Summary

Between November 1990 and May 1991, the Navy assessed the AN/BSY-1 combat system, which is meant to assist in combat operations in antisubmarine, antisurface, strike, mine, and other warfare missions. Although GAO does not disagree with the resulting recommendation that AN/BSY-1 be approved for fleet use, it does note that two AN/BSY-1 critical operational issues--reliability and maintainability--were unsatisfactory and that limitations resulted in incomplete demonstration of two critical operational issues--weapon deployment and navigation--and unrealistic operational testing. GAO could not reach a conclusion on the independence of the operational evaluation. Records show that AN/BSY-1 program and contractor personnel were on board the submarine on days when it was being tested. The Navy could furnish no documentation that these personnel left the submarine before AN/BSY-1 operational evaluation began. On the basis of limited observations, the Navy determined that the AN/BSY-1 operational evaluation was adequate. Because the number of required on-site visits has yet to be established, however, GAO could not assess how effectively the Navy carried out its responsibilities.

GAO found that: (1) the Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) Commander concluded that AN/BSY-1 was operationally effective and suitable for fleet introduction; (2) 23 of the 27 critical operational issues examined were satisfactorily resolved; (3) 96 percent of the systems and all trainers have been delivered to the Navy and initial operating capability has been achieved; (4) reliability and maintainability, two critical operational issues, were not satisfactorily resolved; (5) testing limitations resulted in incomplete demonstration of weapon employment and navigation and unrealistic operational testing; (6) it could not verify the independence of the operational evaluation; and (7) it could not assess how effectively OT&E carried out its responsibilities, since OT&E did not establish the number of on-site visits required.