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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed 
Services, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 1:00 p.m. EST: 

Wednesday, January 31, 2007: 

National Nuclear Security Administration: 

Security and Management Improvements Can Enhance Implementation of the 
NNSA Act: 

Statement of Gene Aloise, Director: 
Natural Resources and Environment: 

GAO-07-428T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-428T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

During the late 1990s, the Department of Energy (DOE) experienced 
difficulties with a lack of clear management authority and 
responsibility that contributed to security problems at the nation’s 
nuclear weapons laboratories and management problems with major 
projects. In response, Congress created the National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA) as a separately organized agency within DOE under 
Title 32 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2000—the NNSA Act. Since its creation, NNSA has continued to experience 
security problems, such as unauthorized access to NNSA computer 
systems, and cost and schedule overruns on major projects, such as the 
National Ignition Facility. 

GAO was asked to review the extent to which NNSA has taken steps to (1) 
improve security at its laboratories and plants and (2) improve its 
management practices and revise its organizational structure. In 
January 2007, GAO issued a report—National Nuclear Security 
Administration: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Management of the 
Nation’s Nuclear Programs, (GAO-07-36)—that addressed these matters. 

To carry out its work, GAO reviewed legislation; NNSA policies, plans 
and budgets; collected and analyzed security performance ratings and 
interviewed current and former DOE and NNSA officials. 

What GAO Found: 

While NNSA has better delineated lines of authority and improved 
communication through a reorganization and has made progress in 
establishing critical management systems, especially in the development 
of its Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation process, 
important weaknesses remain with respect to security; the 
Administration’s relationship with DOE; and project, program and 
financial management. 

Although NNSA has begun to build an effective headquarters security 
organization, it still cannot demonstrate that all of its security 
program objectives are being met at all of its sites. Specifically, GAO 
identified weaknesses in physical security at several NNSA sites, 
including the Nevada Test Site, the Sandia National Laboratories, and 
the Y-12 National Security Complex; and weaknesses in cyber security 
throughout NNSA. Four factors have contributed to these problems: (1) 
lack of consistent NNSA headquarters leadership and direction for 
security; (2) security personnel staffing shortages at NNSA site 
offices; (3) lack of adequate training resources and opportunities for 
site office security staff; and (4) incomplete security data to gauge 
the effectiveness of NNSA’s security program. 

While NNSA has focused considerable attention on reorganizing its 
internal operations, it and DOE have continued to struggle with 
agreeing on how NNSA should operate as a separately organized agency 
within the department. This lack of agreement has resulted in 
organizational conflicts that have inhibited effective operations. 
While there have been continuing calls for removing NNSA from DOE and 
establishing it as a separate agency, GAO does not believe that such 
drastic change is necessary to provide effective oversight of the 
nuclear weapons complex. Rather, DOE and NNSA need to clearly define 
their working relationships and determine how conflicts will be 
resolved. 

Finally, GAO identified several other management weaknesses where 
additional NNSA actions could strengthen its ability to manage the 
nuclear weapons complex. For example, among other things, NNSA has not 
(1) implemented a plan for improving its project management efforts; 
(2) identified all of its program managers and trained them to a 
certified level of competency; and (3) established an independent 
analysis unit to review program budget proposals and analyze budget 
alternatives. 

In its recent report, GAO made recommendations to the Secretary of 
Energy and the Administrator of NNSA to (1) improve NNSA’s security 
oversight program; (2) clearly define NNSA’s status as a separately 
organized agency within DOE; and (3) improve project and program 
management, and the Administration’s planning, programming, budgeting, 
and evaluation process. NNSA generally agreed with the report and its 
recommendations. NNSA considered the agency a success but acknowledged 
there was considerable work yet to be accomplished. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-428T]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 

[End of Section] 

Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We are pleased to be here today to discuss our work on the actions the 
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)--a separately organized 
agency within the Department of Energy (DOE)--has taken to improve the 
security and management of the nation's nuclear programs. Specifically, 
my remarks are based on the report we are issuing today--National 
Nuclear Security Administration: Additional Actions Needed to Improve 
Management of the Nation's Nuclear Programs, which was prepared at the 
request of this Subcommittee.[Footnote 1] 

During the late 1990s, DOE experienced management difficulties with its 
nuclear weapons programs that contributed to security problems at the 
nation's nuclear weapons laboratories and significant cost overruns on 
major projects. According to a June 1999 report by the President's 
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (the Board), DOE's management of 
the nuclear weapons laboratories, while representing "science at its 
best," also embodied "security at its worst" because of "organizational 
disarray, managerial neglect, and …a culture of arrogance." The Board 
urged the Congress to create a new organization that, whether 
established as an independent agency or a semi-autonomous entity within 
DOE, would have a clear mission, streamlined bureaucracy, and 
drastically simplified lines of authority and accountability. 
Responding to the Board's recommendations, the Congress created the 
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) under Title 32 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000--the NNSA 
Act.[Footnote 2] 

The NNSA Act established NNSA as a "separately organized agency" within 
DOE and made NNSA responsible for the management and security of the 
nation's nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval reactor 
programs. The NNSA Act established the position of DOE Under Secretary 
for Nuclear Security, who was also designated as the Administrator of 
NNSA. The Secretary of Energy and the Deputy Secretary of Energy were 
allowed to establish policy for NNSA and to give direction to NNSA 
through the Administrator; however, other DOE employees were prohibited 
from directing the activities of individual NNSA employees. Finally, 
the NNSA Act required that, among other things, NNSA develop a 
planning, programming, and budgeting process in order to ensure that 
the administration operated under sound financial management 
principles. 

Since its inception, however, NNSA has continued to experience both 
security and management problems. For example, with respect to 
security, in 2003 we found that NNSA had not fully defined the roles 
and responsibilities of officials in its security program and that NNSA 
had shortfalls in security staff at the site offices that oversee its 
contractors. In addition, two NNSA studies commissioned in July 2003 
found ongoing problems with NNSA's security program, including 
weaknesses in its security culture, organization, and staffing and 
training. Finally, DOE's Office of Inspector General found security 
problems with NNSA's contractors, including improprieties in the 
testing of the officers who protect NNSA's sites and weaknesses in 
NNSA's cyber security program. With respect to the management of major 
projects, the National Ignition Facility and the Dual Axis Radiographic 
Hydrodynamic Test Facility--two major facilities needed to support 
NNSA's nuclear weapons programs--experienced major delays and cost 
overruns because of problems with project management and are still not 
complete. 

In this context, you asked us to evaluate the extent to which NNSA has 
taken steps to (1) improve security at its laboratories and plants and 
(2) improve its management practices and revise its organizational 
structure. To carry out our objectives, we reviewed the NNSA Act; and 
NNSA and DOE policies, plans and budgets; and interviewed current and 
former NNSA and DOE officials. We also used reports on NNSA's security 
efforts prepared by GAO, the DOE Inspector General, and outside groups, 
such as a 2005 report on security commissioned by NNSA. Finally, we 
collected and analyzed security performance ratings developed by DOE's 
Office of Health, Safety and Security and NNSA site offices, from 
fiscal years 1996 through 2005. We used these performance ratings 
because there was wide agreement among NNSA and DOE security officials 
that these ratings represented the best available information on the 
overall performance of NNSA's safeguards and security program. We 
conducted the work for our report from March 2005 through January 2007 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, 
which included an assessment of data reliability and internal controls. 

In summary: 

Producing a well-organized and effective agency out of what was widely 
considered a dysfunctional enterprise has been a considerable 
challenge. In some areas, NNSA can be viewed as a success. Most 
notably, through its internal reorganization efforts, NNSA has 
addressed some past problems by better delineating lines of authority 
and improving communication and has made important progress in 
establishing critical management systems, especially in the development 
of its Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation (PPBE) process. 
However, important problems remain with respect to security, the 
Administration's relationship with DOE, and project, program and 
financial management. 

Regarding security, NNSA still cannot demonstrate that all of its 
security program objectives are being met at all of its sites. 
Specifically, we found weaknesses with physical security at several 
NNSA sites, including the Nevada Test Site, Sandia National 
Laboratories, and the Y-12 National Security Complex, and weaknesses 
throughout NNSA in the cyber security area. Four factors have 
contributed to problems with NNSA's security program. Specifically, we 
found: 

* a lack of consistent NNSA headquarters leadership and direction for 
security; 

* security personnel staffing shortages at the NNSA site offices that 
oversee NNSA's contractors; 

* inadequate training resources and opportunities for site office 
security staff; and: 

* incomplete security data to gauge the effectiveness of NNSA's 
security program. 

With respect to NNSA's relationship to DOE, we found that almost 7 
years after its creation, NNSA and DOE still have not fully agreed on 
how NNSA should function within the department as a separately 
organized agency. This lack of agreement has resulted in organizational 
conflicts that have inhibited effective operations. In our view, DOE 
and NNSA need to take a more active approach to clearly defining DOE 
and NNSA's working relationships and determining how conflicts will be 
resolved. While there have been continuing calls for removing NNSA from 
DOE and establishing it as a separate agency, we do not believe that 
such drastic change is necessary to produce an organization that can 
provide effective oversight of the nation's nuclear weapons complex. 

Finally, while NNSA has taken several actions to improve its management 
practices, including developing a PPBE process, we also identified 
several areas where management weaknesses remain. Specifically, NNSA 
has not developed a project management policy, implemented a plan for 
improving its project management efforts, and fully shared project 
management lessons learned between its sites. In addition, NNSA has not 
identified all of its program managers and trained them to a certified 
level of competency. Finally, NNSA has not established an independent 
analysis unit to (1) review program budget proposals, (2) confirm cost 
estimates, and (3) analyze budget alternatives. 

In order to improve the management of NNSA and its ability to oversee 
the nuclear weapons complex , in our report to you, we made a series of 
recommendations to the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator, NNSA 
to (1) improve NNSA's security oversight program; (2) clearly define 
NNSA's status as a separately organized agency within DOE; and (3) 
improve project and program management, and the agency's planning, 
programming, budgeting, and evaluation process. In its comments on our 
report, NNSA generally agreed with the report and its corresponding 
recommendations. NNSA noted that it considers the agency to be a 
success but acknowledged that there was considerable work yet to be 
accomplished. 

Background: 

NNSA operates three national laboratories that design nuclear weapons-
-Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, California; Los Alamos 
National Laboratory, New Mexico; and the Sandia National Laboratories, 
New Mexico and California; and four nuclear weapons production sites-- 
the Pantex Plant, Texas; the Y-12 National Security Complex, Tennessee; 
the Kansas City Plant, Missouri; and parts of the Savannah River Site, 
South Carolina; as well as the Nevada Test Site. 

To implement its programs, NNSA received about $9.1 billion for fiscal 
year 2006, including almost $6.4 billion for its nuclear weapons 
activities, about $1.6 billion for its defense nuclear nonproliferation 
programs, and about $782 million for the Naval Reactors program. NNSA's 
appropriation also included about $766 million to provide security at 
its sites. NNSA requested over $9.3 billion for fiscal year 2007, 
including $6.4 billion for its nuclear weapons activities, $1.7 billion 
for its defense nuclear nonproliferation programs, and $795 million for 
the Naval Reactors program. According to NNSA's Future Years Nuclear 
Security Program plan, between fiscal years 2007 and 2011, NNSA is 
proposing to spend almost $48.5 billion on its nuclear weapons, nuclear 
nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs. 

As noted earlier, for several years before NNSA was established, 
external studies found problems with the organization and operation of 
what is now NNSA's principal organization--DOE's Office of Defense 
Programs. These studies cited continuing problems in the areas of 
overall management, organization, priority setting, and maintenance of 
a viable infrastructure and workforce. Most influential in the creation 
of NNSA was the study conducted by a Special Investigative Panel of the 
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Prepared in response 
to a series of security problems, including public access to classified 
documents at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Board found that 
DOE was a dysfunctional bureaucracy incapable of reforming itself and 
that reorganization was clearly warranted to resolve security and 
counterintelligence problems. As noted earlier, the Board urged the 
Congress to create a new organization that, whether established as an 
independent agency or a semi-autonomous entity within DOE, should have 
a clear mission, streamlined bureaucracy, and drastically simplified 
lines of authority and accountability. To correct the problems 
identified by the Board and others, in 1999, the Congress created the 
NNSA. 

For the last several years, we have monitored NNSA's actions to 
implement the NNSA Act for this Subcommittee and the Special Oversight 
Panel on Department of Energy Reorganization, House Armed Services 
Committee. For example, in April 2001, we testified that NNSA's efforts 
to establish a new organization looked promising. However, we 
highlighted the need for NNSA to clearly define the roles and 
responsibilities of headquarters and field staff and to establish clear 
lines of authority between NNSA and its contractors, among other 
things. In May 2001, NNSA announced plans to reorganize its 
headquarters operations. In December 2001, however, we found that 
NNSA's plans for the headquarters reorganization did not contain a 
clear definition of the roles and responsibilities of the headquarters 
organizational units. 

In addition to reorganizing its headquarters, in February 2002, NNSA 
proposed reorganizing its entire operation to solve important, long- 
standing issues. In February 2002, we testified that, with the proposed 
new organizational structure, resolution of NNSA's long-standing 
organizational issues appeared to be within its grasp. However, we 
noted that NNSA's lack of a long-term strategic approach to ensuring a 
well-managed workforce precluded it from identifying its current and 
future human capital needs, including the size of the workforce; its 
deployment across the organization; and the knowledge, skills, and 
capabilities needed to fulfill its mission. In December 2002, the 
Administrator of NNSA implemented the proposed reorganization. 

Our May 2003 report on the management of NNSA's security program 
identified similar concerns about NNSA's security organization and 
management. Specifically, we found that NNSA (1) had not fully defined 
clear roles and responsibilities for its headquarters and site security 
operations and (2) had shortfalls at its site offices in the total 
number of staff and in expertise, which could make it more difficult 
for the site offices to effectively oversee security activities. We 
therefore concluded that NNSA could not be assured that its contractors 
were working to maximum advantage to protect critical facilities and 
material from individuals seeking to inflict damage. 

Finally, in June 2004, we found that NNSA's reorganization had 
addressed some past problems by better delineating lines of authority 
and improving communication. However, we also found that NNSA's 
reorganization had not ensured that the agency had sufficient staff 
with the right skills in the right places because it had downsized its 
federal workforce by about 17 percent without first determining the 
critical skills and capabilities needed to meet its mission and program 
goals. 

Additional Action Needed to Improve NNSA's Security Program: 

Although NNSA has begun to build an effective headquarters security 
organization, it still cannot demonstrate that all of its security 
program objectives are being met at all of its sites. Specifically, we 
found that the results of internal and independent security oversight 
assessments have identified weaknesses in physical security at several 
NNSA sites, including the Nevada Test Site, the Sandia National 
Laboratories, and the Y-12 National Security Complex; and weaknesses in 
cyber security throughout NNSA. The following factors have contributed 
to this situation: 

* Lack of consistent leadership and direction for its security 
activities. For several years, the NNSA headquarters security 
organization experienced turnover in the position of Chief of the 
Office of Defense Nuclear Security. Specifically, four individuals have 
occupied the position since NNSA's creation, often in an acting 
capacity. In addition, these chiefs have reported to different levels 
within the organization. The current Chief is a permanent appointee, 
reporting directly to the NNSA administrator, and he has taken a number 
of steps to develop an effective headquarters security organization. 

* Security personnel staffing shortages at site offices. Having 
sufficient staff to oversee the security programs of its contractors 
continues to be a problem. For example, since NNSA became operational, 
key site offices, such as the Los Alamos Site Office, have experienced 
staffing shortfalls. As a result, sites are limited in their ability to 
effectively oversee contractors' security activities. 

* Lack of adequate training resources and opportunities for site office 
security staff. NNSA has not implemented a training program that 
provides NNSA federal security officials with the skills needed to 
effectively oversee contractor security programs. In addition, NNSA 
site offices often do not have all the resources needed to meet 
training needs. For example, according to site office officials, the 
Los Alamos Site Office did not receive training funds for fiscal year 
2006 and the Nevada Site Office received a minimal training budget for 
its security staff. 

* Lack of data to gauge program effectiveness. NNSA does not have 
complete data for tracking security deficiencies identified by security 
oversight reviews and, as a result, does not have information regarding 
the overall effectiveness of its safeguards and security program. NNSA 
officials told us that while they believe security across the weapons 
complex has improved, NNSA does not have sufficient data to support 
this assertion. In addition, NNSA has not implemented a formal process 
for sharing best practices or lessons learned to guide security 
improvements. While best practices and lessons learned have been 
communicated informally, a formal process could help ensure that 
previously identified security deficiencies, such as the retrieval of 
badges from terminated employees at one NNSA site, are reviewed and 
corrected as necessary at other NNSA field locations. 

DOE and NNSA Have Not Yet Fully Determined How NNSA Should Operate as a 
Separately Organized Agency within DOE: 

While NNSA has focused considerable attention on reorganizing its 
internal operations, it and DOE have continued to struggle with 
establishing how NNSA should operate as a separately organized agency 
within the department. Several factors have contributed to this 
situation. First, DOE and NNSA did not have a useful model to follow 
for establishing a separately organized agency in DOE. The Board's June 
1999 report suggested several federal agencies, such as the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in the Department of Commerce, 
which could be used as a model for NNSA. However, we found that none of 
the officials from these agencies considered their agency to be 
separately organized or believed that their agency's operational 
methods were transferable to NNSA. Second, DOE's January 2000 
implementation plan, which was required by the NNSA Act, did not define 
how NNSA would operate as a separately organized agency within DOE. 
Instead reflecting the opposition of the then DOE senior leadership to 
the creation of NNSA, the implementation plan "dual-hatted" virtually 
every significant statutory position in NNSA with DOE officials, 
including the Director of NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear 
Counterintelligence and General Counsel. As we testified in April 2001, 
this practice caused considerable concern about NNSA's ability to 
function with the independence envisioned in the NNSA Act. Dual-hatting 
was subsequently forbidden by an amendment to the NNSA Act.[Footnote 3] 

As a result, although some NNSA programs have set up procedures for 
interacting with DOE, other programs have not, resulting in 
organizational conflict. For example, DOE made a commitment to issuing 
NNSA-specific acquisition procedures in its January 2000 implementation 
plan for NNSA, but it has not done so. According to DOE Office of 
General Counsel officials, the department subsequently determined that 
NNSA-specific procedures were inconsistent with the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation, the NNSA Act, and the January 2000 implementation plan. 
According to both DOE and NNSA officials, since 2004 the department has 
blocked NNSA's efforts to issue its own acquisition regulations. As a 
result, according to NNSA officials, NNSA has had to issue a series of 
deviations to the DOE acquisition regulations to carry out NNSA 
acquisition policies in areas such as negotiating a more effective 
contract fee arrangement and awarding additional years to a contract's 
term. 

Even where formal procedures have been developed, interpersonal 
disagreements have hindered effective cooperation. Most notable in this 
regard has been the longstanding conflict between NNSA and DOE 
counterintelligence offices. Specifically, as our report documents, 
NNSA and DOE counterintelligence officials have disagreed over (1) the 
scope and direction of the counterintelligence program, (2) their 
ability to jointly direct staff in the headquarters counterintelligence 
program offices, (3) the allocation of counterintelligence resources, 
(4) counterintelligence policymaking and (5) their roles and 
responsibilities in handling specific counterintelligence matters--in 
particular with regard to the department's handling of the well- 
publicized mid-2005 intrusion into an unclassified NNSA computer system 
and removal of the names and social security numbers of 1,502 
individuals working for NNSA. Subsequently, the Congress amended the 
NNSA Act to consolidate the counterintelligence programs of DOE and 
NNSA under the Department of Energy. 

In this environment, concerns about NNSA's organizational status have 
persisted. Most notably, a January 2006 report by the Defense Science 
Board called for the removal of NNSA from DOE and the creation of a 
new, independent National Nuclear Weapons Agency. However, former 
senior DOE and NNSA officials with whom we spoke generally did not 
favor removing NNSA from DOE. 

Several Management Issues Need to be Resolved for NNSA to Become Fully 
Effective: 

In addition to identifying the underlying issue of NNSA's relationship 
to DOE, we identified the following four other management areas where 
additional NNSA actions could strengthen its ability to manage the 
nuclear weapons complex if it took further action. 

* Human capital. NNSA has made progress in developing a human capital 
strategy. However, DOE and NNSA have not conducted a systematic, 
detailed analysis of how many staff NNSA needs in relation to DOE. As a 
result, we identified areas where potential staff imbalances have 
affected NNSA's ability to operate separately from DOE. For example, 
NNSA's Office of General Counsel has 35 attorneys, including the 
General Counsel, to provide NNSA legal analysis, while the rest of DOE 
has 277 attorneys. According to NNSA's General Counsel, his office 
would need 15 to 20 additional attorneys to fully handle NNSA's legal 
workload with minimal assistance from DOE. Currently, NNSA relies on 
DOE's Office of General Counsel to perform a significant portion of its 
legal work. 

* Project management. While both DOE and NNSA have initiated efforts to 
improve project management, NNSA reported in November 2006 that about 
16 percent of NNSA projects were at risk of breaching their cost 
baseline, schedule baseline or both. We identified seven areas for 
improvement that would foster a stronger culture for effective project 
management. For example, DOE's Project Assessment and Reporting System-
-a Web-based system for keeping DOE senior managers apprised of the 
performance of projects costing more than $5 million--does not include 
four major NNSA projects, estimated to cost over $100 million each. 
Consequently, these projects do not receive the senior management 
oversight that can be provided through that system. 

* Program management. NNSA program managers are responsible for 
completing a set of activities by employing a working knowledge of such 
diverse areas as contracting, budgeting, and engineering. Recognizing 
the important role of program managers, NNSA has taken several actions, 
such as developing a program management policy. However, NNSA has yet 
to identify all of its program managers or train them to a certified 
level of competency. Indeed, DOE's most recent performance and 
accountability report for fiscal year 2006 showed that NNSA fully met 
only about 52 percent of its program goals while the rest of DOE 
achieved about a 79-percent success rate. 

* Financial management. NNSA has made significant progress in 
implementing its PPBE process over the last 4 years, as mandated by the 
NNSA Act. However, several areas of improvement still have not been 
fully addressed. For example, NNSA has issued policy letters on PPBE, 
but some of these letters are still in draft form because, in part, 
NNSA is waiting to obtain DOE's views on certain matters. In addition, 
NNSA's PPBE mechanism for centralized resource allocation relies on 
collegial decision making among senior NNSA managers, with the 
Administrator resolving disputes and deciding on the final resource 
allocation. However, the Administrator does not have an independent 
group to review program proposals, confirm cost estimates, and analyze 
alternatives. According to a 2003 DOE Inspector General report, most 
senior managers believe that such an analytical group would be of 
value. While NNSA has taken some action in this direction, it is not 
clear when such a group will be established. 

As discussed earlier, while there have been continuing calls for 
removing NNSA from DOE and establishing it a separate agency, we do not 
believe that such drastic change is necessary to produce an 
organization that can provide effective oversight of the nation's 
nuclear weapons complex. Rather, we believe NNSA can provide 
comprehensive oversight of the operation and security of the nation's 
nuclear weapons programs by addressing a variety of lingering, often 
unrelated, but important management issues. These issues include 
providing sufficient, qualified staff to conduct program and 
operational oversight, especially in the security area, and developing 
and implementing improvements needed to support effective project, 
program, and financial management. 

Madam Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy 
to respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may 
have. 

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements: 

For further information on this testimony, please contact me at (202) 
512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this statement. James Noel, Assistant Director; Robert Baney; 
Preston Heard and Jonathan Ban made key contributions to this 
testimony. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Department of Energy: Views on DOE's Plan to Establish the National 
Nuclear Security Administration, GAO/T-RCED-00-113 (Washington, D.C.: 
March 2, 2000). 

Department of Energy: Views on the Progress of the National Nuclear 
Security Administration in Implementing Title 32, GAO-01-602T 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2001). 

NNSA Management: Progress in the Implementation of Title 32, GAO-02-93R 
(Washington, D.C.: Dec.12, 2001). 

Department of Energy: NNSA Restructuring and Progress in Implementing 
Title 32, GAO-02-451T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 2002). 

GAO, Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to Better Manage Its Safeguards and 
Security Program, GAO-03-471 (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2003). 

National Nuclear Security Administration: Key Management Structure and 
Workforce Planning Issues Remain As NNSA Conducts Downsizing, GAO-04- 
545 (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2004). 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] GAO-07-36. 

[2] Pub. L. No. 106-65, 113 Stat. 512, 953 (1999). 

[3] Pub. L. 106-398, § 3157, 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A-468 (2000) (codified 
as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 2410). 

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