Summary

As a result of problems with several special operations missions in the 1980s, including the failed attempt to rescue American hostages from Iran in April 1980, Congress created a joint special operations command to ensure the combat readiness of assigned forces. In April 1987, the Defense Department established the U.S. Special Operations Command. This report assesses how the Command determines its force level and mix of active and reserve forces and examines issues affecting the readiness of special operations forces.

GAO found that: (1) the Command has not substantially changed its force structure since 1988; (2) the Command determines its future force structure requirements by analyzing its wartime and peacetime needs; (3) nearly 50 percent of the Command's planned force structure is needed to meet peacetime requirements including peacekeeping, peacemaking, and humanitarian assistance; (4) there has only been a slight improvement in the readiness of the Command's special operations forces; (5) shortages of equipment and specialty personnel in active and reserve forces have been primary causes for the lack of significant combat readiness improvements; (6) although the Status of Resources and Training System is used to measure combat readiness, the Command believes that the system does not adequately reflect the capabilities and interoperability of its forces; and (7) the Department of Defense could increase the resources available and improve the readiness of special operations forces by using Air Force and Army special operations units for conventional combat search and rescue operations, and special operations funds to maintain excess reserve forces and expenses that are not unique to special operations.