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Preparedness Can Be Enhanced with Clarified Responsibilities and 
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Report to Congressional Committees:

United States Government Accountability Office:

GAO:

August 2004:

COMBATING TERRORISM:

DOD Efforts to Improve Installation Preparedness Can Be Enhanced with 
Clarified Responsibilities and Comprehensive PlanningCombating 
Terrorism:

GAO-04-855:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-04-855, a report to congressional committees.

Why GAO Did This Study:

Terrorist incidents in the United States and abroad have underscored 
the Department of Defense’s (DOD) need to safeguard military personnel 
and facilities from potential terrorist attacks involving chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and high-yield explosive 
devices. In the 2003 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress 
directed DOD to develop a comprehensive plan to help guide 
departmentwide efforts in improving installation preparedness against 
such attacks. The act also directed GAO to assess DOD’s plan. DOD 
submitted its report to Congress in September 2003. This review 
addresses two questions: (1) Does DOD’s report represent a 
comprehensive plan that can guide installation preparedness efforts? 
and (2) What obstacles, if any, hinder DOD’s ability to develop and 
effectively implement a comprehensive approach to installation 
preparedness?

What GAO Found:

While DOD’s September 2003 report generally met the requirements of the 
act, it does not represent a comprehensive, results-oriented management 
plan that could help guide DOD’s installation preparedness efforts. For 
example, the report described annual performance goals that were 
general in nature and did not have good metrics to gauge progress; it 
did not describe a comprehensive process and total resources needed to 
achieve long-term goals; and it did not define an objective and formal 
process for evaluating results. As a result, it is unclear how 
improvement goals will be achieved, what resources will be required, or 
when improvements are expected to be completed. In addition, it did not 
fully describe the national, regional, and local military response 
capabilities that will be developed, or how these capabilities will be 
integrated with local civilian capabilities. As a result, it is unclear 
how duplication of requirements and redundant capabilities will be 
avoided. DOD officials attributed the report's limitations to evolving 
organizational responsibilities, and a lack of resources and guidance. 
GAO believes that until a more results-oriented, comprehensive plan is 
developed that clearly articulates the military response capabilities 
to be developed and integrated with the civilian community, DOD’s 
ongoing initiatives and other opportunities to improve installation 
preparedness may not be effectively or efficiently implemented. 

Two obstacles impede DOD’s ability to effectively develop a 
comprehensive approach to implement installation preparedness efforts. 
First, while a large number of organizations are engaged in efforts to 
improve installation preparedness, the responsibilities of two newly 
established organizations—the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Homeland Defense and the U.S. Northern Command—are evolving, and the 
installation preparedness related responsibilities of the Assistant 
Secretary for Homeland Defense is not clearly defined. Second, no 
single entity has been given the authority and responsibility to 
integrate and manage departmentwide installation preparedness efforts. 
In discussions with officials at the department, Joint Staff, service 
and installation levels, there was general agreement that a lack of a 
single focal point having the appropriate authority and responsibility 
to integrate overall installation preparedness improvement efforts 
among the many organizations involved has adversely affected their 
ability to effectively plan for and manage departmentwide installation 
preparedness improvements. As a result, DOD has faced difficulties in 
developing departmentwide standards and concepts of operations and in 
preparing a comprehensive plan for installation preparedness. Until 
organization roles and responsibilities are clarified, and an 
integrating authority is designated, DOD will be limited in its ability 
to develop a comprehensive approach, promulgate departmentwide 
guidance, and effectively coordinate ongoing billion-dollar 
improvement initiatives at the installation level.

What GAO Recommends:

GAO is recommending that a single authority be designated to integrate 
installation preparedness efforts, and that the roles of key 
organizations be clearly defined. It is also recommending that the 2003 
plan be updated to fully incorporate results-oriented management 
principles and describe what military response capabilities need to be 
developed. DOD agreed with all the recommendations in this report.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-855.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent at 
(202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

DOD's Report Does Not Represent a Comprehensive, Results-Oriented 
Plan to Improve Installation Preparedness:

Two Obstacles Hinder DOD's Ability to Improve Installation 
Preparedness:

Conclusions:

Recommendations for Executive Action:

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

Appendix I: Section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2003:

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

Related GAO Products:

Tables:

Table 1: GAO Analysis of Legislative Requirements:

Table 2: Key DOD and Joint Staff Organizations Involved in Installation 
Preparedness:

Table 3: Headquarters Organizations and Military Installations Visited 
or Contacted for this Assignment:

Figures:

Figure 1: Decontamination Operation during Installation Exercise:

Figure 2: Emergency Personnel Assist Individual in Chemical/Biological 
Exercise:

Abbreviations:

CBRNE: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield 
explosives:

DOD: Department of Defense:

WMD: weapons of mass destruction:

United States Government Accountability Office:

Washington, DC 20548:

August 12, 2004:

The Honorable John W. Warner: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate:

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives:

Terrorist incidents within the United States and abroad have 
underscored the Department of Defense's (DOD) need to safeguard 
military personnel and infrastructure from potential terrorist attacks 
involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD).[Footnote 1] While many of 
the department's past efforts have focused on enhancing protection and 
response capabilities against high-yield explosives, the new security 
environment underscores the need for the department to expand its 
safeguards to include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
incidents. To address these potential threats, the department has begun 
to direct billions of dollars toward departmentwide initiatives 
designed to safeguard personnel and facilities. At the same time, the 
military services are continuing to pursue initiatives at specific 
installations to lessen their vulnerabilities to terrorist activities.

In recent years, both legislative actions and our prior work have 
focused on DOD's need to develop an effective program to improve its 
installation preparedness against terrorists' incidents. In response to 
a committee mandate[Footnote 2] to review DOD's plans for improving 
installation preparedness for WMD, we concluded in an April 2002 report 
that while the department had made some progress, it did not have a 
comprehensive plan or overall framework to guide its installation 
preparedness improvement efforts.[Footnote 3] We also discussed with 
the department during the course of that work the importance of clearly 
articulating the national, regional, and local response capabilities 
that would be developed and integrated with the civilian community so 
that unnecessary redundant capabilities could be avoided.

Following our initial assessment and report, in September 2002, the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum that called for the 
development of a departmentwide integrated CBRNE approach to 
installation preparedness, with complete integration of policies, 
technologies, equipment, and operational concepts. The memorandum noted 
that the department would begin providing all installation personnel, 
including military and civilian personnel, contractors, and others who 
live or work on base, with protection against the wider range of 
threats.

Also following our initial report, Congress, in section 1402 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (see app. 
I),[Footnote 4] directed the Secretary of Defense to develop a 
comprehensive plan, with annual updates in 2004, 2005, and 2006, for 
improving the preparedness of military installations worldwide for 
terrorist incidents, including attacks involving weapons of mass 
destruction. The legislation also directed us to review DOD's plan and 
provide our assessment to the Senate and House Armed Services 
Committees. In September 2003, the department complied with the section 
1402 mandate by submitting its plan, entitled "Report to Congress on 
Preparedness of Military Installations for Preventing and Responding to 
Terrorist Incidents."

This report summarizes our assessment of DOD's September 2003 report to 
Congress. Specifically, it addresses two questions: (1) Does the 
department's report represent a comprehensive plan that can guide 
installation preparedness efforts? and (2) What obstacles, if any, 
hinder the department's ability to develop and effectively implement a 
comprehensive approach to installation preparedness?

In conducting our assessment, we examined DOD's 2003 report to 
determine if it addressed the elements required by the act, and 
evaluated the quality of the information by comparing it to management 
principles embodied by the Government Performance and Results Act of 
1993,[Footnote 5] such as the desired characteristics for long-term 
goals and strategies to accomplish those goals, and performance 
criteria for measuring progress. We also discussed the content of the 
report with department officials who prepared it to better understand 
how it was developed. To identify obstacles, if any, that may prevent 
DOD from developing a comprehensive approach to improve installation 
preparedness, we discussed with department, service, and installation 
officials the roles and responsibilities of organizations and offices 
involved in the department's installation preparedness efforts, as well 
as the challenges they faced in planning and implementing preparedness 
efforts. As part of our evaluation, we discussed and observed 
installation preparedness capabilities at 13 military installations. 
Although the information obtained at these locations cannot be 
generalized to describe DOD's worldwide installation preparedness 
improvement efforts, it provided us with insights on preparedness 
challenges at the installation level. We assessed the reliability of 
the data used in this report and determined that it was sufficiently 
reliable for our purposes.

We conducted our review between April 2003 and May 2004 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Further 
information on our scope and methodology appears in appendix II.

Results in Brief:

While DOD's September 2003 report generally met the requirements of 
section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2003 by discussing all of the legislatively required elements, the 
report does not represent a comprehensive, results-oriented management 
plan to help guide installation preparedness improvement efforts. For 
example, the report described annual performance goals that were 
general in nature and did not have adequate metrics to gauge progress, 
it did not describe a comprehensive process and total resources needed 
to achieve long-term goals, and it did not define an objective and 
formal process for evaluating results. As a result, it is unclear how 
long-term goals will be measured, what resources will be needed to 
achieve the desired goals, when the goals are expected to be achieved, 
and how the results of improvement efforts will be evaluated. In 
addition, the report did not fully describe the national, regional, and 
local military response capabilities that will be developed, or how 
those capabilities will be integrated with local civilian capabilities. 
As a result, it is unclear how duplication of requirements and 
unnecessarily redundant capabilities will be avoided. Department 
officials acknowledged that the report does not reflect the results-
oriented management elements we describe nor are military response 
capabilities clearly articulated in the report, because, in their 
opinion, DOD organizations' roles and responsibilities were still 
evolving in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001, and because they had limited resources and guidance to prepare 
the report. Officials also stated that responsibility for preparing the 
legislatively required annual updates to the plan has not been 
assigned, and that the department has not yet submitted the 2004 
update, which was required to be sent with materials supporting the 
fiscal year 2005 budget request in March 2004. Until a comprehensive 
plan is prepared that more fully incorporates results-oriented 
management principles and better defines the desired military response 
capabilities, the department's installation preparedness improvement 
initiatives may not be implemented in the most effective and efficient 
manner, the department may be limited in its ability to determine if 
improvement efforts are achieving the desired outcome, and 
opportunities to improve installation preparedness may not be fully 
realized.

Two obstacles impede DOD's ability to effectively develop a 
comprehensive approach to implement installation preparedness efforts. 
First, a large number of organizations are engaged in efforts to 
improve the preparedness of military installations, but the 
installation preparedness-related responsibilities of two recently 
established organizations--the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Homeland Defense and the U.S. Northern Command--are still evolving. On 
May 7, 2004, the U.S. Northern Command was assigned specific 
antiterrorism and force protection responsibilities for domestic 
installations, which was a significant step toward clarifying its 
installation preparedness role, but those of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Homeland Defense are still undefined. Secondly, no single 
entity has been assigned the authority or responsibility to integrate 
and manage departmentwide installation preparedness efforts. As a 
result, DOD has not developed departmentwide installation preparedness 
policies, including integrated concepts of operations and standards, as 
required by the Assistant Secretary in his September 5, 2002, 
memorandum; the comprehensive plan called for by the act was prepared 
by an organization that had no formal authority to integrate 
departmentwide efforts and resolve disagreements between the parties 
involved; and DOD has not taken any specific steps to evaluate 
the overall progress in implementing this plan. Until these obstacles 
are removed, the department will be limited in its ability to develop a 
comprehensive approach, promulgate departmentwide installation 
preparedness guidance, and effectively coordinate ongoing improvement 
initiatives.

We are recommending the department take steps to fully incorporate 
results-oriented management principles in the next update to the plan, 
clarify the installation preparedness related responsibilities of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and designate a 
single integrating authority with the responsibility to coordinate and 
integrate worldwide installation preparedness improvement efforts. In 
comments on a draft of this report, the department agreed with our 
recommendations, and stated it will take specific actions to implement 
them.

Background:

The department's policies, programs, and organizational 
responsibilities related to installation preparedness for attacks 
involving weapons of mass destruction have been evolving over the last 
few years as the department adapted to meet new challenges arising from 
terrorist attacks. Especially since the 1996 attack on Khobar Towers in 
Saudi Arabia, the general focus of the department's installation 
preparedness activities emphasized antiterrorism, or defensive 
measures such as gates, fencing, perimeter lighting, and security 
patrols used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property. 
After the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000, antiterrorism 
measures received even greater emphasis, resulting in additional 
standards and measures to better protect military forces. The September 
11, 2001, attacks in the United States heightened the emphasis and 
focus on installation preparedness against a wider spectrum of threats.

DOD's Antiterrorism/Force Protection Policy and Guidance:

In August 2003, DOD updated its directive signed by the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense that provides DOD's antiterrorism policy and 
assigns responsibilities to defense organizations implementing 
antiterrorism initiatives.[Footnote 6] This directive places 
responsibility for developing antiterrorism policy and guidance with 
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations 
and Low-Intensity Conflict. In this capacity, the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense issued an instruction that established 31 antiterrorism 
standards that DOD organizations, including the services, are required 
to implement.[Footnote 7] These standards address antiterrorism 
planning, training requirements, physical security measures, and 
related issues. The Assistant Secretary also issued a handbook 
containing additional detailed guidance on antiterrorism policies and 
practices, including guidance on assessing these practices, which was 
updated in February 2004.[Footnote 8] Representatives of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff manage antiterrorism funding, conduct inspections, and 
work with the Assistant Secretary to develop DOD antiterrorism 
policies. Additionally, each of the military services has issued 
regulations, orders, or instructions to implement the DOD guidance and 
establish its own specific policies and standards. Overseas, the 
geographic combatant commanders have ultimate antiterrorism and force 
protection authority and responsibility within their areas of 
responsibility.[Footnote 9]

DOD Installation Preparedness Guidance and Improvement Initiatives:

In a September 5, 2002, memorandum, DOD clarified its policy to protect 
military installations from CBRNE attacks, respond to these attacks 
with trained and equipped emergency responders, and ensure that 
installations are able to continue critical operations during an attack 
and resume essential operations afterwards.[Footnote 10] The policy 
also required DOD to approach preparedness from a departmentwide 
perspective, with complete integration of policies, technologies, 
equipment, and operational concepts. The memorandum noted that the 
department would begin providing all installation personnel, including 
military and civilian personnel, contractors, and others who live or 
work on base, with protection against the wider range of threats.

DOD's September 2003 report to Congress was the first to offer a 
definition of installation preparedness. It was defined as a 
collective, proactive effort to prevent, detect, respond, and protect 
department bases, personnel, their families, and infrastructure 
critical to mission accomplishment against terrorists' use of weapons 
of mass destruction. This definition combines the fundamental elements 
of antiterrorism--defensive measures to prevent and detect attacks--
with elements related to responding to and mitigating the effects of an 
attack.

DOD has recently committed significant resources and undertaken a 
number of initiatives to improve installation preparedness to protect 
personnel and facilities. For example, in September 2002, the 
department began a $61 million project called the Joint Services 
Installation Pilot Project, to provide equipment and training to 
enhance chemical and biological detection and emergency response 
capabilities on nine diverse DOD installations. In October 2003, it 
started the Guardian project to improve the detection and protection 
against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats at 200 
domestic and overseas installations at an estimated cost of 
$1.6 billion over the next 5 years. The project is designed to tailor 
requirements according to installation needs, and will include the 
design and installation of detection systems. Figure 1 illustrates a 
decontamination operation during a recent installation training 
exercise responding to a chemical/biological incident.

Figure 1: Decontamination Operation during Installation Exercise:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

In a number of reports that we have issued during the past few years, 
we have underscored the need for DOD to institute sound management 
principles to guide its installation preparedness efforts. Such 
management principles are embodied in the Government Performance and 
Results Act of 1993 and consist of a number of critical elements 
considered essential in developing an effective strategy, guiding 
resource allocations, and monitoring results. In this previous work, we 
concluded that without sound management principles, DOD faces, among 
other things, the potential for inappropriate or redundant allocation 
of resources and limited or lost preparedness and response 
capabilities. In addition, Congress and DOD managers may not be able to 
determine if desired program outcomes are being achieved.

DOD's Report Does Not Represent a Comprehensive, Results-Oriented 
Plan to Improve Installation Preparedness:

While the department's report generally met the requirements of 
section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2003 by discussing all of the legislatively required elements, the 
report does not represent a comprehensive, results-oriented management 
plan to help guide installation preparedness improvement efforts. The 
legislation required the department to address nine elements--seven 
associated with management principles and two associated with military 
response capabilities. The department's report described each of these 
nine elements, but the management elements were not addressed in a 
results-oriented manner, and the military capability elements were not 
discussed in a manner that provides a clear description of the response 
capabilities needed, or how they will be integrated with civilian 
capabilities. As a result, installation preparedness improvement goals, 
objectives, resource requirements, and methods to evaluate the outcome 
of new initiatives remain unclear, as well as how the department 
intends to develop national, regional and local military response 
capabilities that are coordinated with civilian response capabilities.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 required 
DOD to develop a comprehensive plan for improving the preparedness of 
military installations for terrorist incidents. Specifically, it 
required the department to address five elements of a preparedness 
strategy, and four elements of a performance plan. We analyzed these 
nine requirements and found that seven of them were collectively 
related to management principles, and two of them were discussion 
points related to the development of military response capabilities. 
Table 1 lists these nine elements.

Table 1: GAO Analysis of Legislative Requirements:

Seven management-related elements:

1. Identification of long-term goals and objectives for improving the 
preparedness of military installations for preventing and responding to 
terrorist attacks.

2. Description of the process, together with a discussion of the 
resources, necessary to achieve those goals and objectives.

3. A reasonable schedule, with milestones, for achieving the goals and 
objectives of the strategy.

4. Identification of factors beyond the control of the Secretary that 
could impede the achievement of these goals and objectives.

5. Identification of budget and other resource requirements necessary 
to achieve those goals and objectives.

6. Performance criteria for measuring progress in achieving those 
goals and objectives.

7. A description of the process for evaluating results in achieving 
those goals and objectives.

Two military response capability discussion elements: 

8. A discussion of the extent to which local, regional, or national 
military response capabilities are to be developed, integrated, and 
used.

9. A discussion of how the Secretary will coordinate the capabilities 
referred to in #8 above with local, regional, or national civilian and 
other military capabilities. 

Source: GAO analysis of section 1402 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.

[End of table]

DOD's September report to Congress discussed each of the nine 
required elements and was therefore technically in compliance with 
the requirements of the act. However, the report did not address the 
seven management-related elements in a manner that fully incorporates 
results-oriented management principles so that the report could serve 
as a useful tool in guiding installation improvement efforts. The 
following is our assessment of the adequacy of the information provided 
in the department's report when compared to results-oriented management 
principles:

* Long-Term Goals--Long-term goals should explain what results are 
expected, should be results-oriented, and should be expressed in a way 
that allows them to be assessed in terms of achievement. They should 
also describe how managers are to be held accountable for achieving 
such goals. Although the department's report identifies four long-term 
goals, which it calls "preparedness strategy elements"--prevention, 
detection, protection, and emergency response--it does not clearly 
express these goals in a way that would allow the department to measure 
progress toward achieving them. For example, the prevention strategy 
element was described as "The Department's antiterrorism (AT) strategy 
is to maximize efforts to prevent, deter, and detect terrorist attacks 
against DOD personnel, their families, facilities, installations, and 
infrastructure critical to mission accomplishment as well as the 
preparation needed to defend against and respond to the consequences of 
terrorist incidents." This description does not provide the information 
necessary to explain what results are to be expected nor is it 
described in a way that allows progress to be assessed. Furthermore, 
the report did not identify the organizations accountable for achieving 
the goals.

* Process to Achieve Goals--The act required that the plan describe the 
process, together with a discussion of the resources, necessary to 
achieve those goals and objectives. In describing how the installation 
preparedness improvement strategy would be achieved, the department's 
report provided some general narrative such as "DOD…policies support 
this…strategy by ensuring a comprehensive and integrated approach that 
continuously identifies and overcomes vulnerabilities, thereby 
reducing risk to our personnel and resources; enhancing the planning, 
training and equipping of the force; and providing prudent guidance and 
direction…" The department's report also describes ongoing improvement 
initiatives such as the Joint Service Installation Pilot Project and 
the Guardian Program.[Footnote 11] Because of the general nature of the 
discussion in the report, it was not clear the extent to which the 
goals would be met with the cited initiatives, or, as discussed below, 
the full extent to which resources would be required to achieve each 
goal.

* Schedule with milestones--The act required the plan to include a 
reasonable schedule, with milestones, for achieving the installation 
preparedness long-term goals. Such a schedule should include details on 
incremental performance goals that are tangible, measurable, and 
objective; usually expressed within certain timeframes such as "by the 
end of 200X, at least 95 percent of commanders will have completed 
required annual terrorism risk assessments." The department's report 
contained 25 performance goals identified in the report as strategic 
objectives. These objectives were general in nature, and most contained 
a specific year in which the goal was to be either started or achieved. 
However, as discussed in the performance criteria section below, they 
all lacked specific targets that could be used to measure progress. For 
example, one strategic objective listed in the plan states "beginning 
in fiscal year 2003, improve robotic vehicles for [antiterrorism] 
operations as well as for emergency responders."

* External factors that could impede achievement of the long-term 
goals--External impediments should be identified, and the actions 
needed to mitigate these impediments should be addressed. Although the 
department's report identifies a number of external impediments (e.g., 
the feasibility, availability, and affordability of technological 
solutions and the degree to which state and local responders are 
trained and equipped), it does not clearly describe how these factors 
may affect the department's ability to achieve its goals, or ways of 
reducing the potential impact of these impediments.

* Identification of budget and other resources--Good management 
principles call for the identification of resources, including funding, 
personnel, and equipment, needed to accomplish the expected level 
of performance. Although the department's report identifies funding 
resources needed for antiterrorism and consequence management[Footnote 
12]--for example, $8.5 billion in fiscal year 2004--the report 
indicates that this amount is part of a larger funding requirement, but 
it does not provide further details. In addition, the report does not 
include any information on additional personnel or equipment that would 
be needed.

* Performance criteria--Performance criteria or measures are indicators 
used to measure progress in achieving goals and objectives. They should 
be objective and outcome-oriented with specific target levels to meet 
performance goals. The department's report identifies 25 performance 
indicators (one for each performance goal), which it calls measures of 
effectiveness. However, many of them are not outcome-oriented and all 
of them lack specific targets or baselines that could be used to 
measure progress. For example, as discussed previously, although the 
report notes that robotic vehicles will be improved, it does not 
provide a quantifiable target, nor does it present a baseline to assess 
progress. In another example, a strategic objective listed in the plan 
is "develop standardized installation CBRNE scenario exercises for 
training and equipment requirements." The related measure of 
effectiveness described in the report is "standardized exercise 
scenarios will improve efficiencies and consistency in equipment and 
training, leading to improved interoperability." This measure of 
effectiveness is highlighting the potential benefit of achieving the 
objective; it does not provide specific criteria for how it will be 
measured, or any baseline data that can be used to measure progress in 
achieving the stated goal.

* Process for evaluating results--Program evaluations are defined as 
objective and formal assessments of the results, impact, or effects of 
a program or policy. Such information can be used to assess the extent 
to which performance goals were met and identify appropriate strategies 
to meet those goals that were not met. The department's report 
indicates that it will provide general oversight, semiannual review of 
action plans, and annual reviews of antiterrorism plans. However, the 
report does not define how it will evaluate the impact of current 
initiatives or describe how such evaluations could be used to improve 
the department's overall efforts to improve installation preparedness.

In addition to the seven management-related elements, the legislation 
required DOD to discuss two elements related to military response 
capabilities. In the first element, the department was required to 
discuss the extent to which local, regional, or national military 
response capabilities were to be developed, integrated, and used. In 
our view, it is important that DOD articulate the extent to which it 
will develop such capabilities because national and regional 
capabilities can supplement or enhance those available at individual 
installations and redundant capabilities could be avoided. In the 
report, however, DOD discussed non-military capabilities, such as the 
Federal Response Plan, which provides a government-integrated response 
to disasters through the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The 
report also discussed the department's Joint Task Force for Civil 
Support, which serves as a military headquarters unit responsible for 
coordinating department activities supporting civil authorities, but 
does not have specific operational response capabilities of its own.

In the second discussion element, DOD was directed to discuss how it 
would coordinate its proposed military response capabilities with 
civilian capabilities. Such a discussion would provide information on 
how overlap and duplication of efforts between military and civilian 
organizations at all levels could be reduced. However, DOD's report 
discussed the need to use memorandums of agreement between, for 
example, military installations and civilian local-community first 
responders to fill in the gaps in emergency response capabilities on 
and off base. However, because it did not address how military regional 
and national response capabilities were to be developed, integrated, 
and used, the report did not describe how those capabilities would be 
coordinated with those of the civilian sector. Furthermore, while the 
report discussed a national-level response exercise, called "Top 
Officials,"[Footnote 13] involving cooperation and coordination 
between the federal response community (such as the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency) and local and regional civilian response 
organizations, the report did not describe how military response 
capabilities would be integrated into such exercises, nor how lessons 
learned from national exercises would be shared with military 
organizations.

In discussions with us, officials from the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, who were responsible for 
preparing the report, agreed that the report does not fully reflect the 
results-oriented management elements that we have described above. In 
addition, they agreed that the report does not clearly articulate the 
military response capabilities to be developed at the national, 
regional and local levels. They told us that, in their opinion, the 
department organizations' roles and responsibilities were still 
evolving in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001 (discussed in more detail later in this report), and they prepared 
the report with limited staff and limited guidance. As a result, they 
approached the preparation of the report by generally summarizing the 
key efforts underway in the department to improve installation 
preparedness, and by drawing on key elements of the existing 
antiterrorism program.

Based on the concerns of Congress regarding the need for DOD to 
effectively plan for installation preparedness improvements against 
terrorist incidents, and our past work concluding that DOD did not have 
a comprehensive plan or overall framework to guide its installation 
preparedness improvement efforts, we believe that without clearly 
articulated results-oriented management elements, the report--and the 
comprehensive plan it is supposed to reflect--cannot serve as a useful 
tool to guide and manage installation improvement efforts and provide a 
mechanism to adequately assess progress. For example, DOD's report is 
unclear in its discussion of how long-term goals will be measured, what 
resources will be needed to achieve the desired goals, when the goals 
are expected to be achieved, and how the results of ongoing improvement 
efforts will be evaluated. In addition, without a clear description of 
how national, regional, and local military response capabilities will 
be developed and integrated with civilian capabilities, it is unclear 
how duplication of requirements and redundant capabilities will be 
avoided. Therefore, without a comprehensive plan that more fully 
incorporates results-oriented management principles and better defines 
the desired military response capabilities, the department's 
installation preparedness improvement initiatives may not be 
implemented in the most effective and efficient manner, the department 
may be limited in its ability to determine if improvement efforts are 
achieving the desired outcome, and opportunities to improve 
installation preparedness may not be fully realized.

Furthermore, the act requires that DOD submit annual updates to the 
plan in fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006 that include a discussion of 
any revision to the plan, and an assessment of the progress made in 
achieving the goals and objectives of the strategy set forth in the 
plan. DOD, however, has not assigned responsibility for preparing the 
required updates to any organization and has not taken any specific 
steps to evaluate the overall progress in implementing this plan. In 
fact, the first annual update, which was due March 2004 with the 
materials that the Secretary of Defense submits to Congress in support 
of the budget submission, has not yet been submitted. According to the 
officials we spoke with, until specific responsibility for updating the 
plan is assigned, it is unclear who will prepare the updates or when 
they will be prepared.

Two Obstacles Hinder DOD's Ability to Improve Installation 
Preparedness:

Two obstacles have impeded DOD's ability to effectively develop a 
comprehensive approach to implement installation preparedness efforts. 
First, although numerous organizations currently engaged in 
installation preparedness improvement efforts have clear roles and 
responsibilities, two key organizations--the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Homeland Defense and the U.S. Northern Command--have only 
been recently established, and their installation preparedness 
responsibilities are still evolving. On May 7, 2004, the Northern 
Command was assigned specific antiterrorism and force protection 
responsibilities for domestic installations, which was a significant 
step toward clarifying its installation preparedness role, but those of 
Homeland Defense are still undefined. Second, no organization has been 
given the authority and responsibility to integrate and coordinate 
installation preparedness policies and improvement efforts and monitor 
progress in achieving the plan's objectives. Until these issues are 
resolved, DOD will be unable to pursue installation preparedness 
improvements in a comprehensive and integrated manner, and the 
significant resources being applied to accomplish improvement goals may 
not be spent in the most efficient and effective manner.

Numerous Organizations Involved in Installation Preparedness and 
Two Have Evolving Roles and Responsibilities:

Many organizations at various levels within DOD are engaged in 
activities to improve installation preparedness. The military services 
and their installation commanders play a key role in safeguarding their 
individual bases, while combatant commanders are responsible for 
protecting forces within their geographic areas of responsibility. In 
addition, there are several department and Joint-Staff-level 
organizations that have key roles and responsibilities for installation 
preparedness policies and procedures. The roles of most of these 
organizations are clearly defined but those of two recently established 
department organizations--the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Homeland Defense and U. S. Northern Command--are still evolving. Table 
2 lists the key organizations involved in installation preparedness at 
the department and Joint Staff levels, and briefly describes their 
roles and responsibilities.

Table 2: Key DOD and Joint Staff Organizations Involved in Installation 
Preparedness:

Organization: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy: Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; 
Installation preparedness related responsibilities: 
Develops worldwide antiterrorism policy and guidance for the DOD 
components. Such guidance currently includes DOD Directive 2000.12, 
"DOD Antiterrorism Program"; DOD Instruction 2000.16, "DOD 
Antiterrorism Standards"; and DOD O-2000.12-H, "DOD Antiterrorism 
Handbook.".

Organization: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy: Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense; 
Installation preparedness related responsibilities: Provides overall 
supervision of homeland defense activities of the department under the 
authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Policy. As such, will oversee homeland defense activities, develop 
policies, conduct analyses, provide advice, and make recommendations 
on homeland defense, support to civil authorities, emergency 
preparedness and domestic crisis management matters with the 
department. DOD defines homeland defense as the military protection of 
United States territory, domestic population, and critical defense 
infrastructure against external threats and aggression.

Organization: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and 
Chemical and Biological Defense Programs; 
Installation preparedness related responsibilities: Oversees the 
Chemical Biological Defense Program, including programs such as Project 
Guardian, run by the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical-
Biological Defense.

Organization: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics: Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and 
Environment; 
Installation preparedness related responsibilities: Prepares and 
defends the Military Construction Bill, which funds installation 
construction projects that include antiterrorism measures; monitors and 
reports on installations' readiness; and is responsible for the 
development of DOD's minimum antiterrorism standards for buildings.

Organization: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics: Defense Threat Reduction Agency[A]; 
Installation preparedness related responsibilities: The Director of the 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency reports directly to the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; 
Safeguards America's interests from weapons of mass destruction by 
controlling and reducing the threat and providing tools and services 
for the warfighter; 
Provides direction and oversight of the Joint Services Installation 
Pilot Project to upgrade nine military installations to be model sites 
for biological and chemical safety; 
Manages the Unconventional Nuclear Weapons Defense program, in 
conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics.

Organization: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff: Joint Requirements 
Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense; 
Installation preparedness related responsibilities: Develops 
departmentwide concepts of operations and comprehensive CBRNE standards 
for the preparedness of military installations, as directed by the 
Joint Staff; Serves as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's 
focal point for all chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
defense issues in passive defense, force protection, consequence 
management, and homeland security, including installation protection 
responsibilities.

Organization: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff: Joint Program Executive 
Office for Chemical-Biological Defense; 
Installation preparedness related responsibilities: Implements the 
Guardian Program to improve CBRN capabilities on 200 installations 
under the purview of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for 
Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense programs; Developed 
equipment standards for selecting equipment for its installations, and 
will update that equipment list on an annual basis throughout different 
phases of the Guardian program.

Organization: Combatant Commands: Geographic Combatant Commanders; 
Installation preparedness related responsibilities: Responsible for 
implementing antiterrorism policies and programs for the protection of 
all department elements and personnel in their area of responsibility.

Organization: Combatant Commands: U. S. Northern Command; 
Installation preparedness related responsibilities: Responsible for 
conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and 
aggression aimed at the continental United States and other nearby 
areas within its area of responsibility; Effective not later than 
October 1, 2004, will exercise tactical control for department force 
protection and assume overall department antiterrorism program and 
force protection responsibility in the continental United States.

Organization: Military Services: Military departments; 
Installation preparedness related responsibilities: Each of the 
military services has issued regulations, orders, or instructions to 
implement the DOD guidance and establish its own specific policies and 
standards. The services assign responsibility for protecting 
installations from terrorist attacks to installation commanders.

Organization: Military Services: Installation commanders; 
Installation preparedness related responsibilities: Responsible for 
protecting installations from terrorist attacks, including identifying 
and prioritizing requirements using annual assessments of threat, 
vulnerability, and the criticality of assets. 

Source: GAO analysis.

[A] Combat Support Agency.

[End of table]

Three organizations have responsibilities for recent departmentwide 
improvement initiatives. First, the Joint Program Executive Office for 
Chemical-Biological Defense, under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, is in charge of implementing the Guardian program to safeguard 
200 military installations within the next 5 years, at an estimated 
cost of $1.6 billion. Oversight of this project is assigned to the 
Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and 
Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. Second, the Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency, a combat support agency that reports to the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, is 
responsible for managing the Joint Services Installation Pilot Project-
-an initiative to enhance chemical/biological detection and emergency 
response capabilities at nine installations. Figure 2 shows a first 
responder in protective gear assisting a person exposed to a chemical/
biological agent during a Pilot Project exercise. Third, the Joint 
Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 
Defense, under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is 
responsible for developing CBRNE concepts of operations and standards 
for installation preparedness.

Figure 2: Emergency Personnel Assist Individual in Chemical/Biological 
Exercise:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Two recently established organizations have key roles in homeland 
defense, but their roles and responsibilities for improving the 
preparedness of military installations for preventing and responding to 
terrorist attacks are still evolving. The Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, which was established as 
part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2003,[Footnote 14] has responsibility for the overall supervision of 
homeland defense (including land, maritime, and aerospace) activities. 
More specifically, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 
Defense is to lead and focus the department's activities in homeland 
defense and homeland security; ensure internal coordination of DOD 
policy direction; provide guidance to the U.S. Northern Command for its 
homeland defense mission and its military activities in support of 
homeland security, support to civil authorities; and coordinate with 
the Department of Homeland Security and other government agencies. 
However, as of May 2004, DOD had not yet published or promulgated a 
charter for this organization that would clearly define its roles and 
responsibilities for installation preparedness. Although this 
organization prepared DOD's September 2003 report to Congress, it does 
not have the authority or responsibility to integrate and coordinate 
the various aspects of installation preparedness, which are currently 
scattered throughout the department.

Similarly, an April 2002 revision to DOD's Unified Command 
Plan,[Footnote 15] approved by the President, created the new U.S. 
Northern Command, a geographic combatant command with the 
responsibility to militarily defend the continental United States and 
other nearby areas. More specifically, the command is responsible for 
conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and 
aggression aimed at the United States and its territories and interests 
within its area of responsibility; moreover, as directed by the 
President or Secretary of Defense, it provides military assistance to 
civil authorities, including consequence management operations in 
response to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield 
explosive events.

Until recently, Northern Command's specific role in supporting the 
department's efforts to improve installation preparedness was not 
clearly defined. On May 7, 2004, however, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff assigned U.S. Northern Command the responsibilities for 
force protection and the department's antiterrorism program in the 
continental United States, effective no later than October 1, 
2004.[Footnote 16] This step significantly clarified the command's 
role, but the specific details of how those responsibilities will be 
carried out are still being developed. In addition, because the 
Northern Command's area of responsibility covers domestic 
installations, its efforts to support installation preparedness may be 
much more complex than in overseas locations, due to the additional 
responsibilities to provide military assistance to civil authorities, 
including consequence management operations.

The Department Lacks a Focal Point for Installation Preparedness 
Efforts:

DOD has not designated a single focal point with the authority and 
responsibility to integrate and coordinate all aspects of installation 
preparedness, thereby hindering its ability to develop a comprehensive 
approach to installation preparedness. This has been evident in a 
number of areas, for example:

* Although the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Homeland Defense does not have overall authority to integrate 
installation preparedness activities for the department, its staff was 
tasked with preparing DOD's report on installation preparedness. 
Homeland Defense officials told us that developing the report and 
obtaining agreement on its content from the many organizations involved 
in preparedness activities was hampered because they did not have 
overall authority and responsibility for planning the department's 
approach to installation preparedness. For example, they said they had 
limited ability to resolve disagreements among various organizations 
over many issues, such as the definition of installation preparedness 
or the specific language used in the report, and thus faced delays in 
moving the report forward.

* DOD has not assigned responsibility to any organization for updating 
the 2003 report or monitoring progress in achieving its goals. Although 
the 2003 report discussed some oversight and coordination mechanisms, 
these were primarily related to the department's existing antiterrorism 
program. Because of the lack of an assignment, the 2004 update was not 
submitted to Congress, and the department has not taken any specific 
steps to evaluate the overall progress in implementing this plan.

* Responsibilities for developing DOD policy, standards and other 
guidance related to installation preparedness are fragmented. On 
one hand, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and 
Low-Intensity Conflict is responsible for preparing worldwide 
antiterrorism policies,[Footnote 17] standards,[Footnote 18] 
implementation guidance,[Footnote 19] and an antiterrorism strategic 
plan.[Footnote 20] The mission of the DOD antiterrorism program, 
according to officials drafting the new antiterrorism strategic plan, 
is to provide worldwide protection of DOD personnel and their families; 
selected DOD contractors; and installations, infrastructure, and key 
assets/information essential to mission accomplishment from acts of 
terrorism, including CBRNE hazards. Over the past 10 months, this 
office has updated the antiterrorism policy and implementation 
guidance, drafted the antiterrorism strategic plan, and is currently 
revising the antiterrorism standards. The Assistant Secretary was also 
tasked by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in his September 5, 2002, 
memo to ensure that CBRNE standards were developed in coordination with 
the Joint Staff; the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics; and the Chemical and Biological Defense 
Program, with a target issue date of May 2003. However, as of May 2004, 
the Joint Requirements Office, tasked by the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff with preparing these standards, together with the 
concepts of operations, had not been able to obtain final approval for 
either of these documents. Furthermore, according to agency officials, 
future updates to the CBRNE emergency response guidelines will be 
prepared under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Homeland Defense.[Footnote 21]

* Military installations are facing challenges in prioritizing 
requirements for funding and personnel resources because DOD has been 
unable to develop departmentwide CBRNE concepts of operations and 
standards, which provide the basis for calculating requirements. Until 
they receive this guidance, the military services and installations 
will not be able to develop rational funding and personnel 
requirements; in addition, they may encounter difficulties in operating 
and maintaining new detection and protection equipment that they 
receive as a result of departmentwide initiatives such as the Joint 
Services Installation Pilot Project or the Guardian program. For 
example, at three installations participating in the Joint Services 
Installation Pilot Project, officials noted the need for additional 
resources to support the new equipment, which created unfunded 
requirements in fiscal year 2004 ranging from $2.1 to $6.5 million at 
each installation.

In our discussions with officials at the department, Joint Staff, 
service, and installation levels, there was general agreement that the 
lack of a single focal point with the appropriate authority and 
responsibility to integrate departmentwide installation preparedness 
improvement efforts among the many organizations involved has adversely 
affected their ability to effectively plan for and manage these 
efforts. More specifically, the officials said that this lack of a 
focal point has hindered their ability to develop needed overarching 
guidance, such as the comprehensive plan, concepts of operations, and 
CBRNE standards.

The evolving roles of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 
Defense and the Northern Command as the Combatant Command responsible 
for domestic military installations and facilities, combined with the 
lack of an integrating authority to oversee the efforts of various 
department organizations and improvement efforts, has limited the 
department's ability to develop a comprehensive improvement plan, 
integrated concepts of operations, and specific installation 
preparedness standards. The recent decision to assign antiterrorism and 
force protection responsibilities for domestic installations to 
Northern Command has been a significant step in clarifying its overall 
responsibilities, but the role of Homeland Defense remains unclear 
because its charter has not been approved. Until Homeland Defense roles 
and responsibilities are clarified as to how it will support the 
department's plan to improve installation preparedness, and an 
integrating authority is established, the department may continue to 
struggle with these issues, and the improvement efforts at all levels 
within the department may not be fully coordinated or efficiently 
executed.

Conclusions:

Improving the preparedness of military installations worldwide for 
attacks using weapons of mass destruction is a challenging and complex 
task that will require a significant allocation of resources; involve 
numerous organizations within the department; and necessitate the 
coordination with other federal agencies and civilian organizations 
within the United States, and host nation organizations in overseas 
locations. Although the department has taken several steps and 
committed significant resources to immediately begin installation 
preparedness improvements, it lacks a comprehensive approach required 
by Congress that incorporates results-oriented management principles to 
guide improvement initiatives in the most efficient and effective 
manner. Congress has also required the department to prepare annual 
updates to the plan, which presents an opportunity to address the 
plan's weaknesses, but several obstacles exist that have stymied the 
department's ability to develop a comprehensive, results-oriented plan. 
The major obstacle we identified is the lack of a single organization 
or entity with the responsibility and authority to oversee and 
integrate the installation preparedness improvement efforts of various 
DOD organizations. This is a complex issue, because it involves those 
installations located within the continental United States, and 
those located in foreign countries. Other obstacles we noted include 
evolving or unclear responsibilities of key organizations, and an 
unassigned responsibility to update the plan. Without a revised plan 
that fully incorporates results-oriented management principles and 
clearly articulates the military response capabilities to be developed 
and integrated with the civilian community, the significant resources 
being applied to improve preparedness may not be spent in the most 
efficient and effective manner, and more importantly, opportunities to 
improve preparedness and protect military personnel, facilities, and 
capabilities from attacks using weapons of mass destruction may be 
lost.

Recommendations for Executive Action:

To develop a more useful plan to guide installation preparedness 
improvement efforts, and to address barriers that inhibit DOD's ability 
to develop a comprehensive approach to improve installation 
preparedness, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the 
following five actions:

* Designate a single integrating authority with the responsibility to 
coordinate and integrate worldwide installation preparedness 
improvement efforts at the department, service and installation levels.

* Assign that organization with responsibility for preparing the 2004, 
2005, and 2006 updates to the plan, which are required by section 1402 
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.

* Clarify the installation preparedness responsibilities of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.

* Require the next update to the plan to fully incorporate results-
oriented management principles in the legislatively required elements. 
Specifically, the plan should contain:

* Long-term goals that explain what results are expected, are 
results-oriented, and are expressed in a way that allows them to be 
assessed in terms of achievement.

* Strategies that articulate the processes necessary to achieve the 
organization's goals and describe how managers are to be held 
accountable for achieving such goals.

* Annual performance goals that include a schedule with milestones to 
measure progress toward the long-term goals, and are tangible and 
measurable.

* A description of external impediments to achieving the goals and the 
actions needed to mitigate these impediments;

* Identification of resources, including funding, personnel, and 
equipment, needed to accomplish the expected level of performance.

* Performance criteria or indicators used to measure progress in 
achieving goals and objectives; these criteria should be objective and 
outcome-oriented with specific target levels to meet performance goals.

* Evaluation plans that are objective and formal assessments of the 
results, impact, or effects of installation preparedness improvement 
efforts.

* Require the next update to the plan to clearly describe the military 
response capabilities that will be developed at the national, regional, 
and local levels; and how those capabilities will be developed in 
conjunction with civilian capabilities.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

In comments on a draft of this report provided by the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, the department agreed with 
our recommendations recognizing the need for centralized management and 
operational oversight of a comprehensive preparedness program. The 
Assistant Secretary's comments also stated that oversight and policy 
development for worldwide installation preparedness will be assigned to 
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, 
and the charter directive for that organization will promulgate 
responsibility and required authority for worldwide installation 
preparedness. The Assistant Secretary will also be responsible for 
preparing the 2004, 2005, and 2006 updates to the comprehensive plan 
required by section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2003. DOD agreed that these future updates would fully 
incorporate results-oriented management principles in the 
legislatively required elements, clearly describe the military response 
capabilities that will be developed at the national, regional, and 
local levels, and address how those capabilities will be developed in 
conjunction with civilian capabilities. In regard to the military 
response capabilities, DOD stated it was of paramount importance that 
the department work with other local, state, and federal entities to 
ensure redundant capabilities are avoided.

We believe the actions DOD has outlined, when implemented, will be 
responsive to our recommendations, and they represent positive steps 
toward integrating installation preparedness improvement efforts and 
establishing a more results-oriented management framework to guide 
these efforts. The future updates to the comprehensive plan will also 
serve as a mechanism to provide Congress, DOD managers, and other 
organizations with an annual assessment of the progress achieved in 
improving installation preparedness.

DOD's comments are included in their entirety in appendix III.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the 
Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force; the Commandant 
of the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of the Management and 
Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In 
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site 
at http://www.gao.gov. Should you or your staff have any questions 
regarding this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4402, or my 
Assistant Director, Robert L. Repasky, at (202) 512-9868. Key 
contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Signed by: 

Janet St. Laurent, Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management:

[End of section]

Appendix I: Section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2003:

SEC. 1402. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR IMPROVING THE PREPAREDNESS OF 
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS FOR TERRORIST INCIDENTS:

(a) COMPREHENSIVE PLAN--The Secretary of Defense shall develop a 
comprehensive plan for improving the preparedness of military 
installations for preventing and responding to terrorist attacks, 
including attacks involving the use or threat of use of weapons of mass 
destruction.

(b) PREPAREDNESS STRATEGY--The plan under subsection (a) shall include 
a preparedness strategy that includes each of the following:

(1) Identification of long-term goals and objectives for improving the 
preparedness of military installations for preventing and responding to 
terrorist attacks.

(2) Identification of budget and other resource requirements necessary 
to achieve those goals and objectives.

(3) Identification of factors beyond the control of the Secretary that 
could impede the achievement of these goals and objectives.

(4) A discussion of the extent to which local, regional, or national 
military response capabilities are to be developed, integrated, and 
used.

(5) A discussion of how the Secretary will coordinate the capabilities 
referred to in paragraph (4) with local, regional, or national civilian 
and other military capabilities.

(c) PERFORMANCE PLAN.--The plan under subsection (a) shall include a 
performance plan that includes each of the following:

(1) A reasonable schedule, with milestones, for achieving the goals and 
objectives of the strategy under subsection (b).

(2) Performance criteria for measuring progress in achieving those 
goals and objectives.

(3) A description of the process, together with a discussion of the 
resources, necessary to achieve those goals and objectives:

(4) A description of the process for evaluating results in achieving 
those goals and objectives.

(d) SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS.--The Secretary shall submit the 
comprehensive plan developed under subsection (a) to the Committee on 
Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the 
House of Representatives not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act.

(e) COMPTROLLER GENERAL REVIEW AND REPORT.--Not later than 60 days 
after the date on which the Secretary submits the comprehensive plan 
under subsection (a), the Comptroller General shall review the plan and 
submit to the committees referred to in subsection (d) the Comptroller 
General's assessment of the plan.

(f) ANNUAL REPORT.--(1) In each of 2004, 2005, and 2006, the Secretary 
of Defense shall include a report on the comprehensive plan developed 
under subsection (a) with the materials that the Secretary submits to 
Congress in support of the budget submitted by the President that year 
pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code.

(2) Each such report shall include-

(A) a discussion of any revision that the Secretary has made in the 
comprehensive plan developed under subsection (a) since the last report 
under this subsection or, in the case of the first such report, since 
the plan was submitted under subsection (d); and:

(B) an assessment of the progress made in achieving the goals and 
objectives of the strategy set forth in the plan.

(3) If the Secretary includes in the report for 2004 or 2005 under this 
subsection a declaration that the goals and objectives of the 
preparedness strategy set forth in the comprehensive plan have been 
achieved, no further report is required under this subsection.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:

To determine if the Department of Defense's (DOD) September 2003 report 
to Congress represents a comprehensive plan that can guide installation 
preparedness efforts, we based our analysis on our past work that 
addressed the need for DOD to develop comprehensive strategies and 
implementation plans with results-oriented elements that focused on 
program outcomes or results, rather than program activities and 
processes. We discussed the concerns of Congress with committee staffs 
who were involved in developing section 1402 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for fiscal year 2003 to better understand the 
requirements of the Act. We also discussed the report content with 
department officials who prepared it to ensure we had an agreed upon 
interpretation of the elements presented in the report. We then 
compared the nine elements discussed in the report with those 
specifically required by the legislation. We also compared the report's 
seven management-related elements with those developed from sound 
management principles as embodied in the Government Results and 
Performance Act (GPRA) of 1993 and further refined in GPRA user guides 
and prior GAO reports. To assess the two discussion elements related to 
military response capabilities required by the legislation, we reviewed 
information presented in the report to determine if it presented a 
clear discussion of the national, regional, local response 
capabilities, and how they would be developed in conjunction with 
civilian capabilities. We also discussed the content of the report in 
these two areas with officials at the department, Service, and 
installation levels to obtain their views on the report content and the 
usefulness of that information.

To identify obstacles that may hinder the department's ability to 
develop and implement an integrated and comprehensive installation 
preparedness approach, we interviewed officials from the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the military 
services who are responsible for policies, programs, and key 
initiatives related to various aspects of installation preparedness 
against chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield 
explosive incidents. We also gathered and reviewed relevant policy 
guidance, instructions, and implementation documents for current 
improvement initiatives, including the Joint Services Installation 
Pilot Project and project Guardian, and discussed these initiatives 
with department and service headquarters and installation officials.

We discussed and observed installation preparedness capabilities at 
13 military installations. We selected east and west coast military 
installations, representing each of the military services, including 
locations in close proximity to large civilian communities, some that 
were more isolated, and some that were participating in the Joint 
Services Installation Pilot Project. Specific discussions with military 
installation officials included installation preparedness criteria, 
roles and responsibilities, major efforts to improve installation 
preparedness as well as the financial impact to the installations with 
regard to current improvement initiatives, efforts to ensure effective 
coordination among and between military and civilian organizations, 
particularly first responders and those involved in consequence 
management, and what they believe should be included in the 
comprehensive plan to make it a useful management tool. In addition, we 
observed installation preparedness exercises in the Norfolk and San 
Diego areas. Although the information obtained at these locations 
cannot be generalized to describe DOD's worldwide installation 
preparedness improvement efforts, it provided us with insights on 
preparedness challenges at the installation level. Table 3 lists the 
military organizations and installations we visited or contacted to 
obtain our data.

Table 3: Headquarters Organizations and Military Installations Visited 
or Contacted for this Assignment:

Department headquarters organizations, Washington metropolitan area: 

* Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.

* Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict.

* Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, Biological, and 
Defense Programs.

* Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

* National Guard Bureau, Homeland Defense.

Joint Chiefs of Staff headquarters organizations, Washington 
metropolitan area: 

* Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of Operations J-3.

* Joint Program Executive Office, Chemical Biological Program.

* Joint Requirements Office.

Military service headquarters organizations, Washington metropolitan 
area: 

* Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans (G-3) 
and Army Installation Management Agency.

* Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics (N4)) and Chief of Navy 
Installations.

* Commandant of the Marine Corps.

* Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations & Logistics.

Military Installations: 

* Army--Fort Lewis, Wash.

* Marine Corps--Camp Lejeune, N.C.

* Army--Fort Eustis, Newport News, Va.

* Navy Region Mid-Atlantic.

* Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Va.

* Naval Station Norfolk, Va.

* Oceana Master Jet Base, Va.

* Navy Region Northwest, Wash.

* Sub Base Bangor, Wash.

* Naval Station Everett, Everett, Wash.

* Navy Region Southwest, San Diego, Calif.

* Navy Base Point Loma, San Diego, Calif.

* Navy Station San Diego, Calif.

* Navy Base, Coronado, Calif.

* Langley Air Force Base, Va.

* McChord Air Force Base, Wash.

Source: GAO analysis.

[End of table]

To estimate fiscal year 2004 unfunded requirements for installation 
preparedness at three installations, we requested and obtained budget 
estimates from installation officials. We also obtained fiscal year 
2005 unfunded requirements as prioritized by the services and analyzed 
them to determine that installation preparedness activities were 
included in their estimates. Based on our discussions with department 
officials and the budget documentation provided, we determined that the 
data we used were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 
report.

We conducted our review from April 2003 through May 2004 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

[End of section]

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: 
2600 DEFENSE PENTAGON: 
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2600:

HOMELAND DEFENSE:

27 JUL 2004:


Ms. Janet St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:

Dear Ms. St. Laurent:

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report, 
"Combating Terrorism: DoD Efforts to Improve Installation Preparedness 
Can Be Enhanced with Clarified Responsibilities and Comprehensive 
Planning." We concur with the recommendations made by the GAO 
recognizing the need for centralized management and operational 
oversight of a comprehensive preparedness program.

The attacks of September 11, 2001 reinforced the need to review and 
strengthen installation preparedness response capabilities worldwide. 
The Office of the Secretary of Defense had reviewed the conclusions of 
related GAO reports, and had already begun, prior to this report, 
significant actions to establish centralized policy control and 
operational oversight of DoD's preparedness programs.

In line with the recommendations of your report, oversight and policy 
development for worldwide installation preparedness will be assigned to 
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. 
Tactical control of Antiterrorism/Force Protection has already been 
assigned to US Northern Command. We believe these steps will 
significantly address the recommendations in your report.

Let me take this opportunity to thank you and your staff for producing 
a reasoned and accurate report.

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Paul McHale:

GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED JUNE 18, 2004 GAO CODE 350465/GAO-04-855:

"COMBATING TERRORISM: DoD Efforts to Improve Installation Preparedness 
Can Be Enhanced with Clarified Responsibilities and Comprehensive 
Planning":

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATION:

RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
designate a single integrating authority with the responsibility to 
coordinate and integrate worldwide installation preparedness 
improvement efforts at the Department, service and installation levels. 
The Secretary of Defense should assign that organization with 
responsibility for preparing the 2004, 2005, and 2006 updates to the 
plan, which are required by Section 1402 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for fiscal year 2003. (p. 26/GAO Draft Report):

DOD RESPONSE: The Department concurs and will designate a single 
integrating authority to coordinate worldwide installation 
preparedness at the Assistant Secretary level. The charter directive 
for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense will 
promulgate responsibility and required authority for worldwide 
installation preparedness. Accordingly, the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense will be responsible for 
updating the comprehensive plan for improving the preparedness of 
military installations for terrorist incidents as required by Section 
1402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2003.

RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
clarify the installation preparedness responsibilities of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. (p. 27/GAO Draft Report):

DOD RESPONSE: The Department concurs, and as noted above, will 
designate the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense as 
the single integrating authority for coordination of worldwide 
installation preparedness.

RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
require the next update to the plan to fully incorporate results-
oriented management principles in the legislatively required elements. 
Specifically, the plan should include contain:

* Long-term goals that explain what results are expected, are results-
oriented, and are expressed in a way that allows them to be assessed in 
terms of achievement; 

* Strategies that articulate the processes necessary to achieve the 
organization's goals and describe how managers are to be held 
accountable for achieving such goals;

* Annual performance goals that include a schedule with milestones to 
measure progress toward the long-term goals, and are tangible and 
measurable;

* A description of external impediments to achieving the goals and the 
actions needed to mitigate these impediments;

* Identification of resources, including funding, personnel, and 
equipment, needed to accomplish the expected level of performance;

* Performance criteria or indicators used to measure progress in 
achieving goals and objectives, these criteria should be objective and 
outcome-oriented with specific target levels to meet performance goals; 
and:

* Evaluation plans that are objective and formal assessments of the 
results, impact, or effects of installation preparedness improvement 
efforts. (p. 27/GAO Draft Report):

DOD RESPONSE: The Department concurs and will ensure updates to the 
comprehensive plan for improving the preparedness of military 
installations for terrorist incidents addresses the legislatively 
required elements outlined in the recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
require the next update to the plan to clearly describe the military 
response capabilities that will be developed at the national, regional, 
and local levels; and how those capabilities will be developed in 
conjunction with civilian capabilities. (p. 27/GAO Draft Report):

DOD RESPONSE: The Department concurs and will ensure updates to the 
comprehensive plan for improving the preparedness of military 
installations for terrorist incidents addresses the legislatively 
required elements outlined in the recommendation. It is of paramount 
importance that DoD work with other local, state, and federal entities 
to ensure redundant capabilities are avoided. The designation of a 
single integrating authority for installation preparedness will better 
enable DoD to plan for the coordination of capabilities with local, 
state, and federal partners. 

[End of section]

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contact:

Robert L. Repasky (202) 512-9868:

Acknowledgments:

In addition to those named above, Hugh Brady, Nancy Benco, Pat Seaton, 
Elisabeth Ryan, and Corinna Wengryn made key contributions to this 
report.

[End of section]

Related GAO Products:

Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid Foundation 
for Achieving Greater Results. GAO-04-38. Washington, D.C.: March 10, 
2004.

Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Guide Services' Antiterrorism 
Efforts at Installations. GAO-03-14. Washington, D.C.: November 1, 
2002.

Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force 
Protection for DOD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports. GAO-02-
955TNI. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to 
Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-548T. Washington, D.C.: 
March 25, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to 
Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-473T. Washington, D.C.: 
March 1, 2002.

Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short-
and Long-Term National Needs. GAO-02-160T. Washington, D.C.: November 
7, 2001.

Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness 
Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in Chemical 
and Biological Preparedness. GAO-01-162T. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 
2001.

Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach. GAO-02-
150T. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001.

Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation's Issues. GAO-
01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations. 
GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's 
Antiterrorism Program Implementation and Management. GAO-01-909. 
Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources. GAO/
T-NSIAD-00-218. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2000.

Combating Terrorism: Action Taken but Considerable Risks Remain for 
Forces Overseas. GAO/NSIAD-00-181. Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2000.

Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should 
Follow Results Act Framework. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-180. Washington, D.C.: 
May 24, 2000.

Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on Actions Taken 
to Protect Military Forces. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-49. Washington, D.C.: 
October 20, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments 
of Chemical and Biological Attacks. GAO/NSIAD-99-163. Washington, D.C.: 
September 7, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness 
Program Focus and Efficiency. GAO/NSIAD-99-3. Washington, D.C.: 
November 12, 1998.

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help 
Prioritize and Target Program Investments. GAO/NSIAD-98-74.
Washington, D.C.: April 9, 1998.

Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces 
Overseas. GAO/NSIAD-97-207. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 1997.

FOOTNOTES

[1] DOD defines weapons of mass destruction as weapons that are capable 
of a high order of destruction and are used to destroy large numbers of 
people. WMD can consist of chemical, biological, radiological, and 
nuclear weapons and high-yield explosives (CBRNE). 

[2] S. Rep. No. 107-62, at 352 (2001).

[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Preparedness 
of Military Installations for Incidents Involving Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, GAO-02-644R (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2002).

[4] Pub. L. 107-314, §1402 (2002).

[5] Congress enacted the Government Performance and Results Act to 
provide for, among other things, the establishment of strategic 
planning and performance measurement in the federal government. Pub. L. 
103-62 (2003). 

[6] DOD Directive 2000.12: DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program, August 18, 
2003. 

[7] DOD Instruction 2000.16: DOD Antiterrorism Standards, June 14, 
2001.

[8] DOD Handbook O-2000.12-H: DOD Antiterrorism Handbook, February 9, 
2004. 

[9] DOD Instruction 2000.16, DOD Antiterrorism Standards § E3.1.1.11 
(June 14, 2001). 

[10] Deputy Secretary of Defense, "Preparedness of U.S. Military 
Installations and Facilities Worldwide Against Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Attack," 
Memorandum, Sept. 5, 2002.

[11] Referred to in the report as the "Chemical, Biological 
Installation/Force Protection Program."

[12] Consequence management is defined in DOD Directive 2000.12 as 
those measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore 
essential government services, and provide emergency relief to 
governments, business, and individuals affected by the consequences of 
a CBRNE situation.

[13] Congress mandated the Department of State and Department of 
Justice to conduct a series of challenging, role-playing exercises 
involving the senior federal, state, and local officials who would 
direct crisis management and consequence management response to an 
actual WMD attack. The result was Top Officials (TOPOFF), a national-
level domestic and international exercise series designed to produce a 
more effective, coordinated, global response to WMD terrorism.

[14] Pub. L. 107-314, § 902 (2002).

[15] Unified command plans provide guidance to combatant commanders and 
establish their missions, responsibilities, force structure, 
geographic area of responsibility, and other attributes.

[16] In a message from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated May 
7, 2004, with subject: Executive Order for standup of U.S. Northern 
Command's antiterrorism and force protection responsibilities for the 
continental United States.

[17] DOD Directive 2000.12: DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program, August 18, 
2003.

[18] DOD Instruction 2000.16, "DOD Antiterrorism Standards," June 14, 
2001.

[19] DOD Handbook 0-2000.12-H: DOD Antiterrorism Handbook, February 9, 
2004.

[20] DOD O-20012-P Department of Defense Antiterrorism Strategic Plan, 
June 15, 2004.

[21] DOD Instruction 2000.18, "DOD Installation Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Emergency Response 
Guidelines," December 4, 2002.

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