Summary

The Advanced Solid Rocket Motor, one of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) most controversial and expensive projects, is expected to give the space shuttle enough boost to lift it into orbit. The advanced motor program has been touted as a way to enhance the shuttle's safety and reliability and to increase its lift capacity by about 12,000 pounds. Although these benefits are still expected, the need for the advanced motor has declined since the program began. The new motor may not be used for either of the two payloads projected to need the additional lift capacity. In addition, two advisory groups have questioned whether NASA should develop a new motor when the existing redesigned motor has proven safe and reliable. The advanced motor's estimated development cost has increased in recent years by about 95 percent--to $3.25 billion--mainly because of expanding the development scope, increasing construction costs, and adding cost reserves. The schedule for the first advanced solid rocket motor flight has slipped by 2-1/2 years because of delays in awarding the development contract, funding constraints, and a redesign of the building where propellant is mixed and cast. Program officials said that program costs will ultimately exceed $3.25 billion because the fiscal year 1993 funding level will cause NASA to further stretch out the development schedule.

GAO found that: (1) NASA planned the ASRM program to enhance space shuttle safety and reduce human errors in shuttle motor production; (2) NASA identified two payloads that would need the additional lift capacity that ASRM would provide, but redesigned one payload to make it lighter, and ASRM will not be available by the scheduled launch date for the other payload; (3) several advisory groups have recommended that NASA reconsider the ASRM program; (4) since the catastrophic shuttle accident in January 1986, NASA has flown 26 successful shuttle missions with the redesigned motor that ASRM is intended to replace, with no evidence of safety or reliability problems; (5) estimated ASRM development program costs have increased from $1.67 billion to $3.25 billion, a 95-percent increase; (6) the schedule for the first ASRM flight has slipped 31 months, to February 1997; and (7) further cost increases and schedule delays are likely.