertoire, but in general it does mean that certain behaviors become more likely. I take a generally Aristotelian view of both character and how it develops. The goal is to develop good thinking so that a person can determine the most moral choice as well as good habits so that he tends to act on that choice almost effortlessly. Our student pilot must understand the weather, for example, but she must also learn to translate that knowledge into safe actions if she is to become a virtuous pilot. It is also important that persons of good character must be capable of evaluating and improving their own character. A good pilot conscientiously avoids complacency; she evaluates herself continually, and seeks continuous improvement. Good people do the same sort of thing. I'll have more to say about this later--for now, let us suppose that individuals are responsible, at least in some degree, for their own character.

SOME ARISTOTELIAN INSIGHTS INTO CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT AND HABITUATION

Good thinking skills are acquired, according to Aristotle, through education. This seems uncontroversial. Classroom learning is one traditional way of helping students learn to distinguish moral right from moral wrong, or at least for learning how to think morally.

But *knowing* what one ought to do and *doing* what one ought to do are distinct virtues. Moral virtue translates what one knows one ought to do into what one actually does do, and as such, is critical to having a good character.

But, how does one become morally virtuous? The Aristotelian answer to that question is straightforward, at least at first blush: One becomes good by doing good acts--one must

practice doing right and then one will develop into the sort of person who reliably acts rightly.[3]

Now this notion might seem to be a bit circular, and indeed there is an element of bootstrapping here. But the concept is not bankrupt by any means.

Think again about our student pilot. She learns about flying on the ground, but she learns to fly by flying. The beginning flier flies awkwardly, to be sure, but nevertheless is still flying. Before long, if she practices flying assiduously, the beginner grows into a decent flier. As her skills improve, good technique becomes almost effortless, and her enjoyment in flying tends to increase. Growing enjoyment encourages more practice, which in turn increases enjoyment through greater skill. One becomes a flier by flying.

Now Aristotle held, plausibly enough, I think, that one can acquire virtue in much the same way one acquires the skill to fly well, and that the virtuous individual, like the accomplished flier, takes pleasure in acting as she does, and in being who she is. In other words, once certain habits, whether of skillful flying or of, say, taking credit only for one's own work, become ingrained, there is little if any struggle involved in their performance. One is disposed to give credit where it is due just as a good flier is disposed to keep an eye on the weather--it's a natural part of being who one is. It is, so to speak, characteristic.

Now, naturally, if it is the case that desirable dispositions can be ingrained, so can undesirable ones. Consider the smoking habit. This habit is easily established, and very difficult to end. Most smokers are unhappy with their smoking, but quitting is so difficult that many remain smokers. One must be extremely careful as to the dispositions one acquires.

But we aren't doomed; we don't have to worry *too* much about acquiring dispositions we'll later regret having. There are mentors available who can share information and help the less experienced develop the best habits. The first generation of fliers must have had a great deal more difficulty learning to fly, and they undertook considerable risks in doing their learning. They were their own instructors. Today, however, one can easily find an experienced flight instructor for lessons, and learn to fly efficiently and safely. We can profit from the experience of others if we seek and heed qualified instruction. Similarly, we need not discover the appropriate moral dispositions by ourselves; moral wisdom is available.

Aristotle's claim that virtue can be encouraged through habituation is plausible. An environment that fosters, say, honesty, through attempting to ingrain truth-telling as a habit, may be capable of influencing character development in the same way that a mature flight instructor can encourage the development of a pilot's appreciation of her own limitations. The instructor may at first establish limits for the student's solo flying, prohibiting her from renting an airplane in windy conditions or low ceilings. But the hope is that eventually, as the student's piloting character develops, she will set limits for herself. Military academies attempt to inculcate character in much this way. Cadets and midshipmen live under an honor code accompanied by a system of sanctions. If students do not abide by the code out of respect for it, then it is expected that they will comply with its standards out of fear of sanction, and, more importantly, that this fear of sanction will eventually be replaced by a disposition of character. It is hoped that it will eventually dawn on the cadet that habitual honesty is a trait that she should wish to make her own. Ideally, the sanctions exist never to be used, but rather as a tool to help modify behavior as a way of fostering the growth of character.

WHY FREEDOM IS NECESSARY

Good character is more than a certain behavioral repertoire. The essence of the distinction may be summed up in one short, though fecund term: *choice*. The individual of good character acts as she does because she chooses to act that way. Further, she chooses virtuous acts because she understands them to be virtuous.[4] The individual who exhibits good behavior only may well do so out of a bad character--or out of a null character.

Think of the pilot who refrains from recklessly buzzing buildings simply out of fear of being caught--it hardly makes sense to claim

that she respects others' property because of her virtuous character. An adult who refrains from stealing only because of the fear of punishment is not much different. We would say that both of these characters require development. Consider by way of contrast someone who refrains from stealing on the principled ground that people have a right to what they have earned. In all these cases, the *behavior* is just what we would hope for, but our evaluation of character depends on more than the behavior. We care about the motive that the agent has for the admirable behavior. These cases should illustrate Aristotle's point that virtue involves choice. That is, a virtuous act is distinct from a virtuous behavior, or a fortuitous event. Part of being virtuous is choosing virtuously, and then acting in accordance with that choice. In other words, someone who acts virtuously must have chosen to act virtuously because that is the virtuous choice. Behavior alone is not enough.

Freedom is not only necessary for individual virtuous acts, but also for the development of good character in individuals. Some part of having a good character involves taking responsibility for one's actions, freedom to choose is a necessary condition of exercising, and hence, developing good character. We do not blame people for being short, but we do blame them for being cowardly. We do not praise someone for being green-eyed, but we do praise the charitable. The distinction seems clear--we hold people responsible for their characters because we hold them to have control over their characters in a way that they do not have control over certain physical features. It should be obvious, then, that too much restriction necessarily undermines their character development. If one cannot choose freely, one cannot practice choosing well. If one cannot practice virtuous choosing, one cannot develop one's character, nor can one be responsible for

Brigadier General Ruben A. Cubero, USAF, (Ret.), former USAFA Dean of Faculty, is presented the Malham M. Wakin Character Development Award by Lieutenant General Tad J. Oelstrom, USAFA Superintendent.

it. An automaton may behave as if it were virtuous, but even the best behaved automaton would not have a good character.

Now it may be objected that one's dispositions compel certain choices. Consequently, it would seem that if one's character is mature, one's choices are not free, and hence, the person of good or bad character is really deserving of no praise or blame at all. "I could not have done otherwise, because of my bad character" might become the next iteration in the litany of excuses. (To illustrate by way of exaggeration, one might even imagine legal ploys that would defend criminals because they have criminal characters).

It would seem that one can be reliable or one can be free and therefore responsible, but one cannot be both!

But the dilemma is not as severe as it may seem. People do have at least some control over their characters. Indeed, were it otherwise, it would make no sense to esteem some persons while blaming others. But, how should we understand the control we have over our characters?

It is obvious that humans experience certain desires, and that often these just seem to show up in our lives--that is, we do not directly control whether we experience them. With Harry Frankfurt,[5] let's call these desires "first order" desires--such as the desire to drink a glass of water, go play some tennis, to smoke a cigarette. It seems reasonably unimportant to most of us most of the time that we desire to drink a glass of water. But one may well favor one's desire to go exercise, and likewise, one may disfavor one's desire to have a cigarette. Frankfurt refers to these desires regarding first order desires as "second order desires."[6] Now of course, one could have desires regarding second-order desires, and so on, but the crucial point here is that we are capable of having atti-

tudes regarding our own desires. The same holds true for what I've been referring to as dispositions of character, for these are really nothing more than more or less enduring patterns of desires.

Now at least some people who desire to smoke also desire not to have the desire to smoke, and it is this sort of capability for self-evaluation that I want to argue is crucial to the development of character. Just as I may desire not to desire to smoke, I may desire to desire to be more forthright with others, or to take pleasure in generosity. Such self-evaluation seems crucial to the development of character, but it cannot be forced on others. If one is to be responsible for one's character one must have at least some control over it. We can choose at the second order whether to embrace our first-order desires, or to reject them, even though we cannot choose whether to have them. But once the second-order choice is made, one can work to strengthen or weaken the first-order desires for one's own good reasons. There are lots of ways to do this, including seeking help from other people or institutions. I'll say more about this later, but by way of brief illustration, a person may freely (at the second order) decide that he wishes to oppose his first-order disposition to avoid exercise. This person has read a little Aristotle, and he understands that one becomes athletic by practice. If he begins to exercise regularly, he may find before too long that he enjoys exercising. He can, in other words, weaken his first order disposition to be lazy and import a disposition to exercise. *He* has developed *his* character. But notice that this development takes place out of his freely chosen second-order desire. Without commitment on his part at the second-order, the change would not occur.

CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT AND RESPECT FOR AUTONOMY

Thus far I hope I have shown that individual freedom is a precondition both for virtuous acts and for an individual's developing a good character. Freedom is necessary for virtuous acts because behavior resulting from compulsion, no matter how desirable it may be, is

not chosen by the agent.[7] Hence, a compelled act cannot be a virtuous act. Freedom is important for the development of character for two reasons. First, one can never practice choosing well unless one's choices are genuinely free choices. Second, if one is to be responsible for one's character, one must be free not only to evaluate oneself accurately, but also to choose which first-order desires to foster and which to inhibit. Strict behaviorist methods of instilling certain behavior patterns may be necessary for individuals whose characters are inchoate, such as children, but to deny freedom over the long run is to stunt the development of character.

But if the above is so, what can we do to encourage the growth of admirable character in others? We cannot force the development of character, but we can educate for it.[8] We can also set examples. Many of us have had the experience of respecting someone's character, and trying to be more like them. And we can create environments where moral concerns are taken seriously.[9]

COURTING DISASTER

It is logically inescapable that if character development requires each individual to make autonomous choices, then character development is ultimately an individual matter. No one can develop character *for* someone else. If an institution commits to character development, the most it can commit to is fostering or encouraging certain sorts of character. This means that the specter of failure is a constant companion to intelligent character development efforts. If failure were impossible, then choosing must have been circumscribed.

But things are not necessarily as discouraging as the foregoing might suggest. While we cannot preempt choice, we can provide guidance for choosing.

Is this courting disaster? In a sense it is, but as a practical matter the likelihood of disaster is fairly easy to minimize. Disasters occur very infrequently among flying students. This is because, though it is surely logically possible for a student to choose poorly, it is as a practical matter extremely unlikely that she will do so if she has been educated properly. Though the

student is free to decide to attempt an aerobatics display on her first solo, she freely chooses not to. And this too is analogous to the process of character development. There were probably a few tense moments for the instructor when the student made her first unassisted landings, and there may be more as she flies more and more challenging solo flights, but these worries cannot be allowed to preclude her making unassisted landings or going solo. If she's going to learn to fly her instructor must be able to tolerate some level of risk. Indeed, continually to preempt her freedom to choose is to inhibit the likelihood of her development as a competent pilot. Likewise, if moral character is to develop, certain risks are entailed. In order to foster growth, the not yet fully developed character must be allowed the freedom to choose, even if that sometimes results in bad choices. These choices have consequences. Unfortunately, in character development just as in flying, some do fail disastrously. Usually, though, as one gains experience, one notices trends in one's own life. This sort of recognition leads to thinking about the sort of choices one makes, and what sort of person one truly wants to be.

None of this is all that difficult. We can evaluate and improve ourselves. We can seek the help of others in our communities to identify strengths and weaknesses and to provide support. Just as the aviator can correct dubious tendencies in her flying character, either by herself or with the help of an instructor, so we can improve our own characters. And if we rely once again upon Aristotle's recommendation that if one wishes to be a certain sort of person, then one must practice choosing as that person would choose, our chances for improvement are pretty good. To select a common example, most smokers are aware that smoking is unhealthy, and most desire not to have the desire to smoke. In order to rid oneself of the desire to smoke, one must practice not smoking. But, notice that practice alone is insufficient as well. One who is forced not to smoke but who still chooses to smoke will light up as soon as whatever external force that has prevented smoking is removed. The missing element in such cases is the choice to become a nonsmoker. Practice is simply a tool used to bring about the agent's freely de-

sired change in self. The choice to develop a certain character is a necessary condition for that character's coming into being via practice.

Now it takes a certain amount of cognitive capability to have good character, and for this reason, children cannot be pushed into development. In fact, the best one will accomplish is the ingraining of certain responses dependent upon environmental factors. The child, say at age six, simply is not ready for a discussion of the rights of the oppressed. Behavioral intervention is about all that can be done.

It is, however, a severe mistake to continue the exclusively behaviorist approach with individuals who have advanced beyond the level of children, as they will assuredly see the disrespect for their autonomy and will probably resent it. Character development schemes that focus exclusively on behavior, then, can result in precisely opposite the intended effect. In a system that concerns itself solely with behaviors, people learn quickly how to satisfy the system, while developing very little themselves. It is a simple matter for a child, student, or subordinate to learn what behaviors are rewarded. Parents, educators, or supervisors who are satisfied with eyewash often will get it, and this can lead to widespread disaster. Consider flying on an airliner whose pilot was not genuinely concerned with safety, but rather with looking safe. How about a surgeon who is extremely good at giving the impression of caring for others simply as a means to his own monetary gain, or, for that matter, a military officer whose concern for human rights is only an avenue for career advancement. An active respect for others' freedom entails risk; but failing to do so entails much more.

NOTES

[3]Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics*, 1105b10-13.
[4]Anscombe has summed up this Aristotelian insight beautifully: "You cannot be or do any good where you are stupid." G. E. M. Anscombe, "Mr. Truman's Degree," in *Moral Dimensions of the Military Profession*, Second ed. Department of Philosophy and Fine Arts, United States Air Force Academy, eds. (New York: American Heritage, 1996) p. 207.

[5]Frankfurt has written extensively on the topic of character, responsibility and freedom. See especially his "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person" and "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility" in John Fischer, ed., *Moral Responsibility*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986).

[6]Harry Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person" in Fischer, pp. 68-69.

[7]Interestingly, though, one may later freely choose what one was once compelled to do. I suspect that most of us learned to brush our teeth out of compulsion, but now we do so for our own reasons.

[8]There are good reasons to believe that one can educate for character, though I do not have space to address them in depth here. See, for example, Lawrence Kohlberg's "Moral Development: A Modern Statement of the Platonic View," in *Issues in Moral Philosophy*, ed. Thomas Donaldson (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986), p. 42.

[9]See my "On Developing Character in Teaching and Professional Settings," (Fourth National Conference on Ethics in America, 1992), p. 5.

BIOGRAPHY

Lt Col Bill Rhodes is Deputy Head for Curriculum in the Department of Philosophy at USAFA and specializes in moral education. He earned his PhD from the University of Colorado, Boulder, authoring a dissertation entitled "Self-Determination and Moral Character: Some Elements of a Theory of Identification." Lt Col Rhodes has served as course director for the Academy's core ethics course and the Ethics Across the Curriculum Initiative. He conducts research into the development of moral character and gives presentations on the topic at various national conferences. Lt Col Rhodes is a Communication Systems Officer with assignments at Keesler AFB, the Pentagon, and with NORAD. Along with his current position he has served as an Associate Air Officer Commanding for Basic Cadet Training and Squadron Professional Ethics Advisor.

Brigadier General Malham Wakin (USAF, Ret.), former Head of the U.S. Air Force Academy Department of Philosophy and Fine Arts and noted author and speaker on ethics and character issues, visits with guests at the 6th Annual National Leadership & Character Symposium.

A Warrior's Quality of Devotion

William H. Gibson

INTRODUCTION

In the years since Vietnam, the U.S. Armed Services have been reorganized, refitted, reformed and with considerable justification one could say renewed. Dramatic evidence of this was displayed in their superb performance in the Gulf War. Since the Gulf War, the quest for excellence has continued through changes in missions, rounds of down-sizing, technological revolution, and cultural changes. Troubled by the conduct of officers at the Tailhook affair, the practices of drill sergeants with respect to their recruits, and controversies regarding the sexual conduct of officers, the Armed Services, for some time, have been emphasizing character education and corps values instruction.

Sharing this concern about character, in this paper, I sketch the nature of war and its impact on the warrior, consider what qualities are required of a warrior, as well as what may be expected of a warrior. Given the nature of war and its corrosive effect on the warrior, I claim that military institutions and their members must be characterized by a quality of devotion which bonds the members of the institutions together and integrates the moral selves of the members. In short, moral character underwrites the Armed Services for survival and victory in war and existence and readiness in peace. To accomplish this, I have drawn on the ethical theory of a classic American philosopher, John Dewey.

WAR AND WARRIORS

War, as it occurs actually, is constituted by deadly events whose stark and grotesque intrusion into human experience can be only suggested by graphic descriptions. Casualties of war are usually reported numerically. For example, 58,000 Americans were killed in Vietnam or the British lost 50,000 on the first day of the Somme, but this obscures the brutal nature of war. Similarly abstract and opaque is the common definition of war as a state of armed hostile conflict between nations or states. While abstractions may perform useful service, those who have intimate acquaintance with war often think of it in more literal and concrete terms. Erich Maria Remarque wrote of WWI in this literal vein: "A hospital alone shows what war is."[1]

War, as it is referred to in the literal sense, includes not just the fact of grievous wounds and violent death but encompasses the fact that this devastation is intentionally contrived by humans. Of course, not everything that happens in war is a result of human intentions, but even unintended consequences often grow out of consequences which were intended. Sometimes unintended consequences are so impressively devastating that they are adopted for intentional use. Such was the case in the Allied fire bombing of Hamburg during WWII. The firestorm set off in the air raid on 28 July 1943 was so impressive that its precipitating factors were studied for future use. When the circumstances were right at Dresden and subsequently at Tokyo, the impressiveness of their intentional firestorms exceeded that of the original unintentional one at Hamburg.[2] War, as it is literally and concretely, can be understood as killing, wounding, dying, being wounded, and destroying anything within its arena by humans intentionally but indifferently as long as they survive but without their expectation of continuing survival.

Those in direct contact with war, as it is literally, describe themselves in terms of its chief distinction, death. Remarque writes: "We are insensible, dead men, who through some trick, some dreadful magic, are still able to run and kill."[3] James Jones writes similarly of WWII: "Every combat soldier . . . knows and accepts beforehand that he's dead, although he may still be walking around for a while."[4] Fi-

nally, Siegfried Sasoon provides an encompassing perspective on literal war: "Soldiers are citizens of death's gray land, / Drawing no dividend from time's tomorrows."[5] Within this corrosive context, character may be undone by the destruction of ideals, ambitions, and most devastatingly the breaking of bonds of affiliation.[6]

A QUALITY OF DEVOTION

In the ancient tradition of war as characterized by myth, war was a very personal matter. The impulses, passions, and energies of enemies, known to each other, met on the battlefield. Ships set sail for the love of Helen and Achilles seeks revenge upon Hector. But modern war is vastly different from war depicted in the *Iliad*. Although modern war may provide settings for individuals to attempt the reinstatement of ancient military traditions, in the main, it is not just a function of military traditions or institutions but of the social, political, and economic institutions of entire societies. Recognizing the nature of modern war and its effect on its participants, a question arises as to what qualities are required of a warrior; moreover what qualities should society expect of a warrior?

It was not necessary for Admiral Nelson to provide an interpretative commentary when, at 1140 on 21 October 1805 at Trafalgar, he ran up the general signal, "England expects that every man will do his duty."[7] Although the subject of the signal was England, the bonds of relationship between Nelson, his officers, and men were the instantiation of that subject. It was their bonds of mutual trust, reliance, and devotion which provided the substance to which a call to duty could appeal and through which a decisive naval victory over the French fleet was won that day.

It is these bonds of trust and devotion by which naval and military men and women live and for which they die. Rarely if ever do political ideologies bond units, perhaps at times religious conviction does, but most commonly it is the bond of mutual devotion in the face of adversity. Bill Mauldin, the soldier-cartoonist of World War II fame, noticed that men often sneaked back to their units rather that spend time convalescing from wounds and they did so

according to Mauldin:

> not because their presence was going to make a lot of difference to the big scheme of the war, and not to uphold the traditions of the umpteenth regiment. A lot of guys don't know the name of their regimental commanders. They went back because they knew their companies were shorthanded, and they were sure that if someone else in their squad or section were in their shoes, and the situation were reversed, those friends would come back to make the load lighter on *them*.[8]

The excellence of attention to duty arising from associations of mutual support, care, and selfless devotion cannot be equaled by duty exacted through the sanctions of law, the threat of firing squad or pistol,[9] the assertion of absolute principle, or the pronouncement of eternal damnation. Uncommon valor and discipline emanate from the warrior's quality of devotion.

STANDARDS, VIRTUE, AND THE MORAL SELF

Having briefly sketched the context of modern war, raised questions as to the qualities required and expected of a warrior, and linked excellence of achievement to a quality of devotion, let us see what this means for character particularly that of a warrior. The ethical theory of John Dewey should prove helpful at this point.

On Dewey's account, the quest for the Good sets out concrete ends-in-view, the Right takes into account the justifiable claims of society, and the ultimate authority for standards is life and its continued possibilities for growth. However, judgment, including moral judgment, has at least two senses, an intellectual sense in respect to knowledge which thoughtfully weighs evidence and logically decides and a practical sense in respect to human nature which condemns or approves.[10] Reflective morality (Dewey's term for his approach to moral questions), rather than labeling that which has been socially esteemed or approved as virtuous, as

does the customary morality of a culture, raises the question of what <u>should</u> be approved or counted as virtuous. The inquiry of reflective morality seeks to find that which is actually *worth* approving.[11] Such an inquiry has taken place in the military in the last twenty years with dramatic changes in the attitudes and practices of members of the armed services with respect to alcohol, tobacco, drugs and sexual practices.

Photo courtesy of Chaplain William H. Gibson

Capt William H. Gibson (front center), Commanding Officer of Company D, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division, leads five VC captives taken in the valley of An Hoa, southwest of Da Nang, on 6 January 1969. Capt Gibson is clearing a captured rifle. He later left the Marines in the rank of major and subsequently entered the Navy as a chaplain.

Dewey rejects the hedonistic psychology which judges consequences by the standard of pleasure or pain alone. Human beings are active by nature and pleasure or pain may attend their actions or be among their purposes, but many other purposes may be among their chosen objectives of action in which considerations of pleasure or pain are merely incidental if present at all. Rather than considerations of pleasure or pain, Dewey substitutes "the wider, if vaguer, idea of well-being, welfare, happiness as the proper standard of approval."[12] In relating the idea of well-being to personal con-

duct, Dewey says: "the moral problem which confronts every person is how regard for general welfare, for happiness of others than himself, is to be made a regulative purpose in his conduct."[13] This is not to say that the individual's welfare is to be sacrificed to the general well-being, but that, since human beings, over the long run, must live in association, the well-being of the individual is ultimately wrapped-up with the welfare of others. No one can calculate precisely in advance where general well-being or happiness may lie and for this reason personal character must underwrite the continued quest for it.[14] Within the U.S. Air Force, this is recognized and exemplified by a strong emphasis on character development and identifying *service before self* and *excellence in all we do* as two of its three core values.

Well-being should not be thought of as a fixed quality of static existence nor a fixed end at which one arrives. Moreover, welfare should not be thought of in materialistic or physical terms principally, as it often is considered today. Dewey has in mind living well in the dynamic sense of a continued quest for an enriched and enriching life individually and socially. What that might be is a matter for discovery in the many situations of living.

Consider another example from naval service which illustrates a dynamic standard. Sometimes living well in (living through) a storm at sea involves staying in port and doubling up the lines while at other times it involves getting underway and running with the storm on the high seas. Which shape the well-being of the ship and those aboard will take is a matter for determination in the situation and the standard for seamanship is the preservation and well-being of all concerned. Dewey's idea of a standard includes the dynamic standards of those who would sail the high seas, as well as, the settled rules of those who tend ships welded to piers as memorials of seagoing. Similar examples abound for aircraft, vehicles, and people, the standard of well-being is often met on the move. More often than not, considering alternatives in the constantly changing situations of war is like that of making decisions in a storm.

Standards are distinct from ends-in-view in that ends-in-view envision specific, concrete goods to be sought in the future while standards, drawing on the past, view acts as if already performed and asks if they will elicit approval.[15] The function of the standard then is to test more specific ends-in-view and determine whether they conduce to the well-being of all concerned.[16]

Since character underwrites the standard drawn from approvable objective consequences, the habits of character are subject to approval or judgment as to whether they are virtuous or vicious. Rather than a definite, fixed list of acts which are approved as virtues, Dewey defines virtues as "*qualities characteristic of interest.*"[17] An interest is the attention with which one engages an object or matter of concern. In other words a person must care. Interests may be many and changing depending upon one's situation. For example, one situation may elicit attention to or interest in fair dealing, regard for life, or public spiritedness while another situation may call for attention to or interest in courage, faithfulness, and self-restraint. Traits which identify genuine interests or virtues are *wholeheartedness*, *persistence*, and *impartiality*.[18]

For an interest to count as virtuous, it must have the trait or quality of *wholeheartedness*. That is, it must have a quality of devotion which is without reservation. Wholeheartedness is much more than immediate enthusiasm and ardor, genuine wholeheartedness is single-minded devotion to the object and ends of one's interest. In short, it is the virtue of integrity rather than the vice of duplicity.[19] This single-minded devotion is reflected in the military officer's oath whose obligations are taken "without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion."

For the military or naval person, integrity entails unstinting devotion to the most encompassing commitments of one's life. In a context of jaded, hedonistic self-absorption, it may sound odd to assert that any person should commit themselves wholeheartedly to their god or country or service or family or spouse or children, but what is required and increasingly expected for those who aspire to service in the U.S. Armed Services is a quality of devotion

which encompasses all of these. In combat, leaders become most effective when their interests become focused entirely (wholeheartedly) upon the leadership and direction of their units with a concomitant lack of concern for themselves.

Such devotion is extremely difficult to achieve and claims to have done so perfectly raise suspicions of at least unconscious hypocrisy if not actual duplicity. Nelson demonstrated his quality of devotion repeatedly in battle, but his devotion to his wife was less than wholehearted.[20] Perhaps this indicates the limits of Nelson's devotion and the degree in which his integrity was less than perfect. Today a person who seeks to be a naval or military leader can rightly expect that their entire life will be judged by its qualities of devotion. Such judgment should not be that of the self-righteous castigating sinners. Rather, such judgment should be contextual; recognizing that the consistency and continuity of purpose and effort required for a high quality of devotion by individuals requires a community of purpose and effort in which a high quality of devotion is extant.[21] For integrity (Air Force core value) and honor (Marine Corps and Navy core values) to flourish there must be *esprit d'corps*, a spirit or climate of encompassing common devotion.

Dewey notes that "fair weather 'virtue' has a bad name because it indicates lack of stability."[22] Virtually every endeavor of worth reaches a point where initial enthusiasm is spent and adversities mount up. Obstacles multiply. In time of frustration, the danger of ill-will arises threatening *esprit d'corps*. Nowhere is this more evident than in war whose very nature is that of adversity. It takes character to stick it out. Continuous persistence is required. This *persistence* is commonly called courage, the distinctive virtue of the soldier according to Plato and Aristotle, or valor, as stated on the commissions conferred on officers of the U.S. Armed Services.

Finally, an interest regarded as virtuous must be *impartial* in that it regards the interests of others even as it regards one's own. The maxim: to love others as we love ourselves is an expression of this trait. This is impossible to accomplish if love is regarded merely as a matter

of emotional intensity; but it is possible if the concept of love is recognized to include the scope of our thoughts and judgments which regard and respect the interests of others. Herein is justice served.[23]

Within Dewey's framework, justice is not merely a formal principle nor a supreme virtue regardless of the consequences, rather it is "a means which is organically integrated with the end which it [justice] serves," namely the end of human welfare. Justice, rather than being an end-in-itself which must be sought regardless of how harsh the consequences or which must be tempered by mercy to avoid harsh consequences, is a means to bring about such consequences as the shared and common good. According to Dewey, "The meaning of justice in concrete cases is something to be determined by seeing what consequences will bring about human welfare in a fair and even way."[25] Although fairness is not derived from welfare alone, it is a constituent of those consequences which constitute the common good or human welfare. Such commitments to justice in the interest of the common good (rather than harsh retribution) are required of naval and military leaders both in their adherence to and administration of law and regulations

Single-minded commitment, endurance under unfavorable conditions, and impartial regard for persons regardless of race, [gender], color, religion, or nationality constitute the essential, generic traits of interests which are approvable as virtues, according to Dewey.[26] In keeping with his dynamic conception of virtues, Dewey maintains that rather than their being discrete entities which may be separately "pigeon-holed", virtues interpenetrate one another; that is what is meant by integrity of character. As different traits and interests are called forth in different situations, it is a matter of changed emphasis among interpenetrating virtues of an integrated character.[27]

Dewey illustrates the wholeness of virtue by construing it as a holistic love which in its ethical sense "signifies completeness of devotion to objects esteemed good." Dewey characterizes such ethical wholeness in terms of the Platonic virtues as follows:

Such an interest, or love, is marked by temperance because a comprehensive interest demands a harmony which can be attained only by subordination of particular impulses and passions. It involves courage because an active and genuine interest nerves us to meet and overcome the obstacles which stand in the way of its realization. It includes wisdom or thoughtfulness because sympathy, concern for the welfare of all affected by conduct, is the surest guarantee for the exercise of *consideration*, for examination of a proposed line of conduct in all its bearings. And such a complete interest is the only way which justice can be assured. For it includes as part of itself impartial concern for all conditions which affect the common welfare, be they specific acts, laws, economic arrangements, political institutions, or whatever.[28]

CONCLUSION

In expecting, requiring, teaching, training, leading, and exemplifying a quality of devotion which produces an integrated character, a wholeness of the moral self, among our service members, we will produce Armed Services which can achieve victory in service of justice. Moreover, we will produce a quality of character which survives the corrosive effects of war and underwrites the common good of the country in time of peace. In accomplishing this, America can expect, as did England, that every Airman, Marine, Sailor, and Soldier will do their duty.

NOTES

[1] Erich Maria Remarque, *All Quiet on the Western Front* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1929), 266.
[2] Gwynne Dyer, *War* (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1985), 93-94.
[3] Remarque, 115.
[4] James Jones, *World War II* (New York: Gosset and Dunlap, 1975), 54.
[5] Robert Giddings, *The War Poets* (New York: Orion Books, 1988), 143.
[6] Jonathan Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 37.
[7] G. J. Marcus, *A Naval History of England*, vol. 2, *The Age of Nelson* (Sheffield, England: Applebaum Ltd., 1971), 277.
[8] John Keegan and Richard Holmes, *Soldiers: A History of Men in Battle* (New York: Elizabeth Sifton Books, Viking, 1986), 53.
[9] Ibid., 56.

[10] John Dewey, *The Later Works, 1925-1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston and Barbara Levine with introduction by Abraham Edel and Elizabeth Flower, Vol. 7:1932, *Ethics* (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985), 235-236.

[11] Ibid., 237.

[12] Ibid., 241.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid., 242.

[15] Ibid., 245-246.

[16] Ibid., 247.

[17] Ibid., 256.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] It should be noted here that Nelson was unmatched in his devotion to his men, his navy, and England. He exhibited this devotion through selfless leadership in battle which successively cost him the loss of an eye, an arm, and ultimately his life. However, his devotion to his family was less than wholehearted in that he supported a wife in Portsmouth and consorted with a mistress in Naples.

[21] Dewey, *Ethics*, 256.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid., 257.

[24] Ibid., 249.

[25] Ibid., 250.

[26] Ibid., 256-257.

[27] Ibid., 257-258.

[28] Ibid., 259.

The photograph on page 36 was provided by the author. It was originally published in *Chaplains with Marines in Vietnam 1962-1971*, Commander Herbert L. Bergsma, CHC, U.S. Navy, History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C. 1985

Air Force Academy cadets enter Falcon Stadium through Talbot Portal for their graduation ceremony.

BIOGRAPHY

Dr. William H. Gibson is a Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Fine Arts at the Air Force Academy. His academic specialties include ethics, the great religions, philosophy of religion, classic American philosophy, and the great western philosophers. He is also responsible for character and ethics programs for the Academy's Center for Character Development. Dr. Gibson served eight years as a Marine Corps infantry officer and completed two tours in Vietnam. He received the Bronze Star with combat "V" and the Purple Heart decorations for his service. He left the Marines as a Major and went to Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary where he earned a Master of Divinity and Doctor of Ministry. He returned to the military as a chaplain in the U.S. Navy. Dr. Gibson served in various field assignments, on the staff of the Navy Chief of Chaplains, and as Command Chaplain with the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade. Upon retirement as a commander he went to the University of Texas at Austin and earned an MA and PhD focusing on John Dewey's position on the questions of war and peace.

"The evil men do lives after them; The good is oft interred with their bones."

—Julias Caesar Act III, Scene II

Character Development: A Multi-Level Perspective for Program Effectiveness

Michael J. "Mick" Fekula

ABSTRACT

This paper presents a multi-level view of the character development process and calls for the organization of character programs around three main levels: the individual, the group, and the community. Individual-level foci include the ethical dimensions of individual development. The group-level concerns character issues within a primary work group or organization. Community-level considerations highlight the character-based role of individuals and organizations within the larger community. In order to provide a comprehensive illustration of the character development process, these three dimensions are integrated by assessing interactions between the levels. Practical application is made by aligning levels with existing character programs, proposing an integration scheme, and assessing effectiveness relative to the comprehensive multi-level perspective proposed.

INTRODUCTION

One of the difficulties in developing a program aimed at character development rests in the notion of attempting to program processes that humans have performed for centuries. Another problem is building a program to achieve something that is difficult to define. Amidst a myriad of definitions, the United States Air Force Academy defines character as, "The sum of those qualities of moral excellence which stimulates a person to do the right thing, which is manifested through right and proper actions, despite internal or external pressures to the contrary" (United States Air Force Academy, 1996, p. 5). Designing a program to yield a *sum of qualities* for any human outcome is difficult; to do it for character development seems a daunting task, at best.

Another important issue beyond those of program and character is whether character can be significantly developed or changed as an in-dividual approaches adulthood. The mere fact that we perceive a need for character programs (Character Education Partnership, 1999) might mean that it is too late; that we failed to impact character when it was possible to do so, and now younger adults in responsible positions in society simply lack the ingredients vital to mentoring the youth toward character as defined above. This argument can take various forms, with the only clear conclusion being contention and dispute. More than from deficient answers, this debate seems to stem from a lack of knowledge in any usable form. Because character development draws from diverse disciplines, no single person, position, nor field of study can claim character as its province. It is itself a new and developing subject and field of study.

In only the past 20 years, the number of centers related to ethics or character has grown from merely two, to well over 1400 in the United States. Amongst major organizations dedicated to character, the youthfulness of the field is evidenced by the largest of these, the Character Education Partnership (CEP) which held only its sixth annual forum in 1999.

The argument that character development is centuries old implies that there is little new to learn. This claim should be at least abated by the position that the multi-disciplinary flavor of character limits the unity of our knowledge. Drawing from philosophy, psychology, sociology, and various streams within the humanities and social sciences, character development currently lacks a unified body of knowledge like that found in other fields. Since many disciplines contribute, this paper attempts to glean a more fruitful perspective that suggests we can build effective programs by drawing these diverse disciplines together.

In doing so, the multi-level perspective developed herein simultaneously accounts for knowledge from philosophy, psychology, social psychology, and the social processes of the centuries. The goal is to avoid a one-dimensional

program by incorporating the larger societal view into an individual's character development experiences. Though a universally popular definition of character will remain elusive, the multi-level view helps foster the development of a *sum of qualities* because it proposes development beyond individual ethics into the realm of development that is important to groups and communities.

Until we have exhausted all ways of knowing about character, it is hoped that the stance that there is much to learn will suffice to answer the contention that the character of our youth is already established. If not, we suggest society's sages be heeded when they say, "I'm 68 years old, and I'm still working on my character" (Wakin, 1998).

SOCIOLOGY AND LEVELS

The three primary levels proposed for consideration in the design of an effective character development program are the individual, group, and community. This categorization scheme rests upon the sociological perspective that humans are far more than individual and independent actors (Sullivan, 1995). Interaction in groups and social relationships impacts our personal development, as well as the development of the community around us. Since a multi-level view accounts for this inevitable social interaction, an effective character development program must incorporate this perspective.

This approach not only expands the scope of our effort, it also provides a focus for analyzing programs in at least two ways. First, it allows us to see if we are missing critical dimensions of a person's developmental experience, and second, it allows us to discover interactions between programmed activities and desired outcomes. Table 1 illustrates the three levels along with their characteristics and associated programs.

Level (Discipline)	Sample Types Within a Level	Dimensions of Development	Potential & Preferred Outcomes	Sample Types of Activities
Community (Sociology)	Routine social interaction Daily business Loosely-coupled associations	Social responsibility Civility Moral action Commitment	Opportunity Service Gain	Community Service Service Learning Policy Making
Group (Social Psychology)	Workgroup Team	Decision Making Leadership Followership Team spirit Trust	Excellence Achievement Contribution	Team-Building Trust Building Experiential Exercises High-Ropes Training
Individual (Philosophy Psychology)	Actor Member	Affective Behavioral Cognitive Spiritual	Integrity Service Respect Responsibility Strength, Stamina Discipline Moral Courage	Ethical Reasoning Skills Courses Character Reflections Values Lesson Seminars Speakers Conferences/ Symposia Honor Codes Mentor Programs Real Hero Forums

Table 1. Levels, Characteristics, and Programs

It is important to recognize that the levels aggregate, even though each level represents a qualitatively different entity (Scott, 1987). For example, the characteristics of cognition and integrity are fundamentally those of an individual, as opposed to a group or society. But the absence of those characteristics in members of a group will still impact the group's abilities along all dimensions of development and outcomes. However, it is important to recognize that group characteristics are not simply the sum of its members, but more the result of individuals interacting in the groups. Features that are unique to individuals are not necessarily found in teams, just as those that are unique to groups are not found in communities. Similarly, when we reverse our analysis, characteristics of communities are not necessarily found in groups or individuals, nor the features of groups found in their members.

The adoption of a multi-level view significantly impacts the type of character development activities that are deemed necessary in a comprehensive and effective program. Since the sociological perspective suggests that we are not simply individual and independent actors, character-building activities must extend beyond the individual level. The type of programs for individuals listed in Table 1 provide the opportunity to gain knowledge, develop skills, and reflect upon one's character. Outcomes like service, respect, and responsibility imply consideration for others, but it is only through activities like team building and community service that we are assured that individuals engage in activities commensurate with desired outcomes and dimensions of development associated with those levels.

In each case, the character building activity associated with a particular level is expected to contribute to the development of that target group. In turn, the desired dimensions of development must be commensurate with potential and preferred outcomes.

CAUSAL EFFECTS AND INTERACTION

In addition to discovering gaps in a program, another advantage of categorizing by levels is the ability to consider the impact between levels. Figure 1 illustrates some examples of the cross-level effects that are merely hypothesized, but might occur within a program having activities at different levels.

| Community		Community
Opportunity Service Gain		Social Responsibility Gain vs. Greed
Group		*Group*
Outcomes Processes		Achievement Trust Contribution
Individual		*Individual*
Ethical Behavior		Affect Cognition Spirituality

Figure 1. Cross-Level Causal Effects

For example, the ethical behavior of one individual can influence the achievement, trust, and contributions of a group. That same impact can be felt at the community-level wherein the willingness of society's members to act responsibly will be the result of seeing the actions of others. At the group-level, both outcomes and group processes can determine the health of a community and the attitudes of group-members toward established values. Finally, we would expect that the opportunities that a community affords its citizens would impact an individual's development.

The variables in Figure 1 will change according to the context, but the levels will remain the same for all situations. The assumption of such relationships offers a starting point for the challenging task of program integration and the elusive assignment of assessment.

PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH INTEGRATION

The position taken in this paper is that an effective character development program must address multi-levels of an individual's social experience. Failing to do so omits important parts of human existence as those relate to life and our ethos. The way that we conduct ourselves in relationships gets at the very heart of ethics as a guidance system which employs our values. The United States Air Force Core Values of Integrity, Service, and Excellence have been argued to operate within a moral structure of three dimensions: agent, act, and outcome (Myers, 1997). These dimensions are described more simply as someone (agent) doing something (act) having an outcome for someone. Thus, there are always others involved through either formal relationships found in the workplace or looser connections within the community. An effective character development program must explicitly address those contexts in which individuals live and function.

Further, teaching people right from wrong by simply telling them what they should and should not do is inadequate. As retired Brigadier General Mal Wakin so often and aptly puts, "Knowledge alone is not enough" (1997). Group and community level character development activities must be robust; sympathy, if not empathy (Lickona, 1991) must be the order of the day.

Figure 2 proposes a perspective on integration that is based upon the multi-level view, and in addition, places the levels in proper context and alignment. In this depiction, the indi-


Figure 2. Effective Ethical Ellipses

vidual is simultaneously portrayed as both part of a group and the community. Ellipses are used to illustrate orbiting points; in particular, points of interaction with the individual. The orbits suggest that at various points in time, the individual is more or less connected to a group or the community, though nonetheless always connected in some manner. Recall that humans are far more than individual and independent actors (Sullivan, 1995).

The implications of this perspective suggest that a character development program must not only establish activities addressing each level, but must ensure those activities are commensurate with the context in which the organization's individuals operate. For example, particular values are suited to the military profession. Integrity, courage, discipline, and obedience are paramount when lives are at stake. Not only must the character of individuals be exceptional, the cohesion of groups, teams, and units is critical. Thus, the development of respect and dignity for others, as well as those in authority is vital because the winning team is not simply the sum of the functional expertise of its members.

Further, the Oath of Office states that military members will "support and defend the Constitution" and "faithfully discharge the duties of the office." This indicates that military members receive their values from the largest of community levels, that being the nation. In the case of the military, character programs must include team-building activities essential to the task, and the establishment of a duty concept that embodies an ideal of service worthy of the community's high expectations.

Other types of organizations must examine their values as they relate to their members and organizational structure, as well as the way in which their mission, outcomes, or products impact their community. Character activities must then be designed accordingly. As illustrated in Figure 2, effective ethical ellipses are achieved when character programs engage the individual in activities that support a structure of morality. In turn, that structure promotes ethical decisions, actions, and outcomes in all relationships and community interactions.

PROGRAM ASSESSMENT

The value of a multi-level view is at least three-fold. First, by adding greater scope to the analysis, it provides a means to identify major gaps in character development programs. These gaps are the result of missing, but essential activities. Deficiencies can also be recognized along the numerous dimensions within and among levels, including development, outcomes, and programs.

Next, the multi-level view yields a scheme for causal analysis. Prior to establishing a multi-level view this type of analysis could be performed only within a level. The addition of levels allows examiners the ability to see important interactive effects between programs at one level and their effects upon development and outcomes at other levels.

Finally, the multi-level view offers a scheme for the integration of character activities between the levels. By viewing the individual as part of larger groups and communities, designers can build programs suitable to the context within which the individual lives and operates.

CONCLUSION

As with any social science model, the ability to simultaneously be general, accurate, and simple is elusive. The more general the model, the greater its applicability to any or many contexts, but then the less accurate it is for a particular situation. When we increase the accuracy of our model, we stand to lose either or both its simplicity and generality. This paper has provided a model that is generalizable to all situations. The multi-level view is also quite simple since it proposes only three levels. Accuracy is considered to be the responsibility of the user within his or her particular context.

The emphasis on a particular level, the dimensions of development needed, and the outcomes desired will vary based upon the values, needs, and missions of the organization choosing to promote a character development program. Despite any differences between programs and organizations, what remains constant is the view that a character program is ineffec-

tive unless it reflects a multi-level perspective.

We never truly act alone. Because we live and work in a social context, we are usually doing something that has an outcome for someone. If character development is genuinely important to us, then it requires the acknowledgement of a moral structure that accounts for agents, actions, and outcomes in a social context. In turn, the activities we design to develop character must address the many dimensions of our social experience, and at minimum the three herein proposed.

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BIOGRAPHY

Michael J. "Mick" Fekula, Lt Col, USAF (Ret.) headed the Character and Ethics Division in the U.S. Air Force Academy's Center for Character Development from May 1996 to August 1999. He developed and directed Academy programs impacting the character development of 4,000 cadets, and trained staff members engaged in that process. During this period the Air Force Academy's character programs achieved national recognition by twice being named to the John D. Templeton Foundation's Honor Roll for Character Building Colleges.

> **"The strength of an army depends on its moral foundation more than its numbers; the strength of an armed nation depends on the morals of its citizens. If this crumbles the resistance of their armies will also crumble, as an inevitable sequel."**
>
> —**B.H. Liddell Hart,** *Thoughts on War (1944)*
>
> *Words on War; Military Quotations from Ancient Times to The Present,* ©Jay M. Shafritz, Simon & Schuster 1990

For those desiring further information on character and leadership issues in a military context, consider the following conferences:

27-28 January 2000 – JSCOPE, Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics at the Springfield Hilton Hotel, Springfield VA; JSCOPE web page at http://www.usafa.af.mil.jscope/.

16-18 February 2000 – US Army War College Anton Meyer Leadership Symposium at the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks PA; SimmsJB@awc.carlisle.army.mil for information.

8-10 March 2000 – USAFA 7th Annual National Character and Leadership Symposium at the US Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO; cheryl.soat@usafa.af.mil for information.

A series of Professional Military Ethics seminars are being planned for June or July 2000; Lt Col Bill Rhodes at bill.rhodes@usafa.af.mil or 719 333-8663 for information.

Next in Airman-Scholar:

The **Spring 2000** issue of **Airman-Scholar** will feature articles on the future of air power. Although a topic often discussed, we hope to publish articles that take into account the views of Professor Martin van Creveld of Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Dr. van Creveld raised eyebrows during an address to cadets and faculty of the US Air Force Academy in October 1999 when he proclaimed that the importance of air forces was declining and would continue to do so for the foreseeable future. His thoughts are available in a paper he presented to the Royal Australian Air Force, titled "New Era Security: The RAAF in the Next 25 Years – Air power 2025," at http://defence.gov.au/apc96/vancrev.htr.

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