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entitled 'NASA: More Knowledge Needed to Determine Best Alternatives to 
Provide Space Station Logistics Support' which was released on May 31, 
2005.

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Report to Congressional Requesters:

United States Government Accountability Office:

GAO:

May 2005:

NASA:

More Knowledge Needed to Determine Best Alternatives to Provide Space 
Station Logistics Support:

GAO-05-488:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-05-488, a report to congressional requesters:

Why GAO Did This Study:

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) space 
shuttle fleet has been key to International Space Station operations. 
Since the grounding of the fleet in February 2003, Russia has provided 
logistics support. However, due to the limited payload capacity of the 
Russian space vehicles, on-orbit assembly of the space station stopped.

In May 2004 and in February 2005, NASA testified before the Congress 
that it had assessed using alternative launch vehicles to the space 
shuttle for space station operations. NASA concluded that using 
alternatives would be challenging and result in long program delays and 
would ultimately cost more than returning the space shuttle safely to 
flight.

Yet uncertainties remain about when the space shuttle will return to 
flight, and questions have been raised about NASA's assessment of 
alternatives. GAO was asked to determine whether NASA's assessment was 
sufficient to conclude that the space shuttle is the best option for 
assembling and providing logistics support to the space station.

What GAO Found:

NASA's 2004 assessment identified significant challenges associated 
with using alternative launch vehicles for space station assembly and 
operation. According to previous studies and our discussions with 
industry representatives, these challenges would likely preclude using 
alternative vehicles for assembly missions. However, NASA's assessment 
was insufficient to conclude that the shuttle was the best option for 
logistics support missions prior to the proposed retirement of the 
space shuttle in 2010. NASA relied primarily on headquarters expertise 
to conduct the informal assessment, and while we recognize that the 
extensive experience of its senior managers is an important element in 
evaluating alternatives, NASA officials did not document the 
proceedings and decisions reached in its assessment. As a result, the 
existence of this assessment of alternatives cannot be verified, nor 
can the conclusions be validated.

NASA is currently evaluating responses from a September 2004 request 
for information from various commercial space transportation industries 
that could provide launch services to support space station operations, 
following retirement of the shuttle in 2010, until the station's 
planned retirement in 2016. NASA officials indicated that a commercial 
launch capability to support space station operations is possible prior 
to the proposed shuttle retirement in 2010, but stated that this 
capability would not eliminate any of the scheduled space shuttle 
flights. NASA is also re-examining its requirements for the type of 
scientific research to be conducted on the space station as well as the 
manifest requirements of the space shuttle. Combining the information 
gathered from commercial industry and a better definition of space 
station and shuttle requirements, NASA officials agree there is an 
opportunity to perform a more comprehensive assessment of alternatives, 
especially for logistics missions late this decade.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

What GAO Recommends:

GAO is recommending that NASA take action to ensure that its current 
assessments of alternatives for providing logistics support are 
comprehensive and fully documented and that the assessments are 
completed before investments are made in commercial space 
transportation. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-488.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Allen Li at (202) 512- 
4841 or lia@gao.gov.

[End of section] 

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

NASA's 2004 Assessment Was Based on Insufficient Knowledge for 
Concluding Space Shuttle Was Best Launch Option, but Opportunities Now 
Exist for More Detailed Study:

Conclusions:

Recommendation for Executive Action:

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

Appendix II: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration:

Appendix III: Challenges of Using Alternative Vehicles:

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

Figures:

Figure 1: Space Shuttle Endeavour Docked to the International Space 
Station:

Figure 2: International Space Station Operations Support until 2016:

Abbreviations:

AAS: Alternate Access to Station:

ATV: Automated Transfer Vehicle:

HTV: H-II Transfer Vehicle:

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:

United States Government Accountability Office:

Washington, DC 20548:

May 18, 2005:

The Honorable Ken Calvert: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science: House of 
Representatives:

The Honorable Sam Brownback: 
United States Senate:

The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher: 
House of Representatives:

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) space 
shuttle has been the primary vehicle for delivering components for 
assembly and providing logistics support to the International Space 
Station. NASA grounded the space shuttle fleet following the Space 
Shuttle Columbia accident in February 2003, leaving the space station 
dependent on Russia to provide crew rotation, crew rescue, and 
logistics support. However, due to the limited payload capacity of 
Russian space vehicles, on-orbit assembly of the space station has 
halted. NASA plans to return the space shuttle to flight by mid 2005 
and resume space station assembly and logistics missions.

In May 2004 and again in February 2005, NASA testified before the 
Congress that it had assessed using alternative launch vehicles for 
completing space station assembly and providing logistics support. 
According to NASA officials, their assessment showed that using 
alternative launch vehicles would introduce unacceptable operational 
risks, technical challenges, long program delays, and would ultimately 
cost more than returning the space shuttle to flight. Therefore, NASA 
concluded that the space shuttle's unique capabilities provided the 
best available option for these missions. Despite these testimonies, 
concerns have been raised about NASA's conclusions, both within 
Congress and the industry. Due to the uncertainty regarding when the 
space shuttle would return to safe flight and concerns that additional 
flights would be needed to support assembly and logistics operations, 
you asked us to determine whether NASA's assessment of alternatives was 
sufficient to conclude that the space shuttle is the best option for 
completing assembly and providing logistics support to the space 
station.

To conduct our work, we obtained and analyzed agency documentation and 
interviewed NASA officials responsible for managing the launch 
services, space shuttle, and space station programs within NASA 
headquarters as well as program managers at NASA centers involved in 
space shuttle and space station operations. We also interviewed 
commercial space transportation contractors and reviewed pertinent 
documentation related to expendable launch vehicles. In addition, we 
reviewed NASA's request for information for commercial space 
transportation services, which it issued in September 2004, and its 
plans for assessing the responses to this request and follow-on 
activities. We conducted our work from August 2004 through April 2005 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
For a complete description of our scope and methodology, see appendix I.

Results in Brief:

In early 2004, NASA performed an informal assessment of alternative 
launch vehicles that was incomplete and did not provide a clearly 
documented rationale to conclude that the space shuttle was the best 
option to support space station operations. NASA identified significant 
challenges associated with using an alternative to the space shuttle 
for space station assembly, which could preclude these missions from 
consideration. However, the assessment conducted by NASA did not 
include an analysis of the schedule impacts or costs associated with 
using alternative launch vehicles for logistics missions later this 
decade. While we recognize that the extensive experience of its senior 
managers is an important element in evaluating alternatives, NASA 
relied primarily on headquarters expertise to conduct the informal 
assessment. NASA officials did not document the proceedings and 
decisions reached in its assessment. As a result, the existence of this 
assessment of alternatives cannot be verified, nor can the conclusions 
be validated.

NASA is currently evaluating responses from commercial industry on 
capabilities of alternate launch services for providing cargo launch 
services to and the ability to return items from the space station. 
Additionally, NASA is re-examining its requirements for the space 
station and space shuttle. With this information from commercial 
industry and more definitive space station requirements, NASA officials 
agreed that there is an opportunity to perform a detailed analysis of 
alternatives to determine if any planned space shuttle missions to 
perform logistics, prior to the shuttle's retirement, could instead 
make use of commercial launch services.

This report makes recommendations aimed at better positioning the 
agency to determine the best available options for providing logistics 
support to the space station and ensuring that NASA's current analyses 
of alternative launch vehicles are comprehensive and fully documented. 
In written comments on a draft of this report, NASA concurred with our 
recommendations.

Background:

NASA and its international partners--Canada, Europe, Japan, and Russia-
-are building the space station to serve as an orbiting research 
facility. The space shuttle is the primary vehicle supporting the 
assembly and resupply of the station. Figure 1 shows the Space Shuttle 
Endeavour docked to the International Space Station. Following the 
Columbia accident in February 2003, the NASA Administrator grounded the 
space shuttle fleet pending an investigation into the cause of the 
accident. The administrator appointed the Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board to determine the cause of the accident and to make 
recommendations for improving the safety of the space shuttle before it 
could return to flight. The board issued its report in August 2003 with 
29 recommendations for improvement--15 of which must be implemented 
before the space shuttle can return to flight. NASA plans to return the 
shuttle to flight in July 2005.

Figure 1: Space Shuttle Endeavour Docked to the International Space 
Station:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

While the shuttle has been grounded, space station crew transfers and 
logistics resupply have depended on Russian Soyuz and Progress 
vehicles.[Footnote 1] Europe and Japan are also developing logistics 
cargo vehicles to support space station operations later this decade. 
These Russian, European, and Japanese vehicles are launched on 
expendable rockets. The European Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV), 
scheduled to be available for missions to the space station in 2006, is 
being designed to rendezvous and dock with the space station's Russian 
Service Module. The Japanese H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV) is scheduled 
to be available in 2008 and will fly within the proximity of the space 
station to be caught by the station's robotic arm before being berthed 
to the space station. The ATV and HTV also carry less cargo than the 
shuttle.

Because the Russian Soyuz and Progress are the only vehicles currently 
available and carry significantly less payload than the space shuttle, 
operations are generally limited to transporting crew, food, potable 
water, as well as propellant resupply for reboosting the space station 
to higher orbits. Launches of space station assembly elements and large 
orbital replacement items for maintenance have effectively ceased.

From 2000 to early 2004, NASA performed two studies that focused on the 
potential use of commercial launch vehicles to provide logistics 
services to the space station. In a 90-day study conducted in 2000, 
NASA determined that no commercial logistics service for the space 
station was possible at that time, as no launch vehicles possessed the 
critical capabilities necessary to provide logistics services, 
including automated rendezvous capabilities. As a result of this study, 
NASA decided to solicit and fund a more detailed review of concepts 
designed to provide logistics services to the space station. The 
Alternate Access to Station (AAS) study contracts were awarded in July 
2002, with 1-year contracts given to four contractors. In summer 2003, 
these contractors presented architectures that relied on existing 
domestic or international expendable launch vehicles. In the fall of 
2003, the contracts were extended, and the contractors were asked to 
address larger cargo delivery capabilities and "downmass" (e.g. 
returning research materials to earth) requirements were added for the 
return of cargo. This study ended in January 2004 with the contractors 
briefing on their study results, at which time NASA concluded that 
developing a domestic capability to meet most of the space station 
cargo service needs was possible within 3 to 5 years.

In January 2004, the President announced a new Vision for Exploration 
that called for retiring the shuttle in 2010, requiring NASA to find an 
alternative to support space station operations through 2016 by the end 
of the decade. The President called for a shift in NASA's long-term 
focus, envisioning that NASA will retire the space shuttle after nearly 
30 years of service as soon as assembly of the International Space 
Station is completed, planned for the end of the decade, and will 
develop a new crew exploration vehicle as well as launch human missions 
to the moon between 2015 and 2020. In essence, NASA's implementation 
plan holds aeronautics, science, and other activities at near constant 
levels and transitions funding currently dedicated to the space station 
and space shuttle programs to the new exploration strategy as the space 
station and space shuttle programs phase out. The vision also changed 
the space station's on-board research focus. Originally, the space 
station was to be used for conducting experiments in near-zero gravity 
to include life sciences research on how humans adapt to long durations 
in space, biomedical research, and materials-processing research. Under 
the new vision, the research will be focused on determining the effects 
of long duration space travel on humans and developing countermeasures 
for those effects, with the goal that the space station research 
necessary to support human explorers on other worlds would be complete 
by 2016. Figure 2 shows NASA's proposed plan for operational support of 
the space station until 2016.

Figure 2: International Space Station Operations Support until 2016:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

NASA's 2004 Assessment Was Based on Insufficient Knowledge for 
Concluding Space Shuttle Was Best Launch Option, but Opportunities Now 
Exist for More Detailed Study:

According to program officials, NASA's 2004 informal assessment 
concluded that alternative launch vehicles would present operational 
risks, technical challenges, and long program delays and would cost 
more than returning the space shuttle to flight, making the space 
shuttle the best option for both assembly and logistics missions 
through the end of the decade. According to previous studies and our 
discussions with commercial industry representatives, the time involved 
for developing an alternate capability would probably preclude assembly 
missions from consideration. However, NASA did not have sufficient 
knowledge to support its conclusion regarding logistic support 
missions. Specifically, NASA did not perform a comparative cost 
analysis that considered the schedule impacts or associated costs of 
planned space shuttle operations. Furthermore, NASA officials did not 
document these informal proceedings and decisions reached; therefore, 
the thoroughness of any assessment of alternatives cannot be verified, 
nor can their conclusions be validated.

NASA is currently evaluating responses from commercial industry on 
different ways to provide logistics services to and from the space 
station. NASA's re-examination of its requirements for the space 
station and space shuttle, coupled with the cost information of 
alternatives obtained from commercial industry responses, provide NASA 
with a basis for performing a detailed analysis of alternatives to 
determine if any planned space shuttle logistics missions could be 
performed by or complemented with commercial launch vehicles later this 
decade.

Technical Challenges Difficult to Overcome for Assembly Missions, but 
Cost Comparison of Later Logistics Missions Insufficient:

As a result of the informal assessment, NASA outlined a number of 
technical challenges to using an alternate vehicle for space station 
support, especially for assembly missions where the space shuttle's 
crew and remote manipulator arm perform key functions. Appendix III 
provides a discussion of these challenges. NASA officials stated they 
used the AAS study, which concentrated solely on logistics support 
missions, as the foundation for its 2004 informal assessment. In a 
summary of that study, NASA reported that the AAS contractors projected 
the cost to develop an alternate launch capability would be 
approximately $1 billion, take 3 to 5 years to develop, and require $2 
to $3 billion per year for operations. We held discussions with 
commercial industry representatives who concurred with this time frame 
to develop an alternate capability to support space station operation. 
Since a majority of the space station assembly missions are scheduled 
within the next 3 years, these types of missions could preclude the use 
of an alternative vehicle.

However, NASA did not have sufficient knowledge to conclude that the 
shuttle was the best option for logistics missions prior to its 
retirement of the shuttle in 2010. NASA officials stated that the 
technical challenges for developing an alternative vehicle could be 
overcome, but probably not before the 28 missions scheduled through 
2010, of which 8 are for logistics, including 5 of the last 7 missions. 
However, we found no evidence of analyses performed by NASA to compare 
the cost and schedule impact of using alternate launch systems with the 
scheduled space shuttle program costs, to include the cost of returning 
the space shuttle to flight. We recently reported that the majority of 
NASA's budget estimates for returning the space shuttle to flight had 
not been fully developed.[Footnote 2] In fact, NASA officials stated 
that they did not compare estimated costs for developing alternative 
launch vehicles against budget estimates for the 28 space shuttle 
flights currently planned to support the space station, which total 
more than $22 billion between fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2010. In 
addition, NASA has also requested $1.8 billion for crew and cargo 
services over the same time frame to purchase commercial services using 
existing and emerging capabilities, both domestic and foreign. In its 
fiscal year 2006 budget request, NASA indicated that such commercial 
services are expected to be available not later than 2009 and that 
these services are a key element in the future of the space station 
program.

Informal Assessment Was Not Documented:

In addition to lacking sufficient knowledge with regard to the use of 
alternatives for logistics missions, NASA did not document the 
proceedings and decisions reached in its 2004 assessment. Specifically, 
the agency did not record the processes it followed and therefore did 
not capture the basis of the decisions reached. When asked about the 
details of the assessment, NASA officials indicated that the informal 
assessment was based primarily on the expertise within the headquarters 
and they did not formally document the decision paths. While we 
recognize that the extensive experience of its senior managers is an 
important element in evaluating alternatives, the existence of any 
formal assessment of alternatives covering the entire range of missions 
for space station support cannot be verified, and the agency's position 
on the space shuttle being the best option cannot be validated.

NASA's Current Request for Information from Commercial Industry and 
Requirements Review Presents an Opportunity to Perform a More Detailed 
Analysis:

NASA received 26 responses from a September 2004 request for 
information that asked for, among other things, input from the 
commercial space industry regarding capabilities and market interest 
for missions for providing cargo launch services to, and the ability to 
return items from, the space station. This request for information had 
similar characteristics as the AAS study, which also had as its 
objective to explore the development of alternative cargo "upmass" and 
"downmass" support for the space station. The responses are being 
evaluated, and NASA plans to seek more detailed information from the 
commercial launch industry for additional study or development work in 
June 2005. According to NASA officials, the responses from industry 
with regard to space station logistics support have been very 
promising. The officials indicated that it might be possible to have a 
developed and certified capability to provide commercial cargo launch 
service to the space station prior to space shuttle retirement late 
this decade, rather than only after its retirement. However, we were 
told these services would not eliminate any of the scheduled space 
shuttle flights, but only augment the capabilities of the space shuttle.

While these responses are being evaluated and knowledge is being 
gathered, NASA is also reviewing the space station research 
requirements and re-examining the planned manifest for the 28 space 
shuttle flights in an attempt to better align their missions to the 
Vision for Space Exploration. According to NASA's fiscal year 2006 
budget submission, the agency is examining configurations of the space 
station that meet the needs of the new vision and the international 
partners with as few space shuttle flights as necessary.

Combining the information gathered from commercial industry and a 
better definition of space station requirements, NASA officials agreed 
there is an opportunity to perform a more comprehensive assessment of 
alternatives, especially for the logistics missions late this decade. 
According to a recent revision of NASA's internal guidance, the most 
important aspect of formulating a program technical approach is 
conducting a thorough analysis of alternatives.[Footnote 3] NASA 
guidance defines an analysis of alternatives as a formal method that 
compares alternatives by estimating their ability to satisfy mission 
requirements through an effectiveness analysis and by estimating their 
life cycle costs through cost analysis. The results of these two 
analysis are used together to produce a cost-effectiveness comparison 
that allows decision-makers to assess cost and effectiveness 
simultaneously. An analysis of alternatives broadly examines multiple 
elements of program alternatives (including technical performance, 
risk, life cycle cost, and programmatic aspects), and is typically an 
important part of the formulation studies.

Conclusions:

NASA views a thorough analysis of alternatives as an important aspect 
in the formulation of a program technical approach. While we recognize 
that the extensive experience of its senior managers is an important 
element in evaluating alternatives, NASA did not have the full breadth 
of knowledge necessary to perform a comprehensive assessment of 
alternative launch vehicles to enable it to conclude the space shuttle 
was the best option to support space station operations. However, 
NASA's recent request for information from industry offers the agency 
an opportunity to enhance its knowledge of alternatives to the space 
shuttle for providing logistics support for the space station and to 
explore the use of alternatives to the existing space shuttle manifest 
currently under review. Although alternate vehicles would not be 
available for missions to the space station until later this decade and 
difficult to use for assembly missions, several of the space shuttle's 
final flights are planned logistics support missions that might be 
conducted using alternative launch vehicles. By completing a 
comprehensive analysis, NASA could also identify the feasibility and 
risks associated with an alternative means of providing logistics 
support to the space station in case delays occur requiring extension 
of the planned 2010 date. Furthermore, a comprehensive and thoroughly 
documented analysis of launch requirements and launch alternatives can 
provide NASA with comparative cost information and afford the agency 
the opportunity to use its resources more effectively and efficiently. 
This is particularly important now since the space station and space 
shuttle programs will be competing for limited resources.

Recommendation for Executive Action:

To better position the agency to determine the best available option 
for providing logistics support to the space station, we recommend the 
NASA Administrator take the following three steps:

* Direct current efforts to explore other space launch options to 
utilize a comprehensive and fully documented assessment of alternatives 
that matches mission requirements, and associated manifest, with the 
launch vehicles expected to be available;

* As part of this assessment, (a) determine the development and 
operation costs associated with these potential alternatives and (b) 
perform a detailed analysis of these alternatives to determine the best 
option for delivering the logistics cargo required for space station 
operations prior to and after space shuttle retirement; and:

* Ensure this assessment is completed before any NASA investments are 
made for commercial space transportation services to the space station.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

In written comments on a draft of this report, NASA concurred with our 
recommendations and stated that the agency seeks to fully explore space 
launch options for assuring access to the space station in conjunction 
with its retirement planning for the space shuttle. NASA plans to 
document its acquisition strategy through a NASA Headquarters 
Acquisition Strategy Meeting prior to release of a request for proposal 
for commercial space station cargo services later this summer. In 
addition, NASA said it will evaluate the cost and capabilities of the 
proposed transportation system to meet space station and agency needs, 
as well as the needs of its partners. NASA also said that its 
acquisition strategy will be consistent with space station 
requirements, international partner agreements, and available funding.

We are encouraged that NASA has taken steps to pursue a deliberate 
alternative cargo transportation system assessment. However, NASA 
should not limit documentation of this effort to the acquisition 
strategy meeting, but should also document the decision paths leading 
up to that event and throughout the evaluation of the transportation 
systems proposed by contractors responding to NASA's request for 
proposals. This approach should identify the decision makers involved 
and provide a fully documented rationale of the acquisition processes 
as NASA analyzes all alternatives to determine the best options for 
delivering the logistics cargo for space station operations. NASA's 
comments are reprinted in appendix II.

As agreed, unless you publicly announce the contents earlier, we plan 
no further distribution of this report until 15 days from its issue 
date. At that time, we will send copies to the NASA Administrator; the 
Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested 
parties. We will also make copies available to others on request. In 
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site 
at http://www.gao.gov.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any 
questions about this report. Major contributors to this report are 
listed in appendix IV.

Signed by: 

Allen Li: 
Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:

[End of section]

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

To determine whether NASA conducted a detailed assessment of 
alternatives to the space shuttle for completing assembly and providing 
logistics support to the International Space Station, we:

* Obtained and analyzed pertinent NASA documents and briefing slides 
related to the International Space Station, space shuttles, and other 
launch alternatives, such as Expendable Launch Vehicles, including: 
European Space Agency Segment Specifications for the Automated Transfer 
Vehicle; Specification for the Japanese H-II Transfer Vehicle; 
International Space Station Payload Integration and Assembly Sequence 
specifications; Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle configurations; space 
station and space shuttle status, history, and cost briefings; Return 
to Flight Status Briefings; and, Alternate Access to Station briefings.

* Reviewed previous GAO reports on NASA, the Space Shuttle Program, 
International Space Station Program, and best practices in many areas 
and multiple agencies. We also reviewed reports from the Congressional 
Budget Office, Congressional Research Service, Office of Management and 
Budget, and the Planetary Society, and Russian Space Program.

* Interviewed officials responsible for managing the programs within 
the Space Operations Mission Directorate at NASA headquarters, as well 
as program managers at Johnson Space Center, Texas. We also interviewed 
NASA officials at Kennedy Space Center, Florida, who are responsible 
for processing space station payloads and integrating those payloads 
with the launch vehicles. We interviewed contractors at Boeing Launch 
Services and Lockheed Martin Space Systems and reviewed pertinent 
documentation related to expendable launch vehicles for space station 
assembly and logistics support. We also reviewed NASA's request for 
information related to commercial industry interest in providing that 
capability and NASA's plans for assessing responses to the request for 
information and follow on activities. For this, we interviewed NASA 
officials within the Space Operations Mission Directorate and at 
Johnson Space Center, Texas. We also interviewed Air Force officials 
from the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program. We also received, 
reviewed, and analyzed follow-up written and oral comments from several 
individuals at these locations and NASA's Science Directorate.

To accomplish our work, we visited and interviewed officials at NASA 
Headquarters, Washington, D.C; Johnson Space Center, Texas; and Kennedy 
Space Center, Florida. These centers were chosen because they maintain 
primary responsibility for conducting space shuttle and space station 
operations on a day-to-day basis. The offices we met with at 
headquarters and each of these centers included space station program 
officials, space shuttle program officials, NASA Launch Services 
Office, the International Space Station Payload Processing Directorate 
at Kennedy Space Center, and Space Shuttle Program Integration Office 
at Kennedy Space Center. We also visited the Boeing Launch Services, 
Inc., in Huntington Beach, California, and Cape Canaveral Air Force 
Station, Florida; Boeing Commercial Space Systems in Research Park, 
Huntsville, Alabama; and Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company in 
Littleton, Colorado, and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida.

We conducted our work from August 2004 through April 2005 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration:

National Aeronautics and Space Administration: Office of the 
Administrator: 
Washington, DC 20546-0001:

May 9, 2005: 

Mr. Allen Li:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management Team: United States 
Government Accountability Office: Washington, DC 20548:

Dear Mr. Li:

Thank you for the completed comprehensive evaluation of alternatives to 
provide Space Station logistics support. I am pleased to express my 
gratitude for the professionalism your team exhibited while conducting 
this essential audit. NASA appreciates the opportunity to comment on 
the Draft Government Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled, 
"NASA: More Knowledge Needed to Determine Best Alternatives to Provide 
Space Station Logistics Support" (GAO-05-488). Below, please find our 
comments to the recommendations provided in your report.

Recommendation 1: "Direct current efforts to explore other space launch 
options to utilize a comprehensive and fully documented assessment of 
alternatives that matches mission requirements, and associated 
manifest, with the launch vehicles expected to be available;"

We concur with your recommendation. NASA has pursued deliberate 
alternative cargo transportation system assessment activities through 
refinements in the International Space Station (ISS) logistical and 
utilization requirements, release and evaluation of responses to a 
Commercial Transportation Services Request for Information and an 
Industry Day held April 25, 2005, to further refine acquisition 
alternatives and ongoing discussions with international partners. NASA 
seeks to fully explore space launch options for assuring access to the 
ISS in conjunction with retirement planning for the Space Shuttle. The 
acquisition strategy pursued will be documented through a NASA 
Headquarters Acquisition Strategy Meeting (ASM) prior to release of a 
subsequent commercial ISS cargo transportation services Request for 
Proposal (RFP) expected later this summer.

Recommendation 2: "As part of this assessment, (a) determine the 
development and operation costs associated with these potential 
alternatives and (b) perform a detailed analysis of these alternatives 
to determine the best option for delivering the logistics cargo 
required for space station operations prior to and after space shuttle 
retirement,"

We concur with your recommendation. As part of the evaluation of the 
ISS cargo transportation system RFP later this year, NASA will evaluate 
the cost and capabilities of the proposed transportation system to meet 
ISS and Agency needs.

NASA expects to develop an acquisition strategy that meets our ISS 
Partners' commitments with necessary flexibility to accommodate 
changing requirements throughout the life of the ISS program.

Recommendation 3: "Ensure this assessment is completed before any NASA 
investments are made for commercial space transportation services to 
the space station."

We concur with your recommendation. NASA's acquisition strategy for ISS 
Cargo Services will follow the Agency ASM process regarding release of 
an RFP through contract award and will be approved by Agency 
management. The approach will be consistent with ISS requirements, 
international partnership agreements, and available funding.

Again, thank you for the critical insight the report provided. We 
assure you that we are well on our way toward implementing your 
recommendations.

Cordially, 

Signed by: 

Frederick D. Gregory: 
Deputy Administrator: 

[End of section]

Appendix III: Challenges of Using Alternative Vehicles:

According to NASA officials involved in the 2004 assessment, 
accommodating a transition to other launch vehicles would create 
significant challenges that drive risk, schedule, and costs. NASA 
officials stated the space station elements were designed and built to 
take advantage of the more benign launch environment in the space 
shuttle's cargo bay, to be removed and repositioned by the space 
shuttle's robotic arm, and then connected together by the space shuttle 
crew during space walk activities. The following outlines the major 
challenges NASA identified:

* There would be a need to develop a new process to assemble the space 
station using only the space station crew and without the benefit of 
the space shuttle remote manipulator arm.

* Using another launch vehicle would require the redesign and retesting 
of space station elements already built due to the change in launch 
environment. NASA officials stated the space shuttle launch 
environment, with respect to vibration and g-force exerted on the 
payload, cannot be duplicated on an expendable launch vehicle.

* A new, unique transfer vehicle would need to be developed in order to 
rendezvous and dock assembly elements with the space station. For 
logistics cargo support, two transfer vehicles are currently being 
developed for logistics mission to support space station operations, 
the European Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) and the Japanese H-II 
Transfer Vehicle (HTV). These vehicles, much like the Russian Progress 
vehicle, have a limited cargo capability when compared to the space 
shuttle. The ATV, scheduled to be available for missions to the space 
station in 2006, is being designed to rendezvous and dock to the space 
station via the Russian Service Module. The HTV is scheduled to be 
available in 2008 and will fly within the proximity of the space 
station to be caught by the space station's robotic arm before being 
berthed to the space station.

* A carrier to go inside the new transfer vehicle to replicate the 
space shuttle attach points would need to be developed.

* According to these officials, in order to meet volume requirements, 
the payload fairings would have to be modified from the current 5-meter 
to a 6-meter version to accommodate the larger diameter payloads to the 
space station during assembly missions.

[End of section]

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contact:

Allen Li (202) 512-4841:

Acknowledgments:

Staff making key contributions to this report were Jim Morrison, James 
Beard, Rick Cederholm, Karen Sloan, and T.J Thomson.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Soyuz vehicles are used primarily to ferry crew to and from the 
station. Progress vehicles are used to resupply and reboost the station.

[2] GAO, Space Shuttle: Cost for Hubble Servicing Mission and 
Implementation of Safety Recommendations Not Yet Definitive, GAO-05-34 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2004).

[3] NPR 7120.5C: NASA Program and Project Management Processes and 
Requirements, March 22, 2005.

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