This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-05-533T
entitled 'Unfunded Mandates: Analysis of Reform Act's Coverage and 
Views on Possible Next Steps' which was released on April 14, 2005. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part 
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the 
Federal Workforce and the District of Columbia; Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10: 00 a.m. EST Thursday, April 14, 
2005: 

Unfunded Mandates: 

Analysis of Reform Act's Coverage and Views on Possible Next Steps: 

Statement of Orice M. Williams, Director Strategic Issues: 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-533T]: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-05-533T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce and the 
District of Columbia; Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, U.S. Senate: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) was enacted to address 
concerns about federal statutes and regulations that require nonfederal 
parties to expend resources to achieve legislative goals without being 
provided funding to cover the costs. UMRA generates information about 
the nature and size of potential federal mandates but does not preclude 
the implementation of such mandates. At various times in UMRA’s 10-year 
history, Congress has considered legislation to amend aspects of the 
act to address ongoing questions about its effectiveness.

This testimony is based on GAO’s reports, Unfunded Mandates: Analysis 
of Reform Act Coverage (GAO-04-637, May 12, 2004) and Unfunded 
Mandates: Views Vary About Reform Act’s Strengths, Weaknesses, and 
Options for Improvement (GAO-05-454, March 31, 2005). Specifically, 
this testimony addresses (1) UMRA’s procedures for the identification 
of federal mandates and GAO’s analysis of the implementation of those 
procedures for statutes enacted and major rules issued in 2001 and 
2002, and (2) the views of a diverse group of parties familiar with 
UMRA on the significant strengths and weaknesses of the act as the 
framework for addressing mandate issues and potential options for 
reinforcing the strengths or addressing the weaknesses.

What GAO Found: 

The identification and analysis of intergovernmental and private sector 
mandates is a complex process under UMRA. Proposed legislation and 
regulations are subject to various definitions, exceptions, and 
exclusions before being identified as containing mandates at or above 
UMRA’s cost thresholds. Also, some legislation and rules may be enacted 
or issued via procedures that do not trigger UMRA reviews. In 2001 and 
2002, 5 of 377 statutes enacted and 9 of 122 major or economically 
significant final rules issued were identified as containing federal 
mandates at or above UMRA’s thresholds. Despite the determinations 
under UMRA, at least 43 other statutes and 65 rules resulted in new 
costs or negative financial consequences that affected nonfederal 
parties might perceive as unfunded or underfunded federal mandates.

GAO obtained information from 52 knowledgeable parties, who provided a 
significant number of comments about UMRA, specifically, and federal 
mandates, generally. Their views often varied across and within the 
five sectors we identified (academic/think tank, public interest 
advocacy groups, business, federal agencies, and state and local 
governments). Overall, the numerous strengths, weaknesses, and options 
for improvement identified during the review fell into several broad 
themes, including, among others, UMRA-specific issues such as the act’s 
coverage and enforcement, and more general issues about the design, 
funding, and evaluation of federal mandates. UMRA’s coverage was, by 
far, the most frequently cited issue by parties from the various 
sectors. Parties across most sectors said that UMRA’s numerous 
definitions, exclusions, and exceptions leave out many federal actions 
that might significantly impact nonfederal entities and suggested that 
they should be revisited. However, a few parties, primarily from the 
public interest advocacy sector, viewed UMRA’s narrow coverage as a 
strength that should be maintained. Another issue on which the parties 
had particularly strong views was the perceived need for better 
evaluation and research of federal mandates and more complete estimates 
of both the direct and indirect costs of mandates on nonfederal 
entities. The most frequently suggested option to address these 
evaluation issues was more post-implementation evaluation of existing 
mandates or “look backs” at their effectiveness.

Going forward, the issue of unfunded mandates raises broader questions 
about assigning fiscal responsibilities within our federal system. The 
long-term fiscal challenges facing the federal and state and local 
governments and the continued relevance of existing programs and 
priorities warrant a national debate to review what the government 
does, how it does business, and how it finances its priorities. Such a 
reexamination includes considering how responsibilities for financing 
public services are allocated and shared across the many nonfederal 
entities in the U.S. system.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-533T.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Orice M. Williams, (202) 
512-5837, williamso@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I am pleased to have the opportunity to provide testimony today on 
federal mandates and the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 
(UMRA).[Footnote 1] As you know, UMRA was enacted to address concerns 
expressed by state and local governments about federal statutes and 
regulations that require nonfederal parties to expend resources to 
achieve legislative goals without providing funding to cover the 
costs.[Footnote 2] Many federal programs and initiatives, in areas 
ranging from homeland security to health care and environmental 
protection, involve shared responsibilities--and benefits--for the 
federal government, state, local, and tribal governments, and the 
private sector. Determining the appropriate balance of fiscal 
responsibility between the federal government, state, local, and tribal 
governments, and the private sector in carrying out these federal 
mandates is a constant challenge. As the budgets of federal, state, and 
local governments become more constrained, balancing the costs of 
legislative actions with increasingly limited fiscal resources has 
brought this debate to the forefront. 

Mr. Chairman, my testimony today focuses on the findings from two 
reports we issued over the past year at your request.[Footnote 3] We 
believe that both are important to this committee in the context of 
considering possible revisions to UMRA. The first report, issued in May 
2004, focused on UMRA's procedures for identifying federal mandates and 
our analysis of the implementation of those procedures for statutes 
enacted and major rules issued in 2001 and 2002. Building upon the work 
of the first report, the second report, which is being released 
publicly today, focuses on the views of a diverse group of parties from 
the academic/think tank, business, federal agency, public interest 
advocacy groups, and state and local governments sectors on the 
strengths and weaknesses of UMRA and their suggested options for 
reinforcing the strengths or addressing the weaknesses. While the 
information gathered for this second report reflects only the 
perspectives of those individuals who participated in our review, this 
information comes from organizations and individuals recognized as 
being knowledgeable about the implementation of UMRA and/or federal 
mandate programs. 

In summary, our May 2004 report concluded that while information 
provided under UMRA about potential mandates may have helped to 
discourage or limit federal mandates, proposed legislation and 
regulations must pass through multiple steps and meet multiple 
conditions before being identified as containing mandates at or above 
UMRA's thresholds. In 2001 and 2002, the period of our review, we found 
that 5 of 377 statutes and 9 of 122 major or economically significant 
rules were identified as containing federal mandates at or above UMRA's 
thresholds. Despite the determinations made under UMRA, we found that 
some of the statutes and rules that had not triggered UMRA's 
requirements appeared to have potential financial impacts on affected 
nonfederal parties similar to those of actions that were identified as 
mandates at or above UMRA's thresholds. For example, at least 43 
statutes and 65 rules issued in 2001 and 2002 resulted in new costs or 
other negative financial impacts that affected parties might perceive 
as unfunded or under funded mandates even though they did not meet 
UMRA's definition of a mandate. 

In our most recent report, we found a wide variety of views and 
perspectives on UMRA specifically and federal mandates more generally. 
Not surprisingly, the comments provided fell into several broad 
categories or themes, specifically, (a) UMRA coverage, (b) UMRA 
enforcement, (c) other UMRA issues including the use and usefulness of 
the information generated under the Act and consultations with state 
and other governments, and (d) broader issues involving federal 
mandates included the design and funding of federal mandates and 
evaluating those mandates. Those issues discussed most frequently were 
UMRA's coverage, enforcement, and the evaluation of federal mandates. 
While there was some broad-based support by parties across most sectors 
that these are issues that warrant review and reconsideration, there 
was less agreement about suggested options for dealing with them. 

Identification of Mandates Under UMRA Is Complex: 

The procedures under UMRA for the identification and analysis of 
intergovernmental and private sector mandates are very complex. 
Moreover, some potential mandates are enacted through procedures that 
never require them to be reviewed under UMRA. For example, UMRA does 
not require the automatic review of potential mandates contained in 
appropriation bills, nor does the act cover rules that were issued as 
final without having been preceded by a notice of proposed rulemaking. 
Even if proposed legislation or regulations are reviewed under UMRA, 
those provisions are subject to various definitions, exclusions, and 
exceptions before being identified as containing mandates at or above 
UMRA's cost thresholds. For example, UMRA does not apply to legislative 
provisions that cover constitutional rights, discrimination, emergency 
aid, accounting and auditing procedures for grants, national security, 
treaty ratification, and certain parts of Social Security. As figure 1 
illustrates, a provision in legislation must pass through a multiple 
step process before the Congressional Budget Office prepares required 
statements identifying and estimating the costs of mandates in 
legislation that meet certain criteria and determines whether or not 
those estimated costs meet or exceed UMRA's thresholds.[Footnote 4]

Figure 1: The Multistep Process Necessary for CBO to Identify Federal 
Mandates in Proposed Legislation: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Based on UMRA's requirements, we found that few provisions in statutes 
or rules are considered mandates as defined by UMRA. As mentioned 
previously, in 2001 and 2002, the period of our review, only 5 of the 
377 statutes enacted and 9 of the 122 major rules issued contained 
federal mandates at or above UMRA's thresholds. All 5 statutes and 9 
rules contained private sector mandates and only one final rule--an 
Environmental Protection Agency standard on arsenic in drinking water-
-contained an intergovernmental mandate. 

Despite the determinations made under UMRA, nonfederal parties affected 
by federal actions viewed many more federal actions in statute and 
regulation as containing unfunded or under funded mandates. When we 
explored this issue, we found that some of the statutes and rules that 
had not triggered UMRA's requirements appeared to have potential 
financial impacts on affected parties similar to those of actions that 
had been flagged as containing mandates at or above UMRA' s thresholds. 
Specifically, we identified at least 43 statutes and 65 rules issued in 
2001 and 2002 that resulted in new costs or other negative financial 
impacts on nonfederal parties that the affected parties might perceive 
as unfunded or under funded mandates even though they did not meet 
UMRA's definition of a mandate or did not meet or exceed UMRA's 
thresholds. For these statutes and rules, CBO or federal agencies most 
often had determined that the estimated direct costs or expenditures, 
as defined by UMRA, would not meet or exceed the applicable thresholds 
or that one or more of the other definitions, exclusions, or exclusions 
applied. These findings raised the question of whether UMRA, given its 
procedures, definitions, and exclusions, adequately captures and 
subjects to scrutiny federal statutory and regulatory actions that 
might impose significant financial or other burdens on affected 
nonfederal parties. To begin to address this question, you asked us to 
obtain the views of a diverse group of parties knowledgeable about UMRA 
and federal mandates. 

Views of Parties Regarding UMRA and Unfunded Mandates: 

Parties from the various sectors provided a variety of comments but 
they generally fell into several broad themes. UMRA's coverage was the 
most frequently cited theme, with comments provided by all the sectors 
(academic/think tank, business, federal agencies, public interest 
advocacy groups, and state and local governments). Issues involving 
enforcement were the second most frequently cited but with far fewer 
parties providing comments. Other themes that emerged from the comments 
included the use and usefulness of the information generated under 
UMRA, UMRA's analytic framework, and consultation under UMRA. Finally, 
issues involving the design and funding and evaluation of federal 
mandates also emerged as themes. 

UMRA Coverage Generally Viewed as a Weakness but a Few Parties 
Disagree: 

Given the findings from our May 2004 report, it's not surprising that 
UMRA's coverage, including its numerous definitions, exclusions, and 
exceptions, was the most frequently cited issue by parties from all 
five sectors. Most parties from the state and local governments, 
federal agency, business, and academic/think tank sectors viewed UMRA's 
narrow coverage as a major weakness that leaves out many federal 
actions with potentially significant financial impacts on nonfederal 
parties. However, a few parties, from public interest advocacy groups 
and academic/think tank sectors, considered some of the existing 
exclusions important or identified UMRA's narrow scope as one of the 
Act's strengths. 

The comments about weaknesses in UMRA's coverage ranged from general to 
specific. For example, some parties commented, in general, about the 
number of exclusions and exemptions. Others provided more specific 
comments, including points regarding issues with the exclusion of 
indirect costs and UMRA's cost thresholds for legislative and 
regulatory mandates, which result in excluding many federal actions 
that may significantly impact nonfederal entities. Others raised more 
fundamental concerns about the exclusions for appropriations and other 
legislation not covered by the Act and for rules issued by independent 
regulatory agencies, which are also not covered by UMRA but can result 
in provisions that contain mandates. CBO estimates that in 2004, 5 of 
the 8 laws containing federal mandates (as defined by UMRA) that it did 
not review before enactment, were appropriations acts.[Footnote 5] 
Finally, parties from the state and local government sector also 
identified concerns about gaps in UMRA's coverage of federal preemption 
of state and local authority.[Footnote 6] Although some preemptions are 
covered by UMRA such as those that preempt state or local revenue 
raising authority, they are covered only for legislative actions and 
not for federal regulations. According to CBO's 2005 report on unfunded 
mandates, "Over half of the intergovernmental mandates for which CBO 
provided estimates [in 2004] were preemptions of state and local 
authority."[Footnote 7]

Despite the widespread view in several sectors that UMRA's narrow 
coverage leaves out federal actions with potentially significant 
impacts on nonfederal entities, there was less agreement by parties 
about how to address this issue. The options ranged from general to 
specific but those most frequently suggested were: 

* Generally revisit, amend, or modify the definitions, exceptions, and 
exclusions under UMRA and expand UMRA's coverage. 

* Clarify UMRA's definitions and ensure their consistent implementation 
across agencies to ensure that all covered provisions are being 
included. 

* Change the cost thresholds and/or definitions that trigger UMRA by, 
for example, lowering the threshold for legislative or executive 
reviews and expanding cost definitions to include indirect costs. 

* Eliminate or amend the definitional exceptions for conditions of 
federal financial assistance or that arise from participation in 
voluntary federal programs. 

* Expand UMRA coverage to all preemptions of state and local laws and 
regulations, including those nonfiscal preemptions of state and local 
authority. 

As I mentioned previously, while most parties thought UMRA's narrow 
coverage was a weakness, a few parties from academic/think tank and 
public interest advocacy groups sectors view UMRA coverage differently. 
They viewed UMRA's narrow scope as one of its primary strengths. In 
fact, rather than expanding UMRA's coverage, these parties said that it 
should be kept narrow and that the exceptions and exclusions are 
needed. Between 1996 and 2004, CBO reports that of 5,269 
intergovernmental statements, 617 had mandates and of 5,151 private 
sector statements, 732 had mandates.[Footnote 8] Of the mandates 
identified by CBO, about 9 percent of the intergovernmental mandates 
and almost 24 percent of private sector mandates had costs that would 
exceed the thresholds. As discussed at our January 26, 2005, symposium 
on UMRA and federal mandates, some parties also identified a number of 
suggestions that they could not support, namely any attempt to expand 
UMRA to cover constitutional or civil rights or excluding private 
sector mandates. 

UMRA Enforcement: 

Issues involving UMRA enforcement were the second most frequently cited 
issue but with far fewer parties from each sector commenting. Parties 
across and within sectors had differing views on both the enforcement 
mechanisms provided in the law itself and the level of effort exercised 
by those responsible for implementing UMRA's provisions. Many of the 
comments focused on the point of order--one of the primary tools used 
to enforce UMRA requirements in title I of UMRA. Although the point of 
order provides members of Congress the opportunity to raise challenges 
to hinder the passage of legislative provisions containing an unfunded 
intergovernmental mandate, views were mixed about its effectiveness. 
Those representing state and local government and federal agency 
sectors said that the point of order should be retained because it has 
been successful in reducing the number of unfunded mandates by acting 
as a deterrent to their enactment, without greatly impeding the 
process. Conversely, some parties primarily from academic/think tank, 
business, and federal agency sectors did not believe the point of order 
has been effective in preventing or deterring the enactment of mandates 
and suggested otions to strengthen it. Moreover, others commented about 
its infrequent use.[Footnote 9]

Some parties said the point of order needs to be strengthened by making 
it more difficult to defeat. One suggested revision was to require a 
three-fifths vote in Congress, rather than a simple majority, to 
overturn a point of order. This change was believed to strengthen the 
"institutional salience of UMRA" and to ensure that no mandate under 
UMRA could be enacted if it was supported only by a simple majority. As 
you know, on March 17, 2005, the Senate approved the fiscal year 2006 
budget, which included a provision that would increase to 60 the number 
of votes needed to overturn an UMRA point of order in the Senate. 
[Footnote 10]

A few parties from the federal agency and academic/think tank sectors 
commented on another enforcement mechanism for regulatory mandates-- 
UMRA's judicial review provision, which subjects any agency compliance 
or noncompliance with certain provisions in the Act to judicial review. 
Most felt that this mechanism does not provide meaningful relief or 
remedies if federal agencies have not complied with the requirements of 
UMRA because of its limited focus. Specifically, judicial review is 
limited to requirements that pertain to preparing UMRA statements and 
developing federal plans for mandates that may significantly impact 
small government agencies. Furthermore, if a court finds that an agency 
has not prepared a written statement or developed a plan for one of its 
rules, the court can order the agency to do the analysis and include it 
in the regulatory docket for that rule; but the court may not block or 
invalidate the rule. The few parties commenting about judicial review 
suggested expanding it to provide more opportunities for judicial 
challenges and more effective remedies when noncompliance of the Act's 
requirements occur. A few parties primarily from the academic/think 
tank and public interest advocacy groups sectors said that efforts to 
limit or stop implementation of mandates through legal action might be 
unwarranted, because UMRA was not intended to preclude the enactment of 
federal mandates. They were primarily concerned about litigation being 
used to slow down the regulatory process. 

Commenting parties from business, federal agency, and state and local 
governments sectors questioned some federal agencies' compliance with 
UMRA requirements and the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms to 
address this perceived noncompliance. They mentioned the failure of 
some agencies to consult with state, local and tribal governments when 
developing regulations that may have a significant impact on nonfederal 
entities. Likewise, at least one party of each of the three sectors 
expressed concerns about the lack of accurate and complete information 
provided by federal agencies, which are responsible for determining 
whether a rule includes a mandate and whether it exceeds UMRA's 
thresholds. The perceived lack of compliance with certain UMRA 
requirements generated several suggested changes to UMRA. However, the 
only suggestion that had support across parties from multiple sectors 
was to replicate CBO's role for legislative mandates by creating a new 
office within OMB that would be responsible for calculating the cost 
estimates for federal mandates in regulations. 

Parties Across All Sectors Raise Other Issues Regarding UMRA, but 
Little or No Consensus Emerges: 

Parties from all sectors also raised a number of other issues about the 
use and usefulness of UMRA information (in decreasing the number of 
unfunded mandates), UMRA's analytic framework, and federal agency 
consultations with state, local, and tribal governments, but there was 
no consensus in their views about how these issues should be addressed. 
The parties provided mixed but generally positive views about the use 
and usefulness of UMRA information. Some parties commented that the Act 
does increase awareness of unfunded mandates but thought more could be 
done to increase its usefulness. However, the only option that 
attracted multiple supporters was a suggestion for a more centralized 
approach for generating information within the executive branch similar 
to the suggestions mentioned about improving enforcement. Parties also 
provided a number of comments about the provisions of UMRA that 
establish the analytic framework for cost estimates, which generated a 
few suggested options aimed at improving the quality of information 
generated such as including indirect costs for threshold purposes and 
clarifying certain definitions (e.g. "federal mandates" and 
"enforceable duty"). UMRA's consultation also emerged as a recurring 
theme within and across certain sectors. The comments generally were 
about a perceived lack of consistency across agencies when consulting 
with state and local governments. 

Sectors Also Raise Concerns About Federal Mandates in General: 

Parties from all sectors also raised a number of broader issues about 
federal mandates--namely, the design and funding and evaluation of 
federal mandates--and suggested a variety of options. While most of the 
comments were about the evaluation of federal mandates, some parties 
also raised concerns about the design and funding of mandates, which 
varied across sectors. Issues raised include: (1) costs for mandates 
may vary across different affected nonfederal entities, (2) mismatches 
between the funding needs of parties compared to federal formulas, and 
(3) effects of the timing of federal actions and program changes on 
nonfederal parties. Most often, the comments focused on a perceived 
mismatch between the costs of federal mandates and the amount of 
federal funding provided to help carry them out. Others raised issues 
about the need to address the incentives for the federal government to 
"over leverage" federal funds by attaching (and often revising) 
additional conditions for receiving the funding. 

Parties, primarily from the academic/think tank sector, suggested a 
wide variety of options to address their concerns, but there was no 
broad support for any option. For example, while some parties across 
four sectors suggested providing waivers or offsets to reduce the costs 
of the mandates on affected parties or "off ramps" to release them of 
some responsibilities to fulfill the mandates in a given year if the 
federal government does not provide sufficient funding. Others said 
that compliance with federal mandates should not be made contingent on 
full federal funding and off ramps and waivers can introduce other 
issues. The option of building into the design of federal mandates 
"look back" or sunset provisions that would require retrospective 
analyses of the mandates' effectiveness and results was also suggested. 

About half the parties, representing most sectors commented on the 
evaluation of federal mandates and offered suggestions to improve 
mandates, whether covered by the Act or not. Not surprisingly parties 
in the academic/think tank sector, who felt that the evaluation of 
federal mandates was especially important because there is a lack of 
information about the effects of federal mandates on affected parties, 
provided most of the comments. The issues raised included concerns 
about the lack of focus on evaluating the effectiveness (results) of 
the mandates; the questionable accuracy and completeness of cost 
estimates, particularly ones prepared by federal agencies, and the lack 
of evaluation of the impact of mandates. 

All of these issues are related and the concerns expressed touched upon 
the need to adequately evaluate mandates in the context of costs, 
benefits, impacts, and effectiveness of the mandated actions to achieve 
desired goals. Parties across the sectors suggested that various forms 
of retrospective analysis are needed for evaluating federal mandates 
after they are implemented. Some suggestions for retrospective analysis 
focused on costs and effectiveness of mandates, including comparing 
them to the estimates and expected outcomes. Others from the state and 
local governments sector also suggested focusing on the cumulative 
costs and effects of mandates--the impact of various related federal 
actions, which when viewed collectively, may have a substantial impact 
although any one may not exceed UMRA's thresholds. Finally, parties 
primarily from the academic/think tank sector suggested examining local 
and regional impacts of mandates and analyzing the benefits of federal 
mandates, when appropriate, not just costs. 

Observations Regarding Next Steps: 

As Congress reevaluates UMRA on its 10-year anniversary, the 
information we provided over the past year provides some useful 
insights. First, although parties from various sectors generally 
focused on the areas of UMRA and federal mandates that they would like 
to see fixed, they also recognized positive aspects and benefits of 
UMRA. In particular, they commented about the attention UMRA brings to 
potential consequences of federal mandates and how it serves to keep 
the debate in the spotlight. I also found it notable that no one 
suggested repealing UMRA. 

Second, when considering changes to UMRA itself, UMRA's narrow coverage 
stands out as the primary issue for most sectors because it excludes so 
many actions from coverage under UMRA and contributes to complaints 
about unfunded or under funded mandates as discussed in both of our 
reports. Even with an issue such as coverage on which there was some 
general agreement across most sectors, the variety of suggested options 
indicates that finding workable solutions will require including all 
affected parties in the debate. 

Third, one of the challenges for Congress and other federal policy 
makers is to determine which issues and concerns about federal mandates 
are best addressed in the context of UMRA and which are best considered 
as part of more expansive policy debates on federal mandates and 
federalism. On broader policy issues concerning federal mandates, 
various parties recognized that UMRA is only part of the solution and 
the issue raises broader public policy questions about structuring and 
funding mandates in general. These parties made it clear that 
retrospective analysis is needed to ensure that mandates are achieving 
their desired goals, which could help provide additional accountability 
for federal mandates and provide information that could lead to better 
decisions regarding the design and funding of mandate programs. 

Finally, as we move forward in an environment of constrained fiscal 
resources, the issue of unfunded mandates raises broader questions 
about the assignment of fiscal responsibilities within our federal 
system. Reconsideration of such responsibilities begins with the 
observation that most major domestic programs, costs, and 
administrative responsibilities are shared and widely distributed 
throughout our system. Part of this public policy debate includes a 
reexamination of the federal government's role in our system and a need 
to sort out how responsibilities for these kinds of programs should be 
financed in the future.[Footnote 11] If left unchecked, unfunded 
mandates can weaken accountability and remove constraints on decisions 
by separating the enactment of benefit programs from the responsibility 
for paying for these programs. Likewise, 100 percent federal financing 
of intergovernmental programs can pervert fiscal incentives necessary 
to ensure proper stewardship at the state and local level for shared 
programs. 

Mr. Chairman, once again I appreciate the opportunity to testify on 
these important issues and I would be pleased to address any questions 
you or other members of the committee might have. 

Contacts and Acknowledgements: 

If additional information is needed regarding this testimony, UMRA or 
federal mandates, please contact Orice M. Williams at (202) 512-5837 or 
[Hyperlink, williamso@gao.gov] or Tim Bober at (202) 512-4432 or 
[Hyperlink, bobert@gao.gov]. Other key contributors to the work which 
was associated with this testimony were Tom Beall, Kate Gonzalez, and 
Boris Kachura. 

(450405): 

FOOTNOTES

[1] Pub. L. No. 104-4. 

[2] Pub. L. 104-4 pmbl. As in the act, we generally refer to the 
identification of federal mandates, rather than unfunded mandates, in 
this statement. 

[3] GAO, Unfunded Mandates: Analysis of Reform Act Coverage, GAO-04-637 
(Washington, D.C.: May 12, 2004) and Unfunded Mandates: Views Vary 
About Reform Act's Strengths, Weaknesses, and Options for Improvement, 
GAO-04-454 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005). 

[4] UMRA has several titles. Title I requires congressional committees 
and the Congressional Budget Office to identify and provide information 
on potential federal mandates in certain legislation. Similarly, title 
II of UMRA requires federal agencies to prepare a written statement 
identifying the costs and benefits of federal mandates contained in 
certain regulations and consult with affected parties. For legislation, 
the thresholds are direct costs (in the first 5 fiscal years that the 
relevant mandates would be effective) of $50 million or more for 
intergovernmental mandates and $100 million or more for private sector 
mandates, while the threshold for regulations is expenditures of $100 
million or more in any year. The dollar thresholds are in 1996 dollars 
and are adjusted annually for inflation. 

[5] CBO, A Review of CBO's Activities in 2004 Under the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act (Washington D.C.: March 8, 2005). 

[6] Preemption refers to the power of the federal government to enact 
statutes that override state laws. This power derives from the 
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, which states that 
"The Laws of the United States.shall be the supreme Law of the Land.any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary 
notwithstanding." U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. For example, the Internet 
Tax Freedom Act prohibits states from enacting a tax on Internet access 
or multiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce between 
October 1998 and November 2004 and preempts any state or local laws 
enacted during this period. Pub. L. No. 105-277, Div. C, Tit. XI, § 
1101 (1998) (amended 2004). Title I of UMRA only applies to legislation 
that prohibits states from raising revenue, such as the Internet Tax 
Freedom Act. 2 U.S.C. § 658(3)(A)(i). Other preemptions of states' 
regulatory authority are not subject to UMRA's enforcement scheme. 

[7] CBO's March 2005 UMRA report. 

[8] According to CBO's 2005 report, the numbers represent official 
mandate statements transmitted to Congress by CBO. CBO prepared more 
intergovernmental mandate statements than private-sector mandate 
statements because in some cases it was asked to review a specific 
bill, amendment, or conference report solely for intergovernmental 
mandates. These numbers also exclude preliminary reviews and informal 
estimates for other legislative proposals. Finally, mandate statements 
may cover more than one mandate. Similarly, CBO may address a single 
mandate in more than one statement. 

[9] In the last 10 years, at least 13 points of order under UMRA were 
raised in the House of Representatives and none in the Senate. Only 1 
of the 13, regarding a proposed minimum wage increase as part of the 
Contract with America Advancement Act in 1996, resulted in the House 
voting to reject consideration of a proposed provision. 

[10] As of April 11, 2005, the fiscal year 2006 budget was in 
conference negotiations with the House of Representatives. 

[11] For a broader discussion of our work on 21st century challenges 
see, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal 
Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005).