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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on 
Armed Services, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT: 

Tuesday, October 30, 2007: 

Stabilization and Reconstruction: 

Actions Needed to Improve Governmentwide Planning and Capabilities for 
Future Operations: 

Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director International Affairs and 
Trade, and: 

Janet A. St. Laurent, Director: 

Defense Capabilities and Management: 

GAO-08-228T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-228T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, House of 
Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The United States has become increasingly involved in stabilization and 
reconstruction operations as evidenced in the Balkans, Haiti, Somalia, 
Iraq, and Afghanistan. In December 2005, the President issued National 
Security Presidential Directive 44, establishing governmentwide policy 
for coordinating, planning, and implementing U.S. stabilization and 
reconstruction assistance to affected foreign entities. This testimony 
addresses stabilization and reconstruction issues related to (1) State 
Department (State) efforts to improve interagency planning and 
coordination, (2) Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to enhance its 
capabilities and planning, and (3) State efforts to develop civilian 
capabilities. GAO’s statement is based on its May 2007 report on DOD 
stability operations and preliminary observations related to State’s 
interagency planning framework and civilian response capabilities 

What GAO Found: 

State and DOD have begun to take steps to better coordinate 
stabilization and reconstruction activities, but several significant 
challenges may hinder their ability to integrate planning for potential 
operations and strengthen military and civilian capabilities to conduct 
them. State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization is developing a framework for U.S. agencies to use when 
planning stabilization and reconstruction operations, but the framework 
has yet to be fully applied to any operation. The National Security 
Council has not approved the entire framework, guidance related to the 
framework is unclear, and some interagency partners have not accepted 
it. For example, some interagency partners stated that the framework’s 
planning process is cumbersome and too time consuming for the results 
it produces. While steps have been taken to address concerns and 
strengthen the framework’s effectiveness, differences in planning 
capacities and procedures among U.S. government agencies may pose 
obstacles to effective coordination. 

DOD has taken several positive steps to improve its ability to conduct 
stability operations but faces challenges in developing capabilities 
and measures of effectiveness, integrating the contributions of non-DOD 
agencies into military contingency plans, and incorporating lessons 
learned from past operations into future plans. These challenges, if 
not addressed, may hinder DOD’s ability to fully coordinate and 
integrate stabilization and reconstruction activities with other 
agencies or to develop the full range of capabilities those operations 
may require. Among its many efforts, DOD has developed a new policy, 
planning construct and joint operating concept with a greater focus on 
stability operations, and each service is pursuing efforts to improve 
capabilities. However, inadequate guidance, practices that inhibit 
sharing of planning information with non-DOD organizations, and 
differences in the planning capabilities and capacities of DOD and non-
DOD organizations hinder the effectiveness of these improvement 
efforts. 

Since 2005, State has been developing three civilian corps to deploy 
rapidly to international crises, but significant challenges must be 
addressed before they will be fully capable. State and other agencies 
face challenges in establishing two of these units—the Active Response 
Corps and Standby Response Corps—because of staffing and resource 
constraints and concerns that stabilization and reconstruction 
operations are not core missions for each parent organization. Congress 
has not yet enacted legislation necessary for State to obligate funds 
for the third unit, the Civilian Reserve Corps, staffed solely with non-
federal volunteers. Further, State has not fully defined the types of 
missions these personnel would be deployed to support. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommended that DOD take several actions to improve its 
capabilities and interagency planning. DOD partially agreed but did not 
specify actions it would take to address them. Therefore GAO suggests 
Congress require DOD to do so. GAO has prepared a draft report with 
recommendations to State to address the issues cited in this testimony 
and is reviewing State’s comments on the draft. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-228T]. For more information, contact 
Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov, and Joseph 
Christoff, (202) 512-4128 or christoffj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We are pleased to be here today to discuss the goals, opportunities, 
and challenges to improving an integrated government approach to 
stability and reconstruction operations, which is becoming an 
increasingly important aspect of our national security. Stabilization 
and reconstruction operations may include efforts to reestablish 
security, strengthen governance, rebuild infrastructure, and improve 
social and economic well-being in foreign states and regions at risk 
of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife. These 
operations have increasingly become a central operational mission for 
the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State (State), 
highlighted by experiences in the Balkans, Haiti, Somalia, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan. The Defense Science Board's 2004 Summer Study on 
Transition to and from Hostilities noted that since the end of the Cold 
War, the United States has been involved in either a stability or 
reconstruction operation every 18 to 24 months, these operations 
typically last 5 to 8 years, and they are costly in terms of human 
lives and dollars. 

In December 2005, the President issued National Security Presidential 
Directive 44 (NSPD-44), which established the overall governmentwide 
policy related to interagency efforts for stabilization and 
reconstruction efforts. The purpose of NSPD-44 is to promote the 
security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, 
and implementation for stabilization and reconstruction assistance to 
foreign states and regions. NSPD-44 assigned the responsibility for 
coordinating and leading integrated federal efforts to plan for and 
conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities to the Secretary of 
State. It further stated that the Secretary of State shall coordinate 
such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmony with any 
planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of 
conflict. State and DOD have emphasized that success in stabilization 
and reconstruction efforts will depend heavily upon the ability to 
develop an integrated, interagency approach, and they have initiated 
steps to facilitate this shift in focus. 

Our testimony today will address (1) Department of State efforts to 
improve interagency planning and coordination for stabilization and 
reconstruction operations, (2) Department of Defense efforts to enhance 
stability operations capabilities and plans, and (3) State efforts to 
develop a civilian response capability. 

Our testimony is based on recently completed or ongoing work that 
addresses DOD and State efforts to enhance and better integrate 
stability and reconstruction capabilities. In May 2007, we issued a 
report to Representative Christopher Shays, Ranking Member, 
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, House Committee 
on Oversight and Government Reform, on the DOD's approach to stability 
operations and interagency planning and made several recommendations 
for executive action.[Footnote 1] We are also completing work for 
Representative Shays and this subcommittee on State's interagency 
planning framework and civilian response capacities, and we have 
prepared a draft report summarizing our results. We are reviewing 
State's comments on our draft report and are developing recommendations 
to address the problems cited in this statement. For both our prior 
report and ongoing work, we obtained and analyzed National Security 
Presidential Directives; DOD, State, and other relevant agencies' 
internal policies; planning guidance; operational plans; budget 
requests and funding allocations for stability and reconstruction 
efforts. We met with cognizant officials from the Departments of 
Defense, State, Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security, Justice and 
the Treasury, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); 
and private research centers. We also met with various officials and 
military planners from the U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, 
and U.S. Pacific Command and, collectively, 14 component commands. 
While NSPD-44 also charges State with coordinating U.S. stabilization 
and reconstruction efforts with foreign governments, multilateral 
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations, these areas lie 
outside the scope of our review. Our work was conducted from October 
2005 through September 2007 in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. 

Summary: 

State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 
(S/CRS) is developing a framework for U.S. agencies to use when 
planning and coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations 
for countries at risk of, in, or emerging from conflict. The National 
Security Council (NSC) has adopted two of three elements of the 
framework--an Interagency Management System and procedures for 
initiating the framework's use.[Footnote 2] However, the third element-
-a guide for planning stabilization and reconstruction operations--has 
not been approved or completed. While S/CRS has tested parts of the 
framework, it has not fully applied it to any stabilization and 
reconstruction operation. In completing the framework, State must 
address three unresolved issues. First, NSPD-44, the Foreign Affairs 
Manual, and the framework provide unclear and inconsistent guidance on 
the roles and responsibilities of S/CRS and State's other bureaus and 
offices. Second, the lack of a common definition for stability and 
reconstruction operations may pose an obstacle to interagency 
collaboration. Third, some interagency partners expressed concerns over 
the importance and utility of the framework, stating that the framework 
is cumbersome and time-consuming for the results it has produced. 

DOD has taken several positive steps to improve its ability to conduct 
stability operations but faces challenges in identifying needed 
capabilities and measures of effectiveness, integrating the 
contributions of non-DOD agencies into military contingency plans, and 
incorporating lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, and other 
operations into future plans. These challenges, if not addressed, may 
hinder DOD's ability to fully coordinate and integrate stabilization 
and reconstruction activities with other elements of national power, or 
to develop the full range of capabilities those operations may require. 
Since November 2005, the department issued a new directive focused on 
stability operations, expanded its military planning guidance, and 
developed a joint operating concept to help guide DOD planning for 
stability operations. Notwithstanding these positive and important 
steps, however, DOD has encountered challenges in identifying stability 
operations capabilities and developing measures of effectiveness--both 
of which are key tasks required by DOD's recent directive and important 
steps in performance-based management. In addition, DOD is taking steps 
to develop more comprehensive military plans related to stability 
operations, but it has not established adequate mechanisms at the 
combatant commands to facilitate and encourage interagency 
participation in its planning efforts. This shortcoming has occurred 
due to inadequate guidance, DOD practices that limit the sharing of 
planning information without the specific consent of the Secretary of 
Defense, and differences in the planning capabilities and capacities of 
all organizations involved. Also, although DOD collects lessons learned 
from past and ongoing operations, DOD planners are not consistently 
using these lessons learned as they develop future contingency plans. 
We have recommended that DOD take several actions, such as providing 
more comprehensive guidance to combatant commanders and the services on 
how to identify and prioritize stability operations capabilities and 
the mechanisms needed to facilitate and encourage interagency 
participation in the development of military plans. We have also 
suggested that Congress require DOD to develop an action plan and 
report annually on its efforts to address our recommendations. 

Since 2005, State has been developing three civilian corps to deploy 
rapidly to international crises but has not addressed key details for 
establishing and maintaining these units. State created two units 
within the department--an Active Response Corps (ARC) and Standby 
Response Corps (SRC) to serve as early responders to an international 
crisis. State also has collaborated with other U.S. government agencies 
to create similar units. In May 2007, State received funding, subject 
to further congressional authorization, to establish a third corps--the 
Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC)--which would deploy a cadre of civilian 
volunteers such as police officers, judges, public administrators, and 
civil engineers. However, State and other agencies face challenges in 
establishing their response corps, including difficulties in (1) 
achieving planned staffing levels and required training, (2) securing 
resources for international operations that some agencies do not view 
as part of their domestic missions, and (3) ensuring that home units 
are not understaffed as a result of overseas deployments. State faces 
additional challenges in creating the Civilian Reserve Corps. State 
does not yet have congressional authority to establish the corps and 
offer personnel an attractive benefits package. Further, State is 
moving the civilian reserve concept forward without a common 
interagency definition of what constitutes a stabilization and 
reconstruction operation. We are reviewing State Department's comments 
on our draft report and developing recommendations to address the 
problems cited in this statement. 

Background: 

Both State and DOD recognize the need to improve stability and 
reconstruction capabilities of the United States, and the importance of 
coordinating military activities with those of other U.S. government 
agencies and international partners. Following the problems with 
reconstruction efforts in Iraq in the Fall of 2003, State noted that 
the U.S. government had no standing civilian capacity to plan, 
implement, or manage stabilization and reconstruction operations and 
had relied on ad hoc processes for planning and executing these 
efforts. State recommended that a new office be established to provide 
a centralized and permanent structure for planning and coordinating the 
civilian response to stabilization and reconstruction operations. 

In August 2004, the Secretary of State announced the creation of the 
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) 
to coordinate U.S. efforts to prepare, plan, and resource responses to 
complex emergencies, failing and failed states, and post conflict 
environments. Such efforts could involve establishing security, 
building basic public services, and economic development. The 
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005 granted statutory authorization 
for S/CRS within the Office of the Secretary of State.[Footnote 3] 

In November 2005, DOD issued DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support 
for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) 
Operations, which established the Department's policy for stability 
operations. In its directive, DOD recognizes that stability operations 
is a core U.S. military mission, but that many stability operations are 
best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals 
and that DOD's participation may be in a supporting role. However, it 
also states that U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all 
tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do 
so. 

In December 2005, President Bush issued NSPD-44 to promote the security 
of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and 
implementation of stabilization and reconstruction assistance. NSPD-44 
assigned the Secretary of State the responsibility to coordinate and 
lead U.S. government efforts to plan for, prepare and conduct 
stabilization and reconstruction operations in countries and regions at 
risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife. The 
Secretary, in turn, delegated implementation of the directive to S/CRS. 
NSPD-44 identifies roles, responsibilities, and coordination 
requirements of U.S. government agencies that would likely participate 
in stabilization and reconstruction operations. It also requires that 
State lead the development of civilian response capability, including 
the capacity to ensure that the United States can respond quickly and 
effectively to overseas crises. Finally, NSPD-44 established the NSC 
Policy Coordination Committee for Reconstruction and Stabilization 
Operations to manage the development, implementation, and coordination 
of stabilization and reconstruction national security policies. 

State's Planning Framework Lacks Full NSC Approval, Clearly Defined 
Roles and Responsibilities, and Interagency Support: 

S/CRS has led an interagency effort to develop a framework for planning 
and coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations. The NSC 
has adopted two of three elements of the framework--the Interagency 
Management System (IMS) and procedures for initiating the framework's 
use. One element--a guide for planning stabilization and reconstruction 
operations--has not been completed. As of October 2007, the framework 
has not been fully applied to any operation. In addition, NSPD-44, the 
Foreign Affairs Manual, and the framework provide unclear and 
inconsistent guidance on roles and responsibilities for S/CRS and other 
State bureaus and offices; the lack of a common definition for 
stability and reconstruction operations may pose an obstacle to 
interagency collaboration; and some partners have shown limited support 
for the framework and S/CRS. 

S/CRS Is Leading the Development of an Interagency Framework for 
Planning and Coordinating U.S. Stabilization and Reconstruction 
Operations: 

S/CRS is leading an NSC interagency group of 16 agencies to create a 
framework for developing specific stabilization and reconstruction 
plans under NSPD-44. The framework is intended to guide the development 
of U.S. planning for stabilization and reconstruction operations by 
facilitating coordination across federal agencies and aligning 
interagency efforts at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. 
Key elements of the framework include an IMS, a guide for planning 
specific stabilization and reconstruction operations, and procedures 
for initiating governmentwide planning. 

The IMS, the first element of the framework, was created to manage high-
priority and highly complex crises and operations. In March 2007, the 
NSC approved the IMS, which would guide coordination between 
Washington, D.C. policymakers, Chiefs of Mission, and civilian and 
military planners. If used, IMS would include three new interagency 
groups for responding to specific crises: a Country Reconstruction and 
Stabilization Group, an Integration Planning Cell, and an Advance 
Civilian Team. The Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group would 
be responsible for developing U.S. government policies that integrate 
civilian and military plans and for mobilizing civilian responses to 
stabilization and reconstruction operations. The Integration Planning 
Cell would integrate U.S. civilian agencies' plans with military 
operations. The Advance Civilian Team would be deployed to U.S. 
embassies to set up, coordinate, and conduct field operations and 
provide expertise on implementing civilian operations to the Chief of 
Mission and military field commanders. These teams would be supported 
by Field Advance Civilian Teams to assist reconstruction efforts at the 
local level. 

The second element of the framework, which the NSC approved in March 
2007, establishes procedures for initiating the use of the framework 
for planning a U.S. response to an actual crisis or in longer-term 
scenario-based planning. Factors that may trigger the use of the 
framework include the potential for military action, actual or imminent 
state failure, the potential for regional instability, displacement of 
large numbers of people, and grave human rights violations. The use of 
the framework for planning crisis responses may be initiated by the NSC 
or by a direct request from the Secretary of State or the Secretary of 
Defense. The NSC, Chiefs of Mission, and Regional Assistant Secretaries 
of State may request the framework's initiation for longer-term 
scenario planning for crises that may occur within 2 to 3 years. 

The third element, the planning guide, has not been approved by the NSC 
because State is rewriting the draft planning guide to address 
interagency concerns.[Footnote 4] Although NSC approval of the draft 
planning guide is not required, S/CRS officials stated that NSC 
approval would lend authority to the framework and strengthen its 
standing among interagency partners. The draft planning guide divides 
planning for stabilization and reconstruction operations into three 
levels: policy formulation, strategy development, and implementation 
planning. The guide states that the goals and objectives at each level 
should be achievable, be linked to planned activities, and include well-
defined measures for determining progress. 

As of October 2007, the administration had not fully applied the 
framework to any stabilization and reconstruction operation. While IMS 
was approved by the NSC, the administration has not yet applied it to a 
current or potential crisis. The administration also applied earlier 
versions of one component of the framework--the planning guide--for 
efforts in Haiti, Sudan, and Kosovo. According to State officials, the 
administration has been using NSPD-1 processes to manage and plan U.S. 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the absence of an approved 
framework.[Footnote 5] 

Framework Lacks Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities, Common 
Definitions, and Interagency Support: 

In completing the framework, State must resolve three key problems. 

First, NSPD-44, the Foreign Affairs Manual, and the framework provide 
unclear and inconsistent guidance on the roles and responsibilities of 
S/CRS and State's bureaus and offices, resulting in confusion and 
disputes about who should lead policy development and control resources 
for stabilization and reconstruction operations. The Foreign Affairs 
Manual does not define S/CRS's roles and responsibilities, but it does 
define responsibilities for State's regional bureaus and Chiefs of 
Mission. Each regional bureau is responsible for providing direction, 
coordination, and supervision of U.S. activities in countries within 
the region,[Footnote 6] while each Chief of Mission has authority over 
all U.S. government staff and activities in the country.[Footnote 7] 
However, according to S/CRS's initial interpretation of NSPD-44, it was 
responsible for leading, planning, and coordinating stabilization and 
reconstruction operations. Staff from one of State's regional bureaus 
said that S/CRS had enlarged its role in a way that conflicted with the 
Regional Assistant Secretary's responsibility for leading an operation 
and coordinating with interagency partners. More recently, according to 
S/CRS officials, S/CRS has taken a more facilitative role in 
implementing NSPD-44. 

Second, the lack of a common definition for stability and 
reconstruction operations may pose an obstacle to effective interagency 
collaboration under the framework. The framework does not define what 
constitutes stabilization or reconstruction operations, including what 
specific missions and activities would be involved. In addition, the 
framework does not explain how these operations differ from other types 
of military and civilian operations, such as counterinsurgency, 
counterterrorism, and development assistance. As a result, it is not 
clear when, where, or how the administration would apply the framework. 
In our October 2005 report, we found that collaborative efforts require 
agency staff to define and articulate a common outcome or 
purpose.[Footnote 8] Prior GAO work shows that the lack of a clear 
definition can pose an obstacle to improved planning and coordination 
of stabilization and reconstruction operations. 

Third, some interagency partners and State staff expressed concern over 
the framework's importance and utility. For example, some interagency 
partners and staffs from various State offices said that senior 
officials did not communicate strong support for S/CRS or the 
expectation that State and interagency partners should use the 
framework. S/CRS has not been given key roles for operations that 
emerged after its creation, such as the ongoing efforts in Lebanon and 
Somalia, which several officials and experts stated are the types of 
operations S/CRS was created to address. In addition, USAID staff noted 
that some aspects of the planning framework were unrealistic, 
ineffective, and redundant because interagency teams had already 
devised planning processes for ongoing operations in accordance with 
NSPD-1. Further, some interagency partners believe the planning 
process, as outlined in the draft planning guide, is too cumbersome and 
time consuming for the results it produces. Although officials who 
participated in planning for Haiti stated that the process provided 
more systematic planning, some involved in the operations for Haiti and 
Sudan said that the framework was too focused on process. Staff also 
said that in some cases, the planning process did not improve outcomes 
or increase resources, particularly since S/CRS has few resources to 
offer. As a result, officials from some offices and agencies have 
expressed reluctance to work with S/CRS on future stabilization and 
reconstruction plans. 

DOD Is Developing a New Approach to Stability Operations, But Faces 
Significant Challenges to Improve Capabilities and Planning: 

DOD has taken several positive steps toward developing a new approach 
to stability operations but has encountered challenges in several 
areas. As discussed in our May 2007 report, since November 2005, the 
department issued a new policy, expanded its military planning 
guidance, and developed a joint operating concept to help guide DOD 
planning for stability operations.[Footnote 9] However, because DOD has 
not yet fully identified and prioritized stability operations 
capabilities as required by DOD's new policy, the services are pursuing 
initiatives that may not provide the comprehensive set of capabilities 
that combatant commanders need to accomplish stability operations in 
the future. Also, DOD has made limited progress in developing measures 
of effectiveness as required by DOD Directive 3000.05, which may hinder 
the department's ability to determine if its efforts to improve 
stability operations capabilities are achieving the desired results. 
Similarly, the combatant commanders are establishing working groups and 
other outreach efforts to include non-DOD organizations in the 
development of a wide range of military plans that combatant commanders 
routinely develop, but these efforts have had a limited effect because 
of inadequate guidance, practices that inhibit sharing of planning 
information, and differences in the planning capabilities and 
capacities of all organizations involved. Finally, although DOD 
collects lessons learned from past operations, DOD does not have a 
process to ensure that lessons learned are considered when plans are 
reviewed. As a result, DOD heightens its risk of either repeating past 
mistakes or being unable to build on its experiences from past 
operations as it plans for future operations. 

DOD Is Developing a New Approach to Stability Operations: 

Among the many improvement efforts under way, DOD has taken three key 
steps that frame its approach to stability operations. First, in 
November 2005, DOD published DOD Directive 3000.05, which formalized a 
stability operations policy that elevated stability operations to a 
core mission, gave such operations priority comparable to combat 
operations, and stated that stability operations will be explicitly 
addressed and integrated across all DOD activities, including doctrine, 
training, education, exercises, and planning. The directive also states 
that many stability operations are best performed by indigenous, 
foreign, or U.S. civilian personnel, but that U.S. military forces 
shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to maintain order when 
civilians cannot do so. The directive assigned approximately 115 
specific responsibilities to 18 DOD organizations. For example, the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is responsible for, among other 
things, identifying DOD-wide stability operations capabilities, and 
recommending priorities to the Secretary of Defense, and submitting a 
semiannual stability operations report to the Secretary of Defense. 

A second step taken by DOD to improve stability operations was to 
broaden its military planning guidance beyond DOD's traditional 
emphasis on combat operations for joint operations to include noncombat 
activities to stabilize countries or regions and prevent hostilities 
and postcombat activities that emphasize stabilization, reconstruction, 
and transition governance to civil authorities.[Footnote 10] Figure 1 
illustrates the change in DOD planning guidance. 

Figure 1: Prior and Current Phases of Military Operations: 

This figure is a chart showing the flow of prior and current phases of 
military operations. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information. 

[End of figure] 

As shown in figure 1, military planners in DOD's combatant commands 
will now be required to plan for six phases of an operation, which 
include new phases focused on (1) shaping efforts to stabilize regions 
so that conflicts do not develop and (2) enabling civil authorities. 
These are also the phases of an operation that will require significant 
unity of effort and close coordination between DOD and other federal 
agencies. 

A third step taken by DOD that frames the approach to stability 
operations was the publication, by Joint Forces Command, of the 
Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and 
Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept. This publication 
will serve as a basis for how the military will support stabilization, 
security, transition, and reconstruction operations in foreign 
countries in the next 15 to 20 years. 

The military services also have taken complementary actions to improve 
stability operations capabilities. For example, the Marine Corps has 
established a program to improve cultural awareness training, increased 
civil affairs planning in its operational headquarters, and established 
a Security Cooperation Training Center. Navy officials highlighted 
service efforts to (1) align its strategic plan and operations concept 
to support stability operations, (2) establish the Navy Expeditionary 
Combat Command, and (3) dedicate Foreign Area Officers to specific 
countries as their key efforts to improve stability operations 
capabilities. 

Specific Challenges Hinder DOD's Ability to Develop Capabilities and 
Encourage Interagency Participation in Combatant Command Planning 
Efforts: 

We have identified four specific challenges that if not addressed, may 
hinder DOD's ability to develop the full range of capabilities needed 
for stability operations, or to facilitate interagency participation in 
the routine planning activities at the combatant commands. 

* DOD has not identified and prioritized the full range of capabilities 
needed for stability operations. At the time of our review, DOD had 
made limited progress in fully identifying and prioritizing 
capabilities needed for stability operations, which was required by DOD 
Directive 3000.05. In the absence of DOD-wide guidance, a variety of 
approaches were being used by the combatant commands to identify 
stability operations capabilities and requirements. 

We identified two factors that limited DOD's progress in carrying out 
the capability gap assessment process.[Footnote 11] First, at the time 
of our review, DOD had not issued its 2007 planning guidance to the 
combatant commanders that reflect the new 6-phase approach to planning 
previously discussed in this testimony. This planning guidance forms 
the basis on which combatant commanders develop operational plans and 
identify needed capabilities. Second, there was significant confusion 
over how to define stability operations. For example, Air Force 
officials stated in their May 22, 2006, Stability Operations Self- 
Assessment that the absence of a common lexicon for stability 
operations functions, tasks, and actions results in unnecessary 
confusion and uncertainty when addressing stability operations. This 
lack of a clear and consistent definition of stability operations has 
caused confusion across DOD about how to identify stability operations 
activities and the end state for which commanders need to plan. 

Because of the fragmented efforts being taken by combatant commands to 
identify requirements, and the different approaches taken by the 
services to develop capabilities, the potential exists that the 
department may not be identifying and prioritizing the most critical 
capabilities needed by the combatant commanders, and the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy has not been able to recommend 
capability priorities to the Secretary of Defense. The department 
recognizes the importance of successfully completing these capability 
assessments, and in the August 2006 report on stability operations to 
the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary stated that the 
department has not yet defined the magnitude of DOD's stability 
operations capability deficiencies, and that clarifying the scope of 
these capability gaps continues to be a priority within the department. 

* DOD has made limited progress in developing measures of 
effectiveness. DOD Directive 3000.05 required numerous organizations 
within DOD to develop measures of effectiveness that could be used to 
evaluate progress in meeting their respective goals outlined in the 
directive. Our past work on DOD transformation reported the advantages 
of using management tools, such as performance measures, to gauge 
performance in helping organizations successfully manage major 
transformation efforts.[Footnote 12] Performance measures are an 
important results-oriented management tool that can enable managers to 
determine the extent to which desired outcomes are being achieved. 
Performance measures should include a baseline and target; be 
objective, measurable, and quantifiable; and include specific time 
frames. Results-oriented measures further ensure that it is not the 
task itself being evaluated, but progress in achieving the intended 
outcome. 

Despite this emphasis on developing performance measures, however, as 
of March 2007, we found that DOD achieved limited progress in 
developing measures of effectiveness because of significant confusion 
over how this task should be accomplished and minimal guidance provided 
by the Office of Policy. For example, each of the services described to 
us alternative approaches it was taking to develop measures of 
effectiveness, and three services initially placed this task on hold 
pending guidance from DOD. Officials in the combatant commands we 
visited were either waiting for additional guidance or stated that that 
there were no actions taken to develop measures of effectiveness. 
Without clear departmentwide guidance on how to develop measures of 
effectiveness and milestones for completing them, confusion may 
continue to exist within the department, and progress on this important 
management tool may be significantly hindered. 

* DOD has not fully established mechanisms that would help it achieve 
consistent interagency participation in the military planning process. 
The combatant commanders routinely develop a wide range of military 
plans for potential contingencies for which DOD may need to seek input 
from other agencies or organizations. Within the combatant commands 
where contingency plans are developed, the department is either 
beginning to establish working groups or is reaching out to U.S. 
embassies on an ad hoc basis to obtain interagency perspectives. But 
this approach to coordinate with embassies on an ad-hoc basis can be 
cumbersome, does not facilitate interagency participation in the actual 
planning process, and does not include all organizations that may be 
able to contribute to the operation being planned. 

Three factors hinder interagency participation in DOD's routine 
planning activities at the combatant commands. First, DOD has not 
provided specific guidance to the commands on how to integrate planning 
with non-DOD organizations. Second, DOD does not have a process in 
place to facilitate the sharing of planning information with non-DOD 
agencies because department policy is to not share DOD contingency 
plans with agencies or offices outside of DOD unless directed by the 
Secretary of Defense. Third, DOD and non-DOD organizations, such as 
State and USAID, lack an understanding of each other's planning 
processes and capabilities and have different planning cultures and 
capacities. 

* DOD collects lessons learned from past operations, but planners are 
not consistently using this information as they develop future 
contingency plans. Lessons learned from current and past operations are 
being captured and incorporated into various databases, but our 
analysis shows that DOD planners are not using this information on a 
consistent basis as plans are revised or developed. Three factors 
contribute to this inconsistent use of lessons learned in planning: (1) 
DOD's guidance for incorporating lessons learned into plans is outdated 
and does not specifically require planners to include lessons learned 
in the planning process, (2) accessing and searching lessons-learned 
databases is cumbersome, and (3) the planning review process does not 
evaluate the extent to which lessons learned are incorporated into 
specific plans. As a result, DOD is not fully utilizing the results of 
the lessons-learned systems and may repeat past mistakes. 

In our May 2007 report,[Footnote 13] we recommended that DOD provide 
comprehensive guidance to enhance their efforts to (1) identify and 
address capability gaps, (2) develop measures of effectiveness, and (3) 
facilitate interagency participation in the development of military 
plans. We also recommended that the Secretary of Defense in 
coordination with the Secretary of State develop a process to share 
planning information with interagency representatives early in the 
development of military contingency plans, and more fully incorporate 
stability operations-related lessons learned into the planning process. 
DOD partially agreed with our recommendations but did not state what 
specific steps, if any, it plans to take to implement them. Therefore, 
we included a matter for congressional consideration suggesting that 
Congress consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to develop an 
action plan and report annually on the specific steps being taken to 
address our recommendations and the current status of its efforts. 

State Is Establishing Three Civilian Corps but Must Address Staffing 
Issues and Seek Additional Congressional Approvals: 

Since 2005, State has been developing three civilian corps to deploy 
rapidly to international crises. State has established two internal 
units made up of State employees--the Active Response Corps (ARC) and 
the Standby Response Corps (SRC). In May 2007, State began an effort to 
establish the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC), which would be made up of 
nonfederal civilians who would become full-time term federal employees. 
State and other agencies face difficulties in establishing positions 
and recruiting personnel for the ARC and training SRC volunteers; 
securing resources for international operations not viewed as part of 
the agencies' domestic missions; and addressing the possibility that 
deployed volunteers could result in staff shortages for the home unit. 
For the CRC, State needs further congressional authorization to 
establish the Corps and provide compensation packages. Further, State 
is moving the civilian reserve concept forward without a common 
interagency definition of stabilization and reconstruction operations. 

Agencies Have Partially Staffed Active and Standby Response Corps; 
Civilian Reserve Corps Still a Concept: 

To meet NSPD-44 requirements for establishing a strong civilian 
response capability, State and other U.S. agencies are developing three 
corps of civilians to support stabilization and reconstruction 
operations. Table 1 summarizes the three civilian corps. 

Table 1: Three Civilian Corps under Development: 

Unit: Active Response Corps (ARC); 
Composition of volunteers: Current State employees serving 1-year 
rotations as first responders; 
Deployment: Within 24-48 hours for 3-6 months; 
Responsibilities: Deploy to unstable environments to support a U.S. 
mission, engage with a host country government, and conduct assessments 
in the field; 
Personnel, as of 2007: 
* 11 filled positions; 
* 15 approved temporary positions; 
Government-wide personnel goal, for FY 2009: 265. 

Unit: Standby Response Corps (SRC); 
Composition of volunteers: Current and retired State employees 
available as second responders; 
Deployment: Within 30-60 days for up to 6 months; 
Responsibilities: Deploy to unstable environments to assist ARC when 
additional or specialized personnel are needed; 
Personnel, as of 2007: 
* 91 current State employees ready to deploy; 
* 209 retirees on roster; 
Government-wide personnel goal, for FY 2009: 2,000. 

Unit: Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC); 
Composition of volunteers: Non-U.S. government employees with expertise 
in critical areas serving 4-year terms; 
Deployment: Within 30-60 days for up to 1 year; 
Responsibilities: Rapidly deploy to a country in crisis to conduct 
assessments; design, implement and evaluate programs; manage 
contractors, etc.; 
Personnel, as of 2007: None; 
Government-wide personnel goal, for FY 2009: 2,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of State Department information. 

[End of table] 

In 2006, State established the ARC within S/CRS, whose members would 
deploy during the initial stage of a U.S. stabilization and 
reconstruction operation. These first responders would deploy to 
unstable environments to assess countries' or regions' needs and help 
plan, coordinate, and monitor a U.S. government response. Since 2006, 
S/CRS has deployed ARC staff to Sudan, Eastern Chad, Lebanon, Kosovo, 
Liberia, Iraq, and Haiti. When not deployed, ARC members engage in 
training and other planning exercises and work with other S/CRS offices 
and State bureaus on related issues to gain relevant expertise. 

Members of the SRC would deploy during the second stage of a 
stabilization and reconstruction operation and would supplement ARC 
staff or provide specialized skills needed for the stabilization and 
reconstruction operation. When not deployed, SRC employees serve in 
other capacities throughout State. Through October 2007, S/CRS has 
deployed SRC members to Sudan in support of the Darfur Peace Agreement 
and to Chad to support Darfur refugees who had migrated into the 
country. 

S/CRS has worked to establish Active and Standby Response Corps in 
other U.S. agencies that could be drawn upon during the initial stage 
of a stabilization and reconstruction operation. Currently, only USAID 
and the Department of the Treasury have established units to respond 
rapidly to stability and reconstruction missions and have identified 
staff available for immediate deployment to a crisis. In July 2007, the 
NSC approved S/CRS plans to establish a governmentwide SRC with 500 
volunteers by fiscal year 2008 and 2,000 volunteers by fiscal year 
2009. 

In 2007, State received authority to make available funds to establish 
a CRC. This corps' staff would be deployed to support stabilization and 
reconstruction operations for periods of time longer than the Active 
and Standby Response Corps. The CRC would be comprised of U.S. 
civilians from the private sector, state and local governments, and 
nongovernmental organizations who have skills not readily available 
within the U.S. government. These reservists would remain in their 
nonfederal jobs until called upon for service and, when deployed, would 
be classified as full-time term federal employees. They would have the 
authority to speak for the U.S. government and manage U.S. government 
contracts and employees. These personnel would receive training upon 
joining CRC and would be required to complete annual training. In 
addition, they would receive training specific and relevant to an 
operation immediately before deployment. 

The Administration Faces Several Challenges in Establishing the Three 
Civilian Corps: 

Based on our work to date, State and other agencies face the following 
challenges in establishing and expanding their Active and Standby 
Response Corps. 

* S/CRS has had difficulty establishing positions and recruiting 
personnel for ARC and training SRC volunteers. S/CRS plans to increase 
the number of authorized staff positions for ARC from 15 temporary 
positions to 33 permanent positions, which State included in its 2008 
budget request. However, according to S/CRS staff, it is unlikely that 
State will receive authority to establish all 33 positions. Further, S/ 
CRS has had trouble recruiting ARC personnel, and as shown in Table 1, 
S/CRS has only been able to recruit 11 of the 15 approved ARC 
positions. State also does not presently have the capacity to train the 
1,500 new SRC volunteers that S/CRS plans to recruit in 2009. S/CRS is 
studying ways to correct the situation. 

* Many agencies that operate overseas have limited numbers of staff 
available for rapid responses to overseas crises because their missions 
are domestic in nature. Officials from the Departments of Commerce, 
Homeland Security, and Justice said that their agencies or their 
appropriators do not view international programs as central to their 
missions. As a result, it is difficult for these agencies to secure 
funding for deployments to active stabilization and reconstruction 
operations, whether as part of a cadre of on-call first and second 
responders or for longer-term assistance programs. 

* State and other agencies said that deploying volunteers can result in 
staff shortages in their home units; thus, they must weigh the value of 
deploying volunteers against the needs of these units. For example, 
according to State's Office of the Inspector General, S/CRS has had 
difficulty getting State's other units to release the SRC volunteers it 
wants to deploy in support of stabilization and reconstruction 
operations.[Footnote 14] Other agencies also reported a reluctance to 
deploy staff overseas or to establish on-call units because doing so 
would leave fewer workers available to complete the offices' work 
requirements.[Footnote 15] 

State also faces several challenges in establishing the CRC. In 2007, 
Congress granted State the authority to make available up to $50 
million of Diplomatic and Consular Programs funds in the fiscal year 
2007 supplemental to support and maintain the CRC.[Footnote 16] 
However, the legislation specified that no money may be obligated 
without specific authorization for the CRC's establishment in a 
subsequent act of Congress. Legislation that would authorize the CRC is 
pending in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, but as of 
October 2007, neither chamber had taken action on the bills.[Footnote 
17] 

In addition, State needs congressional authority to provide key 
elements of a planned compensation package for CRC personnel.[Footnote 
18] Proposed legislation would allow State to provide the same 
compensation and benefits to deployed CRC personnel as it does to 
members of the Foreign Service, including health, life, and death 
benefits; mission-specific awards and incentive pay; and overtime pay 
and compensatory time. However, the proposed legislation does not 
address whether deployed CRC personnel would have competitive hiring 
status for other positions within State or whether the time deployed 
would count toward government retirement benefits. In addition, 
deployed CRC personnel would not have reemployment rights similar to 
those for military reservists. Currently, military reservists who are 
voluntarily or involuntarily called into service have the right to 
return to their previous places of employment upon completion of their 
military service requirements.[Footnote 19] 

Further, S/CRS is moving the CRC concept forward without a common 
interagency definition of stabilization and reconstruction operations. 
According to S/CRS staff and pending legislation that would authorize 
CRC, reservists would deploy to nonhumanitarian stabilization and 
reconstruction missions. However, S/CRS has not defined what these 
missions would be and how they would differ from other foreign 
assistance operations. A common interagency definition of what 
constitutes a stabilization and reconstruction operation is needed to 
determine the corps' structure, the missions it would support, and the 
skills and training its volunteers would need. 

Conclusions: 

State and DOD have begun to take steps to enhance and better coordinate 
stability and reconstruction activities, but several significant 
challenges may hinder their ability to successfully integrate planning 
for potential future operations and strengthen military and civilian 
capabilities to conduct them. Specifically, without an interagency 
planning framework and clearly defined roles and responsibilities, 
achieving unity of effort in stabilization and reconstruction 
operations, as envisioned by NSPD-44, may continue to be difficult to 
achieve. Also, unless DOD develops a better approach for including 
other agencies in the development of combatant commander military 
contingency plans, DOD's plans may continue to reflect a DOD-centric 
view of how potential conflicts may unfold. Moreover, better guidance 
on how DOD should identify and prioritize capability gaps, measure 
progress, and incorporate lessons learned into future planning is 
needed to ensure that DOD is using its available resources to address 
the highest priority gaps in its stability operations capabilities. 
Finally, unless State develops and implements a sound plan to bolster 
civilian capabilities to support stability and reconstruction 
operations and establish a capable civilian reserve corps, DOD may 
continue to be heavily relied upon to provide needed stability and 
reconstruction capabilities, rather than leveraging expertise that 
resides more appropriately in civilian agencies. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes our 
prepared remarks. We would be happy to answer any questions you may 
have. 

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

For questions regarding this testimony, please call Janet A. St. 
Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov or Joseph A. Christoff 
at (202) 512-4128 or christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this report. Other key contributors to this statement were 
Robert L. Repasky, Assistant Director; Judith McCloskey, Assistant 
Director; Sam Bernet; Tim Burke; Leigh Caraher; Grace Coleman; Lynn 
Cothern; Marissa Jones; Sona Kalapura; Kate Lenane; and Amber Simco. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD Stability 
Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning, GAO-07-549 
(Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2007). 

[2] In this testimony, we use the term "framework" to refer to the key 
elements developed to plan and coordinate stabilization and 
reconstruction operations under NSPD-44. The first section of our 
testimony discusses three elements for planning these operations, while 
civilian response mechanisms, which S/CRS considers a fourth element, 
are discussed later in this testimony. 

[3] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 408 
(2004). 

[4] United States Joint Forces Command J7 and Department of State, 
Pamphlet Version 1.0, U.S. Government Draft Planning Framework for 
Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation (December 
2005) and State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization, Update to Draft USG Planning Framework for 
Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation (Washington, 
D.C.: August 2006). When S/CRS and U.S. Joint Forces Command issued the 
first draft in December 2005, they distributed it to stakeholder 
agencies and requested their feedback. 

[5] NSPD-1 organized the NSC and its committees for the current 
administration. 

[6] Foreign Affairs Manual, 1 FAM 112 (a). 

[7] 22 U.S.C. 3927. 

[8] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance 
an Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies GAO-06-15, (Washington, 
D.C.: October 21, 2005) 

[9] Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Military Support for 
Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 28, 2005); Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint 
Publication 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: September 2006); and Department of 
Defense, Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and 
Reconstruction Operations, Joint Operating Concept (Washington, D.C., 
December 2006). 

[10] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0. 

[11] Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials stated they 
intended to identify capabilities through an iterative process known as 
capability gap assessments. They envisioned that geographic combatant 
commands would conduct theater-specific, scenario-driven assessments of 
forces and capabilities required for contingencies through routine DOD 
planning processes, compare planned requirements for stability 
operations with current available forces and military capabilities, and 
propose remedies for eliminating any gaps in capability that they 
identify. 

[12] GAO, Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, 
and Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform 
Military Capabilities, GAO-05-70 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2004). 

[13] GAO-07-549. 

[14] Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office 
of Inspector General, Report of Inspection: Office of the Coordinator 
for Reconstruction and Stabilization, ISP-l-07-26 (Washington, D.C., 
May 2007). 

[15] Some civilian agencies recently agreed to identify, train, and 
deploy employees to stabilization and reconstruction operations if 
State funds the efforts. According to S/CRS staff, however, the 
training and deployment of non-State ARC and SRC would not begin until 
at least fiscal year 2009. 

[16] See U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and 
Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, § 
3810 (2006). 

[17] See 110th Congress, S. 613 and H.R. 1084. 

[18] These benefits would include, among other things, salary 
commensurate with experience; danger, hardship, and other mission- 
specific pays, benefits, and allowances; recruitment bonuses for hard- 
to-fill positions; overtime pay and compensatory time; competitive 
hiring status; federal health, life, and death benefits, and medical 
treatment while deployed; and dual compensation for retired federal 
workers. 

[19] See Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Act, 38 U.S.C 
§§ 4301-4333. 

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