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BY THE U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE


## Report To The Secretary Of State

# Improvements Needed In Providing Security At Overseas Posts

The State Department started the Security Enhancement Program in 1980 as a response to mob violence against U.S. Embassies in Iran, Pakistan, Libya, and El Salvador. Physical improvements made at overseas posts under this program are aimed at protecting personnel and classified material for a few hours until the host government can bring the situation under control.

State Department officials overestimated the number of posts they could improve each year. Inadequate planning, coordination, and property management caused delays in the implementation of security improvements. Strengthened program management can reduce the time it takes to make such improvements.

In this report, GAO reviews State Department implementation of the program and makes recommendations to the Secretary of State to overcome management problems.



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UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

INTERNATIONAL DIVISION

B-207658

The Honorable George P. Shultz  
The Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This report discusses protection provided to U.S. Missions overseas. It assesses the new Security Enhancement Program, which was designed to provide security from mob violence.

Recommendations are made to you on pages 21 and 33 to further improve the operations of the program to achieve greater effectiveness and economy. As you know, section 236 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 requires the head of a Federal agency to submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Government Operations not later than 60 days after the date of the report and to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report.

Copies of this report are being sent to executive agencies having responsibility for matters discussed in the report; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and interested congressional committees.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Frank C. Conahan".

Frank C. Conahan  
Director



D I G E S T

Danger to the lives of U.S. citizens living overseas and destruction of U.S. property have been continuously increasing. Prior to 1979, attacks by small groups of highly trained terrorists were the main threat to Americans. In 1979 attacks on U.S. embassies caused the U.S. Government to refocus its security priorities. As a result of this violence, the State Department, in 1980, initiated the Security Enhancement Program to improve the physical protection of personnel and to protect classified information at a number of U.S. embassies and other overseas posts in more vulnerable areas. (See pp. 1, 9, and 10.)

This report addresses the Security Enhancement Program and highlights its management and administrative functions. It also identifies numerous problems the Department has had in implementing the program.

Program objectives include making structural improvements to overseas posts, purchasing additional protective equipment and supplies, and providing electronic storage and retrieval of classified materials. Improvements include construction of safehavens and improved perimeter defenses; purchase of protective equipment, such as weapons and gas masks; and purchase of new communications equipment with electronic storage and retrieval capability for high-threat posts. (See p. 10.)

The Special Programs and Liaison Staff was created under the Department's Bureau of Administration to manage the Security Enhancement Program. The Offices of Security and Communications and the Foreign Buildings Office also participate in the implementation of the program. (See p. 10.)

GAO found:

Inadequate planning, coordination and property management caused delays in implementing security improvements at overseas posts. (See p. 12.)

The State Department overestimated its ability to complete projects. The Department first told the Congress that it would upgrade 25 posts a year, for 5 years, at an estimated cost of \$192 million, but 1-1/2 years later, after starting construction on several posts, not one had been completed. According to Department officials, after 2 years, four posts have been completed. The Department has since decided to fully upgrade 70 posts, which will cost an estimated \$175 million. An additional \$125 million will be needed to provide at least some improvements to an additional 55 posts. GAO concluded that it will take more than 5 years to complete even the first 70 posts. (See pp. 12 through 16.)

Accountability for materials purchased and shipped to posts is a major problem. The Special Programs and Liaison Staff had no inventory system for recording purchases and shipments and the Department had no single, centralized way of notifying posts of what enhancement items they were to receive or when the items were to arrive. As a result, loss of control over program material has occurred.

State Department offices were left to maintain inventories of items shipped and provide the posts with this information, which was not always done satisfactorily. Information on material being shipped to the posts is essential. GAO was told by officials at various posts that there have been extensive delays in getting response to inquiries concerning their enhancement projects.

Most of the seven posts visited by GAO have had problems accounting for equipment received in the past. Many posts included in the program may have additional problems, considering the volume of material to be sent to each post. (See pp. 16 through 20.)

Two of the seven posts GAO visited, and 15 of the 38 scheduled for security enhancement projects through fiscal year 1982, do not have Regional Security Officers. At each of these posts, the Administrative Officer, who is also the Post Security Officer, is generally quite occupied with general administrative matters. GAO feels that the Post Security Officer and responsible Regional Security Officer should devote more of their attention to posts' security programs (overseeing the guard forces, assessing the terrorist threat, etc.), and to organizing and overseeing the security enhancement project until structural improvements have been completed. (See p. 24.)

Differing opinions between the Department of State and other agencies have slowed implementation of the Security Enhancement Program. At posts GAO visited, the Agency for International Development, the United States Information Agency, and the Drug Enforcement Administration disagreed with the Department over planned security improvements and ultimate authority over security for the agencies' offices located outside the U.S. Embassy or Consulate. GAO believes these differences need to be resolved by all the involved agencies so that the Security Enhancement Program can be effectively implemented. (See pp. 26 through 29.)

U.S. officials overseas are glad to receive improved security. For the most part, they agree with specific improvements being made at their posts. What people at posts do not like are the delays in actually installing security improvements. The more time that passes, once the post's security planning process is initiated (beginning with survey visits), the more distressed people get. The Special Programs and Liaison Staff suspended surveys for over 6 months in 1981 because it was getting far ahead of implementation and post personnel were getting upset by the lack of action. (See p. 12.)

GAO believes that by strengthening the management of the program, the Department could decrease the time needed to make physical improvements.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

To assist the Department in enhancing the implementation of this program, and resolving associated problems, GAO recommends that the Secretary of State require that the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration:

- take action to ensure improvements are made in the planning and coordination of the Security Enhancement Program (see p. 21);
- develop a single inventory and tracking system which would allow program managers to identify all material going to each post and to use this capability to notify the posts of the specific nature and quantity of material sent and any changes in shipments (see p. 21);
- direct efforts to resolve the differences between the State Department and other agencies concerning the needs of the Security Enhancement Program at overseas posts and the ultimate authority over security for the agencies' offices located outside the U.S. Embassy or Consulate. (See p. 34.)

GAO also recommends that the Secretary of State require the Chief of Mission or his designee:

- at each post assign one official to be responsible for receiving, recording, and storing all material received for the security enhancement project, as well as inventoring all items received and informing Washington of any discrepancies (see p. 21) and
- at high threat posts have the Post Security Officer and responsible Regional Security Officer devote more of their attention to post security and the Security Enhancement Program. (See p. 34.)

## AGENCY COMMENTS

The Departments of State and Justice, the Agency for International Development, and the United States Information Agency have provided comments on this report which have been incorporated where appropriate and are included in part as appendices. (See pp. 43 through 50.)



The Department of State commented that while it found many of the comments and recommendations helpful, it took issue with some of them. It commented that it does not accept as valid the general categorization of the Security Enhancement Program as encountering delays.

GAO believes delays have occurred in the program and the evidence gathered during its review and presented in this report support this position. Delays in program implementation have been caused by inadequate planning, coordination and problems with delivering material to posts and the in-country accounting thereof. (See p. 13.)

In the draft of this report, GAO proposed that the Secretary of State give one office within the State Department the final authority for administering the Security Enhancement Program. The Department took the view that while there was an initial adjustment phase of establishing the program and the roles and interrelationship of each participating office, the entire Security Enhancement Program is now operating much more smoothly and productively than previously. The Department stated that the Special Programs and Liaison Staff play the major role in administering the program through the management and coordination of both the entire program and of individual projects. The Department added that expertise in specific technical areas remain vested in the appropriate existing technical office, especially the Offices of Security, Communications and Foreign Buildings, all of which are within the Bureau of Administration.

While State Department feels the appropriate organization exists to manage the program, GAO believes the evidence gathered during this review shows that the Department continues to have problems in carrying out the Security Enhancement Program. For this reason, GAO changed its proposed recommendation from giving one office within the Department final authority for administering the program to the initial recommendation in this report--charging the Assistant Secretary for Administration with seeking improvements in the planning and coordination of the program. (See p. 22.)

State commented that steps are being taken to develop an inventory control system and to improve accountability and control of material, shipped overseas. (See p. 22.)

# C o n t e n t s

		<u>Page</u>
DIGEST		i
CHAPTER		
1	INTRODUCTION	1
	U.S. Government organizes to combat terrorism	2
	The State Department's security structure includes numerous offices	3
	Both Washington offices and the Missions are involved in administering post security	4
	Objectives, scope, and methodology	5
2	EVOLUTION OF THE SECURITY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM	7
	Early security programs provided protection against small-scale attacks	7
	Mob violence against U.S. embassies introduced a new threat to Americans	7
	Host country support essential in protecting U.S. missions from mob attacks	8
	Security Enhancement Program developed to deal with the threat	9
	Special Programs and Liaison Staff	10
	Security enhancement surveys	11
3	DEFICIENCIES IN PROGRAM PLANNING, COORDINATION, AND PROPERTY MANAGEMENT	12
	Ability to complete projects overestimated by State	12
	Agency comments	13
	Poor planning and coordination	13
	Agency comments	16
	A single, comprehensive inventory system could help posts better control security enhancement material	16
	Agency comments	19
	Post internal inventory and control problems add to difficulty in accounting for security enhancement material	19

## CHAPTER

Page

	Payment of some recurring costs will reduce SEP funds available for new projects	20
	Conclusions	21
	Recommendations	21
	Agency comments and our evaluation	22
4	OTHER SECURITY ENHANCEMENT-RELATED PROBLEMS AND PROGRAMS AT SELECTED POSTS	24
	More attention needed on security at some higher threat posts	24
	Fire-fighting capability is not addressed at some posts	24
	Agency comments	25
	Post maintenance problems reduce effectiveness of security improvements	25
	Differences exist over the security needs of agencies located outside the embassy	26
	United States Information Agency	27
	USIA authority over security matters	27
	Agency for International Development	28
	Drug Enforcement Administration	29
	Training for AID and USIA post security officers	29
	Residential security protection varies according to post	30
	Contingency plans are generally complete but additional testing is needed	31
	Security services are also provided to non-Government Americans	32
	Coordination with other embassies on security matters based on perceived need	33
	Conclusions	34
	Recommendations	34
	Agency comments and our evaluation	34

## APPENDIX

I	List of 29 Government organizations under the Working Group on Terrorism	36
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APPENDIXPage

II	Detailed description of the duties and responsibilities of key post personnel involved with security	37
III	International terrorist incidents 1968-80 by category of attack	40
IV	Planned improvements in the storage, retrieval, and destruction of classified information	41
V	Specific systems and equipment funded under the Security Enhancement Program	42
VI	Letter dated July 28, 1982, from the Comptroller, Department of State	43
VII	Letter dated July 28, 1982, from the Associate Director for Management, United States Information Agency (formerly the International Communication Agency)	45
VIII	Letter dated July 30, 1982, from the Assistant Attorney General for Administration, Department of Justice	48
IX	Letter dated August 3, 1982, from the Inspector General, Agency for International Development	50

ABBREVIATIONS

AID	Agency for International Development
FBO	Office of Foreign Buildings
OC	Office of Communications
RSO	Regional Security Officer
SEP	Security Enhancement Program
SPL	Special Programs and Liaison Staff
SY	Office of Security
USIA	United States Information Agency



## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

From 1968 through 1980 there were over 6,700 international terrorist incidents (see app. III). Almost 3,700 people were killed and about 7,500 wounded during that period. Terrorist violence has been escalating with no reversal in sight.

Attacks on diplomats and diplomatic facilities have been increasing steadily and, according to a Department of State official, this trend has affected the conduct of foreign affairs. Between 1968 and 1980, there have been about 2,500 terrorist acts committed against foreign diplomats worldwide and over 70 forced entries into diplomatic missions. More than half have occurred since the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was seized in 1979. This successful act has created a model for other terrorists.

Americans remain primary targets of international terrorists. Nearly two out of every five incidents have involved U.S. citizens or property including non-diplomatic personnel; these terrorist acts have increased considerably since 1968.

Within the period of a few months in late 1979 and early 1980, an unprecedented series of violent mob and hostage-taking attacks took place against U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel throughout the world. These included

- the overrunning of the Embassy in Tehran and the capture and detention of the American staff;
- the assault against the Embassy in Islamabad, which led to the death of two Americans and the gutting of the Chancery compound buildings;
- the mob attack on the Embassy in Tripoli, which seriously damaged this building and caused the evacuation of the staff from the country;
- a series of small arms and rocket attacks against the Embassy in San Salvador; and
- the kidnapping and detention of Ambassador Diego Asencio in Bogota.

Terrorist activities have affected U.S. Government personnel serving overseas and protection has become a major problem.

The President has taken a strong stance on international terrorism. He stated that U.S. policy will be one of swift and effective retribution for terrorist acts and restated the U.S. policy of not granting concessions to terrorists. The administration's policy is not to pay ransom to terrorists, release prisoners in exchange for hostages, or bargain in any other way for the release of hostages taken by terrorists.

#### U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZES TO COMBAT TERRORISM

In the early 1970s, the United States began establishing and organizing Government structures for combatting terrorism. In 1972, a Cabinet Committee on Terrorism was established under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State. The State Department created a Special Assistant to the Secretary who was charged with policy formulation and chaired the Interagency Working Group. The Special Assistant worked with the regional bureaus and the Deputy Under Secretary for Management in setting up task forces to deal with overseas incidents for which the State Department was the lead agency. Coordination of policy matters centered around an interagency working group directed by the Special Assistant.

In 1977, the National Security Council's Special Coordinating Committee was established to handle crisis management. A smaller working group for coordinating policy--the Executive Committee--was formed, reporting to the Special Coordinating Committee. The Executive Committee consisted of representatives from the Departments of State (Chairman), Defense, Justice, Treasury, Transportation, Energy; the Central Intelligence Agency; and the National Security Council. There was also a larger Working Group consisting of 29 Governmental agencies, which met less frequently to exchange information and coordinate certain activities. (See app. I.)

The Reagan administration has focused policy coordination on the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism, which replaced the Executive Committee on Terrorism. The Interdepartmental Group, chaired by the Department of State, consists of representatives from the Departments of Justice, Defense, Energy, Treasury, Transportation; the Central Intelligence Agency; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the National Security Council; and the Office of the Vice President. This group meets regularly to discuss Government-wide policy formulation and operation coordination, involving such matters as overseas security, contingency planning and exercises, incident management, training, and international initiatives.

Coordination of intelligence information centers around a newly formed Intelligence Committee. The Committee is chaired by the Central Intelligence Agency and includes representatives from the Departments of Defense and State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, and the National Security Agency. This group is expected to meet regularly to coordinate intelligence information among agencies.



The Special Coordinating Committee has been replaced with a Special Situation Group. The Vice President serves as chairman of the Group which is responsible for crisis management. Other representatives include the Secretaries of State and Defense, Counselor to the President, Director of Central Intelligence, Chief and Deputy Chief of Staffs to the President, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others as required.

Various agencies--principally, the Departments of State, Defense, Transportation, and Energy, and the Central Intelligence Agency--are also assigned major responsibilities in combatting international terrorism outside the United States.

The Department of State is the lead agency for responding to terrorist incidents overseas. Its responsibilities include alerting top officials of crisis situations and playing a managerial role during the crisis. It is also responsible for providing security to all U.S. foreign posts, along with alerting Americans overseas of possible crises.

The Department of Defense's major responsibility includes protecting Defense personnel and property from terrorist attacks. It is also responsible for safeguarding nuclear weapons and radioactive materials and, with the Department of Energy, participates in the Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center which stores information on the locations of specialized Defense and Energy Teams needed during emergency nuclear incidents.

The Central Intelligence Agency is the lead agency for providing intelligence information.

The Department of Transportation is responsible for monitoring aviation security measures and conducting airport security surveys abroad. Both the President and the Secretary of Transportation have the authority to impose sanctions against countries involved in terrorist activities, which in most cases, involve countries providing sanctuary to hijackers.

The Department of Energy provides security for all of its energy activities and, with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, safeguards research and development programs.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S SECURITY STRUCTURE  
INCLUDES NUMEROUS OFFICES

Within the Department of State, the Office for Combatting Terrorism is responsible for providing core personnel for responding to overseas terrorist incidents, and formulating policy and guidelines. Its Director chairs both the Inter-departmental Group on Terrorism and the Working Group on Terrorism, under the supervision of the Under Secretary for Management.

The position of Coordinator for Security Policy and Programs was established. The Contingency Planning Group was reconstituted as the Group on Security Policy and Programs and Contingency Planning. Under the chairmanship of the Security Coordinator, this expanded group reviews the entire spectrum of the Department's security activities, including the Security Enhancement Program (SEP) and the relationship of security activities to available resources. All offices involved in the Department's security activities, including the regional bureaus, the Office of Security and the Special Programs and Liaison Staff (SPL), are represented in this group.

The Office of Security (SY), under the Bureau of Administration, is responsible for providing physical and technical security to personnel in overseas missions, and safeguarding national security information. The Office of Technical Services, within SY, is responsible for supplying specialized security equipment.

The Office of Communications (OC), also under the Bureau of Administration, develops and implements secure communication capabilities throughout the world. It shares responsibility for safeguarding classified transmissions, buys and maintains the necessary communications equipment, and provides communications services to State Department offices and those of some 50 Government agencies represented at about 250 posts overseas.

The Office of Foreign Buildings (FBO) is responsible for improving structural security overseas and contracting for overseas construction services.

The Office of Foreign Affairs Information Management, working with OC and SY, researches and develops improved ways to control classified information. It is currently urging some overseas missions to adopt microfiche systems that will reduce paper-holding and destruction time.

The Operations Center is the focal point for receiving reports on international terrorist incidents. Its responsibility includes (1) notifying offices within the State Department when a crisis occurs, (2) serving as an administrative function during the crisis, and (3) reviewing evacuation plans.

BOTH WASHINGTON OFFICES AND THE MISSIONS ARE INVOLVED IN ADMINISTERING POST SECURITY

At the post, security responsibilities start with the Chief of Mission, with the assistance of the Deputy Chief of Mission and the Administrative Officer. The Regional Security Officer (RSO) or Post Security Officer implements the security program. Posts without an RSO receive visits and advice from one stationed at another post. All posts receive some coverage from an RSO, who is a security professional.

The Post Security Officer has other duties; he often is the Administrative Officer. RSOs are assigned from within and report to the Office of Security. Their duties include (1) instituting security programs for the post, (2) maintaining official liaison with the host country security forces, and (3) administering various contingency plans. In addition, they supervise the Marine Security Guards and the local contract guards. At posts with no RSO, the Post Security Officer is responsible for the above listed duties. (See app. II for a description of the duties and responsibilities of the RSO and the post security officer.)

The Deputy Chief of Mission generally is the chairman of the Emergency and Evacuation Committee and the Security Watch Committee. Emergency and Evacuation Committees discuss contingency planning and Security Watch Committees discuss possible security problems. At the posts we visited, we found that these committees rarely meet.

#### OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

Our review was performed in accordance with our current "Standards for Audit of Governmental Organizations, Programs, Activities, and Functions." The objective of this review was to assess how the United States can more effectively protect U.S. Missions and personnel from international terrorist acts. Specifically, the review

- analyzed interagency coordination in Washington and at U.S. posts overseas and
- reviewed ongoing State Department security upgrading programs, focusing on management and administrative functions of the SEP.

In Washington, we spoke with officials from the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, and the Agency for International Development. We performed fieldwork at seven posts overseas. The names of posts we visited have been omitted because their use in connection with the Security Enhancement Program would require that this report contain a security classification, according to the Department of State.

The main focus of the review was an analysis of the Security Enhancement Program. This program began in August 1980, in response to mob violence directed against U.S. embassies in November and December 1979. We felt that a program of this magnitude should be reviewed at an early stage so that problem areas could be addressed. In addition, we reviewed post security overseas, residential security programs, and post contingency plans.

Early in the review we received a request from the House Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, to review interagency coordination among U.S. agencies and Department of State interdepartmental coordination efforts.

## CHAPTER 2

### EVOLUTION OF THE SECURITY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM

Since the 1970s the Department of State has developed security programs to provide greater protection for personnel, property, and information at foreign posts. Through the Counter-Terrorism Program and the Public Access Controls Program, security was provided for protection against intrusions by small bands of trained terrorists.

Following the mob attacks in Iran, Pakistan, and Libya, SEP was formed to provide protection against mob violence.

#### EARLY SECURITY PROGRAMS PROVIDED PROTECTION AGAINST SMALL-SCALE ATTACKS

The death of the U.S. Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission in Sudan, in March 1973, led to the redoubling of efforts to provide better protection for employees of U.S. missions. Efforts to upgrade security at overseas posts began in 1974 with the counter-terrorism program, which provided increased security to U.S. chanceries. From 1974 to 1979, the Department of State, with the support of the Congress, spent more than \$123 million to improve security of overseas posts.

Public access control measures were initiated under the umbrella of the counter-terrorism program to provide minimum security standards for all posts. Minimum standards basically include providing security for the nonsecure public areas of the posts by controlling public access to U.S. facilities, and providing protection for the receptionist area. A 1977 State Department publication was provided to all posts for guidance in meeting the minimum security standards.

By February 1982, just over 100 projects had been completed, with approximately 100 still scheduled for completion.

#### MOB VIOLENCE AGAINST U.S. EMBASSIES INTRODUCED A NEW THREAT TO AMERICANS

Mob violence, particularly when condoned by governments, added to U.S. concerns for security of overseas missions. According to State Department officials, the trend started by the events of 1979 will probably carry over well into the 1980s. They believe one of the most likely scenarios for future threat situations will include host government encouragement, support or sponsorship of violent or nonviolent demonstrations against U.S. interests. The State Department concluded,

as stated in a congressional submission prepared in early 1980, that:

" \* \* \* The main objectives of the security program for the 80's must be to better cope with the threat of mob violence and large scale attacks and to reduce the possibility of our embassies being destroyed; our personnel being taken hostage or killed; and to eliminate the compromising of national security information through rapid and efficient destruction measures. In the same manner that the security program of the 70's responded to the threat of international and transnational terrorism, the security program for the 80's can and should respond to the types of indigenous mob violence that we have seen in Tehran, Islamabad, Libya, and San Salvador. In order to do this we must:

- improve our threat analysis capability;
- expand our concepts of public access controls to embrace a more comprehensive three-tier defensive system (outer perimeter, main buildings, and safe-havens);
- develop and purchase non-lethal activated access denial systems to be employed against mob violence;
- improve internal defense planning based on worse case scenarios;
- make structural improvements to provide a more secure environment;
- purchase additional protective equipment and supplies;
- provide storage and retrieval of classified materials."

In August 1980, the State Department introduced the Security Enhancement Program, designed to provide improved physical security and to develop and improve electronic information handling and storage. Physical security improvements are, according to the State Department's SEP Plan, aimed at protecting building occupants for "a sufficient amount of time without creating a vaulted fortress," until the host government can bring the situation under control.

#### HOST COUNTRY SUPPORT ESSENTIAL IN PROTECTING U.S. MISSIONS FROM MOB ATTACKS

Although improved physical security will help better protect U.S. missions from mob violence, support provided by the host government is absolutely crucial. If the host government is

unable or unwilling to provide adequate support, the post will eventually be overrun. U.S. missions cannot be expected to be defended indefinitely by their occupants. The sanctity of the mission and the safety of its occupants are, therefore, dependent on the host government's ability and willingness to provide the protection expected under international convention.

The governments of all countries we visited provide protective services, including embassy and residential guard service, bodyguards, and even some military protection on a day-to-day, or as needed, basis. No bilateral agreements exist between the United States and the countries we visited; arrangements are all informal.

Post officials, in countries where the host governments are very small and their resources are limited, doubted these governments would be capable, even if willing, to provide the support required in an emergency. Embassy officials in one country seemed certain that needed governmental support could not be provided and added that, at best, security measures could only hope to buy them enough time to destroy classified material. Likewise, in another country, post officials emphasized that host government support would be needed for either an air or sea evacuation, but could not be depended on.

Even in countries where the host government now appears capable to provide emergency support, post officials expressed concern over whether the support would be forthcoming when needed. Officials felt that a change in the historically unstable host governments, or U.S. political relationships, could have a negative impact on host government support.

U.S. security measures are primarily meant to buy time until host government support arrives, which is of vital and critical importance. Without it, the safety of U.S. personnel and property cannot be ensured and the potential for another incident similar to those in Tehran and Islamabad would exist.

#### SECURITY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM DEVELOPED TO DEAL WITH THE THREAT

At Foreign Service posts, in all parts of the world, the program involved individual assessments of the overall threat environment and security posture, such as the:

- design, testing, procurement, shipment and installation of state-of-the-art security and communications-related systems and equipment;
- provision of security, communications, public access, life safety and related systems and equipment to dozens of posts depending on their specific threat environment and local conditions; and

--construction of safehavens; and, in many cases the planning and implementation of large-scale construction and structural modification projects. 1/

According to the State Department, during the first 18 months of SEP, a number of actions were undertaken, including

- establishing the organization and procedures for the program and for the SPL staff;
- commencing the development of new security- and communications-related equipment and systems;
- determining the threat situation confronting each overseas Foreign Service post and developing a means of categorizing such threats, which has been assisted by the provision of a computer in the Office of Security Command Center to assist in collating and analyzing threat information;
- completing security enhancement survey reports covering 30 posts; and
- shipping and installing a large number of security enhancement items and systems in stock or ordered, in the early stages of the program, to approximately 100 security enhancement posts throughout the world.

Department of State officials stated that although these do not represent fully-completed projects, provision of these systems and equipment has significantly improved the security posture at these posts.

#### SPECIAL PROGRAMS AND LIAISON STAFF

In October 1980, SPL, which included the original two officials, was created within the State Department's Bureau of Administration to administer and coordinate SEP. SPL controls all security enhancement funds and no money can be spent without its approval.

The then-Director of SPL told us he had originally requested 250 people, but only 35 were provided from other State Department offices. Of the 35 positions, only 9 were assigned directly to SPL and other existing positions were redesignated as SEP positions within their existing offices.

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1/See app. V for specific systems and equipment included in the Security Enhancement Program.



Office of Communications	10
Office of Security	12
Operations	4
Special Programs and Liaison Staff	<u>9</u>
	35

State Department officials in Washington stated that lack of personnel is the main problem affecting implementation of the program. SPL officials claimed they need more people to properly manage and coordinate the program. Other offices involved, primarily SY, OC, and FBO complained that they were given added responsibilities under SEP, but no additional people. As a result, personnel were diverted from other duties and assigned SEP responsibilities.

In commenting on this report, the Department said that over 50 full-time contractor employees have been hired to augment Department personnel working on the program, and more will be added as appropriate skills are identified and trained personnel become available. It added that this level of personnel resources is still not entirely adequate. Three additional positions are being added to the SPL staff, and other measures are being undertaken to assist in providing more personnel for the program.

#### SECURITY ENHANCEMENT SURVEYS

The major portion of upgrading overseas posts is the construction of safehavens and other structural changes. The first step in this effort is a survey conducted by officials from various State Department offices having some connection with security--SY, FBO, OC, and other offices. Representatives from each office prepare their section of the report and changes affecting more than one office are discussed among the offices. Because of the rush to begin the program, surveys of foreign service posts started before the program was funded and SPL was formed to manage it. Eleven posts in four countries had been surveyed before SPL was established. The first surveys were funded by FBO. Additional discussion on SEP surveys is in chapter 3.

CHAPTER 3

DEFICIENCIES IN PROGRAM PLANNING, COORDINATION,  
AND PROPERTY MANAGEMENT

Inadequate planning, coordination, and property management occurred in the development and implementation of the security enhancement program. As a consequence, security improvements have been delayed at overseas posts. The State Department overestimated the number of posts where it expected to have security upgrade accomplished. Planning was deficient because program managers did not use realistic time frames for completion of various phases of the security enhancement projects. Poor property management and coordination among various program offices and overseas posts resulted in loss of control over material purchased for the program. This points up the need for a comprehensive inventory control system for security enhancement program material.

ABILITY TO COMPLETE PROJECTS  
OVERESTIMATED BY STATE

Initially the Department of State informed the Congress it would upgrade "about 125 [approximately 50 percent of all posts] of the most seriously threatened Foreign Service posts" during the 5-year life of SEP, at a rate of 25 posts each year. One and one-half years after the program began, no posts had been completed, and major construction had begun on only a few.

In commenting on this report, the Department of State noted that through July 1982--2 years into the program--four posts have been completed and a fifth is almost complete. Major construction is currently underway at 9 posts, and is expected to commence at 4 more in 1982.

In the middle of 1981, the delay in implementing improvements forced curtailment of additional surveys for over 6 months. Personnel at posts already surveyed were becoming uneasy because of the time elapsed between surveys and implementation. The delays resulted from inadequate planning and coordination.

Initial and current funding plans for the Security Enhancement Program are shown below.

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>Initial</u>	<u>Current</u>
	------(millions)-----	
1980	\$ 6.1	\$ 6.1
1981	35.8	35.8
1982	30.0	25.0
1983	35.0	25.0
1984	40.0	40.0
1985	<u>45.0</u>	<u>45.0</u>
	191.9	176.9

Approximately \$67 million has been appropriated for this program through fiscal year 1982.

The Department of State originally estimated in 1979 that \$192 million would enable them to fully upgrade 125 posts. Officials now feel about \$175 million will allow them to fully upgrade 70 posts. They also anticipate requesting another \$125 million to provide at least partial upgrading (i.e., purchase of more traditional security and life safety equipment) for an additional 55 posts so that at least some protection will be given 125 posts. Total cost of the program would then be about \$300 million.

Correspondence to a House Subcommittee stated that all posts would be finished within 5 years. However, internal documents and State Department officials have stated it will take up to 5 additional years to complete the program at the current yearly funding rate. Furthermore, it is unlikely they will be able to completely finish 70 posts within the first 5 years or by the end of fiscal year 1985.

#### Agency comments

The State Department commented that it does not accept as valid the general categorization of the Security Enhancement Program as encountering delays. It noted that (1) since the early planning in 1979, several high-threat posts had closed requiring changes to program lists, (2) it had reevaluated worldwide security conditions in 1982 and the applicability of them to the Security Enhancement Program, and (3) construction had been completed at some posts since our earlier work. It also listed a number of actions undertaken during the first 18 months of the program. (See ch. 2.)

GAO believes delays have occurred in the program and the evidence gathered during its review and presented in this report support this position. Delays in the program implementation have been caused by inadequate planning, coordination, and problems with delivering material to posts and the in-country accounting thereof. Regarding the closing of several high threat posts and the consequent changes to the program we noted that most of these posts were closed prior to the start of the program in 1980.

#### POOR PLANNING AND COORDINATION

Initial planning for SEP began in late 1979 and was done primarily by SY and the Office of Communications. Due to pressure from the State Department officials to implement the program quickly, it was undertaken without proper planning or preparation. Objectives were identified in the broadest terms.

The SPL was created to provide program guidance, monitor program progress, and coordinate activities at other offices involved. It was not created to assume the duties and responsibilities of existing offices.

In planning for the program, the Department of State did not adequately take into account the length of time required for the surveys, architectural drawings, bidding, construction, and intra-departmental coordination. One official felt that personnel in charge of the program thought they could complete these steps in much shorter time frames than was reasonable to expect.

Surveying and preparing a report on each post containing specific recommendations takes up to 6 months--further implementing steps can not be taken until the report is finished.

Survey team members with technical expertise in construction, security, communications, and other areas, were detailed to SPL from various offices. Once the survey was completed, the team disbanded--members returned to their regular jobs. Teams now remain cohesive until the project is into the implementation phase.

According to an SPL official, SY, OC, and FBO headquarters offices have routinely overruled agreements made by their own survey team representatives. All proposed changes, whether made by a headquarters office or the post, require discussion and negotiation.

The Director of SPL said several changes were made once the surveys, which earlier had been suspended, were resumed in January 1982. First, each office had a small cadre just to do surveys, allowing them to gain experience. Second, the team now drafts a report which is discussed with post officials, and agreed to and signed by them, and transmitted telegraphically to Washington while the team is still at the post. It does not contain the detail of past reports. In addition, a second report is prepared by the survey team immediately after their return to Washington. This report contains greater detail and, according to State, it takes 3 months or less to prepare.

The Director stated that too many resources were put into past reports. Not only did this cause delays, but as the upgrading project began, and as changes were needed, the detailed reports became obsolete. The new reports will provide the architect and others involved with a framework for designing the project but will not lock them into plans that may require extensive change once building design and other factors are better known. In the future, the Director expects the architect to have a proposal ready 1 month after the team's return. Once the proposal is accepted, he can begin detailed drawings. In May 1982, he said these changes shortened the time needed to do the three posts surveyed to that point.

Changes in post personnel can add to implementation delays. New personnel may want to change plans based on their assessment of the survey team's recommendations and the threat to the post.

In early 1980, one post was surveyed and post officials concurred with the team's proposals. However, according to personnel there in November 1981, three key officials were known to be leaving soon after the 1980 survey. Also, officials there, when the survey was done, did not have the survey report with specific recommendations or architectural plans to consult.

The RSO there in November 1981 stated that it was obvious to him there were major flaws in the survey team's plan. He said recommendations were made based on theory and did not consider the practicalities of that post. Key officials have prepared alternate proposals they feel will better protect the post. They felt the additional cost (approximately \$100,000) and delay of about 6 months is justified because there is currently little threat of mob violence. The Ambassador and the State Department eventually agreed on changes to the survey team's plan, although SPL disagreed.

The State Department commented to us in July 1982 that increased dialogue between Washington and security enhancement posts, as well as review and approval by post officials of the telegraphic survey report, has led to greater cooperation and agreement on project details.

Project implementation at another post, also surveyed in early 1980, has also been delayed, although officials there were generally pleased with the survey team's recommendations. Architectural plans, promised for review by September 1980, had not been received at the time of our field review. According to an official there, the post delayed performing much needed maintenance because of the possibility of having the work being "undone" by enhancement construction. Also, the RSO said he had not conducted the required internal security survey because the upgrade would significantly alter current security conditions (the last survey had been performed September-December 1977). The post had been pushing the Department of State for some firm dates, but had received little response.

The State Department commented that the lessons learned from these two surveys, among the first done, and other earlier surveys, have been applied to later surveys.

Serious delays have also affected provision of better security to U.S. personnel at a third post we visited. Almost 1 year after the survey was completed, the post had not received the complete architectural and engineering plans to review--an intermediate step some months removed from actual construction. The State Department said that these delays were due to the need to resolve several issues between the U.S. and host government. It added that in the meantime a Public Access Control project was completed in the Chancery. These delays are of particular concern to those stationed at the post, which is considered, according to a State Department Inspector General's report dated October 1981, the most vulnerable U.S. facility in that country.

The Inspector General's report concluded that

"\* \* \* with the threat potential remaining high, very little has been done to decrease the vulnerability of U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities \* \* \*. Support from the Department has been inadequate."

Relevant report findings included:

--"\* \* \* generally poor coordination has caused and continues to cause delays. For example, inquiries directed to the Department from the posts were largely ignored or inadequately answered."

--"\* \* \* the bulk of material needed for various enhancement has not been received, and status remains unclear."

Relevant conclusions/recommendations included:

--"\* \* \* security enhancement warrants management's increased attention in the Department."

--"The Department (M, [Office of the Under Secretary for Management], SY and FBO) should immediately take measures necessary to assure substantially more progress in the implementation of the Security Enhancement Program [there]."

#### Agency comments

In commenting on this report, the State Department said there were some coordination and managerial issues which required resolution in the early phases of the program and it has recently taken steps to strengthen program management. These steps include (1) the introduction of streamlined survey team procedures, (2) more frequent and more detailed communications between the Department and security enhancement posts, and (3) the preparation of monthly status reports on major construction projects.

#### A SINGLE, COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORY SYSTEM COULD HELP POSTS BETTER CONTROL SECURITY ENHANCEMENT MATERIAL

Program funding began in July 1980, with only two people managing the program. With little advance notice and preparation, they were instructed to start buying equipment and supplies to upgrade overseas posts. This equipment was stockpiled to meet specific needs from posts included in the program, and for use in the initial security enhancement projects as they were started.

Adding to the program's problems we found that no office centrally keeps or disseminates inventory information on material to be shipped to the posts, including what material is being shipped, when it might be expected, if shipments are complete, and if all components are included in a shipment. Information on some individual shipments is received at posts from State Department offices and some manufacturers. None of this information was complete at any of the posts we visited. Having information compiled and distributed centrally would help to ensure that posts receive the information they need.

This material includes steel doors, escape hatches, walk-through metal detectors, weapons, cameras, alarms, down to locks and tools. The overseas posts receive incomplete information from many of these sources such as missing packing slips, and no advance notice of equipment being shipped. As a result, the posts often do not know what material is coming or what to do with it when it does arrive. With such loose accountability, it is likely that some equipment will be lost. This will be costly and further delay implementation and, more importantly, extend the posts's vulnerability to terrorism.

In the beginning, the offices agreed among themselves that SPL would not check shipments or oversee what SY and OC did with the equipment bought with SEP funds because SPL did not have the manpower to do this effectively. They, therefore, had to depend on SY and OC to ship material only to eligible posts.

It should be the responsibility of one office to provide the posts with information concerning material shipments. Post officials discussed the problem with SY and OC and some improvement has been noted for material shipped directly from the State Department. An interoffice memo described the problem at a high-threat post as follows:

"\* \* \*as various offices were procuring different equipment with no apparent central point of coordination, the effort has been totally disorganized. In many cases, we were given no advance word about the shipment. No packing lists were sent; control numbering procedures were different and inadequate; Post has never received a bill of materials, etc. Recently, the Dispatch Agent asked Post for copies of purchase orders that we obviously do not have because Washington has handled procurement. Responses by Washington to our questions and requests for information have been incredibly slow."

Much of the equipment used for SEP is purchased ahead of time and kept in storage until needed. Purchases are made according to estimates based on expected need, primarily on past experience and the security enhancement surveys that were conducted. A problem is that equipment, especially that which will be used only when structural changes are made, may be purchased and shipped far in advance, needlessly tying up funds that could be put to more immediate security use elsewhere. For example, a walk-through metal detector,

costing about \$4,000 was shipped to one post in late 1980 or early 1981. The post had not requested it and had no immediate need for it; it was put in storage on the assumption it was to become part of the structural changes. A second detector, also unsolicited, arrived a few months later. At the same time, the RSO at a nearby post said they needed a walk-through metal detector for immediate use if they could get one.

Officials at five posts stated that shipments just show up without prior notification from the State Department. A SEP shipment to a post in one country contained medical supplies which the post had not ordered. They thought these supplies had been shipped there by mistake so they gave them to officials from another agency. They later learned it was for the proposed safehaven. Officials retrieved what they could and requested replacement for the rest. The post's cable to Washington added they were continuing to search for one other piece of equipment which the Department had reported "pouched" with no pouch or crate pouch number. They stated this material " \* \* \* could well be with tons of upgrade material received earlier this year."

No post had received a single listing with all SEP material they are supposed to receive, nor had they received complete listings from SY, OC, and FBO stating what they had sent or what had been ordered for each post. Officials at one post stated they were unable to determine if only part of a shipment had arrived, if items were missing from an individual package, or if the shipment was a complete or partial delivery. Officials at another post stated they, too, may not know how many boxes a shipment should contain, and would therefore not know if some were missing.

Without such information, officials could not determine if all components necessary for system installations had arrived. For example, it would be difficult to determine if all necessary lenses and related equipment had arrived for the closed-circuit television camera system without a bill of material. If parts are missing, personnel sent to install the equipment will have to leave the post and return later, wasting time and money. A State Department official said the Department has had problems over the years in notifying posts that material was arriving and in having the posts acknowledge that material had arrived.

Some items were not properly addressed and Embassy personnel did not know who was responsible for the equipment. For example, equipment is addressed to different post officials causing confusion as to who has responsibility. At all posts visited, more than one person was responsible for some part of SEP implementation. At one post, four people--the RSO, the General Services Officer, the FBO project manager, and an administrative assistant to the RSO--all had some responsibility. In some cases, equipment not readily identifiable was placed in storage until officials received further instructions from Washington. Many items for the posts in another country arrived at a post addressed "Ambassador." Without advance shipping notice, officials did not know which of the posts it was intended for.



In one country, three security doors, costing \$3,500 each, had either been shipped elsewhere or lost. The door intended for a center at one post arrived in May 1981. The then-RSO had the door shipped from there to a neighboring country, about a week after it arrived. U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and SPL officials said the door was eventually returned and installed in February 1982, 9 months after it had first arrived.

The doors for two other centers were shipped at the same time as the door for the first center. A USIA official at one post stated that the door came after her arrival in July 1981. It was not located until November 1981 and was installed in February 1982. The door for the other center apparently was lost from the time it left the manufacturer. A November 1981 telegram from USIA personnel to their headquarters, stated that the " \* \* \*door for \* \* \* could still be floating around someplace." It was eventually found and installed in early 1982. The telegram cited above concluded that " \* \* \*without adequate addressee information and without advance notice shipments are bound to get fouled up."

Post officials stated that they have made repeated inquiries to SPL regarding the need for additional information on equipment status. Posts often have to send additional messages to Washington before they receive an answer. Delays of weeks or more waiting for an answer are not uncommon. Because of numerous complaints by the posts regarding the management of SEP, the then-Director of SPL visited several posts in October 1981, and subsequently agreed that more and better information concerning equipment status should be provided to the posts.

#### Agency comments

The Department of State replied that SPL can develop an inventory of all SEP materials from information available in operating offices. Before our field work in November and December 1981, we asked SPL for an inventory list of all items purchased for and shipped to the 7 posts we wanted to visit. They could not provide us with this list; instead we were directed to the operating offices. These offices (particularly SY) provided us with incomplete lists of equipment bought for each post. Parts of each list were handwritten and prepared specifically at our request, which took several days. Other parts of the list were computerized. The posts were not provided the information we had and could not identify what they were supposed to receive.

#### Post internal inventory and control problems add to difficulty in accounting for security enhancement material

Four of the seven posts visited have not been able to fully account for security equipment received. If not corrected, the problem will only get worse as large amounts of security enhancement material arrive. Two other posts have better inventory and

tracking systems but have had trouble identifying and recording security enhancement equipment already received. Much of this equipment is still in shipping cartons.

An SY inspection report on one post, dated late 1980, concluded that " \* \* \* an accountability system is badly needed to control issuance, stock level, and storage location [for security equipment]." The report recommended implementation of a stock level/locator card system for all accountable SY equipment which would " \* \* \* show when the equipment/supplies were received, their present level, to whom they were issued, and when, and/or present location." As of the time of our field review, this recommendation had not been implemented. In addition, we noted discrepancies in one set of post inventory records.

Another post may also experience difficulty in managing and tracking security enhancement material, partly because it does not have an adequate property accountability system. Officials there agreed that additional steps will have to be taken to ensure better accountability.

A third post did not have a system for monitoring the receipt, storage, and issuance of property. The Administrative Officer/Post Security Officer said they will try to establish a system, although it would take some time. They are trying to get the security enhancement project under way as quickly as time will allow.

PAYMENT OF SOME RECURRING  
COSTS WILL REDUCE SEP FUNDS  
AVAILABLE FOR NEW PROJECTS

The question of who would pay for recurring costs associated with SEP, such as maintenance and contract guards, remained open until December 1981. The State Department stated that if all recurring costs were paid from security enhancement funds, the entire fifth year's appropriation of \$45 million would be used just to pay support for projects already started and new projects scheduled for that year would have to be canceled. Using SEP funds for recurring costs will reduce the amount of money available for new projects.

The State Department decided that all expenses incurred in the first year a security enhancement project starts, and second year recurring costs, will be paid for by SEP funds. Starting with the third year, the regional bureaus are to assume funding responsibility for recurring costs. This should limit SPL recurring costs to \$4 million or less each remaining year, according to State. The regional bureaus will start picking up these costs in fiscal year 1983, but have not yet budgeted for such costs and will not be able to do so until the full dimension of each project is decided on. They may have trouble absorbing these costs, particularly as more projects are started. If this happens, the bureaus may request additional funding, either from SPL or as a budget supplement.

## CONCLUSIONS

Although terrorism increased throughout the 1970s, it was the new experience of mob violence which occurred in Iran, Pakistan, and Libya in late 1979 that prompted additional concerns for the safety of Americans overseas. Before these incidents, the main focus of security was on preventing a small group of trained terrorists from penetrating U.S. missions and seizing Americans as hostages. Since early 1980, the U.S. Government has shifted its security priorities to concentrate on protection against mob attacks. The Security Enhancement Program was initiated to upgrade physical security and better protect classified information at selected posts.

The State Department's planning, coordination, and property management for the security enhancement program is deficient. As a consequence, delays have resulted in the implementation of security improvements at overseas posts. Also equipment and material accountability has been a serious problem because the program operated without a central inventory control system. As a result the posts had trouble accounting for and recording security enhancement material received at the posts and organizing storage space for the material and equipment. This is partly due to the fact that several officials at these posts have the responsibility for implementing parts of the project, rather than having one official in charge of the overall SEP. Some of their problems also can be attributed to headquarters staff failure to provide information concerning the status of equipment being sent. These posts can be expected to have additional problems unless improvements are made in their inventory recording and storage capabilities.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend the Secretary of State require the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration:

- take action to insure improvements are made in the planning and coordination of the SEP and
- develop a single inventory and tracking system which would allow program managers to identify all material going to each post and to use this capability to notify the posts of the specific nature and quantity of material sent and any changes in shipments.

Also, we recommend the Secretary of State require the Chief of Mission or a designee, at each post, assign one official to be responsible for receiving, recording, and storing all material received for the security enhancement project, as well as to inventory all items received and inform Washington of any discrepancies.

## AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

In the draft of this report we proposed that the Secretary of State give one office, within the State Department, the final authority for administering the SEP. The Department took the view that while there was an initial adjustment phase of establishing the SEP, and the roles and interrelationship of each participating office, the entire SEP is now operating much more smoothly and productively than previously. The Department stated that the SPL staff plays the major role in administering the SEP through the management and coordination of both the entire program and of individual projects. The Department added that expertise in specific technical areas remains vested in the appropriate existing technical office, especially the Offices of Security, Communications, and Foreign Buildings, all of which are within the Bureau of Administration.

While the State Department feels the appropriate organization exists to manage the program, we believe the evidence gathered during this review shows that the Department continues to have problems in carrying out the SEP. For this reason, we changed our proposed recommendation from giving one office within the Department final authority for administering the program to the initial recommendation in this chapter--charging the Assistant Secretary for Administration with seeking improvements in the planning and coordination of the program.

The Department of State in commenting on the need to establish an inventory control system informed us that the Assistant Secretary for Administration has asked SPL to develop an automated inventory system. The Department stated that this system will be connected with the existing SPL financial and information management system. It is being developed, according to the Department, to assemble inputs from the inventory and tracking systems of the operating offices and to issue a post-by-post materials list. State Department plans call for this system to be operational by the first quarter of fiscal year 1983.

Concerning the need to improve control over SEP material shipped overseas, the Department informed us that:

--It was in the process of clearing a cable for all Chiefs of Mission that will, among other things, strongly recommend that each Chief of Mission designate one member of the U.S. staff to (1) act as receiving officer for all program materials, (2) coordinate with other members of the mission staff, (3) record receipt of shipments, and (4) maintain an inventory of the materials at the post.

--Its operating offices are developing, and in some cases cases have already implemented, regular telegraphic notifications to posts of known and anticipated arrivals of specific SEP materials. In addition, State said

that a shipment notification procedure for SEP materials is being included in the development of the SPL automated inventory tracking system.

--That the SPL staff has successfully established an ongoing dialogue between Washington and the posts since the first surveys in 1980.

## CHAPTER 4

### OTHER SECURITY ENHANCEMENT-RELATED PROBLEMS

#### AND PROGRAMS AT SELECTED POSTS

In addition to problems in planning and property management, we noted problems at several of the posts visited which related to security of persons and property.

#### MORE ATTENTION NEEDED ON SECURITY AT SOME HIGHER THREAT POSTS

Of the seven posts we visited, two did not have RSOs. The Administrative Officer served as the Post Security Officer. At each of these posts, the Administrative Officer is usually quite occupied with general administrative matters. The Administrative Officer at one post receives assistance from the RSO at a neighboring post, who visits about every 2 weeks, while the Administrative Officer at the second post has had a visit from the RSO at a neighboring post about every 2 months.

Of the 38 posts scheduled for security enhancement projects through 1982, 15 have no RSO. We feel that additional attention should be given to these posts' security programs (e.g., conducting inspections, overseeing the Marine Security Guards and local contract guards, assessing the terrorist threat to the post, etc.) and to organizing and overseeing the security enhancement project until structural improvements have been completed.

The Post Security Officer should devote more time both to implementing the posts' security program and to completing the security upgrade project. In addition, since Post Security Officers are not security professionals, the responsible RSO should pay greater attention to these posts to insure that the project is completed satisfactorily and that there are no security lapses while improvements (e.g., safehavens) are being constructed.

#### FIRE-FIGHTING CAPABILITY IS NOT ADDRESSED AT SOME POSTS

Fire-fighting capabilities were not addressed by the security enhancement survey team at three of the posts we visited. At a fourth post, fire-safety improvements were recommended, but post officials claim the building remains a firetrap.

Officials in one post said the security enhancement survey plans called for an elaborate fire detection and alarm system, but failed to include a fire-suppressant capability. City water lines, according to these officials, do not have

the pressure to provide the Embassy with its potential fire-fighting needs. Officials there feel that the city could not provide an adequate water supply to fight a major fire.

Fire-safety concerns at the embassy at another post are somewhat different. The security enhancement team recommended fire-safety improvements, including a sprinkler system and an additional exit. The chancery, however, is constructed of mahogany which is extremely flammable, as a result of regular oilings over the last 25 years. The survey team's report recognized the potential fire threat to the chancery but went ahead and recommended that the communications vault on the second floor be used as a safehaven. Officials expressed concern that this would endanger many lives and felt it would be better to develop an escape route from the chancery.

Fire-fighting capabilities were not addressed by the security enhancement survey team for the AID building at a post in another country.

#### Agency comments

The Department of State noted that emphasis on fire and life safety conditions, as part of security enhancement surveys, is currently being increased. Fire marshalls are now included as survey team members. The Department added that messages were sent to all posts in March and May 1982, which stressed the responsibilities of the posts for these issues, and, in Washington, the responsibilities of FBO, the Office of Medical Services, and the Safety Program Office.

#### POST MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS REDUCE EFFECTIVENESS OF SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS

All posts visited had limited capability to repair sophisticated security and communications equipment. The worst problems occur in lesser developed countries with an unreliable source of electricity. Power surges are quite harmful to television cameras and are expected to affect the new electronic data storage and retrieval systems being developed.

Officials at one post stated that the survey team tended to recommend improvements based on U.S. technology and maintainability. These officials felt such sophisticated equipment made sense in developed countries where repair capability exists locally, but not at this post, where, as in most developing countries, this technical repair expertise is not available and electrical power surges cause damage beyond normal wear. For example, the two cameras currently at the chancery were broken for 6 months, and could not be repaired at the post. Seven additional cameras are scheduled for installation under SEP.

At another post, the Department installed three new "state-of-the-art" cameras in July 1981, although they had not been field-tested. Post officials told us SY had directed that these new cameras be installed over the objections of regional technical service personnel. These technicians felt that since the equipment was new and unproven, it would be better to try it first at a post where maintenance was readily available.

Power surges have also been a problem at this post. Officials said they were adding a regulator between the incoming line and the equipment, hoping to prevent power from surging into the cameras. The Department added that regulators and other electrical current protection systems are routinely included in security enhancement project plans and installations, where needed.

Once installed, technicians from the Engineering Service Center came to this post twice, between July and November 1981, to repair the cameras. However, the cameras worked only for a short time after each visit, and none of them were working in November 1981. An Embassy official said that while the old cameras were not 100-percent reliable, they had worked most of the time.

The State Department commented that where it is believed that local conditions preclude the use of "state-of-the-art" equipment, more maintainable items are substituted in order to assure the provision of the maximum possible level of security protection. It further stated that this policy apparently should have been followed for the above posts.

Officials at a third post stated that the television cameras have been out of operation as much as they have been working. Delivery of replacement cameras can be delayed, these officials stated, because the Regional Service Center does not keep many in stock, due to their high cost. Sometimes the Service Center sends someone to repair the cameras, which also takes a considerable amount of time.

DIFFERENCES EXIST OVER THE SECURITY  
NEEDS OF AGENCIES LOCATED OUTSIDE  
THE EMBASSY

Differences over security enhancement needs between the Department of State and other U.S. Government agencies located outside the embassy or consulate have caused some problems in upgrading security. USIA, AID, and the Drug Enforcement Administration all have agreements with the State Department under which the Department provides them with security services. But these agencies have operational reasons to resist some proposals of State for security enhancement projects. Also, there have been differences of opinion over the ultimate authority over security for agencies located outside the embassy or consulate.



## UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

USIA officials are concerned with security of their facilities, but also want to allow as much public access as possible to their buildings, especially to the Bi-National Centers. At one post, although the Branch Public Affairs Officer felt that the Bi-National Center was not urgently in need of security improvements, deferral was made to the judgment of the Department and the planned improvements were accepted, including installation of a walk-through metal detector.

However, according to officials at another post, an Agency facility there has been attempting to improve its security for the last 2 years, with no success.

USIA stated that since SPL failed to address residential security concerns, the Agency bought ultrasonic portable alarms in 1980. Purchase of additional residential alarms has been included in current funding requests.

### USIA authority over security matters

USIA officials feel they need more independence over which USIA facilities should be given improved security and what types of protection should be provided. Some facilities were denied funding because they were not at posts selected by the Department for security enhancement, according to Agency officials. In one country, USIA had 11 terrorist incidents at their installations and, as a result, had requested guard service for 3 centers. However, since posts in that country had not been considered eligible for security enhancement funding, USIA was given no extra protection for these centers. Posts in three other countries recommended for public access control projects and safehavens were also declared ineligible for SEP funding by the Department.

Under the Counter-Terrorism Program (a separate security program which preceded SEP), about \$800,000 a year was designated for use by USIA, according to Agency officials. Although the State Department administered these projects, they exercised no authority over their content, according to these officials. Since SPL has final say over all expenditures, the State Department has considerable leverage over what SEP projects will be started for other agencies. Discussions have been held between the State Department and USIA concerning its participation in the security enhancement program for their own facilities, but no agreements have been reached.

An incident involving a USIA center resulted in plans to incorporate two separate safehavens because State and USIA could not agree on where a single safehaven should be located, according to an Embassy official. The SPL survey team proposed the safehaven be built in the basement, while USIA recommended it be

built on the top floor with a roof escape hatch. The SPL team preferred a basement safehaven because they believed it offered better protection from heat and smoke, and mob attacks. The survey team concluded, given the building's location, a mob could cut off any chance of escape through an upstairs safehaven within minutes. The RSO agreed with the team's conclusion.

The Ambassador, through the State Department, has tried to convince USIA to accept Department recommendations. He feels that he should have final authority over security matters in-country. State Department officials admitted this issue has been a long-standing problem. They did say an ambassador's view should be given serious consideration in settling security differences, but did not state whether they felt an ambassador had ultimate responsibility for the safety of other agency personnel.

#### AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The question of agency authority also became an issue between AID and the State Department at one post. AID felt that the security package, recently installed, was excessive for their needs. The package involved secure doors, an alarm system and a closed circuit television system. With the exception of the alarm system, none of the equipment was working at the time of our visit. The doors were propped open for this reason, according to officials. They added that even if the doors were operational, they do not have enough personnel to staff the reception desk, where television monitors and controls for the doors are located. Also, AID officials felt that because of their extensive contacts with certain country government officials and other citizens, AID offices should be open. According to the RSO, the Ambassador supports the security measures and will demand that AID use them once they become operational.

At another post, two coordination problems were noted between the Department of State and AID over responsibility for and funding of some security items which, according to an Embassy official, have contributed to some difficulties between the agencies. Both problems proved to be unique to the post and were caused by State's move into the AID building. First, the post does not have a fire plan. Neither the State Department nor AID is willing to take this responsibility and, consequently, no procedures have been outlined and no drills are conducted. Since Department of State employees now occupy most of this building, AID officials contend that development of a fire plan and designation of a fire marshall are the State Department's responsibility. Resolution of this matter appears to have come to a standoff. This situation should be resolved soon.

Secondly, when State first moved into the AID building, AID made many physical changes to the building to meet its needs. According to AID personnel, the Department, while acknowledging the responsibility, has tried to get out of making reimbursements for these costs.

## DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

Drug Enforcement Administration officials at two posts were opposed to tight security because they thought it might discourage informants. Also, an Administration official at one post felt the day-to-day operations would be enhanced if the offices were located outside the compound, because many informants refused to go to the compound. We learned that the basic reason for not relocating the Administration quarters outside of the compound was because of the sensitive material they worked with.

Since the Administration office at another post is not located within the Embassy compound, the Department provided a Marine security guard at the entrance. The agent-in-charge believes that the informants are disturbed at the idea of a Marine securing the entrance and wanted to bypass the guard altogether by bringing informants in through a separate locked door. The RSO stated that allowing informants to bypass the Marine security guard would be unwise from a security viewpoint, and noted that an earlier agent-in-charge had been murdered in his office by an informant with a hidden gun. The RSO stated that he was willing to consider other arrangements to accommodate the Administration's needs, such as remote television monitoring of the entrance.

## TRAINING FOR AID AND USIA POST SECURITY OFFICERS

Both AID and USIA have unit security officers at post, appointed by their respective agencies. They are responsible for the day-to-day procedural security matters, although they have other duties. These officials are not professional security officers and embassy security officials are expected to provide training. We found, however, that such training is not always being provided. At one post, AID and USIA officials stated that the RSO had not provided any special training on security matters to their unit security officers. Also, they had not received any periodic briefings on security matters affecting the post, except for the infrequent meetings of the Security Watch Committee.

The lack of security training was noted in an earlier review. Our report "Review of Inspector General Functions in Agency for International Development" (GAO/ID-82-9, May 21, 1982), discussed inadequate security education for AID security officers. It stated that

\*\*\* of 16 AID missions visited, seven missions (Kenya, Tanzania, Tunisia, the Philippines, Panama, Honduras and Guatemala) had security officers who had received no formal training in security. This training did not take place for several reasons. AID mission security

officers are generally the mission executive officer or general services officer who takes on security in addition to his other administrative duties. At missions in Kenya, Tanzania, and Tunisia, the RSOs indicated they had received no guidance from State or AID Security offices defining their AID-related security responsibilities. Also, according to the RSOs the mission directors at these posts gave security training a relatively low priority."

RESIDENTIAL SECURITY PROTECTION VARIES  
ACCORDING TO POST

Generally, we found post personnel were satisfied with the residential security provided by the State Department. No distinctions were made in the level of protection provided State Department personnel, compared to other agency personnel.

Most American employees at the posts we visited live somewhere near the post. Residences receive security equipment including locks, window grills, radios and alarms. High-ranking officials are provided with additional security, as needed, including 24-hour guards. At two posts, residential security also included radio-equipped roving patrol cars, which cover the residences 24 hours a day. Residential security at a third post includes guard service during the night and on a 24-hour basis when personnel are out of town.

Other agencies provide additional security to their own personnel on an as-needed basis. At a fourth post, Defense Intelligence Agency personnel are provided 24-hour residential security guards and at one of the posts mentioned above, AID provides a sophisticated alarm system which sounds an alarm if the windows or doors are opened, or if some movement is detected within the protected rooms.

At a fifth post, residential security equipment had been received but not distributed. The RSO there had airhorns and mace containers for every residence but had not distributed them. Also, radios had been recommended by the security enhancement survey team for every American residence there. Distribution of equipment was still pending approval in November 1981.

At two of the above posts we found that crime poses the greatest threat to post personnel. At one of them, post officials stated "crime and residential security is a greater threat than terrorism and embassy security." The security enhancement survey team's report on the other stated: "Currently the main security problem facing the post is residential burglary."

CONTINGENCY PLANS ARE GENERALLY COMPLETE  
BUT ADDITIONAL TESTING IS NEEDED

Posts' plans are generally up-to-date and appear to adequately address major contingencies, including emergency evacuation, terrorism, hijacking, bomb threats, and fire. A new Emergency and Evacuation Manual was just distributed to the posts in March 1982.

Marine Security Guard detachments frequently practiced their internal defense plan, which is a section of the Emergency and Evacuation plan. They appeared well-versed on their responsibilities. However, at four posts, drills were not being varied significantly to cover all potentialities. Written critiques are needed to better detect and correct deficiencies and to maintain better continuity for incoming personnel.

From discussions with Embassy officials, we found that some individuals, other than Marine guards, designated as having emergency evacuation responsibilities, were unfamiliar with their individual responsibilities and/or did not engage in practice drills. Advantages of familiarization, through increased drills, include a better understanding of responsibilities, identification of planning flaws, and prevention of panic in an emergency situation.

At one post, the emergency destruction plan was not being practiced by responsible officials, and needed updating. Officials stated this will be done in early 1982, once new equipment is received. In addition, the Embassy had not tested its fire or bomb plans (with the exception of AID, located in a separate facility).

The post has also developed a warden system, wherein the RSO or another official would inform selected individuals of evacuations or other emergency actions, who would in turn, tell others under their jurisdiction. (Jurisdictions would be assigned on a geographical or other pre-determined basis). According to the post's plan, this system should be tested every 6 months, however, it had not been tested in 1-1/2 years.

At another post, we found that officials were not generally familiar with the revised Emergency and Evacuation Plan; many did not have a copy or had never even seen it, including officials we met from the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Department of Defense, and USIA. A State Department Inspector General's report stated that the revised plan had not been fully distributed or understood, and recommended that the post "distribute one copy of the February 1981 E&E Plan to all American personnel and make them initial it as understood." This had not been done at the time of our visit.

Some officials were not aware of their emergency and evacuation responsibilities, and some did not know where their

safehaven was. Some officers were not familiar with key aspects of the plan, such as the location of the various Marine guard posts, the chain-of-command, and the location of weapons and restrictions on their usage.

At another post, officers with emergency and evacuation responsibilities are not given regular briefings or practice drills on their responsibilities, though a post official admitted they should have them. We found that some officers were not familiar with their specific duties in an emergency. Because of burn-time limitations, the only copy of the Emergency and Evacuation plan available to these officials is in the RSO's safe. It would be useful to conduct regular briefings/training for these officials to familiarize them with their duties and to reinforce the post's concern with security.

#### SECURITY SERVICES ARE ALSO PROVIDED TO NON-GOVERNMENT AMERICANS

The Post Emergency and Evacuation plans include steps for evacuating all Americans during an emergency. The Consular Affairs Officer is generally in charge of mobilizing non-government American citizens. Most of the posts have developed a warden system for use by the non-official American community. Officials involved may contact American businesses and hotels, and possibly disseminate emergency information over local radio stations and through newspapers. At one post, during a period of unrest, the embassy put notices in local newspapers advising Americans on current U.S. policy. Post officials also maintained contact with American businesses to provide security briefings.

Since registration with the posts is not mandatory for non-U.S. Government Americans, post officials feel it is difficult to account for all U.S. citizens in-country, especially tourists. The State Department requires that all embassies submit a semi-annual report, updating the number and type of potential evacuees, based on best estimates.

Officials at some posts we visited felt that carrying out emergency evacuation plans for all Americans would be very difficult. For example, lack of information on Americans at another post would make it difficult to contact them to arrange emergency evacuation. Moreover, this post is inland and in mountainous country--circumstances which make it virtually impossible to arrange emergency evacuation if the airports are unavailable. At a third post, officials felt that, along with incomplete registration of Americans, poor communications would hinder mobilization of the American community.

We previously commented on the weaknesses in the system to register non-Government Americans at overseas posts in our report "An Assessment of Selected U.S. Embassy-Consular Efforts To Assist

And Protect Americans Overseas During Crises And Emergencies" (Dec. 4, 1975, ID-76-4). We pointed out that the U.S. registration system in one country was "incomplete, unreliable, and of no help in locating Americans in response to specific requests" following the coup in September 1973. The Embassy estimated there were between 2,200 and 2,800 Americans there at that time.

COORDINATION WITH OTHER EMBASSIES ON  
SECURITY MATTERS BASED ON PERCEIVED NEED

Based on our discussions with embassy officials representing seven developed countries, the United States places a greater emphasis on security than most other nations. It is one of few western countries which allocates personnel to this area on a full-time basis, and applies more financial resources to security than do other countries. One developed countries' representative at one post noted that his budget, devoted to security, has suffered severe cutbacks.

Another factor affecting the degree of security is the threat which the United States and other countries are subjected to. In every country visited, except one, the threat to U.S. personnel and property was considered to be greater than that faced by other countries because of our economic, military, and political influence throughout the world.

U.S. representatives have taken the initiative to establish contacts with other embassies in most instances. There were no formal arrangements reached and none desired by the participants in any of the countries we visited. The United States and other countries both wanted to maintain their flexibility so they could react freely to existing conditions. This would appear to be acceptable to the Department of State which, according to a memorandum, encouraged communications with other countries' embassies, with an effort to conclude a verbal or written cooperative agreement, at the discretion of U.S. Embassy officials.

How much actual support these countries provide U.S. personnel will probably depend on the particular circumstances. Posts prefer to rely primarily on their own resources. However, other embassies have assisted the United States in crisis situations.

Initiatives, taken by U.S. representatives with whom we talked, appeared to be aimed at reaching understandings which would heighten the spirit of cooperation between our embassies and others. Generally, the United States has been active and successful to this end.

## CONCLUSIONS

The security program at some high-threat posts, targeted for security improvements, is run by the Administrative Officer who is also the Post Security Officer. This officer's time is generally quite occupied with administrative duties, leaving little time for security matters. We feel that since these are high-threat posts, scheduled for SEP improvements, the post security officer and responsible RSO should devote more of their time to the posts' security program and to completing the security enhancement project.

The Security Enhancement Program and the upgrading of security in general at overseas posts of USIA, AID, and the Drug Enforcement Administration are faced with problems due to differences at the posts between the State Department and these agencies over program needs and the ultimate authority over security for the agencies' offices located outside the U.S. Embassy or Consulate. These differences need to be resolved by all the involved agencies so that the security enhancement program can be effectively implemented and the security program, in general, at U.S. overseas posts can be improved.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of State require the:

- Chiefs of Mission or a designee at high-threat posts have the Post Security Officers and responsible RSOs devote more of their attention to post security and the SEP.
- Assistant Secretary for Administration direct efforts to resolve the differences between the State Department and other agencies concerning the needs of SEP at overseas posts and the ultimate authority over security for the agencies' offices located outside the U.S. Embassy or Consulate.

## AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

The Department of State in commenting on the recommendation on the need for the Post Security Officer and the Regional Security Officer to devote more attention to security at some high-threat posts stated that it will re-emphasize the need for all post personnel to continue to devote their efforts to the effective implementation of these projects.

The Department of State in commenting on the recommendation concerning the differences over the security enhancement needs between the Department and other agencies at overseas posts noted that the SPL maintains a continuous liaison with other agencies affected by the Security Enhancement Program in which problems are discussed and resolved as they arise. The Department added that while at posts, team members discuss issues



affecting the security of other agencies personnel and facilities at surveyed posts with representatives of these agencies.

Additional comments on this issue by USIA, AID and DEA follow.

USIA stated that

- due to the public and relatively open nature of its facilities, State Department "minimum standards" of protection cannot be applied across-the-board.
- its secure areas are intended to provide initial protection of short duration until help can be called or escape can be made. It believes it is neither desirable nor logical to hide in a safehaven within the building until help arrives.
- the security enhancement team overrode its project design and recommended a full, 12-hour, basement safehaven inconsistent with its policy. The Agency eventually agreed to withdraw objections to the SPL-funded basement safehaven, at the same time, following through on the second floor secure area escape route.

USIA stated that the larger issue involved here is that it must retain final authority over security requirements for its separate buildings. It further stated that State Department standards are often inappropriate for USIA establishments and should not be applied solely for the sake of "consistency." It feels that it must have separate funding and authority to provide appropriate security enhancements for its separate facilities and overseas residences.

AID replied that differences between State and AID over SEP matters are due more to individual differences of opinion at the mission level rather than any policy difference at the headquarters level. AID added that such conflicts have always been resolved satisfactorily.

The Drug Enforcement Administration in Washington stated that its policy is to enhance security at its offices, both inside and outside the Embassy/Consulate compounds. It stated, in addition, that its policy also suggests that informants not be met at the offices.

While the above described State Department actions by the SPL and the survey teams are essential for implementing the program, important differences continue to exist overseas over security needs and the ultimate authority over security for the agencies' offices located outside the U.S. Embassy or consulate. These problems are caused mainly from differences in operational requirements. We believe, therefore, this issue needs to be addressed and resolved at a higher level within the agencies.

LIST OF 29 GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS  
UNDER THE WORKING GROUP ON TERRORISM

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency	Department of the Interior
Agency for International Development	United States Information Agency
Central Intelligence Agency	Department of Justice
United States Coast Guard	District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department
United States Customs Service	National Security Agency
Department of the Army	
Office of the Secretary of Defense	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Joint Chiefs of Staff	
Defense Intelligence Agency	Department of Justice--Office of Justice Assistance, Research and Statistics
Department of State	
Department of Energy	Office of Management and Budget
Federal Bureau of Investigation	United States Postal Service
Federal Emergency Management Agency	Federal Aviation Administration
Federal Protective Service	Department of the Treasury
Center for Disease Control	Department of the Treasury--Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
Immigration and Naturalization Service	United States Secret Service

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES  
OF KEY POST PERSONNEL INVOLVED WITH SECURITY

The post security organization involves the Chief of Mission, the Administrative Counselor, and the RSO or Post Security Officer, all having specific duties and responsibilities. The RSO or Post Security Officer administers the security program at the post which includes the Marine Security Guards and local contract guards. At some high-threat posts, special protective details are provided to protect the Chief of Mission.

CHIEF OF MISSION

The Chief of Mission is the ultimate authority in-country on matters that affect the the embassy or consulate in that specific country, including the safety of U.S. persons and property.

However, there have been conflicts in security matters, limiting, to some degree, the Chief of Missions' authority. Some of the conflicts have resulted from the RSO's authority on security, along with his dual responsibility to the Chief of Mission and to the Office of Security in Washington, and responsibility for protecting agency offices located outside embassy grounds.

REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER

The RSO, as the focal point of security matters, is responsible for a wide range of duties including

- instituting programs to defend American personnel from terrorism, hostile foreign intelligence activity, and criminal acts;
- supervising Marine Security Guards, Navy Seabees, Foreign Service National Investigators, local guard forces, and special bodyguards;
- monitoring and inspecting the security programs of embassies or consulates within his jurisdiction and providing comprehensive training and planning guidance to Post Security Officers at these posts, through periodic visits and telegraphic exchanges;
- maintaining official liaison with host country, third country (other embassies), and U.S. intelligence, security, and law enforcement organizations to conduct exchanges of current terrorist data;

- developing, updating, and administering post contingency plans concerning terrorist attacks; and
- serving as a member of the Security Watch Committee.

The RSO has a dual chain of command as follows:

<u>At post</u>	<u>To headquarters</u>
Chief of Mission	Office of SY (Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security)
Deputy Chief of Mission	Regional Assistant Director for Security
Administrative Officer	
Regional Security Officer	Regional Security Officer

#### POST SECURITY OFFICER

A Post Security Officer is responsible for security at posts not having an RSO. In most cases, the Administrative Officer serves also as the Post Security Officer.

#### DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

The Deputy Chief of Mission and the Administrative Officer are part of the Regional Security Officer's chain-of-command. The Administrative Officer is the RSO's direct supervisor.

#### FBO CONTRACT ON-SITE PROJECT MANAGER

Through FEO, SPL funds a contractor as the on-site, full-time project manager to oversee the implementation of each major security enhancement construction project. This individual maintains contact with Washington and all post officials on project construction matters.

#### MARINE SECURITY GUARDS

The Marine Security Guard force is under the supervision of the RSO, and under the authority of the Ambassador. A non-commissioned officer-in-charge supervises them and reports directly to the RSO or Post Security Officer. Operationally, the Marine Security Guards are not responsible to any military command during either normal or crisis situations. The Marine Corps provides the Guards with administrative services including inspections which are made about twice a year.

The primary duty of the Marine Security Guards is to protect personnel, property, and classified material and equipment within the post. They are also in charge of their own protective equipment.

SECURITY WATCH COMMITTEE

The Security Watch Committee, where one exists, meets when needed to analyze security problems and to recommend courses of action during a potential crisis. Membership includes top Embassy officials, heads of attached agencies, and representatives from U.S. Military units.

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS  
1968-80  
BY CATEGORY OF ATTACK

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	Total	a/
Total	142 (2.1)	214 (3.2)	391 (5.8)	324 (4.8)	648 (9.7)	564 (8.4)	528 (7.9)	475 (7.1)	599 (8.9)	562 (8.4)	850 (12.7)	657 (9.8)	760 (11.3)	6,714	
Kidnapping	1	6	43	30	16	45	43	57	34	40	39	30	17	401	(6.0)
Barricade-hostage	1	0	8	1	4	13	13	16	6	11	19	16	31	139	(2.1)
Letter bombing	3	4	5	1	306	58	18	5	15	17	12	23	3	470	(7.0)
Incendiary bombing	12	25	56	46	22	47	48	42	119	110	128	53	45	753	(11.2)
Explosive bombing	79	115	119	129	148	168	274	232	216	210	235	219	227	2,371	(35.3)
Armed attacks	12	13	8	9	13	16	31	21	21	21	40	22	51	278	(4.1)
Hijacking b/ Assassination	3 7	12 12	24 22	10 13	16 16	7 25	10 16	5 23	6 53	9 33	6 54	29 61	36 107	173 442	(2.6) (6.6)
Sabotage	1	2	0	4	4	3	4	1	2	0	0	3	0	24	(0.4)
Exotic pollution	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	17	3	1	22	(0.3)
Threat	12	12	61	53	77	132	32	34	81	67	234	96	117	1,008	(15.0)
Theft, break-in	3	7	22	10	5	3	10	8	6	2	13	4	14	107	(1.6)
Conspiracy	4	4	7	2	3	21	14	9	7	6	16	13	15	121	(1.8)
Hoax	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	5	48	58	(0.9)
Other actions	0	0	4	8	8	3	9	10	7	11	17	20	20	117	(1.7)
Sniping	3	2	7	3	6	4	3	10	18	12	17	44	23	152	(2.3)
Shootout with police	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	1	3	6	0	0	3	16	(0.2)
Arms smuggling	1	0	2	4	4	16	3	1	3	7	3	16	2	62	(0.9)

a/ Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each category of attack.

b/ Includes hijackings by means of air, sea or land transport.

The categories "sabotage, exotic pollution, threat, conspiracy, hoax, shootout with police and arms smuggling" were first shown separately in 1980.

Source: A research paper prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, "Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980," June 1981.

PLANNED IMPROVEMENTS IN THE STORAGE,  
RETRIEVAL, AND DESTRUCTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

The thrust of the communications segment of SEP is directed toward (1) providing electronic storage and retrieval systems, (2) hardening cable runs and rerouting critical circuitry, and (3) upgrading voice radio systems.

The security threats faced by many posts are giving a special impetus to the Department of State's progression toward so-called "paperless offices." Through this program, the Department of State hopes to achieve both the improved productivity offered by office automation, and the enhanced information security achievable through use of technology.

New technology will eventually allow the Department of State to store and retrieve classified material without each post maintaining extensive files. This new system will give post officials access to needed information without making copies for everyone. This will make it easier to account for classified material and will greatly reduce destruction time.

The biggest problem they have in electronically transferring classified material within Embassies is shielding the transmission lines so emanations do not escape. Once this problem is resolved, they will be able to transfer classified messages directly to sections or individual desks. Paper copy-making capability will still exist, but they hope to discourage this since information will be retrievable electronically. It will be years before many embassies have this capability. Under SEP, they are installing equipment capable of storing and retrieving classified material within a central location. One official said they will have trouble slowing down the copying of classified material until RSOs take steps to restrict the collection of non-essential material. Until sanctions are imposed against offenders, it will be quite difficult to make much of a dent in the accumulation of classified documents.

The State Department also has started a program to put classified, and sensitive, unclassified, information on microfiche. This will also allow better accountability and shorter destruction time. This program is aimed at posts that will not be receiving the new data storage and retrieval systems in the near future, or at all.

SPECIFIC SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENTFUNDED UNDER THE SECURITY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM

Specific systems and equipment funded under the Security Enhancement Program include such items as:

emergency medical kits	emergency breathing devices
weapons and ammunition	intruder alarm systems
defensive protective apparel	document destruction equipment, i.e., shredders and disintegrators
tear gas systems	locks and deadbolt devices
partially and fully armored vehicles	improved communications terminal equipment
window grills	improved telephone equipment
ballistic glass and aluminum	hardening of communications centers and critical circuits
emergency descent devices	emergency radio networks
	computer for improving threat analysis capabilities





## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

JUL 20 1982

**CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL  
(Unclassified upon removal of enclosure)

Mr. Frank C. Conahan  
 Director  
 International Division  
 U.S. General Accounting Office  
 Washington, D.C.

Dear Frank:

I am replying to your letter of June 29, 1982, which forwarded copies of the draft report: "Management Problems Delay Implementation of Security for Americans Overseas."

The enclosed comments, with attachments, on this report were prepared by the Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Administration, and reviewed by the Offices of the Director of Management Operations and the Director for Combatting Terrorism, who also serves as the Department's Coordinator for Security Policy and Programs.

To assist in identifying pertinent sections of the comments, the following offers a guide to those pages which comment on specific points listed on page iii of the draft report Digest:

<u>Draft Report</u>	<u>Comments</u>
Delays in implementing security improvements have resulted from inadequate planning and management.	pp. 5-7 (See GAO note.)
There is a shortage of personnel in all participating offices.	pp. 7-8
Special Programs and Liaison Staff personnel have neither the authority to make decisions nor the expertise to make technically-oriented decisions.	pp. 9-11

**CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL  
(Unclassified upon removal of enclosure)

GAO note: Page numbers refer to the draft report and do not correspond to the page numbers in this final report.

**CONFIDENTIAL****CONFIDENTIAL**  
(Unclassified upon removal of enclosure)

- 2 -

The Special Programs and Liaison Staff pp. 11-12  
has no inventory system of their own  
to account for material purchased with  
Security Enhancement funds.

Posts receive incomplete information pp. 11-12  
on security enhancement material  
shipped to them.

We appreciate having had the opportunity to review and comment  
on the draft report. If I may be of further assistance, I  
trust you will let me know.

Sincerely,



Roger B. Feldman

Enclosure:

As stated.

**CONFIDENTIAL****CONFIDENTIAL**  
(Unclassified upon removal of enclosure)

GAO note: The enclosure has been omitted. Comments have been incorporated  
in the report, where appropriate.

**International  
Communication  
Agency**

United States of America

Washington, D. C. 20541



July 28, 1982

Dear Frank:

In response to your draft report, "Management Problems Delay Implementation of Security for Americans Overseas," I am pleased to inform you that we found the report to be of considerable interest and value. Our comments on several points are enclosed.

In general, there is excellent cooperation between the Department of State and USICA in providing overseas security services. However, as our comments indicate, the security requirements of USICA's facilities abroad are often substantially different from those of the State Department. Our separate buildings must be open to the public and, in addition, they often contain little or no classified material. For these reasons, in many cases we can provide fully adequate security for separate USICA facilities at substantially lower cost than if we had to follow the stricter security guidelines of the State Department.

Consequently, we consider it essential that USICA have the authority and funding necessary to provide the security needed for our separate overseas facilities. We would appreciate your reflecting this point in your final report.

Thank you for sharing the report with us and inviting our comments.

Sincerely,



James T. Hackett  
Associate Director  
for Management

Mr. Frank Conahan  
Director  
International Division  
United States General  
Accounting Office

USICA comments concerning the draft General Accounting Office Report, "Management Problems Delay Implementation of Security for Americans Overseas."

The following remarks essentially follow the same order in which subjects are addressed in the Draft Report:

1. The Report criticizes inaction on the part of USICA and State/A/SPL in implementing security enhancement at Deleted (pp. 39 & 40)

The delays at USICA Deleted were caused initially by necessary refinement of the original access control plan by Washington elements and the post, and subsequently by the unexpected termination of Counter-Terrorism Program funding in 1980 (which was initially expected to fund the project). Then the May 1981 A/SPL Security Enhancement Team visit made different recommendations requiring a complete revision of the proposed improvements. Since May 1981 the project has been entirely in the hands of the State Department's Office of Special Projects and Liaison (A/SPL) which has not yet provided the funding.

However, since A/SPL failed to address residential security concerns, USICA took action to fund and procure ultrasonic portable alarms for its residences in Deleted in 1980, and a post request to purchase additional residential alarms is included in the Agency's portion of a FY-82 Security Supplemental budget request made jointly with the State Department.

2. The Report comments on differing policies and security standards between USICA and the State Department as exemplified by the Deleted Cultural Center safehaven (p.41)

Due to the public and relatively open nature of USICA's facilities, State Department "minimum standards" of protection cannot be applied across-the-board. The USICA Office of Security and the RSO planned an adequate secure area for the Deleted Deleted far in advance of the November 1980 Security Enhancement Team visit. The rationale for this location was based on the nature of the building, the absence of classified material, the absence of any internal defense force, and the utilization of the first floor for essentially public-use operations.

Our policy emphasizes prior evacuation of buildings in the event of expected civil disorder, and immediate evacuation in the event of an attack without prior warning. With little or no classified material to protect, USICA facilities often do not need or have secure areas to provide protection for such material. Our secure area is intended to provide initial protection of

GAO note: Post names and information which could identify posts, have been deleted to comply with the State Department requirement that names of posts connected with the Security Enhancement Program be omitted in order for the report to be unclassified.

- 2 -

short duration, until help can be called or escape can be made. It is neither desirable nor logical to hide in a safehaven within the building until help arrives under these circumstances.

Deleted

However, the Security Enhancement Team overrode our project design and recommended a full, 12 hour, costly basement safehaven inconsistent with our policy. After much negotiation, particularly because of the post's uncertainty, the Agency agreed to withdraw objections to the A/SPL-funded basement safehaven at the same time following-through on the inexpensive, yet effective second floor secure area escape route.

The larger issue involved here is that USICA must retain final authority over security requirements for our separate buildings. State Department standards are often inappropriate for USICA establishments and should not be applied solely for the sake of "consistency."

3. The Report recommends that A/SPL have final authority on Security Enhancement projects

We fully support the recommendation that one State Department Office be given authority for administering the Security Enhancement Program. However, as explained in item 2 above, USICA has significantly different requirements with regard to the security of some of its facilities particularly those located separately from embassies or other State Department buildings. Consequently, USICA must have separate funding and authority to provide appropriate security enhancements for its separate facilities and overseas residences.

We would appreciate your revising the recommendations contained on page 55 of your draft report to permit USICA to be allocated a share of the funds of the Security Enhancement Program to be used to meet our special requirements at our separate facilities. In many cases USICA's different requirements for security of its separate facilities may be achieved at substantially lower costs, thereby meeting our needs better at a saving to the taxpayer.



## U.S. Department of Justice

JUL 30 1982

Washington, D.C. 20530

Mr. William J. Anderson  
Director, General Government Division  
United States General Accounting Office  
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Anderson:

Thank you for providing the Department of Justice (Department) an opportunity to comment on your draft report entitled "Management Problems Delay Implementation of Security for Americans Overseas."

The report was provided to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) for review, and both organizations concur with the overall recommendations. Security of personnel overseas is the primary responsibility of the State Department, and any recommendations adopted as a result of the General Accounting Office (GAO) report that would improve security would also enhance the security of FBI and DEA personnel.

As for that section of the draft report relating to DEA security matters, DEA takes exception to one point. Page 43 of the report states that DEA officials in ~~Deleted~~ made statements in opposition to tight security. These two statements are diametrically opposed to DEA policy and must be discounted. DEA personnel stationed overseas face a double threat: first as members of the U.S. Mission and second as narcotics officers. Therefore, it has been and will continue to be DEA policy to enhance tight security at its offices both inside and outside of chancelleries.

Regarding the issue of informants being hesitant to approach a DEA office and/or the chancellery because of tight security, it must be pointed out that DEA policy, both domestically and abroad, suggests that informants not be met at DEA offices. Rather, these meetings should be arranged at locations where there is the least chance of discovery. Therefore, any lessening of security measures to accommodate DEA personnel meeting informants would be contrary to both agency policy and the best interest of the employee.

With the exception stated above, the Department fully supports the implementation of the proposed security enhancement program. We also suggest that the DEA Office of Security Programs be notified in advance of proposed visits by


GAO note: Post names have been deleted to comply with the State Department requirement that names of posts connected with the Security Enhancement Program be omitted in order for the report to be unclassified.

-2-

security enhancement survey teams to countries where DEA has offices so that they may be apprised of any particular security considerations unique to DEA.

Should you desire any additional information relative to our response, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,



Kevin D. Rooney  
Assistant Attorney General  
for Administration

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523

THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

AUG 3 1982

Mr. Frank C. Conahan  
Director, International Division  
U.S. General Accounting Office  
Washington, DC 20548


Dear Mr. Conahan:

The Agency has carefully reviewed the draft GAO Report (C-GAO/ID-82-28) entitled "Management Problems Delay Implementation of Security for Americans Overseas".

As the report is directed specifically to the Department of State's Security Enhancement Program (SEP), I wish to address only that portion of the report which impacts on AID. Namely, it is important to clarify the issue of "differences" between the Department and AID in program policy. The report gives the impression that AID, as an Agency, is in conflict with the Department over specific SEP recommendations. Any conflicts, in fact, have existed only at the mission level and are due more to individual differences of opinion than any policy difference at the Washington level. Such situations have been few, considering the magnitude of the program, and have always been resolved.

This Agency will continue to work closely with the Department to provide AID employees overseas a safe environment in which to work and live.

Sincerely,


  
Herbert L. Beckington

(462503)









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