LAW OFFICES
                             NEBENZAHL AND KOHN
                A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS
                        SUITE 800 GLENDALE FEDERAL BUILDING
                                9454 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD
                        BEVERLY HILLS, CALIFORNIA 90212-2988

JAMES ALLEN KOHN                                      (310) 858-1700
BERNARD S. NEBENZAHL                             TELECOPIER (310) 275-
5714
M. RANDEL DAVIES
RANDALL S. LEFF            July 6, 1992
GERALD S. FRIM
STUART D. TOCHNER

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

United States Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division
Office on the Americans with Disabilities Act
P.O. Box 66118
Washington, D.C. 20034-6118

Dear Sir/Madam:

        Several financial institutions which are clients of our office
have requested our advice concerning their obligations under the
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12181 et seq.)
with respect to public accommodations upon which they foreclose as
lenders. Subsequent to a foreclosure, the financial institutions
hold these properties for a short term until they are liquidated.

        The issue presented here is the ownership and retention of
property by lenders as a result of the defalcation of borrowers
under their loan obligations, the result of which causes the lender
to foreclose upon the collateral, namely the public accommodations.
Americans With Disabilities Act provides that there shall be no
discrimination on the basis of disability, in connection with,
among other things, accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who "owns" or operates a place of
public accommodation. More particularly, regulations promulgated
under the Act (28 C.F.R. 36.304) require that public accommodations
shall remove architectural barriers where such removal is readily
achievable. The regulations further define what "readily
achievable" means with the operable phrases being "without much
difficulty or expense."

        There is uncertainty with respect to the obligations of a
lender under the circumstances recited above when looking at the
affirmative obligations of one who "owns" the public accommodation.

        These clients have been told by others (including some persons
at the Department of Justice) that their temporary ownership of the
public accommodation is a consideration in determining whether or
not there is an affirmative obligation to remove barriers under the
cited sections.

01-01482


LAW OFFICES
NEBENZAHL AND KOHN

United States Department of Justice
July 6, 1992
Page 2

        We would appreciate your advice on the following in relation
to the current regulations and enforcement policies:

        1. Is temporary ownership a basis upon which a lender, who
forecloses and owns a public accommodation with a view to liquidate
said property and not with a view towards investment or retention,
is exempt from Section 36.04?

        2. Is there a definition or any advisory opinions on
temporary ownership of a public accommodation by lenders?

        3. Is a lender which forecloses upon a public accommodation
and owns such accommodation for resale only, for a period of less
than 12 months (or any other period), required to comply with 28
C.F.R. 36.304?

        Thank you for your consideration of this inquiry, and should
you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

                                Very truly yours,
                                Bernard B. Nebenzahl
BBN:dh
01-01483