

May 2003

COMBATING TERRORISM

Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Address the Overseas Threat



G A O

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Abbreviations

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| ATF | Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives |
| CIA | Central Intelligence Agency |
| CLASS | Consular Lookout and Support System |
| DARPA | Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency |
| DOD | Department of Defense |
| DOE | Department of Energy |
| FARC | <i>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia</i> (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) |
| FBI | Federal Bureau of Investigation |
| FEMA | Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| FEST | Foreign Emergency Support Team |
| FinCEN | Financial Crimes Enforcement Network |
| FISA | Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act |
| FLETC | Federal Law Enforcement Training Center |
| G-8 | Group of Eight |
| GAO | U.S. General Accounting Office |
| ICITAP | International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program |
| ILEA | International Law Enforcement Academy |
| INS | Immigration and Naturalization Service |
| INTERPOL | International Police Organization |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NSC | National Security Council |
| OMB | Office of Management and Budget |
| OPDAT | Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training |
| USAID | U.S. Agency for International Development |
| USA PATRIOT | Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism |
| PDD | Presidential Decision Directive |
| RDT&E | research, development, test, and evaluation |
| UN | United Nations |
| WMD | weapons of mass destruction |

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United States General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548

May 23, 2003

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde
Chairman
The Honorable Tom Lantos
Ranking Member
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives

The Honorable Christopher Shays
Chairman
Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations
Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives

Coordination of federal programs to combat terrorism overseas became even more critical as a result of the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. In response to these attacks, the federal government has taken unprecedented political, diplomatic, legal, law enforcement, financial, military, and intelligence actions to combat terrorism abroad. Among these actions is the publication of a series of new national strategies to combat terrorism.

You asked that we develop baseline information identifying and describing federal programs and activities to combat terrorism overseas. As agreed with your offices, this report describes the interagency framework and policies for planning and coordinating federal efforts to counter international terrorism. It identifies the relationships between and among the new national strategies to combat terrorism. It also describes the federal programs and activities governmentwide to detect and prevent terrorism, disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations, and respond to terrorist incidents overseas. Finally, it provides detailed matrices of selected departments' programs and activities to combat terrorism overseas. We briefed your staffs previously on the preliminary results of our work and, at your request, issued an interim report on *Combating Terrorism: Department of State Programs to Combat Terrorism Abroad* (GAO-02-1021, Sept. 6, 2002). This report contains the final results of our review.

The scope of this report was on combating terrorism overseas and did not include a comprehensive review of homeland security efforts within the

United States or federal agencies' efforts to combat terrorism domestically. However, for this report, we did perform limited work on border security, where homeland security and overseas efforts overlap. Also, we included certain efforts to combat terrorism overseas that actually occur within the United States, such as interagency coordination, intelligence analysis, and law enforcement investigations and prosecutions. Further, our analysis was performed before the Department of Homeland Security began operations in January 2003. Thus, many of the agencies, bureaus, offices, and federal response teams discussed in this report had not yet transferred to the new department from the Departments of Health and Human Services, Justice, Transportation, and the Treasury.

Because of the large number of federal agencies and wide spectrum of efforts involved in combating terrorism overseas, this "landscape" report describes the governmentwide framework and programs and activities rather than evaluating their effectiveness. Therefore, this report contains no recommendations. We recognize that the effectiveness of the new strategies and related programs that we describe will only be determined through time as they are implemented. Some of our recent work on combating terrorism indicates there are many implementation challenges and we have designated some of these programs as high risk. Where we have done evaluative work on relevant programs, we have identified the appropriate GAO products and summarized their results in footnotes. In addition, we include a comprehensive list of related GAO products at the back of this report.

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional committees. We also are sending copies to the Secretaries of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, State, Transportation, and the Treasury; and the Attorney General. In addition, we are sending copies to the Director, U.S. Agency for International Development; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Director, Office of Homeland Security; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies available to other interested parties upon request. This report also will be available on GAO's Web site at <http://www.gao.gov>.

If you or your offices have any questions about matters discussed in this report, please contact me at (202) 512-6020 or by e-mail at deckerrj@gao.gov. Contacts and key contributors are listed in appendix X.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Raymond J. Decker". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long horizontal flourish at the end.

Raymond J. Decker, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management

Executive Summary

Purpose

In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government has taken unprecedented political, diplomatic, legal, law enforcement, financial, intelligence, and military actions to combat terrorism abroad. Combating terrorism is now at the top of the national security agenda, and many changes have occurred in the government's organization and strategies related to these matters. GAO was requested to produce this report to assist congressional committees with their responsibilities to oversee federal programs to combat terrorism overseas. Specifically, this report describes the interagency framework for planning, executing, and coordinating related federal efforts. In addition, this report identifies and describes the programs and activities to detect and prevent terrorist attacks, disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations, and respond to terrorist incidents.

Given the number of federal agencies and the wide spectrum of activities involved in combating terrorism overseas, GAO limited its work to describing the interagency framework and programs and activities and did not evaluate their effectiveness. While there are several new strategies to combat terrorism, many of the programs they incorporate are long-standing. The strategies by themselves, no matter how cohesive and comprehensive, will not ensure an integrated and effective set of programs to combat terrorism overseas. The ability to ensure these things will be determined through time as the strategies and programs are implemented. Some of GAO's recent work on combating terrorism demonstrates some of the challenges ahead.

Background

Although agencies have slightly different definitions, terrorism generally is defined as politically motivated violence to coerce a government or civilian population. Efforts to combat terrorism are further broken down into homeland security activities (those that occur domestically) and combating terrorism overseas (those that occur abroad)—the topic of this report. According to the Central Intelligence Agency, the threat of terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel, facilities, and interests overseas is greater now than ever before. Terrorists attacking the United States employ a variety of tactics, target a number of different interests, and strike in regions throughout the world. The federal government's role in combating terrorism overseas includes political, diplomatic, legal, law enforcement, financial, military, and intelligence efforts. Funding for combating terrorism overseas has increased about 133 percent, growing from \$4.9 billion in fiscal year 2001 to \$11.4 billion requested in fiscal year 2004.

In addition, DOD has spent about \$30 billion on military operations overseas against terrorism in the period roughly equivalent to fiscal year 2002.

Results in Brief

Combating terrorism overseas falls under an interagency framework of plans, agency roles, and interagency coordination mechanisms. In general, the National Security Council manages this interagency framework. The President, National Security Council, and federal agencies have published a series of related directives and new national strategies to guide federal efforts. To implement the directives and strategies, various federal agencies are assigned key roles and responsibilities based on their core missions. Given the number of agencies involved, there are also a number of interagency mechanisms to coordinate across agencies in both Washington, D.C., and overseas. Within this framework, efforts to combat terrorism overseas can generally be divided into programs and activities to (1) detect and prevent terrorism, (2) disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations, and (3) respond to terrorist incidents.

- Efforts to detect and prevent terrorism include activities to gather intelligence on terrorist threats and organizations, protect facilities and persons overseas, impact foreign opinion through public diplomacy, prevent terrorists and their materials from entering the United States, and improve other countries' capabilities.
- Efforts to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations can occur in many ways, to include diplomacy in both bilateral and multilateral forums; law enforcement efforts to investigate, arrest, and prosecute terrorists; financial and related measures to eliminate terrorist support; military actions to destroy terrorists and regimes that harbor them; and covert operations by intelligence agencies.
- Efforts to respond to an international terrorist incident consist of advance preparations, managing the crisis and consequences of an attack, and reviewing incidents to learn lessons and prevent or mitigate future attacks.

GAO is making no recommendations in this report.

GAO's Analysis

The Interagency Framework for Combating Terrorism

The National Security Council and its Director for Combating Terrorism develop and manage the interagency framework for combating terrorism overseas. This framework consists of presidential directives, national strategies, and related guidance. For example, the National Security Council coordinated the overall *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, and the Director for Combating Terrorism coordinated the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. There are other national-level strategies related to combating terrorism. Examples of these include the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* and the *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*. The various strategies were developed for specific and separate purposes. There is a general hierarchy among these overlapping strategies.

Another key element in the interagency framework for combating terrorism overseas is the specific roles played by federal organizations and agencies. Some play a coordinating role, others serve a lead role in specific areas, and many others have support roles for specific activities. Some individual agencies have positions designated within them to lead their agencies' terrorism-related programs. In addition, individual agencies have their own strategic plans or develop interagency plans and related guidance for specific functions. For example, the Department of Justice's *Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2001-2006* and the Department of State's *2002 Annual Performance Plan* provide department-specific plans and goals related to terrorism.

The interagency framework also consists of coordinating mechanisms and groups to implement the functions and activities among all the federal agencies involved. In Washington, D.C., the National Security Council plays a major coordinating role by sponsoring a policy coordinating committee called the Counterterrorism Security Group that has several subordinate working groups on such topics as interagency exercises and assistance to other countries. At U.S. embassies, there are interagency teams that meet to coordinate bilateral efforts to combat terrorism. Similarly, regional military commands have interagency coordination groups that coordinate military operations with non-military tools to combat terrorism.

Efforts to Detect and Prevent Terrorism

Gathering and analyzing intelligence outside of the United States are the major activities to detect and prevent terrorist activities overseas and generally are led by the Central Intelligence Agency. Under the overall leadership of that agency, U.S. intelligence agencies gather information on terrorist organizations, monitor terrorist threats, and share information with other nations. The Departments of State, Justice, and Defense collect and analyze intelligence through surveillance programs and liaisons with foreign police. These intelligence activities support other preventative efforts, such as protecting U.S. facilities and Americans overseas, and visa and border controls.

Protecting U.S. facilities and Americans overseas is a major part of preventing terrorism and is generally led by the Department of State. To protect U.S. facilities and personnel abroad, State has programs that include facility security, local guard forces, armored vehicles for embassy personnel, and Marine Guards to protect sensitive information. The Department of Defense has separate programs to protect its military forces against terrorist attacks. For American citizens traveling and living abroad, the State Department issues public travel warnings and public announcements and operates warning systems to convey terrorist-related information. State also uses overseas advisory councils—voluntary partnerships between State and U.S. businesses—to exchange threat information with private companies.

Improving the image of the United States to support U.S. foreign policy is another activity to prevent terrorism. For example, in an attempt to reduce possible negative perceptions of the United States and foster greater understanding of U.S. policy in key international audiences, State conducts public diplomacy through various media. Similarly, the Broadcasting Board of Governors conducts international broadcasts to worldwide audiences to help support U.S. strategic interests.

Keeping terrorists and their materials out of the United States also helps to prevent terrorism. The State Department has a role in preventing terrorists from entering the United States through its visa programs and related efforts to screen out terrorists. Agencies that have recently transferred from various departments to the Department of Homeland Security also have a role in keeping terrorists and their contraband out of the United States. These include the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S. Border Patrol, the former U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard, which monitor the border at and between ports of entry.

Improving other countries' capabilities is another part of preventing terrorism and is generally led by the Department of State. The department has overall leadership of bilateral relations, including programs to assist foreign nations. Such programs consist of training, equipment, and other assistance to improve foreign police and military capabilities. While the State Department has the overall lead, many of these assistance programs are implemented in conjunction with the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, Energy, and the Treasury. One example is the Antiterrorism Assistance program, which is managed by State, but the training might be delivered by other agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the U.S. Secret Service. These assistance efforts not only help to prevent terrorist attacks, they can improve the capabilities of other countries to disrupt and destroy terrorists and to respond to terrorist incidents.

Efforts to Disrupt and Destroy Terrorist Organizations

Diplomacy and cooperation with other countries, led by the Department of State, enables that department and other federal agencies to undertake a number of efforts to combat terrorism. State manages bilateral and multilateral relationships to leverage opportunities for cooperation among traditional and emerging allies. At the bilateral level, State helps orchestrate other nations' support and assistance for U.S. law enforcement activities, financial operations, and military actions against terrorists. At the multilateral level, State leads U.S. efforts in the United Nations and in other international forums to combat terrorism. For example, State has introduced and coordinated the passage of several related United Nations Security Council Resolutions to combat terrorism.

Law enforcement efforts are also a key activity to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations and generally are led by the Department of Justice and its Federal Bureau of Investigation. These include efforts, in conjunction with other nations, to investigate terrorist incidents, make arrests, arrange for the return of suspects to the United States, and prosecute alleged terrorists. In such investigations, the Departments of State and the Treasury and other law enforcement agencies support the Department of Justice.

Taking action against the financial structure of terrorist organizations also plays a key role in disrupting and destroying the organizations and preventing future attacks. Numerous components of the Departments of State, the Treasury, Homeland Security, Justice, and other agencies participate in efforts to combat terrorist financing. Activities include

blocking or freezing assets of designated individuals and organizations linked to terrorism and conducting investigations aimed at identifying, tracing, and freezing assets tied to terrorist organizations.

Military operations are important in disrupting and destroying terrorist organizations and generally are led by the Department of Defense with support at the multilateral level provided by the Department of State. Operations in Afghanistan bluntly illustrate the devastating nature of military efforts to attack terrorist organizations. Many of the military operations are conducted or coordinated with foreign militaries.

Another means of disrupting and destroying terrorists is to strike secretly at terrorists through covert action, approved by the President and led by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Efforts to Respond to Terrorist Incidents

The federal government takes many advance preparations in anticipation of a terrorist attack. For example, each diplomatic post has an Emergency Action Committee and Emergency Action Plan. The committees are required to exercise these plans periodically. To improve the governmentwide responses to a terrorist incident, a number of federal agencies participate in an interagency exercise program.

Federal efforts to respond to terrorist incidents are organized along a lead agency concept. The State Department is the lead agency for responding to the crisis and managing the consequences of a terrorist incident overseas. In this role, State is responsible for marshaling all federal assets necessary to respond. The U.S. ambassador would be the on-scene coordinator for the U.S. response in the foreign nation, as was done, for example, after the U.S. embassy bombing in Nairobi, Kenya. The State Department, with the concurrence of the National Security Council, can lead a rapidly deployable interagency advisory group called the Foreign Emergency Support Team.

As part of the response to an incident, the Department of Justice, through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, would lead U.S. law enforcement investigations in conjunction with local police in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist incident overseas. Other federal law enforcement agencies—such as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives and the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security—have expertise to assist in investigations at the scene of an overseas attack.

Depending on the nature of the threat or incident, other federal agencies may be called upon to support State in managing the consequences of a terrorist attack. For example, the Department of State may request that the Department of Defense provide military support as part of the U.S. government's efforts to assist in mitigating the consequences of a terrorist incident overseas. The Department of State also may request U.S. military support for the evacuation of embassy staff and other Americans, should that be necessary in the aftermath of a terrorist incident. Many of State Department's efforts for managing the consequences of a terrorist attack have focused on incidents involving weapons of mass destruction—those involving chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials. Several federal agencies could assist the State Department in responding to such an incident. For example, the Department of Energy has a Nuclear Emergency Search Team to provide technical expertise in resolving a nuclear or radiological terrorist incident.

After a terrorist incident overseas, the Departments of State and Defense generally conduct reviews of the incident, which identify actions to prevent or mitigate future attacks. Examples of these include State's Accountability Review Boards for the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa and Defense's Task Force on the 1996 bombing of the al-Khobar Towers military housing facility in Saudi Arabia.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

GAO provided a draft of the report to several federal agencies in March 2003 for their review and comment. Such agencies included the Executive Office of the President (including the National Security Council, the Office of Homeland Security, and the Office of Management and Budget); the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury; the Central Intelligence Agency; and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

The Department of Defense and the U.S. Agency for International Development provided written comments on a draft of this report. These comments generally agreed with the accuracy of the report and they are reproduced in appendixes VIII and IX, respectively. In addition, these agencies provided technical comments, and we made revisions, as appropriate. We also received technical comments from the Office of Management and Budget; the Departments of Justice and State; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the U.S. Secret Service; and the Bureau for Immigration and Customs Enforcement. We made changes, as appropriate, based upon these written and oral technical comments.

Our draft report reflected efforts to combat terrorism overseas just prior to the transfer of certain agencies and functions to the new Department of Homeland Security in March 2003. Therefore, many of the technical comments concerned the creation of the new department and the transfer of these agencies and functions from other departments into the Department of Homeland Security. The Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, Transportation, and the Treasury and the CIA had no comments on a draft of this report.

Introduction: Terrorism Overseas and the Federal Government's Role

Terrorism generally is defined as politically motivated violence to coerce a government or civilian population. Within that definition, there is domestic terrorism and international terrorism, depending on the origin of terrorist groups, where they launch their attacks, and who their victims are. Efforts to combat terrorism are further broken down into homeland security activities (those that occur domestically) and combating terrorism overseas (those that occur abroad).¹ According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the threat of terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel, facilities, and interests overseas is greater now than ever before. Terrorists capable of attacking the United States can employ a variety of tactics, can hit a number of different targets, and can strike in regions throughout the world. Terrorism overseas is aggravated by a series of interrelated factors and trends, such as technological advances and alliances with international crime. The federal government's role in combating terrorism overseas includes political, diplomatic, legal, law enforcement, financial, military, and intelligence efforts. Immediately after the 2001 terrorist attacks, the Congress passed and the President signed into law an emergency supplemental appropriation that increased funding to combat terrorism overseas by at least \$2 billion in fiscal year 2002. Funding for combating terrorism overseas has increased about 133 percent, growing from \$4.9 billion in fiscal year 2001 to \$11.4 billion requested in fiscal year 2004. In addition, the Department of Defense (DOD) has spent about \$30 billion on military operations against terrorism in the period roughly equivalent to fiscal year 2002.

Definitions for Terrorism and Combating Terrorism

"Terrorism" generally is defined as politically motivated violence to coerce a government or civilian population. However, no single definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance by the U.S. government and federal agencies' definitions of terrorism vary somewhat based on their functional roles and missions. For example, the Department of State and the CIA define terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or

¹ In this report, we refer to programs outside of the United States as combating terrorism *overseas*. This term is consistent with how the Executive Office of the President defines terrorism-related programs to distinguish them from programs inside the United States—also known as homeland security programs. For the purposes of this report, we use the terms "overseas" and "abroad" interchangeably to refer to programs and activities that occur outside of the United States.

clandestine agents.”² The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines it more broadly as “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”³ The FBI definition reflects its mission, identifying a terrorist incident as a violation of the criminal laws of the United States and a suspected terrorist would, therefore, be subject to arrest and prosecution. Finally, DOD defines terrorism as “the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or try to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.”⁴ DOD’s definition of terrorism subsumes both definitions used by the Department of State and the FBI. This definition was carefully crafted to distinguish between terrorism and other kinds of violence.

Within the definition of terrorism, there is “domestic terrorism” and “international terrorism,” depending on the origin of terrorist groups, where they launch their attacks, and who their victims are. The FBI defines domestic terrorism as the unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a terrorist group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States or its territories without foreign direction. The 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, for example, was an act of domestic terrorism. The State Department and the CIA define international terrorism as terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country. International terrorist acts can occur either inside or outside of the United States and may transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they intend to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which the perpetrators operate or seek asylum. The 2001 coordinated terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., for example, were acts of international terrorism. Although the attacks occurred within the United States, the perpetrators came from other countries and many of the World Trade Center victims

² This definition is derived from 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d) (2002). “Noncombatant” includes not only civilians, but also military personnel who, at the time of the incident, are unarmed and/or are not on duty. State also considers as acts of terrorism attacks on U.S. military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the incident site, such as terrorist bombings against U.S. military facilities. Since 1983, the U.S. government has used this definition for statistical and analytical purposes.

³ This definition is derived from 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (2002).

⁴ DOD Directive 2000.12, *DOD Antiterrorism/Force Protection Program*, Apr. 13, 1999.

were foreign nationals. Figure 1 shows the aftermath of an international terrorist attack within the United States.

Figure 1: The Pentagon in Flames Moments after International Terrorists Crash a Hijacked Aircraft into the Building on September 11, 2001



Source: U.S. Marine Corps.

“Combating terrorism” refers to the full range of policies, strategies, programs, and activities to counter terrorism both at home and abroad. The distinction between “homeland security” and “combating terrorism overseas” is based on where federal efforts to combat terrorism occur. Federal programs and activities directed against terrorism within the United States are considered homeland security, which is defined by the federal government as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to

terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”⁵ This is a new term, used since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. In contrast, federal programs and activities directed against terrorism outside of the United States are considered combating terrorism overseas, which is the subject of this report.

Finally, within the term combating terrorism, some federal agencies make a further distinction between “antiterrorism” and “counterterrorism” to describe their programs and activities within the context of their functional roles and missions. Antiterrorism generally refers to defensive measures. The Department of State, for example, uses “antiterrorism” in the context of law enforcement training, border security, critical infrastructure protection, and embassy security. DOD uses the term “antiterrorism” to mean the defensive measures, including force protection, taken to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts. DOD uses the term “counterterrorism” to mean offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. The FBI, meanwhile, uses the term “counterterrorism” to refer to the full range of its activities directed against terrorism, including preventive measures, incident response, and investigative efforts. Finally, OMB tracks funding to combat terrorism overseas, but does not include direct military operations in the figures it reports.

The Threat of Terrorism Overseas

International terrorists use a variety of tactics in their attacks against the United States. The number of terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens, facilities, and interests overseas has declined in recent years, but the lethality of the attacks has increased. Although terrorists use many different tactics and methods to attack Americans, bombings are the predominant type of attack in recent years. While the threat to Americans varies by region, type of event, and targets attacked, bombing of U.S. businesses in Latin America constituted the majority of attacks in 2001. Also, international terrorism is aggravated by a series of interrelated factors, such as globalization, technological advances, and troubling trends that include, for example, a shift in terrorists’ tactics and the use of unconventional weapons.

⁵ See Office of Homeland Security, *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, July 16, 2002, p. 2.


**Terrorist Organizations Use
Variety of Tactics to Attack
American Targets
Worldwide**

According to the CIA, the threat of terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel, facilities, and interests overseas is greater now than ever before because of the number and types of terrorist organizations, the lethality of terrorists' tactics, and the ability of terrorists to operate worldwide. Terrorist organizations that threaten U.S. personnel, facilities, and interests at home and abroad come primarily from organized groups that have political, ethnic, or religious agendas; from state sponsors of terrorist organizations; and from transnational groups with broader goals. Islamic terrorist groups, which have become a growing threat in recent years, tend to be loosely organized, recruit their membership from many different countries, and obtain support from an informal international network.

Number and Lethality of Attacks

Worldwide, the number of international terrorist attacks has declined in recent years compared to the mid-1980s. However, the level of violence and lethality of such attacks have increased. According to the Department of State, the number of international terrorist attacks peaked at 666 incidents in 1987 and had declined to 348 in 2001. Yet, casualties resulting from international terrorist attacks during 2001 were the highest ever recorded—3,572 persons killed and 1,083 injured. Figure 2 shows the total number of international terrorist attacks over a 21-year period (1981-2001).

Figure 2: Total International Terrorist Attacks, 1981-2001



Source: Department of State.

The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, represented the most lethal international terrorist attack ever. Three of four separate, but coordinated aircraft hijackings, carried out by the al Qaeda terrorist network, deliberately destroyed predetermined targets that represented America's political, economic, and military strength. (The fourth hijacked aircraft crashed in Pennsylvania apparently as a result of the passengers overpowering the terrorists, thus preventing the aircraft from being used as a missile in the terrorists' plan.) According to State's Office of International Information Programs, a total of 3,057 people were killed in these four incidents.⁶ Citizens representing 78 different countries perished at the World Trade Center site. These events clearly demonstrated not only the lethality, but also the global reach of a terrorist organization


⁶ This figure includes 2,666 persons killed in the coordinated terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, against the World Trade Center Towers in New York City, 125 killed in the Pentagon, 92 killed aboard American Airlines flight 11 that crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center, 65 killed aboard United Airlines flight 175 that crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center, 64 killed aboard American Airlines flight 77 that crashed into the Pentagon, and 45 killed aboard United Airlines flight 93 that crashed in rural Pennsylvania.

beyond any terrorist attack the United States had previously experienced—at home or abroad.

Types of Terrorist Attacks

Terrorists employ a wide variety of tactics, to include violent demonstrations, vandalism, arson, assault, kidnappings, ambushes, sniper attacks, murder, and attacks with firearms, grenades, rockets, and bombs. However, bombings are the most common type of attack. From 1988 to 2001, bombings accounted for 67 percent of all terrorist attacks against Americans. Figure 3 shows the different types of international terrorist attacks by percentage that were perpetrated against Americans over a 14-year period between 1988 and 2001.

Figure 3: Types of International Terrorist Attacks Against Americans by Percentage, 1988-2001



Source: *Political Violence Against Americans, 1987 through 2001*, Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Department of State.


Note: "Other" consists of drugging, sabotage, physical harassment, mortar/landmine, bomb/rocket hoax, banditry, sit-in, and other/incidental.

In recent years, the United States and its interests have been the target of several terrorist bombings overseas, to include the June 1996 truck bombing of the al-Khobar Towers military housing facility near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; the August 1998 truck bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es-Salaam, Tanzania, and in Nairobi, Kenya; and the October 2000 ship bombing of the guided missile destroyer *USS Cole* during a refueling stop in Aden Harbor, Yemen. In 2001 (the most recent year that data is available), bombings have become an even more prevalent type of tactic used by terrorists against U.S. facilities and interests overseas. Of the 219 terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens and facilities overseas during 2001, 207 (or about 95 percent) were carried out by bombing the target.

Type of Targets Attacked

Terrorists attack American businesses most frequently. Of the 228 attacks during 2001 against U.S. targets, 204 (or more than 89 percent) were against American businesses. U.S. government, diplomatic, and military targets tend to be more protected and represent hard targets; American businesses, in contrast, are less protected, making them soft targets. Figure 4 shows the number of terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens, facilities, and interests overseas during 2001 by type of target attacked.


Figure 4: Terrorist Attacks Against U.S. Targets during 2001 by Type of Targets Attacked



Terrorism Varies by Region, With Most Attacks Occurring in Latin America

Terrorism—both in the number of attacks and the nature of the threat—varies by region. The overwhelming number of attacks have occurred in Latin America. Of the 219 terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens and facilities overseas during 2001, 191 (or 87 percent) were in Latin America. Figure 5 shows the number of terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens, facilities, and interests overseas during 2001 by region.

Figure 5: Terrorist Attacks Against U.S. Targets during 2001 by Region



Source: Department of State.

The following sections summarize, by region, the international threat of terrorism to U.S. citizens and personnel; U.S. business, government, and military facilities; and U.S. political, economic, and strategic interests. This information is based on a review of key documents and interviews with officials in the Departments of State and Defense, U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and the CIA.

Africa

In Africa, terrorism is a persistent and increasing threat to U.S. and other countries' personnel, facilities, and interests. Most terrorist attacks in Africa, according to the State Department, stem from internal civil unrest and spillover from regional wars as African rebel movements and opposition groups use terrorist tactics to further their political, social, or economic objectives. For example, insurgent groups have used terrorist tactics and attacked civilians in recent years in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. In addition, international terrorist organizations with Islamic ties, such as al Qaeda and the Lebanese Hizballah, have established footholds in Africa and exploit the continent's permissive operating environment to expand and strengthen their terrorist networks. The al Qaeda terrorist bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 demonstrated how vulnerable "lower risk" U.S. diplomatic facilities are on the continent compared with hardened embassies in the Middle East and elsewhere. Africa's ungoverned areas, porous borders, regional conflicts, lax or non-existent financial systems, and the wide availability of weapons all contribute to an operating environment where terrorist organizations thrive. Similarly, terrorist organizations breed and find sanctuary in Africa's "failed states," such as Somalia, or those countries with weak central governments and poor or nonexistent law enforcement that cannot monitor, let alone control, the activities of terrorists and their supporters. Terrorists also are using the illegal trade in Africa in diamonds both to launder money and to finance their operations worldwide.⁷ Finally, one African nation—Sudan—has been designated by the State Department as one of seven countries worldwide that sponsors terrorism.⁸ Figure 6 shows the aftermath of the 1998 terrorist bombing of a U.S. embassy in East Africa.

⁷ For more information on the illegal diamond trade, see U.S. General Accounting Office, *International Trade: Critical Issues Remain in Deterring Conflict Diamond Trade*, GAO-02-678 (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2002). We reported that the nature of diamonds and the operations of the international diamond industry create opportunities for illicit trade, including trade in conflict diamonds. We also reported that there are considerable challenges in establishing a system that will effectively deter this trade.

Figure 6: Aftermath of the al Qaeda Terrorist Bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Dar es-Salaam, Tanzania, in August 1998



Source: Department of State.

South Asia

South Asia currently represents the primary (but by no means the only) focus of terrorism directed against the United States. Terrorist organizations, such as al Qaeda, continue to operate and garner support in the region. Afghanistan became the first military battleground in the “war on terrorism” in October 2001. Afghanistan, for example, had been used by Islamic extremists from around the world as a training ground and base of operations for their terrorist activities. The al Qaeda leadership used Afghanistan as a safe haven to recruit and train terrorists, manage

⁸ State sponsors of terrorism are those countries designated by the Secretary of State under section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2780(d). Moreover, each year, under the provisions of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (50 U.S.C. § 2405(j)), the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of State, provides the Congress with a list of countries that support international terrorism. The Secretary of State may designate a government as a state sponsor of terrorism if that government has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism, invoking economic sanctions. The seven countries currently on the list are Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Various types of sanctions can be imposed on a government so designated, as discussed in more detail in chapter 4.

worldwide fundraising for the terrorist organization, plan terrorist operations, and conduct violent anti-American demonstrations to provoke extremists in other countries to attack U.S. interests worldwide. These activities culminated in the September 11, 2001, coordinated terrorist attacks against the United States.

East Asia

In East Asia, trafficking in narcotics, persons, and weapons—as well as organized crime and official corruption—are serious international crimes that terrorist organizations exploit to finance their operations. Southeast Asian terrorist organizations that have cells linked to al Qaeda were discovered in 2001 in Malaysia and Singapore and their activities, movements, and connections traverse the entire region. Multinational terrorist organizations and networks operate throughout the region, highlighting the lack of an effective regional counterterrorism mechanism. Most terrorist activity in East Asia is related to domestic political disputes. However, the Abu Sayyaf Group, an Islamic extremist organization in the Philippines, kidnapped two Americans and killed one of them in 2002. The United States remains concerned about Islamic extremists operating in and around western China who have received training, equipment, and inspiration from al Qaeda, the Taliban, and others in Afghanistan.

Eurasia

In Eurasia, the threat against the United States and its interests stems principally from the ongoing threat posed by al Qaeda-linked terrorists rather than by the influx of al Qaeda and Taliban fighters following coalition operations led by the United States in neighboring Afghanistan. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which is on the U.S. foreign terrorist organization list, seeks to overthrow the Uzbek government and create an Islamic state. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are five of the new U.S. partners in the “war on terrorism” and have provided the United States with access to their military facilities for U.S. offensive combat operations and/or humanitarian support in Afghanistan. Also of U.S. concern in Eurasia is the linkage between terrorism and other international crimes (specifically organized crime and trafficking in persons and drugs), ethnic separatism, and religious extremism. U.S. officials remain concerned about routes through Georgia. The international mujahidin with ties to terrorist organizations move people, money, and materiel throughout the Caucasus region in support of separatist fighters in Chechnya, Russia. Finally, the United States is so concerned about the terrorist threat in the region that it has provided Georgia with training to help it implement tighter counterterrorism controls in the Pankisi Gorge.⁹ (Chapter 3 discusses U.S. training to improve other countries’ capabilities to combat terrorism.)

Europe

In Europe, U.S. diplomatic and military officials remain concerned about the terrorist threat to U.S. military and diplomatic facilities and personnel. Potential al Qaeda “ sleeper cells” in Germany and elsewhere continue to pose a threat to U.S. interests. Domestic terrorist organizations in a number of countries (such as Greece, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom) continue to function at varying levels of effectiveness. A wide-range of groups and individuals use terrorist tactics to protest globalization, often directing their demonstrations toward U.S. businesses. In the Balkans, according to the Department of State, although governments generally are committed to combating terrorism, terrorists and Islamic extremist groups have exploited inadequate border security and institutional weaknesses to support their operations. Also, Middle Eastern nongovernmental organizations identified as supporting terrorist activities remain in the Balkans, providing assistance to Islamic extremist groups. Terrorists also exploit some European countries’ liberal asylum laws; open land borders; and weaknesses in their investigative, prosecutorial, and procedural processes while using these countries as operational staging areas for international terrorist attacks. For example, according to the Department of State, the theft and forgery of passports in Belgium facilitated terrorists’ ability to travel freely. State further reported that, while in the past, lenient Greek courts reduced sentences of suspected terrorists and overturned guilty verdicts of terrorist cases, Greek authorities are using new antiterrorism legislation passed in 2002 to more successfully prosecute terrorist cases. Greece effectively neutralized its most lethal terrorist group, Revolutionary Organization 17 November, in June 2002, and 19 suspected members went on trial in March 2003. According to the State Department, U.S. and international officials are pleased with Greek cooperation on security preparations for the 2004 Olympic Summer Games in Athens, Greece.

Latin America

In Latin America, the transnational threats of terrorism, drugs and arms trafficking, illegal migration, and international organized crime are the greatest challenge to U.S. security interests in the region.¹⁰ These transnational threats are increasingly linked as they share common infrastructure, transit patterns, corrupting means, and illicit mechanisms.

⁹ The Pankisi Gorge is a region in northern Georgia that Russia accuses Georgia of allowing Chechen terrorists (separatist fighters) and the international mujahidin to use as a safe haven.

¹⁰ Testimony by General Gary Speer (U.S. Army), Acting Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command, before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Mar. 5, 2002.

International terrorists groups have established support bases in some South American countries that sustain their worldwide operations. For example, the triborder area where the borders of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay converge continues to be a safe haven for Hizballah—the Lebanese-based terrorist organization—and other terrorist organizations, such as HAMAS, where they raise funds to finance their operations through criminal enterprises. According to the Department of State, there are unconfirmed reports that al Qaeda support cells and sympathizers also are scattered throughout Latin America. A Colombian paramilitary organization has been added to the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, known as the FARC (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*), pose a direct threat to U.S. personnel, facilities, and interests. Terrorist attacks against Columbia's energy infrastructure (the Cano Limon-Covenas oil pipeline) has a severe impact. Even members of the Irish Republican Army were arrested in 2001 for helping the FARC prepare for an urban terror campaign by providing explosives training. Bombings, kidnappings, extortions, and assassinations remain the most pervasive terrorism problems in the region. The major concern for U.S. officials is the nexus or linkage between the illegal narcotics trafficking and terrorism or narco-terrorism. In addition, land, maritime, and air smuggling routes and support networks across South America, Central America, and the Caribbean once used exclusively by criminals trafficking in illegal narcotics and humans are now being used by terrorists.

Middle East

In the Middle East, the greatest threat to U.S. interests comes from terrorist groups and state-sponsored terrorist organizations. Chief among the terrorist groups is Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda terrorist organization. According to the Department of State, Syria and Lebanon refuse to recognize Hizballah, HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and other Palestinian rejectionist groups as terrorist organizations, believing that violent activities by these groups represent legitimate resistance. After decades of civil war and foreign occupation, Lebanese governmental control continues to be weak or non-existent in many areas of the country.¹¹ This environment allows for the smuggling of small arms and explosives and training activities by terrorist organizations. Financing of terrorist organizations remains problematic in the Gulf countries. Joint

¹¹ According to the State Department, this is not an issue of the Lebanese having the capability to enforce its will and choosing not to; it is an issue of Lebanese governmental incapacity after decades of Israeli and Syrian occupation of Lebanon.

efforts by the U.S. and Yemeni governments to disrupt and destroy al Qaeda elements in Yemen have been only partially successful, and al Qaeda nodes still exist in that country. Protecting U.S. citizens and personnel and facilities from terrorist attack is a high priority throughout the region. In addition, force protection of U.S. forces transiting the Suez Canal in Egypt has increased.

North America

In North America, the greatest vulnerability to the United States is the porous borders with Canada and Mexico. The lack of adequate border security could allow terrorists to enter the United States unnoticed or unchallenged to carry out their activities and conduct their operations. Another threatening factor facing the United States in North America is a lack of effective mechanisms by neighboring countries to prevent terrorist from financing their operations. In Mexico, for example, new measures taken to counter terrorist financing include monitoring financial movements, exchanging information on unusual movements of capital, and more effective steps to combat money laundering.

Factors That Aggravate the
Threat of Terrorism

The increase in the level and severity of international terrorism (and other international crimes) in recent years can be traced to a series of interrelated aggravating factors. These factors enable terrorist groups to operate more effectively. The factors, as identified by the FBI, are as follows.

Reduced International Barriers

The post-Cold War landscape provides terrorists and terrorist organizations with opportunities to exploit the advantages of reduced or collapsed political and economic barriers to move people, money, information, and materiel—including weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—across international borders.

Global Business Networks

The globalization of business networks also facilitates international terrorism. Like international criminals, international terrorists take advantage of global commercial, banking, transportation, and communication systems to plan, finance, and carry out their operations. Through these networks, terrorists and terrorist organizations often plan their operations in third countries, some of which provide safe havens.

Technological Advances

Technological advances, particularly in information technology and communications, also facilitate terrorist organizations' global reach. Terrorists are becoming more sophisticated in their use of computer and

telecommunications technology. For example, there is widespread use of cell phones to plan, coordinate, support, and execute terrorist operations, making antiterrorism measures challenging. In addition, cyber, or computer-based, attacks are a real threat to the nation's critical computer-supported infrastructures, such as telecommunications, power distribution, financial services, national defense, and critical government operations. Terrorist organizations also are adept at using technology for counterintelligence purposes and for tracking law enforcement activities.

Weak Law Enforcement Institutions

Institutional shortcomings in foreign countries exacerbate federal efforts to combat the spread of international terrorism (and other transnational crimes). According to an interagency working group, local police and the judicial systems in many countries in which terrorists and terrorist organizations operate are ineffective.¹² They lack adequate resources, have limited investigative authorities, or are plagued by corruption. The working group reported that many countries have outdated or even nonexistent laws involving extradition, immigration, asset seizure, anti-money laundering, computers, and anti-terrorism. According to the interagency working group, many countries simply do not have adequate resources, training, equipment, expertise, or the political will to carry out complex, sustained investigations of international terrorism or to conduct counterterrorism operations. Terrorists and terrorist organizations take advantage of these institutional limitations and weaknesses to find and establish sanctuaries, while governments and law enforcement remain constrained by national boundaries.

Trends in International Terrorism

In recent years, U.S. intelligence agencies have identified several important trends in international terrorism. Some of these trends are the result of adaptations that terrorist organizations have made in response to the aggravating factors discussed above. These trends are as follows:

¹² See *International Crime Threat Assessment* (Dec. 2000). This global assessment was prepared by an interagency working group in support of and pursuant to the President's *International Crime Control Strategy of the United States* (The White House, May 1998). The interagency working group included representatives from the Departments of State, the Treasury, Justice, and Transportation; the CIA; the FBI; Drug Enforcement Administration; U.S. Customs Service; U.S. Secret Service; Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; National Drug Intelligence Center; the Office of National Drug Control Policy; and the National Security Council.

Decline in state-sponsorship of terrorism

Terrorists have become less dependent on sponsorship by sovereign states. State-sponsors in the past had provided terrorists with a safe haven and political, financial, and logistical support. They provided intelligence, planning, and support for terrorist acts and may have had prior knowledge of such attacks. However, the threat of sanctions and retaliation have reduced the willingness of most states to sponsor terrorism. By the late 1990s, according to the Director of Central Intelligence, a completely new phenomenon had emerged—a terrorist sponsoring a state. The Taliban actively aided Osama bin Laden by assigning him guards for security, permitting him to build and maintain terrorist camps, and refusing to cooperate with efforts by the international community to extradite him. In return, bin Laden invested vast amounts of money in Taliban projects and provided hundreds of well-trained fighters to help the Taliban consolidate and expand its control of Afghanistan.¹³

Move to loosely affiliated groups

As dependency on state-sponsored terrorism decreases, terrorist groups operating on their own in loosely affiliated groups have increased. The resulting transnational and decentralized structure facilitates terrorists' avoiding detection. In particular, Islamic terrorist groups tend to be loosely organized, recruit their membership from many different countries, and obtain support from an informal international network of like-minded extremists.

Use of unconventional weapons

Tactics among international terrorists have shifted from aircraft hijackings and hostage taking to indiscriminate terrorist attacks that yield maximum destruction, casualties, and impact. Although the vast majority of terrorist attacks worldwide continue to be carried out with conventional weapons, such as firearms and bombs, there is a concern among U.S. intelligence community officials about terrorists using unconventional weapons, namely weapons of mass destruction to include chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.

Alliance with transnational crime

There has been a coalescence of terrorism and other transnational crimes, which provides terrorists with various types of international crime to finance their operations. These include, for example, illegal immigration, contraband smuggling, visa fraud, piracy, illegal trafficking in human

¹³ Written statement for the record by the Director of Central Intelligence before a Joint Hearing of the Joint Inquiry Committee of the House Select Committee on Intelligence and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Oct. 17, 2002, p. 5.

beings, diamond smuggling, and tobacco diversion and associated tax fraud.

The Federal Government's Role and Resources for Combating Terrorism Overseas

The federal government's role in combating terrorism overseas involves many diplomatic, law enforcement, financial, military, and intelligence activities. These roles span numerous departments, agencies, bureaus, and offices. In fact, no single government agency possesses the authority, responsibility, and capability to effectively detect and prevent terrorism, disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations, deny terrorists safe haven, and respond to terrorist incidents abroad. Therefore, the federal government combats terrorism overseas simultaneously on many different fronts by attempting to coordinate its interagency efforts. The federal government's interagency framework for combating terrorism overseas, including federal agencies' roles and responsibilities and how they coordinate with each other, is discussed in detail in chapter 2 and other chapters, as appropriate. The federal government has dedicated substantial resources to combating terrorism overseas.

Funding of Federal Programs and Activities to Combat Terrorism Overseas

Identifying funding to combat terrorism is inherently difficult, but the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), as required by law, has reported on these funds annually since 1998.¹⁴ Funding to combat terrorism overseas only recently has been identified separately from other funding to combat terrorism (i.e., domestic spending for homeland security). The funding of federal programs and activities to combat terrorism overseas has increased dramatically since the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. Emergency supplemental appropriations increased funding by \$2 billion in fiscal year 2002. Funding for combating terrorism overseas has increased about 133 percent, growing from \$4.9 billion in fiscal year 2001 to \$11.4 billion requested in fiscal year 2004. In addition to these amounts, DOD has spent about \$30 billion on military operations against terrorism in the period roughly equivalent to fiscal year 2002.

Funding to Combat Terrorism Is Difficult to Identify

There are inherent challenges in identifying federal funding to combat terrorism. First, numerous federal agencies have some role in combating terrorism. Second, the agencies' budgets often include both domestic and overseas components. Third, there are no separate appropriation accounts

¹⁴ P.L. 105-85 § 1051, Nov. 18, 1997, as amended by P.L. 105-261 § 1403, Oct. 17, 1998.

specifically for combating terrorism and the many activities it entails. Fourth, funding for these programs may be in accounts authorized to fund programs and activities not specific to combating terrorism.

As required by law, OMB has issued an annual report to the Congress since 1998 on federal funding to combat terrorism. This report is to include such information as a description of the programs and activities, the amounts to be expended, program priorities, and areas of potential duplication.¹⁵ The OMB report also has a classified annex providing additional detail on DOD and intelligence activity funding. The most recent OMB report, issued in June 2002, provides funding and programmatic information on 27 federal entities (for example, departments, agencies, bureaus, and offices) that have budgeted or spent combating terrorism funds.¹⁶ These entities are responsible for the federal government's efforts to combat terrorist activity both domestically and overseas, including defense against terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.

Funding to Combat Terrorism Overseas Now Identified Separately

In the June 2002 report, OMB for the first time separately identified funds to combat terrorism domestically (for homeland security) from those to combat terrorism overseas. In prior reports, both domestic and overseas activities were combined. However, as a result of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the emphasis on domestic protection, OMB included a separate, detailed analysis of homeland security—which OMB defined as activities to combat terrorism within the United States. For the June 2002 report, OMB defined “overseas combating terrorism” as activities outside of the United States, excluding direct military actions, such as the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. Of the \$52.74 billion budget requested to combat terrorism in fiscal year 2004, \$11.4 billion (or 22 percent) was for combating terrorism overseas. The remaining \$41.35 billion (or 78 percent) was requested for homeland security activities (gross budget authority). Table 1 shows the President's fiscal

¹⁵ For an evaluation of OMB's annual reports, including an assessment of their usefulness to the Congress, see U.S. General Accounting Office, *Combating Terrorism: Funding Data Reported to Congress Should be Improved*, [GAO-03-170](#) (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 26, 2002). We reported on the difficulties in coordinating budgets to combat terrorism, limitations to OMB's annual reports, and recommended ways to improve OMB reporting to the Congress on programs to combat terrorism.

¹⁶ See *2002 Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism*, OMB, June 24, 2002. At the time this report was being prepared, OMB had not issued the 2003 report.

year 2004 budget request to combat terrorism both domestically and overseas.

Table 1: Fiscal Year 2004 President's Request for Funding to Combat Terrorism Domestically and Overseas (Gross Budget Authority)

Dollars in millions

| Department or agency | Fiscal year 2004 request for homeland security (domestic) | Fiscal year 2004 request for overseas combating terrorism | Total fiscal year 2004 request for combating terrorism (domestic and overseas) |
|-----------------------------------|---|---|--|
| Energy | \$1,361 | \$226 | \$1,587 |
| Homeland Security | 23,890 | ^a | 23,890 |
| Justice | 2,290 | ^a | 2,290 |
| National Security ^b | 6,717 | 8,455 | 15,172 |
| State | 811 | 1,555 | 2,366 |
| Treasury | 91 | ^a | 91 |
| International assistance programs | 0 | 1,158 | 1,158 |
| All other federal agencies | 6,187 | 2 | 6,189 |
| Total | \$41,347 | \$11,396 | \$52,743 |

Source: GAO analysis of OMB data.

^aThe Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and the Treasury have some funds dedicated to activities to combat terrorism overseas. However, OMB includes these funds as part of homeland security.

^bNational Security combines DOD and selected intelligence activities. These figures are combined to prevent the disclosure of classified intelligence spending. In addition, the amounts do not include direct military action.

There are several qualifications to the figures reported by OMB. First, OMB officials said that there is not always a clear distinction between activities to combat terrorism and other related activities, nor between domestic activities and overseas activities. The OMB budget examiners must make judgment calls about how to characterize the funding. For example, some combating terrorism missions have multiple purposes and funding for these missions is co-mingled in accounts that can cover multiple purposes. OMB reports all of DOD's military and civilian personnel costs associated with security as funds to combat terrorism—even if these individuals spend some portion of their time on security matters not related to combating terrorism. In contrast, OMB does not report the State Department's public diplomacy activities as funds to combat terrorism—even if these activities have a major terrorism focus. As another example, OMB's reported figures

do not capture overseas law enforcement activities from the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and the Treasury. Examples of these activities include customs, legal and financial attachés stationed overseas,

training and assistance provided to other countries, or these departments' support to International Law Enforcement Academies around the world.¹⁷ OMB includes the funding of such activities along with homeland security (domestic) programs of the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and the Treasury. Finally, as stated earlier, OMB's reported figures for combating terrorism overseas do not include direct military actions, such as the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. For the purpose of this report, we are including military actions against terrorists as part of combating terrorism overseas. OMB has estimated military operations against terrorism at \$30 billion for the period roughly equivalent to fiscal year 2002.¹⁸

Funding to Combat Terrorism Overseas Increased

In response to the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the Congress appropriated a supplemental \$40 billion to the Emergency Response Fund.¹⁹ Of this amount, \$12.9 billion was provided for combating terrorism, including just over \$2 billion for combating terrorism overseas. The remaining \$28 billion from that emergency supplemental appropriation was made available to other missions, such as recovery efforts at the World Trade Center Towers in New York City and at the Pentagon.²⁰ The President's Budget requested additional funding for federal programs and activities to combat terrorism overseas, which increased from about \$4.9 billion in fiscal year 2001 to almost \$11.4 billion (or about 133 percent) in the President's fiscal year 2004 budget request.²¹

¹⁷ More details on these activities are provided in chapters 3 and 4.

¹⁸ OMB Press Release 2002-61, Sept. 10, 2002.

¹⁹ See 2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States (P.L. 107-38), Sept. 18, 2001.

²⁰ A second supplemental appropriation totaling \$29 billion was signed into law on August 2, 2002. Of that amount, some \$14 billion was allocated to DOD, but none of it was for combating terrorism overseas, according to OMB.

²¹ As discussed earlier, OMB only began reporting the overseas funding for combating terrorism separately from domestic (homeland security) in its June 2002 report to the Congress. However, in that report they estimated the overseas funding for the previous 2 years (fiscal years 2001 and 2002).

While the level of funding for intelligence activities is classified—and included with DOD funding to prevent the disclosure of classified data—recent unclassified statements by the Director of Central Intelligence provide information on the magnitude of increases in intelligence programs related to terrorism.²² According to the Director, intelligence funding to combat terrorism tripled between fiscal years 1990 and 1999. The Director also said that the percent of the CIA's budget dedicated to combating terrorism increased from less than 4 percent in fiscal year 1994 to almost 10 percent in fiscal year 2002.

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Based upon your original requests and in subsequent discussions with your offices, our overall objective was to identify and describe federal agencies' programs and activities to combat terrorism overseas. This report discusses

- the federal government's interagency framework to combat terrorism overseas (see ch. 2);
- federal programs and activities to detect and prevent terrorism overseas (see ch. 3);
- federal programs and activities to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations overseas (see ch. 4); and
- federal programs and activities to respond to terrorist incidents overseas (see ch. 5).

In addition, the report discusses how federal agencies coordinate efforts in Washington, D.C., and at U.S. missions and other locations abroad to combat terrorism overseas. Where appropriate, it also discusses recent changes since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Information on coordination mechanisms and recent changes is discussed throughout the report.

In preparing this report, we limited our scope to developing descriptive information rather than conducting evaluations of individual programs and activities. This was done, as agreed with our congressional clients, because

²² See Written Statement for the Record, Director of Central Intelligence, Before the Joint Inquiry Committee, Oct. 17, 2002.

of the large number of departments, agencies, bureaus, and offices as well as the multitude of their programs and activities to combat terrorism overseas. Where we have conducted related evaluative work, we have identified the appropriate GAO products and their results in footnotes. In addition, we include a list of related GAO products at the end of this report. In addition, to make this report most useful for oversight, we limited our discussion in this report to unclassified information.

The scope of this report included key federal departments and agencies with programs and activities to combat terrorism overseas. Review work was conducted in Washington, D.C., at the Executive Office of the President, including the National Security Council (NSC), Office of Homeland Security, and OMB; the Departments of Defense, Energy, Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury; and at the CIA. We also conducted review work at or met overseas with officials from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); Defense Intelligence Agency; Drug Enforcement Administration; the FBI; Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC); the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS); USAID; the former U.S. Customs Service; U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Secret Service. In addition, fieldwork was conducted at the U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida; U.S. European Command, Patch Barracks, Stuttgart/Vaihingen, Germany; U.S. Southern Command, Miami, Florida; U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida; U.S. Embassy in Athens, Greece; and at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Budapest, Hungary. We included information on other departments and activities based on previous and ongoing work by GAO. A complete listing of organizations and locations visited or contacted is found in appendix VII.

While our scope was generally limited to combating terrorism overseas, we included programs related to border security, which also are considered part of homeland security. Also, we included certain efforts to combat terrorism overseas that actually occur within the United States, such as interagency coordination, intelligence analysis, and law enforcement investigations and prosecutions. Our more comprehensive work on homeland security is summarized in two recent reports.²³ Most of our

²³ See U.S. General Accounting Office, *Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Homeland Security*, GAO-03-102 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1, 2003) and U.S. General Accounting Office, *Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal Leadership*, GAO-03-260 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002).

analysis for this report was performed before the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in December 2002 and its initial operations in January 2003. Therefore, when we conducted our review, many of the agencies, bureaus, offices, and federal response teams discussed in this report had not yet been transferred to the new department from the Departments of Health and Human Services, Justice, Transportation, and the Treasury.

For each objective, we interviewed agency officials, reviewed supporting programmatic and budgetary documentation, and reviewed prior GAO work.

To identify and describe the federal government's interagency framework and policies to combat terrorism overseas and how they have changed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, we conducted a qualitative analysis of: (1) the current interagency framework and policies for combating terrorism overseas; (2) the relationship between and among various national strategies to combat terrorism overseas; (3) the roles, responsibilities, and management structure of the NSC and its Policy Coordinating Committees for international counterterrorism coordination and the role of the Office of Homeland Security; (4) the roles, responsibilities, and management structure of the lead federal agency (Department of State) for crisis and consequence management of terrorist incidents overseas and those of support agencies (Departments of Defense, Justice, and the Treasury, and the intelligence community); (5) legislation and agency plans, implementing guidance, concepts of operations, and contingency plans; and (6) changes in the interagency framework, policies, and implementing guidance since September 11, 2001.

To identify and describe federal programs and activities to combat terrorism overseas, we conducted a qualitative analysis of these efforts in the areas of: (1) preventing and detecting terrorism overseas; (2) disrupting and destroying terrorist organizations; and (3) responding to a terrorist incident overseas.

To identify and describe how federal agencies coordinate efforts in Washington, D.C., and at U.S. missions abroad to combat terrorism overseas, we conducted a qualitative analysis of: (1) interagency and agencies' roles and responsibilities; (2) interagency management structures, policies, and procedures to coordinate international counterterrorism at headquarters and at a selected U.S. mission abroad; (3) U.S. missions' roles, responsibilities, management structures, and

procedures to coordinate international counterterrorism with headquarters elements; and (4) changes in coordination policies and procedures that resulted from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

We faced some limitations to our methodology during our review. For example, the NSC's *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* was released at the end of our review. In addition, agencies' reorganizations and creation of the Department of Homeland Security affected the organization, management structure, roles and missions, programs, and activities of numerous agencies involved in combating terrorism overseas. Funding to combat terrorism overseas is not always identified as such and may not be broken out neatly into specific functions. Additional terrorism-related funding was appropriated in addition to funds requested in the President's budget, including supplemental appropriations, emergency funding, and reprogrammed funding from other accounts. Also, there is not always a clear distinction between programs and activities to combat terrorism and other transnational crimes, such as money laundering, arms trafficking, and piracy. Finally, many DOD and intelligence community's operations, programs, and activities are classified, which limited what we could discuss in an unclassified report.

To mitigate these limitations, we relied on other key NSC policy and planning documents and interviews with key officials until the national strategy was released. Agencies' reorganization and creation of the Department of Homeland Security will have more of an impact on combating domestic terrorism than terrorism overseas. OMB requested that agencies identify terrorism-related funding and we reviewed that process. We gathered information, where available, on funding for programs and activities to combat terrorism overseas. Terrorism is one of many transnational crimes, which often are used to fund terrorist organizations' operations. Where appropriate, we identified the nexus or linkage between terrorism and other transnational crimes. Finally, we worked with DOD and the CIA to accurately describe the threat and their counterterrorism programs and activities in an unclassified manner. Given our efforts to mitigate these factors, we do not believe they had a material affect on our work.

We performed our review from December 2001 through March 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

The Interagency Framework for Combating Terrorism Overseas

The interagency framework for combating terrorism overseas consists of policies and plans, agency roles and responsibilities, and interagency coordination mechanisms developed and managed by the NSC and its Director for Combating Terrorism. The policies and plans are articulated in presidential directives, new national strategies, annual plans, and operational guidance. These policies and plans lay out the roles and responsibilities of individual federal agencies that lead or support specific functions. In addition, many individual agencies have their own policies and plans that direct their own activities to combat terrorism overseas. The interagency framework also includes coordinating mechanisms to implement combating terrorism functions and activities across federal agencies. For example, the NSC—which plays a major coordinating role—sponsors a policy coordination committee called the Counterterrorism Security Group, which has several subordinate working groups on such topics as interagency counterterrorism exercises, and assistance to other countries. Overseas, U.S. embassies and regional military commands coordinate activities through interagency teams that meet to coordinate efforts to combat terrorism across agencies. In addition, interagency coordination is facilitated by personnel exchanges and liaisons among agencies. The effectiveness of this interagency framework will be determined through time as the new strategies and programs are implemented.

Policies, Plans, and Legislation

U.S. policies and plans for combating terrorism overseas have developed over the past 17 years. These policies and plans consist of presidential directives, national-level strategies, and operational guidance. Various laws also address terrorism.

Subsequent chapters in this report provide details on how agencies are implementing and coordinating these policies, plans, and legislation.

Policies and Plans in Place before Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001

According to the Department of State, four enduring policy principles guide U.S. strategies to combat terrorism overseas. They are as follows:

- Make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals.
- Bring terrorists to justice for their crimes.

- Isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behavior.
- Bolster the counterterrorist capabilities of those countries that work with the United States and require assistance.

One of the earlier executive-level formalization of counterterrorism policy occurred in 1986 under National Security Decision Directive 207. This directive was in response to several terrorist attacks on U.S. facilities and interests overseas in the early 1980s, and focused primarily on responding to terrorism abroad. It designated the Department of State as the lead agency for dealing with overseas terrorist incidents, and designated the FBI as the lead agency for handling domestic terrorist incidents, unless otherwise specified by the Attorney General. It also set up an interagency working group on counterterrorism to coordinate efforts across the different agencies.

The next major presidential directive on terrorism occurred in 1995 under Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39. Following the terrorist bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City, this directive had a more domestic focus, outlining measures to be undertaken by federal agencies to reduce domestic vulnerabilities to terrorism, deter and respond to terrorist acts, and develop capabilities to effectively manage the consequences of a terrorist attack. The directive designated the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as the lead agency for managing the consequences of a terrorist incident within the United States. This directive also detailed the responsibilities of other agencies expected to provide support when requested by the lead agencies.

Counterterrorism policy was further developed in 1998 through PDDs 62 and 63. PDD 62 further clarified agency roles and responsibilities in terrorism prevention, terrorist apprehension and prosecution, transportation security, and protection of critical infrastructure. PDD 63 established critical infrastructure protection as a national goal and described a strategy for cooperative efforts by government and the private sector to protect the physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of the government and economy—such as telecommunications, power distribution, financial services, national defense, and critical government operations—from physical and cyber attacks. To help manage these issues, these directives established a National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism. This Coordinator was meant to coordinate relevant

agency programs and activities on behalf of the NSC, as well as take the lead in providing guidelines for interagency operations.

The previous administration issued a federal strategy for combating terrorism in 1998—the Attorney General’s *Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan*.¹ The Congress mandated this plan, which was intended to serve as a baseline strategy for coordination of national policy and operational capabilities to combat terrorism both at home and abroad.² It identified several high-level counterterrorism goals and described the specific tasks of federal agencies in responding to terrorist incidents. Although primarily domestic in focus, one of the plan’s five major goals was to facilitate greater international cooperation to combat terrorism. The Department of Justice issued annual updates to the *Five-Year Plan* in 1999 and 2000, which did not revise the basic plan but tracked agencies’ progress in implementing the original plan. Justice Department officials told us they are no longer providing annual updates because other interagency plans (discussed later in this chapter) have been released.

Operational guidance on combating terrorism overseas (i.e., specific agency roles and actions in a crisis) was drafted in 1996 by the Department of State. This guidance, known as the International Guidelines, outlines procedures for deploying emergency support teams and otherwise coordinating federal operations overseas. Although the NSC did not formally approve the International Guidelines until January 2001, agencies had used them in draft form since 1996. Our previous examination of operations to combat terrorism overseas found that agencies generally followed the draft International Guidelines when performing their

¹ Another earlier and related plan was the *International Crime Control Strategy*, released in May 1998. While not specific to terrorism, this plan had 8 overarching goals and 30 implementing objectives related to international crime. For more information, see U.S. General Accounting Office, *International Crime Control: Sustained Executive-Level Coordination of Federal Response Needed*, [GAO-01-629](#) (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 13, 2001).

² Conference Committee Report (House Report 105-405), Nov. 13, 1997, accompanying the Fiscal Year 1998 Appropriations Act for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies (P.L. 105-119), Nov. 26, 1997.

respective roles in diplomacy, law enforcement, military planning, and intelligence gathering.³

Current Policies and
Plans Include New Areas
of Responsibility and
National Strategies

Many federal policies and plans changed in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. There were changes in both positions and offices to manage terrorism-related programs, and changes through the publishing of new strategies.

New Areas of Responsibilities
Established

The President divided the responsibilities of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism, created in PDD 62, among three new areas of responsibility.

- Efforts to combat terrorism domestically. Executive Order 13228, dated October 8, 2001, created a new Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, to head a new Office of Homeland Security responsible for coordinating efforts to combat terrorism inside the United States. Specific responsibilities included working with departments and agencies, state and local governments, and private entities to ensure the adequacy of the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*. The order detailed a number of other specific responsibilities for the Office of Homeland Security.⁴
- Efforts to combat terrorism overseas. National Security Presidential Directive 8, dated October 24, 2001, created a National Director for

³ U.S. General Accounting Office, *Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism Operations*, GAO/NSIAD-99-135 (Washington, D.C.: May 13, 1999). We reported that with ongoing counterterrorism operations, federal agencies had not completed interagency guidance and resolved command and control issues. Also, key federal agencies did not capture lessons learned for all field and tabletop exercises in which they led or participated.

⁴ For information on the situation leading up to the creation of this position, including GAO's recommendations that a similar type of focal point be established, see U.S. General Accounting Office, *Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations*, GAO-01-822 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2001). We reported on (1) the current framework for leadership and coordination of federal agencies' efforts to combat terrorism, (2) progress the federal government made in developing and implementing a national strategy to combat terrorism domestically, (3) the federal government's capabilities to respond to a domestic terrorist incident, (4) progress the federal government made in helping state and local emergency responders, and (5) progress made in developing and implementing a federal strategy for combating cyber-based attacks.

Combating Terrorism, with responsibilities for activities to combat terrorism overseas. The Director is located in the NSC and reports to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Per the directive, the Director also serves as the Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism. The Director chairs a policy coordination committee named the Counterterrorism Security Group. While not specified in the directive, this group has a number of interagency working groups, which are described later in this chapter. The director also reports to the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security on matters relating to global terrorism inside the United States.

- Efforts to protect critical infrastructure. On February 28, 2003, the President signed Executive Order 13286, which maintained “it is the policy of the United States to protect against disruption of the operation of information systems for critical infrastructure and thereby help to protect the people, economy, essential human and government services, and national security of the United States, and to ensure that any disruptions that occur are infrequent, of minimal duration, and manageable, and cause the least damage possible.”⁵ It also stated that “implementation of this policy includes voluntary public-private partnership, involving corporate and nongovernmental organizations.” In addition, Executive Order 13286 replaced in its entirety Executive Order 13231,⁶ thus dissolving the President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board that was to coordinate cyber-related federal efforts and programs associated with protecting the nation’s critical infrastructures, and the board’s chair—the Special Advisor to the President for Cyberspace Security—and related staff.

Series of New Strategies
Published

A series of new national plans were developed and published to help guide U.S. policy. Some of these plans—called national strategies—are specific to combating terrorism, while others involve terrorism to lesser degrees. The strategies most directly addressing terrorism are the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, published in September 2002; the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, published in July 2002; and the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, published in

⁵ The White House, Executive Order 13286—Amendment of Executive Orders, and Other Actions, in Connection With the Transfer of Certain Functions to the Secretary of Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2003).

⁶ The White House, Executive Order 13231—Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 16, 2001).

Chapter 2
 The Interagency Framework for Combating
 Terrorism Overseas

February 2003. Table 2 summarizes the functions of each of the various national strategies and how they relate to combating terrorism overseas.⁷

Table 2: National Strategies Related to Combating Terrorism

| Strategy | Description of strategy |
|---|---|
| <p><i>National Security Strategy of the United States of America</i> Issued by the President, September 2002</p> | <p>This document provides a broad framework for strengthening U.S. security in the future. It identifies the national security goals of the United States, describes the foreign policy and military capabilities necessary to achieve those goals, evaluates the current status of these capabilities, and explains how national power will be structured to utilize these capabilities. It devotes a chapter to combating terrorism that focuses on the disruption and destruction of terrorist organizations, the winning of the “War of Ideas,” the strengthening of homeland security, and the fostering of cooperation with allies and international organizations to combat terrorism.</p> |
| <p><i>National Strategy for Homeland Security</i> Issued by the President, July 2002</p> | <p>This document addresses the threat of terrorism within the United States by organizing the domestic efforts of federal, state, local, and private organizations. Although mostly domestic in focus, this strategy mentions various initiatives related to combating terrorism overseas, including: negotiating new international standards for travel documents, improving security for international shipping containers, enhancing cooperation with foreign law enforcement agencies, expanding specialized training and assistance to allies, and increasing the security of transnational infrastructure. The strategy stresses the importance of expanding international cooperation in research and development and enhancing the coordination of incident response. Finally, the strategy recommends reviewing current international treaties and laws to determine where improvements could be made.</p> |
| <p><i>National Strategy for Combating Terrorism</i> Issued by the President, February 2003</p> | <p>This document elaborates on the terrorism aspects of the <i>National Security Strategy of the United States of America</i> by expounding on the need to destroy terrorist organizations, win the “War of Ideas,” and strengthen security at home and abroad. Unlike the <i>National Strategy for Homeland Security</i> that focuses on preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, the <i>National Strategy for Combating Terrorism</i> focuses on identifying and defusing threats before they reach the borders of the United States. In that sense, although it has defensive elements, this strategy is an offensive strategy to complement the defensive <i>National Strategy for Homeland Security</i>.</p> |

⁷ There are additional national strategies that have some discussion of terrorism that we have not included. For example, the *National Drug Control Strategy*, issued by the President in February 2003, cites the importance of a unified approach to fighting both drugs and terrorism, particularly in South America. The 2002 strategy highlighted drug revenue as a source of funding for 12 of the 28 international terrorist groups identified by the Department of State.

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The Interagency Framework for Combating
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(Continued From Previous Page)

| Strategy | Description of strategy |
|---|---|
| <p><i>National Military Strategy of the United States of America</i> Issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 1997</p> | <p>This document sets the strategic direction for all aspects of the U.S. Armed Forces. This includes force structure, acquisition, and doctrine, as well as the strategic environment. The 1997 strategy notes the rising danger of asymmetric threats, such as terrorism. The strategy stresses the need for the military to adapt its doctrine, training, and equipment to ensure a rapid and effective joint and interagency response to these threats.</p> <p>There is also a more recent <i>Defense Strategy</i>, which was issued by the Secretary of Defense in September 2001. This strategy is part of DOD's <i>Quadrennial Defense Review</i> and has relatively little discussion of terrorism.</p> |
| <p><i>National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism</i> Issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 2002</p> | <p>This document provides a framework to guide the conduct of the "war on terrorism" by U.S. Armed Forces. It provides specific guidance from which regional commanders, the military services, and other agencies can formulate their own individual action plans. Individual regional commands drafted their own campaign plans in response to this plan. For example, one regional command plans to conduct maritime interception operations to disrupt terrorists' use of commercial shipping to transport people and material.</p> |
| <p><i>National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction</i> Issued by the President, December 2002</p> | <p>This document presents a national strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction through three major efforts: (1) nonproliferation, (2) counterproliferation, and (3) consequence management in WMD incidents. The plan addresses the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among states, as well as the potential threat of terrorists using WMD agents.</p> |
| <p><i>National Money Laundering Strategy</i> Issued by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, July 2002</p> | <p>This document presents a national strategy to combat money laundering and other financial crimes. The strategy sets forth an action plan for how law enforcement, regulatory officials, the private sector, and the international community could take steps to make it harder for criminals to launder money generated from their illegal activities. In addition to addressing general criminal financial activities, the 2002 strategy presents the government's plan to attack financing networks of terrorist entities. The strategy discusses the need to adapt traditional methods of combating money laundering to unconventional tools used by terrorist organizations to finance their operations.</p> |
| <p><i>National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace</i> Issued by the President, February 2003</p> | <p>This document is intended to provide an initial framework for both organizing and prioritizing efforts to protect our nation's critical cyber infrastructures. Also, it is to provide direction to federal departments and agencies that have roles in cyberspace security and to identify steps that state and local governments, private companies and organizations, and individual Americans can take to improve the nation's collective cybersecurity. The strategy is organized according to five national priorities, with major actions and initiatives identified for each. These priorities are: (1) a National Cyberspace Security Response System, (2) a National Cyberspace Security Threat and Vulnerability Reduction Program, (3) a National Cyberspace Security Awareness and Training Program, (4) Securing Governments' Cyberspace, and (5) National Security and International Cyberspace Security Cooperation. In describing the threats and vulnerabilities for our nation's cyberspace, the strategy highlights the potential for damage to U.S. information systems by criminals, nation-states, and terrorists.</p> |

Chapter 2
The Interagency Framework for Combating
Terrorism Overseas

(Continued From Previous Page)

| Strategy | Description of strategy |
|---|---|
| <i>National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets</i> Issued by the President, February 2003 | This document provides a statement of national policy to remain committed to protecting critical infrastructures and key assets from terrorist attacks, and it is based on eight guiding principles, including establishing responsibility and accountability, encouraging and facilitating partnering among all levels of government and between government and industry, and encouraging market solutions wherever possible and government intervention when needed. The strategy also establishes three strategic objectives. The first is to identify and assure the protection of the most critical assets, systems, and functions, in terms of national-level public health and safety, governance, and economic and national security and public confidence. The second is to assure protection of infrastructures and assets facing specific, imminent threats. The third is to pursue collaborative measures and initiatives to assure the protection of other potential targets that may become attractive over time. |

Source: Published national strategies.

Note: GAO analysis of published national strategies.

New Strategies Provide
Framework

As we have recently testified, we view the new strategies, and the framework they provide, as a positive step.⁸ The new strategies are organized in some hierarchy, share common themes, and cross-reference each other.

The strategies are organized in a hierarchy with the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* providing the overarching strategy related to national security as a whole, including terrorism. According to the administration, the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* and the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* are top-level strategies that together address U.S. security both overseas and domestically. According to the administration, these two strategies establish a framework that takes precedence over *all* other national strategies, plans, and programs. Our interpretation of the hierarchy among strategies is somewhat different from how the administration has presented it. We do not view the hierarchy as that absolute because we see the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* and the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* as roughly equivalent. These two strategies provide, respectively, the strategies to combat terrorism related to defensive domestic issues and offensive overseas issues.⁹


Under this hierarchy, the other strategies provide further levels of detail on the specific functions related to military operations, money laundering, weapons of mass destruction, cyber security, and protection of physical infrastructures. Intelligence is one of the critical functions that cuts across all the other strategies, but does not have a strategy itself related to

⁸ For a more detailed discussion and evaluation of these collective strategies, see U.S. General Accounting Office, *Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to Terrorism*, [GAO-03-519T](#) (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 3, 2003). In this testimony, we stated that the new strategies show cohesion in that they are organized in a hierarchy, share common themes, and cross-reference each other. In addition, the collective strategies are more comprehensive than the single strategy they replaced. However, we noted there will be many challenges in implementing these strategies.

⁹ We recognize that this characterization of the strategies simplifies a complex relationship among the two. Both strategies contain both defensive and offensive elements. For example, while we characterize the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* as mainly defensive, it includes offensive initiatives to target and attack terrorist financing, and to track foreign terrorists and bring them to justice. Similarly, while we characterize the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* as mainly offensive, it includes defensive objectives to implement the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* and to protect U.S. citizens abroad.

terrorism, according to CIA officials with whom we spoke. Some of these other strategies contain independent elements beyond national security that do not overlap with the other strategies. For an example of the latter, both the *National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace* and the *National Money Laundering Strategy* include some domestic criminal elements not associated with national security or terrorism. Also, the *National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace* and the *National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets* make a distinction between threats to national security and threats to national economic security and national public health and safety. Further, the *National Drug Control Strategy* has relatively little overlap with these other strategies. Figure 7 displays graphically how some of these national strategies fit into a hierarchy and overlap.

Figure 7: Relationships Between and Among National Strategies Related to Combating Terrorism Overseas



Source: Published national strategies.

Notes: GAO analysis of national strategies.

This graphic is intended to show relationships and overlaps among these national strategies. The sizes and shapes of the boxes are not meant to imply the relative importance of the strategies.

The various strategies also share common themes. Among the strategies more relevant to combating terrorism overseas—such as the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, the *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*, and the *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*—all contain either goals or objectives relating to strengthening international relationships; strengthening intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities; and improving capabilities to deter, prevent, and respond to weapons of mass destruction.

In addition, the strategies have linkages among them in the form of citations and cross-references from one document to another. At least half of the strategies cite either the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* or the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*. The most extensively linked strategies include the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, and the *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*. Strategies that cover topics beyond terrorism, such as criminal law enforcement, are less extensively linked to these documents. For example, the *National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace* and the *National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets* solely cite each other and the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*. The *National Drug Control Strategy* and the *National Money Laundering Strategy* contain no explicit linkages to any of the other strategies, but are referenced in the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*. Some strategies contain broad themes that are covered in more detail by other strategies, but do not cite these documents. For instance, although the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* mentions the topic of terrorist financing, it does not mention the *National Money Laundering Strategy*. Nevertheless, it mentions the *National Drug Control Strategy*, a document with considerably less thematic overlap in terms of terrorism. The *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* covers many broad strategic themes, but refers to no other national strategies, although many of the strategies refer back to it.

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

The key strategy for overseas efforts is the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, issued in February 2003. According to this strategy, terrorist groups can be categorized as those that operate primarily within a single country, those that operate regionally, and those with global reach. The document's strategic intent calls for fighting terrorist organizations of global reach and reducing their scope and capabilities to the regional and

then local levels. The goal is to reduce the scope of terrorism to make it more localized, unorganized, and relegated to the criminal domain. The strategy seeks to accomplish this through four goals and 15 subordinate objectives. Together, these goals comprise the “4D Strategy” and are shown in table 3.

Table 3: Goals and Objectives in the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*

Goal: *Defeat* terrorist organizations of global reach by attacking their sanctuaries; leadership command, control, and communications; material support; and finances.

Objective: Identify terrorists and terrorist organizations.

Objective: Locate terrorists and their organizations.

Objective: Destroy terrorists and their organizations.

Goal: *Deny* further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by ensuring that other states accept their responsibilities to take actions against these international threats within their sovereign territory.

Objective: End the state sponsorship of terrorism.

Objective: Establish and maintain an international standard of accountability with regard to combating terrorism.

Objective: Strengthen and sustain the international effort to fight terrorism.

Objective: Interdict and disrupt material support for terrorists.

Objective: Eliminate terrorists’ sanctuaries and havens.

Goal: *Diminish* the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit by enlisting the international community to focus its efforts and resources on the areas most at risk.

Objective: Partner with the international community to strengthen weak states and prevent the (re)emergence of terrorism.

Objective: Win the War of Ideas.

Goal: *Defend* the United States, its citizens, and its interests at home and abroad by both proactively protecting the homeland and extending defenses to identify and neutralize the threat as early as possible.

Objective: Implement the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*.

Objective: Attain domain awareness.

Objective: Enhance measures to ensure the integrity, reliability, and availability of critical physical and information-based infrastructures at home and abroad.

Objective: Integrate measures to protect U.S. citizens abroad.

Objective: Ensure an integrated incident management capability.

Source: *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, Feb. 2003.

New Strategies Will Not
Guarantee Success

As we have testified, the strategies by themselves, no matter how cohesive and comprehensive, will not ensure an integrated and effective set of programs to combat terrorism.¹⁰ The ability to ensure these things will be determined through time as the strategies are implemented. In addition, these new strategies reflect a host of long-standing themes and programs. For example, certain themes and related programs contained in the new strategies—preventing and deterring terrorism, maximizing international cooperation to combat terrorism, and improving crisis and consequence planning and management—were included in the Attorney General’s 1998 *Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan*. Some of the related policies and programs have been in place for decades. For example, the State Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, which provides assistance to other countries to improve their capabilities, has existed since 1983. Given that these strategies are relatively new, GAO has not yet evaluated their implementation, either individually or collectively. However, we have done work that demonstrates the federal government will face many implementation challenges. For example, we have designated the implementation and transformation of the Department of Homeland Security—which will have some responsibilities for combating terrorism overseas—as a high-risk federal activity.¹¹ We have also identified cyber security as a high-risk area.¹²

Various Laws Address
Terrorism

While there is no single, comprehensive federal law explicitly dealing with terrorism, the Congress passed and the President signed a series of laws dealing with various aspects of terrorism before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The Congress passed these laws to ensure that the

¹⁰ [GAO-03-519T](#).

¹¹ We designated the implementation and transformation of the department as a high risk for three reasons. First, the size and complexity of the effort make the challenge especially daunting, requiring sustained attention and time to achieve the department’s mission in an effective and efficient manner. Second, components being merged into the department already face a wide variety of existing challenges that must be addressed. Finally, the department’s failure to effectively carry out its mission exposes the nation to potentially very serious consequences. For more details, see [GAO-03-102](#); [GAO-03-260](#); and U.S. General Accounting Office, *Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies*, [GAO-03-293SP](#) (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002).

¹² See U.S. General Accounting Office, *High-Risk Series: Protecting Information Systems Supporting the Federal Government and the Nation’s Critical Infrastructures*, [GAO-03-121](#) (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1, 2003).

perpetrators of certain terrorist acts are subject to punishment no matter where the acts occur; require or permit sanctions on countries and organizations supporting or sponsoring terrorism; delineate agency roles and responsibilities; and authorize and/or appropriate funding for agencies to carry out their responsibilities.

Responding to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Congress passed and the President signed into law legislation affecting the way the United States combats terrorism overseas and domestically. The Congress enacted these laws to improve intelligence sharing, enhance airport security, and strengthen border control, among other goals. To provide the intelligence community and law enforcement with additional means to fight terrorism worldwide and prevent future terrorist attacks, the Congress enacted the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act.¹³ In addition to broadening the definition of “terrorist activity” and “terrorist organization,” and addressing international money laundering, the act also authorizes the Secretary of State to share sensitive visa information with foreign government officials, where appropriate. In addition, the Congress recently enacted legislation to implement the obligations of the United States under the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings.¹⁴

Another major piece of legislation that has greatly impacted the war on terrorism, both overseas and domestically, is the Homeland Security Act of 2002.¹⁵ The act created the Department of Homeland Security, an agency whose primary mission includes preventing terrorist attacks within the United States and reducing the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism. The act combined many of the federal agencies involved in combating terrorism into the new department, including those discussed in this report.¹⁶ In addition, the act contains a number of provisions that

¹³ P.L. 107-56, Oct. 26, 2001.

¹⁴ Terrorist Bombings Convention Implementation Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-197), Jun. 25, 2002.

¹⁵ P.L. 107-296, Nov. 25, 2002.

¹⁶ See appendix II for the Matrix of Department of Homeland Security Programs and Activities to Combat Terrorism Overseas.

encourage the sharing of information between the intelligence and law enforcement communities.¹⁷

Recent legislation further addressed the issues of border and aviation security. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 increased the number of authorized INS inspectors and support staff to prevent terrorist suspects from entering the United States.¹⁸ It also addressed the need for increased interagency data sharing pertaining to the admission of and ability to remove aliens. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act created the Transportation Security Administration within the Department of Transportation to strengthen security at U.S. national and international airports.¹⁹

Roles and Responsibilities of Key Federal Agencies

Another key element in the interagency framework for combating terrorism overseas is the delineation of roles played by federal organizations and agencies. Some play a coordinating role, others serve as leads in specific areas, and many others provide various kinds of support. Some agencies also have positions designated within them to lead their agencies' terrorism-related programs and have agency-specific plans. The roles and responsibilities of the key organizations and agencies are described below.

Subsequent chapters provide additional information on these agencies' roles in the areas of diplomacy, law enforcement, intelligence, international finance, military operations, and other activities to combat terrorism overseas. In addition, appendixes provide further details on selected agencies' programs and activities.

¹⁷ For example, Subtitle I of the act, the Homeland Security Information Sharing Act, requires that, under procedures prescribed by the President, all appropriate agencies, including the intelligence community, shall share homeland security information with federal agencies and appropriate state and local personnel, subject to certain protections.

¹⁸ P.L. 107-173, May 14, 2002.

¹⁹ P.L. 107-71, Nov. 19, 2001.

National Security Council
Leads Coordination Across
Agencies

Located within the Executive Office of the President, the NSC advises and assists the President on national security and foreign policy. It serves as a forum for the discussion and debate of national security issues between the President, presidential advisors, and cabinet officials. It is also the President's instrument for coordinating policy among government agencies on crosscutting issues, such as terrorism. Beyond the NSC principals committee—consisting of secretaries of the cabinet departments or equivalent heads of independent agencies—the Council is composed of a professional staff and various policy coordination committees. The policy coordination committee that deals with terrorism is the Counterterrorism Security Group. The National Director for Combating Terrorism chairs this group, which has subordinate working groups discussed later in this chapter. The NSC is the lead for developing the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* and the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*—the key strategies that address combating terrorism overseas.

Office of Homeland Security
Coordinates Related
Domestic Issues

The Office of Homeland Security, also located within the Executive Office of the President, coordinates efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the United States. Similar to NSC, the Office of Homeland Security has several interagency working groups (called policy coordination committees) to manage crosscutting issues.²⁰ Although mainly domestic in scope, the Office is involved in functions that intersect with combating terrorism overseas, such as border security. The Director for Homeland Security heads this office, which developed the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*—the key strategy for combating terrorism domestically.

Office of Management
and Budget Tracks Funding
for Combating Terrorism

The Office of Management and Budget, also located in the Executive Office of the President, assists the President in overseeing the preparation of the federal budget and supervises its administration in Executive Branch

²⁰ For more information on the Office of Homeland Security and its role and coordination mechanisms related to combating terrorism domestically, see U.S. General Accounting Office, *Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal Leadership*, GAO-03-260 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002). We reported that additional actions to clarify missions and activities across agencies involved in homeland security will be necessary and some agencies will need to determine how best to support both homeland security and non-homeland security missions. Also, more emphasis on collaboration and coordination with the state and local governments and the private sector will be needed to meet overall goals.

agencies. Since 1998, OMB has issued its *Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism*, which provides funding and programmatic information on the federal government's efforts to combat terrorism and, in the most recent report, breaks out funding for combating terrorism overseas separately from homeland security initiatives. The report summarizes data for three fiscal years—the most recent prior year, current operating year, and the President's budget year request—by department, agency, and mission area.

Department of State Leads Overall Efforts Overseas

Below the Executive Office of the President, the State Department is the lead federal agency for U.S. government activities to combat terrorism overseas. The activities that State leads include diplomatic efforts on both the bilateral and multilateral levels, protecting U.S. facilities and personnel abroad, protecting American civilians traveling and working abroad, limited law enforcement functions, and providing assistance to other countries to improve their capabilities to combat terrorism. The State Department also has the lead in responding to terrorist attacks on U.S. interests overseas. In such a terrorist incident, State would lead and coordinate measures to alleviate damage, protect health, and provide emergency assistance. Other federal agencies would provide support under State's direction.

The Coordinator for Counterterrorism—an ambassador rank position—heads the State Department's efforts to combat terrorism. The department's objectives for combating terrorism are delineated in the State Department's *2002 Annual Performance Plan*. This plan describes the State Department's objective as to reduce international terrorist incidents, especially against the United States. Key goals in the plan are to (1) reduce the number of attacks, (2) bring terrorists to justice, (3) reduce or eliminate state-sponsored terrorist acts, (4) delegitimize the use of terror as a political tool, (5) enhance the international response, and (6) strengthen international cooperation and operational capabilities to counter terrorism.

Department of Justice Leads Arrest and Prosecution of Terrorists

The Department of Justice has the lead in law enforcement and criminal matters related to terrorism—both domestically and overseas. The department has responsibility for investigating, indicting, and prosecuting terrorists. In addition, the department administers training for foreign law enforcement and security services through a variety of programs. These responsibilities are distributed among a number of components within Justice. For example, the department's efforts to prosecute terrorists are

led by the Counterterrorism Section of Justice's Criminal Division, and its Office of International Affairs works with the State Department to negotiate treaties and agreements with other countries that promote international cooperation, including cooperation in terrorism cases. The department's plans and goals for combating terrorism are documented in its *Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2001-2006*.

The FBI leads Department of Justice efforts to investigate international terrorism. Specifically, the FBI is responsible for the apprehension and rendition of foreign terrorists who are suspected of violating U.S. statutes.²¹ According to the FBI, it also has the primary responsibility to collect foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information, including that related to terrorism, within the United States. In a terrorist incident overseas, the FBI could support the State Department in resolving the crisis. Within the FBI, efforts related to international terrorism are led by the Counterterrorism Division, which has two International Terrorism Operations Sections that investigate terrorist crimes against U.S. interests, along with a Terrorism Financing Operations Section that investigates terrorism financing. In addition, the FBI legal attachés overseas work with foreign services. The FBI's strategic plan is currently under revision to reflect FBI's recent reorganization, done in part to reflect new priorities to include terrorism.²²

Other agencies within the department have important roles. For example, the ATF leads or supports investigations related to firearms and explosives, including terrorist incidents overseas. This bureau transferred from the Department of the Treasury to the Department of Justice in January 2003. Some of the Department of Justice's functions related to border security, such as those conducted by the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security in March 2003.

²¹ According to the FBI, in cases where the United States lacks an extradition treaty, the U.S. government can capture suspected terrorists through an overseas arrest called a rendition. State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, in conjunction with State's Office of the Legal Adviser, the Department of Justice, and other agencies, would coordinate State's role in negotiating and conducting these arrests. Since 1987, there have been 11 reported renditions (see table 8 in ch. 4 for a complete list of reported extraditions and renditions of terrorists to the United States between 1987 and 2001).

²² GAO currently has additional work under way to evaluate the FBI's efforts to reorganize.

New Department of Homeland Security Has Variety of Functions to Combat Terrorism

The new Department of Homeland Security also has selected responsibilities for combating terrorism overseas. It has an Office of International Affairs with responsibilities to promote information and education exchange with foreign nations with respect to best practices and technologies related to homeland security. The department also has the responsibility of coordinating the federal government's lines of communications with state and local public safety agencies and the general public, including monitoring threats from terrorists (including international terrorists) and keeping the nation alerted via the color-coded Homeland Security Advisory System.

In addition, the Department of Homeland Security assumed many responsibilities for combating terrorism overseas when certain agencies and their functions transferred into the department in March 2003. Many of these responsibilities relate to border security. For example, the U.S. Customs Service (formerly under the Department of the Treasury) and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (formerly under the Department of Justice) and their functions are now part of the department's Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The U.S. Coast Guard (formerly under the Department of Transportation) is responsible for maintaining border security at certain maritime borders between ports of entry. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard tracks suspicious vessels and works with DOD to conduct maritime interception operations. The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement also has some responsibilities to track and investigate terrorist financing. The Department of Homeland Security has a number of other functions as well. For example, the U.S. Secret Service (formerly under the Department of the Treasury) protects the President and certain other senior officials when they travel abroad. In addition, the department has several disaster response teams (formerly with a variety of other department and agencies) that have a domestic mission but could be deployed abroad in a terrorist incident overseas. Further, the department's responsibilities include enhancing the security of the nation's cyber and physical public and private infrastructures essential to national security, national economic security, and/or national public health and safety.

Department of the Treasury Identifies and Blocks Terrorist Financing

The Department of the Treasury has a number of important roles in combating terrorism overseas. The department has a key role, working with other agencies, in efforts to prevent money laundering and to disrupt and dismantle the financial support of terrorist organizations. The

Financial Crimes Network and the Office of Foreign Assets Control provide support to the Treasury and other law enforcement agencies in investigating and freezing terrorist financial assets. Treasury's plans for financial operations against terrorist finances are included in the *National Money Laundering Strategy*, issued jointly with the Department of Justice. Treasury's Office of International Affairs coordinates the department's assistance to other countries. The Department of the Treasury recently transferred selected agencies and functions to the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, as discussed above.

Department of Defense Leads Military Operations Against Terrorists

DOD is the lead agency for military operations against terrorist organizations and states that sponsor them. If directed by the President, DOD can use military forces to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations and operations. DOD also is responsible for protecting its worldwide forces from terrorist attacks. In a terrorist incident overseas, DOD could support the State Department in resolving the crisis. DOD has a broad array of capabilities—from tactical units to transportation assets to decontamination units—that could help manage a terrorist incident, including those involving WMD agents. DOD also leads the U.S. government's international counterterrorist response exercise program. DOD agencies are part of the intelligence community and have a mutually supportive relationship with the CIA. While DOD provides training and equipment to foreign governments to improve their capabilities to combat terrorism, the Department of State retains overall statutory authority for training and equipping foreign personnel.

The Secretary of Defense establishes policy and guidance for DOD's operations to combat terrorism overseas. The Secretary of Defense's senior policy advisor on terrorism is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ensures implementation of the Secretary's guidance by issuing direction to combatant commanders, defense agencies, and the military services as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Within the Joint Staff, the Chairman has a number of directorates of dedicated staff with expertise to conduct the war on terrorism, including the Deputy Director for the War on Terrorism in the Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), the War on Terrorism Branch within the Special Operations Division of the Directorate for Operations (J-3), and several elements within the Directorate for Intelligence (J-2).

Staff representing the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff work together with other agencies to develop and implement DOD plans and operations. U.S. military forces, in coordination with other U.S. government agencies and/or allied forces, carry out operations. These forces are under the command of one of the geographic or functional combatant commanders who have specific areas of responsibility. DOD's plans to combat terrorism are included in the *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*, which is implemented by the combatant commands' campaign plans.

Department of Energy Has Role in Radiological Issues

DOE is responsible for responding to radiological terrorist incidents and preventing the proliferation of WMD materials. DOE's response programs consist of special teams that could deploy overseas to follow State Department's lead in a terrorist crisis. Specifically, these DOE response teams could provide threat assessments, search operations, diagnostic and device assessments, containment relocation and storage of special nuclear material, and post-incident cleanup. DOE's non-proliferation programs, implemented in conjunction with the State Department and other agencies, provide assistance and training to foreign countries. These programs are primarily focused on nations in the former Soviet Union and are aimed at keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists and rogue states by preventing the smuggling of nuclear materials.

No single DOE official is in charge of coordinating the department's efforts to combat terrorism. However, the Administrator of the department's National Nuclear Security Administration is responsible for supervising both response and non-proliferation programs. While the department has no agency specific strategic plan for combating terrorism, the department's response teams have contingency and operational plans. According to officials from the National Nuclear Security Administration, they are currently developing plans specific to their counterterrorism and non-proliferation missions.

Central Intelligence Agency Leads Overseas Intelligence Activities

The CIA has the lead for gathering, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence on foreign terrorist organizations. This information is used to produce a wide variety of intelligence products for policymakers and operational agencies, ranging from quick-reaction briefings to long-term research studies. These efforts broadly support diplomatic, legal, financial, and military operations against terrorism. Additionally, the CIA Director is

charged with promoting coordination and information sharing between all intelligence community agencies.²³ The CIA also has the lead for covert action and other special activities used to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations.

CIA efforts to combat terrorism are coordinated in its Counterterrorist Center, which is located at the agency's headquarters. The center, which includes representatives from a number of other federal agencies, is the CIA's central coordination center for agency and governmentwide intelligence activities related to foreign terrorists.

U.S. Agency for International Development Helps with Disasters and Institution Building

USAID has roles in providing immediate emergency assistance after a terrorist incident and in providing long-term assistance to strengthen other countries' capabilities to combat terrorism. USAID, working under the leadership of the Department of State, coordinates U.S. government efforts to manage the consequences of a terrorist incident. In the aftermath of a terrorist incident, USAID could respond with humanitarian relief and rehabilitation activities. Within USAID, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance leads agency efforts to provide such assistance. In addition, several USAID programs provide assistance to other countries in developing their law enforcement and judicial systems. For example, USAID supports programs to (1) train foreign law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges and (2) assist in rewriting legislation and criminal sentencing guidelines. These programs, which are discussed in chapter 3, could help these countries bring terrorists to justice.

Other Federal Agencies Could Provide Specialized Assistance

Other federal agencies have more limited roles in combating terrorism overseas. These agencies generally have a domestic focus, but have unique capabilities to provide technical advice or special response teams. These

²³ The intelligence community includes the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the National Imagery and Mapping Agency; the National Reconnaissance Office; the Defense Intelligence Agency and other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs and the intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps; the FBI; the Department of the Treasury; the Department of Energy; the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and such other elements of any department or agency as may be designated by the President or jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence and the head of the department or agency concerned.

teams could deploy overseas to support the State Department in managing a terrorist WMD incident or in other activities related to terrorism. Such agencies include the following:

- The Department of Health and Human Services has expertise and capabilities related to the health and medical consequences of terrorist WMD incidents, particularly biological agents.
- The Department of Veterans Affairs has expertise and capabilities related to the health and medical consequences of radiological agents.
- The Environmental Protection Agency has expertise and capabilities related to identifying and cleaning up hazardous materials, including chemical agents.

Interagency Coordination Mechanisms

Another part of the interagency framework to combat terrorism overseas is coordination. Interagency coordination is important because of the large number of agencies and multiple functions involved. Agencies involved in combating terrorism participate in various interagency mechanisms used to coordinate their activities. In Washington, D.C., NSC policy coordination committees and interagency working groups coordinate higher-level policy issues. Overseas, U.S. missions and regional military commands coordinate their activities through a combination of working groups and operational plans. Agencies also achieve interagency coordination through personnel exchanges and cross-agency liaisons.

Subsequent chapters provide more information on how coordination occurs in the specific functions of diplomacy, intelligence, law enforcement, financial operations, and military operations against terrorism overseas.

NSC Oversees Interagency Coordination in Washington, D.C.

Formal interagency coordination of national policy and operational issues to combat terrorism overseas occurs through the NSC. The NSC heads a policy coordination committee called the Counterterrorism Security Group.²⁴ The group is comprised of high-level representatives (at the

²⁴ The Counterterrorism Security Group was formerly known as the Coordinating Sub-Group of the NSC Deputies' Committee.

assistant secretary level) from key federal agencies that combat terrorism such as the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense and other agencies, to include the FBI and the CIA. Other departments or agencies might be invited to participate in meetings of the group as needed, such as the Departments of the Treasury, Transportation, Health and Human Services, Energy, and FEMA. The group develops and tries to reach consensus on terrorism policy and operational matters and makes recommendations to the President. The Counterterrorism Security Group has a number of subordinate interagency working groups that coordinate efforts related to specific issues in combating terrorism overseas. Table 4 describes these subordinate groups and their functions.

Table 4: NSC-Sponsored Interagency Working Groups Under the Counterterrorism Security Group to Coordinate Efforts to Combat Terrorism Overseas

| Working group (Chair) | Functions of working group |
|--|---|
| Exercise and Readiness Sub-Group. Chairs: State Department, the FBI, and FEMA | This long-standing group promotes interagency planning, implementation, and evaluation of exercises to combat terrorism. The State Department, the FBI, and FEMA co-chair the group, taking responsibility for planning exercises. The group has regular meetings where agencies address interagency issues, plan future exercises, and compare and resolve schedule conflicts in agency exercises. |
| Terrorist Financing Working Group. Chair: Treasury Department | This group coordinates U.S. government efforts to identify and deny terrorist financing. It coordinates policy, strategy, and operations to disrupt terrorist networks by freezing terrorist accounts. The group also helps to develop strategies and activities for working with other countries. |
| Training and Assistance Sub-Group. Chair: State Department | This group coordinates the different programs to provide terrorism-related training and assistance to foreign governments and their officials. This training can include technical assistance, classroom courses, or field training. The group works to prioritize countries that should receive assistance. The group reviews assistance programs of the various agencies to ensure they are properly sequenced, avoid duplication, and ensure that they are implemented in collaboration with or reinforce other efforts, as appropriate. |
| Counterterrorism Finance Training and Technical Assistance Working Group. Chair: State Department | This is a subgroup of the above Training and Assistance Sub-Group that focuses on assistance to other countries to eliminate terrorist funding. The group focuses on providing related finance training and technical assistance to a set of priority countries, and attempts to ensure that the delivery of such assistance by different agencies does not conflict and is used effectively and efficiently. |
| Hostage Crisis Working Group Chair: NSC | This group develops and coordinates the U.S. government's hostage crisis policy. The group meets on an emergency basis to monitor and plan actions related to overseas crises or incidents where Americans are taken hostage by terrorists. |
| Technical Support Working Group. Chair: State Department | This long-standing group conducts the national interagency research and development program for combating terrorism. It operates under the policy oversight of the State Department and the management and technical oversight of DOD. This group coordinates research and development across nine categories of terrorism-related products, amounting to \$165 million in fiscal year 2003. |

Source: GAO discussions with NSC and agency officials.

Note: Until recently, there was also a National Strategy Working Group chaired by NSC. This group was formed to develop, write, and coordinate the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. It disbanded when the strategy was published in February 2003.

Some terrorism-related groups formerly under the NSC have been transferred to the Office of Homeland Security. For example, the NSC had interagency working groups related to issues such as WMD consequence management, aviation security, and assistance to state and local governments. These functions are now covered by the Office of Homeland Security, which has its own interagency working groups (called policy coordination committees) to coordinate these and other domestic issues. Our work in producing this report did not evaluate the implications of the new Department of Homeland Security, but it also will participate in some of these policy coordination committees under the sponsorship of the Office of Homeland Security.

Coordination Occurs Overseas through U.S. Missions

At U.S. embassies overseas, programs to combat terrorism are coordinated through various plans and working groups. Each embassy has a mission performance plan to coordinate embassy activities across agencies. The mission performance plans list each embassy's priorities and include implementation and budgeting plans. In cases where combating terrorism is a priority, the plan might include specific goals and actions to counter that threat. For example, one embassy has goals to both reduce the threat of terrorists against Americans in that country and to keep the host government an active and effective member of the international coalition against terrorism.

In addition, embassies have a "country team" that can be used to coordinate efforts to combat terrorism. The country team, which includes representatives from all of the agencies with representatives at the embassy, sometimes have subgroups related to terrorism. For example, selected embassies have country team subgroups dedicated to law enforcement matters, chaired by the deputy chief of mission. These groups consist of agency representatives at the embassy with law enforcement duties, such as the regional security officer, FBI legal attaché, Treasury Department financial attaché, and officials from other agencies. The country teams and their subgroups meet regularly and on an ad hoc basis for crises or time-sensitive matters. The ambassador works with the country teams in developing the mission performance plan discussed above.

Regional Military Commands also Provide Interagency Coordination Overseas

U.S. regional military commands also have plans and interagency working groups to coordinate their military operations with other agencies to combat terrorism overseas. These regional commands include the U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Pacific Command.²⁵ All of these commands have Campaign Plans and Theater Security Cooperation Plans to coordinate their activities. The Campaign Plans are the regional commanders' strategies for implementing DOD's *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* in their specific geographic area of responsibility. These plans include efforts to coordinate both military and non-military operations. In addition, the commands' Theater Security Cooperation Plans lay out strategies for working with other countries in the region to further U.S. foreign policy and military goals. Command officials told us that since September 11, 2001, these plans have additional emphasis on coordinating efforts to combat terrorism with other countries.

These regional commands also have new interagency working groups to help coordinate activities to combat terrorism across different agencies. DOD created these interagency groups on an experimental basis right after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and NSC formally approved them in January 2002. The working groups coordinate military operations with nonmilitary activities, to include diplomacy, law enforcement, intelligence, and others. The groups include representatives from the Department of State, Department of Justice (including the FBI), Department of Homeland Security (including the U.S. Secret Service), the intelligence community (including the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and National Imagery and Mapping Agency), and other agencies (including USAID). These interagency working groups include agencies with long-standing representatives at the commands as well as newcomers. For example, some of the defense components of the intelligence community have long had liaisons at the regional commands. In contrast, law enforcement agencies have only recently assigned staff to the regional commands on a full- or part-time basis.

²⁵ We did not include the newly created U.S. Northern Command in our review because of its domestic focus. The Northern Command is responsible for homeland defense within the United States and at its borders.

Interagency Coordination also Facilitated via Personnel Exchanges

Agencies also accomplish interagency coordination and information sharing through personnel exchanges and agency liaisons. Such exchanges occur at all levels and can be extensive. For example, the FBI and the CIA routinely detail senior-level officers to the counterterrorism office of their counterpart. The Deputy Chief of the CIA's Counterterrorist Center is an FBI official, while the Deputy Section Chief in the FBI's Counterterrorism Division is a CIA official. Additionally, the staff of the newly instituted Office of Intelligence at the FBI is headed by a CIA official and includes 25 staff on detail from the CIA.

The staff exchanges provide a valuable service to both their assigned and home agencies. Besides contributing their own expertise, part of the job of these detailees is to provide their agency hosts with timely verbal briefings, especially during crisis situations when interagency liaison is critical. For example, CIA officers detailed to the counterterrorism offices of other agencies maintain direct contact with their primary assignments at the CIA's Counterterrorist Center. State Department political advisors detailed to U.S. regional military commands help coordinate with both State Department headquarters in Washington, D.C., and with U.S. embassies overseas.

Personnel also learn about other agencies by taking orientation and training courses. One new initiative is a training program where new CIA chiefs of station are introduced to FBI perspectives and capabilities. New FBI legal attachés receive reciprocal training at the CIA. Through these types of initiatives, personnel are able to better understand their counterparts' roles, responsibilities, and authority and thus promote better coordination.

Coordination through personnel exchanges also occurs at the international level. For example, U.S. officials are detailed to international multilateral organizations, such as the International Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

The Departments of Defense, Justice, and State and USAID provided technical comments on this chapter, generally relating to their roles in combating terrorism overseas. Based upon these comments, we made revisions, as appropriate. We also made revisions regarding the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the transfer of various agencies and functions from other departments into that department.

Federal Efforts to Detect and Prevent Terrorism

The federal government has an important mission to protect Americans abroad from terrorist attacks. A critical component in performing that mission is detecting terrorists and preventing their attacks against U.S. interests. By protecting Americans abroad, the federal government helps protect the homeland. Federal efforts to detect and prevent terrorism involve a wide range of programs and activities. Efforts to detect terrorism are led by the CIA and the intelligence community, which gather, analyze, and share intelligence on terrorist threats. Efforts to protect U.S. interests abroad are led by the State Department and other agencies, which have programs to protect U.S. government facilities and personnel as well as American civilians living, working, and traveling overseas. Preventing terrorism through public diplomacy is led by the State Department, which seeks to shape foreign opinion and garner support for U.S. foreign policy. Efforts to prevent terrorists from entering the United States are conducted by several federal agencies, which operate visa and border controls. Efforts to prevent terrorism also include several agencies' programs to improve coalition partners' capabilities through training, equipment, security, and economic assistance, and assistance in providing security for special international events. This chapter describes the relevant federal programs in place and is not an evaluation of their effectiveness.

Intelligence Gathering and Analysis Help Detect Terrorist Activities

The *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* includes objectives to identify and locate terrorists and terrorist organizations. There is also an objective to attain domain awareness—the knowledge of all activities, events, and trends within any specified domain (air, land, sea, and cyber) that could threaten the United States. Intelligence gathering and analysis are key functions toward these objectives. Intelligence gathering and analysis are critical in detecting terrorist activities and generally are led by the CIA. Under the overall leadership of that agency, U.S. intelligence agencies gather information on terrorist organizations, monitor terrorist threats, and share information with other nations. The Departments of State and Defense collect and analyze intelligence and participate in surveillance programs and liaisons with foreign police at the local level. These intelligence activities support other preventative efforts, such as protecting U.S. facilities and Americans overseas, public diplomacy, and border controls.

Federal efforts to combat terrorism are supported by the work of the U.S. intelligence community, which is a group of government agencies that play various roles in intelligence gathering, analysis, and distribution. That intelligence provides policymakers with valuable information about

terrorist organizations and forms the basis for threat assessments and warnings. Also, it generally supports operations against terrorist organizations. In the wake of September 11, 2001, many intelligence agencies have sought to reduce barriers to the flow of such intelligence between and within agencies. The CIA and various interagency bodies manage the coordination of these agencies.

CIA Leads Intelligence Community Collection and Analysis of Foreign Intelligence from Overseas

The CIA leads the intelligence community in efforts to collect, analyze, and disseminate information on terrorist incidents and groups. This information and analysis is used to inform government decision makers and supports diplomatic, legal, and military operations against terrorism. It can include such things as how terrorist groups are organized, who their leaders are, what their objectives are, what weapons and tactics they use, and whether they receive support from state sponsors of terrorism.

Such information is collected through various means. Signals intelligence can be collected through intercepted communications, radar, and telemetry signals. Imagery intelligence can be derived from visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, and electro-optics. Human intelligence is collected directly from human sources, sometimes through clandestine collection operations. Open source intelligence is gathered from media sources open to the public, such as foreign newspapers or trade journals. A considerable volume of intelligence information has been produced by the current military campaign in Afghanistan. According to the CIA, this information has provided policymakers with a better understanding of al Qaeda's leadership, structure, and capabilities.

Raw intelligence on terrorist groups, such as the previous example, is combined and analyzed by various agencies, but most notably by staff of the Counterterrorist Center within the CIA. Dissemination of finished intelligence occurs through various intelligence community products, including periodicals, daily reports, daily briefings, and warning memorandums. The products are delivered to national-level policymakers including the President, Cabinet- and sub-Cabinet-level officers, Members of Congress, U.S. military commands, and law enforcement agencies. Some products are short-range, such as the President's daily intelligence brief, while more long-range forecasts are made through National Intelligence Estimates.

FBI Has Key Role in Collection and Analysis of Foreign Intelligence from Domestic Sources

In addition to law enforcement functions, the FBI is designated as an intelligence agency by Executive Order 12333.¹ As such, according to the FBI, it has the primary responsibility for the collection of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information within the United States. In this role, the FBI monitors the activities of terrorist groups (including those of foreign origin) operating within the United States. Within FBI, these activities are coordinated through the FBI's Counterterrorism Division. Intelligence information collected by the FBI's Counterterrorism Division is used to protect against international terrorism by identifying terrorist groups, their members, their plans, and the means by which they communicate and conceal their activities. The FBI gathers this information through Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act investigations, recruited sources, double agents, and undercover operations. The FBI also monitors the activities of terrorist groups operating outside the United States. For example, FBI Legal Attachés overseas acquire and disseminate information on terrorists through liaison with foreign services. In addition to using FBI intelligence, the Counterterrorism Division utilizes intelligence information from other agencies such as the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and the State Department. Eighteen federal agencies are represented in the division, including the CIA, the U.S. Secret Service, and the Department of State. The FBI's Threat Assessment/Prevention Unit also assists international terrorism personnel with assessing the potential threats existing in the short- and long-term environments. In addition, the FBI's Office of Intelligence supports counterterrorism and counterintelligence programs through strategic and tactical intelligence capacity.

Information from these various sources is collected, analyzed, and shared with policymakers and investigators. Raw intelligence collected by the intelligence community also is compared with investigative data accumulated by the FBI to determine the feasibility and credibility of threat information received in various venues. The Counterintelligence Division coordinates investigative matters concerning foreign counterintelligence, including activities related to investigations into espionage, overseas homicide, protection of foreign officials and guests, and nuclear extortion. The FBI's goal in these intelligence activities is to assemble a picture of the threats posed by international terrorist groups and provide a basis for neutralizing those groups before they commit acts of terrorism.

¹ Executive Order 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*, Dec. 4, 1981.

Other Agencies also Have Important Intelligence Roles

The State Department also has a major role in gathering, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence on terrorist groups. The department's Bureau for Intelligence and Research prepares intelligence reports and related policy guidance for the Secretary of State and other department officials. In addition, this bureau provides intelligence products, such as threat information, to ambassadors at U.S. embassies. This bureau also conducts foreign public opinion surveys related to terrorism. For example, it conducted surveys in several Arab countries to gauge public reaction to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and public perceptions of Osama bin Laden. The department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security gathers information through its contacts with foreign police, security, and intelligence officials. Through these contacts and related investigations, this bureau's regional security officers—located at U.S. embassies—may be the first to recognize potential terrorist activities and threats. The bureau also analyzes terrorist and related threats and publishes their results in *Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans*, and *Terrorist Tactics and Security Practices: Lessons Learned and Issues in Global Crime*. In addition, the departments' Coordinator for Counterterrorism, in conjunction with the intelligence community, studies terrorist groups and state sponsors of terrorism, and provides a review of the international terrorism situation in the annual publication *Patterns of Global Terrorism*.² These publications are disseminated to, among others, department offices and U.S. embassies for their use in developing policies and programs to combat terrorism.

DOD also plays a significant role in intelligence collection and analysis. The Defense Intelligence Agency provides military intelligence to warfighters, policymakers, and force planners involved in combating terrorism. The National Security Agency collects and processes foreign signals intelligence for national leadership and warfighters. The National Reconnaissance Office coordinates collection and analysis of information from space and airborne reconnaissance by the CIA and the military services. In addition, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps intelligence agencies each collect and process intelligence relevant to their particular service's needs. Regional command officials told us that DOD's combined intelligence activities are increasingly focused on protecting deployed military forces, supporting military operations against

² The State Department prepares this annual publication for the Congress as required by 22 U.S.C. § 2656f (2002).

terrorists, and providing intelligence to other federal agencies that combat terrorism overseas.

The Department of Homeland Security also has a role in analysis of information related to terrorism threats because the nation's critical cyber and physical infrastructures are vulnerable to attack from international sources. According to the Homeland Security Act, the Department of Homeland Security's Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate is responsible for accessing, receiving, and analyzing law enforcement information, intelligence information, and other threat and incident information from respective agencies of federal, state, and local governments and the private sector and for combining and analyzing such information to identify and assess the nature and scope of terrorist threats.³ The directorate also is tasked with coordinating with other federal agencies to administer the Homeland Security Advisory System to provide specific warning information along with advice on appropriate protective measures and countermeasures.

Threat Assessments Allow Government to Take Preemptive or Preventive Actions

Threat assessments and warnings play a crucial role in the dissemination effort, helping to inform and prioritize security planning. When the threat of terrorism becomes pronounced, warnings are issued to the public and policy community. One of the more visible threat assessments by the intelligence community is the Homeland Security Advisory System. The warning function for the counterterrorism community is housed within the Community Counterterrorism Board, which produces Terrorist Alerts and Advisories on a need-to-know basis for a wide government audience.

"Strategic warning" is used to describe instances in which the intelligence community has very broad indications that an attack may occur but does not have the specifics as to where, when, or how the attack will be carried out. Strategic warning enables policymakers and government decision makers to take steps to strengthen anti-terrorist defenses and initiate other counterterrorist actions. Strategic warnings could include, for example, the Department of Homeland Security adjusting its threat levels and DOD adjusting its Force Protection Conditions. "Tactical warnings" may be issued when the intelligence community has more detailed information on where, when, or how an attack might be carried out.

³ Section 201, P.L. 107-296, Nov. 25, 2002.

Tactical warnings can lead to immediate, direct preventive action against specific individuals who may be involved in the planned attack and to implement appropriate protective action for specific targets. For instance, in early September 2002, the State Department was able to act on credible and specific threat information by closing many U.S. embassies in Asia and reviewing their security postures.

Intelligence Supports
Diplomatic, Law
Enforcement, and
Military Actions

Intelligence information supports the efforts of other agencies involved in combating terrorism overseas. It enhances the diplomatic efforts of the Department of State, for example, by providing essential information to the TIPOFF database intended to prevent terrorists from obtaining entry visas into the United States. Intelligence information also augments the security of U.S. military facilities abroad, for instance through the CIA's Counterterrorist Center. The center maintains a liaison staff to provide military commands worldwide with up-to-date information on the modus operandi of terrorist groups in their geographic areas of responsibility. Investigations by the FBI and other law-enforcement agencies also derive support from intelligence information. Finally, military operations against terrorist organizations often rely on intelligence information. For example, the 1998 cruise missile attack against an al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan relied on data from the intelligence community.

Actions undertaken by the U.S. diplomatic, law enforcement, financial, military, and intelligence communities supported by intelligence information are discussed further in chapter 4.

Efforts to Reduce
Barriers to Information
Sharing Within the
Federal Government

Before September 11, 2001, much information sharing was handled through staff detailed to other agencies and interagency liaison. For example, in early 2001, 10 percent of the CIA Counterterrorist Center's staff complement had been detailed from outside agencies. Recent efforts to improve data sharing have focused primarily on data access and availability. According to recent testimony by the Director of Central Intelligence, the State Department currently is working with the CIA to renovate the current TIPOFF all-source watchlist into a National Watchlist Center that will serve as a base for all watchlists in the U.S. government.⁴ In

⁴ Written Statement for the Record of the Director of Central Intelligence before the Joint Inquiry Committee, Oct. 17, 2002.

the interim, the Community Counterterrorism Board is providing secure access to State's current watchlist database via a secure system known as "CT Link." Furthermore, the CIA currently is developing a multi-agency, common repository for classified and unclassified information accessible to the entire intelligence community as well as to state and local law enforcement.

To improve intelligence sharing both within and among agencies, intelligence agencies are reevaluating their own internal data management procedures. The FBI plans to fully convert to a new data management system by December 2003 and currently is in the process of consolidating its various databases. The CIA also is attempting to improve its database procedures. These improvements include: consolidating terrorist identity information, lowering the threshold for nominating individuals for watchlist status, lowering the threshold for dissemination of information previously regarded as "operational," and increasing managerial oversight through periodic reviews of the system.

Efforts also are under way to improve information sharing between members of the intelligence community and the law enforcement community. The FBI's Criminal Division develops evidence for possible prosecution, while the CIA and other intelligence agencies develop intelligence to assess and counter threats. The collection and use of intelligence information on individuals for domestic law enforcement purposes is constrained by the application of constitutional protections, statutory controls, and rules of evidence. For instance, to obtain a search warrant in a criminal investigation, the government, in general, is required to establish probable cause to believe that an individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a particular predicate offense.⁵ The rules are different for domestic collection of foreign intelligence. In general, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) requires that a FISA Court judge find probable cause to believe that a suspect target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, and that the places at which the surveillance is directed are being used, or are about to be used, by a foreign

⁵ Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-351), Jun. 19, 1968, as amended.

power or an agent of a foreign power.⁶ As a result of these different standards, there are situations in which it is possible to obtain a foreign intelligence surveillance order that would not satisfy the standards for a criminal search warrant or electronic surveillance order.⁷ FISA has been interpreted as requiring a separation or “wall” that limits coordination between domestic law enforcement and foreign intelligence investigations and the use of information collected by foreign intelligence agents in criminal prosecutions.⁸ Various provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act seek to improve the sharing of information between the intelligence and law enforcement communities.⁹ For example, the USA PATRIOT Act amended FISA to provide more flexibility to federal investigators in sharing information obtained under FISA.¹⁰

International Intelligence Sharing and Cooperation

U.S. intelligence operations also are augmented by the efforts of U.S. friends and allies. Historically, the United States often has participated in beneficial bilateral intelligence cooperation with other countries. The Director of Central Intelligence formulates policy governing the liaison, coordination of relationships, and cooperative intelligence arrangements between members of the intelligence community and the intelligence or security branches of foreign governments. These relationships can take the form of reciprocating collection and analysis activities, joint collection operations, exchange of analysts or technicians, or even training furnished by the United States in return for services rendered by the foreign intelligence service. In one such training program, the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center is involved in training foreign agencies to better prevent terrorist attacks. According the Director of Central Intelligence,

⁶ P.L. 95-511, Oct. 25, 1978, as amended.

⁷ See U.S. General Accounting Office, *FBI Intelligence Investigations: Coordination Within Justice on Counterintelligence Criminal Matters Is Limited*, GAO-01-780 (Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2001).

⁸ A second type of “wall” continues to limit the use of foreign intelligence information in criminal prosecutions. In this respect, intelligence analysts are concerned that primary sources and methods could be disclosed, namely in criminal court. This may cause them to release intelligence information to the FBI for lead purposes only, rather than fully share information that could be used for evidentiary purposes.

⁹ P.L. 107-56. For example, see sections 203, 218, and 504.

¹⁰ Also see the recent decision of the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review *In re: Sealed Case No. 02-001*, Nov. 18, 2002, which addresses these issues.

these foreign security services arrest terrorists on the basis of U.S. intelligence. For example, terrorist groups planning attacks on American and local interests in Europe were identified and disrupted through cooperation between the CIA and various European governments. Intelligence liaison has also greatly augmented U.S. efforts against al Qaeda.

Coordination Mechanisms for Intelligence Activities

Executive responsibility for coordination and information sharing among the intelligence community agencies lies with the Director of Central Intelligence.¹¹ The Director serves as the President's principal intelligence advisor and serves as both head of the CIA and the greater U.S. intelligence community. The Director's coordination duties include being the intelligence community's spokesman to the Congress, establishing services of common concern within the intelligence community, and promoting common administrative practices—most notably on classification issues. The Director also has full responsibility for the production, interagency sharing, and timely dissemination of foreign intelligence information, and carries the authority to assign specific analytical tasks to specific intelligence community member agencies. The Director also governs requirements and priorities for the collection of foreign intelligence.

Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism

The lead forum for coordination of intelligence activities across agencies is the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism. The committee, established in 1990, advises and assists the Director of Central Intelligence in coordinating the intelligence community over the long term. It facilitates the Director's use of intelligence resources to resolve long-term policy coordination issues in combating terrorism. It is composed of representatives of the intelligence, law enforcement, and regulatory communities, and it also oversees several subcommittees. These subcommittees conduct research and develop solutions to intelligence issues, including Intelligence Requirements, Information Handling, Technical Countermeasures, Training, Warning, and Unconventional Weapons. Leadership within the committee is provided by the Community Counterterrorism Board, which serves as the committee's executive secretariat. The board also manages "CT Link," a secure network for counterterrorism research, coordination, and communication available on

¹¹ See Executive Order 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*, Dec. 4, 1981.

**Chapter 3
Federal Efforts to Detect and Prevent
Terrorism**

the individual desktops of all member agencies. Committee members assess indications of terrorist threats and share information on the activities of terrorist groups and countries that sponsor terrorism. Table 5 shows selected members of the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism.

Table 5: Selected Members of the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism

| Organization | Organization |
|--|---|
| Central Intelligence Agency | Department of State |
| Department of Defense | Department of Justice |
| • Office of the Secretary of Defense | • Criminal Division |
| • Defense Intelligence Agency | • Federal Bureau of Investigation |
| • National Security Agency | • Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives |
| • National Reconnaissance Office | • Drug Enforcement Administration |
| • National Imagery and Mapping Agency | • U.S. Marshals Service |
| • Defense Information Systems Agency | Department of Transportation |
| • Defense Threat Reduction Agency | • Federal Aviation Administration |
| • Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency | • Department of Homeland Security |
| • White House Communications Agency | • U.S. Secret Service |
| • White House Military Office | • U.S. Coast Guard |
| • Joint Chiefs of Staff | • Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement |
| • Unified Commands | • Bureau of Customs and Border Protection |
| • U.S. Army | • Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| • U.S. Air Force | Environmental Protection Agency |
| • U.S. Marine Corps | Executive Office of the President |
| • U.S. Navy | • National Security Council |
| • Chemical, Biological Incident Response Force | • Office of Homeland Security |
| | • Executive Office of the Vice President |
| | U.S. Postal Service |
| | Federal Reserve Board |
| | National Communications System |
| | Nuclear Regulatory Commission |
| Department of Commerce | U.S. Capitol Police |
| Department of Energy | |
| Department of Health and Human Services | |

Source: CIA.

Counterterrorist Center at CIA

The primary link between the long-term interagency coordination needs of the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism and the more immediate coordination needs of intelligence operations is the Director of Central Intelligence's Counterterrorist Center. The center was established at CIA Headquarters in 1986 to coordinate intelligence operations across agencies. Many agencies represented in the center are also members of the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism. All information on terrorists is channeled to the center. This intelligence collection is fused with analysis and operational capabilities to give the center the speed to seize fleeting opportunities. The center is, therefore, somewhat unique among intelligence "centers," in that it combines intelligence analysis, planning, operational support, and also serves as a general platform for carrying out general U.S. counterterrorism policy.

The interagency coordination managed by the Counterterrorist Center is intended to support U.S. efforts to penetrate, preempt, disrupt, and ultimately destroy terrorist organizations worldwide. The center carries out a number of responsibilities against terrorism: analysis, warning, and activities in support of diplomatic, legal, and military operations against terrorism. For example, it often plays a key role in the tracking and rendition of terrorist suspects, usually in concert with the FBI or foreign law enforcement agencies. The center also prepares intelligence reports on terrorist groups and countries that support terrorism that are made available to other intelligence and law enforcement agencies. For example, the center issues a monthly, classified review of international terrorism developments and provides other analysis on terrorist groups, capabilities, or incidents as needed. Smaller units within the center develop specialized intelligence on specific terrorist groups. As mentioned earlier, the center makes extensive use of personnel exchanges to facilitate greater coordination. Counterterrorist Center staff work closely with other agency counterparts in Washington, D.C., and with intelligence assets in the field.

Beyond the operational coordination of the Counterterrorist Center and the long-term coordination initiatives of the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, the intelligence community uses no overarching strategic plan to coordinate its efforts. There are, however, operational plans for intelligence campaigns against specific targets, such as Osama bin Laden.

New Terrorist Threat
Integration Center

In January 2003, the President announced the creation of a Terrorist Threat Integration Center to coordinate intelligence activities across agencies. The President instructed the leaders of the FBI, CIA, and Departments of Defense and Homeland Security to develop the center to merge and analyze all threat information in a single location. The center is to have access to all terrorist threat information available to the U.S. government and will seek to minimize any seams between analysis of terrorism intelligence collected overseas and in the United States. It is to conduct threat analysis, institutionalize information sharing across agency lines, and provide comprehensive threat assessments. The center also is intended to play a lead role in tasking the intelligence community to gather intelligence and it will maintain an up-to-date database of known and suspected terrorists. It will not conduct intelligence collection or operations. The Terrorist Threat Integration Center will eventually be collocated with the Director of Central Intelligence's Counterterrorist Center and the FBI's Counterterrorism Division to improve collaboration among agencies. However the Director of Central Intelligence's Counterterrorist Center and the FBI's Counterterrorism Division will retain their distinctive operational capabilities. The head of the center will report to the Director of Central Intelligence. The Director of Central Intelligence will appoint the head of the center in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, and the Director of the FBI. In February 2003, the President announced a plan for implementing the new center, starting in May 2003.

Protecting
U.S. Government
Facilities and
Americans Abroad

The *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* includes an objective to integrate measures to protect U.S. citizens abroad. According to the strategy, the Department of State will take the lead and, in conjunction with appropriate agencies, partner with industry to establish cost-effective best practices and standards to maximize security. Toward this objective, the Department of State conducts multifaceted activities in its effort to prevent terrorist attacks on Americans abroad. For example, to protect U.S. officials, property, and information abroad, State operates programs that include local guards for U.S. missions, armored vehicles for embassy personnel, U.S. Marine security guards to protect sensitive information, and plans to evacuate Americans in emergencies. DOD has similar programs to protect its military forces against terrorist attacks. The U.S. Secret Service and State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security protect senior U.S. government officials when traveling overseas. For Americans traveling and living abroad, State issues public travel warnings and public announcements and operates warning systems to convey terrorism-related

information. For U.S. businesses and universities operating overseas, State uses the Overseas Security Advisory Councils—voluntary partnerships between the State Department and the U.S. private sector—to foster the exchange of security and threat information, implement security programs, and provide a forum to address security concerns. These efforts are coordinated both at the headquarters level in Washington, D.C., and at individual U.S. missions abroad.

U.S. Mission Security

The Department of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security is responsible for providing a secure environment worldwide for the conduct of American diplomacy. The bureau manages a broad range of programs to create and maintain appropriate levels of security for more than 50,000 U.S. government personnel, staff, and dependents, who work and live at 260 embassies, consulates, and other U.S. missions overseas. The bureau can dispatch Diplomatic Security teams to threatened overseas missions. At each U.S. mission, the regional security officer is responsible for implementing Diplomatic Security measures and coordinating protection with host government authorities.

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security also reviews standards and risk management. It develops, evaluates, and applies security standards for a broad range of categories. These include (1) physical protection for office and residential buildings, (2) access to communication equipment, (3) intrusion detection devices, (4) secure conference rooms, and (5) armored vehicles. These standards are intended to allow the bureau to identify and address threats posed by terrorism, political violence, human intelligence, and technical intelligence penetration of facilities. The bureau uses these elements to target resource allocations to identified threats at each mission or location. The bureau is required to provide to the Congress each year a ranking of the U.S. missions abroad most vulnerable to terrorist attack.¹² These standards also help target additional security funding to the highest threat missions, as in the case of Emergency Security

¹² See U.S. General Accounting Office, *Embassy Construction: Better Long-Term Planning Will Enhance Program Decision-Making*, GAO-01-11 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 22, 2001). In this report, we note that the Department of State has ranked the more than 180 facilities that it proposes to replace and/or provide with major security enhancements into groups or "bands" of 20 in order from the most vulnerable to the least vulnerable to terrorist attack. The ranking, which is provided to the Congress annually, is intended to serve as a guide for which embassies and consulates State would replace first.

Supplemental and Worldwide Security Upgrade funds to meet the most pressing security needs.

The State Department conducts multifaceted activities in an effort to prevent terrorist attacks against U.S. missions. Following the August 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es-Salaam, Tanzania, State upgraded security for all of its missions. As we have reported previously, there are a number of U.S. embassy security programs and activities to prevent terrorism overseas, which generally are managed by State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security.¹³

Embassy threat assessments

This Bureau of Diplomatic Security program helps the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations develop embassy security measures. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security develops, with other elements in State, threat assessments that State uses to prioritize which U.S. missions are most in need of new, safer embassy buildings.

Embassy construction program

This Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations program is attempting to replace State Department's less secure facilities on an accelerated basis with new, secure embassies and consulates that meet current security standards, such as having a 100-foot setback from streets surrounding embassies. State has a 6-year Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan, which includes both new construction and the major renovation and rehabilitation of existing facilities.

Worldwide Security Upgrade Program

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security and Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations jointly are responsible for the Worldwide Security Upgrade Program, which provides a physically secure environment for all U.S. government personnel under the jurisdiction of the chief of mission. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, through its physical security program, strengthens building exteriors, lobby entrances, and the walls and fences around embassies and consulates.¹⁴ Inside an embassy or consulate, closed-circuit television monitors, explosive-detection devices, walk-through metal detectors, and hard-line walls and security doors provide protection. These are intermediate measures—only new embassies will address all security concerns.

¹³ See U.S. General Accounting Office, *Combating Terrorism: Department of State Programs to Combat Terrorism Abroad*, GAO-02-1021 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2002).

| | |
|--|---|
| Residential Security program | The Residential Security program provides for security upgrades to the residences of U.S. employees assigned to overseas diplomatic and consular missions. Prior to occupancy, all newly acquired residential facilities are equipped with appropriate security features, such as locks, alarms, shatter-resistant window film, and reinforced doors, based on the level of the threats. |
| Overseas Protection of Information program | The Overseas Protection of Information program implements a comprehensive set of information protection programs. These programs are intended to protect national security information discussed at meetings in secure conference rooms or on secure telephones, processed and stored on computers, and preserved and communicated on paper documents. This program includes (1) personnel investigations for security clearances, (2) courier protection for diplomatic pouches, (3) construction security and access control equipment, (4) U.S. Marine security guards controlling access to embassies at 130 U.S. missions overseas, (5) locks for containers holding classified material, (6) secure conference rooms, (7) detection and containment of emanations from processing equipment, (8) counterintelligence investigations and briefings, and (9) computer security. |
| Surveillance Detection Program | The Surveillance Detection Program utilizes plainclothes security agents to provide surveillance detection measures around U.S. embassies, consulates, and residences of embassy employees. The program is used to identify suspicious activity, such as terrorists' casing embassy facilities or personnel, and includes capabilities intended to resolve all suspicious activity. |
| Local Guard Services | Local Guard Services augment host government resources for protecting overseas diplomatic and consular office facilities and residences of U.S. government employees and dependents of all agencies under the chief of mission. |

¹⁴ The USAID Overseas Management Office is responsible for ensuring security at all USAID facilities that are not collocated with U.S. missions (approximately 58 of 95, as of January 2002), although it coordinates these security arrangements with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security in Washington and with the regional security officers in country. Additionally, the Office of Security handles USAID building construction issues, coordinating extensively with State's Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, which constructs buildings for USAID's tenancy.

Overseas Protective Vehicles

The Overseas Protective Vehicles program provides light and heavy armor vehicles to protect embassy personnel. Currently, all chief-of-mission vehicles have been ordered and are being armored and 94 percent of these vehicles already have been delivered to missions.

Host Nation Security Support

Host nations also provide critical support in preventing terrorist attacks against U.S. missions. Based on its capabilities—and sometimes willingness—host nation security support could include, for example, sharing intelligence about threats with the regional security officer, providing bodyguards for U.S. officials, stationing local police guards outside of a U.S. mission, closing roads adjacent to a U.S. mission, controlling crowds, responding first to a terrorist incident, and conducting an investigation of a terrorist attack. Figure 8 shows how a host government provides perimeter security for a U.S. embassy.

Figure 8: Host Nation Police Use Buses to Cordon off a U.S. Embassy during a Heightened Threat Period



Source: GAO staff.

Military Force
Protection Efforts

The threat of terrorism is one of the most pervasive challenges facing DOD, making the protection of U.S. forces against terrorist attacks a top priority for the department.¹⁵ The June 1996 truck bombing of the al-Khobar Towers military housing facility near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 Americans and wounding hundreds of others prompted DOD to reexamine its programs to protect both its forces and installations overseas. However, U.S. forces remained vulnerable to terrorist attacks as demonstrated by the October 2000 al Qaeda bombing of the *USS Cole* in Yemen that killed 17 U.S. sailors.

Overall Management at DOD,
Joint Staff, and Service Levels

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict is responsible for developing antiterrorism guidance, providing policy oversight, and ensuring compliance with these policies. In June 2001, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict established standards addressing antiterrorism planning, training requirements, physical security measures, and related issues.¹⁶ This office had earlier issued a handbook in 1993 containing detailed guidance on antiterrorism policies and practices, including guidance on assessment methodology.¹⁷

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Deputy Director for Global Operations in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directorate for Operations (J-3) help implement the policy of the Assistant Secretary by reviewing services' budgets, developing standards, making vulnerability assessments, and representing regional commands on force protection issues. The Joint Staff issued an installation-planning template to help installations prepare their antiterrorism plans in July 1998 and currently manages the Integrated Vulnerability Assessment Program. This program has teams, also consisting of staff from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, that travel to military

¹⁵ For a more detailed discussion and our evaluation of DOD force protection efforts, see U.S. General Accounting Office, *Combating Terrorism: Actions Taken but Considerable Risks Remain for Forces Overseas*, [GAO/NSIAD-00-181](#) (Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2000); *Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD Antiterrorism Program Implementation and Management*, [GAO-01-909](#) (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2001); and *Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Guide Services' Antiterrorism Efforts at Installations*, [GAO-03-14](#) (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 2002).

¹⁶ DOD Instruction 2000.16, *DOD Antiterrorism Standards*, June 14, 2001.

¹⁷ DOD Handbook O-2000.12-H, *Protection of DOD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence*, Feb. 19, 1993.

installations (including those overseas) to conduct vulnerability assessments and support installation commanders and local anti-terrorism/force protection managers in writing force protection and WMD response plans.

Each military service headquarters is responsible for implementing the DOD antiterrorism program with assistance from the Joint Staff. Although regional commands and installations directly implement force protection policy, service headquarters control funding and personnel resources for individual installations overseas. The services base their final funding and staffing decisions on a review of the antiterrorism priorities and requirements submitted by each combatant commander. The majority of funding for force protection activities is for personnel, operations, and maintenance appropriations for each service. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund provides additional funding. This fund is managed by the Joint Staff and supports emergency or other unforeseen high-priority combating terrorism needs. The services also issue regulations, orders and instructions to establish their own specific antiterrorism policies and standards.

Regional and Installation Commander Responsibilities

Regional commands merge and prioritize the antiterrorism requirements submitted by their respective installation commanders. They use this information to develop general antiterrorism policy for installations in their geographic areas of responsibility. Such guidance takes precedence over broader DOD or service guidance from Washington. They also determine the type of threats their forces face, identifying the money and manpower needed to achieve sufficient force protection, and work with the services to provide the necessary resources.

Local installation commanders assume primary responsibility for the protection of the forces, assets, and installations under their command from terrorist attacks. They combine, adapt, and implement the force protection standards established by DOD, combatant commanders, and the service headquarters into an installation antiterrorism plan. Local installation commanders, in concert with the installation's designated anti-terrorism/force protection manager, compose a prioritized list of antiterrorism requirements that they submit to their respective major commands.

DOD Uses Risk
Management Approach

When making these plans and listing their requirements, installation commanders employ a “risk management” approach.¹⁸ This approach is a systematic, analytical process to determine the likelihood that a threat will negatively impact physical assets, individuals, or operations and identify actions to reduce risk and mitigate the consequences of an attack. The principles of risk management acknowledge that although risk generally cannot be eliminated, it can be significantly reduced by enhancing protection from known or potential threats. Installation commanders also rely on annual DOD assessments of threat, vulnerability, and criticality of assets.

- Threat Assessment. This identifies and evaluates potential terrorist threats on the basis of such factors as threats’ capabilities, intentions, and past activities. It represents a systematic approach to identify potential threats before they materialize. It is performed by the services’ investigative and intelligence agencies, which compile and examine all available information concerning potential terrorist groups and criminal activity that could affect the installation. The threat assessment may not adequately capture all emerging threats, even in cases where the assessment is frequently updated. The risk management approach, therefore, uses vulnerability and criticality assessments as additional inputs to the risk management decision-making process.
- Vulnerability Assessment. This identifies weaknesses that may be exploited by terrorists and suggests options that address those weaknesses. Teams of multidisciplinary experts in such areas as structural engineering, physical security, and installation preparedness review the installation’s antiterrorism program, including antiterrorism plans, counterintelligence, law enforcement liaison, physical security, and incident response measures.
- Criticality Assessment. This evaluates and prioritizes assets and functions to identify which assets and missions are relatively more important to protect from attack. They might consider a number of factors, such as importance to the military mission, significance as a target, accessibility by terrorists, construction, ease of reconstruction, and monetary value.

¹⁸ See [GAO-03-14](#).

The risk management approach and these annual assessments form the foundation of each installation's antiterrorism plan and support decision-making to improve resource allocations.

DOD Personnel at
Diplomatic Posts

Some DOD personnel overseas do not fall under the direct command of the regional commands. For example, DOD personnel assigned to diplomatic post would be protected as part of U.S. mission security (discussed in the previous section). To clarify who is responsible for the protection of these military personnel, DOD and State have signed a Memorandum of Understanding, and regional commands have signed over 146 country-level Memorandums of Agreement with their local U.S. ambassadors.

U.S. Programs and Activities
to Protect Senior-Level
Officials

Federal agencies also have programs to protect senior-level officials from terrorism during international travel. The U.S. Secret Service, which recently transferred from the Department of the Treasury to the Department of Homeland Security, provides protection to a limited number of senior-level U.S. officials (for example, the President) at all times, which includes travel overseas. In addition, the Secret Service protects official representatives of the United States performing special missions abroad.¹⁹ The U.S. Secret Service has advance teams that work with host countries to coordinate security of these U.S. officials that travel overseas. In addition, if a protected person attends a special event abroad, such as a bilateral or multilateral political or athletic event, then the U.S. Secret Service works with the event security coordinators. Even in cases where the President is not necessarily going to attend but a number of other U.S. citizens will, the U.S. Secret Service also provides consulting to help host nations provide for event security. For example, the U.S. Secret Service, working with the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security, is assisting the Greek and Chinese governments in preparing for upcoming Olympic Summer Games in Athens in 2004 and Beijing in 2008, respectively. To support this protective mission, as well as other missions, the U.S. Secret Service maintains 18 offices overseas.

¹⁹ The U.S. Secret Service is authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a) to protect the President, Vice President, their immediate families, former Presidents, visiting heads of state, and other distinguished foreign visitors as directed by the President, among others.

The U.S. Secret Service also provides security for heads of foreign governments and other foreign distinguished guests while visiting the United States. In addition, the U.S. Secret Service provides security for foreign visitors when they attend certain international events in the United States.²⁰ An example would be the 50th anniversary NATO summit held in Washington, D.C., in April 1999, which included foreign heads of state, ministers, and military leaders. For this one event, there were over 1,000 escorts for dignitary motorcades. The U.S. Secret Service, through its Uniformed Division's Foreign Mission Branch, provides exterior security for over 400 foreign diplomatic facilities (embassies, chanceries, consulates, and ambassador residences) in the Washington, D.C., area. To support its protective mission, the U.S. Secret Service has an Intelligence Division that oversees the identification, assessment, and management of threats in support of domestic and foreign protectee visits and events of national significance.

The State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security also provides protection to senior-level officials during international travel. These officials are less senior than those protected by the U.S. Secret Service and include the Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary, selected ambassadors, and others U.S. officials overseas. Diplomatic Security agents provide protection to other foreign dignitaries (other than heads of state and certain others protected by the U.S. Secret Service) when they visit the United States. These agents participate in more than 150 foreign and domestic dignitary details each year, protecting such diverse individuals as the Secretary General of NATO, President of the Palestine National Authority, and the Dalai Lama. Also, the bureau provides security to selected foreign officials residing in the United States. These protective details are based upon the level of threat. The bureau also provides for security in special international events in the United States. For the 50th anniversary NATO summit (discussed above), the bureau's Dignitary Protective Division was part of the security preparations and provided 48 protective details. For the 1996 Olympic Summer Games in Atlanta, the bureau protected 14 foreign individuals from Israel, India, and Saudi Arabia.

²⁰ PDD 62 established a process to designate certain special events as National Security Special Events, which warrant greater federal planning and protection than other special events. This designation is based upon the nomination of the National Security Council and certified by the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security. In these events, the U.S. Secret Service, the FBI, and Federal Emergency Management Agency have specific roles for preventing and responding to a terrorist incident.

According to State Department officials, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security is providing protective assistance to two heads of government in their own countries—President Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan and President Alvaro Uribe Velez in Colombia. According to bureau officials, they are providing security and/or advisors and training to these leaders because of the extreme threat of assassination from terrorist groups and the relatively weak capabilities for senior official protection in each country.

Protecting American Civilians Living, Working, and Traveling Abroad

The Department of State has several programs to help warn Americans living and traveling abroad against potential threats, including those posed by terrorists. State's Bureau of Consular Affairs provides travel warnings, public announcements, and Consular Information Sheets to American civilians who are living, working, and traveling abroad. The bureau seeks to provide important threat warnings and security information to U.S. citizens and assets abroad in a timely and effective manner based on the "No Double Standard" policy on dissemination of specific, credible terrorist threat information that has not or cannot be countered (i.e., it is the policy of the U.S. government that official Americans cannot benefit from receipt of information that might equally apply to the public, but is not available to the public).

In fiscal year 2001, for example, the bureau issued 64 travel warnings, 134 public announcements, and 189 Consular Information Sheets. The bureau's Internet Web site received 117.9 million inquiries, 30.7 million more than in fiscal year 2000. According to bureau data, 90 percent of the users found the information helpful. The bureau also held 69 briefings for stakeholder groups, including international student program participants, travel agents, and others.

The bureau also maintains a warden system for notifying Americans who have registered with the U.S. embassy or consulate of potential terrorist threats. Warden networks consist of telephone-calling trees, e-mails, fax systems, and other systems, as appropriate. The warden system covers both U.S. embassy and consulate personnel and other registered Americans. The system usually works by alerting major employers or compounds with high concentrations of Americans. It is used for a variety of communications purposes, from passing out voter information to notifying wardens and their wards of U.S. embassy evacuations.

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security manages the Overseas Security Advisory Councils, which provide security support to U.S. businesses and

private-sector organizations worldwide. The councils are a joint effort between State and the private sector. They foster exchange of security and threat information, implement security programs, and provide a forum to address security concerns. Embassy regional security officers coordinate with council headquarters in Washington, D.C., to set up, develop, and maintain councils in country. Presently, councils are active in 47 countries worldwide.

Coordination Mechanisms for Protecting U.S. Government Facilities and Americans Abroad

The Department of State is responsible for maintaining an effective security program at U.S. diplomatic missions worldwide and for coordinating all federal agencies' efforts to protect U.S. government facilities and Americans abroad. At U.S. missions, the country team is the primary coordinating mechanism. It typically consists of the ambassador, deputy chief of mission, and key functional personnel, including representatives from other federal agencies represented at the U.S. mission. The regional security officer has primary coordinating responsibility for security programs and activities at U.S. missions.

In addition, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security provides security liaison officers to DOD's regional military commands: the U.S. Central Command at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida; U.S. European Command in Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany; U.S. Pacific Command at Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii; and U.S. Southern Command in Miami, Florida. These officers coordinate with the commands on theater threat assessments, contingency planning, and implementation of Department of State and DOD agreements on overseas security support.

In Washington, D.C., the Overseas Security Policy Board considers, develops, coordinates, and promotes standards and agreements in overseas security operations, programs, and projects, which affect all federal agencies under an ambassador's authority abroad. The board, which is chaired by the Director of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security, consists of representatives from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury; USAID; the CIA; Peace Corps; Federal Aviation Administration; and OMB. Since 1990, the board has issued 37 standards for U.S. missions overseas. The standards address the full spectrum of security programs pertaining to terrorism and other threats. These standards range from armored vehicles and protective details for ambassadors to emergency plans and exercises and residential security.

Public Diplomacy Builds International Support for U.S. Foreign Policy

The *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* and the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* call for the United States to wage a “War of Ideas” against international terrorism, through effective public diplomacy. Toward these objectives, the State Department and Broadcasting Board of Governors conduct efforts to improve the image of the United States and support U.S. foreign policy. For example, to forestall possible negative perceptions of the United States and foster greater understanding of U.S. policy for key international audiences, State conducts public diplomacy through various media. Similarly, the Broadcasting Board of Governors conducts international broadcasts to worldwide audiences to help support U.S. strategic interests.

State Department Programs Promote Anti-Terrorism Support

The State Department helps build and influence international opinion in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives. Since the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, State has encouraged international support for efforts to combat terrorism overseas. For example, its programs have generated over 240 newspaper, 100 radio, and 150 television interviews, and over 300 opinion-editorial articles in newspapers either signed or prepared for U.S. ambassadors. Almost 60 U.S. speakers have traveled abroad on State-funded programs addressing September 11, 2001-related issues. U.S. embassies have sponsored over 100 panel discussions and over 220 speeches on combating terrorism. In addition, *Network of Terrorism*, a department-produced print and electronic pamphlet, is available in 36 languages and 1.3 million print copies are in circulation.

Broadcasting Board of Governors Promotes U.S. Foreign Policy on Combating Terrorism

The Congress passed the United States International Broadcasting Act of 1994 with the goal of reorganizing and consolidating U.S. international broadcast efforts.²¹ The act created a bipartisan Broadcasting Board of Governors (the Board) to oversee and coordinate the efforts of all nonmilitary international broadcasting. The Board manages the operations of three federal broadcast entities—the Voice of America, WORLDNET Television and Film Service, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting. The board also has supervisory authority over two non-profit corporations—Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Radio Free Asia. These broadcast

²¹ Title III, P.L. 103-236, Apr. 30, 1994.

entities reach more than 125 markets worldwide in 65 different languages. With a fiscal year 2003 appropriated budget of \$514 million, the Board employs 3,400 journalists, producers, technicians, and support personnel in Washington, D.C., and throughout 90 news bureaus and offices worldwide.

The Board's over-arching goal is to reach significant audiences worldwide in areas of strategic interest to the United States where freedom of the press does not fully exist. The board's strategic plan includes an objective to "pioneer anti-terrorism broadcasting" to counter terrorists use of media coverage that inflict fear and panic in the public.²² One project supporting anti-terrorism is the Middle East Radio Network (known as "Radio Sawa" in the region) that broadcasts and analyzes news and explains U.S. policies. Other recent initiatives in the region include the Afghanistan Radio Network and a service targeted at young adults in Iran called Radio Farda. Finally, the Congress has approved an initial round of funding for a new Middle East Television Network, which is expected to launch later in 2003.

Coordination of Public Diplomacy Activities

The newly created Office of Global Communications was designed to coordinate public diplomacy activities, including those related to terrorism. The Office was established under Executive Order 13283 on January 21, 2003, and will advise the President, heads of offices within the Executive Office of the President, and senior government officials on the most effective means of promoting the interests of the United States abroad. According to the Executive Order, the office will coordinate messages that reflect the strategic communications framework and priorities of the United States. The office is designed to facilitate the development of a strategy among federal agencies to help communicate such messages. The office will coordinate the deployment of "information teams" worldwide in areas of high global interest and media attention. These teams are intended to disseminate information to the on-site news media and assist media personnel in obtaining access to information, individuals, and events. Prior to any deployments abroad, the office is to consult with the Departments of State and Defense and notify the NSC.

²² *Marrying the Mission to the Market: Strategic Plan 2002-2007*, Broadcasting Board of Governors.

Visa and Border Controls Are Intended to Prevent Terrorists and Their Materials from Entering the United States

Visa and border controls are additional tools that are designed to help detect and prevent terrorism by keeping terrorists and their materials out of the United States. The *National Strategy for Homeland Security* has an objective to ensure the integrity of borders and prevent the entry of unwanted persons. It also has an objective to increase the security of international shipping containers. According to the strategy, of the annual 500 million people who enter the United States legally, 330 million are not citizens.²³ Some of these non-citizens need visas to enter the United States. The Department of State uses various tools to screen visa applicants to identify potential terrorists. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies support this visa screening process by maintaining databases and watch lists of suspected terrorists and making that information available to the State Department. Factors such as a visa applicant's country of origin can affect the level of scrutiny they receive. Visitors from certain countries (known as visa waiver countries) are not required to have visas because the Departments of State and Homeland Security have determined that they represent a low risk. State investigates visa and passport fraud to help maintain the integrity of travel documents and thus prevent terrorists from receiving visas or entering the country under false names. Further, the United States shares a 5,525-mile border with Canada, a 1,989-mile border with Mexico, and possesses 95,000 miles of shoreline. The Department of Homeland Security guards the borders at and between almost 400 ports of entry, seeking to interdict terrorists and their materials at the border. Finally, international cooperation is an important factor in strengthening international visa and border controls. For example, the State Department shares information on suspected terrorists with other countries to enhance their border controls.

²³ The actual number of different travelers into the United States is unknown because some people enter the country many times a year.

Visa Controls Designed to Keep Terrorists Out of the United States

State's Bureau of Consular Affairs, provides overall supervision to consular officers at U.S. missions overseas. Consular officers adjudicate visa applications from foreign citizens who wish to visit the United States.²⁴ These consular officers aim to facilitate travel for those eligible to receive visas and deny visas to those who are ineligible. For the most common categories of nonimmigrant visas, an applicant must demonstrate that they (1) have a residence abroad, which they do not intend to abandon, (2) intend to leave the United States after a limited period of time, and (3) intend to engage in legitimate activities related to that nonimmigrant category. The most common nonimmigrant visas are those for temporary stays for business or pleasure (79 percent), special worker visas (4.6 percent), student visas (4.2 percent), and exchange visas (4 percent).

All applicant information is entered into the Consular Consolidated Database before it is reviewed. The Bureau of Consular Affairs manages this database. After being entered into the database, applicant information is reviewed by a consular officer at a U.S. embassy or consulate. At that point, the consular officer may call the applicant in for an interview. The consular officer will conduct a name check on all applicants who ultimately receive a visa. In addition, some applicants may undergo a special security review if they fall into one of many special categories of visa applicants. A visa can be refused at any stage after it is entered into the database.

Besides supporting the bureau's visa mission, the Consular Consolidated Database also supports the work of law enforcement agencies. In fiscal year 2002, for example, the bureau performed numerous searches of nonimmigrant visa records at the request of federal law enforcement task forces investigating the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. In addition, the bureau's Passport Services office provided law enforcement with 305 records. The bureau used facial recognition software to compare the photographs on the visa applications of the September 11, 2001, hijackers in the database against other visa photographs.

²⁴ A visa enables a person to apply at a port of entry to enter the United States, but it does not guarantee that a person will be able to enter the United States. For a more detailed discussion of the nonimmigrant visa application process, see U.S. General Accounting Office, *Border Security: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool*, [GAO-03-132NI](#) (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2002). This report evaluates the visa process before September 11, 2001, and what changes have been made since then. It makes several recommendations to strengthen the visa process.

Various Databases Are Used to
Screen for Terrorists

The Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) name check system is the primary means through which consular officers determine if a visa applicant is suspected of being a terrorist or could pose other security risks. Sources for information in CLASS include the State Department's database of visa refusals, the State Department's interagency watch list for terrorists, known as TIPOFF, and several other law enforcement and intelligence sources. CLASS also uses Arabic and Russian/Slavic language algorithms to help increase the likelihood that the name check will find a person's name if it is in the database. Consular officers must run an applicant's name through CLASS before issuing a visa.

The CLASS name check system includes information from the TIPOFF terrorist watch list, which is managed by State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. This list contains declassified biographical information, such as name, birth date, or passport number on thousands of suspected terrorists. This information is drawn from sensitive all-source intelligence and law enforcement data provided by the FBI, the CIA, and other intelligence community agencies. When a consular officer using CLASS receives a TIPOFF "hit" on an applicant's name, the officer refers the case to the TIPOFF staff at the Department of State. The TIPOFF staff will then make available the classified information supporting the TIPOFF entry to authorized consular and legal experts within the Department of State, who then determine whether the evidence is sufficient to deny the visa request. The consular officer may not issue a visa until the Bureau of Consular Affairs has responded with its security advisory opinion. TIPOFF "hits" through the CLASS system are coordinated with the FBI and other agencies. Foreknowledge of pending terrorist travel has, in the past, enabled authorities to arrest terrorist suspects at ports of entry, or to conduct surveillance of them inside the United States.

The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, also updated the Terrorist Exclusion List and the Foreign Terrorist Organization lists, which designate groups as terrorist organizations. Members or supporters of these organizations are to be denied entrance at U.S. ports of entry and deported if found within the United States.

The State Department also strengthened its oversight over visa operations by instituting new inspection measures. An embassy's nonimmigrant visa chief, the visa chief, or the consular section chief is now required to periodically conduct spot checks of approved visa applications, in addition to the spot checks for CLASS name check compliance that are already in place.²⁵

Level of Visa Screening Varies by Risk Level of Country of Origin

Depending on their nationality, a visa applicant may require a special security review. Special clearance procedures and interagency name checks for visa applicants from certain countries were originally designed during the Cold War to screen out individuals who could pose a threat to U.S. interests, primarily through espionage. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Departments of State and Justice revised these procedures. As a result, all male visa applicants aged 16 through 45 from certain national groups received a 20-day computerized hold on their applications, during which a visa physically could not be issued. The application information was then electronically submitted to the FBI for the actual name check. Once 20 days had passed, the computer unlocked the applicant case. If a negative response had not been received from either the State Department or the FBI by this time, then the consular officer was permitted to issue a visa. This 20-day computerized hold requirement ended in October 2002, when another program—the Visa Condor program—became fully functional.

The Visa Condor program is a name check procedure that is initiated when an applicant fulfills certain classified criteria. To help the consular officer determine whether Visas Condor criteria have been met, the State Department, in January 2002, began to require all 16- to 45-year old males from certain national groups to fill out a supplemental visa application form. This new form provides additional information such as an applicant's travel and educational history, employment information, and military service. Under the Visas Condor process, the post sends an applicant's information to the FBI National Name Check Program, where it is run against FBI databases. Some of the information in these databases comes from the FBI's Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force.²⁶ In the event of a possible match, the information is sent back to the State Department. The consular officer cannot issue a visa to an applicant meeting Visas Condor criteria without an affirmative response from the Department of State. In

²⁵ See [GAO-03-132NI](#).

July 2002, the Visas Condor procedure became mandatory for all applicants over the age of 16 from countries listed as state sponsors of terrorism.

Visitors from Selected Countries
Do Not Need Visas

The Visa Waiver Program allows persons to enter the United States for tourism or business for 90 days or less without applying for a visa if they are a citizen from one of 27 participating countries.²⁷ Citizens from participating countries would still be required to have a passport from their home country and, upon arrival, pass through standard border controls (discussed below). This program was created to improve U.S. foreign relations and encourage foreign travel to the United States without posing a threat to national security.²⁸ It also allowed the State Department to perform greater visa screening in high-risk countries, while scaling back its visa operations in low-risk countries. Country participation is contingent upon a Department of Homeland Security and Department of State review of the country's political, social, and economic situation; the quality and security of its passport system; its border controls and immigration laws; its law enforcement policies and practices; as well as other relevant matters. (Prior to March 1, 2003, the Department of Justice performed this review with State.) Visa waiver countries also must have a low nonimmigrant visa refusal rate for their citizens, the ability to supply machine-readable passports, and must offer visa-free travel for U.S. citizens and nationals. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may terminate a country's participation in the program in the event of an emergency that threatens U.S. security or law enforcement interests, such as severe economic

²⁶ The FBI Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force is composed of personnel from a range of agencies, including the Department of Justice's FBI and the Department of Homeland Security's Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. It coordinates a multi-agency effort to identify, locate, and deny entry to or remove terrorists and their supporters from the United States.

²⁷ The 27 countries are Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brunei, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

²⁸ For a more detailed discussion and our evaluation of this program, see U.S. General Accounting Office, *Border Security: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program*, GAO-03-38 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002). We reported on the process used to assess countries' eligibility to participate in the Visa Waiver Program and the implications in eliminating the program. Such implications could affect U.S. relations with other countries, U.S. tourism, and State Department resources abroad; however, the impact on national security is unclear.

collapse or a breakdown of the rule of law within a country.²⁹ Previously, the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of State, had this authority. While the Justice Department has not systematically collected data on how frequently potential terrorists and other criminals have entered the United States, anecdotal information indicates that such individuals have entered the United States under the Visa Waiver Program as well as with valid U.S. visas. Participating countries must certify by October 26, 2004, that they have a program to issue tamper-resistant, machine-readable passports that contain biometric and document authentication identifiers.³⁰ This is required by the Enhanced Border Security Act of 2002, which also conditioned participation on a country's timely reporting of its stolen blank passports to the United States.³¹

State Department Investigates Visa and Passport Fraud

The *National Strategy for Homeland Security* has an objective to combat fraudulent travel documents. Toward this objective, the State Department attempts to impede terrorist entry into the United States through its investigations of visa and passport fraud. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security investigates more than 3,500 passport and visa fraud cases annually, resulting in more than 500 arrests each year. A number of suspects have been linked to terrorism. The bureau has 450 special agents in over 160 countries and approximately 700 special agents assigned throughout the United States. State's Office of the Inspector General also conducts visa and passport investigations.

²⁹ GAO-03-38.

³⁰ For a more detailed description and evaluation of biometrics in this context, see U.S. General Accounting Office, *Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security*, GAO-03-174 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2002). In this report, we identified important policy trade-offs between increasing security and the impact on areas such as privacy, economy, traveler convenience, and international relations. Also, we reported that biometric technology can play a role in associating a person with travel documents such as visas and passports. When used at a border inspection, biometrics can help determine whether to admit a traveler into the United States.

³¹ Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-173), May 14, 2002.

Border Controls Attempt to Deter Entry of Terrorists and Their Materials

Border controls staffed by officers from the Department of Homeland Security also play a role in deterring terrorists and their materials from entering the United States. All visitors, whether they have visas or are seeking to enter the United States under the Visa Waiver Program, are to undergo inspections at U.S. ports of entry. The Border Patrol and U.S. Coast Guard work between U.S. ports of entry to detect and prevent terrorists and their materials from entering the United States. On March 1, 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Border Patrol, U.S. Customs Service and U.S. Coast Guard became part of the new Department of Homeland Security.

Immigration Controls

Department of Homeland Security immigration inspectors are to conduct a primary inspection of travelers arriving at a U.S. port of entry. During these inspections, the immigration inspector observes the applicant, examines their passport, and utilizes automated databases to judge admissibility. The inspector should either permit travelers to enter or refer them to secondary inspection, where a more detailed examination of travel documents or further questioning can be conducted. People may be refused entry for the same reasons they may be refused a visa. Immigration inspectors use the Interagency Border Inspection System—a multi-agency database of lookout information that alerts inspectors of conditions that may make travelers inadmissible to the United States. It also provides information about warrants for U.S. citizens who may be wanted by U.S. law enforcement. Data sharing between this system and the TIPOFF database began in 1991 and, since then, it has enabled immigration inspectors to intercept 290 terrorists from 82 countries at 84 different ports of entry. In fiscal year 2001, immigration inspectors using TIPOFF through the Interagency Border Inspection System had 86 matches from the terrorism database at ports of entry. Of these, 38 were denied entry and 1 was arrested. During primary inspection, the tools used by immigration inspectors differ according to type of entry.

- Air Ports of Entry. At the 155 air ports of entry, commercial airline carriers are required to transmit passenger and crew manifests to immigration inspectors through the Advance Passenger Information System for flights into the United States. This information includes a passenger's name, date of birth, nationality, and passport number. With this information, immigration inspectors can analyze intelligence on passengers before flights arrive and identify passengers who will require referral to secondary inspection. Immigration inspectors at air ports of entry have access to the Interagency Border Inspection System.

- Sea Ports of Entry. At the 86 sea ports of entry, primary inspection at stations equipped with the Interagency Border Inspection System functions much the same as airports. Where this system is not available, immigration inspectors board ships with the Portable Automated Lookout System. This system contains lookout information, which immigration inspectors use to conduct name checks and examine documents of all aliens aboard a vessel.
- Land Ports of Entry. At the 154 land ports of entry, immigration inspectors can query the Interagency Border Inspection System with a traveler's name, passport, or license plate number. Documents and names of a vehicle's driver are checked randomly or when an inspector suspects that something is wrong.

An immigration inspector can refer a traveler to secondary inspection at any port of entry. In secondary inspection, inspectors are to review a traveler's documents for accuracy and validity and check various databases for any information that could affect the traveler's entry, including criminal history information from the FBI and non-immigrant visa issuance data from State Department. An immigration inspector conducting a secondary inspection can also utilize a fingerprint identification system to determine whether a traveler has been previously apprehended for an immigration offense or is wanted by U.S. law enforcement. As mentioned above, a traveler may be refused entry for the same reasons they can be denied a visa.³²

A number of new immigration initiatives were started after September 11, 2001. The predominant focus of these initiatives has been to establish relationships with other countries to coordinate with their border, law enforcement, and intelligence officials on immigration matters.

- Operation Global Shield. For this operation, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service deployed "immigration control officers" to a number of overseas transit points around the world to push out the

³² For a more detailed discussion and our evaluation of INS border security processes, see [GAO-03-174](#) and U.S. General Accounting Office, *Illegal Aliens: INS' Processes for Denying Aliens Entry into the United States*, [GAO-02-220T](#) (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2001). In this testimony, we discussed INS' processes for denying aliens entry at land and airports of entry, including the expedited removal and credible fear processes. In addition, see our testimony *Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the United States*, [GAO-03-438T](#) (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2003).

U.S. line of defenses against illegal immigration related to terrorism. These officers, who have no law enforcement authority in these foreign countries, have an advisory and consultative role. The specific functions of Operation Global Shield are to disrupt and deter the smuggling of select aliens, prevent the movement of persons who are security risks, provide advance notice of passengers warranting closer inspection upon arrival, collect law enforcement intelligence, cooperate on apprehensions and prosecutions, and provide training on fraudulent travel documents.

- **Operation Southern Focus.** For this operation, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service deployed special agents and intelligence analysts abroad to target key smuggling organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean. These U.S. personnel have been working with authorities in Mexico, Guatemala, Panama, and the Dominican Republic, as well as other U.S. personnel stationed overseas to identify, investigate, and prosecute regional smuggling organizations. According to officials, undercover operations are ongoing in several areas to capture key smugglers and return them to the United States.

Customs Controls

At ports of entry, Department of Homeland Security customs inspectors look for illegal materials, such as drugs, currency, and explosives, whether or not the contraband is intended for terrorism. While most of the customs inspection equipment was developed and acquired to detect drugs, the majority of this equipment does not detect specific substances but detects anomalies in general. For example, X-ray machines may alert an inspector to something unusual about an item being examined and, therefore, the possible concealment of materials.³³

The Department of Homeland Security also utilizes export controls to prevent illegal exporters, terrorist groups, and international criminal organizations from (1) trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and their components; (2) obtaining and illegally exporting controlled commodities, technologies, conventional munitions, and firearms; (3) exporting stolen property from the United States; and (4) engaging in financial and other

³³ For a more detailed description and evaluation of these efforts, see U.S. General Accounting Office, *Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New Initiatives and Challenges*, [GAO-03-297T](#) (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 18, 2002). In this testimony, we reported that programs in place to detect certain terrorist materials were limited in a number of respects and rely heavily on the availability of quality information for targeting those cargoes posing the greatest risk.

transactions that support these activities or that violate U.S. sanctions and embargoes.

A number of new customs initiatives were started after September 11, 2001. The predominant focus of these initiatives has been to establish additional lines of security in the supply chain of international commerce. Examples of these initiatives are below.

- Container Security Initiative. This program, initiated by the former U.S. Customs Service, seeks to extend customs inspections beyond U.S. ports of entry rather than waiting for these goods to arrive in U.S. ports for screening and inspection. Begun in January 2002, its goal is to place U.S. customs personnel at ports of origin or transit to screen cargo containers and select high-risk containers for inspection by the host country's customs administration. As one of its first steps, the United States entered into negotiations with governments of the top 20 "mega-ports" that handle 66 percent of the containers destined for the United States. As of the end of January 2003, 11 governments representing 16 of the top 20 mega-ports have signed arrangements, and the United States has placed customs officers in 2 of these ports.³⁴ The United States also has placed customs officers at 3 ports in Canada, which are not among the top 20 mega-ports. Other elements of the Container Security Initiative include improving security criteria to identify high-risk containers, expanding the use of technology in the United States and foreign ports to examine high-risk containers, and developing the use of smart and secure containers.
- Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism. This program, also initiated by the former U.S. Customs Service, focuses on efforts by importers and others to enhance security procedures along their supply chains in exchange for certain benefits, such as reduced likelihood of inspections. As part of this initiative, which began in April 2002, importing businesses, freight forwarders, carriers, and other logistics providers enter into agreements with the United States to voluntarily undertake measures that will reduce security vulnerabilities.

³⁴ The 11 governments and their ports are Belgium (port of Antwerp), France (port of Le Havre), Germany (ports of Bremerhaven and Hamburg), China (port of Hong Kong), Italy (ports of Genoa and La Spezia), Japan (ports of Tokyo, Nagoya, Kobe, and Yokahama), the Netherlands (port of Rotterdam), Singapore, South Korea (port of Pusan), Spain (port of Algeciras), and United Kingdom (port of Felixstowe). As of January 2003, the Department of Homeland Security had placed customs officers at the ports of Rotterdam and Le Havre.

- Project Shield America. This industry outreach program was launched by the former U.S. Customs Service in December 2001 and seeks the cooperation of companies involved in the manufacture, sale, and/or export of U.S.-origin technology and munitions items in identifying suspicious or unusual inquiries or orders. Customs agents have visited over 5,000 companies since the inception of Project Shield America and have initiated dozens of criminal investigations based on information gathered during these visits.

Border Patrol Between Ports of Entry

Between U.S. ports of entry, the Department of Homeland Security's Border Patrol has the mission to detect and apprehend illegal aliens and smugglers (including potential terrorists). The Border Patrol, formerly part of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, has a workforce of about 9,500 agents and is responsible for patrolling about 6,000 miles of Mexican and Canadian international land borders and 2,000 miles of coastal waters surrounding the Florida Peninsula and the island of Puerto Rico. Agents patrol these borders utilizing various vehicles, including aircraft, marine vessels, all-terrain vehicles, and horse units. Border Patrol agents also conduct traffic checks on selected major highways leading away from the border. They also maintain bike patrols in some urban areas near ports of entry. In fiscal year 2002, Border Patrol agents made nearly 1 million apprehensions of aliens attempting to enter or reside in the country illegally.

Maritime Controls Outside Ports of Entry

The U.S. Coast Guard, which transferred from the Department of Transportation to the Department of Homeland Security in March 2003, participates in efforts to detect terrorists and their materials outside maritime ports of entry. Shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. Coast Guard modified its ship arrival notification requirements as part of its screening process for identifying and boarding vessels of special interest or concern. The modification requires all vessels over 300 gross tons to contact the U.S. Coast Guard 96 hours—up from 24 hours—before they are scheduled to arrive at a U.S. port. Each vessel must provide information on its destination, its scheduled arrival, the cargo it is carrying, and a roster of its crew. This information, which is processed and reviewed by the U.S. Coast Guard's National Vessel Movement Center, is used in conjunction with intelligence data to identify "high interest" vessels. Decisions on appropriate actions to be taken with respect to such vessels, such as whether to board, escort, or deny entry are based upon established criteria and procedures.

International Cooperation
Efforts to Strengthen Visa
and Border Controls

International cooperation is an essential tool in restricting terrorist movements around the globe. State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism uses the Terrorist Interdiction Program to enhance border security by providing participating foreign governments with a computerized database that allows border control officials to identify and detain or track individuals of interest. The program currently is installed in 2 foreign countries, with another 60 countries under consideration. State plans to install the program in up to five new countries per year. Additionally, the USA PATRIOT Act authorizes the Secretary of State to share sensitive visa information with foreign government officials where appropriate.

International cooperation is also important in preventing terrorist materials from entering the United States. As mentioned, the Department of Homeland Security is working with other countries to place its customs agents overseas as part of the Container Security Initiative. In addition, the United States is working with several international organizations in setting standards and procedures for cargo security.

International Maritime
Organization

The International Maritime Organization is responsible for improving maritime safety, including combating acts of violence or crimes at sea. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the organization started drafting new regulations needed to enhance ship and port security and to prevent shipping from becoming a target of international terrorism. The International Maritime Organization adopted port and ship security measures in December 2002 at its conference of the parties to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea.³⁵

World Customs Organization

The World Customs Organization is an independent, intergovernmental body whose mission is to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of

³⁵ The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea amendments and its accompanying International Ship and Port Facility Security Code include a number of measures, such as (1) shipboard automatic identifier systems; (2) ship-to-shore alert systems; (3) port state control over ships; (4) continuous maintenance of ship registry, ownership, and operational control information; and (5) clear responsibilities for threat assessments and security plans. In November 2002, the President signed the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-295), Nov. 25, 2002, that, according to the State Department, tracks very closely with these international measures. The U.S. Coast Guard currently is developing regulations to implement the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, and the Maritime Transportation Security Act.

customs administrations. In September 2002, the organization established a task force to develop new guidelines for supply chain security.

U.S. customs agents are participants in this task force, which is scheduled to complete its work in June 2003. The task force will examine numerous security related topics, including enhancing in-transit controls, improving technology, and better data for selecting which cargoes to inspect.

International Organization
for Standardization

The International Organization for Standardization is another important international body involved in improving supply chain security. It is a worldwide nongovernmental federation of national standard bodies from more than 140 countries that attempts to standardize various activities and products related to international trade. The organization currently is participating in a pilot project dealing with electronic seals on cargo containers.

International Labor Organization

The International Labor Organization is a United Nations (UN) agency that sets requirements for seafarer identification documents. Such documents are important for checking on the background of crewmembers who are transporting cargo destined for the United States. Since February 2002, this organization and the International Maritime Organization have been working on the issue of seafarer documents.

UN Subcommittee of Experts on
Transportation of
Dangerous Materials

The UN Subcommittee of Experts on Transportation of Dangerous Materials provides advice on international regulations concerning the transport of dangerous materials. U.S. Department of Transportation delegates to the subcommittee have worked collaboratively with other governments to develop a consensus on new security requirements.

International Civil
Aviation Organization

The International Civil Aviation Organization is working to set improved security standards for travel documents, such as passports and visas.

Coordination Mechanisms
Related to Border Security

Border security is an issue that crosses both homeland security and combating terrorism overseas. The Office of Homeland Security (the domestic equivalent of the NSC with respect to terrorism) coordinates issues across agencies through a number of policy coordination committees. The office has a specific policy coordination committee for Key Asset, Border, Territorial Waters, and Airspace Security. In addition, the overall strategy for border security is described in the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* and includes ensuring the integrity of borders and preventing the entry of unwanted persons. In addition, the new

Department of Homeland Security serves a coordination role by consolidating several agencies that were formerly under separate departments including the Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Customs Service, and U.S. Coast Guard. The new department has a Directorate of Border and Transportation Security charged with preventing the entry of terrorists and securing the borders: territorial waters; ports; terminals; waterways; and air, land, and sea transportation systems of the United States.

Agencies also attempt to coordinate border security activities by sharing selected information on their various watch lists. Nine federal agencies develop and maintain 12 watch lists of suspected and known criminals and terrorists.³⁶ As mentioned above, the Department of State provides information from CLASS to the Interagency Border Inspection System. This enables State, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and immigration officials to share information on individuals who should not receive U.S. visas. State also provides information on lost and stolen U.S. passports to the Department of Homeland Security.

Efforts to prevent terrorist materials from entering the United States are coordinated through an Interagency Container Working Group. This group is co-chaired by the Departments of Transportation and the Treasury. The Secretary of Transportation established this group to address the security issues surrounding the movement of marine cargo containers through the international transportation system. For example, the group has made recommendations to improve the security of container transportation. These recommendations include such measures as improving the coordination of government and business container security activities, enhancing cargo data collection, and improving the physical security of containers.

³⁶ For a more detailed description and evaluation of these watch lists, see U.S. General Accounting Office, *Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be Consolidated to Promote Better Integration and Sharing*, [GAO-03-322](#) (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2003). We reported that the federal government's approach to using watch lists in performing its border security mission is decentralized and nonstandard and recommended that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, in collaboration with the heads of other agencies that have and use watch lists, lead an effort to consolidate and standardize the federal government's watch list structures and policies.

Coalition Capabilities Are Enhanced through Bilateral Programs and Activities

One of the enduring policy principles that guides U.S. strategies to combat terrorism overseas is bolstering the counterterrorist capabilities of those countries that work with the United States and require assistance. The *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* calls for ensuring that other nations have the political, law enforcement, financial, and military tools to combat terrorism within their borders. In addition, the National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for the United States to help foreign nations combat terrorism. These efforts to improve other countries' capabilities are another part of preventing terrorism led by the Department of State. The department has overall leadership of bilateral relations, including programs to assist foreign nations. Such programs consist of training, equipment, and other assistance to improve foreign police and military capabilities. While State has the overall lead, many of these assistance programs are implemented in conjunction with the Departments of Defense, Justice, and the Treasury. For example, the Antiterrorism Assistance program is managed by State while some training is provided by other agencies, such as the FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration, and U.S. Secret Service. Such training by other agencies is provided under the direction and oversight of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Antiterrorism Assistance program. These assistance efforts seek to not only prevent terrorist attacks, but also improve the capabilities of other countries to disrupt and destroy terrorists and to respond to terrorist incidents.

Training to Improve Other Countries' Law Enforcement Capabilities to Combat Terrorism

Many U.S. coalition partners that want to eliminate terrorism in their own countries do not have the capability to combat terrorism effectively in the areas of law enforcement and security. Many are developing countries that lack human and other resources needed to establish and maintain an effective antiterrorism program and infrastructure. U.S. law enforcement training programs and facilities help build the capacity of coalition partner nations to combat terrorism overseas and augment their existing capabilities by providing training, relevant support equipment, and technical advice. These programs and facilities include the (1) Antiterrorism Assistance program, (2) International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), (3) Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT), (4) Countering Terrorist Financing, (5) FLETC, and (6) International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEA).

Antiterrorism Assistance
Program

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Office of Antiterrorism Assistance designs, manages, implements, provides oversight, and evaluates the Antiterrorism Assistance program. The program provides training to approved foreign national participants in five areas: (1) law enforcement, (2) protection of national leadership, (3) control of borders, (4) protection of critical infrastructure, and (5) crisis management. Since its inception in 1983 as a major initiative against international terrorism, the program through fiscal year 2001 has trained more than 28,000 foreign law enforcement and security personnel representing 124 countries in crisis management, dignitary protection, bomb detection, airport security, border control, kidnap intervention, terrorist financing, pipeline security, and response to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. These foreign law enforcement and security personnel can help protect Americans living, working, and traveling abroad, because they are responsible for taking offensive action against international terrorist cells and networks that target Americans overseas and in the United States. They also have the primary responsibility for responding to and mitigating the impact of terrorist attacks—including those directed against U.S. targets—that occur in their home countries.

State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism provides policy guidance to the program and ensures that the training assistance reflects U.S. national objectives and priorities. According to State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, antiterrorism assistance is considered on a priority basis for countries that meet one or more of the following criteria: (1) the country is categorized as a critical or high-threat for terrorism and cannot adequately protect U.S. facilities and personnel in the country with their own resources, (2) a substantial U.S. presence exists in the country, (3) the country is served by a U.S. air carrier or is the last point of departure for airline flights to the United States, (4) important bilateral policy interests are at stake, and/or (5) the country is not in violation of human rights legislation. Training may be initiated by the U.S. government or requested by the potential participant government. Once State makes a policy determination that antiterrorism assistance is needed, the U.S. mission in that country determines if such assistance is feasible. A Bureau of Diplomatic Security-led team of experts assesses the country's civil police antiterrorism capabilities and identifies specific training needs. The team considers five basic areas that are fundamental in any nation's defense against terrorism. Collectively, they establish the framework for determining a country's ability to deter and/or respond to terrorist threats. The team assesses the host government's ability to (1) enforce the law, preserve the peace, and protect life and property; (2) protect its national

leadership, the seat and functions of government, and the resident diplomatic corps; (3) control its international borders; (4) protect its critical infrastructure; and (5) manage crises having national implications.

Finally, State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor helps determine a country's eligibility to participate in the program based on the country's human rights record. U.S. missions abroad screen each training candidate to ensure that no human rights abusers or foreign officials involved in corrupt practices are included.

Most of the antiterrorism assistance involves U.S.-based training, technical consultations, seminars, in-country training, exercises, and program reviews. Training is tailored to meet a country's specific needs in various police and internal security disciplines. While the program does not provide basic police training, it does provide courses designed to improve functional police skills, mid-level supervisory skills, and senior-level management and leadership skills. Training is provided at various federal, state, local, and private contractor venues in the United States. In addition, the Antiterrorism Assistance program proposes to build a Center for Antiterrorism and Security Training at the U.S. Army's Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, which would be a consolidated state-of-the-art facility for training in antiterrorism disciplines. In addition to meeting the program's growing demands for classroom space, the facility, if approved by the Congress, would include shooting and explosives ranges, a tactical driving track, and an extensive urban tactical training complex. Overseas training is conducted in the participant country to help sustain program effectiveness. Training is done by a variety of federal agencies. For example, the ATF supports the Antiterrorism Assistance program through its explosives enforcement officers, who have traveled to more than 43 countries to evaluate foreign governments explosives incidents countermeasures and response capabilities, and ability to neutralize explosives threats.

The program also provides non-standard assistance—if there is a compelling need. Courses, consultations, or advisory assistance to address significant security threats can include police administration, management, and organizational effectiveness; police instructor training; police academy development; judicial security; interview and investigative techniques; and integrated exercises. Recent technical consultations, for example, focused with Egypt on explosive detector dogs, with Greece on security preparations for the 2004 Olympic Summer Games in Athens, and with Yemen on investigations.

The Antiterrorism Assistance program also provides participant countries with grants to purchase equipment directly related to the training. For example, grants might be used to procure airport passenger and baggage screening equipment, crime scene investigation kits, bomb render-safe tools, and tactical and communication equipment. To provide control over the transfer of such equipment, the regional security officer at the U.S. mission provides the equipment to the appropriate foreign government end-user(s). Once a participant country has received a significant amount of assistance and has had sufficient opportunity to incorporate it into its security operations, State conducts a program review to determine if the assistance should be expanded, refocused, or curtailed.

The effectiveness of the Antiterrorism Assistance program, according to the Department of State, rests in its ability to reduce the threat of terrorism toward U.S. facilities overseas and U.S. personnel living, working, and traveling abroad. U.S. missions operating in participant countries experience a close working relationship with the host nation's law enforcement and security forces. The program also is intended to provide the participant country police and security forces with a cadre of trained officers, familiar with American values and thinking, with whom the regional security officer and other U.S. mission personnel can rely on during a crisis. For example, in preparation for the 2004 Olympic Summer Games in Athens, Greek law enforcement officials have used the Antiterrorism Training program and equipment grants to improve their security preparations by participating in explosive ordnance and vital installation security training. Antiterrorism Assistance program-trained explosive detection dogs also are being requested from surrounding countries to assist the Greek police. These K-9 units have the potential to assist with the protection of U.S. interests during the 2004 Olympic Summer Games.

Mobile Emergency Training Team

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Antiterrorism Assistance program officials realized that key "front line" states in the war on terrorism often did not have adequate personnel to send anyone to the United States for training at the program's U.S.-based facilities. Pakistan, for example, declined all Antiterrorism Assistance training offers for months for that reason. In response to the urgency surrounding training support requirements of "front line" countries, program officials decided to forego the U.S. training experience and provide more in-country training, because participants may have to be withdrawn to handle operational crises. Thus, the program established the Mobile Emergency Training Team that can be airborne on 72 hours notice to provide this training in the

International Criminal
Investigative Training
Assistance Program

participant country. Instructors will be trained in four key disciplines: VIP protection, critical response team (special weapons and tactics) operations, bomb disposal operations, and high-risk police patrol/firearms instructor training.

The purpose of ICITAP, which is located in Justice's Criminal Division, is to provide training and development assistance to foreign police agencies worldwide in the form of technical advice, training, mentoring, equipment donation, and internships with criminal justice organizations. The mission of ICITAP is to support U.S. foreign policy and criminal justice goals by helping foreign governments develop the capacity to provide modern professional law enforcement services based on democratic principles and respect for human rights. ICITAP also has direct antiterrorism applications, which are discussed below.

Specific ICITAP activities or projects are initiated at the request of the NSC, Department of State, and/or USAID in agreement with the foreign governments requesting the assistance. Priority is to be given to countries in transition to democracy, where unique opportunities exist for major restructuring and refocusing of police and investigative resources toward establishment of the rule of law. Currently, ICITAP is managing programs in 18 countries and a regional program in the Newly Independent States.³⁷

Although focused primarily on supporting U.S. criminal justice goals internationally, according to the Department of Justice, ICITAP also has a number of direct antiterrorism applications to include: (1) infrastructure development training and technical assistance, (2) criminal investigator training, (3) training academy development, (4) information acquisition, management, and analysis, (5) forensics technical assistance and training, (6) professional responsibility, (7) border control, (8) civil disorder management and control, and (9) managing significant events.

³⁷ ICITAP's Newly Independent States Regional Assistance Program includes Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

Office of Overseas Prosecutorial
Development, Assistance
and Training

Created in 1991, OPDAT provides justice-sector institution-building assistance, including training of foreign judges and prosecutors in coordination with various government agencies and U.S. embassies. Although part of Justice's Criminal Division, OPDAT programs are funded principally by the Department of State and USAID.³⁸

OPDAT programs take place in South America, the Caribbean, Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, the new independent states of the former Soviet Union, Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and the Pacific region. In many of these countries, OPDAT has placed resident legal advisors. The advisors are experienced prosecutors who are intended to interact with local justice-sector officials and direct OPDAT assistance projects. These projects seek to strengthen the legislative and regulatory criminal justice infrastructure within the host country, and enhance the capacity of that country to investigate and prosecute crime more effectively, consistent with the rule of law.

USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance has an agreement with Justice that allows USAID missions around the world to access OPDAT for help in activities such as conducting justice sector assessments, reviewing laws and legislation, designing rule of law programs, and providing other technical assistance.

In response to the August 1998 terrorist bombings of the two U.S. embassies in East Africa—and at the suggestion of State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Antiterrorism Assistance program sponsored (in cooperation with OPDAT, Justice's Counterterrorism Section, and the FBI) the development of the Financial Underpinnings of Terrorism Program specifically to assist U.S. coalition partners in identifying and attacking terrorism's financial aspects. Because the motive behind terrorist crimes is often political or ideological rather than financial, terrorists' revenues, expenditures, and methods of moving funds differ from profit-oriented organized crime networks. Thus, this program takes a somewhat different approach to combating money laundering and organized criminal activity. The program conducts one session for senior policy level officials and a second session

³⁸ USAID also supports programs to train foreign law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges and to assist in rewriting legislation and criminal sentencing guidelines. USAID missions and State's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance have rule-of-law and governance programs in about 60 of the 85 countries where USAID has a presence.

for front-line investigators, analysts, judges, and prosecutors. Senior officials receive training on the methods of financing terrorism, financial investigation as a means of combating terrorism, and legal and operational impediments, while the front-line officials conduct practical exercises and receive training focused on developing best practices for investigating and prosecuting those engaged in providing financial support to terrorists. According to OPDAT, sessions to date, for example, have helped strengthen Philippine money-laundering laws, which enhance the Philippine's ability to detect and disrupt terrorist financing; provided assistance to Azerbaijan on counter-terrorist legislation; and helped State conduct a counter-terrorism assessment in Pakistan.

Working with the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism and the Antiterrorism Assistance program, OPDAT organized a series of seven seminars in Washington, D.C., to help provide guidelines to countries in strengthening their counterterrorism legislation and regulations and in complying with UN Security Council Resolution 1373. U.S. government experts, as well as presenters from the United Nations, Australia, Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom, conducted the seminars for 36 participating countries. The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism and OPDAT also provided a similar seminar in Botswana in March 2003 to southern African countries.

A key element in protecting Americans against the threat of terrorism is U.S. assistance to its coalition partners in strengthening their capacity to investigate terrorist activity and prosecute and adjudicate overseas terrorist criminal acts, consistent with the rule of law. OPDAT's Counter-Terrorism Project takes a comprehensive, institution-building approach seeking to strengthen a country's capability to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate terrorist activity. To meet that goal, OPDAT's Counter-Terrorism Project tries to (1) assist the host country in building or strengthening the legislative and regulatory infrastructure necessary to address threats from terrorist activity; (2) enhance, through development of relevant skills, the capacity³⁹ of host country officials to counter terrorist groups; (3) strengthen the capacity of host country to prevent, investigate, and prosecute terrorist groups through team building, cooperative and regional

³⁹ The term "capacity" means the potential of the host country's justice sector human resources—its prosecutors and judges, police and other investigative personnel, and court and penal system officials.

approaches; and (4) sustain results achieved through the development of permanent structures.

Countering Terrorist Financing

State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, along with the Departments of Justice and the Treasury, have a program called Countering Terrorist Financing. This program provides training and assistance to foreign governments to strengthen their financial and regulatory regimes to reduce terrorist financing.

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

The Department of Homeland Security's FLETC, headquartered in Glynn County ("Glynco"), Georgia, serves as an interagency law enforcement training organization for federal law enforcement agencies. The center also provides services to state and local and international law enforcement agencies. FLETC offers selected, specialized training programs for foreign law enforcement personnel through its International Programs Division. These offerings are designed to meet training needs not generally available to these agencies and to enhance networking and cooperation throughout the law enforcement community. The Department of Homeland Security supervises FLETC's administrative and financial activities, while FLETC's partner organizations⁴⁰ have considerable input regarding training issues and operational and functional aspects of the center. Representatives from these agencies take part in regular curriculum review and development conferences as well as the development of FLETC policies and directives.

As administered under FLETC's International Programs Division, training is provided at the center through State's Antiterrorism Assistance program and overseas through the U.S. government's Law and Democracy Program and the International Law Enforcement Academies. To date, law enforcement officials from the Middle East, Africa, Central and South America, and Asia have attended antiterrorism courses at the center. However, since September 11, 2001, the center has placed its emphasis on training U.S. law enforcement officials at its Glynco, Georgia, facility. Since that time, training of foreign law enforcement officials is conducted primarily overseas through the Law and Democracy Program,

⁴⁰ Federal partner organizations are made up of 31 departments and independent agencies. Selected partner organizations include the Departments of Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Justice, State, and the Treasury; the CIA; and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, among others.

Antiterrorism Assistance program, and the International Law Enforcement Academies.

International Law
Enforcement Academies

Much of the technical assistance that the United States provides to other nations for fighting international crime—including terrorism—involves training at law enforcement academies established abroad. International Law Enforcement Academies provide law enforcement training to foreign governments. State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs funds and manages the U.S. government's interagency regional ILEAs in Europe (in Budapest, Hungary), Southeast Asia (in Bangkok, Thailand), and Southern Africa (in Gaborone, Botswana) and a graduate-level ILEA (in Roswell, New Mexico), in a cooperative effort with the Departments of the Treasury and Justice, including the FBI. In addition, the bureau plans to establish another regional ILEA in the Western Hemisphere (in San Jose, Costa Rica). In fiscal year 2003, the bureau is scheduled to provide law enforcement training to some 12,000 officials, doubling the number trained in fiscal year 2001. The *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* calls for broadening the scope and strength of the ILEAs.

To achieve overall coordination of the ILEAs domestically, a Policy Board was established that is comprised of members from each department and appointed by the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of the Treasury. The mission of these academies has been to support emerging democracies; help protect U.S. interests through international cooperation; and promote social, political, and economic stability by combating crime. ILEAs also are to encourage strong partnerships among regional countries to address common problems associated with criminal activities.

- **ILEA Europe.** In 1995, the United States and the Government of Hungary cooperated to create the first ILEA in Budapest, Hungary, under FBI leadership. ILEA Budapest's purpose is to train law enforcement officers from Central Europe and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. The academy offers two categories of courses. An 8-week core course—a personal and professional development program—focuses on leadership, personnel and financial management issues, ethics, the rule of law, and management of the investigative process. According to the State Department, approximately 250 to 300 mid-level police officers and managers receive this training annually, which is provided by various U.S. agencies and Hungarian and Western European law enforcement agencies. Specialized short-term courses provide law

enforcement officers with training on combating various types of crime, such as organized crime, financial crime, corruption, nuclear smuggling, illegal migration, and terrorism—including training on prosecuting criminal cases. According to the State Department, about 850 police, prosecutors, immigration specialists, and others participate in these courses annually.

- ILEA Southeast Asia. ILEA Southeast Asia—located in Bangkok, Thailand—opened in March 1999 under Drug Enforcement Administration leadership. Like the ILEA Budapest program, the purpose of ILEA Bangkok is to strengthen regional law enforcement cooperation and improve performance. According to the State Department, this academy’s curriculum and structure are similar to those of ILEA Budapest, with the exception of a shorter core course (6 weeks). In 1999, over 700 law enforcement personnel representing 10 countries participated in courses at the academy.
- ILEA Southern Africa. In July 2000, the State Department announced an agreement with the Government of Botswana to establish the ILEA for Southern Africa in Gaborone, under the leadership of FLETC. Similar in overall format to the other academies, ILEA Gaborone is to follow the model developed for ILEAs in Budapest and Bangkok by providing courses on a wide range of law enforcement skills, including police survival, forensics, basic case management, fighting organized crime, supervisory police training, police strategy, narcotics identification and evidence handling, customs interdiction, illegal migration, and public corruption. ILEA Gaborone’s curriculum also addresses special topics, such as stolen vehicles, money laundering, crimes against women, domestic violence, terrorism, and other critical topics such as human rights and policing.
- ILEA Roswell, New Mexico. In September 2001, State opened a new ILEA in Roswell, New Mexico. This new facility, which will be open to graduates of the regional ILEAs, will offer shorter-term (4 weeks versus 8 weeks) advanced training with a greater focus on an academic versus practical or operational curriculum.
- ILEA Western Hemisphere. Tailored to the regional needs of officials from Central and South America and the Dominican Republic, pilot courses of a new Western Hemisphere ILEA already have been conducted at a temporary site in Panama. However, activities were

suspended until a permanent location could be selected. State plans to establish ILEA San Jose in Costa Rica.

U.S. Assistance to Other Countries to Detect Weapons of Mass Destruction

The *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* calls for active nonproliferation diplomacy. It also discusses the importance of international cooperation in reducing threats and controlling nuclear materials. Toward these efforts, the United States has a number of programs that provide assistance to other countries to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These nonproliferation programs are intended to, among other things, keep terrorists from acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction. Currently, these programs are divided among several federal agencies including the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and Justice. U.S. assistance began in the mid-1990s under DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction program and then expanded to the Departments of State and Energy and other DOD programs.

The agencies have provided a range of assistance, including installing security equipment around nuclear facilities, conducting research and development on nonproliferation and verification technologies, as well as providing conventional equipment and training. DOE has been leading many of these efforts. For example, over the last 7 years, Energy has worked cooperatively with Russia to install modern nuclear security systems at Russia's nuclear material sites. These security upgrades consist of (1) physical protection systems, such as fences and metal doors; (2) material control systems, such as seals attached to nuclear material containers and badge systems that only allow authorized personnel into areas containing nuclear material; and (3) material accounting systems, such as inventories of nuclear material and computerized databases. In addition, Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration has been conducting research and development on new technologies that are intended to improve U.S. capabilities in nuclear explosion monitoring, proliferation detection, and response to chemical or biological attacks. Furthermore, as part of their nonproliferation assistance programs, Energy and the other five agencies have been providing equipment and training to Russia and other countries—mostly in Central and Eastern Europe. Radiation detection equipment is one of the many types of assistance that the U.S. agencies are providing. Other equipment ranges from simple hand tools for taking apart and searching different compartments of a vehicle for

hidden contraband to boats and vehicles for conducting patrols. Similarly, training ranges from hands-on instruction in using the equipment and conducting searches to high-level technical exchanges on establishing the legal and regulatory basis for preventing illicit trafficking and trade in sensitive goods and materials that terrorists could use in a nuclear weapon.⁴¹

While the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State receive their own funding for their assistance programs, the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice receive their funding from State and/or DOD. Energy also receives part of its funding from State. Table 6 lists each specific U.S. nonproliferation assistance program and activity.

⁴¹ For a more detailed discussion and an evaluation of these programs, see U.S. General Accounting Office, *Nonproliferation R & D: NNSA's Program Develops Successful Technologies, but Project Management Can Be Strengthened*, [GAO-02-904](#) (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 23, 2002). We reported that research areas of the Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development Program lack a formal process to identify users' needs. See U.S. General Accounting Office, *Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning*, [GAO-02-426](#) (Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002). We reported that U.S. assistance is not effectively coordinated and lacks an overall governmentwide plan to guide it, because agencies do not always coordinate their efforts through an interagency group chaired by the Department of State. U.S. General Accounting Office, *Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia's Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed*, [GAO-01-312](#) (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2001). We reported that hundreds of metric tons of nuclear material continue to lack improved security systems and no mechanism is in place to monitor the effectiveness of the systems once they are installed.

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Table 6: U.S. Nonproliferation Assistance Programs

| Agency | Program | Activity description |
|----------------------|--|---|
| Department of Energy | Material Protection, Control, and Accounting program | Installs improved security systems for nuclear material at civilian nuclear sites, naval fuel sites, and nuclear weapons laboratories throughout Russia. These security upgrades have consisted of (1) physical protection systems, such as fences and metal doors; (2) material control systems, such as seals attached to nuclear material containers and badge systems that only allow authorized personnel into areas containing nuclear material; and (3) material accounting systems, such as computerized databases. In addition, Energy is providing sites with long-term assistance through equipment warranties, operating procedure development, and training. |
| | Second Line of Defense program | Provides and installs radiation detection equipment, such as portal monitors, at Russian border crossings, including a Moscow airport. Energy may expand the program beyond Russia to include countries of the former Soviet Union. |
| | International Export Control program | Provides funds to help countries of the former Soviet Union control the export of goods and technologies that could be used in the development of nuclear weapons. The program provides assistance to prevent legitimate enterprises, such as businesses that were affiliated with the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons complex, from intentionally or unintentionally engaging in illicit trade in such goods and technologies. |
| | Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development program | Manages projects that cover a wide spectrum of activities to improve U.S. capabilities in the areas of nuclear explosion monitoring, proliferation detection, and chemical and biological response. Projects range from manufacturing specialized satellite-based sensors that detect nuclear explosions to developing and delivering sensor technologies that detect the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, materials, and technologies worldwide. |
| | Installs radiation detection equipment in countries of the former Soviet Union (other than Russia) and Central and Eastern Europe. | |
| Department of State | Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund | Provides radiation detection equipment and other assistance for interdicting nuclear smuggling to the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe. |
| | Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program | Provides radiation detection equipment, such as vans equipped with radiation detectors, and other assistance for interdicting nuclear smuggling to countries of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe. (The program took over Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund radiation detection assistance beginning in fiscal year 2002.) |
| | Republic of Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement program | Provides a wide range of assistance to the Republic of Georgia's border guards and customs service to interdict nuclear smuggling; fight other crimes, such as drug smuggling; and develop border infrastructure. |

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(Continued From Previous Page)

| Agency | Program | Activity description |
|---|--|--|
| Department of Defense | Cooperative Threat Reduction program | Provides funds to various countries for the (1) purchase of radiation detection equipment, such as pedestrian portal monitors to screen people and (2) handheld radiation detection monitors and other equipment to enable the countries to better patrol their borders, conduct searches for smuggled contraband, and equip their border posts. |
| | International Counterproliferation program | Provides funds to the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI for training and equipment for countries of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe. |
| Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (formerly run by the U. S. Customs Service under the Department of the Treasury) | | With funding provided by the Departments of Defense and State, provides training and equipment to customs agencies and border guards in other countries. The equipment includes radiation pagers (small detectors that can be worn on a belt to continuously monitor radiation levels or used as a handheld device to pinpoint the location of radioactive material detected by a portal monitor) as well as a variety of other high- and low-technology tools to conduct searches and detect sensitive goods and materials. Training includes assistance in operating the x-ray vans equipped with radiation detectors and providing hands-on instruction in using equipment to detect nuclear smuggling. |
| Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard | | Through funding provide by the State Department's Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program, provides assistance for maritime interception of nuclear smuggling to countries of the former Soviet Union. Assistance provided has included boats with spare parts and the stationing of an in-country U.S. Coast Guard advisor. |
| Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation | | Through DOD's International Counterproliferation program, trains and equips foreign law enforcement agencies to investigate and respond to actual seizures of smuggled nuclear or other material. Training has included seminars for high-level officials and courses on conducting investigations and managing a crime scene where a seizure has taken place. Equipment provided as part of the training has included hazardous material suits to make handling of seized material safer, evidence collection and sampling kits, and chemical detection equipment. |

Source: Departments of Defense, Energy, and State; U.S. Coast Guard; and the FBI.

U.S. Security and Economic Assistance Seeks to Enhance Coalition Capabilities

U.S. security and economic assistance programs, which are managed by the Department of State, can enhance the capabilities of coalition partners in combating terrorism overseas. Long-standing U.S. security and economic assistance programs have attempted to support the “global war on terrorism” in general and Operation Enduring Freedom in particular. They include the following:

Foreign Military Financing

The Foreign Military Financing program provides financial grants through the Department of State to foreign governments to purchase U.S.-made weapons and military training. It is intended to promote U.S. national security interests by contributing to global and regional stability, strengthening military support for democratically elected governments, and containing transnational threats, including terrorism. As such, the program can be a key economic assistance tool in supporting U.S. coalition partners in combating terrorism overseas. The Department of State provides grants for the acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training that enable key allies and friends to improve their defense capabilities. Improved capabilities are expected to (1) strengthen multilateral coalitions with the United States and its allies, (2) improve bilateral military relationships between the United States and the recipient nations, and (3) allow U.S. friends and allies increased interoperability with U.S. forces. Many of the grants during fiscal year 2003 will be used to help combat terrorism overseas. For example, grants will be used to (1) target security requirements linked to the “war on terrorism” in Jordan, Oman, and Yemen; (2) assist Colombia’s effort to defend its economy by supporting a brigade to protect its oil pipeline; (3) support India and Pakistan in their efforts in the war on terrorism; (4) continue efforts to integrate recent NATO members and sustain support for Partnership for Peace countries in Central Europe, the Baltics, the Caucasus (especially Georgia), and in the Central Asian countries; and (5) sustain the Philippine’s military capability, particularly in its effort to address the terrorist threat.

Foreign Military Sales

The Foreign Military Sales program is used by the United States to sell weapons, weapons systems, and military equipment to foreign countries to maintain close ties with neighbors and key allies, maintain stable and secure regional partners, and ensure regional stability. Additionally, State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, through FMS and other security assistance, helps new members of NATO upgrade their military capabilities and achieve greater interoperability with U.S. and other alliance forces and helps to strengthen the security and defense capabilities of key Central

Asian and Caucasus partners, whose support is crucial to combating terrorism.

International Military Education and Training

The International Military Education and Training program was established in 1976 as a low-cost security assistance program intended to foster the development of more professional militaries around the world through training and education of foreign military and civilian personnel.⁴² The program provides training on a grant basis to some 10,000 students annually from 133 allied and friendly countries. Formal instruction is provided through more than 2,000 courses taught at about 150 U.S. military schools and installations. In many of these countries, it is the only military engagement tool available to the United States. According to the Department of State, the program advances U.S. interests in furthering regional stability by enhancing military alliances, building coalitions, and strengthening efforts to combat terrorism abroad. State determines the political advisability of providing training to individual countries and funds the program through its International Affairs budget. DOD plans and manages the program through its Defense Security and Cooperation Agency, which works with the various military departments and unified military commands to implement the program. Coordination of the program overseas is handled by DOD's security assistance offices located in U.S. embassies around the world, which field requests from their host countries to participate in the program. All foreign applicants are screened before being admitted to the program. Enhancing military professionalism is intended to make militaries more efficient, effective, and interoperable with U.S. and NATO forces as well as regional coalitions. Also, it seeks to foster a better understanding of democratic values, including civilian rule of the military, belief in the rule of law, and respect for internationally recognized civil and human rights. Finally, the program's development of professional and personal military-to-military relationships provide U.S. access and influence to a critical sector of society that can help support U.S. access to foreign military bases and facilities—a critical component in efforts to combat terrorism overseas.

Economic Support Funds

Economic Support Funds are used to promote security and stability overseas, particularly in emergency situations, where the United States has vested interests. The funds are provided to foreign nations in grant form,

⁴² The International Military Education and Training program was established as part of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (22 U.S.C. § 2751 et seq.), Jun. 30, 1976.

often without restrictions on the money's use. Though not intended for military use, the money allows foreign governments to free up other funds for military use or other purposes. The Economic Support Fund is intended to promote the economic and political foreign policy interests of the United States by providing assistance to allies and countries in transition to democracy, supporting the Middle East peace negotiations, and financing economic stabilization programs, frequently in a multi-donor context. USAID, with overall foreign policy guidance from the Department of State, implements most Economic Support Fund programs. By promoting economic growth, good governance, and strong democratic institutions, the Economic Support Fund is intended to eradicate the economic and political disparity that often underlies social tension and can lead to radical, violent reactions against government institutions. Thus, these economic assistance programs focus on mitigating the root causes of terrorism.

Peacekeeping Operations

In addition to its contributions to UN peacekeeping operations, the United States maintains a Peacekeeping Operations program of its own that is designed to promote increased involvement of regional organizations and some individual countries in regional and international peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping operations support U.S. national interests by promoting human rights, democracy, and regional security. They facilitate humanitarian responses to crisis situations. Also, they support the increased involvement of regional organizations in conflict resolution, multilateral peace operations, and sanctions enforcement through provision of logistics support, peacekeeping training, and peacekeeping equipment. The United States has a strong interest in enhancing the ability of other nations to lead or participate in voluntary peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in order to reduce the burden on the United States. Finally, peacekeeping operations can help address the root causes of terrorism by reducing the likelihood of hostile interventions by other powers, preventing the proliferation of small conflicts, facilitating the stability necessary for the establishment and growth of new market economies, containing the cost of humanitarian emergencies, and limiting refugee flows. This is accomplished through the separation of adversaries; facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian relief; repatriation of refugees and displaced persons; demobilization, disarmament, and reconciliation of combatants; and creation of conditions under which political reconciliation may occur and democratic elections may be held.

Additional Assistance through Military-to-Military Training

In addition to the security and economic assistance programs mentioned, DOD provides military-to-military training to other countries to improve their abilities to prevent and detect terrorism and, if necessary, disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations. These bilateral programs are part of the regional commands' Theater Security Cooperation Plans to improve U.S. allies' capabilities to combat terrorism.

Joint Combined Exchange and Training

DOD's Joint Combined Exchange and Training program provides U.S. special operations forces opportunities to develop and maintain their skills and to train foreign militaries and other groups to combat terrorism overseas, among other missions. U.S. special operations forces generally are organized into small units for military action focused on strategic or operational goals. They are tasked with a variety of missions ranging from training, advising, and organizing foreign groups for unconventional warfare to training coalition forces for multinational military operations, including combating terrorism overseas. These missions require special skills that conventional forces do not have, such as the ability to speak foreign languages, understand regional cultural and environmental characteristics, and quickly deploy and operate unsupported in sometimes hostile or politically sensitive areas. The U.S. Special Operations Command believes that the best way its forces can train for these types of missions is to train with the people in the places where they may have to operate.

In 1991, the Congress clarified DOD's authority to spend training funds in connection with special operations forces training overseas with friendly foreign forces, as long as the primary purpose was to train U.S. forces.⁴³ Since the enactment of this legislation, such training has commonly been referred to as Joint Combined Exchange Training.⁴⁴ Special operations forces are charged with nine principal missions and, on the basis of their unique capabilities, conduct a variety of other activities. The principal missions are to (1) train and otherwise assist foreign militaries to combat insurgency and other threats to stability (foreign internal defense);

⁴³ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (P.L. 102-190), Dec. 5, 1991.

⁴⁴ For a more detailed description and GAO's evaluation of the JCET program, see U.S. General Accounting Office, *Military Training: Management and Oversight of Joint Combined Exchange Training*, GAO/NSIAD-99-173 (Washington, D.C.: July 23, 1999). We reported that DOD had complied with the statutory requirement for conducting JCETs. However, DOD had not accurately reported to the Congress the number of JCETs that were conducted, their costs, or their relationship to counternarcotics and counterterrorism.

(2) train, advise, and otherwise assist local forces for guerilla warfare (unconventional warfare); (3) protect against and prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (counterproliferation); (4) use offensive and defensive measures to prevent or resolve terrorist incidents (combating terrorism); (5) obtain information concerning capabilities and activities of actual or potential adversaries (special reconnaissance); (6) inflict damage on an adversary or recover personnel or material (direct action); (7) target an adversary's information system while defending U.S. systems (information operations); (8) establish, maintain, or strengthen relations between U.S. and allied governments to facilitate military operations (civil affairs); and (9) influence attitudes of foreign audiences (psychological operations). Specific Joint Combined Exchange and Training operations and activities are classified.

U.S. Special Operations
Forces Training for the Republic
of Georgia

The U.S. European Command initiated the Georgia Train and Equip Program to enhance Georgia's counter-terrorism capabilities. The program's goal is to build strong effective staff organizations capable of creating and sustaining standardized operating procedures, training plans, operational plans, and a property accounting system. The curriculum consists of performance-oriented training and exercises. The time-phased training will be conducted by U.S. Special Forces to build upon the military-to-military relationship developed between the two countries. The program will consist of command center staff training for members of the Georgian Ministry of Defense as well as training for units of the Land Forces Command. Border Guards and other Georgian security agencies will be included to ensure interoperability among Georgia's security forces. Almost 200 Georgians have completed the staff-training phase and about 500 Georgians are completing the light-infantry tactics training. Military equipment to be provided will include uniform items, small arms and ammunition, communications gear, training gear, medical gear, fuel, and construction material.

Figure 9 shows members of 2nd Company, Georgian Commando Battalion, performing a combat off load at a training range at Krtsanisi, Republic of Georgia. The U.S. Army's 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) is in Georgia conducting the Georgia Train and Equip Program, which will enhance Georgian soldiers' abilities in various battlefield techniques.

Figure 9: 2nd Company, Georgian Commando Battalion, Perform a Combat Off Load With Members of the U.S. Army's 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) at a Training Range at Krtsanisi, Republic of Georgia



Source: U.S. Air Force.

U.S. Special Operations Forces Training for the Philippines

The U.S. Pacific Command is assisting the Republic of the Philippines in developing a counter-terrorist capability within their armed forces through the Foreign Military Financing program. The U.S. Pacific Command deployed a Joint Task Force advisory team to the southern Philippines to begin preparations. The Joint Task Force advisory team, composed of U.S. Special Operations personnel is providing training at the command level at headquarters down through the company level in the field. The training emphasizes joint operations and tactics to help eliminate terrorist threats. Training includes counter-terrorism campaign planning, intelligence fusion, psychological operations, civil-military operations, and field tactics. U.S. Special Operations personnel completed training with 25 field companies and provided equipment that included aircraft, U.S. Coast Guard cutters, and helicopters.

Figure 10 shows a U.S. Special Forces soldier demonstrating to a Filipino soldier how to adjust the sights on his M-16 rifle during marksmanship training in Tipo-Tipo Town, Basilan Island, Philippines. U.S. forces currently are in the Philippines participating in joint combating-terrorism training with their Filipino counterparts.

Figure 10: U.S. Special Forces Soldier Shows a Filipino Soldier How to Adjust the Sights on His M-16 Rifle during Marksmanship Training in Tipo-Tipo Town, Basilan Island, Philippines



Source: Jason Carter of the Pacific Stars and Stripes. © 2003 Stars and Stripes.

Assisting Other Countries with International Security Events

Some special events overseas, such as presidential summit meetings and the Olympic games, have international significance and thus may attract terrorist attacks. These international special events receive U.S. security protection, whether through the U.S. Secret Service providing protective security to senior U.S. officials, Diplomatic Security protecting U.S. personnel and facilities, or the military standing by to respond, if needed, to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction or to evacuate Americans.

Unlike domestic special security events, there is no process to coordinate federal agencies' roles and responsibilities for special security events held outside of the United States.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, the United States can provide assistance to other countries for special security events. For example, the Department of State coordinated and managed federal agencies' assistance for the 1992 Olympic Summer Games in Barcelona, Spain; the 1994 Olympic Winter Games in Lillehammer, Norway; and the 1994 Commonwealth Games in Victoria, British Columbia, Canada. For the upcoming 2004 Olympic Summer Games in Athens, Greece, the Department of State is coordinating federal agencies' assistance at the headquarters level in Washington, D.C., and at the U.S. Embassy in Athens, Greece. In Washington, D.C., the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Bureau of Diplomatic Security established an interagency group and at the U.S. Embassy in Athens, the bureau established an Olympic Security Coordinator and an Olympic Security Advisory Team to coordinate federal assistance. The advisory team is composed of agency officials from DOD, the FBI, the CIA, and the Federal Aviation Administration. As discussed earlier in this chapter, one initiative includes counterterrorism training for Greek law enforcement authorities through State's Antiterrorism Assistance program.

Security planning for the 2004 Olympic Summer Games in Athens is a multilateral effort. The Government of Greece requested Olympic security expertise from seven countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Israel, Germany, and Australia. These countries make up the Olympic Security Advisory Group, which reports to the Greek Minister of Public Order on security issues at the strategic level. The group also provides advice on technical support issues at the operational level. The range of issues includes intelligence, planning, training and exercises, technology, command and control coordination, and venue security.

⁴⁵ For domestic situations, PDD 62 created a category of special events called National Special Security Events, which are events of such significance that they warrant greater federal planning and protection than other special events. For these events, the directive reaffirmed the FBI's lead federal agency role for crisis management and designated the U.S. Secret Service as lead federal agency for security design, planning, and implementation. The directive also reaffirmed the Federal Emergency Management Agency as responsible for consequence management.

Coordination Mechanisms for Assistance to Enhance Coalition Capabilities

Programs to assist other countries are coordinated through a variety of forums. For those aimed at improving other countries' capabilities to combat terrorism, coordination across agencies is done in working groups under the NSC's Counterterrorism Security Group (discussed in chapter 2). Specifically, the State Department chairs a Training and Assistance Sub-Group that coordinates the different programs to provide terrorism-related training and assistance to foreign governments and their officials. The group works to prioritize countries that should receive assistance. The group reviews assistance programs of the various agencies to ensure they are properly sequenced, avoid duplication, and ensure that they are implemented in collaboration with or reinforce other efforts as appropriate. This group has a subordinate group, also chaired by the Department of State, called the Counterterrorism Finance Training and Technical Assistance Working Group. This group focuses on providing related finance training and technical assistance to a set of priority countries and attempts to ensure that the delivery of such assistance by different agencies does not conflict and is used effectively and efficiently. Within the State Department, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism work with other agencies to decide how to spend Antiterrorism Training Assistance funds. In the field, the embassy country teams are also involved in coordinating programs from the various agencies with headquarters and negotiating the assistance packages with the foreign government.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

The Departments of Defense, Justice, and State and the former Immigration and Naturalization Service provided technical comments on the matters covered throughout this chapter. Based upon these comments, we made revisions, as appropriate. We also made revisions (primarily to the section on border security) based upon the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the transfer of various agencies and functions from other departments into that department.

Federal Efforts to Disrupt and Destroy Terrorist Organizations

Federal agencies attempt to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations through diplomatic initiatives, law enforcement efforts, financial operations to freeze assets, military operations, and covert action. Diplomatic initiatives, led by the Department of State, strengthen international cooperation and capabilities through bilateral and multilateral agreements. The State Department's diplomatic leadership and agreements allow other agencies to cooperate more closely with foreign countries on specific types of efforts. Other multilateral agreements, including UN resolutions and conventions, also help to strengthen international cooperation. Law enforcement efforts, led by the Department of Justice, disrupt terrorist organizations through investigations, arrests, and prosecutions of terrorists. As a principal investigative agency of the federal government, the FBI conducts investigations on acts of terrorism against U.S. persons and property overseas. Operations to identify and freeze terrorists' financial assets are conducted by the Departments of the Treasury, Justice, and State and involve tracking monies, accounts, and wire transfers of terrorist organizations. Military operations, led by DOD, destroy terrorist organizations and complement other methods—diplomatic, legal, and economic—to prevent or disrupt terrorist organizations. DOD and its coalition partners are conducting Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and surrounding regions to destroy al Qaeda and the Taliban regime. Captured combatants—who are not considered prisoners of war by the U.S. government—have been detained and interrogated to provide intelligence information. Finally, covert actions, led by the CIA, have been used to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations. This chapter describes the relevant federal programs in place and is not an evaluation of their effectiveness.

Diplomatic Initiatives Strengthen International Cooperation

The *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* includes an objective to strengthen and sustain international efforts to combat terrorism. There is also an objective to establish and maintain an international standard of accountability with regard to combating terrorism. The strategy also gives the Department of State the lead in developing specific regional strategies for combating terrorism overseas, as well as policy action plans to deal with state sponsors of terrorism. Diplomatic initiatives, led by the Department of State, are key to achieving these objectives. Such diplomatic efforts help strengthen international cooperation in the effort to disrupt and destroy terrorists and their organizations. State helps to orchestrate other nations' bilateral support to assist the United States in conducting law enforcement cooperation, financial operations, and military

operations. State negotiated a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements with foreign countries to support these operations. State also solicited international cooperation by actively trying to enlist multilateral organizations in the fight against terrorism. These efforts include multilateral agreements and conventions, resolutions, and international summits involving the United Nations and other international organizations. Various State Department offices, bureaus, and missions overseas—in conjunction with other federal agencies—coordinate these diplomatic initiatives.

U.S. officials, from several agencies at both the headquarters and overseas, told us that bilateral agreements with individual nations are the most productive type of cooperation. However, they noted that multilateral agreements provide an important framework that, in the eyes of other countries, legitimizes their bilateral cooperation with the United States.

**Bilateral Cooperation
Supports Variety of
Activities by U.S.
Government Agencies**

The Department of State strengthens international cooperation through agreements, consultations, and negotiations with other countries to assist other U.S. government agencies in their efforts to enforce laws, deny terrorist financing, and carry out military operations against terrorists and their organizations. The Department of State leads periodic U.S. delegations—consisting of a number of U.S. agencies—that meet with other nations to discuss and cooperate on terrorism issues of mutual bilateral concern. For example, State Department’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism recently led one of these U.S. delegations to meet with French officials. Through its diplomacy, the department facilitates cooperation in a variety of areas.

Law enforcement

The Department of State negotiates formal bilateral agreements to strengthen law enforcement cooperation with other individual countries. For example, there are a number of law enforcement-related treaties negotiated by the Department of State, in conjunction with the Department of Justice, related to legal assistance and extradition. These agreements promote increased cooperation with foreign law enforcement authorities for the exchange of evidence and apprehension of terrorist suspects.

Terrorist financing

The Departments of State and the Treasury have worked with a number of countries on a bilateral basis to strengthen measures to deny terrorists access to financial support. Since September 11, 2001, the United States, in conjunction with other countries, designated a number of individuals and

organizations as sponsors of terrorism. At individual embassies, State Department economic officers work with their counterparts to improve joint efforts to disrupt terrorist financing.

Military operations

The State Department worked to negotiate a number of bilateral agreements for military cooperation to combat terrorism. In the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks, State worked with DOD to establish bilateral agreements to support military operations in Afghanistan and surrounding regions. Ultimately, 89 countries agreed to provide over-flight rights for U.S. military aircraft and 76 agreed to provide landing and/or bed-down rights for U.S. military aircraft. In addition, 23 countries agreed to host U.S. and coalition forces involved in military operations in Afghanistan. These later agreements, reached with neighboring countries, such as Pakistan and the Central Asian republics, were particularly significant in that they provided secure staging areas for U.S. and coalition military forces to carry out their missions. These bilateral agreements are in addition to other countries actually conducting military operations with the United States.

Multilateral Cooperation through the UN Provides Political Support for Coalition Efforts

The Department of State works with international organizations to enhance multilateral support to disrupt and destroy terrorists and their organizations. Foremost of these organizations is the United Nations. Its Counterterrorism Committee reviews international efforts to combat terrorism. The State Department works with the United Nations and its member states to establish a broad array of resolutions and conventions to create a multilateral framework for combating international terrorism. This UN-based multilateral framework falls into three broad categories of documents or agreements (as described below). Appendix VI provides a listing of protocols, conventions, and resolutions that the United Nations has identified as related to terrorism.¹

UN Conventions and Protocols

There are 10 UN conventions and 2 protocols dating back to 1963 that are related to terrorism. An example of these is the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings. The State

¹ In addition to those listed in appendix VI, there are other UN efforts indirectly related to terrorism. According to ATF, these include efforts to combat illicit trafficking in firearms, ammunition, and explosives used not only by common criminals but also terrorists. UN efforts include the UN Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms and the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons.

Department, through its diplomatic efforts in Washington and around the world, has urged countries to agree to these conventions and protocols. Before September 11, 2001, only 2 countries were parties to all 12 instruments. As of November 2002, 16 countries, including the United States, are a party to each of the 12 conventions and protocols.

UN Security Council Resolutions

The UN Security Council consists of 5 permanent members with veto authority (China, France, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom) and 10 rotating members.² Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, mandatory provisions in resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council form a legal basis for taking actions against terrorists. There are numerous UN Security Council Resolutions dating back to 1970 that are related to terrorism. For example, UN Security Council 1373, which is a wide-ranging measure calling for international cooperation against terrorist financing. Among other things, this resolution calls for member nations to report back on their activities to combat terrorism. According to the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, UN Security Council Resolution 1373 is one example of the United States enlisting the international community to establish and maintain an international standard of accountability with regard to combating terrorism.

Figure 11 shows the UN Security Council voting on a terrorism-related resolution in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001.

² The current 10 rotating members of the UN Security Council are Angola, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, Germany, Guinea, Mexico, Pakistan, Spain, and Syria.

Figure 11: UN Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 1373, Calling for Wide-Ranging International Cooperation to Combat Terrorism



Source: UN/DPI Photo.

UN General Assembly Resolutions

The UN General Assembly consists of the entire membership, currently numbering 189 nations. Resolutions from the General Assembly are adopted based upon the votes of the entire UN membership but, unlike UN Security Council Resolutions, are not binding. There are numerous UN General Assembly resolutions dating back to 1972 related to terrorism. An example of these is UN General Assembly Resolution 39/159 from 1984, which condemned all policies and practices of terrorism between states as a method of dealing with other states.

State Department Works With Variety of Other International Multilateral Organizations

In addition to the United Nations, the State Department is working with a number of other international organizations to promote multilateral cooperation to combat terrorism. The memberships of these other international organizations overlap, with several nations (including the United States) belonging to several of them. Examples of these international organizations and some of their related activities are as follows.

North Atlantic Treaty
Organization

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a political and security alliance of 19 nations from North America and Europe.³ In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, NATO members invoked Article V—a collective defense provision of the 1949 Washington Treaty. The provision, invoked for the first time in NATO’s history, states that an armed attack on any ally is considered an attack against all. NATO approved eight measures to expand its options in the campaign against terrorism, including the deployment of its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and its Airborne Early Warning force.

European Union

The European Union is a group of 15 countries forming a political and economic union. The European Union has taken steps to improve cooperation between European and U.S. law enforcement officials, coordination of the freezing of terrorist assets, and to provide a framework for cooperation on border security issues.

The Group of Eight

The Group of Eight (G-8) is a group of major industrialized democracies that meet periodically on a number of political, economic, and security issues.⁴ The G-8 has been an active forum for supporting measures against terrorists and their organizations. Several of the group’s summits have resulted in joint declarations that condemn terrorism and pledge to improve member countries individual and collective efforts to combat terrorism, including endorsing international recommendations to combat terrorist financing.

The Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe consists of 55 nations from Europe, Central Asia, and North America that discuss human rights, economic development, and security issues. The organization has incorporated combating terrorism financing into its work plan and agenda, urging its members to implement certain recommendations to combat terrorist financing.

³ NATO’s current membership includes Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In addition, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia have been invited to begin accession talks to join NATO in May 2004.

⁴ G-8 members include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The Organization of American States

The Organization of American States consists of 35 nations from the Western Hemisphere. The organization adopted the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism requiring, among other things, that each signatory state establish a legal and regulatory regime to combat the financing of terrorism. Parties also agreed to improve controls at banks and other financial institutions.

Other international groups

Other international groups provide collective support to specific functions related to terrorism. These include the Financial Action Task Force and the Egmont Group, which both are involved in disrupting terrorist financing. The membership of these groups overlaps with many of the other groups mentioned above. In addition, the State Department has sponsored and/or attended a number of international meetings to discuss terrorism outside the forums described above. An example includes terrorism summits at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, in 1994. These international summits resulted in declarations of support for national and international efforts to combat terrorism.

Coordination Mechanisms for Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy

The State Department generally is in charge of efforts to coordinate diplomatic initiatives related to combating terrorism overseas. Overall, the department's Coordinator for Counterterrorism coordinates both bilateral and multilateral initiatives. Within the coordinator's office, officers are assigned specific regional areas to coordinate activities. The department's regional and functional bureaus also are involved in coordination of diplomatic initiatives, as are other federal agencies, as appropriate.

For bilateral diplomatic initiatives, the department's regional bureaus, functional bureaus, country desks, and U.S. embassies play a major role in coordination. For example, U.S. efforts with the Philippines to combat terrorism would involve the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, the Bureau of East Asian Affairs, the Bureau of Political Military Affairs, the Philippines country desk, and the U.S. Embassy in Manila. Other federal agencies with specific programs would also be involved in coordination, such as DOD in the case of military assistance to the Philippines related to combating terrorism. Another example would be the Department of Justice's involvement in negotiations of bilateral agreements related to mutual legal assistance or extradition, which is discussed later in this chapter.

For multilateral diplomatic initiatives, the department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs, working with the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, has the lead in coordinating activities with international

organizations. Similar to regional bureaus, the bureau has individual desks for individual international organizations. Similar to U.S. embassies, the United States maintains diplomatic missions to international organizations, such as the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York; the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels, Belgium; and the U.S. Mission to the European Union, also in Brussels, Belgium. The department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement coordinates multilateral law enforcement programs, such as the International Law Enforcement Academies. Again, other federal agencies with specific programs also are involved in coordination, such as the Department of the Treasury's programs to disrupt terrorist financing and DOD's European Command involvement in the case of NATO naval support to maritime operations in the Mediterranean. The State Department also participates in multilateral negotiations of treaties and other agreements relating to terrorism.

Law Enforcement Efforts to Disrupt Terrorist Organizations

One of the enduring policy principles that guides U.S. strategies to combat terrorism overseas is to bring terrorists to justice for their crimes. The *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* has an objective to destroy terrorists and their organizations, in part, by expanding law enforcement efforts to capture, detain, and prosecute known and suspected terrorists. In addition, the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* has an objective to intensify international law enforcement cooperation.

Such law enforcement efforts are led by the Department of Justice and attempt to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations overseas. The Department of Justice, working with the Department of State, will expand, where appropriate, its law enforcement presence abroad to further counterterrorism interdiction, investigation, and prosecution. The Department of State coordinates U.S. efforts to improve international counterterrorism cooperation, including the diplomatic aspects of law enforcement. United States law enforcement efforts overseas involve investigating terrorism-related crimes and the apprehension and prosecution of terrorists. The Department of Justice, through the FBI, leads U.S. investigations of terrorist incidents overseas. Such investigations, although conducted by FBI, are done under the authority of the ambassador at the relevant U.S. embassy. Depending upon the nature of the terrorist incident, other federal agencies, such as the State Department and its embassies, also may participate in or support terrorism investigations. The Department of Justice, in conjunction with the State Department, leads the federal government's efforts to apprehend terrorists overseas for prosecution. Suspected terrorists who are apprehended overseas are

brought back to the United States for prosecution through extraditions and renditions. Foreign governments, through both bilateral and multilateral devices, provide key assistance with investigations, arrests, and prosecutions of terrorists. The Department of Justice coordinates its efforts to combat terrorism overseas through various mechanisms, including its legal attachés located in U.S. missions overseas, Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and Anti-Terrorism Task Forces. Efforts to identify, disrupt, and freeze terrorist assets are a related law enforcement activity and are covered in more detail in the next section.

Investigations of Terrorist Incidents Overseas Are Led by the FBI

As a principal investigative agency of the federal government for terrorism matters, the FBI is responsible for detecting and investigating acts of terrorism committed against U.S. citizens and property overseas. According to the FBI, extraterritorial jurisdiction is the principle that allows the bureau to expand its investigative authority outside U.S. borders and deploy FBI personnel to work in conjunction with host government law enforcement agencies to make arrests and prosecutions. The FBI undertakes these investigations under the authority of the ambassador at the relevant U.S. embassy abroad.

According to the FBI, its role in investigating terrorist crimes overseas was expanded through a series of congressional acts in the mid-1980s. For example, the FBI cited the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984⁵ and the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorist Act of 1986,⁶ which expanded the federal jurisdiction of the United States to terrorist crimes, including hostage taking, homicide, conspiracy to commit homicide, or physical violence committed against U.S. national or interest anywhere in the world. The FBI also noted that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996⁷ granted authority to designate foreign terrorist organizations, prohibits the providing of material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, and makes it a federal crime to participate in certain international terrorism activities. These changes were the result of concerns that terrorists who committed the attacks against U.S. nationals

⁵ P.L. 98-473, Oct. 12, 1984.

⁶ P.L. 99-399, Aug. 27, 1986.

⁷ P.L. 104-132, Apr. 24, 1996, as amended.

overseas would escape justice and flee to countries that oppose the United States.

Other Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Support Terrorism Investigations

Depending upon the nature of a terrorist incident, other federal agencies also may participate in or support terrorism investigations overseas. For example, several agencies in the Department of the Treasury might support the FBI in conducting overseas investigations and in combating terrorism. Table 7 shows key federal investigative agencies that have a role in investigating acts of terrorism overseas.

Table 7: Federal Agencies' Roles in Investigating Terrorist-Related Incidents Overseas

| Federal agency | Agency role |
|--|--|
| Department of Justice | Leads law enforcement and criminal matters related to terrorism both domestically and overseas. Responsible for investigating, indicting, and prosecuting terrorists. |
| Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation | Leads efforts to investigate terrorist crimes domestically and overseas. Responsible for the apprehension, extradition, and rendition of foreign terrorists who are suspected of violating U.S. statutes. |
| Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (formerly under the Department of the Treasury) | Investigates terrorist bombings and explosive blasts overseas using its International Response Team and explosive experts. Special agents with post-blast expertise, forensic chemists, and bomb technicians are used to overcome difficulties inherent in investigations of large-scale fire or explosives crime scenes. |
| Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security | Leads investigations of selected incidents involving U.S. diplomatic facilities and/or personnel. Participates in investigations of terrorist incidents against U.S. diplomatic personnel and other persons under its protection. Also investigates passport and visa fraud. |
| Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network | Supports lead investigative agencies in determining actual or suspected terrorist financial transactions and money laundering. |
| Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (includes parts of former U.S. Customs Service under the Department of the Treasury) | Investigates suspected terrorists or materials crossing U.S. borders, including illegal movement of arms, munitions, and WMD components. Also investigates violations of economic sanctions, embargoes, and money laundering related to financing designated international terrorist organizations. |
| Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (includes parts of former Immigration and Naturalization Service under the Department of Justice) | Investigates cases of terrorists crossing U.S. borders. Also, it investigates cases of terrorists using transnational smuggling organizations, using illicit document vendors, and entering the United States illegally. Has officers stationed intermittently for flexible periods of time at key choke point airports to disrupt the smuggling and trafficking of persons, including terrorists, to the United States. |

Chapter 4
Federal Efforts to Disrupt and Destroy
Terrorist Organizations

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| Federal agency | Agency role |
|---|---|
| Department of Homeland Security, United States Secret Service (formerly under the Department of the Treasury) | Investigates terrorists' threats against officials under its protective mission overseas, including the President and Vice President. |
| Department of Defense | Investigates acts of terrorism committed against DOD personnel or facilities overseas. |

Source: Departments of Defense, Justice, State, and the Treasury.

Note: GAO analysis of agency documents.

United States Works With Other Countries in Conducting Investigations

In conducting terrorist investigations, the United States works with other countries to gather or share evidence. Much information and evidence are exchanged informally through law enforcement channels. When a formal request for assistance is necessary, and where there is no bilateral treaty, executive agreement, or applicable multilateral convention with another country, the United States often must rely upon letters rogatory to obtain international assistance. A letter rogatory is a request from a judicial official in one country to a judicial official in another country seeking assistance. Letters rogatory usually include background on the nature and targets of the criminal investigation, relevant facts about the case or investigation, the type of assistance needed, statutes alleged to have been violated, and a promise of reciprocity.

Department of Justice officials said that they prefer to use the more modern, more reliable, and more expeditious Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty process than the more cumbersome letters rogatory process. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties strengthen law enforcement by permitting direct communication between appropriate executive branch law enforcement officials in the United States and foreign countries rather than relying upon the letters rogatory process with its judge-to-judge communications transmitted through the diplomatic channel. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties provide for the exchange of valuable evidence, often in a form that is admissible at trial. They enable the Justice Department to obtain foreign financial records, obtain statements or testimony of foreign witnesses, conduct search and seizure of foreign evidence, and in some cases, freeze and recover the forfeiture of proceeds of U.S. crimes committed abroad. The Department of State, in conjunction with the Department of Justice, is responsible for negotiating the treaties. Once a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty is in force, the Department of Justice is responsible for making specific requests to other countries for assistance under the treaty. As of January 2003, the United States had bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties covering 47 foreign jurisdictions. In addition, many modern

multilateral law enforcement conventions, including those dealing with terrorism and terrorist financing, contain broad mutual legal assistance articles.

Return of Overseas Terrorists via Extraditions and Renditions

The Department of Justice, in coordination with the Department of State, is responsible for obtaining the arrest and return of accused persons who commit acts of terrorism against U.S. persons and property overseas. The United States sometimes uses extradition treaties to obtain custody of accused terrorists. Extradition treaties provide for the request by one party to the treaty to the other party for the arrest and surrender of a person accused or convicted of a crime in the country making the request. The Department of Justice is currently working with the Department of State to renegotiate a number of extradition treaties to further broaden their coverage of terrorist-related crimes. Modern extradition treaties contain a “dual criminality” clause, which makes any offense considered a crime in both countries extraditable under the treaty. Thus, such modern treaties provide for growth and development in the criminal law, so that when countries criminalize new activity (including terrorist activity), those new crimes will be extraditable without the need to renegotiate the existing treaty. Often, before an alleged terrorist can be formally extradited to the United States, a number of factors must exist. Specifically:

- An extradition treaty must usually be in force between the United States and the country in which the fugitive terrorist is located.
- The extradition treaty must cover the crime or crimes for which the terrorist is wanted in the United States (either because it is an offense “listed” in the treaty, or because it meets the “dual criminality” requirement set out in the treaty; i.e., it is considered a crime in both countries).
- All requirements of the applicable extradition treaty must have been met (for example, the quantum of evidence required by the treaty has been provided in the formal extradition documents).
- The fugitive terrorist is otherwise extraditable (e.g., a national of a third country).

Once the extradition proceedings in the foreign country are complete and the fugitive terrorist is ready for surrender, the Justice Department sends escort agents, usually from the United States Marshals Service, to collect

and return the fugitive to the United States. As shown below in table 8, the U.S. government has obtained the extradition of six terrorists operating overseas since 1987, one of the most recent being an accused terrorist who was extradited from Germany in December 1998 for his role in the August 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa. As of January 2002, the United States had extradition treaties in force with more than 100 foreign jurisdictions.

The United States also can obtain custody of an individual without the formalities of an extradition treaty by agreeing to have the host nation render the individual to the United States for trial or deport the individual out of the country. The United States used renditions in 11 cases since 1987 to obtain custody of suspected terrorists operating overseas. As shown in table 8, the most recent reported rendition used by the United States to apprehend a suspected terrorist was in September 2001 when a terrorist suspect was taken into custody from an undisclosed country for perpetrating the hijacking of Pan American flight 73 in Karachi, Pakistan. That individual will stand trial in the United States for the terrorist attack in which 22 persons, including two U.S. citizens, were killed and at least 100 persons were injured. Table 8 shows reported extraditions and renditions of terrorist suspects to the United States over the last 15 years, as reported by the State Department and the FBI.

Table 8: Reported Extraditions and Renditions of Terrorists to the United States, 1987-2001

| Month and year | Name and crime(s) | Extradition or rendition | Country |
|----------------|--|--------------------------|---------|
| September 1987 | Viken Tcharkhutian (May 1982 bombing of an Air Canada aircraft) | Extradition | Greece |
| September 1987 | Fawaz Younis (June 1985 hijacking of a Royal Jordanian Airlines aircraft) | Rendition | Cyprus |
| January 1991 | Khalid al Jawary (March 1973 bombing of three vehicles in New York City) | Extradition | Italy |
| March 1993 | Mahmoud Abu Halima (February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City) | Extradition | Egypt |
| July 1993 | Mohammed Ali Rezaq (November 1985 hijacking of Egyptair flight 648) | Rendition | Nigeria |

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Federal Efforts to Disrupt and Destroy
Terrorist Organizations**

(Continued From Previous Page)

| Month and year | Name and crime(s) | Extradition or rendition | Country |
|-----------------------|---|---------------------------------|-----------------------|
| February 1995 | Ramzi Ahmed Yousef (January 1995 Far East bomb U.S. airlines plot; February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City) | Extradition | Pakistan |
| April 1995 | Abdul Hakim Murad (January 1995 Far East U.S. airlines bomb plot) | Rendition | Philippines |
| August 1995 | Eyad Mahmoud Ismail Najim (February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City) | Extradition | Jordan |
| December 1995 | Wali Khan Amin Shah (January 1995 Far East U.S. airlines bomb plot) | Rendition | Country not disclosed |
| September 1996 | Tsutomu Shirosaki (May 1986 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia) | Rendition | Country not disclosed |
| June 1997 | Mir Aimal Kansil (January 1993 shooting at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia) | Rendition | Country not disclosed |
| June 1998 | Mohammed Rashid (August 1982 bombing of a Pan American aircraft) | Rendition | Country not disclosed |
| August 1998 | Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali (August 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya) | Rendition | Kenya |
| August 1998 | Mohamed Sedeek Odeh (August 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya) | Rendition | Kenya |
| December 1998 | Mamdouh Mahmud Salim (August 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya) | Extradition | Germany |
| October 1999 | Khalfan Khamis Mohamed (August 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Dar es-Salaam, Tanzania) | Rendition | South Africa |
| September 2001 | Zayd Hassan Abd al-Latif Masud al-Safarini (1986 hijacking of Pan American flight 73 in Karachi, Pakistan) | Rendition | Country not disclosed |

Source: *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001*, Department of State, May 2002 and *Terrorism in the United States, 1999*, the FBI, 1999. There may be additional renditions since September 11, 2001, that have not been reported because they are classified.

INTERPOL is a multilateral organization that, among other things, facilitates the arrest of terrorist suspects to bring them to the United States (or elsewhere) for trial. INTERPOL was established to promote international police cooperation to help officers from different police forces, countries, languages, and cultures work with each other to solve crimes. Although INTERPOL has a world headquarters in Lyon, France, every member country has its own INTERPOL office called a National

Central Bureau. This bureau is the single point-of-contact for foreign governments requiring assistance with overseas investigations. Each member country employs its own officers to operate on its own territory in accordance with its own national laws. INTERPOL provides criminal intelligence with its member countries and plays a number of roles in information exchange, such as encouraging member countries to use shared automated systems and issuing international wanted notices for fugitives. When the whereabouts of a suspected terrorist is unknown or the United States seeks an immediate arrest of a terrorist suspect, the Department of Justice can request their arrest through a “Red Notice.” These notices are issued through INTERPOL with the intent to follow up with an extradition. While law enforcement authorities in some countries are authorized to make an immediate arrest of a suspected terrorist based on a Red Notice, other countries require an official provisional arrest or formal extradition request.

Rewards for Justice Program Leads to Arrests and Prosecutions

The State Department’s Rewards for Justice Program provides a tool to law enforcement for arresting and prosecuting terrorist suspects. The program was established under the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism⁸ and is administered by the Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security. The program generally offers rewards up to \$5 million for information that leads to the arrest or conviction in any country of any individual for conspiring, aiding, abetting, or committing an act of international terrorism against U.S. persons or property or the prevention, frustration, or favorable resolution of such an act. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 authorizes the Secretary of State to offer or pay rewards of greater than \$5 million if the Secretary determines that a greater amount is necessary to combat terrorism or to defend the United States against terrorist acts. The Secretary authorized a reward of up to \$25 million for information leading to the capture of Osama bin Laden and other key al Qaeda leaders.

Information provided through the Rewards for Justice Program has been used to apprehend and arrest suspected terrorists. In the past 7 years, the United States has paid over \$9.5 million to 23 individuals who provided credible information leading to the arrest of international terrorists. The program played a significant role in the arrest of a suspected terrorist in February 1995 for the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993. In

⁸ P.L. 98-533, Oct. 19, 1984.

addition, the program provided key information about a planned terrorist attack against airline ticket counters. As a result, the United States and the host nation prevented the terrorist act from being carried out.

Department of Justice Prosecutes Suspected Terrorists

Suspected terrorists apprehended and arrested overseas for crimes committed against U.S. citizens or interests are prosecuted in the United States by the Department of Justice. The U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, together with the Department of Justice's Counterterrorism Section, ordinarily prosecute the offense. In some cases, the prosecutions are led by other U.S. Attorneys. For example, on October 18, 2001, the Department of Justice successfully prosecuted four al Qaeda members in the Southern District of New York for their roles in the bombings of two U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which killed 224 persons, including 12 U.S. citizens. The court sentenced the four suspects to life in prison.

Coordination Mechanisms for Law Enforcement

Investigations of terrorist incidents, including those related to international terrorism, are coordinated through the National Joint Terrorism Task Force. This task force serves as a coordinating mechanism for sharing information on suspected terrorists, including those of foreign origin. It operates out of the FBI's Strategic Information Operations Center in Washington, D.C. In addition, such investigations also are coordinated through the FBI's 66 local Joint Terrorism Task Forces. The FBI established these task forces to coordinate law enforcement efforts among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Depending on the nature of terrorist activities in each location, the task forces may include representatives from other federal agencies such as the ATF, CIA, the Department of Homeland Security (to include the U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Coast Guard, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection) and the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security. One of the most robust Joint Terrorism Task Forces is in Washington, D.C., which has representatives from 15 federal agencies. These task forces serve as the coordinating mechanisms that combine the international and national investigative resources of the federal government with the street-level expertise of local law enforcement agencies. This "cop-to-cop" relationship enables law enforcement agencies to share information on suspected terrorists, including those of foreign origin.

To coordinate strategic long-term planning and policy in areas related to national security efforts to combat terrorism, the Department of Justice established the National Security Coordination Council.⁹ In areas related to prosecutions, the Department of Justice also established Anti-Terrorism Task Forces to integrate and coordinate the anti-terrorism activities in each of the judicial districts within the United States. The task forces are comprised of federal prosecutors from the U.S. Attorney's Office, members of the federal law enforcement agencies, as well as the primary state and local enforcement officials in each district. They are intended to serve as a national network that coordinates closely with the Joint Terrorism Task Forces in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information. The Anti-Terrorism Task Forces also are intended to develop the U.S. investigative and prosecution strategy in terrorism cases.

Overseas, coordination within the federal government and with foreign governments is led by the Department of Justice, in coordination with Justice officials stationed at U.S. embassies. The FBI has legal attachés at overseas posts that work closely with law enforcement agencies of the host country on common crime problems. They also play a large role in facilitating the international battle against terrorism by enlisting the cooperation of foreign law enforcement, enabling the arrest of U.S. terrorist suspects, and solving crimes against U.S. citizens. For example, in the aftermath of the August 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa, the FBI was able to take immediate steps to initiate a joint investigation with local law enforcement authorities and to preserve the crime scene and critical evidence. The legal attachés also played a key role in the investigation, in that they were the first FBI agents to arrive in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es-Salaam, Tanzania, in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist bombings. The legal attachés also assist in coordinating investigations with federal law enforcement overseas by disseminating information to key U.S. federal agencies stationed abroad. They routinely share information on investigations with liaisons serving with DOD components overseas. Currently, there are FBI legal attachés stationed at 45 overseas posts, and additional positions have been approved. They sometimes serve multiple countries in a region. For example, the legal attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Athens not only covers Greece but also Turkey, Cyprus, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan.

⁹ This is separate from the NSC, which is part of the Executive Office of the President and was discussed in more detail in chapter 2.

The State Department's regional security officers at U.S. embassies also play a key role overseas in coordinating with federal law enforcement agencies and with foreign governments. These officers, part of the department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security, are stationed at all U.S. embassies. The regional security officers work with foreign law enforcement officials at the national, regional, and local level. They often serve as liaisons when other federal law enforcement agencies request assistance with investigations. They play a particularly important role at U.S. embassies not served by FBI legal attachés. They also work with foreign officials to monitor terrorist threats in the host country, and take preemptive measures as appropriate. For example, if the threat level increases against U.S. interests in a particular country, the regional security officer could request that local police forces adopt a higher threat posture around the U.S. embassy.

Identifying and Freezing Terrorists' Financial Assets Disrupts Terrorist Organizations

The *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* calls for the United States to work with its allies to disrupt the financing of terrorism by identifying and blocking the sources of funding for terrorists and denying them access to the international financial system. In addition, the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* includes an objective to interdict and disrupt material support for terrorists, including their financial support. Moreover, one of the enduring policy principles that guides U.S. strategies to combat terrorism overseas is isolating and applying pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behavior. The Departments of State, the Treasury, Homeland Security, and Justice conduct activities to deny terrorists and their sponsors access to financial assets. In some cases, the federal government designates terrorists and terrorist organization before the Departments of the Treasury, Justice, and State attempt to deny them financing and financial services. The United States also works with several international organizations to disrupt terrorist financing. Coordination occurs through interagency working groups or operations sponsored by the NSC and various departments. As of November 2002, the government reported that over \$113 million in terrorist related assets had been frozen, including \$35 million in the United States and \$78 million in other countries.

Designation of Terrorist Organizations and Their Sponsors and Supporters Permits Action to Block Assets

As a prelude to freezing terrorist assets, the U.S. government can designate a terrorist organization as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and the states, organizations, and individuals that sponsor or support them as State-sponsors of terrorism, or organizations or individuals that support terrorism, respectively. Different processes exist for designating such organizations and states and those who support them. Those processes and related sanctions are described below.

Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Under the authority provided by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, as amended by the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, designates foreign terrorist organizations.¹⁰ The Secretary is authorized to designate an organization as a foreign terrorist organization if it is (1) a foreign organization, (2) the organization engages in terrorist activity or retains the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism,¹¹ and (3) the terrorist activity or terrorism of the organization threatens the security of U.S. nationals or the national security of the United States. Designating these organizations allows the Treasury to block the assets of these organizations in U.S. financial institutions. It also makes it a crime to knowingly provide funds and other forms of material support to the designated groups and allows the blocking of visas for their members without having to show that the individual was involved in specific terrorist activities. As of April 2003, 36 groups had been designated as foreign terrorist organizations.

State Sponsors of Terrorism

The Secretary of State designates a government as a State Sponsor of Terrorism if that government has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. The United States imposes various sanctions on designated state sponsors of terrorism, such as (1) a ban on defense-related exports and sales, (2) certain controls over exports of dual use items, (3) restrictions on foreign assistance, and (4) imposition of financial and other restrictions, including U.S. opposition to loans by or other use of funds by the World Bank and other international financial institutions and amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to lift sovereign immunity in civil litigation in U.S. courts. The Secretary of State has

¹⁰ P.L. 104-132, Apr. 24, 1996, as amended.

¹¹ For the purposes of this designation, “terrorist activity” as defined in 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B) (the Immigration and Nationality Act) or “terrorism” as defined in 22 U.S.C. 2656f(d)(2).

designated seven countries as State Sponsors of Terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. All of these countries have held such a designation for several years.

Organizations and Individuals
That Support Terrorism

Executive Order 13224 establishes policies and procedures for designating terrorists, their organizations, and others who provide financial support or other services to them.¹² The executive order authorizes the Department of the Treasury, in consultation with the Department of State and the Attorney General, to block assets of individuals and organizations supporting terrorists in any financial institution in the United States or assets held by any U.S. person. As of September 2002, provisions under Executive Order 13224 had identified 236 organizations and individuals that support terrorism.

Department of the Treasury
Efforts to Identify, Track,
and Block Terrorist
Financial Assets

Since PDD 39 in June 1995, the Secretary of the Treasury has been responsible for identifying and blocking terrorist financing. These efforts were stepped up after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when the President signed Executive Order 13224. This order directed the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, to deny financing and financial services to terrorists and terrorist organizations. The executive order authorizes the blocking of assets of those designated individuals and organizations linked to global terrorism. It also prohibits transactions with designated terrorist groups, leaders, and corporate and charitable fronts. The Department of the Treasury also is working with key federal agencies in implementing key statutory provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act to permit more information sharing among law enforcement entities and financial institutions. A number of organizations within the Department of the Treasury are involved in these efforts.

¹² Executive Order 13224 “*Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism,*” Sept. 23, 2001.

Executive Office for Terrorist
Financing and Financial Crimes

The Executive Office for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes was created in March 2003 and assumed selected functions of the former Office of Enforcement.¹³ The office is charged with coordinating Treasury Department's efforts to combat terrorist financing both in the United States and abroad. The new office is responsible for the following specific duties: (1) developing and implementing U.S. government strategies to combat terrorist financing domestically and internationally, (2) developing and implementing the *National Money Laundering Strategy*, (3) participating in the department's development and implementation of U.S. government policies and regulations in support of the USA PATRIOT Act, (4) joining in representation of the United States in international bodies dedicated to fighting terrorist financing, and (5) developing U.S. government policies related to financial crimes. The office will work with other Treasury elements to include the International Affairs Task Force on Terrorism, the Office of Foreign Assets Control, and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (all described below).

International Affairs Terrorist
Financing Task Force

The International Affairs Terrorist Financing Task Force works with other countries in an effort to implement and improve mechanisms for blocking terrorist assets globally and thereby deny terrorists access to formal and informal financial systems. The task force tracks global progress in blocking terrorist assets and attempts to coordinate these efforts with various international organizations.

Office of Foreign Assets Control

The Office of Foreign Assets Control administers economic sanctions and embargo programs against specific foreign countries or groups (including designated terrorists, terrorist organizations, state sponsors, and individuals supporting those organizations) to further U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives. The office imposes control on financial transactions and freezes foreign assets, denying the targeted country, individual, or organization.

Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has a mission is to (1) support law enforcement investigative efforts and foster interagency and global cooperation against domestic and international financial crimes

¹³ The Department of the Treasury's Office of Enforcement had been responsible for the policy, development, guidance, and coordination of Treasury's law enforcement entities to combat money laundering, including terrorists financing. The office had also been involved in negotiating international agreements to engage in joint law enforcement operations and exchange financial information and records.

and (2) provide U.S. policymakers with strategic analyses of domestic and worldwide money-laundering developments, trends, and patterns. The network supports law enforcement investigations to prevent and detect terrorist financing, money laundering and other financial crimes.

Department of Homeland Security Has Role Related to Terrorist Financing

The new Department of Homeland Security also has a role in tracking terrorist financing and conducting related investigations. The department's Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the U.S. Secret Service are involved in these activities.

Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement

The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, consisting in part of the former U.S. Customs Service, has a mission to target current terrorist funding sources and identify possible future sources. The bureau has a multi-agency entity called Operation Green Quest to bring together federal agency expertise across departments and bureaus to identify systems, individuals, and organizations that serve as sources of terrorist funding. According to Operation Green Quest officials, their investigations have resulted in a number of arrests, indictments, convictions, and seizures. Operation Green Quest is working in tandem with other federal law enforcement agencies in pursuing several specific cases related to terrorist financing.

U.S. Secret Service

The U.S. Secret Service is responsible for enforcement of laws relating to securities of the United States and financial crimes. Its efforts to combat international terrorism rest primarily on the investigation of counterfeiting of currency and securities.

Department of Justice and the FBI also Track and Investigate Terrorist Assets

The Department of Justice and the FBI also have efforts under way to disrupt terrorist financing. According to the department, the FBI has the lead in law enforcement and criminal matters related to terrorism, and terrorist financing is one element of overall terrorist investigations and prevention efforts. There are two major organizations within the department that are involved in these efforts.

Terrorist Financing Task Force

The Department of Justice established a Terrorist Financing Task Force to coordinate the terrorist financing enforcement efforts. Within Justice's Criminal Division, the task force works with prosecutors around the country as well as with the FBI's Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force and

Terrorist Financing Operation Section to disrupt groups and individuals representing terrorist threats.

Terrorist Financing Operations
Section

In response to the events of September 11, 2001, the FBI established the interagency Terrorist Financing Operations Section within its Counterterrorism Division to work jointly with the law enforcement and intelligence communities to identify, investigate, disrupt, dismantle, and prosecute, as appropriate, terrorist-related financial and fund-raising activities. With access to FBI and CIA intelligence and criminal databases and connectivity to terrorism investigations, the section is a focal point for efforts to identify and target terrorist financing. According to the FBI, the Terrorist Financing Operations Section brings the bureau's financial expertise to bear in identifying terrorist financing methods and movement of money into and out of the United States in support of terrorist activity. The section works with other agencies and partners in the law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and international sectors. To help prevent terrorist attacks, the section developed a centralized terrorist financial database to identify potential terrorist-related activity in the United States and abroad. This database is utilized in conjunction with a number of initiatives, which include working with the financial sector in developing predictive models and conducting data mining analysis to facilitate a proactive approach in identifying previously unknown "sleeper" terrorist suspects. According to the FBI, information developed by the section is shared within the law enforcement and intelligence community.

International Cooperation
to Identify and Freeze
Terrorist Assets

The Departments of State, the Treasury, and Justice work with other countries on a bilateral and multilateral basis to identify and freeze terrorist assets. At the State Department, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism and the Office of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement have the lead in coordinating capacity building to combat terrorist financing in other countries. Offices from other agencies lend their expertise on a bilateral and multilateral basis to provide technical assistance and training to countries to assist these countries in meeting international standards to combat terrorist financing. For example, the Treasury's Office of International Affairs takes the lead in working with other countries. Treasury's Office of Technical Assistance is working with a number of countries to assess their capabilities and provide technical support to disrupt terrorist financing. In another example, the Department of Justice's Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section provides assistance to other countries in drafting money-laundering legislation. Types of U.S. government technical assistance and training cover both the

legal aspects (from drafting laws and implementing regulations to training prosecutors and judges) and financial aspects (from developing financial intelligence units to conducting financial investigations). Additional information on training and assistance was provided in chapter 3.

As of November 2002, 208 countries and jurisdictions have pledged their support for the financial war on terrorism and 165 countries and jurisdictions have issued orders in force to freeze terrorist assets. Since September 11, 2001, the international community has frozen millions of dollars in terrorist-related assets under UN Security Council Resolutions 1267, 1390, 1373, and 1455. Other countries improved their legal and regulatory systems to help block terrorist funds.

On a bilateral basis, U.S. embassy officials representing the Departments of State, the Treasury, and Justice work with individual host countries on matters of terrorist financing. State economic officers, Treasury financial attachés, and FBI legal attachés all play roles in this type of bilateral cooperation. In 2002, the State Department required that each U.S. embassy establish a Terrorist Financing Task Forces, an initiative to further coordinate the activities of these agencies. The Department of Homeland Security's Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (formerly U.S. Customs Service) provides expertise on import/export issues. The Embassy's Deputy Chief of Mission generally leads these task forces.

On a multilateral basis, the U.S. government works with several international organizations, to increase international cooperation to combat terrorist financing. Examples of these include:

United Nations

Several UN Security Council Resolutions call on UN member states to take actions against terrorist financing. Resolution 1373 is the broadest of these and it, among other things, obligates member states to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts, freeze funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit or attempt to commit terrorist acts, and criminalize the collection or provision of funds intended for use in carrying out terrorist acts. In addition, UN Security Council Resolution 1455 requires member states to continue sanctions against the Taliban, Osama bin Laden, and al Qaeda. It requires states to implement sanctions to include freezing economic resources, preventing the supply or sale of weapons, and preventing members of al Qaeda or the Taliban from entering or traveling through their territories.

Financial Action Task Force

The Financial Action Task Force is another international group that cooperates in efforts against terrorist financing and support. The task force—consisting of 31 members—has served as the preeminent multilateral organization to combat money laundering since 1989. The Financial Action Task Force established a Terrorist Financing Working Group, which is co-chaired by Spain and the United States (through the Department of the Treasury). The working group is to identify members that will need assistance to come into compliance with the recommendations on terrorist financing. The task force issued eight special recommendations on terrorist financing, requiring all members to (1) ratify the UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and implement relevant UN Security Council Resolutions against terrorist financing; (2) criminalize the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts, and terrorist organizations; (3) freeze and confiscate terrorist assets; (4) require financial institutions to report suspicious transactions linked to terrorism; (5) provide the widest possible assistance to other countries' law enforcement and regulatory authorities for terrorist financing investigations; (6) impose anti-money laundering requirements on alternative remittance systems; (7) require financial institutions to include accurate and meaningful originator information in money transfers; and (8) ensure that non-profit organizations cannot be misused to finance terrorism. The task force also requires members to provide closer scrutiny of transactions with non-cooperative countries and prohibits financial transactions with these members' jurisdictions.

Egmont Group

The Egmont Group is an international group that cooperates in efforts against terrorist financing and support. There are 69 members, with each member designating one of its agencies as its Financial Intelligence Unit to act as a central resource for collecting information and cooperating with the other Egmont members. For the United States, the Department of the Treasury has designated FinCEN as the Financial Intelligence Unit. The intelligence units work collectively to (1) eliminate impediments to information exchange, (2) make terrorist financing a form of suspicious activity to be reported by all financial sectors to their respective intelligence unit, and (3) undertake joint studies of money laundering vulnerabilities, especially those having some bearing on terrorism. The intelligence units foster interagency global cooperation in the efforts to combat international financial crimes. This includes sharing information on training and expertise with foreign law enforcement officials. FinCEN maintains country specific expertise of financial crimes, promotes the development of Financial Intelligence Units in other countries, and facilitates investigative exchanges with them.

International Organization of
Supreme Audit Institutions

International cooperation related to money laundering also occurs through the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions, which represents 184 UN member nations' top accountability organizations related to government audit and oversight. The U.S. General Accounting Office and its counterparts from all parts the world are working cooperatively to improve their oversight capacity for government departments and regulatory financial institutions. This work takes the form of publishing and disseminating standards and guidelines in critical areas such as auditing, internal control, financial reporting, information technology, and public debt. In addition, the organization recently established a task force charged with studying the national audit offices' role in helping prevent and detect money laundering and sharing information and experiences with each other. The organization also has established partnerships with organizations such as the World Bank and the International Federation of Accountants to strengthen its impact in these areas.

Coordination Mechanisms
for Efforts to Disrupt
Terrorist Financing and
Support

At the strategy and policy level, interagency coordination of U.S. government efforts to deny terrorists financing is intended to occur through a NSC-sponsored working group chaired by the Department of the Treasury. The interagency group helps to coordinate operations to disrupt terrorist networks by freezing terrorist accounts and seizing assets. The interagency group also helps to develop strategies and activities to deny terrorist financing with other countries. The highest-level interagency planning document is the *National Money Laundering Strategy*. The Departments of the Treasury and Justice jointly published this July 2002 strategy. The strategy sets forth an action plan for how law enforcement, regulatory officials, the private sector, and the international community could take steps to make it harder for criminals to launder money generated from their illegal activities. In addition to addressing general criminal financial activities, the 2002 strategy presents the government's plan to attack financing networks of terrorist entities. The strategy discusses the need to adapt traditional methods of combating money laundering to unconventional tools used by terrorist organizations to finance their operations.

At the operations level, interagency coordination occurs through the Department of Homeland Security's Operation Green Quest and the FBI's Terrorist Financing Operations Section and Joint Terrorism Task Forces. These organizations, particularly Operation Green Quest and the Terrorist Financing Operations Section, were established to investigate and pursue

terrorist cells and networks, including the financing of such networks. They act as both operational units and coordination mechanisms by pooling information and expertise from participating agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security's Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S. Secret Service; the Department of Justice's FBI and ATF; the Department of the Treasury's Internal Revenue Service, FinCEN, and Office of Foreign Assets Control; and the CIA.

Overseas coordination occurs at U.S. embassies through recently established Terrorist Financing Task Forces. The U.S. embassy's deputy chief of mission leads these task forces with important roles also being played by Department of State economic officers, Department of the Treasury financial attachés, FBI legal attachés, and Department of Homeland Security customs attachés.

Military Operations Provide Means to Destroy Terrorist Organizations

The *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* includes objectives to destroy terrorists and their organizations and to deny them sanctuaries and havens. According to the strategy, the intelligence community, in conjunction with the Departments of State and Defense, will conduct an annual review and assessment of international terrorist sanctuaries and develop plans to address them. Military operations, led by DOD, provide a means to meet these objectives that complement other means—political, diplomatic, legal, economic, and financial. Following the coordinated terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, DOD has deployed forces worldwide in military operations against terrorists and their supporters. As part of those deployments, DOD led Operation Enduring Freedom with its coalition partners to disrupt and destroy global terrorist organizations. U.S. Special Operations Forces worked on the ground in Afghanistan with the Northern Alliance to help coordinate naval and air attacks against the Taliban regime and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. U.S. and coalition maritime interception operations disrupt terrorist organizations' transport of terrorists and shipping of materiel and illegal contraband to help support their operations. Members of al Qaeda and Taliban forces captured during Operation Enduring Freedom have been designated as combatants without prisoner of war status and are being detained by the United States and its coalition partners for interrogation and potential prosecution. A number of military contributions made by the U.S. coalition partners helped support Operation Enduring Freedom. Some of these contributions included aircraft to support the air campaign over Afghanistan, ground troops inside the country, including special operations

forces, and naval forces dispatched to the North Arabian Gulf and Indian Ocean.

DOD Deployed Worldwide in Military Operations Against Terrorists and Their Supporters

According to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. forces now are deployed to an unprecedented number of locations in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.¹⁴ One of the most visible deployments relate to operations in and around Afghanistan, discussed in more detail below. In addition, military forces have been deployed on missions related to terrorism in a number of other countries, including Colombia, Cuba, Georgia, the Philippines, and Yemen.

DOD Leads Operation Enduring Freedom and Topples Taliban Regime

Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, the Secretary of Defense directed the preparation of “credible military options” to respond to international terrorism. The U.S. Central Command—DOD’s regional military command whose area of responsibility includes Afghanistan and surrounding geographic areas—devised a plan to destroy the al Qaeda network inside Afghanistan along with the Taliban regime, which was harboring and protecting terrorists. On October 7, 2001, 26 days after the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon, Operation Enduring Freedom was launched on a global scale as a broad and sustained campaign to disrupt and destroy terrorists and terrorist organizations. According to the Secretary of Defense, the objectives of the military operations were as follows:

- Make clear to the Taliban leaders and their supporters that harboring terrorists is unacceptable and carries a price.
- Acquire intelligence to facilitate future operations against al Qaeda and the Taliban regime that harbors the terrorists.
- Develop relationships with groups in Afghanistan that oppose the Taliban regime and the foreign terrorists that they support.
- Make it increasingly difficult for the terrorists to use Afghanistan freely as a base of operations.

¹⁴ Posture Statement of General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, February 5, 2003.

- Alter the military balance over time by denying to the Taliban the offensive systems that hamper the progress of various opposition forces.
- Provide humanitarian relief to Afghans suffering oppressive living conditions under the Taliban regime.

Military operations were conducted in Afghanistan in conjunction with U.S. coalition with the goal of removing the Taliban from power and destroying the al Qaeda network within Afghanistan. U.S. forces and its coalition partners combined operations with the Northern Alliance fighters (primarily from the Tajik and Uzbek ethnic groups) and the Southern Alliance fighters in the defeating the Taliban forces.

A series of bombing sorties were launched against the Taliban's air defense, command and control, and mobility capabilities. U.S. Special Operations Forces on the ground worked with the Northern Alliance fighters to identify targets for a coordinated air attack. Long-range air strikes using advanced laser-guided weapons were launched from aircraft carriers in the Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean, and from regional land bases. U.S. Navy, Marine, and Air Force pilots delivered in excess of 18,000 munitions, of which more than 10,000 were precision-guided bombs. As shown in figure 12, B-52 long-range bombers launched from Diego Garcia (a British archipelago in the Indian Ocean) also were used during the air campaign.

Figure 12: Air Force B-52H Bomber Drops a Load of M117 750 lb. Bombs



Source: U.S. Air Force.

U.S. forces conducted surveillance of Afghanistan and the movement of enemy forces through a combination of intelligence assets. U.S. Special Operations Forces on the ground provided human intelligence while manned and unmanned surveillance aircraft patrolled the skies, providing information on sites, facilities, and troop concentrations. Figure 13 shows U.S. Special Operations Forces adapting to their environment by riding on horseback to conduct operations in northern Afghanistan.

Figure 13: U.S. Special Forces Troops Riding Horseback in Afghanistan With Members of the Northern Alliance during Operation Enduring Freedom



Source: DOD.

These operations have resulted in the destruction of the Taliban regime, although U.S. forces continue to locate and engage remaining pockets of terrorists and their supporters to improve security and stability in Afghanistan. According to U.S. Central Command officials, many al Qaeda members, including their operational planners, facilitators, and logisticians, have been captured or killed. In addition, al Qaeda training

facilities in Afghanistan have been destroyed, command and control capabilities have been disrupted, and the remaining al Qaeda leaders are on the run.

As of April 2003, according to the U.S. Central Command, the initial objectives of Operation Enduring Freedom—to destroy the base of the al Qaeda terrorist organization in Afghanistan and replace the Taliban regime that supported al Qaeda—largely have been met. Combined Joint Task Force 180, which took direct control of operations in Afghanistan in June 2002, continues this mission. It also is conducting operations to ensure that Afghanistan will not again be a safe haven for terrorists and to facilitate the reintroduction of Afghanistan into the community of nations.

The U.S. Central Command's operations in Afghanistan have been complemented by cooperative efforts with Pakistan to eliminate the al Qaeda organization in that country. According to the U.S. Central Command, these efforts have led to the capture of hundreds of al Qaeda and Taliban members, including very senior members of the al Qaeda organization. This cooperation continues to degrade the al Qaeda organization and is a critical component in the terrorist organization's destruction.

DOD and U.S. Coast Guard Conduct Maritime Interception Operations

The *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* includes an objective to interdict and disrupt material support for terrorists. As part of this objective, U.S. military forces, in conjunction with coalition partners, conduct maritime interception operations to disrupt shipping by terrorist organizations. According to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President approved expanded maritime interception operations in July 2002, authorizing commanders to stop, board, and search merchant ships identified to be transporting terrorists and/or terrorist-related material.¹⁵ These operations have been concentrated in the areas of responsibility of the U.S. European Command and U.S. Central Command. In support of Operation Enduring Freedom, U.S. naval forces conducted maritime interception operations with a number of coalition partners. Operations by the U.S. European Command include NATO maritime and air forces. These operations resulted in more than 16,000 vessels being queried and about 200 vessels being boarded and searched. One operation led to the detention

¹⁵ Posture Statement of General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Feb. 5, 2003.

of four suspected al Qaeda members in the Gulf of Oman as navy vessels and aircraft from Canada, France, Italy, and the Netherlands targeted, intercepted, and boarded two vessels. The four captured al Qaeda members were transported to the detainee facility at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. Figure 14 shows coalition forces conducting such operations in the Arabian Sea.

Figure 14: British Troops Prepare to Board an Oil Tanker as Part of the Coalition's Maritime Interception Operations in the Arabian Sea



Source: U.S. Air Force.

The U.S. Coast Guard also participates in maritime interception operations. In its role as a military service, the U.S. Coast Guard supports regional military commands, which have requested and received U.S. Coast Guard cutters to conduct such operations. A 1995 Memorandum of Agreement between the Departments of Defense and Transportation identified the appropriate roles, missions, and functions of the U.S. Coast Guard to support the national military and naval strategies of the United States. The agreement recognized that the U.S. Coast Guard maintains many proficiencies and platforms directly applicable to maritime interception operations and that is it appropriate and desirable for the U.S. Coast Guard

to participate in such operations. To accomplish its missions to combat terrorism, both domestic and overseas, the U.S. Coast Guard developed a *U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security*. This strategy puts a premium on identifying and intercepting threats well before they reach U.S. shores by conducting layered, multi-agency, maritime security operations that include surveillance and reconnaissance, tracking, and interception.

Detainees Held by DOD for Intelligence Gathering

Throughout the military operations in Afghanistan, U.S. forces and military coalition partners captured over 5,000 Taliban and al Qaeda forces and confiscated laptop computers and cell phones. DOD holds some al Qaeda fighters who had information about operational methodology and future operations in Kandahar and Bagram, Afghanistan. DOD transported other detainees to detention facilities at Naval Air Station Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Over 500 detainees from 44 countries were transported to Guantánamo Bay. Figure 15 shows part of the newly constructed detention facility at Naval Air Station Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.

Figure 15: Camp X-Ray Used as a Temporary Holding Facility for Detainees Held at U.S. Naval Air Station Guantánamo Bay, Cuba



Source: DOD.

The U.S. Southern Command activated Joint Task Force 160 to staff the maximum-security installation and provide security and support functions at Naval Air Station Guantánamo Bay. The detainees, originally housed in the wire enclosures at Camp X-Ray, are now housed in a more permanent facility, known as Camp Delta. The U.S. Southern Command also established Joint Task Force 170 to coordinate U.S. military and government agency interrogation efforts in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. A Joint Interagency Interrogation Facility was established to support interrogations focused on intelligence collection, force protection, and planned terrorist activities. These efforts also support law enforcement agencies and military tribunal efforts.

The detainees are not considered to be prisoners of war. The President determined that the Geneva Convention of 1949 applies to the conflict with the Taliban in Afghanistan because Afghanistan is a state and signatory of the Geneva Convention. However, the President determined that the Taliban detainees do not have prisoner of war status because they fail to meet the criteria under article 4 of the Geneva Convention. For example,

throughout combat in Afghanistan, the Taliban did not wear distinctive signs, insignias, symbols, or uniforms, and were not organized into military units with identifiable chains-of-command. In addition, the President determined that the Geneva Convention of 1949 does not apply to al Qaeda detainees because they are considered to be a non-state terrorist network.

DOD's Military Order issued on November 13, 2001, permits military commissions to try non-U.S. citizens accused of terrorism against the United States and DOD has announced procedural draft guidelines for those commissions. Non-U.S. citizens selected by the President, to include al Qaeda and Taliban members, those involved in acts of international terrorism against the United States, and those members or actors who knowingly harbor such terrorist may be tried. According to the order, the Secretary of Defense will appoint members to each commission, which will have three to seven members. One commission member—the presiding officer—will ensure discipline and the decorum and dignity of the proceedings. As of March 2003, no trials have been held.

Coalition Partners Support U.S. Military Operations

Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, the Department of State led efforts to build a coalition to support the global war on terrorism. About 90 nations made contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom including intelligence, personnel, equipment, and military assets. In the U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility, coalition partners deployed more than 16,000 troops. In Afghanistan, coalition partners contributed more than 8,000 troops to both Operation Enduring Freedom and to the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, which represented over

half of the 15,000 non-Afghan forces in Afghanistan.¹⁶ Some 9 countries provided ground forces to serve in Afghanistan and 21 countries deployed forces to support the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Other key military contributions included support to aircraft in the air campaign over Afghanistan, ground troops inside Afghanistan, including special operations forces, and naval forces dispatched to the North Arabian Gulf and Indian Ocean for maritime surveillance and interception operations. Table 9 summarizes the military contributions made by selected coalition partners to support Operation Enduring Freedom. These contributions are in addition to the basing and overflight agreements negotiated by the State Department and discussed under diplomatic initiatives at the beginning of this chapter.

Table 9: Significant Military Contributions by Selected Coalition Partners in and around Afghanistan in Support of Operation Enduring Freedom

| Type of operations | Contributions in support of Operation Enduring Freedom |
|----------------------------------|--|
| Ground operations | |
| Special operations forces | Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom deployed special operations forces in Afghanistan and surrounding regions to perform the full spectrum of missions. |
| Infantry support | Canada, France, Italy, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom deployed infantry and equipment in Afghanistan and surrounding regions to perform security and combat operations. |
| Naval operations | |
| Maritime interception operations | Australia, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and the United Kingdom deployed ships, aircraft, and forces in the Arabian Gulf and surrounding areas to support maritime interception operations. |
| Logistical support | Japan, India, and Poland deployed ships for logistical support, such as refueling and escort assistance. |
| Combat operations | France, Italy, Turkey, and the United Kingdom deployed ships to support combat operations in the region. Denmark and the Netherlands also deployed naval ships to relieve U.S. units in the U.S. Southern Command. |

¹⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 1386 (Dec. 20, 2001) authorized the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force to provide assistance and maintain security in Kabul, Afghanistan, and its surrounding areas.

**Chapter 4
Federal Efforts to Disrupt and Destroy
Terrorist Organizations**

(Continued From Previous Page)

| Type of operations | Contributions in support of Operation Enduring Freedom |
|---------------------------------|--|
| Air operations | |
| Combat air patrol | Denmark, France, and Norway deployed fighter aircraft in Afghanistan and surrounding regions to support combat air patrol missions. Australia deployed fighter aircraft to perform combat air patrol missions at Diego Garcia in support of the U.S. Pacific Command. The Czech Republic and the United Kingdom deployed personnel and aircraft in support NATO airborne warning and control systems missions. |
| Strategic airlift | Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, and Norway deployed aircraft in Afghanistan and surrounding regions to support strategic airlift operations. Japan also deployed aircraft to support re-supply and transport requirements within the U.S. Pacific Command's area of responsibility. |
| Logistical support | Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey, and the United Kingdom deployed aircraft to Afghanistan and surrounding regions to conduct logistical support, including aerial refueling. |
| Surveillance and reconnaissance | France and United Kingdom deployed aircraft in Afghanistan and surrounding regions to provide support to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. |
| Other support | |
| Mine clearing operations | Denmark, Jordan, Norway, Poland, and the United Kingdom deployed personnel and equipment in Afghanistan to conduct mine clearing missions. |
| Civil-military support | Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom deployed civil military personnel, aircraft, and equipment to support the UN International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. |
| Humanitarian support | Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Turkmenistan, and the United Kingdom provided humanitarian support to Afghanistan. |
| Consequence management support | Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and the United Kingdom provided consequence management teams (nuclear, biological, and chemical teams) in Afghanistan and surrounding regions. |

Source: DOD.

Note: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Forces from NATO countries played a key role in the effort to end Afghanistan's role as a safe haven for terrorists and terrorist organizations by providing direct and indirect military support to the United States. As shown above, NATO members providing support included Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. In addition, forces under direct NATO control were deployed to support U.S. forces. For example, NATO deployed five airborne warning and control systems aircraft to the continental United States to patrol the skies and free up similar U.S. aircraft for missions over Afghanistan. The alliance also sent its Standing Naval Force to the Mediterranean Sea to establish a NATO presence in the region. NATO's support in the region helped provide enhanced intelligence sharing, access

to ports and airfields, increased security for U.S. bases on allied territory, and backfill for selected U.S. and allied military assets withdrawn from NATO's area of responsibility. Figure 16 shows aerial reconnaissance support provided by a NATO country.

Figure 16: NATO Member France Provided Six Mirage 2000 Aircraft to Fly Reconnaissance Missions in Support of Operation Enduring Freedom



Source: U.S. Air Force.

Coordination Mechanisms for Military Operations

At the headquarters level, military operations are coordinated at DOD. Within the Joint Staff's various directorates for intelligence, operations, logistics, and planning, there are sections dedicated to military operations against terrorism. For example, the Joint Staff's Directorate for Planning (J-5) has a special section for planning the worldwide campaign against terrorism. This section developed DOD's *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*. DOD currently coordinates its worldwide, military operations through various regional and functional commands. The regional commands—responsible for a specific geographic area of

responsibility—include the U.S. Central Command, the U.S. European Command, the U.S. Northern Command, the U.S. Pacific Command, and the U.S. Southern Command.¹⁷ DOD’s functional commands include the U.S. Joint Forces Command, the U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Space Command, and U.S. Transportation Command. The U.S. Special Operations Command is preparing to take a lead role in the war on terrorism in future operations and will transition from a “supporting” to a “supported” command in this role. As discussed previously, the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and various regional bureaus are involved in headquarters coordination of military operations with other countries, particularly when diplomatic negotiations are required to obtain coalition support.

At the field level, military operations are coordinated by DOD’s regional commands. Depending on the operation, the regional and functional commands are either “supported commands” (having the lead for that operation) or “supporting commands” (providing support to the lead command). For example, for operations in Afghanistan, the U.S. Central Command was the supported command, in charge of planning and executing operations. It got help from supporting commands to include the U.S. Transportation Command (which supplies airlift), the U.S. Special Operations Command (which supplies special operations forces), and other commands. These commands also have subordinate headquarters or forward operating bases overseas to coordinate military operations in the field.

The regional commands also coordinate their activities through interagency working groups and various plans. DOD created interagency working groups following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States and they include agencies representing diplomacy, intelligence, and law enforcement. Some of the agencies had long-standing liaisons at the commands, while other agencies established liaisons for the first time. An example of a long-standing liaison would be State Department political advisors with the rank of ambassador, who help the commands coordinate diplomatic activities with the department in Washington, D.C., and with U.S. embassies in the command’s area of responsibility. Regional military commands also have command-specific

¹⁷ The U.S. Northern Command became operational in October 2002. Its focus is on homeland security and, therefore, was not covered in this report on efforts to combat terrorism overseas.

campaign plans to implement DOD's *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* in their geographic area of responsibility. They also have Theater Security Cooperation Plans to lay out the command's strategies for working with other countries in the region to further U.S. foreign policy and military goals.

Covert Actions Can Be Used to Disrupt and Destroy Terrorist Organizations

Another tool that can be used to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations is covert action by the intelligence community.¹⁸ By executive order and statute, the CIA specifically is authorized to initiate such actions that are individually authorized by the President.¹⁹ Other federal agencies and departments also may be tasked to support covert action, with a separate presidential authorization. The Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991 allows the President to authorize covert actions if they are necessary to support the foreign policy objectives of the United States. According to the act, any new covert action must be justified according to this standard in a written finding that the President must submit to the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence, unless the President determines that it is necessary to limit access to the finding to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital U.S. interests. This finding must specify the government agencies participating in the action, can never be retroactive, and may not authorize any action that would violate the U.S. Constitution or U.S. statute. In extraordinary circumstances, the President may restrict access to findings to certain congressional officials, but such reasons for the restriction must be submitted to the committees. Finally, the President must notify the committees of any significant change to a previously approved covert action. The Congress has supported such actions in the past, urging the President to "use all necessary means, including covert action, to disrupt, dismantle and destroy infrastructure used by international terrorists, including overseas terrorist training facilities and safe havens."²⁰

¹⁸ Covert action is an operation designed to influence governments, events, organizations, or persons in support of foreign policy in a manner that is not necessarily attributable to the United States. It may include political, economic, propaganda, or paramilitary activities.

¹⁹ Executive Order 12333, Dec. 4, 1981 and P.L. 102-88, Aug. 14, 1991.

²⁰ P.L. 104-132 § 324, Apr. 24, 1996.

The Director of Central Intelligence, in discussing covert actions in an unclassified forum, provided several examples of CIA efforts to disrupt terrorist organizations.²¹ By 1993, the U.S. intelligence community already had recognized al Qaeda as a significant threat and began operations to reduce its capabilities. These efforts included hitting al Qaeda's infrastructure, working with foreign security services, disrupting and weakening Osama bin Laden's businesses and finances, and recruiting or exposing operatives. By 1999, these efforts had coalesced into a concerted offensive disruption campaign against the al Qaeda network. During the millennium threat period, CIA and FBI disruption operations identified 36 terrorist agents and successfully targeted 21. A parallel operation in East Asia led to the arrest or detention of 45 members of Hizballah. Later, during the Ramadan threat period (winter of 2000), terrorist cells planning attacks on U.S. and foreign military and civilian targets in the Persian Gulf were broken up and their equipment seized. This equipment included hundreds of pounds of explosives as well as anti-aircraft missiles. The operation also netted proof that some Islamic charitable organizations had been either hijacked or created to provide support to terrorists operating in other countries. Finally, in the spring and summer of 2001, the CIA helped break up a terrorist cell in Jordan, disrupted a plan to attack U.S. facilities in Yemen in concert with a foreign partner, and mounted a broad disruption effort that substantially delayed attacks, including one planned on the U.S. military in Europe.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

The Departments of Defense, Justice, and State and ATF provided technical comments on the matters covered throughout this chapter. Based upon these comments, we made revisions as appropriate. We also made revisions (primarily to the sections on law enforcement and terrorist financing) based upon the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the transfer of various agencies and functions from the Department of the Treasury into that department.

²¹ These unclassified examples are from the Written Statement for the Record of the Director of Central Intelligence before the Joint Inquiry Committee, Oct. 17, 2002.

Federal Efforts to Respond to Terrorist Incidents Overseas

The *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* includes an objective to ensure a fully integrated incident management capability. In addition, the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* calls for the United States to improve international cooperation in response to terrorist attacks. Further, the *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* calls for the United States to be prepared to manage the consequences of a WMD attack, including those that occur overseas. Federal efforts to respond to terrorist incidents overseas consist of actions taken before, during, and after a terrorist incident. Advance preparations include contingency plans and exercises in anticipation of terrorist attacks. Incident response is managed by the State Department through interagency task forces at agencies' headquarters, the ambassador at a U.S. embassy, and special emergency support teams. The FBI leads law enforcement aspects of crisis management to investigate incidents and obtain evidence for prosecution. The State Department, in conjunction with USAID and other agencies, manages the consequences of an attack—including those involving WMD agents. After a terrorist attack, federal agencies review the incident to determine whether security procedures were followed, establish accountability within the government, and provide lessons learned to prevent or mitigate future attacks. This chapter describes the relevant federal programs in place and is not an evaluation of their effectiveness.

Advance Preparations for Terrorist Incidents

In anticipation of terrorist incidents overseas, the federal government takes a number of preparations in advance. The State Department requires that overseas posts prepare and exercise emergency contingency plans. In addition, a number of other agencies participate in exercises—generally sponsored by DOD—to test their responses to an overseas terrorist incident.

Contingency Planning at Overseas Posts

As lead agency for interagency coordination of international terrorist incidents, the Department of State has prepared a variety of contingency arrangements and plans in the event of a terrorist attack. State's Emergency Planning Handbook serves as a consolidated source of guidance for overseas posts on how to plan for and deal with emergencies abroad. The handbook explains post mechanisms for crisis management, identifies post emergency management responsibilities, discusses emergency and crisis management mechanisms within State and with other U.S. government agencies; highlights the kinds of information the post will need to plan for specific emergencies; and provides

action-oriented checklists that posts may use to ensure rapid, clear, and complete responses in emergencies.

Every diplomatic post overseas is required to have an operative Emergency Action Plan designed to provide procedures on how to deal with foreseeable contingencies specific to the post. The post plan is written by members of the Emergency Action Committee, which translate guidance issued by State into a post-specific action plan for managing a crisis event. The ambassador establishes the Emergency Action Committee and designates personnel responsible for specific crisis-related functions. Every U.S. diplomatic post is required to have an Emergency Action Committee.

Exercises Practice Incident Response

PDD 39 requires key federal agencies to maintain well-exercised capabilities to combat terrorism. Exercises test and validate policies and procedures, test the effectiveness of response capabilities, increase the confidence and skill levels of personnel, and identify strengths and weaknesses in responses before they arise in actual incidents.

The State Department conducts internal exercises at overseas posts to test their Emergency Action Committees and Emergency Action Plans, and to generally prepare them for crisis management. The department conducts exercises designed to expose posts to issues of decision-making, contingency planning, implementation of plans and formulation, and interpretation and coordination of policy. These exercises may cover a wide range of contingencies related to terrorism, such as hostage barricades, terrorist threats, and bombings. The State Department has been running these at post exercises since 1983. In addition to these department-led exercises, the post-level Emergency Action Committee is to prepare, execute, and evaluate post-level crisis exercises. These exercises are designed to test individuals' understanding of their roles under all foreseeable crises. They seek to identify gaps or ambiguities in the plan or in department guidance.

The Department of State, in conjunction with other federal agencies, also coordinates an interagency exercise program to combat terrorism overseas.¹ Coordination of the exercises program is done through NSC's Counterterrorism Security Group and its Exercise and Readiness Subgroup. The interagency exercise program is designed to strengthen the U.S. government's overall ability to deal with terrorist attacks. On an annual basis, about four to six full-scale interagency overseas field exercises are conducted. The exercises involve the actual movement of response teams in a scenario that simulates a realistic overseas terrorist incident. In addition, tabletop exercises are held periodically to practice the coordination and management of a terrorism crisis without the expense of actually deploying special teams of people. The scenarios and agencies differ from exercise to exercise to develop and improve U.S. capabilities to deal with a variety of situations. Some exercises are conducted in overseas location with host government participation.

DOD sponsors many interagency exercises to prepare for terrorist incidents overseas. For example, every year DOD sponsors no-notice interagency field exercises. These exercises require regional commanders to execute their own response plans and test interagency interoperability. DOD also sponsors periodic senior-level interagency tabletop exercises. These exercises emphasized interagency coordination among agency officials for a crisis incident. DOD's exercises also have included the Departments of State, Health and Human Services, and Energy; the FBI; the Environmental Protection Agency; and USAID.

DOD also has exercises for its forces outside the interagency exercise program. Some require the regional commander to exercise all levels of their response capabilities—tabletop sessions with their staff, response forces, and integration with Special Operations Forces. In addition, DOD runs exercises related to evacuations of U.S. diplomatic personnel and

¹ For a more detailed description and evaluation of these exercises, see [GAO/NSIAD-99-135](#) and U.S. General Accounting Office, *Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Federal Counterterrorist Exercises*, [GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR](#) (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 1999). In this report, we reported that federal agencies had increased the number of counterterrorism exercises, but only a few included no-notice deployments of personnel and equipment. More than two-thirds of the exercises had WMD scenarios, while others had more likely scenarios involving conventional arms and explosives. Also, very few exercises dealt with the likely situation of both crisis and consequence management occurring simultaneously. Also, we found that State Department used DOD- and DOE-led exercises to practice its leadership role. These exercises were well developed and enhanced the preparedness of the federal government to respond to terrorist incidents overseas.

other Americans. Some of these may include some participation of other agencies. For example, since 1991, the State Department has participated in the U.S. Marine Corps' Special Operations Capable Exercise Program to help train Marine Expeditionary Units in Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.

Response to a Terrorist Incident Overseas

PDD 39 divided incident response into crisis management and consequence management. Crisis management includes efforts to stop a terrorist attack, respond to the attack itself, and arrest and prosecute terrorists. Consequence management includes efforts to provide medical treatment and emergency services and evacuate people from dangerous areas. When terrorist attacks occur without threat warning, crisis and consequence management will be concurrent activities. The presidential decision directive specified that the Department of State is the lead federal agency for interagency coordination of international terrorist incidents, to include both crisis and consequence management.² The State Department is to manage the incident through interagency task forces at headquarters and through the ambassador at the appropriate U.S. embassy. The Department of Justice, through the FBI, would lead the law enforcement aspects of crisis management, potentially deploying its response teams to investigate incidents and obtain evidence for prosecution purposes. As the lead agency for a terrorist incident, State also is responsible for marshaling the federal assets necessary to manage the consequences of an attack. A number of other federal agencies have response teams that can be deployed overseas to support the response. State, in conjunction with other agencies, has capabilities and contingency plans for WMD incidents—the kind of incident most likely to overwhelm host government capabilities.

Incident Management at Headquarters

In managing a crisis overseas, the Department of State coordinates operations through its 24-hour global Operations Center at the department in conjunction with the NSC. During a crisis, the department's Operations Center establishes a 24-hours task force to coordinate the flow of

² For international incidents, the distinction between crisis management and consequence management is less significant than for domestic incidents. In a domestic incident, the FBI leads crisis management and FEMA leads consequence management. As a domestic incident progresses, federal leadership in an incident can transfer from the FBI to FEMA. In an international incident, the State Department leads both crisis and consequent management, thus there is no transfer of command from one agency to another.

communication and instructions between the department, relevant agencies involved, overseas posts, and foreign governments. The task force would be chaired by the Coordinator for Counterterrorism and would include relevant State bureaus as well as other U.S. government agencies. The global watch is the initial point of contact for posts experiencing emergency crises overseas. The 24-hour global watch and crisis management support staff is maintained within the Operations Center.

Incident Management at Overseas Posts

In an overseas incident, the ambassador—working with the Emergency Action Committee—would act as the on-scene coordinator for the U.S. government. Interagency and State Department teams could provide assistance. For example, the Department of State can deploy an interagency Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) in coordination with the NSC to assist the host government and the ambassador at the post. The FEST primarily is an advisory team and serves as the single point-of-contact for the ambassador in coordinating all U.S. government support during a terrorist incident. The FEST will not enter the host country unless requested by the ambassador, with the host government's permission. Depending upon the type of incident overseas and the host governments' capabilities, the FEST can be tailored with expertise to manage the crisis. The FEST can tailor its team to include experts on managing specific types of WMD incidents, such as nuclear, biological, and chemical threats. For example, the FEST can provide (1) guidance on terrorist policy and incident management, (2) dedicated secure communications to support the U.S. embassy throughout the incident, and (3) special expertise and equipment not otherwise available, including a professional hostage negotiations adviser. According to the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, the Departments of State and Defense (and other relevant agencies) will ensure adequate staffing for the FEST. Procedures for deploying the FEST are outlined in the interagency International Guidelines, which were issued in January 2001.

State also maintains its own security response teams that can deploy in anticipation of a terrorist crisis. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security has Mobile Training Teams and Security Support Teams to respond to increased threats or critical security needs at posts. These teams can provide special training or assistance to plan or implement a draw down or evacuate post personnel. These teams are to provide supplemental support to regional security officers and stand ready for immediate deployments to any post worldwide.

Law Enforcement
Investigations for Overseas
Incidents

Crisis management has an important law enforcement function, including efforts to gather evidence, and arrest and prosecute terrorists. PDD 39 and PDD 62 affirmed the role of the Department of Justice, through the FBI, to coordinate the efforts of law enforcement agencies in preventing terrorist attacks and investigating those attacks when they occur in international waters or against U.S. persons and interests overseas.

According to the FBI, the bureau has a number of capabilities it can deploy overseas to coordinate large scale investigations. In cases when an incident occurs overseas, the FBI initially deploys its legal attachés to respond to the crime scene to communicate initial reports to the FBI's main deployment team. In the interim, an advance team will depart from Washington, D.C., and will include (1) a command element, (2) an investigative component, (3) logistics personnel, (3) Critical Incident Response Group, (4) physical security specialists to report on the continuing threat to responding FBI personnel, and (5) communicators. And, if needed and allowed by the host nation, the FBI will deploy a Rapid Deployment Team overseas to provide additional investigative support, including language specialists and expert forensics personnel from an FBI laboratory. The Rapid Deployment Teams were established following the 1998 bombings of the two U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania so that more capabilities and additional personnel could be deployed to crime scenes in nations that are receptive to joint investigations. Based on the needs at the incident site and with the concurrence of the host nation, the FBI will deploy additional agents to assist with the investigation. Figure 17 shows the damage inflicted to the *USS Cole* by a terrorist bomb explosion. The FBI deployed its response teams to Aden to investigate the bombing.

Figure 17: *USS Cole* Damaged by a Terrorist Bomb Explosion While Refueling at the Port of Aden, Yemen



Source: DOD.

As discussed in chapter 4, other federal agencies may assist the FBI in its terrorism investigations overseas. For example, the ATF has significant explosives investigation capability, which can support FBI investigations of bombings. When needed, the bureau can deploy its International Response Team to help gather evidence and identify the cause and origin of an explosion or fire.

Managing the Consequences of a Terrorist Incident

PDD 39 affirmed State as the lead agency for consequence management overseas, responsible for ensuring that the U.S. government is prepared to respond to a foreign incident. Consequence management predominantly is an emergency management function and includes efforts to provide medical treatment and emergency services, evacuate people from dangerous areas, and restore services. The responsibility for managing the consequences of a terrorist incident remains with the host nation, although

the United States may provide assistance under certain circumstances. If the ambassador determines that the host government is unable to cope with managing the incident without outside help, the United States can provide assistance if it is requested and it is in U.S. interests to provide it.

A foreign consequence management event is an incident that occurs abroad and involves chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear contamination. It is not limited to a terrorist incident; it also can be caused by a war, natural cause, or accident. In other words, a consequence management event is not defined by *how* the release of a WMD agent occurred, only *that* a release occurred. The terrorist bombings of the *USS Cole* and the U.S. embassies in East Africa, for example, were not foreign consequence management events. In addition, a foreign consequence management event must threaten to overwhelm existing host-nation response capabilities and prompt a host-nation request for immediate international assistance. According to the Department of State, the release of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear contaminants is required by international agreements to be reported, regardless of how the agent was released. Finally, consequence management of an incident is the sole responsibility of the host nation. The United States may be asked to provide assistance only.

Depending upon the type of incident overseas, the Department of State may also deploy a Consequence Management Support Team. The team is tailored to meet the specific emergency situation or condition in the host country and may deploy as an integral part of the NSC-directed FEST. The team leader normally would be from State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and would be responsible for coordinating consequence management activities and for keeping the ambassador informed about ongoing relief activities. The team leader serves as a primary liaison between the ambassador, FEST, and team's technical experts. The team also would coordinate U.S. government consequence management activities with the authorities of the host country. According to the Department of State, the Consequence Management Support Team deployed several times, most recently to the Persian Gulf, but had not yet deployed with the FEST.

Role of USAID

PDD 39 designated USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance as the lead agency for coordinating the U.S. government humanitarian relief and rehabilitation activities overseas for incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. The office facilitates a coordinated U.S. government response for an incident through the U.S. ambassador in support of the affected host

country. The office responds to these incidents at the request of the U.S. ambassador to the affected country and works through the host nation, U.S. government, international organizations, other donor governments, and nongovernmental organizations. In a crisis incident overseas, the State Coordinator for Counterterrorism may request an Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance representative to deploy as part of the FEST and assist in the development of a consequence management strategy for the humanitarian response. Also, if necessary, the office will provide guidance and liaison to the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs-led Consequence Management Support Team and work in conjunction with the team in the development of a humanitarian strategy.

The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance can respond to virtually any type of disaster abroad, including a terrorist incident. USAID is the focal point for U.S. government disaster relief and humanitarian assistance overseas. After a U.S. ambassador's disaster declaration, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance can respond with humanitarian relief items or by providing funds to the United Nations, international organizations, or local and international non-governmental organizations to perform humanitarian relief activities. The office can also provide damage and needs assessment specialists and a wide variety of disaster management consultants, should the post require them. The office has stockpiles of basic disaster relief items, such as tents, plastic sheeting, and blankets. These stockpiles are strategically located around the world and can be used to provide humanitarian assistance in the event of a terrorist incident, as is the procedure for any other humanitarian disaster that overwhelms local capacity. These stockpiles are used frequently, and due to changing stock levels, the office determines how to best support a specific disaster and when to release stockpile material. To help manage the humanitarian relief activities on the ground, the office can deploy its Disaster Assistance Response Team to carry out sustained response activities in the field and a Response Management Team in Washington, D.C., that is responsible for providing support to the Disaster Assistance Response Team and assisting with the information management and coordination of the event from an interagency operations center. The activities of these teams will vary depending upon the type, size, and complexity of the disaster.

Role of DOD Is Unique

If ongoing military operations permit, DOD supports the Department of State for crisis and consequence management functions overseas in the event of a terrorist incident. DOD is unique in that it has the greatest depth and breadth of worldwide response capabilities. Specific types of support include threat assessments, technical advice, operational support, tactical

support, and transportation. In the event of a terrorist incident overseas, DOD also provides force protection to the Department of State. DOD and State have memorandums of understanding on the coordination and implementation of plans for the protection of U.S. citizens abroad in emergencies, and on the protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens and designated aliens abroad. A pending or actual terrorist crisis may require the evacuation of U.S. government employees, as well as other Americans in the area. These evacuations—known as Noncombatant Evacuation Operations—may be necessary in the face of continued terrorist attacks or in an attack involving weapons of mass destruction.

DOD support for the Department of State for a foreign consequence management operation is not automatic and is either approved or disapproved by the Secretary of Defense. DOD assets, albeit unique and robust compared to those of other U.S. government agencies, are finite. According to DOD, ongoing military operations may preclude DOD support for a foreign consequence management operation.

Weapons of Mass Destruction


U.S. government efforts to provide consequence management overseas have focused on WMD incidents, which are the most likely to overwhelm host nation capabilities. In PDD 39, the President directed the State Department, in coordination with DOD and USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, to develop a plan to provide assistance to foreign populations that are victims of terrorist WMD attacks. In response, the State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs wrote draft guidelines for a consequence management response to an international WMD incident. The guidelines provide a framework of planning guidance for all types of deliberate or accidental chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incidents. They outline operational concepts for a U.S. response overseas and provide a foundation for operational plans and procedures. They also identify procedures by which the United States, partner nations, host nations, and international response agencies can most effectively unify and synchronize their response actions. The guidelines require that State (along with the Departments of Defense, Energy, and Health and Human Services and USAID) maintain the capability to respond rapidly to any incident when approved by the NSC. The response would be authorized subject to the concurrence of the ambassador and host government.

The guidelines also identify various federal response teams and detail their deployment and employment considerations. As discussed above, State maintains a standing Consequence Management Support Team that would manage the consequences of a WMD emergency overseas. The Consequence Management Support Team, through its USAID representative, would coordinate all U.S. government consequence management activities with the appropriate authorities of the host country, as well as the international organizations, private voluntary organizations, and non-government organizations that may be involved in the emergency. The same federal agencies that would provide consequence management in a domestic WMD incident could also respond overseas. While some of these agencies have a more domestic focus, they have unique capabilities that could be deployed overseas.³ Figure 18 shows federal agency response teams that could be called upon in an overseas WMD incident. Several of these response teams transferred into the Department of Homeland Security on March 1, 2003, from a variety of other departments.

³ For more details on these teams, see U.S. General Accounting Office, *Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination*, [GAO-01-14](#) (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2000). We reported that federal response teams do not duplicate one another; however, agencies lack a coherent framework to develop and evaluate budget requirements for teams. Because most response teams have multiple missions, federal agencies do not track the resources for their teams based on their roles in combating terrorism.

**Chapter 5
Federal Efforts to Respond to Terrorist
Incidents Overseas**

Figure 18: Federal Response Teams That Could Respond to a Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident Overseas



Evaluations in the Aftermath of a Terrorist Incident

After a terrorist attack, the federal government reviews the facts leading up to the incident. These reviews are done to determine whether security procedures were followed; to establish accountability within the government, if appropriate; and to provide lessons learned to prevent or mitigate future attacks.

Reviewing Terrorist Incidents Against Diplomatic Posts

The Secretary of State convenes an Accountability Review Board in cases involving acts of terrorism against U.S. diplomatic installations and personnel abroad that involve serious injury, loss of life, or significant destruction of property.⁴ These boards investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the damage to determine whether security measures systems and procedures were adequate and implemented. The boards also propose recommendations aimed at saving lives and improving security systems and procedures, including those aimed at improving crisis management. Each board consists of five members—four appointed by the Secretary of State and one appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence.

State convened two Accountability Review Boards following the August 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es-Salaam, Tanzania, to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the near simultaneous bombings. The boards examined a number of security measures and procedures including (1) whether the incidents were security related, (2) whether security systems and procedures were adequate and implemented properly, (3) the impact of intelligence and information availability, (4) whether any employee of the U.S. government or member of uniformed services breached his or her duty, and (5) whether any other facts or circumstances in these cases may be relevant to security management of U.S. missions abroad.

⁴ Required by the 1986 Omnibus Diplomatic and Anti-Terrorism Act (P.L. 99-399), Aug. 27, 1986.

Reviewing Incidents Against Military Targets

DOD also has convened ad hoc commissions to evaluate terrorist incidents aimed at its overseas military facilities. For example, following the June 1996 truck bombing of the al-Khobar Towers military housing facility near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, the Secretary of Defense directed a task force to assess facts and circumstances surrounding the attack, including the security policies, infrastructures, and systems.⁵ The Secretary also asked the team to recommend measures to minimize casualties and damage from such attacks in the future. The task force's report made a number of recommendations to improve security at military facilities overseas.

Past Incidents Studied to Provide Lessons Learned

In addition to reviewing individual incidents, the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security analyses numerous past incidents and related exercises to provide more general lessons learned. Since 1987, the bureau has analyzed various threats and incidents, including terrorist attacks, and published its results. This annual publication, done with the assistance of other federal agencies, is called *Political Violence Against Americans*. It focuses on major incidents based upon, among other things, their lethality, property damage, and use of unusual tactics or weapons. The publication is designed to provide a comprehensive picture of political violence against U.S. interests. In addition, the bureau conducts an annual longer-term analysis covering a number of years that provide lessons learned in crisis management.⁶ These promote awareness of basic crisis management principles.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

The Departments of Defense and State and USAID provided technical comments on the matters covered throughout this chapter. Based upon these comments, we made revisions, as appropriate. We also made revisions (primarily to the figure on WMD response teams) based upon the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the transfer of various response teams and functions into that department.

⁵ The Downing Assessment Task Force, also known as the Downing Commission because it was headed by General Wayne Downing, issued its report on Aug. 30, 1996.

⁶ For example, see U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, *Lessons Learned in Crisis Management 1983-1994*, Feb. 1995, and *Terrorist Tactics and Security Practices: Lessons Learned and Issues in Global Crime*, 1994.

Matrix of Department of Defense Programs and Activities to Combat Terrorism Overseas

The Department of Defense (DOD) supports the Department of State, which is the lead federal agency for coordinating U.S. government efforts to combat terrorism overseas. Within the department, the military services as well as multiple offices and agencies manage various programs and activities to combat terrorism abroad. DOD also works with other U.S. government agencies, foreign government military organizations and agencies, and international organizations in carrying out these programs and activities. Some of these activities directed at combating terrorism overseas (e.g., coordination) may actually occur in the United States.

Appendix I identifies and describes the following:

- the strategic framework of DOD’s efforts to combat terrorism overseas;
- DOD’s programs and activities to detect and prevent terrorism overseas;
- DOD’s programs and activities to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations overseas; and
- DOD’s programs and activities to respond to terrorist incidents overseas.

Table 10: Department of Defense Programs and Activities to Combat Terrorism Overseas

| Department of Defense office or military service | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|--|---|---|
| STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK | | |
| Agency head’s role in combating terrorism | | |
| Office of the Secretary of Defense | <p>The Secretary of Defense is the principal defense policy advisor to the President.</p> <p>The Office of the Secretary of Defense is the principal staff element of the Secretary of Defense in the exercise of policy development, planning, resource management, fiscal, and program evaluation responsibilities.</p> | <p>The Secretary of Defense is responsible for supporting (1) the lead federal agency—the Department of State—in responding to a terrorist incident overseas, (2) the Department of Justice (through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)) for crisis management of a domestic terrorist incident, and (3) the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for consequence management of a domestic terrorist incident.</p> |

**Appendix I
Matrix of Department of Defense Programs
and Activities to Combat Terrorism Overseas**

(Continued From Previous Page)

| Department of Defense office or military service | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|---|--|--|
| Special agency official or office in charge of combating terrorism | | |
| Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict | Special operations and low-intensity conflict | Serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for the broad spectrum of combating terrorism policy and support. |
| Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense | Civil support | Serves as the focal point for the coordination of DOD efforts in preparation for requests from civilian agencies on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) consequence management. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense provides civilian oversight for the Joint Task Force for Civil Support. |
| Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff | Principal military advisor to the President, Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council | Serves as the principal advisor and focal point to the Secretary of Defense for all DOD antiterrorism issues. |
| Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics | Acquisition, technology, and logistics | Responsible for the development, application, testing, and evaluation of new and commercial-off-the-shelf technology for combating terrorism. |
| Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence | Command, control, communications, and intelligence | Provides policy guidance and oversight for information, information technology and physical security programs, security and investigative matters, counterintelligence, DOD foreign counterintelligence, intelligence, and information operations programs. |
| Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs | Reserve affairs | Provides policy direction and oversight of the military departments' Reserve Component readiness/training policies and funding for Reserve Component domestic and overseas combating terrorism preparedness. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs also exercises policy direction and oversight for the Domestic Preparedness Program. |
| Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) | Health affairs | Supports the federal interagency process with medical research and development programs and interfaces with the National Disaster Medical System. |
| Service Secretaries (Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force) | Military services | Establish and provide resources for combating terrorism programs, incorporating existing physical security, base defense, and law enforcement initiatives, which address terrorism as a potential threat to DOD elements and personnel, to include the Reserve Components. |
| Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense | Domestic Preparedness Program and Consequence Management Program Integration Office | Develops and implements the Domestic Preparedness Program's "first responder" training and exercise missions and manages the Consequence Management Program Integration Office. |
| Commanders of the combatant commands | Command policies and programs | Establish command policies and programs for the protection of all forces (military, civilian, and family members) and facilities in their area of responsibility to include assigned personnel, those under operational control, and individuals that fall under memorandums of understanding. |
| Joint Task Force for Civilian Support | Support to civilian agencies | Responsible, through the Commander, Joint Forces Command, for marshalling the capabilities of the Armed Forces in support of civilian agencies responding to domestic consequence management contingencies involving weapons of mass destruction. |

**Appendix I
Matrix of Department of Defense Programs
and Activities to Combat Terrorism Overseas**

(Continued From Previous Page)

| Department of Defense office or military service | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|--|--|---|
| Directors of defense agencies and field activities | Providing resources for combating terrorism programs | The directors establish and provide resources for combating terrorism programs, incorporating existing physical security programs with antiterrorism awareness, which address terrorism as a potential threat to DOD elements and personnel. |
| Agency plans or strategies to combat terrorism | | |
| Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff | <i>National Military Strategy of the United States of America</i> (Sept. 1997) | Sets the strategic direction for all aspects of the Armed Forces for 3-5 years. This document includes objectives, force structure, capabilities, and the strategic environment. The most recent strategy (issued in September 1997) notes the rising danger of asymmetric threats, including terrorism. It stresses the need for the military to adapt its doctrine, training, and equipment to ensure a rapid and effective joint and interagency response to these threats. |
| Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff | <i>National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism</i> (Oct. 19, 2002) | Provides the strategic framework to guide the conduct of the global war on terrorism by the U.S. Armed Forces. This classified plan discusses the strategic environment and outlines national guidance to (1) defeat terrorists and terrorist organizations; (2) deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists; (3) diminish the underlying conditions that permit terrorism; and (4) defend the United States, its citizens, and its interests at home. This plan also provides defense guidance, including the national defense strategy and concept for the global war on terrorism. It lays out the strategic approach for the war on terrorism, identifies strategic military objectives, and provides the strategic military approach to carry out the war on terrorism over an extended period of time. The plan addresses planning for and establishing administrative and logistics systems and command and control for each contingency. Rather than prescribing specific battle plans or future operations, the plan provides combatant commanders with principles for planning their military operations as well as specific tasks and initiatives to combat terrorism overseas. Also, it provides a framework from which regional commanders, the military services, and other agencies can formulate their own individual action plans. In response to this plan, individual regional commands have drafted their own classified campaign plans to combat terrorism overseas. |
| Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict | Combating Terrorism Program | Includes all actions—(1) antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts), (2) counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), (3) terrorism consequence management (preparation for and response to the consequences of a terrorist incident/event), and (4) intelligence support (collection and dissemination of terrorism-related information as the first line of defense)—taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum, to include terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction and/or high explosives. |

**Appendix I
Matrix of Department of Defense Programs
and Activities to Combat Terrorism Overseas**

(Continued From Previous Page)

| Department of Defense office or military service | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|--|---|---|
| Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict | DOD Directive 2000.12, <i>DOD Antiterrorism/ Force Protection Program</i> (Apr. 13, 1999) | <p>This directive (1) changes the name of the DOD Combating Terrorism Program to the DOD Antiterrorism/Force Protection Program, (2) updates DOD policies and assigns responsibilities for implementing the program, (3) authorizes publication of DOD standards and related guidance, (4) establishes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal advisor and focal point for antiterrorism/force protection issues, and (5) defines antiterrorism/force protection responsibilities of the military departments, commanders of the combatant commands, and defense agencies.</p> <p>This directive also establishes DOD policy, among other things, (1) to protect DOD elements and personnel from terrorist acts, (2) that antiterrorism/force protection is the commander's responsibility, (3) to maintain a Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund to respond to emergent, unforeseen requirements, and (4) to comply with the "No Double Standard" policy on dissemination of specific, credible terrorist threat information that has not or cannot be countered (i.e., it is the policy of the U.S. government that official Americans cannot benefit from receipt of information that might equally apply to the public, but is not available to the public).</p> <p>Also, this directive established the Antiterrorism Coordination Committee and its Senior Steering Group to reduce vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks. Both act as a clearinghouse for policy recommendations and facilitate coordinating antiterrorism/force protection actions and taskings.</p> |
| Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict | DOD Instruction 2000.16, <i>DOD Antiterrorism Standards</i> (June 14, 2001) | <p>This instruction (1) reissues DOD Instruction 2000.16, <i>DOD Antiterrorism Standards</i> (Jan. 8, 2001), (2) updates policy implementation, (3) assigns responsibilities, (4) prescribes procedures under DOD Directive 2000.12, <i>DOD Antiterrorism/Force Protection Program</i>, for protection of personnel and assets from acts of terrorism, and (5) assists DOD components in implementing this instruction and DOD Directive 2000.12. It references DOD Instruction 5210.84, <i>Security of DOD Personnel at U.S. Missions Abroad</i>, which provides guidance for the security of DOD personnel at overseas locations. It also refers to specific guidance for DOD elements and personnel under the responsibility of the Department of State in the <i>Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of State and the Department of Defense on Overseas Security Support</i>. Finally, it refers to specific common criteria and minimum construction standards to mitigate antiterrorism vulnerabilities and terrorist threats.</p> <p>This instruction reaffirms DOD's policy to (1) protect DOD personnel, their families, installations, facilities, information, and other material resources from terrorist acts; (2) establish primary standards for antiterrorism efforts; and (3) provide commanders at all levels with the authority to enforce security measures and the responsibility for protecting persons and property under their control.</p> |

**Appendix I
Matrix of Department of Defense Programs
and Activities to Combat Terrorism Overseas**

(Continued From Previous Page)

| Department of Defense office or military service | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|--|---|--|
| Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict | DOD Instruction 2000.14, <i>DOD Combating Terrorism Program Procedures</i> (June 15, 1994) | This instruction establishes policy, assigns responsibility, and prescribes procedures under DOD Directive 0-2000.12, <i>DOD Combating Terrorism Program</i> , for implementation and use in the DOD Antiterrorism Program. This instruction establishes DOD policy to (1) protect DOD personnel and their families, facilities, and other material resources from terrorist acts and, in the event of a terrorist attack, to respond with properly trained, organized, and equipped personnel (including local law enforcement or host nation assets) to terminate the incident or reduce the effects of the attack; (2) provide guidance on the conduct of DOD personnel and their families if seized by terrorists; (3) ensure actions to combat terrorism outside of the United States will comply with applicable Status of Forces Agreements, other international agreements, and memoranda of understanding, as well as coordinate with the U.S. embassy and host nation; and (4) coordinate defense attaché and security assistance organization antiterrorism programs overseas with the chief of mission at the U.S. embassy and comply with Department of State standards. |
| Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics | Unified Facilities Criteria 4-010-01, <i>DOD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings</i> (July 31, 2002) | Sets standards to minimize the possibility of mass casualties in buildings or portions of buildings owned, leased, privatized, or otherwise occupied, managed, or controlled by DOD. The standards provide a level of protection against terrorist attacks for all inhabited DOD buildings where no known threat of terrorist activity currently exists. |
| Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics | Unified Facilities Criteria 4-010-10, <i>DOD Minimum Antiterrorism Standoff Distances for Buildings</i> (July 31, 2002) | Identifies the minimum standoff distances and separation for new and existing buildings and expeditionary and temporary structures. |
| Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy | DOD Directive 5200.8, <i>Security of DOD Installations and Resources</i> (Apr. 25, 1991) | Outlines the requirements of DOD's physical security program. Commanders at the unit, activity, installation, and major command levels use the standards outlined in this and other guidance documents to determine their physical security equipment requirements. |
| Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy | DOD Regulation 5200.8-R, <i>Physical Security Program</i> (May 13, 1991) | This regulation, in accordance with DOD Directive 5200.8, <i>Security of DOD Installations and Resources</i> , prescribes DOD policies and minimum standards for the physical protection of DOD personnel, installations, operations, and assets. The physical security program involves both active and passive measures designed to prevent unauthorized access to personnel, equipment, installations, material, and documents, and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. The regulation provides policy and guidance on installation access and circulation control, security of weapons systems and platforms, protection of bulk petroleum products, security of communications systems, and security of material. |

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| Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) | DOD Directive 3150.3, <i>Nuclear Force Security and Survivability (S2)</i> (Aug. 16, 1994) | This directive (1) reissues DOD Directive 3150.3, <i>Survivability and Security (S2) of Nonstrategic Nuclear Forces (NSNF)</i> , to add strategic nuclear weapons and forces to the existing DOD Nonstrategic Nuclear Forces Program and update policy and responsibilities for nuclear force survivability and security; (2) describes the DOD program to develop concepts, procedures, equipment, facilities, and training programs that ensure the survivability and security of nuclear weapons systems throughout the threat spectrum, including terrorism; and (3) requires the military services to maintain nuclear force survivability and security programs. |
| Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence | DOD Directive C-5210.41-M, <i>Nuclear Weapon Security Manual (U)</i> (Apr. 1994) | This manual is a classified document. |
| Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence | DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, <i>Information Security Program</i> (Jan. 14, 1997) | This regulation implements Executive Order 12958, <i>Classified National Security Information</i> , within DOD and establishes the DOD Information Security Program to promote proper and effective classification, protection, and downgrading of official information requiring protection and the declassification of information no longer requiring such protection. |
| Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict | DOD Worldwide Combating Terrorism Conference | Serves as a continuing forum to communicate guidance, exchange ideas, and generate policy recommendations that will reduce DOD vulnerability to terrorism. The 2001 conference established seven working groups (Intelligence, Operations, Policy, Research and Development, Consequence Management, Resources, and Interagency Community). |
| Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence | DOD Directive 5240.2, <i>DOD Counterintelligence</i> (May 22, 1997) | This directive, among other things, (1) integrates DOD counterintelligence capabilities and coordination procedures into a national counterintelligence structure under the direction of the National Security Council (NSC) under Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-24, <i>U.S. Counterintelligence Effectiveness</i> ; (2) establishes and maintains a comprehensive, integrated, and coordinated counterintelligence effort within DOD; (3) assigns responsibilities for the direction, management, coordination, and control of DOD counterintelligence activities; and (4) establishes the Defense Counterintelligence Board. This directive establishes DOD policy that, among other things, counterintelligence activities be undertaken to detect, identify, assess, exploit, and counter or neutralize the intelligence collection efforts, other intelligence activities, sabotage, terrorist activities, and assassination efforts of foreign powers, organizations, or persons directed against DOD, its personnel, information, materiel, facilities, and activities. |

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| Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence | DOD Instruction 5240.10, <i>DOD Counterintelligence Support to Unified and Specified Commands</i> (Apr. 8, 1992) | <p>This instruction (1) establishes policies, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures to ensure that the counterintelligence requirements of the combatant commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands are met under the parameters established by law, Executive order, and DOD directives and (2) provides general principles for the command relationships and support requirements between the counterintelligence organizations of the military departments and the Unified and Specified Commands during peacetime, exercises, contingencies, and through the spectrum of armed conflict.</p> <p>This instruction establishes DOD policy that, among other things, the counterintelligence mission is provided to all DOD components with the necessary counterintelligence support (the functions of collection and production, operations, and investigations) to gather information and conduct activities to protect against espionage and other intelligence activities, sabotage, international terrorist activities, or assassinations conducted for, or on behalf of, foreign powers, organizations, or persons.</p> |
| DETECT AND PREVENT TERRORISM ABROAD | | |
| Antiterrorism/force protection | | |
| Local commander | Antiterrorism/Force Protection (defensive measures) | Defensive measures (to include force protection) used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. Combatant commanders, military services, and defense agencies, working in close cooperation with the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies, will use all authorized means to deter, detect, defend, respond to, and mitigate terrorist attacks. These antiterrorist measures include increased security and vigilance for key personnel, installations, and equipment. Established Antiterrorism Coordination Committee and its Senior Steering Group. |
| Antiterrorism/force protection categories | | |
| Local commander | Physical security equipment | Any item, device, or system that is used primarily for the protection of assets, personnel, information, or facilities, to include alarms, sensors, protective lighting and their control systems and the assessment of the reliability, accuracy, timeliness, and effectiveness of those systems, such as (1) exterior surveillance and/or intrusion detection systems (wide-area security and surveillance systems); (2) lighting systems; (3) access controls and alarm systems; (4) residential security equipment; (5) equipment for executive protection, to include added doors, increased ballistic protection at offices and residences, personal body armor and protective equipment, and armored vehicles; and (6) detection devices (under vehicle surveillance systems) and canine systems. |

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| Local commander | Physical security site improvements | Facility improvements using operations and maintenance or military construction funding, new construction, or new construction design, whose purpose is to protect DOD assets, personnel, or information from terrorist threats. The improvements may include walls, fences, barricades, or other fabricated or natural impediments used to restrict, limit, delay, or deny entry into a DOD installation or facility. Improvements may include (1) primary facility modifications/features that include special structural improvements to walls, doors, windows, and ceilings; interior barriers; and any land acquisition for standoff distances; (2) supporting facility modification/features, such as site improvements in fencing, perimeter/area lighting, blast mitigation barriers, vehicle barriers, and special landscaping; (3) safe havens; (4) evacuation facilities; and (5) surveillance platforms. |
| Local commander | Physical security management and planning | Includes all personnel who manage physical security programs, resources, and assets, such as headquarters staff and headquarters staff elements performing such functions. |
| Local commander | Security forces/technicians | Personnel and operating costs associated with protective forces whose primary or supporting mission is to safeguard assets, personnel, and information. Security forces/technicians include personnel engaged in such activities as (1) dedicated response forces and security forces; (2) locksmiths; (3) perimeter, installation, or facility access control; (3) inspection and maintenance of barriers and security system components; (4) antiterrorism training for security forces; and (5) antiterrorism awareness programs and training. |
| Local commander | Law enforcement | Personnel and operating costs associated with any law enforcement activity, such as (1) protective service details, including advance work; (2) response forces; and (3) military police. |
| Local commander | Security and investigative matters | Includes DOD criminal investigative resources, conduct of vulnerability assessments (periodic high-level reviews and physical security assessments), security and intelligence activities, and any cross-discipline security functions, such as (1) terrorism investigations; (2) executive antiterrorism training; (3) surveillance and counter-surveillance teams; (4) protective service details, including advance work; (5) route surveys; (6) antiterrorism awareness programs and training; and (7) Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments. |
| Local commander | Research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) | Includes any RDT&E resources expended in the area of antiterrorism and force protection to provide new and enhanced capabilities to combat terrorism. The two primary programs are the Counterterror Technical Support Program and the Physical Security Equipment Development Program. |

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| Technical Support Working Group | Counterterror Technical Support Program | A fast-track research and development program for advanced technologies and state-of-the-art prototype equipment that addresses both interagency and international combating terrorism requirements. The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG)—the research and development arm of the National Security Council’s (NSC) Interagency Working Group on Counterterrorism— provides resources and program management. The Department of State provides policy oversight to TSWG, which is co-chaired by the Departments of Defense and Energy and the FBI. TSWG consists of over 50 federal government organizations that identify operational needs and coordinate research and development for combating terrorism. Typical TSWG projects include (1) stand-off explosive detection of terrorist devices, (2) large vehicle bomb countermeasures (detect and disable), (3) entry point screening, (4) structural blast mitigation, (5) national infrastructure assurance and protection, and (6) advanced sensor detection and defeat. |
| Physical Security Equipment Action Group | Physical Security Equipment Development Program | A research and development program designed to support the rapid acquisition and quick field integration of state-of-the-art security technology to deployed forces, in particular commercial off-the-shelf equipment. The Physical Security Equipment Action Group funds and provides resources to the program. The group consists of representatives from the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Joint Staff, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The program evaluates, develops, and integrates equipment and systems related to (1) intrusion detection, (2) entry control, (3) access control, (4) waterside security, (5) delay/denial, (6) interior and exterior robotics, and (7) explosive detection systems. |
| Vulnerability assessments | | |
| Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff | Integrated Vulnerability Assessment Team | Ensures that commanders at all levels have an accurate awareness of the existing vulnerabilities and readiness of antiterrorism programs within their command. The assessments assist commanders in implementing risk management practices when allocating resources in a uniform and complementary fashion that are adaptable to changing terrorist threats. Approximately 96 assessments are planned for fiscal year 2003. |
| Antiterrorism activities | | |
| Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense | Chemical, biological, and radiological monitoring, detection, and identification | Based on an assessment by the Strategic Deterrence Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment, a monitoring, detection, and identification package was developed for protection of the Pentagon and other strategic U.S. sites within the United States and in forward threat areas, including Northeast Asia and Southwest Asia. Equipment is to detect chemical and radiological agents. Systems include the Automatic Chemical Agent Detection Alarm and the Personnel and Vehicle Entry Radiological Detectors. According to DOD, detection capability for biological agents currently is limited to “detect to treat.” Emphasis is placed on monitoring, sampling, confirmatory analysis, and medical surveillance through such systems as Portal Shield, Joint Bio Point Detection System, Portable Bio Aerosol Sampler, Dry Filter Units, and Polymerase Chain Reaction Identification Devices. |

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| Military security assistance | | |
| Defense Security Cooperation Agency | Foreign Military Financing | The Department of State provides grants to foreign governments for the acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and military training, which enable key U.S. allies and friends to improve their defense capabilities. It promotes U.S. national security interests by contributing to global and regional stability, strengthening military support for democratically elected governments, and containing transnational threats, including terrorism. This security assistance is a key tool in supporting U.S. coalition partners in combating terrorism overseas. It reduces the likelihood of conflict and war that could threaten the United States. The Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs sets policy for the program, while the Defense Security Cooperation Agency manages the program on a day-to-day basis. Security assistance offices within U.S. embassies abroad play a key role in managing the program within recipient countries. |
| Defense Security Cooperation Agency | Foreign Military Sales | A U.S. security assistance program used to sell defense articles or services to authorized governments. The program is used to maintain close ties with neighbors and key allies, maintain stable and secure regional partners, and ensure regional stability. This program helps countries, such as the new members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), upgrade their military capabilities and achieve greater interoperability with U.S. and other alliance forces. Also, it helps strengthen the security and defense capabilities of recipient countries, whose support is crucial to combating terrorism. These countries include, for example, the new U.S. Central Asian and Caucasus partners in the war on terrorism. The Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs approves foreign military sales, while security assistance offices at U.S. embassies abroad promote the sale of U.S.-produced defense items and carry out most of the tasks associated with foreign military sale cases. An implementing agency within DOD—the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, or the Defense Logistics Agency, depending upon the type of item being considered—negotiates the terms of the sale. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency buys the items from U.S. manufacturers for the recipient country. |

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| Defense Security and Cooperation Agency | International Military Education and Training | <p>Serves as a low-cost security assistance program intended to foster the development of more professional militaries around the world through training and education of foreign military and civilian personnel. The program provides training on a grant basis to some 10,000 students annually from 133 allied and friendly countries. Formal instruction is provided through more than 2,000 courses taught at about 150 U.S. military schools and installations. The program advances U.S. interests in furthering regional stability by enhancing military alliances, building coalitions, and strengthening efforts to combat terrorism abroad.</p> <p>DOD plans and manages the program through the Defense Security and Cooperation Agency, which works with the various military departments and unified military commands to implement the program. Coordination of the program overseas is handled by DOD's security assistance offices located in U.S. embassies around the world, which field requests from their host countries to participate in the program.</p> <p>Enhancing military professionalism is intended to make militaries more efficient, effective, and interoperable with U.S. and NATO forces as well as regional coalitions. Also, it fosters a better understanding of democratic values, including civilian rule of the military, belief in the rule of law, and respect for internationally recognized civil and human rights. Finally, the program's development of professional and personal military-to-military relationships provide U.S. access and influence to a critical sector of society that can help support U.S. access to foreign military bases and facilities—a critical component in efforts to combat terrorism overseas.</p> |
| Embassy security | | |
| U.S. Marine Corps | Protection of information at U.S. diplomatic missions overseas | U.S. Marine security guards control access to 130 U.S. embassies and missions worldwide. |

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| Military training (with foreign governments) | | |
| U.S. Special Operations Command | Joint Combined Exchange and Training | Provides U.S. special operations forces opportunities to develop and maintain their skills and to train foreign militaries and other groups to combat terrorism overseas, among other missions. U.S. special operations forces are tasked with nine principal missions to (1) train and otherwise assist foreign militaries to combat insurgency and other threats to stability (foreign internal defense); (2) train, advise, and otherwise assist local forces for guerilla warfare (unconventional warfare); (3) protect against and prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (counterproliferation); (4) use offensive and defensive measures to prevent or resolve terrorist incidents (combating terrorism); (5) obtain information concerning capabilities and activities of actual or potential adversaries (special reconnaissance); (6) inflict damage on an adversary or recover personnel or material (direct action); (7) target an adversary's information system while defending U.S. systems (information operations); (8) establish, maintain, or strengthen relations between U.S. and allied governments to facilitate military operations (civil affairs); and (9) influence attitudes of foreign audiences (psychological operations). Specific Joint Combined Exchange and Training operations and activities are classified. |
| U.S. European Command | Republic of Georgia Train and Equip Program | Enhances the Republic of Georgia's counter-terrorism capabilities. The program's goal is to build strong effective staff organizations capable of creating and sustaining standardized operating procedures, training plans, operational plans, and a property accounting system. The curriculum consists of performance-oriented training and exercises. The time-phased training will be conducted by U.S. Special Forces to build upon the military-to-military relationship developed between the two countries. The program will consist of command center staff training for members of the Georgian Ministry of Defense as well as training for units of the Land Forces Command. Border guards and other Georgian security agencies will be included to ensure interoperability among Georgia's security forces. Almost 200 Georgians have completed the staff-training phase and about 500 are completing the light-infantry tactics training. Military equipment to be provided will include uniform items, small arms and ammunition, communications gear, training gear, medical gear, fuel, and construction material. |
| U.S. Pacific Command | U.S. Special Operations Forces Training for the Philippines | Develops a counter-terrorist capability within the Philippines armed forces through the Foreign Military Financing program. The U.S. Pacific Command deployed a Joint Task Force advisory team to the southern Philippines to begin preparations. It is composed of U.S. Special Operations personnel and provides training at the command level at headquarters through the company level in the field. The training emphasizes joint operations and tactics to help eliminate terrorist threats. Training includes counterterrorism campaign planning, intelligence fusion, psychological operations, civil-military operations, and field tactics. U.S. Special Operations personnel completed training with 25 field companies and provided equipment that included aircraft, Coast Guard cutters, and helicopters. |

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| U.S. Special Operations Command | U.S. Special Operations Forces Training for Yemen | U.S. Special Forces trained approximately 200 Yemeni military forces in counterterrorism tactics. |
| Border security | | |
| U.S. Air Force | Combat Air Patrols | Provides protection of U.S. air space. |
| DISRUPT AND DESTROY TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS ABROAD | | |
| Counterterrorism | | |
| Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict | Counterterrorism (offensive measures) | Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. The Nunn-Cohen Amendment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 established the (1) U.S. Special Operations Command, (2) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, (3) coordinating board for low-intensity conflict within the NSC, and (4) created a new Major Force Program for special operations forces resources. Also, the act included counterterrorism activity for special operations. |
| Counterterrorism categories | | |
| U.S. Special Operations Command | Special Operations Forces | U.S. Special Operations Forces conduct offensive counterterrorism measures and operations directed at preventing, deterring, and responding to terrorist acts against U.S. interests worldwide. U.S. Special Operations Forces receive the most advanced and diverse training available and exercise continually, often with foreign counterparts, to maintain proficiency and develop new skills. |
| Regional Special Operations Commands | Special Operations Forces and Geographic Combatant Commands | Regional Special Operations Commands are subordinate unified commands assigned to the Geographic Combatant Commands. The Regional Special Operations Commands plan, prepare, and conduct special operations, including counterterrorism, within the Geographic Combatant Commander's area of responsibility. The Regional Special Operations Commands also provide a trained, operationally ready, and deployable Joint Special Operations Task Force headquarters that can respond rapidly to terrorism using forces assigned permanently or temporarily to the Geographic Combatant Commander. |
| U.S. Army Special Operations Command | Special Operations Forces | The command is responsible to the U.S. Special Operations Command for the readiness of Special Forces, Rangers, special operations aviation units, psychological operations units, and civil affairs personnel for deployment worldwide in support of unified combatant commanders. The command is headquartered at Fort Bragg, N.C., and has both active and U.S. Army Reserve special operations forces. |
| Naval Special Warfare Command | Special Operations Forces | The command is responsible to the U.S. Special Operations Command for the readiness of active and reserve naval special warfare forces. The command deploys SEAL, Special Boat, SEAL Delivery Vehicle teams, and other Naval Special Warfare Detachments worldwide and administratively supports forward-based naval special warfare units. The command is located at the Coronado Naval Amphibious Base in Coronado, Calif. |

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| U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command | Special Operations Forces | The command is responsible to the U.S. Special Operations Command for the readiness of Air Force active, reserve, and National Guard special operations forces for deployment worldwide. The command consists of three special operations wings, two special operations groups, and one special tactics group. The command is located at Hurlburt Field, Fla. |
| U.S. Air Force | Transportation support to the Foreign Emergency Support Team | Provides transport capability to the Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) through use of two C-32B (Boeing 757-200) aircraft. The U.S. Air Force supports worldwide operations to select U.S. government agencies on the recommendation of the Deputies Committee and approval by the Secretary of Defense. |
| Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict | RDT&E | Like the antiterrorism component, the counterterrorism component has two RDT&E programs as well: (1) Counterterror Technical Support Program (renamed the Combating Terrorism Technology Support Program) and (2) Counterproliferation Support to Special Operations Forces program. Program management is provided by the Combating Terrorism Technology Support Office, which is staffed through the U.S. Navy. |
| Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict | Counterterror Technical Support Program (renamed the Combating Terrorism Technology Support Program) | Originally established to help fund research and development activities of the TSWG, this program was renamed and enlarged to fund its international component and to better focus DOD's research and development efforts on counterterrorism, which includes countermeasures for weapons of mass destruction. In addition to the research and development initiatives discussed above, this program also encompasses counterterrorism requirements. Projects include (1) improved audio and video surveillance of terrorists; (2) advanced night vision capabilities; (3) through-wall-imaging capability for use by tactical forces; (4) small, hand-held gamma and neutron radiation detector; and (5) diagnostic equipment for improvised devices. |
| Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict | Counterproliferation Support to Special Operations Forces | A specialized RDT&E program to develop and demonstrate special operations forces unique devices. These projects enable Special Operations Forces and special mission units to detect, disable, and neutralize weapons of mass destruction and their associated facilities under the direction of a geographic combatant commander in support of a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Concept Plan. These devices are employed by Special Operations Forces units with direct application to the nation's efforts to counter the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Efforts include (1) defeat of hard and deeply buried targets; (2) explosive ordnance disposal (biological, chemical, and nuclear); and (3) maritime efforts to prevent the spread of WMD technology or systems using the sea lanes. |

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| Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency | Counterterrorism research and development | Conducts research and development on ways to counter asymmetric threats and an unconventional, yet highly lethal attack by a loosely organized group of transnational terrorists or other factions seeking to influence U.S. policy. Such attacks occur using equipment that has a smaller mass, exhibit fewer observables, and are more lethal than a conventional military attack. Consequently, such evidence is more difficult to detect, correlate, and understand. Specific needs include the capability to (1) automatically recognize and identify humans at a distance; (2) detect an enemy agent conducting surveillance of a U.S. target; (3) automatically discover, extract, and link together sparse evidence of a group's intentions and activities from vast amounts of classified and unclassified information and sources that lead to the discovery of additional relationships and patterns of activity that correspond to unusual events, potential threats, or planned attacks; (4) more precisely model the beliefs and organizational behavior of small terrorist groups to better simulate and wargame such adversaries; and (5) provide more effective collaborative reasoning and decision aids to improve the speed and effectiveness of teams of analysts and decision makers in ever-changing situations. |

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| Military operations | | |
| U.S. Central Command | Operation Enduring Freedom | <p>Since the coordinated terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, the U.S. Central Command has been conducting Operation Enduring Freedom with its coalition partners, which now number 51 other countries, to disrupt and destroy global terrorist organizations. The initial focus of Operation Enduring Freedom was on Afghanistan to destroy the base of the al Qaeda terrorist organization and replace the Taliban regime that supported al Qaeda. These objectives largely have been met in Afghanistan.</p> <p>Combined Joint Task Force 180 (see below), which took direct control of operations in Afghanistan in June 2002, continues this mission. It also is conducting operations to ensure that Afghanistan will not again be a safe haven for terrorists and to facilitate the reintroduction of Afghanistan into the community of nations.</p> <p>The U.S. Central Command's operations in Afghanistan have been complemented by cooperative efforts with Pakistan to eliminate the al Qaeda organization in Pakistan. According to the U.S. Central Command, these efforts have led to the capture of hundreds of al Qaeda and Taliban members, including very senior members of the al Qaeda organization. This cooperation continues to degrade the al Qaeda organization and is a critical component in its ultimate defeat.</p> <p>Operation Enduring Freedom also involves numerous other activities, including bilateral cooperation with most of the countries within the U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility, Maritime Interception Operations to intercept al Qaeda movement and communications, and maintaining a quick strike capability against fleeing al Qaeda targets within the command's area of responsibility. Maritime Interception Operations involve a high-level of coalition cooperation. The entire Maritime Interdiction Operation in the Horn of Africa region is a coalition operation under Combined Task Force 150.</p> |

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| U.S. Central Command | Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa | <p>To detect, disrupt, and defeat terrorists who pose an imminent threat to coalition partners in the Horn of Africa region (Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Yemen). In November 2002, Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa was established to carry out Operation Enduring Freedom in that portion of the U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility that previously was conducted directly by the command. Particular attention is focused on U.S. cooperation with Yemen.</p> <p>The Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa acts on credible intelligence to attack, destroy, and/or capture terrorists and their support networks in the region. It also works with host nations to deny the reemergence of terrorist cells and activities by supporting international agencies working to enhance long-term stability for the region. Currently, the headquarters element has about 400 members representing each military service, civilian personnel, and coalition force representatives afloat aboard the <i>USS Mount Whitney</i>, which operates in the Gulf of Aden. An additional 900 personnel are stationed ashore at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. The headquarters element will transition ashore to Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, in the spring of 2003.</p> |
| U.S. Central Command | Combined Joint Task Force 150 | <p>Constitutes a flotilla of coalition warships from France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States in searching for terrorist operatives and contraband while patrolling the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean areas around the Horn of Africa. Combined Joint Task Force 150 is based in Djibouti.</p> |
| U.S. Central Command | Combined Joint Task Force 180 | <p>Serves as the forward headquarters of the primary U.S. force in Afghanistan. Combined Joint Task Force 180 is located at Bagram Airfield outside of Kabul, Afghanistan. (See Operation Enduring Freedom above.)</p> |
| U.S. Central Command | Operation Iraqi Freedom | <p>Ongoing operations in Iraq are designed to eliminate potential sources of weapons of mass destruction for international terrorists as well as eliminating the regime—a long-time supporter of terrorism. As part of Operation Iraqi Freedom, a group directly related to al Qaeda in northern Iraq already has been largely eliminated. The full impact of successful operations in Iraq in the war on terrorism will not be known until the operation is over. However, as a result of the operations, the U.S. Central Command expects to significantly enhance its ability to defeat international terrorism.</p> |
| Intelligence on terrorist groups and threat assessments | | |
| Defense Intelligence Agency | Intelligence Support to Combating Terrorism (first line of defense) | <p>Collection, analysis, and dissemination of all-source intelligence on terrorist groups and activities intended to protect, deter, preempt, or counter the terrorist threat to U.S. personnel, forces, critical infrastructures, and interests.</p> |

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| Department of Defense office or military service | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|---|---------------------------------------|---|
| DOD | National Foreign Intelligence Program | <p>This program has two mission areas: (1) Support to Military Operations, Force Protection, and (2) Support to Law Enforcement, Counterterrorism.</p> <p>The Support to Military Operations, Force Protection, mission area includes the personnel and funding for intelligence activities associated with protecting lives and property, reducing risks, and expanding opportunities for operation success through early detection and definition of threats to U.S. forces. Its focus is on gathering information on terrorist activities aimed at U.S. personnel, forces, critical infrastructures, and interests.</p> <p>The Support to Law Enforcement, Counterterrorism, mission area includes the personnel and funding for intelligence activities associated with gathering information on any foreign terrorist activity aimed at U.S. personnel or interests, in support of a well-coordinated use of diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, and military assets.</p> |
| U.S. Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Counterintelligence/ Human Intelligence Division, and U.S. Marine Corps, Headquarters, Intelligence Department, Director of Intelligence | Tactical Counterintelligence | <p>Defense intelligence support to combating terrorism includes personnel and funding associated with U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps tactical counterintelligence resources, U.S. Army security and intelligence activities, Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities, and Joint Military Intelligence Program activities.</p> <p>Counterintelligence activities include, for example, (1) terrorism investigations, (2) surveillance and countersurveillance teams, (3) counterterrorism analysis and production, (4) force protection source operations, (5) threat assessments, (6) counterterrorism collection, (7) route surveys, and (8) intelligence staff support to deployed task forces.</p> |
| U.S. Army | Counterintelligence activities | <p>Conducts comprehensive and coordinated counterintelligence activities worldwide to detect, identify, assess, counter, neutralize, and/or exploit threat intelligence and international terrorist collection efforts and activities. The U.S. Army's counterintelligence mission is to support force protection and antiterrorism efforts. It supports the command's responsibility to protect personnel, equipment, and facilities against foreign intelligence services and international terrorist threats. The U.S. Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence Division has management oversight of the U.S. Army's program.</p> |
| U.S. Marine Corps | Counterintelligence activities | <p>Collects, produces, and disseminates counterintelligence information and conducts activities to protect commands against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, assassinations, or terrorist activities conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments, foreign organizations, or foreigners. Counterterrorism support is provided to the service, joint combatant, and operational commanders through counterintelligence investigations; operations; collections and reporting; and analysis, production, and dissemination. The Director of Intelligence, Intelligence Department, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., provides program and policy guidance.</p> |

**Appendix I
Matrix of Department of Defense Programs
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| Department of Defense office or military service | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|---|--|--|
| RESPOND TO TERRORIST INCIDENTS ABROAD | | |
| Terrorism consequence management^a | | |
| U.S. Army, Office of the Director, Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization; Military Support Division, Operation Directorate; and the U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md. | Terrorism Consequence Management Response | Terrorism consequence management is an emerging component in DOD's efforts to combat terrorism. DOD focuses its terrorism consequence management activities in two areas: (1) installation preparedness and (2) support to the lead federal agency. Under this component, DOD brings to the interagency arena a wide variety of unique warfighting technical and operational support capabilities that could be used to provide assistance to state and local authorities, if requested by the lead federal agency. DOD's response assets are found in both its Active and Reserve Components. DOD's role is to support the lead federal agency: the Department of State for terrorist incidents overseas, the Department of Justice (through the FBI) for crisis management of domestic terrorist incidents, and FEMA for consequence management of domestic terrorist incidents. DOD's focus is to provide assistance using its unique resources and capabilities, which are not found in the other federal agencies. These include the ability to mass mobilize and provide extensive logistical support. Because DOD's assets are structured, manned, and equipped for a warfighting mission, the Secretary of Defense must first determine that DOD's special capabilities and expertise are both necessary and critical to respond to an act of terrorism and that the provision of such assistance will not adversely the military preparedness of the U.S. Armed Forces. |
| U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Va. | | In foreign consequence management, DOD cooperates closely with the Department of State. Regional combatant commands are conducting exercises of their functional consequence management plans, both in combined capacity with partner nations in their areas of responsibility and with interagency counterparts. |
| U.S. Navy, Combatant Commander, Atlantic Command, Norfolk, Va. | | |
| U.S. Air Force, Readiness and Installation Support Division, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics, and Force Protection Division, Office of the Air Force Surgeon General | | |
| Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, Services' Surgeon General's Offices, and local commanders | | |
| Terrorism consequence management-installation preparedness | | |
| Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict | Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, <i>Preparedness of U.S. Military Installations and Facilities Worldwide Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Attack</i> (Sept. 5, 2002) | Establishes the DOD policy to protect personnel on military installations and DOD-owned or leased facilities against chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive attacks; to respond to these attacks with trained and equipped emergency responders; and to ensure installations are able to continue critical operations during an attack and to resume essential operations after an attack. The memorandum also promulgated the actions necessary to accomplish this policy in terms of (1) installation preparedness, (2) personnel protection, (3) concept of operations, (4) standards and guidelines, and (5) budget and programs. |
| Military services | Installation First Response Preparedness | This was a new initiative in fiscal year 2001. The military services were directed to develop requirements, train personnel, and procure equipment for first response preparedness at DOD installations and facilities. |

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| Department of Defense office or military service | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|--|---|--|
| U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans | Installation Preparedness Program (planned) | Conducts a complete assessment of U.S. Army installations WMD preparedness. Also included are training, exercise, and equipment packages to prepare installation first responders for WMD incidents on and off post. The Director of Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization is the U.S. Army's Action Agent for this program. |
| U.S. Navy | First Responder Preparedness | Provides planning, training, medical equipment, and non-medical equipment for personnel who will respond to chemical, biological, and radiological incidents. |
| U.S. Air Force | Disaster Response Force | Provides planning, training, exercise, and response equipment for the Disaster Response Force to respond to a WMD incident. First responders include security forces, fire department, medical personnel, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel. The U.S. Air Force program includes conducting and evaluating training and exercises for base and headquarters personnel, support for formal and supplemental training courses, developing and evaluating response plans, and other associated activities required to implement the WMD Threat Response Program. Only 11 U.S. Air Force installations will be funded over 7 years (beginning in fiscal year 2001). |
| Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency | RDT&E | Like the antiterrorism and counterterrorism components, the consequence management component has its own RDT&E programs: (1) Counterterror Technical Support Program and (2) Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Biological Warfare Defense Program. |
| Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency | Counterterror Technical Support Program | Research and development initiatives to support all facets of combating terrorism. Projects that specifically address consequence management requirements include (1) protective clothing, (2) forensics equipment for on-scene analysis, (3) responder databases, and (4) urban modeling. |
| Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency | Biological Warfare Defense Program | Applied research program to develop and demonstrate technologies to thwart the use of biological warfare agents (including bacterial, viral, and bio-engineered organisms and toxins) by both military and terrorist opponents (against U.S. assets at both home and abroad). DARPA's primary strategy is to create technologies applicable to broad classes of pathogens and toxins. The program is focused on supporting the warfighter; however, many of the technologies also have applicability as a supporting element of DOD's combating terrorism activities. Projects include (1) real-time environmental sensing; (2) external protection (including novel methods of protection, air and water purification, and decontamination); (3) consequence management tools; (4) advanced medical diagnostics for the most virulent pathogens and their molecular mechanisms; (5) pre- and post-exposure medical countermeasures; and (6) pathogen genomic sequencing. The program collaborates with pharmaceutical, biotechnology, government, and academic centers of excellence. The program also is closely coordinated with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Food and Drug Administration, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Department of Energy (DOE), and the intelligence community. |

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| Department of Defense office or military service | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|--|---|--|
| DOD terrorism consequence management support to lead federal agency and response assets | | |
| DOD | Joint Task Force for Civil Support | Plans and carries out military assistance to civil authorities for consequence management of WMD incidents. It supports the lead federal agency, establishes command and control of designated DOD forces, and provides military assistance to civil authorities to save lives, prevent human suffering, and provide temporary critical life support. It consists of a headquarters element with an operational focus, but has no assigned forces. The Joint Task Force for Civil Support could deploy overseas 60 dedicated personnel, who are located at Fort Monroe, Va. |
| U.S. Army | Chemical-Biological Rapid Response Team | Coordinates and integrates DOD's technical assistance for the detection, neutralization, containment, dismantlement, and disposal of weapons of mass destruction containing chemical, biological, or related materials. Assists first responders in dealing with consequence management. Operational control is exercised by the (1) supported commander, (2) Joint Special Operations Task Force, (3) Joint Task Force for Civil Support, or (4) Response Task Force. The Chemical-Biological Rapid Response Team could deploy overseas 14 dedicated personnel. They are located at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Md. |
| Defense Threat Reduction Agency | Defense Nuclear Advisory Team | Provides unique nuclear-related technical assistance to the Response Task Force or the lead federal agency. Teams consist of health physicists, radiation physicians, legal advisors, and other related professionals. The team can deploy within 4 hours. |
| Defense Threat Reduction Agency | Consequence Management Advisory Team | Assists other DOD organizations in matters involving weapons of mass destruction and radiological accidents and incidents. The agency maintains a deployable Consequence Management Advisory Team that provides technical, consequence management planning, weapons effects modeling, general counsel, public affairs, and health physics expertise to augment commanders' staffs. The team also has a reach-back capability to more robust technical resources within the agency. The team is a formal part of the Joint Forces Command Joint Technical Augmentation Cell for continental United States consequence management response. It also augments the Joint task Force-Civil Support for U.S.-based response. Because team members are assigned additional full-time duties within the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, no dedicated manpower is associated with this team. |
| U.S. Air Force | Radiological Assessment Team | A rapidly deployable team with the personnel and equipment necessary to respond to accidents or incidents involving radioactive materials. The team can provide in-depth technical assistance in identifying the immediate health risks associated with radiological threats. The team is located at Brooks Air Force Base, Tex., and could deploy within 72 hours. |

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| Department of Defense office or military service | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|---|---|--|
| U.S. Army | 52 nd Ordnance Group (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) | Provides military explosive ordnance disposal/bomb squad units to defeat or mitigate the hazards from conventional, nuclear, or chemical military munitions and weapons of mass destruction. Three Explosive Ordnance Disposal companies have unique counter booby trap equipment and are trained to operate specialized equipment provided by the Department of Energy (DOE) for diagnostics and render-safe/mitigation of a nuclear device. The 52 nd Ordnance Group's three companies could be deployed overseas. They are located in San Diego, Calif.; San Antonio, Tex.; and at Fort Belvoir, Va. |
| U.S. Army | Technical Escort Unit | Provides worldwide, no-notice capability to provide advice, detection, field sampling, field verification, assessment, monitoring, render-safe, decontamination, recovery, packaging, transportation, and escort of weaponized and non-weaponized chemical and biological materials, devices, or hazards. The Technical Escort Unit has approximately 190 military and civilian personnel that could be deployed overseas. They are located at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Md.; Fort Belvoir, Va.; Pine Bluff Arsenal, Ark.; and Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah. |
| U.S. Army | Edgewood Chemical and Biological Forensic Analytical Center Modular On-site Laboratory | Provides on-site laboratory capability to analyze chemical safety materials, foreign chemical warfare agents, and other hazardous industrial chemicals. The laboratory consists of a series of transportable modules that contain analytical instruments and their own electrical generators. Five personnel accompany the laboratory, including chemists and sampling technicians. The on-site laboratory can be deployed within 4 hours. |
| U.S. Army | U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense, Medical Chemical Biological Advisory Team | Provides the primary source of medical information dealing with the management of chemical warfare agent casualties for the federal government. The team assists the WMD incident commander by identifying the medical implications to military and/or civilian operations and advising on the initial and long-term management of chemical casualties at the incident site. The team also supervises the collection of biological samples (bodily fluids) for subsequent verification of chemical agent exposure that can be used to facilitate confirmation, diagnosis, and treatment. |

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| Department of Defense office or military service | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|---|--|--|
| U.S. Army | U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases | Conducts research to develop strategies, products, procedures, and training programs for medical defense against biological warfare threats and infectious diseases. Also, it develops vaccines, drugs, diagnostic tests, and medical management procedures to protect military personnel against biological attack or endemic infectious diseases. It provides medical and scientific experts and technical guidance to commanders on the prevention and treatment of hazardous diseases and management of biological casualties. It serves as DOD's reference center for the identification of biological agents. Primary capabilities are technical expertise, extensive laboratory facilities, and the Aeromedical Isolation Team, which is a rapid response unit that can deploy to any area of the world to transport and provide patient care under high containment of contagious and dangerous diseases. The team has a limited capability, equipment, and staff and is not geared to handle mass casualties. No personnel are assigned directly to the Aeromedical Isolation Team. When deployed, the team would consist of two elements, each capable of transporting only one patient. The institute is located at Fort Detrick, Md. |
| U.S. Army | Special Medical Augmentation Response Team—Nuclear/Biological/Chemical | Provides technical advice in the detection, neutralization, and containment of chemical, biological, or radiological hazardous materials in a terrorist event. The Special Medical Augmentation Response Team—Nuclear/Biological/Chemical has six teams, located at various sites, which could be deployed overseas. Six members per team have these collateral duties. |
| U.S. Army | Special Medical Augmentation Response Team—Aero-Medical Isolation | Provides a rapid response evacuation unit to any area of the world to transport and provide patient care under conditions of biological containment to service members or U.S. civilians exposed to certain contagious and highly dangerous diseases. The Special Medical Augmentation Response Team—Aero-Medical Isolation includes approximately 20 personnel who have this collateral duty that could be deployed overseas. They are stationed at Fort Detrick, Md. |
| U.S. Army | Radiological Advisory Medical Team | Assists and furnishes radiological health hazard guidance to the on-scene commander, U.S. Army Response Task Force (discussed below), or local medical authorities at an incident site and the installation medical authority. The Radiological Advisory Medical Team has 8-10 personnel who have these collateral duties and could be deployed overseas. They are located at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, D.C. |
| U.S. Army and U.S. Navy | Radiological Control Teams | Provides radiological monitoring support and advice to the U.S. Army Response Task Force (discussed above). The teams are capable of deploying within several hours. The teams are located at Fort Monmouth, N.J., and Norfolk, Va. |

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| Department of Defense office or military service | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|---|--|--|
| U.S. Marine Corps | Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force | A highly trained, rapid response force that is capable of providing consequence management for terrorist-initiated chemical and biological attacks to mitigate the effects of multiple/mass casualty incidents. It also provides force protection in the event of a terrorist incident, domestically or overseas. Capabilities include threat identification, casualty extraction, personnel decontamination, and medical triage/treatment/ stabilization. The force also maintains an information "reach-back" capability to chemical/biological subject matter and disaster response experts for consultation. The Marine Corps Systems Command at Quantico, Va., manages the program. The force is a national asset that operationally falls under the Joint Forces Command. The Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force has 373 dedicated personnel who could be deployed overseas. They are located at Indian Head, Md. |
| U.S. Navy | U.S. Navy Environmental and Preventive Medical Unit, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Environmental Defense Response Team | Provides doctors, industrial hygienists, environmental health officers, microbiologists, preventive medical technicians, and other related professional who could be deployed in response to an incident. Teams remain on alert for a rapid response and can advise the Chemical/Biological Rapid Response Team and local public health authorities and augment other Chemical/Biological Rapid Response Team medical assets. |
| U.S. Navy | U.S. Navy Medical Research Institute | Provides a transportable biological field laboratory that is capable of rapid identification of biological warfare agent. With a team of two operators, the laboratory can be ready to deploy within 4 hours. |
| Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) | Response Teams | Provide short-duration medical augmentation to federal and defense agencies responding to disaster, humanitarian, and emergency incidents. Response Teams are composed of medical experts who can be deployed to assist in emerging medical situations. Such situations include medical operational threat assessment and risk communication; surveillance; investigation; intervention and control of occupational environmental illnesses, injuries, and disease; advance diagnostic testing; and health hazard assessments and surveillance detection and identification of chemical, biological, radiological, or environmental agents. Management oversight is provided by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), each military service's Office of the Surgeon General, and military installation commanders, who act as host to tenant commands. |

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| Department of Defense office or military service | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|---|---------------------------------------|---|
| Military assistance to other countries for international special security events | | |
| Regional military commanders | International special security events | Provides a military response, if needed, to a terrorist incident overseas involving weapons of mass destruction or to evacuate Americans during an international special security event, such as a presidential summit meeting or the Olympic Games. For example, DOD representatives participate in the Olympic Security Advisory Team at the U.S. Embassy in Athens to coordinate federal assistance to the Government of Greece in preparation for the 2004 Olympic Summer games in Athens. The team provides advice to the Greek Ministry of Public Order on security issues at the strategic level and advice on technical support issues at the operational level. Issues include intelligence, planning, training and exercises, technology, command and control coordination, and Olympic venue security. |

Source: DOD.

Notes: Although DOD's terrorism consequence management response assets are geared primarily to respond to a domestic terrorist incident—if requested by the Department of Justice through the FBI or by FEMA, these same assets could be deployed overseas to respond to an international terrorist incident—if requested by the Department of State.

For a detailed description of military service-specific categories of equipment, activities financed, program management, planned activities, funding, and personnel levels, see Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Congressional Report: DOD Combating Terrorism Activities*, January 14, 2000, and *Combating Terrorism Activities, Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Estimates*, March 2002.

^aThe response to a terrorist incident involves managing the immediate crisis as well as its consequences. "Crisis management" involves efforts to prevent and deter a terrorist attack, protect public health and safety, arrest terrorists, and gather evidence for criminal prosecution. "Consequences management" involves efforts to provide medical treatment and emergency services, evacuate people from dangerous areas, and restore government services.

Matrix of Department of Homeland Security Programs and Activities to Combat Terrorism Overseas

The Department of Homeland Security is primarily focused on combating terrorism within the United States. However, for selected overseas activities, it supports the Department of State, which is the lead federal agency for coordinating U.S. government efforts to combat terrorism overseas. Within the department, multiple bureaus, offices, and agencies manage various programs and activities to combat terrorism abroad. Department of Homeland Security also works with other U.S. government agencies, foreign government organizations and agencies, and international organizations in carrying out these programs and activities. Some of these activities directed at combating terrorism overseas (e.g., coordination) may actually occur in the United States.

Appendix II identifies and describes the following:

- the strategic framework of Homeland Security’s efforts to combat terrorism overseas;
- Homeland Security’s programs and activities to detect and prevent terrorism overseas;
- Homeland Security’s programs and activities to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations overseas; and
- Homeland Security’s programs and activities to respond to terrorist incidents overseas.

Table 11: Department of Homeland Security Programs and Activities to Combat Terrorism Overseas

| Department of Homeland Security office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|--|----------------------------------|--|
| STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK | | |
| Special agency official or office in charge of counterterrorism | | |
| Secretary of Homeland Security | Serves as head of the department | Responsible for preventing terrorist attacks within the United States and reducing vulnerability to those attacks. The Secretary also is responsible for minimizing damage and assisting in the recovery from terrorist attacks that occur within the United States. |

**Appendix II
Matrix of Department of Homeland Security
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| Department of Homeland Security office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|--|---|--|
| Agency plans or strategies to combat terrorism | | |
| Department of Homeland Security | <i>National Strategy for Homeland Security</i> (September 2002) | The strategy addresses the threat of terrorism within the United States, but does mention various initiatives related to combating terrorism overseas. These initiatives include (1) negotiating new international standards for travel documents, (2) improving security for international shipping containers, (3) enhancing cooperation with foreign law enforcement agencies, (4) expanding specialized training and assistance to allies, and (5) increasing the security of transnational infrastructure. The strategy stresses the importance of expanding international cooperation in research and development and enhancing the coordination of incident response. Finally, the strategy recommends reviewing current international treaties and law to determine where improvements could be made. |
| DETECT AND PREVENT TERRORISM ABROAD | | |
| Critical infrastructure protection | | |
| Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate | Implementation of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 | <p>Helps implement Department of Homeland Security critical infrastructure protection responsibilities in (1) developing a comprehensive national plan for securing the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States; (2) recommending measures to protect the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States in coordination with other federal agencies and in cooperation with state and local government agencies and authorities, the private sector, and other entities; and (3) disseminating, as appropriate, information analyzed by the department both within the department and to other federal agencies, state and local government agencies, and private sector entities to assist in the deterrence, prevention, preemption of, or response to terrorist attacks.</p> <p>The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created the directorate within the new department and transferred to it the functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities of several existing organizations with critical infrastructure protection responsibilities, including the National Infrastructure Protection Center (other than the Computer Investigations and Operations Section) and the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office.</p> |
| Law enforcement training (with foreign governments) | | |
| Federal Law Enforcement Training Center | Glynn County ("Glynco"), Georgia, facility | Serves as an interagency law enforcement training organization for federal law enforcement agencies. The center provides facilities, equipment, and support services for conducting training of federal law enforcement personnel. It also has a reimbursable program to accommodate the training requirements of various federal agencies, state, local, and foreign law enforcement personnel on a space-available basis. As a result of increased domestic interest in training, it does not have the capacity to train foreign nationals at its Glynn County ("Glynco"), Georgia, facility. |

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| Department of Homeland Security office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|---|---|--|
| Federal Law Enforcement Training Center | International Programs Division | <p>Under agreement with the Department of State, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center's (FLETC) International Programs Division provides specialized training focused in three areas: (1) the U.S. government's Law and Democracy Program, with a focus on white-collar crime, illegal narcotics, and building democratic institutions; (2) Antiterrorism Assistance program, with a focus on combating international terrorism; and (3) International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEA), with a focus on law enforcement skills.</p> <p>Recently, the division's focus has been on ILEA training, including leading assessments to identify training needed by participating countries and teaching the rule of law. The division also has focused on bilateral programs with specific countries. FLETC instructors teach needed skills/techniques in, for example, money laundering and investigations. Presently, FLETC is finalizing a course on the Financing of Terrorism, which will soon be offered to foreign nationals. Since its inception in 1994, FLETC has helped train 1,900 law enforcement officials representing 34 countries.</p> |
| Bureau of Customs and Border Protection | Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program | Provides basic and specialized border control training and equipment to customs and law enforcement agencies with a focus on Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine. This program is funded through the Department of Defense. |
| Bureau of Customs and Border Protection | Project Amber | Provides basic border control training and advanced courses on cross-country tracking, targeting of high-risk shipments, and proper utilization of Department of State-provided x-ray vans to detect nuclear materials. |
| Bureau of Customs and Border Protection | Service Counter-proliferation Program | Cooperative effort with the Department of Defense that provides border control training and equipment, including large consignments of high- and low-tech interdiction and detection tools and advanced investigative techniques. |
| Bureau of Customs and Border Protection | Export Control/Border Security Program | Provides on-site technical assistance by 13 customs advisors in 9 offices who cover 25 countries. Focuses on delivery of training, technical assistance, and equipment; coordinates the delivery of assistance from other federal agencies; and fosters host country interagency cooperation and cross-border and regional cooperation. |
| Border Security | | |
| Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement | Customs Air and Marine Interdiction | Responsible for protecting the nation's borders and the American people from smuggling of narcotics and other contraband terrorist activity with an integrated air and marine interdiction force. |

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| Department of Homeland Security office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
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| Bureau of Customs and Border Protection | Operation Shield America | Cooperative initiative with American companies to help prevent international terrorist groups from obtaining sensitive U.S. technology, weapons, and equipment. Operating internationally, customs attaché offices have begun reaching out to foreign law enforcement counterparts to help raise awareness among businesses in their countries. Operation Shield America tracks inquiries and orders for technology to be shipped outside the United States; ensures export specialists know export controls and follow appropriate screening and licensing; ensures employees understand certain technologies are restricted from export; and investigates suspicious customers attempting to obtain sensitive technologies. |
| Bureau of Customs and Border Protection | Advanced Passenger Information System | Provides mandatory information on arriving airline passengers that is submitted to the immigration inspectors for review. Failure to transmit arriving passenger data could result in penalties ranging from monetary fines for the pilot up to the revocation of landing rights for the airline. |
| Bureau of Customs and Border Protection | Automated Manifest System | Provides extensive data to customs inspectors on the shipping industry, its patterns, and all who participate. Customs officials report that they receive information on 98 percent of all containers entering the United States. |
| Bureau of Customs and Border Protection | Trade Partnership Against Terrorism | Cooperative agreement to work with the trade community to improve border security. Based on a model designed to prevent smuggling of illegal drugs, the initiative was proposed to improve security along the entire supply chain, from the factory floor, to foreign vendors, to U.S. ports of entry. |
| Bureau of Customs and Border Protection | Smart Border Declaration | Cooperative agreement between the United States and Canada whereby customs officials in both countries target and pre-screen cargo headed to each country. The agreement focuses on four areas: (1) secure flow of people, (2) goods, (3) investments in technology to expedite trade and minimize threats, and (4) coordination and information sharing to defend common borders. A similar agreement is being negotiated between the United States and Mexico. |
| Bureau of Customs and Border Protection | NEXUS Program | Allows low-risk Canadian and U.S. citizens to travel across the U.S.-Canadian border with minimal customs or immigration processing by either country. This is a pilot program. |
| Bureau of Customs and Border Protection | Container Security Initiative | Protects the use of ocean-going sea containers in international trade. Initially the focus will be on the largest ports of entry and focus on pre-screening of cargo prior to shipment to the United States. The initiative is expected to (1) establish criteria for identifying high-risk containers, (2) pre-screen containers before they are shipped to the United States, (3) use technology to pre-screen high-risk containers, and (4) develop and use smart/secure containers. |
| U.S. Coast Guard | Maritime border controls between ports of entry | The U.S. Coast Guard participates in efforts to detect terrorists and their materials outside maritime ports of entry. The U.S. Coast Guard has a National Vessel Movement Center that identifies and tracks "high interest" vessels. Decisions on appropriate actions to be taken with respect to such vessels, such as whether to board, escort, or deny entry are based upon established criteria and procedures. |

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| Department of Homeland Security office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|---|---|---|
| U.S. Border Patrol | Land border controls between ports of entry | The U.S. Border Patrol has the mission to detect and apprehend illegal aliens and smugglers between U.S. ports of entry. The Border Patrol is responsible for patrolling about 6,000 miles of Mexican and Canadian international land borders and 2,000 miles of coastal waters surrounding the Florida Peninsula and the island of Puerto Rico. Agents patrol these borders utilizing various vehicles, including aircraft, marine vessels, all-terrain vehicles, and horse units. |
| DISRUPT AND DESTROY TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS ABROAD | | |
| Law enforcement Investigations | | |
| Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement | Customs Attachés | Work closely with host government customs services and other law enforcement agencies to coordinate law enforcement actions domestically and internationally against terrorists cells and networks. |
| Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement | Operation Global Shield | Immigration Control Officers deployed at transit points around the world to serve as the front line of defense against those individuals who might well cause harm to the security of the United States. The control officers work closely with host country government agencies to gather law enforcement intelligence and information on migrant smuggling and trafficking organizations. |
| Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement | Operation Oasis | Operation is directed at identifying, detecting, and halting the illegal exportation of unreported currency to terrorist activity. |
| Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement | Customs investigations | Responsible for investigating a range of issues including terrorist financing, export enforcement, money laundering, smuggling, fraud, and cyber crimes. |
| U.S. Secret Service | Investigates terrorists' threats | Investigates terrorists' threats against officials under its protective mission overseas, including the President and Vice President. |
| Identifying, freezing, and seizing terrorist organizations' assets | | |
| Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement | Operation Green Quest | Multi-agency financial enforcement initiative intended to augment existing counter-terrorist efforts by bringing the full scope of the government's financial expertise to bear against systems, individuals, and organizations that serve as sources of terrorist funding. Operation Green Quest is aimed at identifying, freezing, and seizing the accounts and assets of terrorist organizations that pose a threat to the United States and other nations. |
| U.S. Secret Service | Investigates financial crimes | Responsible for enforcing laws related to securities of the United States and financial crimes. Its efforts to combat international terrorism rest primarily on the investigation of counterfeiting of currency and securities. |

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| Department of Homeland Security office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|--|---|---|
| Military Operations | | |
| U.S. Coast Guard | Maritime interception operations | Conducts maritime interception operations. In its role as a military service, the U.S. Coast Guard supports regional military commands, which have requested and received U.S. Coast Guard cutters to conduct such operations. To accomplish its missions to combat terrorism, both domestic and overseas, the U.S. Coast Guard is developing a <i>U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security</i> . This strategy puts a premium on identifying and intercepting threats well before they reach U.S. shores by conducting layered, multi-agency, maritime security operations that include surveillance and reconnaissance, tracking, and interception. |
| Protection of Americans abroad | | |
| U.S. Secret Service | Protection of senior officials overseas | Responsible for the security of the President and Vice President, as well as other designated individuals under its protective mission overseas. |
| RESPOND TO TERRORIST INCIDENTS ABROAD | | |
| Crisis and consequence management domestic and abroad^a | | |
| Department of Homeland Security | Emergency Response Teams | Includes a number of response teams with unique capabilities that are primarily used in a domestic capacity, but could respond overseas to a terrorist incident. |

Source: Department of Homeland Security.

^aThe response to a terrorist incident involves managing the immediate crisis as well as its consequences. "Crisis management" involves efforts to prevent and deter a terrorist attack, protect public health and safety, arrest terrorists, and gather evidence for criminal prosecution. "Consequences management" involves efforts to provide medical treatment and emergency services, evacuate people from dangerous areas, and restore government services.

Matrix of Department of Justice Programs and Activities to Combat Terrorism Overseas

The Department of Justice supports the Department of State, which is the lead federal agency for coordinating U.S. government efforts to combat terrorism overseas. Within the department, multiple bureaus and offices manage various programs and activities to combat terrorism abroad. The Department of Justice also works with other U.S. government agencies, foreign government law enforcement organizations and agencies, and multinational organizations in carrying out these programs and activities. For many of these activities, there may be no clear boundary between combating terrorism domestically and overseas. Some of these activities directed at combating terrorism overseas (e.g., coordination) may actually occur in the United States.

Appendix III identifies and describes the following:

- the strategic framework of Justice’s efforts to combat terrorism overseas;
- Justice’s programs and activities to detect and prevent terrorism overseas;
- Justice’s programs and activities to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations overseas; and
- Justice’s programs and activities to respond to terrorist incidents overseas.

Table 12: Department of Justice Programs and Activities to Combat Terrorism Overseas

| Department of Justice office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|--|---|--|
| STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK | | |
| Agency head’s role in counterterrorism | | |
| Justice, Attorney General | Head of the Department of Justice and chief law enforcement officer of the federal government | Represents the United States in legal matters related to terrorism and gives advice and opinions to the President and to the heads of the executive departments of the government. Also, the Attorney General, through the Department of Justice, has the lead federal role for crisis management in a domestic terrorist incident and a support role to the Department of State during a terrorist incident overseas. |
| Special agency official or office in charge of counterterrorism | | |

**Appendix III
Matrix of Department of Justice Programs
and Activities to Combat Terrorism Overseas**

(Continued From Previous Page)

| Department of Justice office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|---|---|---|
| Justice, Deputy Assistant Attorney General | Criminal Division, Counterterrorism Section | This section is responsible for the design, implementation, and support of law enforcement efforts to combat international terrorism, including legislative initiatives and policies. This includes investigating and prosecuting suspected terrorists for acts of terrorism against U.S. interests worldwide. |
| Justice, U.S. Attorney District Offices | Anti-Terrorism Task Forces | Integrates and coordinates the anti-terrorism activities in each of the judicial districts within the United States. The task forces are comprised of federal prosecutors from the U.S. Attorneys Office, members of federal law enforcement agencies, as well as the primary state and local enforcement officials in each district. They serve as part of a national network that coordinates closely with the Joint Terrorism Task Forces in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information. The Anti-Terrorism Task Forces also develop the U.S. investigative and prosecution strategy throughout the country. |
| Justice, Deputy Attorney General | National Security Coordination Council | Coordinates policy, resource allocation, operations, long-term planning, and information sharing related to national security efforts to combat terrorism. Membership includes the Deputy Attorney General, who heads up the council, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other department officials. |
| Agency plans or strategies to combat terrorism | | |
| Justice, U.S. Attorney General | <i>Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan</i> (Sept. 1999) | Serves as a baseline strategy for coordination of national policy and operational capabilities to combat terrorism in the United States and against American interests overseas. |
| Justice, U.S. Attorney General | <i>Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2001-2006</i> (Sept. 2000) | Provides a multi-year plan for carrying out the department's mission. The plan is oriented toward achieving the vision of securing equal justice for all, enhancing respect for the rule of law, and making America a safer and less violent nation. The plan includes goals, objectives, and strategies for the next 5 years. It also describes key interagency programs and summarizes the external factors that may affect goal achievement. |
| Justice, U.S. Attorney General | <i>National Money Laundering Strategy</i> , jointly issued by the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury in July 2002 | The strategy includes, for the first time, a comprehensive national plan to attack the financing of terrorist groups. Goal 2 of the <i>Strategy</i> focuses law enforcement and regulatory resources on identifying terrorist financing networks by (1) implementing a multi-pronged operational strategy to combat terrorist financing, (2) identifying and targeting the methods used by terrorists financiers, and (3) improving international efforts to dismantle terrorist financial networks. The strategy is an interagency plan, which draws on the expertise and resources of the Departments of Justice and the Treasury, and other federal agencies as well as foreign partners and the private sector. |
| FBI | <i>Strategic Plan 1998-2003</i> (May 1998) | Concentrates on specific 5-year strategic goals and key functional strategies in areas related to operations, intelligence, information technology, applied science and engineering, management, and state and local services. The plan guides the direction, priorities, and resources of the FBI. The plan currently is under revision to reflect the FBI's recent reorganization, done in large part to provide additional resources to combat terrorism. |

**Appendix III
Matrix of Department of Justice Programs
and Activities to Combat Terrorism Overseas**

(Continued From Previous Page)

| Department of Justice office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|---|--|---|
| DETECT AND PREVENT TERRORISM ABROAD | | |
| Law enforcement training (with foreign governments) | | |
| FBI | International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA)— Budapest, Hungary | Trains law enforcement officers from Central Europe and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. The academy provides specialized short-term courses and an 8-week professional development program focusing on law enforcement issues, rule of law, investigation process, leadership, and ethics. It also serves as a cooperative effort between the Departments of State, Justice, and the Treasury. |
| FBI, Training Division | International Training and Assistance Unit | Conducts worldwide in-country training through the International Training and Assistance Unit for foreign law enforcement entities. The unit responds to training requests from the legal attachés for foreign police agencies. The training emphasizes crisis management and major case management as well as the investigation of transnational organized crime groups. The training also enhances the FBI's international investigative mission by creating "cop-to-cop" relationships with foreign law enforcement agencies. |
| Justice, Criminal Division, International Training and Development Programs | International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program | Provides training and development assistance to police organizations worldwide. The training also helps foreign governments develop the capacity to provide modern professional law enforcement services based on democratic principles and respect for human rights. Activities include the development of police forces in the context of international peacekeeping operations and enhancing the capabilities of existing police organizations in emerging democracies. |
| Justice, Criminal Division, International Training and Development Programs | Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training | Provides justice-sector institution building assistance, including training of foreign judges and prosecutors, in coordination with various government agencies and U.S. embassies. The training is intended to strengthen the legislative and regulatory criminal justice infrastructure within the host country, and enhance the capacity of the country to investigate and prosecute crime more effectively, consistent with the rule of law. |
| Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives | International Programs Branch training | Trains foreign nationals in conjunction with the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and/or Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Antiterrorism Assistance program. Programs include: International Post Blast Investigation, International Firearms and Explosives Identification, Tax and Revenue Training, and Explosives Detection Canine Training. The branch also serves as technical and legal experts with the Department of State on the negotiation of several international instruments. The ATF currently is establishing a Center for Explosive Research and Training in Virginia. The ATF anticipates that training supplied there for domestic and international law enforcement officials will become part of the international fight against terrorism and violent crime. |

**Appendix III
Matrix of Department of Justice Programs
and Activities to Combat Terrorism Overseas**

(Continued From Previous Page)

| Department of Justice office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|--|--|---|
| Border security (including visa processing issues) | | |
| Justice | National Security Entry-Exit Registration System | Tracks up to 200,000 foreign visitors each year and stops suspected terrorists prior to entry into the United States. The system verifies visitor's activities and whereabouts while in the country. Future plans will include efforts to track up to 35 million foreign visitors entering the United States annually. The system has three components that include (1) fingerprinting and photographing at the border, (2) periodic registration of aliens who stay in the United States 30 days or more, and (3) exit controls that will help the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to remove those aliens who overstay their visas. |
| Justice | Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force | Coordinates a multi-agency effort to identify, locate, and deny entry to, or remove terrorists and their supporters from, the United States. The task force includes a number of agencies, including the FBI, INS, and the U.S. Customs Service. |
| DISRUPT AND DESTROY TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS ABROAD | | |
| Law enforcement cooperation | | |
| FBI, Executive Assistant Director for Law Enforcement Services | Office of Law Enforcement Coordination | Establishes relationships and enhances information sharing with state and local police professionals. In addition, helps the FBI tap into the strengths and capabilities of its partners. |
| FBI, Counterterrorism Division | National Joint Terrorism Task Force | Serves as the national coordinating mechanism for sharing information on suspected terrorists, including those of foreign origin. Also, it complements the local Joint Terrorism Task Forces to improve collaboration and information sharing with other federal, state, and local agencies. The task force operates out of the FBI's Strategic Information Operation Center in Washington, D.C. |
| FBI, Field Offices | Joint Terrorism Task Forces | Serves as a coordinating mechanism that combines the international and national investigative resources of the federal government with the street-level expertise of local law enforcement agencies. This "cop-to-cop" relationship enables law enforcement agencies to share information on suspected terrorists, including those of foreign origin. One of the most robust Joint Terrorism Task Forces is in Washington, D.C., which has representatives from 15 federal agencies. Throughout its field offices, the FBI has 56 task forces in place. |
| Justice, Criminal Division | Terrorist Financing Task Force | Coordinates the terrorist financing enforcement efforts within Justice's Criminal Division. The task force works with prosecutors around the country as well as with the FBI's Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force and Terrorist Financing Operation Section to disrupt groups and individuals representing terrorist threats. |
| FBI, Executive Assistant Director for Law Enforcement Services | International Operations | Promotes relations with both foreign and domestic law enforcement agencies and security services and facilitates investigative activities. Also provides managerial support of the Legal Attaché Program. |

**Appendix III
Matrix of Department of Justice Programs
and Activities to Combat Terrorism Overseas**

(Continued From Previous Page)

| Department of Justice office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|---|---|--|
| FBI, International Operations | Legal Attaché Program | <p>Provides Senior Special Agents stationed at U.S. missions overseas who work closely with law enforcement agencies of host countries on common crime problems. They also play a large role in facilitating the international battle against terrorism by enlisting the cooperation of foreign law enforcement, enabling the arrest of U.S. terrorist suspects, and solving crimes against U.S. citizens.</p> <p>Legal Attachés also assist in coordinating investigations with federal law enforcement overseas by disseminating information to officials of key U.S. federal agencies stationed abroad. They routinely share information on investigations with liaisons serving with Department of Defense (DOD) components overseas. The FBI currently operates 44 legal attaché offices worldwide.</p> |
| Justice, Criminal Division, Office of International Affairs | Negotiates bilateral and multilateral agreements | In conjunction with the Department of State, the Office of International Affairs negotiates extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties with foreign governments. As of July 2002, the United States had bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties covering 46 jurisdictions and over a 120 extradition treaties in force with foreign jurisdictions. |
| Justice | U.S. National Central Bureau of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) | Represents the United States as a member of INTERPOL. It facilitates international law enforcement cooperation by transmitting law enforcement-related information between the National Central Bureaus of INTERPOL, member countries, and U.S. law enforcement agencies. It also coordinates information relevant to international investigations and identifies patterns and trends in criminal activities. |
| Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives | Law enforcement cooperation | Works directly and in cooperation with other agencies to enforce federal laws and regulations related to firearms, explosives, and fire-related violent crimes. |
| Law enforcement investigations | | |
| FBI, Counterterrorism Division | Lead agency in charge of investigating international terrorist incidents | As principal investigative agency of the federal government, it serves as lead agency for international counterterrorism investigations. The FBI has extraterritorial jurisdiction to expand its investigative authority outside U.S. borders. Its investigations include incidents involving bombings, hostage taking, homicides of U.S. citizens overseas, sabotage, and extortion by threatening the use of weapons of mass destruction. |
| Justice | Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counter-intelligence Investigations | Establishes prediction levels and limits on international counterterrorism investigations involving U.S. persons or foreign nationals overseas. |
| FBI | National Crime Information Center Database | Provides the names and identifying information of terrorist suspects under domestic and international investigations. The data is accessible to state and local law enforcement officers. |
| FBI | Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System | Provides the capability to search and match fingerprints of suspected terrorists against millions of fingerprints contained in the criminal fingerprint repository. |

**Appendix III
Matrix of Department of Justice Programs
and Activities to Combat Terrorism Overseas**

(Continued From Previous Page)

| Department of Justice office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|---|---|--|
| FBI | National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime | Provides investigative and operational support functions to federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement agencies investigating unusual or repetitive violent crimes. The center also can provide support through expertise and consultation for non-violent matters related to national security. |
| Justice, Criminal Division, Office of International Affairs | Mutual legal assistance treaties | Provides for the exchange of evidence between parties to a treaty, often in a form that is admissible at trial. The treaties enable the Department of Justice to obtain foreign financial records and testimonial statements of foreign witnesses. In addition, they allow for the search and seizure of foreign evidence, and, in some cases, the right to freeze and recover the forfeiture of proceeds. |
| Justice, Criminal Division, Office of International Affairs | Letters rogatory | Letters rogatory are requests that come from judicial officials in one country to judicial officials in another country seeking assistance with an investigation. The letters usually include background on the nature and targets of the criminal investigation, relevant facts about the case or investigation, type of assistance needed, statutes alleged to have been violated, and a promise of reciprocity. |
| Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives | International Programs Branch | Combats the illegal movement of firearms, explosives, and ammunition to prevent such arms from being used to commit acts of terrorism, among other international crime. The responsibilities of the International Programs Branch include: (1) supervising and coordinating the utilization of ATF Country Attachés in support of International Trafficking in Arms Investigations, (2) developing international firearms programs and policy, (3) performing/conducting international firearms trafficking assessments, and (4) and performing/conducting firearms trafficking studies concerning foreign countries. According to the ATF, since September 11, 2001, its International Programs Branch has been inundated with requests for assistance from numerous foreign law enforcement agencies. Most of these requests have been for assistance in the area of explosives investigations, explosives tracing, and post-blast evidence recovery. |
| Law enforcement renditions and extraditions | | |
| Justice, Criminal Division, Office of International Affairs | Extradition treaties | Enables parties to a treaty to obtain custody of accused terrorists. The agreement provides for the request of one party to the treaty to the other party for the arrest and surrender of an individual accused or convicted of a crime in a country making the request. Modern extradition treaties contain a "dual criminality" clause, which makes any offense considered a crime in both countries extraditable. |
| FBI | Renditions | Escort agents apprehend and obtain custody of suspected terrorists without the formalities of an extradition treaty. This occurs when the asylum nation agrees to render the individual to the United States for trial or deports the individual out of the country. |
| Justice, U.S. Marshals Service | Extraditions-prisoner custody and transportation | Escort agents apprehend and transport suspected terrorists to the United States for prosecution once the extradition proceedings in a foreign country are complete and the suspected terrorist is ready for surrender. |

**Appendix III
Matrix of Department of Justice Programs
and Activities to Combat Terrorism Overseas**

(Continued From Previous Page)

| Department of Justice office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|--|--|--|
| Law enforcement arrests and prosecutions | | |
| Justice, Criminal Division, Counterterrorism Section | Prosecutions | Prosecutes suspected terrorists for acts of terrorism against U.S. citizens or interests through the Department of Justice, Criminal Division's Terrorism Section. |
| Intelligence on terrorist groups and threat assessments | | |
| FBI, Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence | Counterterrorism Division | Centralizes operational and analytical functions to combat terrorism on three fronts: (1) international terrorism operations both within the United States and in support of extraterritorial investigations, (2) domestic terrorism operations, and (3) countermeasures relating to both international and domestic terrorism. The division enhances the level of analytical support to the counterterrorism program, increases the capability to electronically share information and intelligence, and creates additional field office capacity to respond to terrorist issues. Includes the National Joint Terrorism Task Force and the "Flying Squads." |
| FBI, Counterterrorism Division | "Flying Squads" | Enables agents with specific counterterrorism knowledge to rapidly access knowledge and expertise in the field to ensure it is relayed to FBI headquarters for analysis. |
| FBI, Counterterrorism Division | Information Integration Initiative | Improves interagency terrorism-related information sharing by facilitating the warehousing of law enforcement and public safety agencies data in a single secure database. Also facilitates terrorism information sharing between the FBI and the law enforcement and public safety communities. |
| FBI, Counterterrorism Division | Terrorist Financing Operations Section | The Terrorist Financing Operations Section works jointly with the law enforcement and intelligence communities to identify, investigate, disrupt, dismantle, and prosecute as appropriate, terrorist-related financial and fund-raising activities. According to the FBI, the Terrorist Financing Operations Section brings the bureau's financial expertise to bear in identifying terrorist financing methods and movement of money into and out of the United States in support of terrorist activity. |
| FBI, Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence | Counter-intelligence Division | Coordinates investigative matters concerning foreign counterintelligence, including activities related to investigations into espionage, overseas homicide, protection of foreign officials and guests, and nuclear extortion. The division also works with other government agencies and the private sector to identify and protect U.S. secrets from being compromised by foreign agents and spies. |
| FBI, Counterintelligence Division | Counter-Espionage Section | Manages espionage investigations and evaluates and prioritizes all existing espionage cases to ensure effective allocation of human resources and expertise. |
| FBI, Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence | Office of Intelligence | Serves as a strategic and tactical intelligence and analytical mechanism for pulling information from various sources. Also supports counterterrorism and counterintelligence programs through strategic and tactical intelligence initiatives. In addition, the office ensures intelligence within the law enforcement and intelligence communities in cases when it is appropriate to do so. |

**Appendix III
Matrix of Department of Justice Programs
and Activities to Combat Terrorism Overseas**

(Continued From Previous Page)

| Department of Justice office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|---|---|---|
| FBI, Counterterrorism Division | Threat Assessment/Prevention Unit | Assesses the potential threats existing in short- and long-term environments, both domestically and outside the United States. The unit also determines the feasibility and credibility of threat information by comparing intelligence collected by the intelligence community with investigative information. |
| FBI, Counterterrorism Division | National Threat Warning System | Provides threat warning information to the law enforcement and intelligence communities. The system also enables the FBI to communicate threat information directly to U.S. citizens. |
| FBI | Terrorism Watch List | Serves as a single integrated listing of suspected terrorists who are of interest to FBI investigations. The watch list is accessible to the law enforcement and intelligence communities. Information is derived from the Joint Terrorism Task Force investigations, the intelligence community, DOD, and foreign governments. |
| FBI, Counterterrorism Division, Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit | Publishes annual report on Terrorism in the United States | The annual report, <i>Terrorism in the United States</i> , is published to provide a comprehensive picture of the security threats that American citizens and interests have encountered in the United States. |
| FBI, Counterintelligence Division | Awareness of national security issues and response | Serves as the public voice of the FBI for espionage, counterintelligence, counterterrorism, economic espionage, cyber and physical infrastructure protection, and all national security issues. It also provides unclassified national security threat and warning information via e-mail to U.S. corporate physical and information security directors and executives, law enforcement, and other government agencies. |
| FBI, Counterterrorism Division | National Infrastructure Protection Center | Serves as the focal point for interagency efforts to warn of and respond to cyber intrusions, both in the United States and overseas. The center also gathers information on threats to the infrastructure and provides the principal means of facilitating the coordination of the federal government's response to the incident. The center's programs have been established in each of the FBI's field office divisions. |
| FBI, Counterterrorism Division | Information Sharing and Analysis Center | Increases security for the nation's critical infrastructures through a two-way sharing of information with the private sector. The center was established through the National Infrastructure Protection Center to enhance private sector cooperation and trust and information sharing. |
| Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives | National Firearms Tracing Center | Traces crime guns taken into police custody in the United States as well as U.S.-source firearms recovered in foreign countries. The center is an effort to curb the flow of illegal firearms. |
| Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives | Transnational Intelligence Branch | In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the ATF created the Transnational Intelligence Branch to manage the classified intelligence it received. The Department of the Treasury determines the requirements and classifications. |
| RESPOND TO TERRORIST INCIDENTS ABROAD | | |
| Crisis and consequence management—domestic and abroad^a | | |
| FBI, Counterterrorism Division | WMD Operations Unit | Coordinates the interagency threat assessment process and determines the (1) credibility of the threat received, (2) immediate concerns involving health and safety of the responding personnel, and (3) requisite level of response warranted by the federal government. |

**Appendix III
Matrix of Department of Justice Programs
and Activities to Combat Terrorism Overseas**

(Continued From Previous Page)

| Department of Justice office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|--|---|---|
| FBI | Strategic Information and Operations Center | Serves as a focal point for information management, coordination, and operational support. The center provides the facilities, information systems, and communications equipment to support special events and crisis operations. Also, during major crises, investigations, or special events, the center is fully activated as a headquarters command center. |
| FBI, Executive Assistant Director for Law Enforcement Services | Laboratory Division | Provides forensic and technical services to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. The division collects and conducts analysis of physical evidence ranging from biological materials to explosives. Through its trained teams of FBI Special Agents and support personnel, it can assist international law enforcement agencies with large-scale investigations and disasters. |
| FBI, Executive Assistant Director for Law Enforcement | Investigative Technologies Division | Provides technical and tactical services in support of investigators and the intelligence community. Some of the services provided by the division include electronic surveillance, physical surveillance, cyber technology, and wireless radio communication. The division also is working on developing new investigative technologies and techniques as well as training the agents and personnel with the new technologies. |
| FBI, Laboratory Division, Enforcement Services | Mobile Crime Laboratory | Provides the capability to collect and analyze a range of evidence at the crime scene. The laboratory also has analytical instrumentation for rapid screening and triage of explosives and other trace evidence recovered at the crime scene. |
| FBI, Laboratory Division, Enforcement Services | Flyaway Laboratory | Provides the capacity to rapidly respond to criminal acts involving the use of chemical or biological agents with the mobile, self-contained lab. The laboratory allows for the safe collection of hazardous materials, sample preparation, storage, and analysis in a field setting. |
| FBI, Laboratory Division | Explosives Unit | Examines evidence associated with bombings, including the identification and function of the components used in the construction of the explosive device. The unit also performs chemical analysis to help identify the type of explosive used in the device. |
| FBI, Laboratory Division | Firearms Unit | Examines evidence related to firearm and ammunition components. The division also provides support with investigations involving the collection, preservation, and processing of evidence at crime scenes. If needed, the unit can serve as a liaison with international forensic laboratories. |
| FBI, Laboratory Division, Enforcement Services | Evidence Response Team | FBI Special Agents who specialize in conducting major evidence recovery operations. The unit is the laboratory representative to the Critical Incident Response Group. The unit responds to crisis situations and coordinates the mobilization of the Emergency Response Team. |
| FBI, Enforcement Services, Critical Incident Response Group | Critical Incident Response Group | This group facilitates the rapid response to—and the management of—crisis incidents. The group deploys investigative specialists to respond to terrorist activities, hostage taking, child abductions, and other high-risk repetitive violent crimes. |
| FBI, Enforcement Services, Critical Incident Response Group | Crisis Negotiation Unit | Maintains an immediate operational response capability to conduct and manage on-scene negotiations during any significant crisis event in which the FBI is involved. The unit deploys overseas to assist in the management of kidnapping situations involving U.S. citizens. |

**Appendix III
Matrix of Department of Justice Programs
and Activities to Combat Terrorism Overseas**

(Continued From Previous Page)

| Department of Justice office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|---|--------------------------------------|---|
| FBI, Enforcement Services, Critical Incident Response Group | Crisis Management Unit | Operationally supports FBI field and headquarters entities during critical incident or major investigations. The unit conducts crisis management training and related activities for the FBI, and other international, federal, state, and local agencies or department. It also conducts several regional field-training exercises each year. |
| FBI, Enforcement Services, Critical Incident Response Group | Rapid Deployment Logistics Unit | Coordinates administrative and logistical matters for deploying the Rapid Deployment Team. The unit also coordinates military and commercial airlift deployment requirements for the Crisis Incident Response Group and other FBI entities. In addition, it coordinates all Rapid Start Information Management System matters in support of major investigations and operations. |
| FBI | Rapid Deployment Team | Provides the capability to deploy large numbers of personnel to crime scenes in nations that are receptive to ongoing joint investigations. The team enables the FBI to arrive on the scene with pre-constituted investigative, administrative, and logistical support elements needed to conduct a major investigation. The teams are designed to be fully deployed in response to bombings of U.S. interests and are augmented by a cadre of special agent bomb technicians. Evidence Response Teams and security specialists also join the team. |
| FBI, Enforcement Services, Critical Incident Response Group | Hostage Rescue Team | Conducts rescues of U.S. persons and others held illegally by a hostile force, either terrorist or criminal in nature. The team is capable of performing other law enforcement activities related to dive searches, hurricane relief operations, dignitary protection missions, and tactical surveys. And, on occasion, the team pre-positions itself in support of special security events. |
| FBI, Enforcement Services, Laboratory Division | Hazardous Materials Response Unit | Provides the capability to safely and effectively respond to incidents involving the use of hazardous materials. The unit also develops technical proficiency and readiness procedures for crime scene and evidence-related operations. |
| Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives | International Incident Response Team | Responds with investigative assistance and laboratory support to assist foreign law enforcement authorities and governments in responding to explosives and fire incidents. The response team was created in 1993 with the Department of State as a result of the 1993 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina. The response team is in a constant state of readiness. Since 1993, it has been deployed 22 times. |

Source: Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and the Treasury.

^aThe response to a terrorist incident involves managing the immediate crisis as well as its consequences. "Crisis management" involves efforts to prevent and deter a terrorist attack, protect public health and safety, arrest terrorists, and gather evidence for criminal prosecution. "Consequences management" involves efforts to provide medical treatment and emergency services, evacuate people from dangerous areas, and restore government services.

Matrix of Department of State Programs and Activities to Combat Terrorism Overseas

The Department of State is the lead federal agency for coordinating U.S. government efforts to combat terrorism overseas. Within the department, multiple bureaus and offices manage various programs and activities to combat terrorism abroad. State also works with other U.S. government agencies, foreign government agencies, and international organizations in carrying out these programs and activities. Some of these activities directed at combating terrorism overseas (e.g., coordination) may actually occur in the United States.

Appendix IV identifies and describes the following:

- the strategic framework of State’s efforts to combat terrorism overseas;
- State’s programs and activities to detect and prevent terrorism overseas;
- State’s programs and activities to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations overseas; and
- State’s programs and activities to respond to terrorist incidents overseas.

Table 13: Department of State Programs and Activities to Combat Terrorism Overseas

| Department of State office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|---|---|---|
| STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK | | |
| Agency head’s role in counterterrorism | | |
| Office of the Secretary | Directs State Department, the lead U.S. agency for counterterrorism activities abroad | <p>The Secretary of State is responsible for the coordination of all U.S. civilian departments and agencies that provide counterterrorism assistance overseas. The Secretary also is responsible for the management of all U.S. bilateral and multilateral relationships intended to promote activities to combat terrorism abroad.</p> <p>Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the Office of the Secretary has made its counterterrorism activities a top priority. The Office helps manage the U.S. “war on terrorism” by (1) building the global coalition against terrorism; (2) building diplomatic support for military operations in Afghanistan and other countries; (3) helping coordinate intelligence to detect terrorist networks; (4) imposing economic sanctions to reduce terrorist financing; (5) supporting international law enforcement efforts to identify, arrest, and bring terrorists to justice; and (6) leading multinational efforts through the United Nations (UN) and other organizations to reduce the terrorist threat.</p> |

**Appendix IV
Matrix of Department of State Programs and
Activities to Combat Terrorism Overseas**

(Continued From Previous Page)

| Department of State office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|--|---|--|
| Special agency official or office in charge of counterterrorism | | |
| Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism | Coordinates all State Department counterterrorism activities and leads U.S. government efforts to improve counterterrorism cooperation with foreign governments | <p>Coordinates U.S. overseas counterterrorism policy and response to international terrorist incidents that take place outside of U.S. territory.</p> <p>Engages in bilateral, multilateral, and public diplomacy to deter terrorism through a policy of making no concessions to terrorists, prosecuting or extraditing international terrorists, opposing state-sponsored terrorism, and curbing terrorist resources.</p> <p>Provides the lead in conducting interagency bilateral counterterrorism consultation with about 20 foreign governments and participates in multilateral negotiations and meetings.</p> <p>Identifies and develops justification for the U.S. government's biennial designation of foreign terrorist organizations.</p> <p>Chairs the State Department's terrorism task forces to coordinate responses to major international terrorist incidents, including those that may occur domestically.</p> <p>Coordinates U.S. counterterrorism research and development, including consultations and cooperation with selected countries.</p> |
| Each U.S. ambassador | Responsible for the full array of counterterrorism activities at each U.S. mission | See below for descriptions of counterterrorism activities at U.S. missions. |
| Agency plans or strategies to combat terrorism | | |
| Office of the Secretary | State Department's Annual Performance Plan | The State Department's <i>2002 Annual Performance Plan</i> highlights its counterterrorism objective to "reduce international terrorist incidents, especially against the United States." Key goals are to (1) reduce the number of attacks, (2) bring terrorists to justice, (3) reduce or eliminate state-sponsored terrorist acts, (4) delegitimize the use of terror as a political tool, (5) enhance the international response, and (6) strengthen international cooperation and operational capabilities to counter terrorism. |
| U.S. embassies (ambassador) | Mission Performance Plan | Lists each embassy's priorities and includes implementation and budgeting plans. If counterterrorism activities are an embassy priority, then the plan should include specific goals and actions to counter the threat. |

**Appendix IV
Matrix of Department of State Programs and
Activities to Combat Terrorism Overseas**

(Continued From Previous Page)

| Department of State office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|---|--|---|
| DETECT AND PREVENT TERRORISM ABROAD | | |
| Military security assistance | | |
| Bureau of Political-Military Affairs | Regional security and arms controls to enhance regional stability | <p>Supports the war on terrorism and Operation Enduring Freedom with security assistance programs such as (1) foreign military financing, (2) foreign military sales, (3) International Military Education and Training, and (4) peacekeeping operations.</p> <p>For Operation Enduring Freedom, Political-Military Affairs stated that arms transfers and security assistance policies have enhanced cooperation with the states of the region and influenced operations in Afghanistan. For example, arms transfers helped enhance security cooperation with such key U.S. strategic partners as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates.</p> |
| Embassy security | | |
| Bureau of Diplomatic Security | Responsible for providing a secure environment for the conduct of American diplomacy worldwide | <p>Manages a broad range of programs to create and maintain the highest appropriate levels of security possible for more than 50,000 U.S. government personnel, staff, and dependents who work and live at 260 embassies, consulates, and other missions overseas. Diplomatic Security can dispatch its teams to threatened overseas missions. Diplomatic Security activities include protection of the Secretary of State and other high-level U.S. government officials on official government business abroad. At each U.S. mission, the regional security officer is responsible for implementing the Bureau's security measures and coordinating protection with host government authorities.</p> |
| Diplomatic Security | Review of standards and risk management | <p>Develops, evaluates, and applies security standards for a broad range of categories. These include (1) physical protection for office and residential buildings, (2) access to communication equipment, (3) intrusion detection devices, (4) secure conference rooms, and (5) armored vehicles.</p> <p>These standards are intended to allow Diplomatic Security to identify and address threats posed by terrorism, political violence, human intelligence, and technical intelligence penetration of facilities. Diplomatic Security uses these elements to target resource allocations to identified threats at each mission or location. Diplomatic Security is required to provide to the Congress each year a ranking of the U.S. missions abroad most vulnerable to terrorist attack. These standards also help target additional security funding to the highest threat missions, as in the case of Emergency Security Supplemental and Worldwide Security Upgrade funds to meet the most pressing security needs.</p> |
| Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations | Embassy construction program | <p>Replaces State Department's less secure facilities on an accelerated basis with new, secure embassies and consulates.</p> <p>State has a 6-year Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan, which includes both new construction and the major renovation and rehabilitation of existing facilities.</p> |

**Appendix IV
Matrix of Department of State Programs and
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| Department of State office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|---|------------------------------------|--|
| Diplomatic Security | Embassy construction program | Participates with Overseas Buildings Operations in developing embassy security measures. Develops, with other elements in State, threat assessments that it uses to prioritize which U.S. missions are most in need of new, safer embassy buildings. |
| Diplomatic Security and Overseas Buildings Operations | Worldwide Security Upgrade Program | Provides a physically secure environment for all U.S. government personnel under the jurisdiction of the Chief of Mission. Diplomatic Security, through the physical security program, strengthens building exteriors, lobby entrances, and the walls and fences around embassies and consulates. Inside an embassy or consulate, closed-circuit television monitors, explosive-detection devices, walk-through metal detectors, and hard-line walls and security doors provide protection. Diplomatic Security and Overseas Buildings Operations have joint responsibility for this program. |
| Diplomatic Security | Residential security | Provides for security upgrades to the residences of U.S. employees assigned to overseas diplomatic and consular missions. Prior to occupancy, all newly acquired residential facilities are equipped with appropriate security features, such as locks, alarms, shatter-resistant window film, and reinforced doors, based on the level of the threats to be addressed. |
| Diplomatic Security | Overseas Protection of Information | Implements a comprehensive set of information protection programs. These programs are intended to protect national security information discussed at meetings in secure conference rooms or on secure telephones, processed and stored on computers, and preserved and communicated on paper documents. This program includes (1) personnel investigations for security clearances, (2) courier protection for diplomatic pouches, (3) construction security and access control equipment, (4) U.S. Marine security guards controlling access to embassies at 130 U.S. missions overseas, (5) locks for containers holding classified material, (6) secure conference rooms, (7) detection and containment of emanations from processing equipment, (8) counterintelligence investigations and briefings, and (9) computer security. |
| Diplomatic Security | Surveillance Detection Program | Utilizes plainclothes security agents to provide surveillance detection measures around U.S. embassies, consulates, and residences of embassy employees. The program is used to identify suspicious activity, such as terrorists' "casing" of embassy facilities or personnel, and includes capabilities intended to resolve all suspicious activity. |
| Diplomatic Security | Local Guard Services | Augments host government resources for protecting overseas diplomatic and consular office facilities and residences of U.S. government employees and dependents of all agencies under the Chief of Mission. |
| Diplomatic Security | Overseas Protective Vehicles | Provides light and heavy armor vehicles to protect embassy personnel. One hundred percent of the Chief of Mission vehicles have been ordered and are in the armoring phase, with 94 percent delivered to missions. |

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| Department of State office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
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| Diplomatic Security | Security Liaison Officers | Provides Security Officers to selected DOD Unified Commands (U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida; U.S. European Command, Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany; and U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii). These officers coordinate with the commands on theater threat assessments, contingency planning, and implementation of Department of State and Department of Defense (DOD) agreements on overseas security support. |
| Warnings to and information-sharing with Americans abroad | | |
| Bureau of Consular Affairs | Travel warnings, public announcements, and Consular Information Sheets | Ensures that important threat warnings and security information reach U.S. citizens and assets abroad in a timely and effective manner. In 2001, Consular Affairs issued 64 travel warnings, 134 public announcements, and 189 Consular Information Sheets. Consular Affairs' Internet Web site received 117.9 million inquiries, 30.7 million more than in fiscal year 2000. According to Consular Affairs data, 90 percent of the users found the information helpful. Consular Affairs also held 69 briefings for stakeholder groups, including international student program participants, travel agents, and others. |
| Consular Affairs | Warden system for notifying registered Americans of threats | Notifies Americans who have registered with the U.S. embassy or consulate of potential terrorist threats. Warden networks consist of telephone-calling trees, e-mails, fax systems, and other systems, as appropriate. The warden system covers both U.S. embassy and consulate personnel and other registered Americans. The system usually works by alerting major employers or compounds with high concentrations of Americans. It is used for a variety of communications purposes, from passing out voter information to notifying wardens and their wards of U.S. embassy evacuations. |
| Diplomatic Security | Overseas Security Advisory Council | Provides security support to U.S. businesses and private-sector organizations worldwide through Overseas Security Advisory Councils. A joint effort between State and the private sector, Overseas Security Advisory Councils foster the exchange of security and threat information and implementation of security programs and provides a forum to address security concerns. Regional security officers coordinate with Overseas Security Advisory Council headquarters to set up, develop, and maintain councils in country. Overseas Security Advisory Councils coordinate with U.S. embassies and are active in 47 countries. |
| Law enforcement training (with foreign governments) | | |
| Diplomatic Security | Antiterrorism Assistance | Provides training to approved foreign national participants in five areas: law enforcement, protection of national leadership, control of borders, protection of critical infrastructure, and crisis management. Antiterrorism Assistance has trained 28,000 foreign national participants from 124 countries since its inception. |
| Diplomatic Security | Antiterrorism Assistance's proposed Center for Antiterrorism and Security Training | Antiterrorism Assistance proposes to build the Center for Antiterrorism and Security Training, a consolidated facility for training in various antiterrorism disciplines. |

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| Department of State office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|--|---|--|
| Diplomatic Security | Antiterrorism Assistance's Mobile Emergency Training Team | Provides quick in-country training to allied nations. |
| Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs | International Law Enforcement Academy | Provides law enforcement to foreign governments. International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs manages the U.S. government's interagency regional International Law Enforcement Academies (Budapest, Hungary; Bangkok, Thailand; Gaborone, Botswana; and Roswell, New Mexico), in conjunction with the Departments of the Treasury and Justice, including the FBI. In fiscal year 2003, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is scheduled to provide law enforcement training to 12,000 officials, doubling the number trained in fiscal year 2001. |
| International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs | Law enforcement and police science | Provides training and technical assistance to foreign law enforcement personnel to combat crime and advance U.S. interests in international counterterrorism cooperation. Law enforcement and police science training is managed and funded by International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and carried out by the Departments of Justice and the Treasury, among other federal agencies. The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development and Training are examples of these types of programs. |
| Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs | Countering terrorist financing | Provides, with the Departments of Justice and the Treasury, training and assistance to foreign governments to strengthen their financial and regulatory regimes to reduce terrorist financing. |
| Border security (including visa processing issues) | | |
| Consular Affairs | Visas | Processes applications for visas from foreign citizens who wish to visit the United States. Consular Affairs is to facilitate travel for those eligible to receive visas and to deny visas to those who are ineligible. A visa enables a person to apply at a port of entry to enter the United States, but it does not guarantee that a person will be able to enter the United States. |
| Consular Affairs | Consular Consolidated Database (visa data, including photographs) | Supports the antiterrorist task forces since September 11, 2001. In fiscal year 2002, Consular Affairs performed numerous searches of visa records and photographs at the request of federal law enforcement task forces investigating the terrorist attacks. In addition, Passport Services provided law enforcement with 305 records. Consular Affairs used facial recognition software to compare the photographs on the visa applications of the September 11 hijackers in the database against other visa photographs. According to State, the review found no evidence that the hijackers had applied for visas using different names. |
| Bureau of Intelligence and Research | TIPOFF program | Manages the TIPOFF program, a database of sensitive intelligence and law enforcement information contributed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency, and the FBI. TIPOFF contains information on some 68,000 suspected terrorists and international organized crime figures. TIPOFF alerts consular officers at U.S. embassies and INS officers at ports of entry when potential terrorists try to enter the United States. |

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Matrix of Department of State Programs and
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| Department of State office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|---|---|---|
| Consular Affairs/Visa Services | TIPOFF to impede terrorist entry into the United States | Uses TIPOFF in the visa program to identify and stop potential terrorists trying to enter the United States. In fiscal year 2001, Consular Affairs indicated that there had been 178 TIPOFF matches for visa applicants; of those, 81 were denied, 14 abandoned their applications, and 4 withdrew their applications. TIPOFF, used by the INS, yielded 86 matches from the terrorism database at ports of entry in fiscal year 2001. Of these, 38 of the individuals were denied entry, and 1 was arrested. |
| Diplomatic Security | Investigation of visa and passport fraud | Impedes terrorist entry into the United States. Diplomatic Security investigates more than 3,500 passport and visa fraud cases annually, resulting in more than 500 arrests each year. A number of suspects have been linked to terrorism. Diplomatic Security has 450 special agents in over 160 countries and approximately 700 special agents assigned throughout the United States. |
| Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism | Terrorist Interdiction Program | Enhances border security by providing participating foreign governments with a computerized database that allows border control officials to identify and detain or track individuals of interest. The Terrorist Interdiction Program currently is installed in 2 foreign countries, with another 60 countries under consideration. The Program is scheduled to be installed in up to five new countries per year. |
| Office of the Inspector General | Investigation of visa and passport fraud | Conducts visa and passport investigations. The Office of the Inspector General conducted several joint investigations with the INS in fiscal year 2001. In one case, the Office found that defendants took in \$21 million by defrauding the visa program. |
| Public Diplomacy | | |
| Office of International Information Programs | Build international support for U.S. foreign policy | Influence international opinion in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Office of International Information Programs has encouraged international support for the war on terrorism. For example, its initiatives have generated over 240 newspaper, 100 radio, and 150 television interviews, and over 300 opinion-editorial articles in newspapers either signed or prepared for ambassadors. Almost 60 U.S. speakers have traveled abroad on Office of International Information Programs-funded programs addressing September 11-related issues. U.S. embassies have sponsored over 100 panel discussions and over 220 speeches on the issue. In addition, <i>Network of Terrorism</i> , an Office of International Information Programs-produced print and electronic pamphlet, is available in 36 languages, and 1.3 million print copies are in circulation. |
| DISRUPT AND DESTROY TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS ABROAD | | |
| Military operations | | |
| Political-Military Affairs | State's primary liaison with the Department of Defense | Facilitates Defense-State actions concerning military operations. |

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Matrix of Department of State Programs and
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| Department of State office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|---|--|---|
| Political-Military Affairs | Supporting U.S. military war on terrorism | Assists in developing and maintaining the global military coalition against terrorism and serves as main point of contact for coalition matters. Assists in negotiating with foreign governments for deployment orders, requests for coalition forces, fly-over rights, and bed-down rights. Between September 11, 2001, and the end of January 2002, Political-Military Affairs processed 120 deployment orders and 72 requests for coalition forces in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. |
| Political-Military Affairs | Political Advisor to U.S. regional military commands | Political-Military Affairs provides personnel to DOD and the principal military commands to improve cooperation between State and the U.S. military. For example, the Political Advisor at the U.S. Central Command provides liaison services between State, the command, and the representatives of the 31 nations located at U.S. Central Command headquarters that provide assets for Operation Enduring Freedom. |
| International relations | | |
| Office of the Secretary | Worldwide diplomatic support for war on terrorism and Operation Enduring Freedom | Received offers of military assistance for the war on terrorism from 136 countries. Secured over-flight rights from 89 countries. Secured landing rights for U.S. military aircraft from 76 countries. Secured NATO support to invoke article V of the NATO charter, which states that an attack on one is an attack on all. Developed new U.S. relationships with key countries against terrorism. |
| U.S. embassies (ambassador) | Bilateral diplomatic support for war on terrorism and Operation Enduring Freedom | Implements the above activities of the Office of the Secretary, in support of the war on terrorism and Operation Enduring Freedom. |

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Matrix of Department of State Programs and
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| Department of State office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|--|--|--|
| Bureau of International Organization Affairs | Works with international organizations on counterterrorism issues | <p>Develops and implements U.S. counterterrorism policy in the UN and other international organizations, serving as State's primary liaison.</p> <p>Helped craft and aided in the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373, obligating all member nations to fight terrorism and report to the Security Council on their counterterrorism efforts.</p> <p>Assisted in the creation of a UN Counterterrorism Committee to oversee the implementation of UNSCR 1373. Through bilateral and multilateral efforts, International Organization Affairs encourages all nations to comply with UNSCR 1373 and has offered the services of the U.S. government to other nations to aid in their compliance.</p> <p>Assisted with resolutions extending UN sanctions on (1) al Qaeda and the Taliban, (2) Iraq (including gaining passage of new "smart sanctions"), (3) Libya, and (4) certain African regimes, including those whose activities benefit terrorists.</p> <p>Assisted in the lifting of UN sanctions on Sudan, which has cooperated with the international community and the United States in its war on terrorism.</p> <p>Aided in the UN International Atomic Energy Association's reevaluation of its response to the threat of nuclear terrorism.</p> <p>Assisted in the UN International Civil Aviation Organization's passing an antiterrorism resolution.</p> |
| Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and the Economic Bureau, in coordination with the Department of the Treasury and other agencies | Reduce the flow of money and other material support to terrorists. | Blocks terrorism-related financing. The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, with the concurrence of the Departments of Justice and the Treasury, designates foreign terrorist organizations, individuals, and groups for a variety of purposes, including to block terrorism-related financing. The Economic Bureau is responsible for leading the effort to build international coalition support to also block these assets. According to State, since September 11, 2001, the United States has blocked \$34.3 million in terrorist-related assets. |
| Office of the Legal Adviser | Negotiates international agreements | Pursues extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties with foreign governments and works with the UN and with other nations in drafting multilateral agreements, treaties, and conventions on counterterrorism. |
| Office of the Legal Adviser | Works with Department of Justice on international law enforcement issues | Works closely with the Department of Justice's Office of International Affairs on specific cases and on building consensus on broad international counterterrorism and crime issues. |
| Office of the Legal Adviser | Drafts U.S. counterterrorism-related legislation | The Office of the Legal Adviser works with the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, the Economic Bureau, and the Department of Justice when U.S. legislation is needed to combat terrorism abroad. |

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| Department of State office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|--|---|--|
| Law enforcement | | |
| Diplomatic Security and Regional Security Officer | Law enforcement cooperation | Cooperates with local intelligence, security, and law enforcement entities to track and capture terrorists in country and to block attempted terrorist attacks on U.S. citizens and U.S. assets abroad. |
| Diplomatic Security | Investigations of terrorist incidents | Conducts investigations of terrorist incidents involving U.S. diplomatic personnel and other persons under its protection. These investigations are conducted for the purpose of preventing or deterring future incidents. Diplomatic Security supports the FBI in its extra-territorial investigations into the criminal prosecution of the perpetrators. |
| Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism | Coordinates State's role in negotiating and conducting renditions | Captures suspected terrorists overseas. In cases where the United States lacks an extradition treaty, the U.S. government can capture suspected terrorists through an overseas arrest called a rendition. The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, in conjunction with the Office of the Legal Adviser, the Department of Justice, and other agencies, would coordinate State's role in negotiating and conducting these arrests. Since 1987, there have been 11 reported renditions. |
| Diplomatic Security | Rewards for Justice Program | Provides payments for information leading to the arrest and prosecution of individuals involved in international terrorism and for information that thwarts a terrorist attack. Rewards have been offered for terrorists involved in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the African embassy bombings, and the <i>USS Cole</i> bombing. The program awards payments of up to \$25 million for this information. In fiscal year 2001, State spent \$113,000 for cases concerning terrorist acts, \$1.7 million for cases concerning narcotics traffickers, and \$14,000 for cases concerning war crimes. In the past 7 years, the United States has paid over \$9.5 million to 23 individuals who provided credible information leading to the arrest of international terrorists. |
| Intelligence on terrorist groups and threat assessments | | |
| Intelligence and Research | Intelligence support for Secretary of State and for U.S. missions | Prepares intelligence reports for the Secretary of State, department officials, and ambassadors at U.S. missions. Monitors governmentwide intelligence activities to ensure their compatibility with U.S. counterterrorism foreign policy objectives. Seeks to expand interagency data sharing on known terrorist suspects. |
| Intelligence and Research | Intelligence assessments and policy guidance | <p>Conducted the first public opinion survey inside Taliban-controlled Afghanistan to determine public reaction to the Taliban government. Results were used in U.S. counterterrorism briefings to State, the NSC, the CIA, DOD, and U.S. Central Command officials.</p> <p>Conducted "flash surveys" immediately after September 11, 2001, in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Palestinian Authority to gauge Arab public reaction to the attacks on the United States and public perceptions of Osama bin Laden for use in policy formulation.</p> |
| Intelligence and Research | Electronic Read-and-Burn Pilot Project | Provides intelligence products, especially threat information, to chiefs of mission who could not previously receive this type of highly classified material. |

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| Department of State office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|--|--|---|
| Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism | Studies terrorist groups worldwide | Publishes an unclassified report called <i>Patterns of Global Terrorism</i> , as called for under 22, U.S.C. § 2656f (a). |
| Diplomatic Security | Publishes annual security reports | The annual reports, <i>Significant Incidents of Political Violence against Americans and Terrorist Tactics and Security Practices: Lessons Learned, and Issues in Global Crime</i> , are intended to provide a comprehensive picture of the broad spectrum of political violence and security threats to American citizens and interests abroad. |
| Diplomatic Security and Regional Security Officer | Threat and intelligence assessments | Interacts with police and intelligence contacts in other countries. A mission's regional security officer often is the first to recognize, through investigative work, possible terrorist activities. Diplomatic Security agents frequently are requested to follow up on leads for other law enforcement agencies not represented at the mission. |
| Intelligence information sharing (with foreign governments) | | |
| Diplomatic Security and Regional Security Officer | Information sharing and cooperation with host country governments | Cooperates with foreign governments and their law enforcement and security forces in sharing threat and security information. Conducts extensive liaison with foreign police and security and intelligence services, which allows regional security officers to assist other U.S. government law enforcement agencies. Such activities include criminal record checks, tracing fugitives, interviewing informants and suspects, and processing extradition requests. |
| RESPOND TO TERRORIST INCIDENTS ABROAD | | |
| Crisis and consequence management domestic and abroad^a | | |
| Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism | Headquarters leadership of the U.S. government response to a terrorist incident overseas | Serves as the lead for crisis and consequence management in directing the U.S. government response to a terrorist incident overseas. The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism would lead a task force and work through the State Department Operations Center (discussed below). |
| State Department Operations Center | Headquarters task force for coordinating the U.S. government response to a terrorist incident overseas | State's Operations Center maintains a 24-hour global watch and crisis management support staff. The watch is the initial point of contact for posts experiencing emergency crises, including terrorist attacks. In a crisis, the Operations Center would establish a 24-hour task force to coordinate the flow of communications and instructions between the Department of State, other involved agencies, overseas posts, and foreign governments. This task force would be led by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism and, in addition to relevant State Department bureaus, may include other U.S. government agencies with action responsibilities. |
| U.S. embassies (ambassador) | Serves as the U.S. government on-scene coordinator for terrorist incidents overseas | In a given country, the ambassador would act as the on-scene coordinator in a terrorist incident. The ambassador would lead the Emergency Action Committee to manage the response. The ambassador could request a Foreign Emergency Support Team (discussed below) for assistance and to help coordinate the U.S. government's interagency response. |

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| Department of State office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|--|---|---|
| Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism | Foreign Emergency Support Team to provide on-scene support | In coordination with the NSC, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism would lead an interagency Foreign Emergency Support Team to assist the ambassador and host government to manage a terrorist incident. The team is advisory and will not enter the host country unless requested by the ambassador, with the host government's permission. The team provides the ambassador a single point of contact to coordinate all U.S. government on-scene support during a terrorist incident. Each team is tailored to the specific incident and can provide guidance on terrorist policy and incident management, dedicated secure communications, and special expertise. |
| Diplomatic Security | Special Diplomatic Security teams to assist and investigate crisis situations | Deploys its Mobile Support Teams and Security Support Teams to respond to increased threats or critical security needs at U.S. missions in crisis, including providing special training or draw down/evacuation assistance. These teams provide supplemental support to regional security officers and stand ready for immediate deployment to any U.S. mission where conditions require the reestablishment of a secure environment. |
| Political-Military Affairs | Consequence management; Consequence Management Support Team | <p>Serves as the lead for consequence management in directing the U.S. government response to a terrorist incident outside of U.S. territory. The U.S. government provides assistance overseas when a U.S. ambassador has determined that the host government is unable to cope with a problem, when the host government seeks U.S. assistance, and when it is in the U.S. interest to provide such assistance.</p> <p>Provides a standing Consequence Management Support Team designed to help manage the consequence of a WMD emergency overseas. The multi-agency team is tailored to manage the specific emergency situation or conditions of the host nation. The team coordinates and facilitates the flow of critical requirements and information necessary to respond, advise, and assist foreign government and U.S. decision makers. The team would deploy as an integral part of FEST operations and would take the lead for the consequence management response.</p> |
| Overseas Buildings Operations | Emergency Response Team | Helps secure embassy grounds and restore communications following a crisis. |
| Consular Affairs | Medical needs | Assists American victims with medical needs. Also, assists in the process of identifying victim remains, notifying the next of kin, and shipping home the remains. |
| Consular Affairs | Liaison with U.S. citizens under duress | Provides assistance for Americans stranded overseas by the closure of U.S. air space. |
| Consular Affairs | Liaison with foreign nationals in the United States | <p>Provided assistance to New York City officials handling the deaths of foreign nationals in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the World Trade Center.</p> <p>Works with the Department of Justice to address foreign embassy concerns regarding the large number of aliens detained on a variety of charges as part of the war on terrorism.</p> |

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| Department of State office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|--|--|---|
| Planning and exercises at headquarters and abroad | | |
| Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism | Counterterrorism Security Group, Exercise and Readiness Subgroup | Manages the interagency exercise program for combating terrorism overseas and coordinates these exercises with other departments. The exercise program is designed to strengthen the U.S. government's ability to deal with terrorist attacks. |
| Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism | International Senior Officials Workshops | Conducts Senior Policy Workshops with friendly foreign governments. These workshops are generally tabletop simulations with no actual physical deployment of troops. Coordinates training programs to help other countries develop and coordinate responses to a WMD event. |
| Political-Military Affairs | Contingency planning | Has responsibility for preparing U.S. forces, foreign governments, and international organizations to manage the consequences of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incident overseas. |
| Political-Military Affairs | Consequence management exercises | Sponsors consequence management exercises, in conjunction with other U.S. government agencies. Exercises can be directed at select department and agency components, for example, regional military commands, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, or partner nations. |
| Diplomatic Security | Emergency Planning Handbook | Serves as a consolidated source of guidance for overseas missions on how to plan for and deal with emergencies abroad. The handbook is used as the principal reference when a mission prepares its Emergency Action Plan. |
| U.S. embassies | Emergency Action Committee | Every foreign service mission is required to have an Emergency Action Committee. In organizing for emergency action, the Chief of Mission establishes a committee and designates personnel responsible for specific crisis-related functions. The Emergency Action Committee is responsible for developing and testing the mission's Emergency Action Plan. |
| U.S. embassies | Emergency Action Plan | Every foreign service mission requires an Emergency Action Plan, which is written by members of the Emergency Action Committee and provides mission-specific procedures for responding to terrorist and other crises. The plan translates worldwide guidance for dealing with emergencies into a mission-specific action plan. |
| Foreign Service Institute | Emergency Action Committee exercises | Trains Emergency Action Committee members in their emergency action plan using various scenarios. Exercises are designed to expose mission officials to issues of decision-making, contingency planning, implementation of plans, and interpretation and coordination of policy. |
| Deputy Chief of Mission and Regional Security Officer | Emergency Action Committee/ Emergency Action Plan exercises | Tests its Emergency Action Plan to prepare for management of crises, including terrorist attacks. The Emergency Action Committee at each mission is responsible for periodic drills, including their preparation, execution, and evaluation. |

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| Department of State office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|--|---|--|
| U.S. embassies (ambassador) | Plans and coordinates evacuations and military noncombatant evacuation operations | The Secretary of State is responsible for the protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens. In a crisis such as a terrorist incident, an ambassador can order the evacuation of U.S. government personnel and dependents. The preferred method of evacuation is through normal commercial transportation or commercial charter. However, to assist State in some cases, DOD may execute military Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. Ambassadors can request the assistance of the appropriate unified military command to assist planning such operations. State, and in urgent cases the ambassador, will make the determination as to when such evacuation plans should be implemented. |
| Alternative command centers | | |
| Office of the Secretary | Alternate operations center | Transformed State's Alternate Operations Center from a part-time facility to a full-time alternate site to carry out critical State functions. |
| Overseas Buildings Operations | Alternate operations centers | Maintains an alternate operations center for its headquarters operations and maintains facilities or the ability to establish alternate operations centers for its overseas U.S. mission operations. |
| Post-incident law enforcement investigation | | |
| U.S. embassies (ambassador) | Point of contact during any investigation | Serves as the point of contact for any post-incident law enforcement investigation. The ambassador would serve as the official liaison between the host country government and the U.S. government investigation. |

Source: Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and the Treasury.

^aThe response to a terrorist incident involves managing the immediate crisis as well as its consequences. "Crisis management" involves efforts to prevent and deter a terrorist attack, protect public health and safety, arrest terrorists, and gather evidence for criminal prosecution. "Consequences management" involves efforts to provide medical treatment and emergency services, evacuate people from dangerous areas, and restore government services.

Matrix of Department of the Treasury Programs and Activities to Combat Terrorism Overseas

The Department of the Treasury supports the Department of State, which is the lead federal agency for coordinating U.S. government efforts to combat terrorism overseas. Within the department, multiple bureaus, offices, and agencies manage various programs and activities to combat terrorism abroad. The Treasury also works with other U.S. government agencies, foreign government organizations and agencies, and international organizations in carrying out these programs and activities. While these activities are generally directed at combating terrorism overseas, some of the activities (e.g., coordination) may actually occur in the United States.

Appendix V identifies and describes:

- the strategic framework of the Treasury’s efforts to combat terrorism overseas;
- Treasury’s programs and activities to detect and prevent terrorism overseas;
- Treasury’s programs and activities to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations overseas; and
- Treasury’s programs and activities to respond to terrorist incidents overseas.

Table 14: Department of the Treasury Programs and Activities to Combat Terrorism Overseas

| Department of the Treasury office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|---|--|---|
| STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK | | |
| Agency head’s role in counterterrorism | | |
| Office of the Secretary of the Treasury | The Secretary of the Treasury is the principal economic advisor to the President | The Secretary of the Treasury plays a critical role in policy-making by bringing an economic and government financial policy perspective to issues facing the government. Among other duties, the Secretary is responsible for overseeing the department’s activities in carrying out its major law enforcement responsibilities, including (1) preventing money laundering, (2) disrupting and dismantling terrorist organizations’ financial support, and (3) investigating and freezing terrorists’ financial assets. The Secretary also has a support role to the Department of State during a terrorist incident overseas. |

Appendix V
Matrix of Department of the Treasury
Programs and Activities to Combat Terrorism
Overseas

(Continued From Previous Page)

| Department of the Treasury office or bureau | Program or activity | Description of program or activity |
|--|---|---|
| Special agency official or office in charge of counterterrorism | | |
| Agency plans or strategies to combat terrorism | | |
| Department of the Treasury | <i>National Money Laundering Strategy</i> , jointly issued by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General in July 2002 | The strategy includes, for the first time, a comprehensive national plan to attack the financing of terrorist groups. Goal 2 of the <i>National Money Laundering Strategy</i> focuses law enforcement and regulatory resources on identifying terrorist financing networks by (1) implementing a multi-pronged operational strategy to combat terrorist financing, (2) identifying and targeting the methods used by terrorists financiers, and (3) improving international efforts to dismantle terrorist financial networks. The strategy is an interagency plan that draws on the expertise and resources of the Departments of the Treasury and Justice, and other federal agencies as well as foreign partners and the private sector. |
| DETECT AND PREVENT TERRORISM ABROAD | | |
| Diplomacy | | |
| Treasury, Office of International Affairs | Maintain international coalition against terrorist finances | The Office of International Affairs works bilaterally and multilaterally to build and maintain the international coalition against terrorist finances along with other federal agencies, including the Departments of State and Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the intelligence community. |
| Treasury, Office of International Affairs | Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering | Consists of an international group of 31 member-states, which focuses on terrorist financing. The task force provides its members with an action plan that includes eight special recommendations, which are viewed as a standard to address terrorist financing. |
| Treasury, Office of International Affairs | Task Force on Terrorist Financing | Works with countries and monitors their efforts to track and block terrorists' financial assets. This task force, established by the Department of the Treasury in the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, is composed of international economists and financial analysts from the International Affairs and Enforcement's Office of Foreign Asset Control. The department enlisted support from ministries of finance and central banks worldwide to assist efforts to immobilize and/or confiscate the financial assets of terrorist organizations and deny such organizations use of the international banking system. |
| Treasury, Office of International Affairs | Financial Attachés | Develop extensive contacts with foreign finance ministries, foreign regulatory authorities, central banks and financial market participants. Financial Attachés explain new U.S. policies to their foreign counterparts. They also collect, report, interpret, and forecast macroeconomic and financial developments and policies in their assigned countries. |

Appendix V
Matrix of Department of the Treasury
Programs and Activities to Combat Terrorism
Overseas

(Continued From Previous Page)

Department of the Treasury office or bureau

Program or activity

Description of program or activity

Prevent undermining of economic reforms

| | | |
|---|--|--|
| Treasury, Office of International Affairs | Office of Technical Assistance/Enforcement Policy and Administration Program | Provides specialist teams to countries through an advisor-based program to help prevent corruption, organized criminal enterprises, and other criminal activities that were undermining Treasury's economic reforms. |
|---|--|--|

Law enforcement training (with foreign governments)

DISRUPT AND DESTROY TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS ABROAD

Identifying, freezing, and seizing terrorist organizations' assets

| | | |
|----------|---|--|
| Treasury | Executive Office for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes | This office was created in March 2003 and assumed the main functions of the former Office of Enforcement. The office is charged with coordinating Treasury Department's efforts to combat terrorist financing both in the United States and abroad. The office is responsible for the following specific duties: (1) developing and implementing U.S. government strategies to combat terrorist financing domestically and internationally, (2) developing and implementing the <i>National Money Laundering Strategy</i> , (3) participating in the department's development and implementation of U.S. government policies and regulations in support of the USA PATRIOT Act, (4) joining in representation of the United States in international bodies dedicated to fighting terrorist financing, and (5) developing U.S. government policies related to financial crimes. |
| Treasury | Financial Crimes Enforcement Network | Supports law enforcement investigations to prevent and detect money laundering and other financial crimes. FinCEN's network links law enforcement, financial, and regulatory communities into a single information-sharing network. Using Bank Secrecy Act information reported by banks and other financial institutions, FinCEN serves as the national's central clearinghouse for broad-based financial intelligence and information sharing on money laundering. This information helps illuminate the financial trail for investigators to follow as they track criminals and their assets. Through investigative analysis efforts, FinCEN provides support for the investigation and prosecution of law enforcement cases at the federal, state, local, and international levels, using financial data collected under the Bank Secrecy Act, as well as other commercial and law enforcement information. FinCEN serves as a catalyst for research, analysis, and dissemination of information on money laundering methods and trends through joint case analysis with law enforcement, integration of all source information, and the application of state-of-art data processing techniques. Internationally, FinCEN maintains in-depth, country-specific expertise concerning money laundering and other financial crimes around the world to assist decision makers in developing and promoting U.S. government anti-money laundering policies. FinCEN uses this expertise to promote the development of Financial Intelligence Units in other countries, which facilitate investigative exchanges. |

**Appendix V
Matrix of Department of the Treasury
Programs and Activities to Combat Terrorism
Overseas**

(Continued From Previous Page)

**Department of the
Treasury office or
bureau**

Program or activity

Description of program or activity

| | | |
|--|--------------------------------|---|
| Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control | Administers Economic Sanctions | This office administers economic sanctions and embargo programs against specific foreign countries or groups (including designated terrorists, terrorist organizations, state sponsors and individuals supporting those organizations) to further U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives. The office imposes control on financial transactions and freezes foreign assets, denying the targeted country, individual, or organization. |
|--|--------------------------------|---|

RESPOND TO TERRORIST INCIDENTS ABROAD

Crisis and consequence management domestic and abroad^a

| | | |
|----------|------------------------|---|
| Treasury | Counter-terrorism Fund | In its fiscal year 2003 budget, the Department of the Treasury proposed that \$40 million remain available until expended to reimburse any federal agency for costs of responding to the U.S. Secret Service's request to provide security at designated National Special Security Events and only be provided after notice to appropriate congressional committees. The proposed \$40 million would (1) provide support to counter, investigate, or prosecute domestic or international terrorism, including payment of rewards in connection with these activities and (2) re-establish the operational capability of an office, facility or other property damaged or destroyed as a result of any domestic or international terrorist incident. Treasury bureaus have important counterterrorism responsibilities, including (1) protecting the President; (2) designing and implementing security at National Special Security Events; (3) investigating arson, explosives, and firearms incidents; (4) conducting financial investigations relating to terrorism; (5) preventing weapons of mass destruction from entering the United States; and (6) implementing sanctions against terrorist organizations. |
|----------|------------------------|---|

Source: Department of the Treasury.

^aThe response to a terrorist incident involves managing the immediate crisis as well as its consequences. "Crisis management" involves efforts to prevent and deter a terrorist attack, protect public health and safety, arrest terrorists, and gather evidence for criminal prosecution. "Consequences management" involves efforts to provide medical treatment and emergency services, evacuate people from dangerous areas, and restore government services.

United Nations Protocols, Conventions, and Resolutions Related to Terrorism

This appendix is a representative list of United Nations (UN) documents related to combating terrorism overseas. The Department of State works with international organizations, such as the United Nations, to enhance multilateral support to disrupt and destroy terrorists and their organizations. The United Nations and its member states established a broad array of resolutions and conventions to create a multilateral framework for combating international terrorism. This UN-based multilateral framework falls into three broad categories of documents or agreements: (1) UN conventions or protocols related to terrorism, (2) UN Security Council Resolutions, and (3) UN General Assembly Resolutions. The following conventions, protocols and resolutions were identified by the United Nations as related to terrorism. According to the Department of State, the United States is a party to all 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

Table 15: UN Conventions and Protocols Related to Terrorism

| UN convention or protocol | Purpose |
|--|---|
| International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, New York Dec. 9, 1999 | Commits member states to prevention and counteraction of the financing of terrorists; holds those who finance terrorists liable; and provides for the identification, freezing and seizure of funds for terrorist activities. |
| International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, New York Dec. 15, 1997 | Creates a regime of universal jurisdiction over the use of explosives and other lethal devices. |
| Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Montreal Mar. 1, 1991 | Combats aircraft sabotage. Designed to control and limit the use of undetectable plastic explosives. |
| Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf, Rome Mar. 10, 1988 | Obligates member states to establish jurisdiction over unlawful acts and punish offences with appropriate penalties. |
| Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Rome Mar. 10, 1988 | Establishes a legal regime applicable to acts against international maritime navigation. Makes it an offence for a person to unlawfully and intentionally seize or exercise control over a ship by force. |
| Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Montreal Feb. 24, 1988 | Extends provisions of the Montreal Convention to include terrorist acts at international airports. |
| Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Vienna Mar. 3, 1980 | Criminalizes the unlawful possession, use, transfer, of nuclear material, the theft of nuclear material, and threats to use nuclear material to cause death or serious injury. |

**Appendix VI
United Nations Protocols, Conventions, and
Resolutions Related to Terrorism**

(Continued From Previous Page)

| UN convention or protocol | Purpose |
|---|---|
| International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, New York Dec. 17, 1979 | Defines the taking of hostages and requires state parties to make this offense punishable by appropriate penalties. |
| Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, New York Dec. 14, 1973 | Defines internationally protected persons; requires appropriate penalties for those who commit attacks against internationally protected persons and for those who support them. |
| Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Montreal Sept. 23, 1971 | Outlaws acts of violence on aircraft, placement of explosives on aircraft, and supporting those who attempt such acts. |
| Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, The Hague Dec. 16, 1970 | Outlaws the use of intimidation to take control of aircraft; hijackers must be prosecuted or extradited. |
| Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Tokyo Sept. 14, 1963 | Applies to acts affecting in-flight safety; authorizes pilot to take measures to protect aircraft; requires contracting states to take custody of offenders and return aircraft to pilot. |

Source: United Nations.

Table 16: UN Security Council Resolutions Related to Terrorism

| UN Security Council Resolution | Key provisions |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| 1465 Feb. 13, 2003 | Condemns the bomb attack in Bogota, Colombia, on February 7, 2003. Also, urges all states, in accordance with resolution 1373, to cooperate with and provide support and assistance to the Colombian authorities in their efforts to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of this terrorist attack. |
| 1456 Jan. 20, 2003 | Calls on states to prevent and suppress all active and passive support to terrorism and comply with UN Security Council resolutions 1373, 1390, and 1455. Also, calls on states to become a party to all relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, in particular the 1999 international convention for the suppression of the financing of terrorism. |
| 1455 Jan. 17, 2003 | Calls on all states to enforce and strengthen measures, where appropriate, against their nationals or other individuals or entities operating in their territory, to prevent and punish violations. Also calls upon states to submit an updated report to the Committee no later than 90 days from adoption of this resolution on steps being taken to implement the measures. |
| 1452 Dec. 20, 2002 | Decides that the provisions of resolution 1267 and 1390 do not apply to funds and other financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by the state to be necessary for basic expenses and extraordinary expenses. |
| 1450 Dec. 13, 2002 | Condemns the terrorist bomb attack at the Paradise Hotel in Kikambala, Kenya, and the attempted missile attack on Arkia Israeli Airlines flight 582, departing from Mombasa, Kenya, on November 28, 2002. Also, urges all states in accordance with resolution 1373 to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of these terrorist attacks. |
| 1440 Oct. 24, 2002 | Condemns the act of taking hostages in Moscow, Russia, on October 23, 2002. Also, urges all states, in accordance with resolution 1373, to cooperate with the Russian authorities in their efforts to find and bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of this terrorist attack. |

Appendix VI
United Nations Protocols, Conventions, and
Resolutions Related to Terrorism

(Continued From Previous Page)

| UN Security Council Resolution | Key provisions |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| 1438 Oct. 14, 2002 | Condemns the bomb attacks in Bali, Indonesia, on October 12, 2002. Also, urges all states, in accordance with resolution 1373 to cooperate with and provide support and assistance to the Indonesian authorities in their efforts to find and bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of these terrorist attacks. |
| 1390 Jan. 16, 2002 | Calls on member states to continue sanctions against the Taliban, Osama bin Laden, and al Qaeda. Requires states to take a number of steps against the two regimes, including freezing economic resources, preventing the supply or sale of weapons, and preventing members from entering or traveling through their territories. Also, directs states to report to the Sanctions Committee on actions taken to implement the sanctions. |
| 1377 Nov. 12, 2001 | Calls on member states to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and to assist each other in doing so. Also, invites states to inform the Counterterrorism Committee of areas where they require support. |
| 1373 Sept. 28, 2001 | Calls on member states to work together to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, through cooperation and implementation of the international conventions relating to terrorism. Also, obligates states to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts and to freeze funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit or attempt to commit terrorist acts. |
| 1372 Sept. 28, 2001 | Recalls UN Security Council Resolution 1044 and notes steps taken by the Government of Sudan to comply with UN Security Council Resolutions 1044 and 1070. Terminates the measures brought against Sudan in UN Security Council Resolutions 1054 and 1070. |
| 1368 Sept. 12, 2001 | Calls on member states to bring to justice the perpetrators and sponsors of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Also, calls on the international community to increase cooperation and implementation of anti-terrorist conventions and UN Security Council Resolutions. |
| 1363 July 30, 2001 | Establishes a mechanism to monitor the implementation of the measures imposed by UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1333. |
| 1333 Dec. 19, 2000 | Calls on member states to freeze funds and other financial assets of Osama bin Laden and individuals and entities associated with him, including those in the al Qaeda organization. Also, demands that the Taliban comply with UN Security Council Resolution 1267 and turn over Osama bin Laden to authorities in a country where he has been indicted. |
| 1269 Oct. 19, 1999 | Calls on member states to implement the international anti-terrorist conventions to which they are a party and encourages the speedy adoption of the pending conventions. |
| 1267 Oct. 15, 1999 | Calls on member states to freeze funds and other financial resources owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban. |
| 1214 Dec. 8, 1998 | Demands that the Taliban stop providing sanctuary and training for international terrorists and their operations, and that all Afghan factions cooperate with efforts to bring indicted terrorists to justice. |
| 1189 Aug. 13, 1998 | Calls on member states and international institutions to cooperate with and provide support to the investigations in Kenya, Tanzania, and the United States, to apprehend the perpetrators of the criminal acts and bring them to justice. |
| 1070 Aug. 16, 1996 | Demands the Government of Sudan comply with UN Security Council Resolutions 1044 and 1054 and also decides that member states shall deny Sudanese aircraft permission to take off, land, or over fly their territories. |
| 1054 Apr. 26, 1996 | Demands the Government of Sudan extradite three suspects to Ethiopia who are wanted for the assassination attempt on the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt. Also demands the Government of Sudan desist from providing shelter and sanctuary to terrorist elements. |
| 1044 Jan. 31, 1996 | Calls upon the Government of Sudan to extradite three suspects wanted in the connection with assassination attempt on the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt. |
| 883 Nov. 11, 1993 | Demands that the Libyan government comply with UN Security Council Resolutions 731 and 748 and decides that member states freeze the funds and financial resources of the government of Libya and all Libyan undertakings. |

Appendix VI
United Nations Protocols, Conventions, and
Resolutions Related to Terrorism

(Continued From Previous Page)

| UN Security Council | |
|----------------------------|---|
| Resolution | Key provisions |
| 748 Mar. 31, 1992 | Decides that the Libyan government must commit itself to cease all forms of terrorist action and all assistance to terrorist groups. Also decides that states shall prohibit the provision of weapons to Libya. |
| 731 Jan. 21, 1992 | Condemns the destruction of Pan American flight 103 and urges the Libyan government to provide a full and effective response to UN member states' requests to eliminate international terrorism. |
| 687 Apr. 3, 1991 | Recalls the <i>International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages</i> , which categorizes all hostage-taking acts as manifestations of international terrorism. |
| 635 June, 14, 1989 | Condemns all acts of unlawful interference against the security of civil aviation. Calls upon all member states to implement measures to prevent acts of terrorism, including those involving explosives. Urges the International Civil Aviation Organization to intensify its work on devising an international regime for the marking of plastic explosives for the purpose of detection. |
| 337 Aug. 15, 1973 | Condemns the Government of Israel for the forcible diversion and seizure of a Lebanese airline from Lebanon's air space. |
| 286 Sept. 9, 1970 | Appeals to all parties concerned for the immediate release of all passengers and crews held as a result of hijackings. Calls on member states to take legal steps to prevent hijackings or other interference with international civil air travel. |

Source: United Nations.

Table 17: UN General Assembly Resolutions Related to Terrorism

| UN General Assembly | |
|----------------------------|---|
| Resolution | Key provisions |
| 56/1 Sept. 18, 2001 | Condemns the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and expresses condolences and solidarity with the people and Government of the United States. Calls for urgent international cooperation to bring the perpetrators to justice. |
| 55/158 Jan. 30, 2001 | Reiterates General Assembly Resolution 54/110. Welcomes the efforts of the Terrorism Branch of the Centre for International Crime Prevention. Continues the previous work of the Ad Hoc Committee. |
| 54/164 Feb. 24, 2000 | Recalls General Assembly Resolution 52/133. Commends those governments that supplied the Secretary General with their views on the implications of terrorism. Welcomes the Secretary General's report and requests that he continue to seek views of member states. |
| 54/110 Feb. 2, 2000 | Recalls General Assembly Resolution 53/108. Notes the establishment of the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the Centre for International Crime Prevention in Vienna, Austria. Invites states to submit information on their national laws, regulations, or initiatives regarding terrorism to the Secretary General. Invites regional intergovernmental organizations to do likewise. Continues the previous work of the Ad Hoc Committee. |
| 54/109 Feb. 25, 2000 | Adopts the <i>International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism</i> and urges all states to sign and ratify, accept, approve, or accede to the Convention. |
| 53/108 Jan. 26, 1999 | Recalls General Assembly Resolution 52/165. Reaffirms that actions by states to combat terrorism should be conducted in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, international law, and relevant conventions. Decides to address the question of convening a UN conference to formulate a joint response to terrorism by the international community. Decides the Ad Hoc Committee shall continue to elaborate on a draft convention for the suppression of terrorist financing and will continue developing a draft convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism. |

Appendix VI
United Nations Protocols, Conventions, and
Resolutions Related to Terrorism

(Continued From Previous Page)

| UN General Assembly Resolution | Key provisions |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| 52/165 Dec. 15, 1997 | Reiterates General Assembly Resolution 51/210. Reaffirms the <i>Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism</i> . Requests the Ad Hoc Committee established by UN General Assembly Resolution 51/210 continue its work. Requests the Secretary General to invite the International Atomic Energy Agency to assist the Ad Hoc Committee. |
| 52/133 Dec. 12, 1997 | Recalls General Assembly resolution 50/186. Condemns incitement of ethnic hatred, violence, and terrorism. Requests the Secretary General seek the views of member states on the implications of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. |
| 51/210 Dec. 17, 1996 | Calls upon states to adopt further measures to prevent and combat terrorism. Some of these include: accelerating research and development of explosive detection and marking technology; investigating the abuse of charitable, social, and cultural organizations by terrorist organizations; and developing mutual legal assistance procedures to facilitate cross-border investigations. Further calls upon states to become parties to relevant international anti-terrorism conventions and protocols. Also establishes an Ad Hoc Committee to elaborate an international convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings and acts of nuclear terrorism. Approves a supplement to the 1994 declaration on measures to <i>Eliminate International Terrorism</i> , which, among other things, reaffirms that asylum seekers may not avoid prosecution for terrorist acts and encourages states to facilitate terrorist extraditions even in the absence of a treaty. |
| 50/186 Dec. 22, 1995 | Recalls General Assembly Resolution 49/185. Requests the Secretary-General continue to seek the views of member states on the possible establishment of a UN voluntary fund to aid victims of terrorism, as well as ways and means to rehabilitate and reintegrate such victims back into society. Requests the Secretary General submit a report to the General Assembly containing the views of member states on these topics. |
| 50/53 Dec. 11, 1995 | Reaffirms the <i>Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism</i> . Urges all states to cooperate in eliminating terrorist safe-havens and in further developing international law regarding terrorism. Recalls the role of the Security Council in combating terrorism. Requests the Secretary-General submit an annual report on the implementation of paragraph 10 of the declaration. |
| 49/185 Dec. 23, 1994 | Recalls General Assembly Resolution 48/122. Expresses solidarity with the victims of terrorism. Requests the UN Secretary General seek views of member states on the establishment of a UN voluntary fund for victims of terrorism. |
| 49/60 Dec. 9, 1994 | Approves the <i>Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism</i> , which, among other things, unequivocally condemns all acts of terrorism, demands that states take effective and resolute measures to eliminate terrorism, and charges the Secretary General with various implementation tasks. Some of these tasks include collecting data on the status of existing international agreements relating to terrorism and developing an international legal framework of conventions on terrorism. |
| 48/122 Dec. 20, 1993 | Condemns terrorism as an activity aimed at the destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms, and democracy. Also condemns terrorism for threatening state security, destabilizing legitimate governments, undermining civil society, and obstructing economic development. Calls upon states to take effective measures to combat terrorism in accordance with international standards of human rights. Urges the international community to enhance cooperation against terrorism at many levels. |
| 46/51 Dec. 9, 1991 | Recalls General Assembly Resolution 44/29. Welcomes the recent adoption of the <i>Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection</i> . |
| 44/29 Dec. 4, 1989 | Recalls General Assembly Resolution 42/159. Expresses concern at the growing link between terrorist groups, drug traffickers, and paramilitary gangs. Calls upon member states to use their political influence to secure the safe release of all hostages. Also urges the International Civil Aviation Organization to intensify its work on devising an international regime for the marking of plastic explosives for purposes of detection. Welcomes the recent adoption of aviation and maritime security conventions and protocols. |

Appendix VI
United Nations Protocols, Conventions, and
Resolutions Related to Terrorism

(Continued From Previous Page)

| UN General Assembly Resolution | Key provisions |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| 42/159 Dec. 7, 1987 | Reaffirms General Assembly Resolution 40/61. Urges all states to (a) prevent the preparation and organization of terrorist acts from their territories; (b) ensure the apprehension, prosecution, or extradition terrorist perpetrators; (c) conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements to that effect; (d) cooperate with other states in exchanging terrorist information; and (e) harmonize their domestic legislation with existing international conventions to prevent terrorism. Also welcomes the air and maritime-security conventions being drafted by the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization. |
| 40/61 Dec. 9, 1985 | Recalls General Assembly Resolution 38/130. Unequivocally condemns all acts of terrorism. Urges all states not to obstruct the application of appropriate law enforcement measures against terrorist suspects provided for in the conventions to which these states are a party. Urges states to eliminate underlying causes of terrorism, including colonialism, racism, and situations involving massive human rights violations. Also, calls upon all states to follow the recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization to prevent terrorist attacks against civil aviation transport. Requests the International Maritime Organization study the problem of terrorism against ships. |
| 39/159 Dec. 17, 1984 | Condemns policies and practices of terrorism between states as a method of dealing with other states and peoples. Demands that states refrain from taking action aimed at undermining other states. Urges all states to respect and observe the sovereignty and political independence of states. |
| 38/130 Dec. 19, 1983 | Recalls General Assembly Resolution 34/145. Deeply deplores the loss of innocent human lives and the pernicious impact of international terrorist acts on friendly relations among states as well as on international cooperation. Re-endorses the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism. |
| 36/109 Dec. 10, 1981 | Re-endorses the recommendations made to the General Assembly by the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism and calls upon all states to observe and implement these recommendations. |
| 34/145 Dec. 17, 1979 | Unequivocally condemns all acts of international terrorism. Adopts the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee relating to cooperation for the elimination of international terrorism. Calls upon states to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorism in another state. Appeals to states to become parties to existing international conventions relating to terrorism. Invites states to harmonize their domestic laws with international conventions on terrorism and cooperate with each other more closely in the areas of information sharing, terrorist extradition, and terrorist prosecution. |
| 31/102 Dec. 15, 1976 | Urges states to continue to seek just and peaceful solutions to the problem of international terrorism. Reaffirms the inalienable right to self-determination of all people, and condemns the continuation of repressive and terrorist acts by colonial, racist, and alien regimes. Continues the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism in studying the underlying causes of terrorism and requests that it submit practical measures to combat terrorism to the Secretary General. |
| 30/34 Dec. 18, 1972 | Urges states to devote their immediate attention to the growing problem of international terrorism. Reaffirms the inalienable right to self-determination of all people under colonial regimes and upholds the legitimacy of national liberation movements. Also, establishes an Ad Hoc Committee on terrorism to study the root causes and devise solutions to terrorism. |

Source: United Nations.

Organizations Visited or Contacted

During the course of our review, we visited and/or contacted officials from the following organizations.

Cabinet Departments and Related Agencies

Department of Defense

- Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, Washington, D.C.
- Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.
- Unified Combatant Commands
 - U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida
 - U.S. European Command, Patch Barracks, Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany
 - U.S. Southern Command, Miami, Florida
 - U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida
- Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C.
 - Defense Attachés at selected U.S. embassies (see Department of State)

Department of Homeland Security

- Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Washington, D.C.
- Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, Washington, D.C.
- U.S. Secret Service, Washington, D.C.
- Headquarters, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Glynco, Georgia

Department of Justice

- Criminal Division, Washington, D.C.
 - Terrorism Section, Washington, D.C.
- Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C.
 - Counterterrorism Division, Washington, D.C.
 - Investigative Services Division, Washington, D.C.
 - International Operations Branch, Washington, D.C.
 - Legal Attaché Program, Washington, D.C.
- Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Washington, D.C.
- International Law Enforcement Academy, Budapest, Hungary
- Legal Attaché at a selected U.S. embassy (see Department of State)

Department of State

- Bureau of Administration, Washington, D.C.
- Bureau of Consular Affairs, Washington, D.C.
- Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Washington, D.C.
- Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Washington, D.C.
- Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, D.C.
- Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Washington, D.C.
- Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Washington, D.C.
- Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, Washington, D.C.
- Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Washington, D.C.
- Geographic Bureaus, Washington, D.C.

Appendix VII
Organizations Visited or Contacted

- African Affairs, Washington, D.C.
- East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Washington, D.C.
- European and Eurasian Affairs, Washington, D.C.
- Near Eastern Affairs, Washington, D.C.
- South Asian Affairs, Washington, D.C.
- Western Hemisphere Affairs, Washington, D.C.
- Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Washington, D.C.
- Office of International Information Programs, Washington, D.C.
- Office of the Legal Adviser, Washington, D.C.
- Overseas Security Advisory Council, Washington, D.C.
- U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C.
 - Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Washington, D.C.
- U.S. Embassy, Athens, Greece

Department of the Treasury

- Office of Foreign Assets Control, Washington, D.C.
- Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Washington, D.C.
- Treasury personnel at a selected U.S. embassy (see Department of State)

Other Agencies

Central Intelligence Agency • Counterterrorist Center, Langley, Virginia

Executive Office of the President

- National Security Council, Washington, D.C.
- Office of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C.
- Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C.

Comments from the Department of Defense



SPECIAL OPERATIONS/
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2500

April 14, 2003

Mr. Neal P. Curtin
Director, Defense Capabilities and
Management
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548

Dear Mr. Curtin,

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General Accounting Office (GAO) Draft Report, GAO-03-165, "COMBATING TERRORISM: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Combat Terrorism Overseas." The Department of Defense notes that the portion of Draft Report GAO-03-165 detailing DoD's role in the overall effort in combating terrorism overseas is accurate as presented.

The Department of Defense appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report. While the Department of Defense accepts the findings of the draft report, DoD has provided comments and corrections of a technical nature directly to your staff in an effort to improve the accuracy of the final report.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "M.A. Westphal".

Michael A. Westphal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and
Combating Terrorism

Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development



U.S. AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT

MAY 2 2003

Mr. Raymond J. Decker
Director, Defense Capabilities
and Management
U.S. General Accounting Office
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548

Dear Mr. Decker:

I am pleased to provide the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID's) formal response on the draft GAO report entitled Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Combat Terrorism Overseas (May 2003).

The Agency is in general agreement with the draft report, however several technical comments are included in the enclosed appendix.

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this review.

Sincerely,

John Marshall
Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Management

Enclosure: a/s

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Acknowledgments

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