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Report to Congressional Requesters:

September 2003:

Nuclear Regulatory Commission:

Oversight of Security at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants Needs to Be 
Strengthened:

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-752] GAO-03-752:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-03-752, a report to congressional requesters

Why GAO Did This Study:

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks intensified the nation’s 
focus on national preparedness and homeland security. Among possible 
terrorist targets are the nation’s nuclear power plants—104 facilities 
containing radioactive fuel and waste. The Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) oversees plant security through an inspection program 
designed to verify the plants’ compliance with security requirements. 
As part of that program, NRC conducted annual security inspections of 
plants and force-on-force exercises to test plant security against a 
simulated terrorist attack. GAO was asked to review (1) the 
effectiveness of NRC’s security inspection program and (2) legal 
challenges affecting power plant security. Currently, NRC is 
reevaluating its inspection program. We did not assess the adequacy of 
security at the individual plants; rather, our focus was on NRC’s 
oversight and regulation of plant security. 

What GAO Found:

NRC has taken numerous actions to respond to the heightened risk of 
terrorist attack, including interacting with the Department of 
Homeland Security and issuing orders designed to increase security and 
improve plant defensive barriers. However, three aspects of its 
security inspection program reduced NRC’s effectiveness in overseeing 
security at commercial nuclear power plants. 

First, NRC inspectors often used a process that minimized the 
significance of security problems found in annual inspections by 
classifying them as “non-cited violations” if the problem had not been 
identified frequently in the past or if the problem had no direct, 
immediate, adverse consequences at the time it was identified. Non-
cited violations do not require a written response from the licensee 
and do not require NRC inspectors to verify that the problem has been 
corrected. For example, guards at one plant failed to physically 
search several individuals for metal objects after a walk-through 
detector and a hand-held scanner detected metal objects in their 
clothing. The unchecked individuals were then allowed unescorted 
access throughout the plant’s protected area. By making extensive use 
of non-cited violations for serious problems, NRC may overstate the 
level of security at a power plant and reduce the likelihood that 
needed improvements are made. 

Second, NRC does not have a routine, centralized process for 
collecting, analyzing, and disseminating security inspections to 
identify problems that may be common to plants or to provide lessons 
learned in resolving security problems. Such a mechanism may help 
plants improve their security.

Third, although NRC’s force-on-force exercises can demonstrate how 
well a nuclear plant might defend against a real-life threat, several 
weaknesses in how NRC conducted these exercises limited their 
usefulness. Weaknesses included using (1) more personnel to defend the 
plant during these exercises than during a normal day, (2) attacking 
forces that are not trained in terrorist tactics, and (3) unrealistic 
weapons (rubber guns) that do not simulate actual gunfire. 
Furthermore, NRC has made only limited use of some available 
improvements that would make force-on-force exercises more realistic 
and provide a more useful learning experience. 

Even if NRC strengthens its inspection program, commercial nuclear 
power plants face legal challenges in ensuring plant security. First, 
federal law generally prohibits guards at these plants from using 
automatic weapons, although terrorists are likely to have them. As a 
result, guards at commercial nuclear power plants could be at a 
disadvantage in firepower, if attacked. Second, state laws vary 
regarding the permissible use of deadly force and the authority to 
arrest and detain intruders, and guards are unsure about the extent of 
their authorities and may hesitate or fail to act if the plant is 
attacked. 

What GAO Recommends:

GAO is making recommendations to strengthen NRC’s oversight at 
commercial nuclear power plants by promptly restoring annual security 
inspections and revising force-on-force exercises. NRC disagreed with 
many of GAO’s findings, but did not comment on GAO’s recommendations. 
GAO continues to believe its findings are appropriate and the 
recommendations need to be acted upon.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-752.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click 
on the link above. For more information, contact Jim Wells at (202) 
512-3841 or wellsj@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Three Aspects of NRC's Security Inspection Program Inhibit Effective 
Oversight: 

Federal Law Limits the Type of Weapons That Guards Can Use, and State 
Laws Vary on Guards' Authority to Deal with Intruders: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes:

Appendix I: Scope And Methodology: 

Appendix II: U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants That Are Licensed 
to Operate: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

Figures:

Figure 1: Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States: 

Figure 2: Security Enhancements Made before OSRE Exercises: 

Abbreviations: 

DOE: Department of Energy:

NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission:

OSRE: Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation:

Letter September 4, 2003:

The Honorable John D. Dingell 
Ranking Minority Member 
Committee on Energy and Commerce 
House of Representatives:

The Honorable Edward J. Markey 
House of Representatives:

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and 
the Pentagon intensified the nation's focus on national preparedness 
and homeland security. Among possible terrorist targets are the 
nation's commercial nuclear power plants--104 facilities containing 
radioactive fuel and waste operating in 32 states. The Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) licenses commercial nuclear power plants 
and requires the licensee, among other things, to protect the plants 
against a potential terrorist threat. The design basis threat--which 
NRC develops for these facilities--delineates the maximum number of 
terrorists that NRC expects plants to defend against, the extent of 
their training, and the weapons and tactics they could use.

To ensure that commercial nuclear power plants can be protected against 
the design basis threat and meet other security requirements, NRC 
requires each licensee to have an NRC-reviewed and -approved security 
plan before NRC allows the plant to operate. After the plant begins 
operations, NRC oversees plant security through an inspection program 
designed to verify that the plant continues to meet security 
requirements. As part of the security inspection program, NRC conducts 
annual security inspections of plants and conducts force-on-force 
exercises. During the security inspections, NRC reviews (1) the list of 
those who have access to the plant, (2) the plant's response to an 
unusual security event, (3) any changes to the security plan, and (4) 
samples of the plant's own assessment of its security. Since 1991, the 
inspection program has also included periodic force-on-force exercises, 
which are designed to simulate an attack on the plant that is based on 
the design basis threat. NRC also conducts nonrecurring inspection 
activities, such as special inspections to ensure that post-September 
11, 2001, security enhancements have been implemented at each plant.

In 2001, NRC curtailed its annual security inspections and force-on-
force exercises to redesign them for heightened security threats. Until 
the annual security inspections are resumed sometime in 2004, NRC 
inspectors have been verifying that post-September 11, 2001, security 
improvements have been implemented at each plant and conducting special 
inspections if a serious problem is identified by the licensee in its 
quarterly self-assessment. In terms of force-on-force exercises, NRC is 
currently testing and evaluating these exercises under a pilot program 
that has resulted in five exercises being conducted since January 2003.

You asked us to review (1) the effectiveness of NRC's inspection 
program to oversee security at commercial nuclear power plants and (2) 
legal challenges currently affecting physical security at the power 
plants. We did not assess the adequacy of security at the nation's 
nuclear power plants. Rather, our focus was on NRC's oversight and 
regulation of plant security. In conducting our review, we analyzed 
NRC's inspection program from January 2000 through September 2001 and 
the force-on-force exercise program from January 1991 through September 
2001. We also reviewed NRC's initiatives to enhance power plant 
security after September 11, 2001, as well as its efforts to ensure 
that the power plants implemented those initiatives. We met with NRC, 
the Department of Energy (DOE), and power plant representatives and 
obtained NRC advisories, orders, regulations, and inspections reports. 
To determine how NRC tests the power plants' security, we reviewed 
reports for 80 force-on-force exercises that NRC conducted through 
September 2001. We designed and completed a data collection instrument 
in order to organize specific elements that we extracted from these 
reports. We also held discussions with DOE officials to determine how 
they conduct force-on-force exercises at DOE's nuclear facilities and 
if there are any "promising practices" that might be applied to NRC's 
program. Finally, we obtained NRC's and industry officials' views on 
laws that could affect a licensee's ability to adequately secure 
commercial nuclear power plants. Appendix I contains a more detailed 
discussion of our scope and methodology.

Results in Brief:

Since September 11, 2001, NRC has taken numerous actions to increase 
security at commercial nuclear power plants. However, three aspects of 
NRC's security inspection program have reduced its effectiveness in 
overseeing security at commercial nuclear power plants. First, during 
annual inspections, NRC inspectors often classified security problems 
as "non-cited violations" if the problem had not been identified 
frequently in the past or if the problem had no direct, immediate, 
adverse consequences at the time that it was identified. This 
classification tends to minimize the seriousness of the problems. Non-
cited violations do not require a written response from the licensee 
and do not require NRC inspectors to verify that each problem has been 
corrected. For example, guards at one plant failed to physically search 
several individuals for metal objects after a walk-through detector and 
a hand-held scanner detected metal objects in their clothing. The 
unchecked individuals were then allowed unescorted access throughout 
the plant's protected area. Although this incident appears serious, NRC 
issued a non-cited violation for it and rated the plant's security as 
meeting security objectives. Through its extensive use of non-cited 
violations, rather than reporting the problems as more serious cited 
violations, NRC may have overstated the level of security at power 
plants.

Second, NRC does not have a centralized process for routinely 
collecting, analyzing, and disseminating security inspections to 
identify problems that may be common to plants or to provide lessons 
learned in resolving a security problem. Third, although force-on-force 
exercises could demonstrate how well a nuclear plant might defend 
against a real-life threat, several weaknesses in how NRC conducted 
past exercises limited their usefulness. Specifically, (1) NRC 
conducted these exercises at each nuclear power plant once every 8 
years; (2) the licensees used plant defenses during the exercises that 
were enhanced beyond those used during normal operations; (3) the 
attacking forces were not trained in terrorist tactics; (4) 
participants used unrealistic weapons (e.g., rubber guns instead of 
laser equipment, which would better simulate weapon fire); (5) 
exercises did not test the full extent of the design basis threat; and 
(6) exercise reports were often late. As a result, the exercises did 
not provide information on a power plant's ability to defend against 
the maximum design basis threat and permanent correction of problems 
may have been delayed. Furthermore, NRC has made only limited use of 
some available administrative and technological improvements that would 
make force-on-force exercises more realistic and provide a more useful 
learning experience.

Commercial nuclear power plants face legal challenges in ensuring 
physical plant security. First, federal law generally prohibits private 
citizens--including guards at these plants--from using automatic 
weapons, although terrorists are likely to have them. As a result, 
guards at commercial nuclear power plants could be at a disadvantage in 
firepower if attacked. Second, state laws vary regarding the 
permissible use of deadly force and the authority to arrest and detain 
intruders. According to NRC's force-on-force reports and NRC officials, 
plant guards are unsure about when and if they can use deadly force, 
and guards are unclear about what authority they have to arrest and 
detain intruders. As a result, guards may hesitate or fail to take 
action if a plant comes under attack. NRC has recognized the impact of 
these federal and state laws on security and has sought federal 
legislation to address these legal challenges.

We are making recommendations to the NRC Commissioners to restore and 
strengthen NRC's oversight of security at commercial nuclear power 
plants--specifically, NRC's annual inspection program and force-on-
force exercises. In reviewing a draft of this report, NRC did not 
comment on our conclusions and recommendations. NRC did comment that 
our report failed to reflect changes made to the program since 
September 11, 2001, and that the issues addressed in the report were 
relatively minor and were appropriately addressed. While we agree that 
NRC has taken many actions since September 11, we note that most of 
these actions related to enhancing security at the plants and did not 
relate to NRC's oversight efforts. In fact, since September 11, NRC has 
suspended the two major elements of its oversight program, baseline 
inspections and force-on-force exercises. We believe that the issues 
cited in this report, such as improperly screening individuals entering 
the plant, are not minor, and that promptly restoring the annual 
security inspections and force-on-force exercises will improve NRC's 
oversight responsibilities.

Background:

NRC is an independent agency established by the Energy Reorganization 
Act of 1974 to regulate civilian use of nuclear materials. NRC is 
headed by a five-member commission. The President designates one 
commission member to serve as Chairman and official spokesperson. The 
commission as a whole formulates policies and regulations governing 
nuclear reactor and materials safety, issues orders to licensees, and 
adjudicates legal matters brought before it. Security for commercial 
nuclear power plants is primarily the responsibility of NRC's Office of 
Nuclear Security and Incident Response. This office develops overall 
agency policy and provides management direction for evaluating and 
assessing technical issues involving security at nuclear facilities, 
and it is NRC's safeguards and security interface with the Department 
of Homeland Security, the intelligence and law enforcement communities, 
DOE, and other agencies.[Footnote 1] The office also develops and 
directs the NRC program for response to incidents, and it is NRC's 
incident response interface with the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency and other federal agencies. NRC implements its programs through 
four regional offices. Figure 1 shows the location of commercial 
nuclear power plants operating in the United States. (See app. II for a 
list of the commercial nuclear power plants, their locations, and the 
NRC regions that are responsible for them.):

Figure 1: Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Commercial nuclear power plants are also subject to federal and state 
laws that control certain matters related to security functions, such 
as the possession and use of automatic weapons by security guards and 
the use of deadly force.

NRC Security Regulation and Oversight:

NRC begins regulating security at a commercial nuclear power plant when 
the plant is constructed. Before granting an operating license, NRC 
must approve a security plan for the plant. Since 1977, NRC has 
required the plants to have a security plan that is designed to protect 
against a design basis threat for radiological sabotage.[Footnote 2] 
Details of the design basis threat are considered "safeguards 
information" and are restricted from public dissemination.[Footnote 3] 
The design basis threat characterizes the elements of a postulated 
attack, including the number of attackers, their training, and the 
weapons and tactics they are capable of using. The design basis threat, 
revised twice since it was first issued in 1977, requires the plants to 
protect against "a determined violent external assault by stealth, or 
deceptive actions" or "an internal threat of an insider, including an 
employee in any position." Under the 1977 design basis threat, plants 
had to:

* add barriers to vital equipment and work zones and develop 
identification and search procedures for anyone entering restricted 
areas;

* upgrade alarm systems and internal communication networks and control 
keys, locks, and combinations; and:

* maintain a minimum number of guards, armed with semiautomatic 
weapons, that had to be on duty at all times (unless NRC granted an 
exemption that allowed fewer guards).

In 1993, in response to the first terrorist attack on the World Trade 
Center in New York City and to a vehicle intrusion at the Three Mile 
Island nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania, NRC revised the design 
basis threat for radiological sabotage to include the possible use of a 
vehicle bomb. This action required the installation of vehicle barriers 
at the power plants. On April 29, 2003, NRC issued a revised design 
basis threat that the commission believes is the "largest reasonable 
threat against which a regulated private guard force should be expected 
to defend under existing law." NRC has given the power plants 18 months 
to comply with the new design basis threat.

NRC's inspection program is an important element in its oversight 
effort to ensure that commercial nuclear power plants comply with 
security requirements. Security inspectors from the agency's four 
regional offices conduct annual inspections at each plant. These 
inspections are designed to check that the power plants' security 
programs meet NRC requirements in the areas of access authorization, 
access control, and response to contingency events. The inspections 
also involve reviewing changes to the plant's security plan and random 
samples of the plant's own assessment of its security. NRC suspended 
its inspection program in September 2001 to focus its resources on the 
implementation of security enhancements. NRC is currently revising the 
security inspection program.

NRC also conducted force-on-force exercises under the security 
inspection program. These force-on-force exercises, which were referred 
to as Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) exercises, were 
designed to test the adequacy of a plant's capability to respond to a 
simulated attack. NRC began conducting these exercises in 1991 but 
suspended them after September 11, 2001. NRC intends to restructure the 
program. It has recently begun a series of pilot force-on-force 
exercises that are designed to provide a more rigorous test of security 
at the plants and to provide information for designing a new force-on-
force exercise program. No date has been set for completing the pilot 
program or for initiating a new, formal force-on-force program.

NRC Actions to Enhance Security at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants 
since September 11, 2001:

In order to respond to the heightened risk of terrorist attack, NRC has 
had extensive interactions with the Department of Homeland Security and 
the Homeland Security Council on security at commercial nuclear power 
plants. NRC also has issued advisories and orders that were designed to 
increase the size and improve the proficiency of plant security forces, 
restrict access to the plants, and increase and improve plant defensive 
barriers. On October 6, 2001, NRC issued a major advisory, stating that 
the licensees should consider taking immediate action to increase the 
number of security guards and to be cautious of temporary employees. 
NRC conducted a three-phase security inspection, checking the licensees 
to see if they had complied with these advisories. Each licensee's 
resident inspector[Footnote 4] conducted phase one, which was a quick 
overview of the licensee's security program using a headquarters-
prepared survey. During phase two, NRC's regional security inspectors 
conducted a more thorough survey of each plant's security. During phase 
three, which concluded in January 2002, NRC's regional security 
inspectors reviewed each licensee's security program to determine if 
the licensee had complied with the additional measures suggested in the 
October 6, 2001, advisory.

NRC used the results from the three-phase security inspection in 
developing its February 25, 2002, order requiring licensees to 
implement additional security mechanisms.[Footnote 5] Many of the 
order's requirements were actions suggested in previous advisories. The 
licensees had until August 31, 2002, to implement these security 
requirements. In December 2002, NRC completed a checklist to provide 
assurance that the licensees had complied with the order. In addition, 
NRC developed a security inspection procedure to validate and verify 
licensee compliance with all aspects of the order. NRC estimates that 
this procedure will be completed by December 2003. On August 14, 2003, 
NRC stated that 75 percent of the power plants had been inspected for 
compliance with the order.

NRC also took action on an item that had been a security concern for a 
number of years--the use of temporary clearances for temporary workers. 
Commercial nuclear power plants use hundreds of temporary employees for 
maintenance--most frequently during the period when the plant is shut 
down for refueling. In the past, NRC found instances in which personnel 
who failed to report criminal records had temporary clearances that 
allowed them unescorted access to vital areas.[Footnote 6] In its 
October 6, 2001, advisory, NRC suggested that licensees limit temporary 
clearances for temporary workers. On February 25, 2002, NRC issued an 
order that limited the use and duration of temporary clearances, and, 
on January 7, 2003, NRC issued an order to eliminate the use of these 
clearances.[Footnote 7] NRC now requires a criminal history review and 
a background investigation to be completed before allowing temporary 
workers to have unescorted access to the power plants.

On April 29, 2003, in addition to issuing a new design basis threat, 
NRC issued two orders that are designed to ensure that excessive work 
hours do not challenge the ability of security forces in performing 
their duties and to enhance the training and qualification program for 
security forces.

Three Aspects of NRC's Security Inspection Program Inhibit Effective 
Oversight:

NRC's security inspection program may not be fully effective because of 
weakness in three areas. First, during the annual inspections conducted 
from 1999 until September 2001, NRC's regional security specialists 
used a process to categorize the seriousness of security problems that, 
in some cases, minimized their significance. As a result, NRC did not 
track these problems to ensure that they had been permanently corrected 
and may have overstated the level of security at power plants. Second, 
NRC does not routinely collect and disseminate information from 
security inspections to NRC headquarters, other NRC regions, or other 
power plants. Dissemination of this information may help other plants 
to correct similar problems or prevent them from occurring. Third, NRC 
has made limited use of some available administrative and technological 
improvements that would make force-on-force exercises more realistic 
and provide a more useful learning experience.

NRC's Inspection Practices Minimize the Significance of Some Security 
Problems:

NRC ensures that commercial nuclear power plants maintain security by 
monitoring the performance and procedures of the licensees that operate 
them. NRC's inspection program is the agency's only means to verify 
that these plants comply with their own NRC-approved security plans and 
with other NRC security requirements.

NRC suspended its annual security inspection program after September 
11, 2001, and currently is revising the program. NRC does not expect a 
new security inspection program to be implemented until some time in 
2004. Although NRC has temporarily suspended its annual security 
inspections, it continues to check a plant's self-assessments and 
conduct an inspection if the licensee identifies a serious problem.

Under the previous security inspection program, initiated in 1999 and 
suspended in 2001, NRC used a "risk informed" performance-based system 
(the Reactor Oversight Process) that was intended to focus both NRC's 
and the licensees' resources on important safety matters. In an attempt 
to focus NRC attention on plants with the most serious problems, and to 
reduce regulatory burdens on the nuclear industry, the Reactor 
Oversight Process relied heavily on performance assessment data 
generated by the licensees and submitted quarterly to NRC. In the 
security area, these licensee self-assessments provided NRC with data 
on (1) the operation of security equipment (such as intrusion detectors 
and closed-circuit television cameras), (2) the effectiveness of the 
personnel screening program (including criminal history and background 
checks), and (3) the effectiveness of the employee fitness-for-duty 
program (including tests for substance abuse and behavioral 
observations). Under guidelines for these self-assessments, licensees 
are required to report only the most serious problems. NRC inspectors 
followed a multistep process to monitor security, including verifying 
the licensees' self-assessments and conducting their own annual 
inspection. NRC inspectors did not verify all aspects of the licensees' 
self-assessments. Instead, the inspectors made random checks of the 
quarterly self-assessments during their annual security inspection of 
the plant.

During the inspections, the inspectors reviewed the following aspects 
of security at each plant:

* Access authorization and fitness for duty (performed annually). 
Inspectors interviewed supervisors and their staffs about procedures 
for recognizing drug use, possession, and sale; indications of alcohol 
use and aberrant behavior; and records of testing for suspicious 
behavior. These procedures were designed to ensure that the licensee 
conducts adequate personnel screening and enforces fitness-for-duty 
requirements--functions considered critical to protect against an 
insider threat of radiological sabotage.

* Access control (performed annually). Inspectors observed guards at 
entry points during peak hours, checked screening equipment, read event 
reports and logs, checked access procedures for the plant's vital area, 
and surveyed data in the security computers. For example, inspectors 
observed searches of personnel, packages, and vehicles for contraband 
(i.e., firearms, explosives, or drugs) before entry into the protected 
area and ensured that the guards granted only authorized persons 
unescorted access to the protected and the vital areas of the plant.

* Response to contingency events (performed triennially).[Footnote 8] 
Inspectors tested the licensee's physical security by testing the 
intrusion detection system.

* Random checks of changes to security plans (performed biennially). 
Under NRC regulations, licensees can change their security plans 
without informing NRC if they believe that the change does not decrease 
the effectiveness of the plan. Inspectors reviewed security plan 
changes and could have physically examined a change if an issue arose.

If NRC inspectors detected a security problem in these areas, they 
determined the problem's safety significance and whether it violated 
the plant's security plan or other NRC requirements. If a violation 
occurred, and the inspectors determined that the problem was "more than 
minor," they used a "significance determination process" to relate the 
violation to overall plant security. According to NRC officials, the 
significance determination process is also being revised. Under the 
process previously used, the inspectors assigned a violation one of the 
following four ratings: very low significance, low to moderate 
significance, substantial significance, and high significance. For 
violations more serious than very low significance, the licensee was 
required to prepare a written response, stating the actions it would 
take to correct the problem. However, violations judged to be of very 
low significance--usually categorized as non-cited violations--were 
routinely recorded; entered into the plant's corrective action plan; 
and, from NRC's perspective, closed. Violations were judged to be of 
low significance and categorized as a non-cited violation if the 
problem had not been identified more than twice in the past year or if 
the problem had no direct, immediate, adverse consequences at the time 
it was identified. In addition, for non-cited violations, NRC did not 
require a written response from the licensee and did not routinely 
follow up to ensure that a permanent remedy had been implemented unless 
the non-cited violation was randomly selected for review of the 
licensee's corrective action program.

We found that NRC frequently issued non-cited violations. NRC issued 72 
non-cited security violations from 2000 to 2001 compared with no cited 
security violations during the same period. In addition, NRC issued 
non-cited violations for security problems that, while within NRC's 
guidance for non-cited violations, appear to be serious and seem to 
justify the formality and follow-up of a cited violation. For example:

* At one plant, an NRC inspector found a security guard sleeping on 
duty for more than half an hour. This incident was treated as a non-
cited violation because no actual attack had occurred during that time, 
and because neither he nor any other guard at the plant had been found 
sleeping more than twice during the past year.

* At another plant, a security officer falsified logs to show that he 
had checked vital area doors and barriers when he was actually in 
another part of the plant. The officer was the only protection for this 
area because of a "security upgrade project.":

* At another plant, NRC inspectors categorized two security problems as 
non-cited violations because they had not occurred more than twice in 
the past year. In one incident, an inspector observed guards who failed 
to physically search several individuals for metal objects after a 
walk-through detector and a hand-held scanner detected metal objects in 
their clothing. The unchecked individuals were then allowed unescorted 
access throughout the plant's protected area. Also, security was 
compromised in a vital area--where equipment that could be required to 
protect public health and safety is located--when an inspector found 
that tamper alarms on an access door had been disabled. In this case, 
the only compensatory measure implemented was to have a guard check the 
location once during each 12-hour shift.

In addition to NRC's annual inspections, NRC will conduct an inspection 
if a plant's quarterly self-assessment identifies a serious security 
problem. Between 2000 and 2002, only 4 of the 104 plants reported 
security problems that required NRC to conduct a follow-up inspection. 
In 2000, each plant identified that equipment for controlling access to 
the plant's protected area was often broken, requiring extra guards as 
compensation. None of the 104 plants' self-assessments identified any 
security problems in 2001, 2002, or the first 6 months of 2003.

Once every 3 months, NRC develops performance summaries for each of the 
nuclear power plants it regulates. In the security area, NRC uses each 
plant's self-assessment performance indicators and its own annual 
inspections as the basis for each plant's quarterly rating. The 
performance rating can range from "meeting security objectives" to 
"unacceptable." The ratings are displayed on NRC's Web site, which is 
the public's main link to NRC's assessment of the security at each 
plant. However, because of NRC's extensive use of non-cited violations, 
the performance rating may not always accurately represent the security 
level of the plant. For example, the plant where the sleeping guard was 
found was rated as meeting security objectives for that period. NRC 
also rated security as meeting objectives at the plant where physical 
searches were not conducted for metal detected by scanners.

NRC Does Not Systematically Collect, Analyze, and Disseminate 
Information That May Improve Security at All Plants:

NRC does not have a routine, centralized process for collecting, 
analyzing, and disseminating security inspections to identify problems 
that may be common to other plants or to identify lessons learned in 
resolving a security problem that may be helpful to plants in other 
regions. NRC headquarters only receives inspection reports when a 
licensee challenges the findings from security inspections. Following 
the inspection, the regional security specialist prepares a report that 
is then sent to the licensee for comment. If the licensee does not 
challenge the report's findings, the report is filed at the region. If 
the licensee challenges the findings, a NRC headquarters security 
review panel meets to resolve the issue. At this point, headquarters 
security specialists may informally retain copies of the case, but, 
officially, headquarters returns the files to the region, which replies 
to the licensee.

According to NRC headquarters officials, they do not routinely obtain 
copies of all security inspection reports because headquarters files 
and computer databases are insufficient to hold all inspection reports. 
In addition, some of the reports contain safeguards information and can 
only be transferred by mail, courier, or secure fax. Instead, 
headquarters only has a list of reports in its computer database--not 
the narrative details that include safeguards information. According to 
headquarters officials, regional NRC security specialists may maintain 
their own information about security problems and their resolution, but 
they have not done this systematically nor have they routinely shared 
their findings with headquarters or the other regions.

NRC's Force-on-Force Exercises Are Limited in Their Usefulness:

From 1991 through 2001, NRC conducted force-on-force exercises, called 
OSREs, at the nation's commercial nuclear power plants. Although these 
exercises have provided learning experiences for the plants and may 
have helped improve plant security, the exercises did not fully 
demonstrate the plants' security preparedness. The exercises were 
conducted infrequently, against plant security that was enhanced by 
additional guards and/or security barriers, by simulated terrorists who 
were not trained to operate like terrorists, and with unrealistic 
weapons. In addition, the exercises did not test the maximum limits of 
the design basis threat, and inspectors often filed OSRE reports late. 
As a result, the exercises did not provide complete and accurate 
information on a power plant's ability to defend against the maximum 
limits of the design basis threat, and permanent correction of problems 
may have been delayed. Furthermore, NRC has made only limited use of 
some available administrative and technological improvements that would 
make force-on-force exercises more realistic and provide a more useful 
learning experience.

Exercises Were Conducted Infrequently:

NRC was not required by law, regulation, or order to conduct OSRE 
exercises; however, NRC and the licensees believed that these exercises 
were an appropriate mechanism to test the adequacy of the plants' 
security plans, and all licensees agreed to participate in these 
exercises. Since there is no requirement, NRC started the OSRE program 
without guidance on how frequently the exercises should be conducted at 
each plant. NRC conducted OSRE exercises at each commercial nuclear 
power plant about once every 8 years. Sixty-eight power plant sites 
have conducted one OSRE exercise and 12 sites have conducted two 
exercises.

Like NRC, DOE conducts force-on-force exercises at its nuclear 
facilities.[Footnote 9] DOE's regulations state that force-on-force 
exercises should be conducted at every facility once a year. According 
to DOE officials, annual inspections are important because DOE wants 
up-to-date information on security preparedness at each nuclear 
facility; and more frequent exercises require the facilities to 
maintain the quality of the security program because another drill is 
always only a few months away. According to NRC officials, they are 
planning to initiate a new force-on-force exercise program that will be 
based on ongoing pilot force-on-force exercises. They plan to conduct 
an exercise for each licensee every 3 years, which will require 
additional regional security inspectors.

Exercises Were Conducted Against Enhanced Plant Defenses:

According to NRC officials, they provided the licensee with up to 12 
months' advance notice of OSRE exercises so that it could assemble a 
second team of security guards to protect the plant while the exercise 
was being conducted. However, the advanced notification also allowed 
licensees to enhance security prior to the OSRE exercises, and they 
were not required to notify NRC of any enhancements to their security 
plan. As a result, according to NRC officials, during the exercises, 
many plants increased the number of guards that would respond to an 
attack; added security barriers, such as additional fencing; and/or 
added defensive positions that they did not previously have. According 
to our review of all 80 OSRE reports, at least 45--or 56 percent--of 
the exercises were conducted against plant defenders who had received 
additional training for the exercise or against enhanced plant security 
features, such as additional guards or defensive positions or barriers. 
Figure 2 shows the number of OSRE reports that stated that the 
exercises were conducted against (1) guard forces that were larger than 
those provided for in the security plan; (2) increased defensive 
positions or barriers; (3) guards that had received additional 
training; and (4) guard forces that were larger than those provided for 
in the security plan, guards that had received additional training, or 
plants that had enhanced defensive positions or barriers.

Figure 2: Security Enhancements Made before OSRE Exercises:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Although we found 11 instances in which plants had increased the number 
of security guards for the OSRE exercises, an NRC official told us that 
the number was actually higher but was not reported in the OSRE 
reports. According to this official, 52 of the first 55 OSREs conducted 
used more guards than provided for in the plants' security plans. For 
these plants, the number of guards used exceeded the number called for 
in the security plan by an average of 80 percent. According to this 
official, using additional guards impaired the realism of the exercise 
because in the event of an actual attack, only the number of guards 
specified in the security plan would protect the plant.

Plants that used increased numbers of guards, increased training, or 
increased defensive positions or barriers fared better in the OSREs 
than those that used the plant defenses specified in the security plan. 
According to the OSRE reports, of the 45 plants that increased plant 
defenses beyond the level specified in the security plan, 10 (or 22 
percent) failed to defeat the attackers in one or more of the exercises 
conducted during the OSRE. However, of the 35 plants that used only the 
security levels specified in the security plan, 19 (or 54 percent) 
failed to defeat the attackers in one or more exercises conducted 
during the OSRE.

The increased training and preparation for the OSRE exercises provided 
an opportunity for the licensee to examine its security program and 
upgrade the program in areas found lacking. However, according to an 
NRC official, the licensee could decrease security to previous levels 
after the exercise. Consequently, the exercise only provided an 
evaluation of the "ramped up" security and provided little information 
on the plant's normal day-to-day security. According to this official, 
NRC could not hold a licensee accountable for ramping down after the 
OSRE exercise because the enhanced training and additional barriers 
were not part of the licensee's security plan, and NRC can only hold 
the licensee accountable for its security plan. NRC has not required 
that security enhancements implemented to prepare for OSRE exercises be 
included as part of the plants' security plans. However, as of November 
2000, NRC no longer allowed the licensee to increase the number of 
guards or add defensive positions or security barriers for OSRE 
exercises. Between November 2000 and the suspension of the program in 
September 2001, only eight OSREs were conducted.

DOE--which also provides its facilities with advanced notice of a 
scheduled force-on-force exercise (up to 1 year) and allows the 
facility to upgrade its security for the exercise--requires that any 
enhancements to security that are implemented for the exercise become 
integrated into the facility's security plan. DOE inspectors conduct 
follow-up visits to verify that the enhancements have been maintained.

Adversary Forces Were Not Trained in Terrorist Tactics:

Licensees used off-duty guards, guards from other licensees, and 
management personnel as the simulated adversary force for OSRE 
exercises, but these forces may not have accurately simulated the 
dangers of an attack. The guards on the adversary force had training 
only in defending the plant, not in terrorist and offensive tactics or 
in the use of weapons that a terrorist might have. Furthermore, plant 
managers participating in the drill had little or no training or 
experience, even in defensive tactics. Finally, some members of the 
adversary force could have a vested interest in having the licensee's 
guard force successfully defeat them in attempting simulated 
radiological sabotage, thereby demonstrating an adequate security 
program.

In contrast, DOE uses a trained, simulated composite adversary force in 
all of its force-on-force exercises. This force includes guards from 
all departmental facilities.[Footnote 10] Team members are trained in 
offensive tactics and, according to DOE officials, have an "adversary" 
mind-set, which allows them to think and act like terrorists.

According to NRC officials, as part of the pilot program, they are 
assessing the characteristics, training, and selection of the adversary 
force. They said that they also have reviewed DOE's composite adversary 
team methods, attended DOE's adversary training school, and are 
assessing the DOE program's relevance to NRC activities.

Exercises Used Unrealistic Weapons:

Adversary and plant defensive forces generally used rubber weapons 
during OSRE exercises. Although under some circumstances, such as very 
confined spaces, rubber weapons would be the most practical, in 
general, rubber weapons do not simulate actual gunfire or provide real-
time experience. Licensee employees (controller judges) had to 
determine whether a guard or adversary member's weapon hit its intended 
target. This led to unrealistic exercises. For example, in one OSRE 
exercise, the controller judges reported that they could not determine 
when weapons were "fired" or if a person was hit.

DOE usually uses Multiple Integrated Laser Equipment to simulate weapon 
fire and provide real-time experiences. Multiple Integrated Laser 
Equipment consists of weapons-mounted laser transmitters and laser 
sensors on the guard forces and adversary team members. When a laser 
gun is fired and hits a target, an alarm registers the hit, thereby 
allowing the participants to simulate weapon fire and participate in 
real-time exchanges.

A few NRC OSRE exercises used Multiple Integrated Laser Equipment. 
According to one OSRE report, the use of laser guns provided realistic 
scenarios and simulated the stress of an actual engagement. 
Consequently, the exercise showed results that "significantly helped in 
evaluating the effectiveness of both the defensive strategy and the 
officers executing the strategies." NRC officials said that they are 
conducting a $1.4 million assessment of the use of Multiple Integrated 
Laser Equipment.

Exercises Did Not Test the Full Extent of the Design Basis Threat:

NRC never tested several aspects of the design basis threat in the OSRE 
exercises. As a result, NRC could not determine the plants' capability 
to defend against the maximum credible terrorist attack. According to 
the NRC official who was in charge of the OSRE program, NRC did not use 
and test certain adversary capabilities because the exercises would 
have been too rigorous, would have resulted in too many exercises in 
which the adversaries achieved their objectives, and thus may have 
resulted in the elimination of the OSRE program. The second round of 
OSRE exercises, begun in 2000, was originally planned to include all of 
the adversary capabilities. However, from the beginning of the second 
round of OSREs to the suspension of the program in September 2001, none 
of the OSREs included all adversary capabilities.

DOE tests the full adversary capabilities of the design basis threat 
and often goes beyond those capabilities. DOE officials believe it is 
important to test the licensee's security against all of the adversary 
capabilities so that DOE can determine how secure the facility is and 
what improvements are needed.

Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation Reports Were Not Timely:

NRC had a program goal of issuing OSRE reports 30 to 45 days after the 
end of the exercise, but 46 of 76 reports (60 percent) were not issued 
within the required time.[Footnote 11] Delays in releasing a report to 
the licensee may have affected the timeliness of permanent corrective 
actions and diminished the effectiveness of feedback on the exercise. 
On average, NRC issued OSRE reports to the licensees 98 days after the 
end of the exercises. The OSRE reports addressed any problems that 
needed to be corrected and specified how long the licensee had to 
correct the problem. NRC communicated the results of the exercise to 
the licensee at a closeout meeting. If a concern was severe and made 
the licensee vulnerable to security breaches, the licensee was required 
to provide temporary protection to address that concern until it 
implemented a permanent correction. However, the OSRE reports have 
specified an average of 51 days to permanently correct a concern after 
the report was issued. As a result, nearly 5 months elapsed between 
when the exercise was completed and when the report was issued and a 
permanent correction was required.

Federal Law Limits the Type of Weapons That Guards Can Use, and State 
Laws Vary on Guards' Authority to Deal with Intruders:

Commercial nuclear power plants face challenges in securing their 
plants against intruders because federal and state laws limit security 
guards' ability to defend these plants. Federal law generally prohibits 
private ownership of automatic weapons, and there is no exemption in 
the law for security guards at commercial nuclear power 
plants.[Footnote 12] As a result, no nuclear power plants use automatic 
weapons in their defense. However, terrorists attacking a nuclear power 
plant could be armed with automatic weapons or other advanced weapons. 
NRC officials believe that a terrorist attacking a nuclear power plant 
could obtain and use any weapon that can be purchased on the black 
market, while guards generally have to rely on semiautomatic pistols, 
rifles, or shotguns. As a result, guards at nuclear power plants could 
be at a great disadvantage in terms of firepower, if attacked.

According to NRC officials, the use of fully automatic weapons would 
provide an important option to plants as they make security decisions 
about a number of factors, such as the number of plant guards, the 
positioning of guards at the facilities, and the quality and 
capabilities of surveillance equipment. According to these officials, 
plants will have more options in developing the appropriate combination 
of security elements if guards have the authority to carry automatic 
weapons. NRC recognizes, however, that some plant sites face special 
conditions under which fully automatic weapons might not be beneficial 
or practicable.

Commercial nuclear power plants also face security challenges because 
of the absence of nationwide legal authority and clear guidance on when 
and how guards can use deadly force in defending these plants. 
According to NRC's regulations,[Footnote 13] a guard should use deadly 
force in protecting nuclear power reactors against sabotage when the 
guard has a reasonable belief that such force is necessary for self-
defense or the defense of others. However, in general, state laws 
govern the use of deadly force by private sector persons, and these 
laws vary from state to state. For example, under New Hampshire 
statutes, guards may not use deadly force if they can safely retreat 
from the encounter.[Footnote 14] In contrast, Texas statutes allow 
guards to use deadly force in defense of private land or property, 
which includes nuclear power plants, without retreating, if such action 
is necessary to protect against another's use of unlawful 
force.[Footnote 15] In still other states, such as Virginia and 
Michigan, no state statutes specifically address the issue, and the 
courts decide whether deadly force was appropriate in a given 
situation.

NRC officials believe that guards--concerned about their right to act-
-might second-guess, hesitate, delay, or fail to act appropriately 
against an attacker, thereby increasing the risk of a successful attack 
on the nation's nuclear power plants. During OSRE exercises, NRC 
officials presented guards with various scenarios that could involve 
the use of deadly force. In 7 of the 80 OSRE reports we reviewed (about 
9 percent) NRC found that the guards did not understand or did not 
properly apply its guidance on the use of deadly force.

Finally, guards at nuclear power plants do not have nationwide legal 
authority and clear guidance on when and how to arrest and/or detain 
intruders at the nation's plants. NRC officials believe that there is a 
question about whether federal authority can be directly granted to 
private security guards who are not deputized. State laws governing 
this authority vary. For example, in South Carolina, private security 
guards' authority to arrest and/or detain intruders on plant property 
is similar to local law enforcement officials' authority.[Footnote 16] 
However, in most states, these guards have only the arrest authority 
afforded every U.S. citizen.[Footnote 17]

To enable nuclear power plants to better defend against attacks, NRC 
has sought federal legislation that would authorize the use of deadly 
force to protect the plants. Legislation has not been enacted but is 
currently pending on arrest and detain authority.

Conclusions:

NRC has taken several actions to respond to the heightened risk of 
attack following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and, in 
April 2003, issued a new design basis threat that the commercial 
nuclear power plants must be prepared to defend against. However, NRC's 
past methods for ensuring that plants are taking all of the appropriate 
defensive measures--the annual security inspections and the force-on-
force exercises--had significant weaknesses. As a result, NRC's 
oversight of these plants may not have provided the information 
necessary for NRC to ensure that the power plants were adequately 
defended.

In particular, NRC's past use of non-cited violations for security 
problems that appear to be serious is detrimental to ensuring the 
plants' security because NRC did not require follow-up to ensure that a 
non-cited violation was corrected. Lack of follow-up reduces the 
likelihood that needed improvements will be made. Moreover, NRC may 
have overstated security levels when it provided a "meeting security 
objectives" rating to some plants having non-cited violations that 
appear to have serious security implications. NRC could not have known 
whether some non-cited violations, such as guards found asleep on duty 
or failure to physically search for metal detected by scanners, were 
vulnerabilities that could have been exploited. However, accepting such 
vulnerabilities post-September 11, 2001, opens the power plants to 
undue risk. Furthermore, NRC may be missing opportunities to better 
oversee and improve security at the plants because it does not 
routinely collect, analyze, and disseminate information on security 
enhancements, problems, and solutions among the plants and within the 
agency. Such a mechanism may help other plants to improve their 
security.

Similarly, the force-on-force exercises were not realistic enough to 
ensure the identification and correction of plants' security 
vulnerabilities. Untrained adversary teams, temporarily enhanced 
defenses, and rubber weapons used in past force-on-force exercises 
simply do not compare with simulated attack exercises using 
technologically advanced tools that provide realistic, real-time 
experience. Furthermore, NRC was not required to conduct these 
exercises and has done so infrequently, thereby making plants even less 
prepared to address an attack. In addition, in the past, exercises have 
not addressed the full range of the design basis threat. Finally, 
delays in issuing reports on the OSRE exercises may have resulted in 
delays in the permanent correction of known security problems.

NRC is in the process of revising both its security inspection program 
and its force-on-force exercise program. What these programs will 
consist of when they are revised is currently unknown. NRC expects its 
security inspection program to be restored by 2004 and will decide the 
future of its force-on-force program after completing its pilot 
program--at a date yet to be determined. Revisions of these programs 
provide NRC with an opportunity to use the lessons learned from the 
suspended programs to strengthen them and make them more relevant to 
the post-September 11, 2001, environment.

Until these programs are restored, NRC is relying on plants' self-
assessments and the force-on-force pilot program as its mechanisms to 
oversee security at the nation's nuclear power plants. The self-
assessments rely on the licensees to identify problems, which then 
prompts NRC to conduct security inspections. Since the inspection 
program was curtailed in 2001, the plants have not identified any 
serious security problems in their self-assessments. Therefore, it is 
critical for NRC to revise and restore promptly its annual security 
inspections and force-on-force exercises to fulfill its oversight 
responsibilities.

Recommendations for Executive Action:

To strengthen NRC's security inspection program, we recommend that the 
NRC Commissioners:

* ensure that NRC's revised security inspection program and force-on-
force exercise program are restored promptly and require that NRC 
regional inspectors conduct follow-up visits to verify that corrective 
actions have been taken when security violations, including non-cited 
violations, have been identified;

* ensure that NRC routinely collects, analyzes, and disseminates 
information on security problems, solutions, and lessons learned and 
shares this information with all NRC regions and licensees; and:

* make force-on-force exercises a required activity and strengthen them 
by:

* conducting the exercises more frequently at each plant;

* using laser equipment to ensure accurate accounts of shots fired;

* requiring the exercises to make use of the full terrorist 
capabilities stated in the design basis threat, including the use of an 
adversary force that has been trained in terrorist tactics;

* continuing the practice, begun in 2000, of prohibiting licensees from 
temporarily increasing the number of guards defending the plant and 
enhancing plant defenses for force-on-force exercises, or requiring 
that any temporary security enhancements be officially incorporated 
into the licensees' security plans; and:

* enforcing NRC's requirement that force-on-force exercise reports be 
issued within 30 to 45 days after the end of the exercise to ensure 
prompt correction of the problems noted.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

We provided a draft of this report to NRC for its review and comment. 
NRC stated that our report did not provide a balanced or useful 
perspective of its role in ensuring security at commercial nuclear 
power plants. NRC believed that our report was "of a historical 
nature," focusing on NRC's oversight of power plants before September 
11, 2001, and that our report failed to reflect the changes NRC has 
made to its program since September 11. Furthermore, NRC commented that 
our characterization of non-cited violations as minimizing the 
significance of security problems is a serious misrepresentation. NRC 
said that the "anecdotal" issues noted in the draft report were 
"relatively minor issues" and that it treated them appropriately.

We agree that NRC has taken numerous and appropriate actions since 
September 11, 2001, and that additional security procedures have been, 
and are being, put in place to increase power plant operators' 
attention to enhancing security. Our draft report had discussed many of 
these actions, and we have added additional language to the report to 
more fully reflect these actions. We note that most of these actions 
were advisories or requirements for the licensee to enhance plant 
physical security and did not relate to NRC's oversight activities. 
With respect to NRC oversight of security at the nuclear power plants, 
NRC has suspended the two primary elements of its oversight program, 
the security inspection program and the OSRE exercises and has not yet 
resumed them. NRC's oversight actions since September 11 have been 
interim in nature; it has conducted ad hoc inspections and some force-
on-force exercises as part of a pilot program. NRC said that it plans 
to reinstitute the security inspection and the force-on-force exercise 
programs in the future, but it does not now know what the revised 
programs will consist of. As a result, we remain convinced that it was 
appropriate to examine NRC's security oversight program before 
September 11. In the absence of any formal post-September 11 oversight 
program, this was the only way to systematically assess the strengths 
and weaknesses of NRC's oversight. Our recommendations are directed at 
strengthening the oversight programs and making NRC's oversight more 
relevant to the post-September 11 environment.

In that regard, while the NRC comments reference numerous efforts and 
enhancements, we note that, with one exception, these actions were 
designed to enhance power plant security and not to improve or enhance 
NRC's oversight program, which is the subject of this report. The one 
exception is NRC's force-on-force evaluation program, a major element 
in NRC's oversight program. In its comments, NRC stated that we failed 
to adequately reflect NRC's enhanced force-on-force evaluation program, 
including the increased frequency and greater degree of realism of the 
exercises. We disagree. NRC has not yet instituted a new force-on-force 
program, and our report reflects NRC's current force-on-force efforts. 
NRC suspended its old OSRE program after September 11, 2001, and is 
currently conducting pilot force-on-force exercises, which we describe 
in this report. NRC has not determined when a permanent program will be 
instituted or what it will consist of when it is reinstituted. NRC 
plans to use the results of the pilot exercises to help formulate a 
new, permanent program.

We also disagree that the "anecdotal" issues cited in the draft report 
were "relatively minor issues" and do not believe that the continued 
extensive use of non-cited violations will achieve the best oversight. 
Sleeping guards, unauthorized access to protected areas, disabled 
alarms in the vital area, and failure to inspect visitors who set off 
alarms on metal detectors are all serious security problems that 
warrant NRC attention and oversight. NRC's belief that it should rely 
on the licensees to self-identify and correct these types of problems 
is troubling. Instead of discounting problems that are, on their face, 
quite worrisome, NRC should aggressively determine the root cause of 
the problems, formulate corrective actions, and follow up to ensure 
that the approved corrective actions have been implemented and that the 
implemented actions have corrected the problems. The use of non-cited 
violations delegates these activities and responsibilities to the 
licensees. NRC believes that such delegation is appropriate and that 
the use of non-cited violations contributes to an environment in which 
the licensee self-identifies and corrects problems, a behavior that NRC 
said it encourages. However, in the cases we cited, the delegation of 
responsibility for identifying and correcting security problems was not 
effective because all were security problems that the licensee failed 
to identify, but instead were found by NRC security inspectors.

Finally, NRC stated that its process requires it to review a sampling 
of the licensees' corrective actions to ensure that the licensees are 
implementing the corrective actions. NRC failed to note, however, that 
the requirement cited is part of the baseline security inspection 
program that was suspended after September 11, 2001, and that has not 
been reinstated. In addition, when NRC was conducting baseline security 
inspections, the program required corrective action checks only every 2 
years, and the sample selected for checks included all corrective 
actions--safety and emergency preparedness, as well as security. As a 
result, NRC had no assurance that any security corrective actions would 
be selected for follow-up. Licensees should be involved in identifying 
and correcting problems. However, we believe that by delegating these 
functions to the licensee, NRC is abandoning its oversight 
responsibilities and, as a result, cannot guarantee that problems are 
identified and corrected.

NRC did not comment on our recommendations for reinstituting and 
improving its baseline inspection and force-on-force exercise programs. 
Nevertheless, we hope that NRC decides to implement our recommendations 
as it fulfills its 31 U.S.C. 720 requirement to submit a written 
statement of the actions taken on our recommendations. This statement 
is to be submitted to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and 
the House Committee on Government Reform not later than 60 days after 
the date of this report's release, and to the Senate and House 
Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for 
appropriations made more than 60 days after that same date.

In addition to its overall comments and observations (see app. III), 
NRC provided a number of technical comments and clarifications, which 
we incorporated in this report as appropriate.

As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce its 
contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 
30 days after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send 
copies of the report to interested congressional committees, the 
Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies available to 
others on request. In addition, this report will be available at no 
charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov.] http://
www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call 
me at (202) 512-3841 or contact me at [Hyperlink, Wellsj@gao.gov] 
Wellsj@gao.gov. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix 
IV.

Jim Wells 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:

Signed by Jim Wells: 

[End of section]

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Scope And Methodology:

Our objectives were to review (1) the effectiveness of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission's (NRC) inspection program to oversee security at 
commercial nuclear power plants and (2) legal challenges currently 
affecting physical security at the power plants.

To meet these objectives, we visited NRC's Headquarters in Rockville, 
Maryland, and Region I in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania; obtained NRC 
advisories, orders, regulations, Operational Safeguards Response 
Evaluation (OSRE) reports, and annual security inspection reports; and 
interviewed officials who were knowledgeable about NRC's physical 
security requirements for nuclear power plants. We also visited the 
Limerick, Oyster Creek, and Calvert Cliffs power plants; obtained 
licensee documents and requirements regarding their security 
procedures; and interviewed licensee officials who were knowledgeable 
about the facilities' security plans, procedures, and NRC's nuclear 
power plant physical security regulations. During our visits, we 
observed the security measures that were put in place to reflect NRC's 
advisories and orders since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001.

To determine the extent of NRC's oversight of nuclear power plant 
security, we held discussions with NRC Region I security inspectors and 
officials in NRC's Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, 
Office of General Counsel, and Office of the Executive Director for 
Operations. We also held discussions with licensee officials at the 
Limerick, Oyster Creek, and Calvert Cliffs power plants on their 
security procedures and mechanisms and on their interaction with NRC 
security inspectors. In addition, we collected information on nuclear 
security from all NRC regional security offices.

To determine how NRC assesses the quality of daily security procedures 
and mechanisms against the licensees' security plans, we obtained and 
reviewed all 49 NRC inspection reports that contained a finding that 
was judged to be of moderate significance or higher. We also had 
discussions with officials in NRC's Office of Nuclear Security and 
Incident Response regarding the methods for conducting and reporting 
annual inspections and in NRC's Office of Enforcement regarding how 
security violations are administered.

To determine how NRC tests licensees against the design basis threat, 
we interviewed NRC officials to understand both the process for OSRE 
exercises and report writing and the follow-up procedures for any 
concerns found during an OSRE exercise. We also examined all OSRE 
reports from each NRC licensee. We designed a data collection 
instrument in order to organize specific elements that were extracted 
from 80 OSRE reports. Two GAO analysts followed procedures to ensure 
the completeness of all data collection instrument entries. The data 
collection instrument data were entered into a spreadsheet file for 
analysis. To detect potential coding and keying errors, the accuracy of 
the data entered into the spreadsheet file was verified. We also held 
discussions with Department of Energy officials to (1) determine how 
they conduct force-on-force exercises at the department's nuclear 
facilities and (2) determine if there are any promising practices that 
might be applied to NRC's OSRE program.

To determine NRC's views on federal and state laws and on NRC 
institutional policies (i.e., regarding the use of automatic weapons, 
the authority to use deadly force, and the authority to arrest and 
detain) that could impact a licensee's ability to adequately secure 
commercial nuclear power plants, we discussed these issues with 
officials from NRC's Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response 
and Office of General Counsel. Additionally, we discussed these same 
issues with industry officials who were specifically knowledgeable 
about these areas. We examined existing federal and state laws, and we 
also examined federal and state bills that have been proposed or are 
pending legislative passage.

[End of section]

Appendix II: U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants That Are Licensed to 
Operate: 

Power plant: Arkansas Nuclear 1; City: Russellville; State: AR; NRC 
region: 4.

Power plant: Arkansas Nuclear 2; City: Russellville; State: AR; NRC 
region: 4.

Power plant: Beaver Valley 1; City: McCandless; State: PA; NRC region: 
1.

Power plant: Beaver Valley 2; City: McCandless; State: PA; NRC region: 
1.

Power plant: Braidwood 1; City: Joilet; State: IL; NRC region: 3.

Power plant: Braidwood 2; City: Joilet; State: IL; NRC region: 3.

Power plant: Browns Ferry 1; City: Decatur; State: AL; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: Browns Ferry 2; City: Decatur; State: AL; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: Browns Ferry 3; City: Decatur; State: AL; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: Brunswick 1; City: Southport; State: NC; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: Brunswick 2; City: Southport; State: NC; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: Bryon 1; City: Rockford; State: IL; NRC region: 3.

Power plant: Bryon 2; City: Rockford; State: IL; NRC region: 3.

Power plant: Callaway; City: Fulton; State: MO; NRC region: 4.

Power plant: Calvert Cliffs 1; City: Annapolis; State: MD; NRC region: 
1.

Power plant: Calvert Cliffs 2; City: Annapolis; State: MD; NRC region: 
1.

Power plant: Catawba 1; City: Rock Hill; State: SC; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: Catawba 2; City: Rock Hill; State: SC; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: Clinton; City: Clinton; State: IL; NRC region: 3.

Power plant: Columbia Generating Station; City: Richland; State: WA; 
NRC region: 4.

Power plant: Comanche Peak 1; City: Glen Rose; State: TX; NRC region: 
4.

Power plant: Comanche Peak 2; City: Glen Rose; State: TX; NRC region: 
4.

Power plant: Cooper; City: Nebraska City; State: NE; NRC region: 4.

Power plant: Crystal River 3; City: Crystal River; State: FL; NRC 
region: 2.

Power plant: D C Cook 1; City: Benton Harbor; State: MI; NRC region: 3.

Power plant: D C Cook 2; City: Benton Harbor; State: MI; NRC region: 3.

Power plant: Davis-Besse; City: Toledo; State: OH; NRC region: 3.

Power plant: Diablo Canyon 1; City: San Luis Obispo; State: CA; NRC 
region: 4.

Power plant: Diablo Canyon 2; City: San Luis Obispo; State: CA; NRC 
region: 4.

Power plant: Dresden 2; City: Morris; State: IL; NRC region: 3.

Power plant: Dresden 3; City: Morris; State: IL; NRC region: 3.

Power plant: Duane Arnold; City: Cedar Rapids; State: IA; NRC region: 
3.

Power plant: Edwin I. Hatch 1; City: Baxley; State: GA; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: Edwin I. Hatch 2; City: Baxley; State: GA; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: Fermi 2; City: Toledo; State: MI; NRC region: 3.

Power plant: Fort Calhoun; City: Omaha; State: NE; NRC region: 4.

Power plant: Ginna; City: Rochester; State: NY; NRC region: 1.

Power plant: Grand Gulf 1; City: Vicksburg; State: MS; NRC region: 4.

Power plant: H.B. Robinson 2; City: Florence; State: SC; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: Hope Creek 1; City: Lower Alloways Creek; State: NJ; NRC 
region: 1.

Power plant: Indian Point 2; City: New York; State: NY; NRC region: 1.

Power plant: Indian Point 3; City: New York; State: NY; NRC region: 1.

Power plant: James A. FitzPatrick; City: Oswego; State: NY; NRC region: 
1.

Power plant: Joseph M. Farley 1; City: Dothan; State: AL; NRC region: 
2.

Power plant: Joseph M. Farley 2; City: Dothan; State: AL; NRC region: 
2.

Power plant: Kewaunee; City: Green Bay; State: WI; NRC region: 3.

Power plant: La Salle 1; City: Ottawa; State: IL; NRC region: 3.

Power plant: La Salle 2; City: Ottawa; State: IL; NRC region: 3.

Power plant: Limerick 1; City: Philadelphia; State: PA; NRC region: 1.

Power plant: Limerick 2; City: Philadelphia; State: PA; NRC region: 1.

Power plant: McGuire 1; City: Charlotte; State: NC; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: McGuire 2; City: Charlotte; State: NC; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: Millstone 2; City: New London; State: CT; NRC region: 1.

Power plant: Millstone 3; City: New London; State: CT; NRC region: 1.

Power plant: Monticello; City: Minneapolis; State: MN; NRC region: 3.

Power plant: Nine Mile Point 1; City: Oswego; State: NY; NRC region: 1.

Power plant: Nine Mile Point 2; City: Oswego; State: NY; NRC region: 1.

Power plant: North Anna 1; City: Richmond; State: VA; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: North Anna 2; City: Richmond; State: VA; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: Oconee 1; City: Greenville; State: SC; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: Oconee 2; City: Greenville; State: SC; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: Oconee 3; City: Greenville; State: SC; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: Oyster Creek; City: Toms River; State: NJ; NRC region: 1.

Power plant: Palisades; City: South Haven; State: MI; NRC region: 3.

Power plant: Palo Verde 1; City: Phoenix; State: AZ; NRC region: 4.

Power plant: Palo Verde 2; City: Phoenix; State: AZ; NRC region: 4.

Power plant: Palo Verde 3; City: Phoenix; State: AZ; NRC region: 4.

Power plant: Peach Bottom 2; City: Lancaster; State: PA; NRC region: 1.

Power plant: Peach Bottom 3; City: Lancaster; State: PA; NRC region: 1.

Power plant: Perry 1; City: Painesville; State: OH; NRC region: 3.

Power plant: Pilgrim 1; City: Plymouth; State: MA; NRC region: 1.

Power plant: Point Beach 1; City: Manitowoc; State: WI; NRC region: 3.

Power plant: Point Beach 2; City: Manitowoc; State: WI; NRC region: 3.

Power plant: Prairie Island 1; City: Minneapolis; State: MN; NRC 
region: 3.

Power plant: Prairie Island 2; City: Minneapolis; State: MN; NRC 
region: 3.

Power plant: Quad Cities 1; City: Moline; State: IL; NRC region: 3.

Power plant: Quad Cities 2; City: Moline; State: IL; NRC region: 3.

Power plant: River Bend 1; City: Baton Rouge; State: LA; NRC region: 4.

Power plant: Salem 1; City: Lower Alloways Creek; State: NJ; NRC 
region: 1.

Power plant: Salem 2; City: Lower Alloways Creek; State: NJ; NRC 
region: 1.

Power plant: San Onofre 2; City: San Clemente; State: CA; NRC region: 
4.

Power plant: San Onofre 3; City: San Clemente; State: CA; NRC region: 
4.

Power plant: Seabrook 1; City: Portsmouth; State: NH; NRC region: 1.

Power plant: Seqouyah 1; City: Chattanooga; State: TN; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: Seqouyah 2; City: Chattanooga; State: TN; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: Shearon Harris 1; City: Raleigh; State: NC; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: South Texas Project 1; City: Bay City; State: TX; NRC 
region: 4.

Power plant: South Texas Project 2; City: Bay City; State: TX; NRC 
region: 4.

Power plant: St. Lucie 1; City: Ft. Pierce; State: FL; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: St. Lucie 2; City: Ft. Pierce; State: FL; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: Summer; City: Columbia; State: SC; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: Surry 1; City: Newport News; State: VA; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: Surry 2; City: Newport News; State: VA; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: Susquehanna 1; City: Berwick; State: PA; NRC region: 1.

Power plant: Susquehanna 2; City: Berwick; State: PA; NRC region: 1.

Power plant: Three Mile Island 1; City: Harrisburg; State: PA; NRC 
region: 1.

Power plant: Turkey Point 3; City: Miami; State: FL; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: Turkey Point 4; City: Miami; State: FL; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: Vermont Yankee; City: Battleboro; State: VT; NRC region: 
1.

Power plant: Vogtle 1; City: Augusta; State: GA; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: Vogtle 2; City: Augusta; State: GA; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: Waterford 3; City: New Orleans; State: LA; NRC region: 4.

Power plant: Watts Bar 1; City: Spring City; State: TN; NRC region: 2.

Power plant: Wolf Creek 1; City: Burlington; State: KS; NRC region: 4.

Source: NRC.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix III: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:

UNITED STATES:

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001:

August 7, 2003:

Mr. James Wells, Director:

Natural Resources and Environment United States General Accounting 
Office 441 G Street, NW:

Washington, D.C. 20548:

Dear Mr. Wells:

On behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am responding 
to your July 15, 2003, letter requesting the NBC's review of the draft 
report (GAO-03-752) entitled "Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Oversight 
of Security at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants Needs to be 
Strengthened." I appreciate the opportunity to provide comments to the 
General Accounting Office (GAO). I, and my fellow Commissioners, are 
concerned that this draft report does not provide an appropriately 
balanced or very useful perspective of the NBC's role in assuring 
nuclear power plant security.

The report, while it accurately describes some of the legal challenges 
that currently exist, fails to fully recognize the significant effort 
the NRC has made in the post-September 11, 2001, environment to 
strengthen what was already a very robust security program. The staff 
is preparing more detailed comments to address issues of correctness, 
currentness, and clarity. These comments will follow in a subsequent 
letter from the agency's Executive Director for Operations (EDO). 
However, I have several observations of note.

First, this report is of a historical nature, focusing almost 
exclusively on NBC's oversight of nuclear power plants prior to 
September 11, 2001. It thus fails to adequately reflect significant 
changes we have made to our program to meet the current challenges. 
These include:

the extensive effort and direct oversight (substantially more than 
prior to 9/11) the NRC has provided at every nuclear plant while it 
revamps the security inspection program;

a greatly enhanced personnel access authorization program through the 
application of new requirements and improved processes;

enhanced training, qualification, and fitness-for-duty requirements 
for security forces;

close interaction with the intelligence community that resulted in a 
revision to the Design Basis Threat which will require licensees to 
upgrade their security plans and defensive capabilities;

an enhanced force-on-force evaluation program including increased 
frequency of drills and exercises and a greater degree of realism;

significant outreach efforts to Federal, State and local organizations 
to improve the integrated response to an actual event; and:

extensive interactions with the Department of Homeland Security and the 
Homeland Security Council on security at commercial nuclear power 
plants. These efforts include protection of the national infrastructure 
as well as vulnerability assessments and mitigation strategies.

Second, the report's emphasis on non-cited violations as somehow 
"minimizing" the significance of security problems is a serious 
misrepresentation. The individual anecdotal issues noted in the report 
were appropriately treated within the NBC's enforcement process. NBC's 
regulatory process necessarily relies on licensees taking corrective 
actions. The use of non-cited violations contributes to an environment 
that fosters licensee self-identification and correction of problems, 
an important organizational behavior the NRC encourages. The NBC's 
process requires that a sampling of those corrective actions are 
reviewed during subsequent inspections to assure that the process is 
being properly implemented.

I note that the key issues you raised are relatively minor issues and 
had already been identified by the NRC before your review was 
initiated. Corrective actions for these issues either have been 
completed or are nearly complete.

Again, I appreciate the opportunity to comment on this draft report. As 
I noted earlier, the EDO will be responding soon with more detailed 
comments.

Sincerely,


Signed by: 

Nils J. Diaz:

[End of section]

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contacts: 

Andrea Wamstad Brown (202) 512-3319 Kenneth E. Lightner, Jr (202) 512-
3471:

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to those named above, Jill Ann Roth Edelson, Kevin L. 
Jackson, William Lanouette, J. Addison Ricks, Carol Herrnstadt Shulman, 
and Barbara R. Timmerman made key contributions to this report.



(360201):


FOOTNOTES

[1] DOE operates facilities that contain radioactive material used in 
its nuclear weapons program.

[2] Radiological sabotage against a nuclear power plant is a deliberate 
act that could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and 
safety by exposure to radiation.

[3] Safeguards information is unclassified sensitive information.

[4] NRC resident inspectors are stationed at each commercial nuclear 
power plant facility. The resident inspectors are not security 
specialists, focusing primarily on plant safety.

[5] NRC Order EA-02-026.

[6] The vital area, within the protected area, contains the plant 
equipment, systems, devices, or material whose failure, destruction, or 
release could endanger the public health and safety by exposure to 
radiation. This area is protected by guard stations, reinforced gates, 
surveillance cameras, and locked doors.

[7] NRC Order EA-02-261.

[8] A contingency event is any event that could impact on the security 
of the plant.

[9] DOE's facilities differ from the commercial nuclear power plants 
that NRC oversees. Both of these types of facilities, however, contain 
radioactive material that must be protected. The security that is 
required to protect the facilities also differs; however, we believe 
that there are some similarities that allow for lessons learned or 
promising practices by one agency to have application by the other.

[10] DOE, Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance, 
Inside Oversight, Special Edition, June 2002, 1-2.

[11] Four of the 80 reports did not contain the information that was 
necessary to determine the time required to issue the report.

[12] Automatic weapons manufactured before 1986, prior to the Firearms 
Owners' Protection Act (18 U.S.C. 921 et. seq.) are regulated by the 
National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C. 5801 et. seq.), which allows civilian 
ownership provided certain requirements are met. States may further 
restrict ownership of automatic weapons. 

[13] 10 C.F.R. 73.55(h)(5).

[14] N.H. Rev. Stat. 627.4.

[15] TX Pen. Code, Sections 9.41-9.43.

[16] S.C. Code Section 40-18-110.

[17] Citizen's arrest authority evolved from old English law. Some 
states have statues specifying and clarifying citizen's arrest 
authority, and others rely on common law citizen's arrest authority. 
Generally, under common law, a private citizen may arrest another when 
there is probable cause to believe that the other person is committing 
or has committed a felony in the citizen's presence.

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