<DOC>
[109th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:22613.wais]
FORCED LABOR IN CHINA
=======================================================================
ROUNDTABLE
before the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 22, 2005
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov
______
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Senate House
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska, Chairman JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa, Co-Chairman
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas DAVID DREIER, California
GORDON SMITH, Oregon FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia
JIM DeMINT, South Carolina JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
MAX BAUCUS, Montana
CARL LEVIN, Michigan
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
STEPHEN J. LAW, Department of Labor
PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State
David Dorman, Staff Director (Chairman)
John Foarde, Staff Director (Co-Chairman)
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
Wu, Harry, founder and Executive Director, Laogai Research
Foundation, Washington, DC..................................... 2
Fiedler, Jeffrey L., President, Food and Allied Service Trades
Department, AFL-CIO, co-founder, Laogai Research Foundation.... 5
Xu, Gregory, Falun Gong practitioner and researcher, Edison, NJ.. 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements
Wu, Harry........................................................ 24
Fiedler, Jeffrey L............................................... 36
Xu, Gregory...................................................... 40
FORCED LABOR IN CHINA
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 22, 2005
Congressional-Executive
Commission on China,
Washington, DC.
The roundtable was convened, pursuant to notice, at 10
a.m., in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, David Dorman
(Staff Director (Chairman)) presiding.
Also present: John Foarde, Staff Director (Co-chairman);
Susan Roosevelt Weld, General Counsel; Patricia Dyson, Senior
Counsel, Labor Affairs; Carl Minzner, Senior Counsel; Adam
Bobrow, Counsel, Commercial Rule of Law; and Katherine Palmer
Kaup, Special Advisor on Minority Affairs.
Mr. Dorman. It is just about 10 o'clock, so we will get
started in just a minute. Before we do that, I would direct
everybody's attention to the table in the hallway, which has
statements from all the witnesses. So if you would like to have
a copy of the witness statements before we get started, now is
the time to do that. Good.
Well, thank you to our witnesses and to the audience for
attending this staff-led issues roundtable, one in a series of
roundtables put on by the Congressional-Executive Commission on
China.
Today, this roundtable will examine the use of forced labor
in China. Forced labor is an integral part of the Chinese
administrative detention system. China has adopted, like all
members of the ILO, the Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work, which includes a guarantee for freedom from
forced labor. The Commission remains troubled that China is not
meeting its obligation under that particular Declaration, hence
the roundtable today.
Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 prohibits the import
of goods made by prisoners into the United States. To enforce
this law, the United States signed a Memorandum of
Understanding with the Chinese Government in 1992 in which the
Chinese Government agreed to assist in investigating reports of
prison labor products reaching the United States. According to
the State Department's 2004 Human Rights report, at last year's
end, the backlog of relevant cases remained substantial. The
Commission expects the Chinese Government to meet its
obligations under the 1992 Memorandum of Understanding.
There are continuing reports of the use of forced labor in
Chinese detention facilities. Reports indicate that Falun Gong
practitioners and other prisoners detained under China's
reeducation through labor system have been producing goods for
local and export markets under highly abusive conditions, and
we will hear some testimony today specifically on that issue.
Corruption associated with the management of profit-making
prisons has generated some national attention in China. In
September 2003, the Chinese Government announced experimental
plans to separate the production units from the direct
supervision of prison wardens and place them under the control
of provincial administrators. To date, no such plans have been
implemented.
In spring 2005, Chinese diplomats assured U.S. officials
that the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] will
soon be opening an office in Beijing. Once in place, the ICRC
may be able to create more transparency in the Chinese
detention system. Again, the Commission expects the Chinese
Government to meet its obligation to allow an ICRC office.
I am very pleased to introduce our witnesses. We have a
very distinguished panel. As has been the case in previous
roundtables, the way that we run the proceeding is to give each
witness, after an introduction, 10 minutes for an opening
statement. We are rather strict in holding witnesses to their
time, to allow plenty of time for questions and answers. After
all the witnesses have given their statements, we go to a
question and answer period, giving each staff member on the
dais five minutes to ask a question and hear an answer. We will
continue the roundtable until 11:30, or until we run out of
questions. Generally, we find it easy to fill out the entire 90
minutes with conversation.
I am very happy to introduce the first member of our
distinguished panel, Mr. Harry Wu. Mr. Wu is founder and
Executive Director of the Laogai Research Foundation. The
Laogai Research Foundation has documented the use of forced
labor in China since 1992. The Foundation publishes an annual
Laogai handbook, newsletters, special investigative reports,
and assists television media in preparing documentary films on
the Laogai system.
The Foundation has expanded its focus to report on other
human rights issues, including organ harvesting and the
persecution of religious believers.
Mr. Wu, you have 10 minutes for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HARRY WU, FOUNDER AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, LAOGAI
RESEARCH FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Wu. Ladies and gentlemen, today we have come here to
talk about forced labor in China. If we talk about forced
labor, we must talk about the Laogai, China's vast labor reform
system and the Chinese Communist Party's primary instrument for
detaining political dissidents and penal criminals.
The two major aims of the Laogai are to use all prisoners
as a source of cheap labor for the Communist regime, and to
reform criminals through hard labor and compulsory political
indoctrination.
Many actions have been taken over the past 15 years that
were supposed to curb U.S. imports of products coming from
Chinese prison camps. For instance, the Memorandum of
Understanding on Prison Labor was signed by the United States
and China, detention orders were enforced by the U.S. Customs
Service, and companies suspected of importing Laogai products
were taken to court. However, from the testimony of Mr. Fiedler
and Mr. Xu, we can see that these actions have not stopped
forced labor products from entering the United States.
We must understand the nature of the Laogai itself in order
to understand forced labor in the Laogai and to learn how to
stop these products from being exported to countries outside
China. The Laogai is not a dying institution, as some have
suggested. It is true that the composition of the camps has
changed. In the past, the majority of criminals were jailed for
political reasons, and the majority of today's inmates are
incarcerated for more common crimes. Nevertheless, this does
not indicate a fundamental change in the nature of the Laogai.
To the contrary, the Chinese Government's dependence on the
Laogai as its primary tool of suppression is as strong now as
it was in the days of Chairman Mao Zedong's rule.
For those imprisoned for common crimes but deprived of
their due process or forced to labor under barbaric conditions,
the Laogai is alive. For those imprisoned for publicizing their
beliefs, for those caught fighting for Tibetan independence or
labor unions, for those persecuted for asserting their
religious rights, the Laogai is very much a living institution.
When President Ronald Reagan proclaimed that the Soviet
Union was an evil empire, he had many reasons for doing so, but
one of the main reasons was the existence of the Soviet gulag.
Recently, much attention has been focused on the North Korean
gulag. Some people today even say that the Guantanamo Bay
prison camp is an American gulag. But why is there no
discussion of the Chinese gulag? Very few people today talk
about the Chinese gulag. The forced labor products we are
talking about here today come from the Chinese gulag. If we are
talking about forced labor products in China, we must also talk
about the Laogai.
Some American academics, including James Seymour from
Columbia University and another professor from Georgetown
University, have said that while the Laogai is ``pretty bad,''
it cannot be compared with the Soviet gulag. However, is this
really the case? Today more than a quarter century after Mao's
death, the Laogai system still thrives, and an untold number of
prisoners continue to suffer behind the high walls and the
barbed wire fences of more than 1,000 Laogai camps.
A majority of the inmates currently in the Laogai is
incarcerated for reasons that have little to do with politics
or class background; however, the Laogai still serves its
political purpose. Individuals deemed to be threats to China's
one-party system may be held for ``crimes against the state or
public security'' or ``revealing state secrets,'' or for other
offenses that have the ring of more common crimes, such as
hooliganism or arson, that actually mask politically motivated
incarceration.
Additionally, the general lack of due process in the
Chinese legal system victimizes countless individuals. Well-
documented reports of several human rights organizations have
revealed a system where individuals are often convicted and
sentenced with no trial at all. Even when an individual is able
to secure their right to trial, they are often refused the
right to adequately defend themselves, or they are convicted
through so-called ``evidence'' that was extracted through
torture.
If we want to see the advent of democracy and freedom in
China, we must talk about the Laogai, because democracy and
freedom are incompatible with the Laogai. There are many
hearings in CECC and other institutions devoted to the
discussion of human rights violations in China, including the
persecution of Tibetans, Uighurs, Internet, and religious
dissidents, and Falun Gong practitioners.
These issues are all discussed separately, even though
members of all of these persecuted groups are ultimately sent
to the Laogai. The Laogai system, as a whole is never
discussed. Efforts by the Laogai Research Foundation and other
human rights groups to focus international attention on this
system resulted in the Chinese Government dropping the term
``laogai,'' (reform through labor) from its official documents
and replacing it with the word ``prison'' in 1994. This, as
well as other pronouncements by the Chinese Government in
recent years, was designed to create the impression abroad that
the Chinese system is similar to penal systems found in the
West. However, as Chinese authorities emphasize, the function
of reform through labor remains unchanged. Severe violations of
human rights continue to take place in the Laogai system.
China's efforts to stop the use of the word ``laogai'' in
order to improve its international imagine came too late. The
Laogai Research Foundation was pleased to bring about the
addition of the word ``laogai'' in the Oxford English
Dictionary [OED] in 2003, after over a decade of efforts to
raise awareness and expose the Laogai, China's brutal system of
labor camps. This marked an historical milestone for the Laogai
Research Foundation and its work.
The inclusion of the word ``laogai'' into the lexicon of
the OED is not only a recognition of the Laogai's existence,
but is also acknowledgement of the hard work of those trying to
expose its atrocities. The Oxford English Dictionary's entries
for ``laogai'' make the distinction between the Soviet gulag as
a thing of the past and the ``laogai'' as a system that remains
fully operational in China today.
It is common knowledge that every totalitarian regime must
have a suppressive mechanism to maintain its hold on power.
China is no exception. Issues such as the persecution of
Tibetans and Falun Gong practitioners, the detention of
Internet activists, and forced labor products in China should
not be discussed in isolation.
The subject of China's Laogai encompasses all of these
issues, and the system of repression embodied by the Laogai
must be talked about as a whole in order to get to the root of
the suppression that is taking place and bring about freedom in
China. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wu appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Dorman. Mr. Wu, thank you very much. I just want to
express our gratitude to you for testifying today and providing
your expertise on this subject to the Commission.
Next, we will hear from Mr. Jeff Fiedler, who is President
of the Food and Allied Services Trades Department of the AFL-
CIO, and a co-founder of the Laogai Research Foundation.
When Mr. Wu was detained in 1995, Mr. Fiedler coordinated
the public campaign to win his release. Mr. Fiedler is a member
of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Pacific Council on
International Policy.
He attended three of the American Assembly Conferences on
China sponsored by Columbia University, and has been
interviewed on CBS, NBC, ABC, CNN, and CNBC regularly on China
policy, international trade issues, human rights, and child
labor.
Mr. Fiedler, you have 10 minutes for your opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF JEFFREY L. FIEDLER, PRESIDENT, FOOD AND ALLIED
SERVICE TRADES DEPARTMENT, AFL-CIO, AND CO-FOUNDER OF THE
LAOGAI RESEARCH FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Fiedler. I will limit myself to the United States and
U.S. Government policy, practice, and recent history, if you
will, regarding forced labor products coming into the United
States, and I will not detail my written testimony.
For background purposes, it is important to understand that
the first Memorandum of Understanding [MOU] on Prison Labor
that was negotiated by the State Department under the first
Bush Administration was, in my view, in response to political
circumstances in the United States that potentially exacerbated
the relationship between the United States and China, and
complicated the Most Favored Nation [MFN] status debate from
some people's point of view. In its first instance, in my view,
the term ``prison labor'' was intentionally misleading. In
other words, the U.S. Government did not accept the term
``forced labor,'' it used ``prison labor,'' which was deceptive
in the following sense, that, oh, California has prison labor.
We just do not want to import products into the United States
that are made cheaply by prisoners in another country in the
world. That was not, of course, our issue. Our issue was that
the forced labor system itself in China was the aberration and
was what should be dealt with.
Then the MOU's implementation--by the way, there is one
other variant of this, and that is, the word ``inspection'' was
used in association with the MOU. If you look at the
attachments to my testimony with the actual MOU, you will not
see the word ``inspect'' anywhere in it. Those of you who have
diplomatic experience understand that the word ``inspection''
is very different in meaning from the word ``visit.'' There are
nuclear ``inspections,'' then there are ``visits.'' One term is
more powerful than the other, the word ``inspection.'' And the
Chinese never agreed, by the way, to any inspection. They
agreed to a bureaucratic system that was not very good, and
even then they did not implement it.
But ending Chinese ``prison'' exports of forced labor
products to the United States became a must-do condition in the
MFN debate under the Clinton Administration--President Clinton
set implementation of the MOU as a must-do condition for the
Chinese.
Well, there was no way that the Clinton Administration
could say that the Chinese were implementing the agreement, so
in a diplomatic sleight of hand, in my view, they negotiated a
Statement of Cooperation which said the Chinese would do
better. They then held the Statement of Cooperation up as
compliance with the must-do condition. So you see that all of
this stuff is done in a political context, which, arguably,
would have been better if there were no sort of political
pressure for this.
Now, after the MFN, and subsequently Permanent Normal
Trading Relations [PNTR] debates for China and entry into the
World Trade Organization [WTO], the government has fallen
asleep on the question of forced labor exports to the United
States. The Customs Service certainly does not talk to us. They
do not talk to the Falun Gong. You do not read anything about
this issue. You see no findings in the Federal Register.
Yet people like us and our researchers will go to the
Internet to a Web site called ``China Big,'' which is co-owned
by R.H. Donnelly, a U.S. company, and find, I believe, 126
forced labor camps listed on the Internet with their commercial
names. There are very few with their actual prison names, but
there are a couple, and we believe 31 to be camps or production
facilities run by the police that are associated with camps.
This, by the way, is on top of the 99 camps we found doing $700
million a year in production listed in Dun & Bradstreet's China
directory some years ago.
So what is the point of the U.S. Government doing it? You
see in my testimony a series of proposals to change U.S. policy
and change U.S. law. Our objective should not be, simply, under
the 1933 Act, to punish U.S. people who import forced labor
products. The evidence for that is largely in China, and the
U.S. legal system does not recognize the validity of the
testimony if the witnesses are somewhere else, or the paper
documents are somewhere else, and I would not want to send
somebody to jail, either, based upon flimsy evidence. But now
the issue becomes, one, are we interested, as a matter of
policy, in ending forced labor in China? Two, as a vehicle to
do that, are we interested in ending forced labor exports by
the Chinese to our country and other countries? If we are, then
we should set different evidentiary standards for the
importation of hand tools, for instance. Those are not human
beings, those are hand tools.
We should use our intelligence resources in ways that we
have not done up until now. I mean, once someone asked us,
``How come you can find forced labor product exports in the
United States and the U.S. Government cannot? '' My not-too-
glib answer was, ``Because we want to, and they do not.'' I
still believe that. So if people are serious, this Commission,
and others, can sit down and say, all right--let's look at the
problem. There is a task force, I believe, in the law that
established this Commission, that has probably never met, or
has rarely met, and has not issued a report of any kind that
the public has seen, at least that I could find. And we sit
down and say, ``All right, here is the problem.'' This is what
they did when the Laogai Research Foundation exposed it: you
drove them deeper underground. Oh, well. You got only a few
dollars a year, but we are the U.S. Government and we have a
little bit more.
We will offer rewards to U.S. businessmen, and to Taiwanese
businessmen, and Korean businessmen, and European businessmen
and women, anybody who reports hard evidence to the U.S.
Government that can be corroborated about forced labor in
China.
Let me tell you, I suspect that more than a few people are
privately angry, such as the U.S. businessman was who was
making binder clips and who took it upon himself some years ago
to track the forced labor exports down himself, with our
assistance. There are businessmen who are angry that they are
being undercut by Chinese forced labor products. I am less
interested in business than I am in ending the forced labor
system. I am much more interested in that. But it is a vehicle
for us to do so, and I think the Commission ought to give more
serious thought to actually getting to enforce the cooperation
and the task force that exists in current law. We would be more
than agreeable to help in that process.
Mr. Dorman. Good. An extra minute for Mr. Xu.
Mr. Fiedler. I try to be timely.
Mr. Dorman. Thank you very much for that testimony.
Mr. Fiedler. He much deserves the extra minute.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fiedler appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Dorman. Both you and Mr. Wu have provided us plenty to
talk about in the question and answer session.
Our next witness is Mr. Gregory Xu, a Falun Gong
practitioner, and researcher on the treatment of Falun Gong
practitioners in China. Mr. Xu has collected reports from all
parts of China on the imprisonment of practitioners since 1991.
He is a software engineer for a technology company.
Mr. Xu, 10 minutes for your opening statement, please.
STATEMENT OF GREGORY XU, FALUN GONG PRACTITIONER, AND
RESEARCHER ON THE TREATMENT OF FALUN GONG PRACTITIONERS IN
CHINA, EDISON, NJ
Mr. Xu. Mr. Dorman, staff members of this Commission,
ladies and gentlemen, thank you for giving me this opportunity
to speak on the plight of Falun Gong practitioners in China.
We are grateful for the support that this Congress has
shown us during this difficult time. We are, however, sad to
report that in the past six years, the persecution of Falun
Gong in China has gone into a covert one, but has continued to
worsen. Over the years, between 200,000 and 1 million
reportedly have been sent to forced labor camps without trials.
The persecution methods used in such camps are extremely cruel,
encompassing a wide variety of brutal tortures; and yet the
Chinese Government has imposed strict blockades in an attempt
to conceal information and absolve itself of responsibility.
Most recently, Falun Dafa Information Center [FDI] has
learned that Ms. Gao Rongrong, whose face was grossly
disfigured as a result of torture in Longshan Forced Labor
Camp, was murdered and died on June 16, 2005. Ms. Gao went
through nearly two years of incarceration, brainwashing, and
torture for her beliefs in Falun Gong. Her case even involved
directives from Luo Gan, one of the Standing Committee members
on the Chinese Communist Party's Politburo.
In July 2003, Ms. Gao was sent to Longshan Forced Labor
Camp. On May 7, 2004, at approximately 3 p.m., Tang Yubao, the
deputy head of the No. 2 Prison Brigade, along with team leader
Jiang Zhaohua, summoned Ms. Gao to the office and began to
torture her with an electric baton.
The torture continued for about seven hours, and the
inmates in the labor camp said that Ms. Gao sustained multiple
burns to her face, head, and neck. Ms. Gao's face was covered
with blisters and her hair was matted with pus and blood. So
severe were the injuries, that Ms. Gao's face was disfigured
and she had difficulty seeing. Shocking photos made their way
overseas, and they were publicized widely. You can see,
actually, from the other report, Ms. Gao's picture. Details of
her case were submitted to relevant government offices in the
United States and other nations, and were also presented to the
United Nations. As international pressure mounted concerning
Gao's case, Luo Gan, one of China's highest-ranking officials,
stepped in. Luo proceeded to order the Liaoning Province
Chinese Communist Party Political Judiciary Committee, the
Procuratorate, the Department of Justice, and the police
department to conceal any and all information about Ms. Gao's
case.
On March 6, 2005, Ms. Gao was located by police and again
abducted. Neither her location nor her condition was revealed
to her family members until June 12, when she was sent to the
Medical University Hospital in Shenyang City from the Masanjia
Labor Camp. According to Ms. Gao's family, by the time they
reached the hospital on June 12, Ms. Gao had lost
consciousness. Her organs were atrophying, and she was hooked
up to a respirator. They said she was little more than skin and
bones. Ms. Gao died four days later. Chinese police are now
pressuring Ms. Gao's family to cremate her body quickly, trying
to eliminate the evidence of torture.
Ms. Gao's death is part of a disturbing pattern of
systematic rights violations, systematic cover ups, and zero
accountability. Since China's former president, Jiang Zemin,
launched the persecution of Falun Gong in 1999, according to
incomplete statistics, more than 180 forced labor camps in
China have directly participated in persecution through illegal
forced labor of over 200,000 Falun Gong practitioners.
In addition to forced brainwashing and torture, China's
labor camps also force a large number of Falun Gong
practitioners to work as slave laborers. Falun Gong
practitioners have been made to work overtime shifts, subject
to punishment by deprivation of food or sleep if assigned
quotas are not met, and tortured if they refuse to cooperate.
They are often arbitrarily detained beyond their release dates
because of the huge profits that the camps stand to gain as a
result of free labor.
Practitioners are forced to work more than 10 hours a day,
sometimes even continuously overnight. Because of the terrible
working conditions and the highly labor intensive work, Falun
Gong practitioners have all suffered various degrees of damage,
both mentally and physically. Some have become disabled, or
have even died. About 30 percent of all of the death cases of
Falun Gong practitioners resulted from torture in the labor
camps. Sixty-nine labor camps have directly caused the deaths
of Falun Gong practitioners, including elderly people in their
60s and an eight-month-old infant. Even women, children, or
disabled practitioners were not spared.
U.S. citizen Charles Lee was arrested upon arriving at the
Guangzhou airport on June 22, 2003. He was rushed through a
one-day show trial on March 21, 2003, and sentenced to a three-
year prison term for his intention of exposing human rights
violations against the Falun Gong practitioners by the Chinese
Government.
According to the information from his friends, throughout
two and a half years of detention, Dr. Lee has suffered both
physical and mental abuses. He has been beaten, force fed,
deprived of sleep, handcuffed for days at a time, and forced to
watch anti-Falun Gong brainwashing videos. Starting from early
to late June 2004, Dr. Lee was forced to make Christmas lights
daily. At times, he was forced to work 10 to 12 hours a day,
and seven days a week. These Christmas lights are to be
exported to the United States.
FDI and the World Organization to Investigate the
Persecution of Falun Gong [WOIPFG] investigated the persecution
of Falun Gong and has collected ample evidence that shows
China's labor camps cooperated with companies to force Falun
Gong practitioners to manufacture forced labor products without
any payment during their detention. Products from these labor
camps are exported to more than 30 countries and regions,
including the United States, Canada, Australia, France,
Germany, New Zealand, Southeast Asia, et cetera.
For example, WOIPFG reported that there are two main
products made for the Henan Province hair products industry by
over 800 detainees, including illegally detained Falun Gong
practitioners in Hunan Province's No. 3 Labor Camp and the
Shibalihe female labor camp in Zhengzhou city, have been pushed
to work day and night by guards who threaten them with torture,
punishment, and humiliation. They work extra hours to bring in
foreign exchange income and more profits for the labor camps
for the Henan Rebecca Hair Products, Inc.
To increase profits, Hunan Province and No. 3 Labor Camp
even buy Falun Gong practitioners as slaves from other places
for 800 yuan each. When the labor camp was short of funds and
was about to be shut down, many Falun Gong practitioners were
abducted and incarcerated in this camp where they were forced
to make hair products. The United States is the largest
distribution and consumer market of hair products in the world.
Henan Rebecca Hair Products, Inc. accounts for a significant
market share in the United States.
Statistics show that the United States has a need for 15
million human hair weavings, many of which come from Henan.
WOIPFG has submitted a petition to the Department of Homeland
Security for an immediate investigation and environmental
action on certain wigs exported by Henan Rebecca Hair Products,
Inc.
The crackdown on Falun Gong over the past six years in the
People's Republic of China has led to unjust imprisonment of
hundreds of thousands of innocent practitioners. Consequently,
many children have lost either one or both parents, sometimes
even their caregiver. According to the 2005 report of Global
Mission Rescue [GMR], on persecuted Falun Gong practitioners,
five children were killed in police custody; 18 children lost
both of their parents during the persecution; 102 children lost
one of their parents; 43 children are directly targeted,
tortured, and thrown into prisons in the labor camps because of
their parents' belief in Falun Gong; 39 children were forced to
separate from their parents because their parents are detained.
In addition, hundreds of thousands of children have been forced
to slander Falun Gong, or upon refusal, be expelled from
school. Moreover, many young ones are discriminated against, as
their parents are practicing Falun Gong.
This data, however, only represents the information
investigated and confirmed by GMR. Due to censorship and the
tight hold on information related to Falun Gong in China, what
has been reported so far represents perhaps only a tiny tip of
the iceberg. I hope that this testimony will help you
understand the severity and the scope of this ruthless campaign
of persecution against the Falun Gong practitioners of China.
Thank you for your consideration. I would be pleased to
answer questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Xu appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Dorman. Mr. Xu, thank you very much for your testimony.
For those of you who have arrived late, I just want to
point out that written statements from the witnesses are on a
table in the hallway. There are also additional materials from
the Laogai Research Foundation on the table. Our Senior Counsel
for Labor Affairs, Pat Dyson, has put a few copies of the new
ILO report on forced labor on the table as well. So, please
feel free to take copies if you would like.
Each of the staff on the dias now has five minutes to ask a
question and hear an answer from the witnesses. We should be
able, I think, to get through two rounds of questions before we
reach 11:30.
I have a brief question for the entire panel, and a shorter
question, if I have time, for Mr. Fiedler specifically.
Realizing the depth of experience here today on this
particular issue, and at least two of you have been researching
this issue much, much longer than the Commission, I wanted to
get a sense of where the Chinese leadership is on this issue
right now, because an important part of what this Commission
tries to do, as you point out, Mr. Fiedler, is to usefully,
effectively, constructively, insert itself into the
conversation. Pat Dyson recently showed me a speech from last
year, I think, by China's Minister of Justice. The speech,
which I referenced in my opening statement, described some
plans, some intentions, some discussions by the Chinese
Government to separate production units from the management
authority of prison wardens.
Something else that Pat has briefed me on is discussions in
China on eliminating forced labor, not so much because it
violates sensibilities and international agreements, but
instead because the profits from forced labor feed official
corruption, a problem we all know is growing in severity in
China.
So, based on your understanding and extensive research,
could each of you in turn comment on your analysis of comments
like this from Chinese authorities, and what these comments
tell us in terms of intentions.
Mr. Wu, would you like to begin?
Mr. Wu. I think, first of all, we have to realize that
American law is talking about forced labor in that, if the
product is processed by forced labor, or partially or wholly
made by forced labor, it is illegal.
Jeff Fiedler mentioned the binder clips. The entire
material of the binder clips comes from a legitimate factory,
but they are only using female prisoners to assemble the clips.
We have evidence that all the female prisoners' fingers are
bloodied just from putting wires into the clips. This process
is illegal. End it, and the prison men will go to court.
Another case is artificial flowers. A witness who is now in
New York was forced to make such flowers, in a detention
center, before he had undergone a trial. The flowers were
designed and made by other legitimate companies or factories.
The prisoners, even before undergoing a trial, were waiting in
the detention center and assembling products. This is illegal.
So we must know what is the real definition of what is known as
an illegal product? It is not like we are able to easily
ascertain that, ``Oh, this is a brand from a prison camp.''
The Chinese today say, ``Well, we have a police family
workshop.'' So an American investigator goes to China and they
say, ``Do you want to see it? I can show you all these
daughters and sons of policemen working on the production line.
They are not prisoners at all.'' But the parts come from the
workshop in which the prisoners work.
I can go further. I can tell you, probably seven years ago,
Chrysler Corporation had a Jeep Cherokee factory in China.
Several years ago, the Jeep Cherokee factory in Beijing
announced that ``we are pretty good now, and most of our parts
come from Chinese companies, not necessarily imported from the
United States.'' They had a long list of Chinese suppliers.
Among these suppliers, a number of them were prison camps.
According to American law, it is illegal to import the Jeep
Cherokee to the United States, because some parts were
partially made by forced labor. I really doubt that Americans
really care about this issue.
If they really want to do something about it, they should
implement the law. I am not talking about a human rights issue
at this moment. I am an American citizen, an American taxpayer.
I want to ask the government to implement the law. It is their
duty. It is my right to ask for it. You listened to what Jeff
Fiedler said. They do nothing. There is a case--and later maybe
Mr. Fiedler can explain to you about the graphite products--and
they just drop it. For example, the binder clips case. All of
this hard evidence and these witnesses were produced by us.
Otherwise, the case would never have come to light. But we have
such a powerful Customs Service institution there, the question
is whether they implement the law or not.
Mr. Fiedler. To answer your question more directly,
obviously I am suspicious of the Chinese leadership's
expression of a desire to change. We have heard them on any
number of subjects.
In my view, they want their system to appear to be a prison
system like everyone else's yet the sort of persecution of the
Falun Gong has presented them with a dilemma. The government is
acting much more like it did 30 years ago than like it was
heading toward more recently.
The notion of profitmaking. Actually, the rationale was not
profitmaking to start with. The rationale was to have the
system be self-paying so that it was not a drag on the
government's revenue. It led into profitmaking.
It led into profitmaking, in my view, among other reasons,
because recently--in the last 10 or 15 years--you did not have
any power in China unless you had access to dollars. Anybody
who had access to hard currency and business was more powerful
than somebody who did not. The overseers of the system did not
want to be left out in the rush, in the laissez faire
capitalist rush that was overtaking China, one can argue. So I
do not believe that they are serious, other than to make it
appear as if they have a new system. We do not see any
evidence. As a matter of fact, we see all evidence to the
contrary to that development.
Mr. Dorman. Good. My time is up.
Mr. Xu, if you would like to comment on my question, we can
get it in the next round. I want to move on, because we have
many staff members who would like to ask questions.
I am going to turn the microphone over to John Foarde, my
colleague, who serves as Staff Director for our House of
Representatives Co-Chairman Congressman Jim Leach.
John.
Mr. Foarde. Thank you, Dave.
Let me address this question to both Jeff Fiedler and Harry
Wu, just for the record, so we can understand more fully. All
three of you have spoken quite eloquently about the export of
forced labor products to the United States from China. How much
export of forced labor products is there to other countries
besides the United States, and do you have any sense of whether
or not it is more or less than to the United States, and
roughly what percentage may be going elsewhere?
Mr. Wu. We do not have accurate numbers because the
statistics are hiding in, as the Chinese have said, indirect
exports. The United States is the only country in the world
that forbids products made by forced labor from being imported.
We find many products in London, in Toulouse, in Paris, and
nobody cares about that. So, we do not have any figures for
that. But, anyway, they just go on.
Mr. Fiedler. There are certain kinds of products. For
instance, the Liaoning Laogai that historically produced entire
trucks, which were exported throughout Southeast Asia. The
Chinese product manuals that we have examined over the years,
and of course ever since we exposed the information they kind
of stopped bragging about it, always included information about
exports. They would say they export to the United States,
Europe, and Australia. I do not know how much of it is, in
fact, true. We have no real sense of the size of the trade.
But you can get a sense, from the Dun & Bradstreet
information that was from the Chinese statistical annuals, on
Laogai company revenue. Again, one must take such information
somewhat with a grain of salt as with any statistics coming out
of China. Of 99 camps, according to their information, they
were doing $700 million worth of business.
These were largely coastal camps and Guangdong camps that
mirrored the sort of economic development of the country, not
the backwater, provincial camps that make bricks and cement. By
the way, the labor is no more gratifying in those places than
it is in the coastal areas. So, it is very hard. We do not have
any good numbers. I do not think anybody has any good numbers.
Mr. Foarde. Thank you. I know that my colleagues all have
questions, so I am happy to yield the floor to someone else.
Mr. Dorman. I next would like to recognize the Commission's
General Counsel, Dr. Susan Roosevelt Weld.
Susan.
Ms. Weld. Thanks, Dave.
I am interested in the ways in which Falun Gong prisoners
are treated either like other prisoners or differently. I
wonder if any of you have statistics on the Laojiao--
reeducation through labor camps--which do not require a trial
before people are sentenced to them. What percentage of the
inmates in the laojiao system are Falun Gong practitioners who
have been picked up for Falun Gong offenses?
Mr. Xu. Since the information is blocked, we do not have an
exact percentage. But I can give some examples. They have
expanded the prisons, and spent a lot of money to expand the
prisons after 1999, because with the imprisonment of so many
Falun Gong practitioners, the cells were full. That is one
example.
Ms. Weld. What evidence do you have of the expanded
prisons? Is it just size of population or the actual area of
the prisons, or the kinds of labor?
Mr. Xu. Expanding scales of prison size and incorporating
Falun Gong practitioners.
Ms. Weld. Thank you.
Mr. Wu. According to Chinese law, the laojiao is not a
prison, so they are not prisoners. So if an American wanted to
visit a prison, they would say, no, this is the facility of
some institution, not a prison. They would say that this
facility exists out of consideration. I myself spent 19 years
mostly in a laojiao prison, with no trial, no papers. That is
it. Today, the estimated number of laojiao prisoners is
probably, at a minimum, 300,000. The higher estimate is a half
million. If we take the middle number, it is about 400,000, and
probably 15 percent of these prisoners are Falun Gong
practitioners.
Ms. Weld. Fifty percent?
Mr. Wu. Fifteen percent of them. It is probably around
60,000, concentrated in certain provinces. They particularly
focus on certain provinces, such as: Shandong, Liaoning,
Heilongjiang, Henan, Hebei, and Shaanxi. These reeducation
camps are full of Falun Gong practitioners.
Ms. Weld. Very quick follow-up. Are the Falun Gong inmates
segregated from other inmates and subject to different kinds of
treatment?
Mr. Wu. Yes. The Chinese Communist Government has a
different policy for Falun Gong practitioners. The policy
directive from the former president, Jiang Zemin, is that if a
Falun Gong practitioner is killed, he should just be buried.
Also, another policy is to deprive Falun Gong practitioners
economically and defame them.
The main purpose for putting Falun Gong practitioners into
labor camps is, as the authorities call it, reeducation. They
try to convert them, force them to give up their beliefs. You
can hear many cases about torture, and the purpose for this
torture is to force them to give up their beliefs.
Mr. Dorman. Good. Thank you.
I would like to recognize, next, Pat Dyson, who is the
Commission's Senior Counsel for Labor, and she is also the
person who organized this roundtable.
Thank you, Pat.
Ms. Dyson. I want to thank all of you for coming and giving
your testimony. It has been most useful. I wanted to ask Mr. Wu
to describe what the working conditions are. We are all talking
about forced labor, but how many hours are people required to
work? What are the safety conditions? What are the results on
people's health and welfare when they have gone through four or
five years of this process?
Mr. Wu. Number one, it is a national policy that all
prisoners are forced to work. The purpose for this is not only
to make a profit to support the government, support the regime.
This is a way that the government supposedly helps you to
``reform.''
The first day you arrive at the camp, the warden will say,
``Do you know how you have become a criminal? We are going to
help you.'' Is your sentence 5 years, 10 years? Not only will
you receive punishment, but you have to engage in hard labor,
or else you never can become a ``new socialist person.'' So
this is not something to punish you, and it doesn't matter
whether you like it or do not like it. You have to do it. If
you do not engage in the hard labor, they say, ``Well, how can
I help you? '' So this labor is a kind of offer from the
government. You have to do what they say.
Number two, there is no other country in the world where
the prisons are enterprises. This practice of prison
enterprises is not carried out just occasionally, or
temporarily, or locally somewhere. This is national policy.
Each labor camp, except one prison, Qincheng Prison--
because this is a very special prison, for high-level, senior
political criminals--chooses names, both enterprise names and
prison names. It is true that they are enterprises. The Chinese
call this the Special Enterprise System.
Number three, except in ``Potemkin villages,'' except for
these model camps for foreigners to visit, the situation in
common prison camps depends on the nature of the camps. If it
is an agricultural camp, in the wintertime the labor is slow
because there is nothing to do in the fields, and because other
agricultural camps have stopped their work.
Mostly, like me, we were digging a canal in the winter or
repairing the roads. In the summertime, you work for a very
long time. When the sun rises, you just go to work. When the
sun is setting, you come back. There is no time out for rest.
Sometimes, when you are harvesting the crops, you are working
for a longer amount of time. This is in agricultural camps.
As for the other camps--for example, the coal mine--I
worked in a coal mine for nine years, from 12 o'clock to 12
o'clock, two shifts a day. And I also worked long hours in a
chemical factory, from 12 o'clock to 12 o'clock, two shifts a
day. Today, there is a very special policy, the so-called
``accumulate your score'' policy. According to this policy, if
you work hard, you earn points. There is a daily quota for
every laborer. If you work hard and you have done your job,
then you earn points.
If you accumulate points, they can reduce your sentence, by
three months, or six months, or maybe give you a favor so that
you can buy more food, or your family can come to visit you,
and they have a special place where you can stay with your wife
during the night because you work hard. Because today they
really are talking about profit.
Mr. Fiedler. There is nobody that we know of on the outside
enforcing any conditions that we would normally think
appropriate. There is famous footage that Harry took in the
early 1990s in the Qinghai Hide Factory, which is a prison, of
a prisoner standing half-naked in a vat of chemicals tanning a
hide. In the United States, we do not tan many hides any more
because the chromium tanning process is so toxic. We send most
of our hides to China, actually. But there is nobody checking
these conditions. They clearly vary, but nobody really knows,
except for ex-prisoners who have suffered them recently.
Mr. Dorman. Good. I would like to recognize, next, CECC
Senior Counsel Carl Minzner for five minutes.
Mr. Minzner. Thank you very much. I have to confess, I am
not an expert in criminal or labor law, so this is definitely a
very useful experience for me to be able to listen to you. Just
from listening to your testimony, it sounds like you are
describing the problem of forced labor in China as a two-part
problem. On the one hand, it sounds like the central leadership
has made a decision that it is permissible to use severe
punishment and abuse of political prisoners, particularly of
groups such as the Falun Gong.
Second, it sounds like you are also describing a highly
decentralized system in which each camp has significant
incentives, particularly financial incentives, to make money
and significant leeway to compel prisoners to engage in forced
labor in order to generate profits for the camp staff.
All of you have very eloquently talked about the first
point. I wondered if you could explore the second point a
little bit more. Particularly, what are the incentive
structures that the individual prisons operate under?
Are there quotas that are sent down on how much should be
produced? Who keeps the money that results as a result of the
products? Perhaps if we can understand what the incentives are
in the individual camps, it might help us think more about how
to address them.
Mr. Fiedler. Can I start on that? In the prison literature
from the government journals and some of their reports, prisons
brag about how much money they kick upstairs to the central
government. So, there is some number of dollars, X percentage,
that may go to the central government. The rest stays in the
system. They have got a budget to operate the place. I do not
know how many of you have done budgets, but I have never seen a
budget that was not manipulated in some way.
So, they run the place on X number of dollars, then there
is money left over for themselves, and their families, and
their friends, and the companies that they are dealing with.
We have no idea what the financial relationship is between,
for instance with the binder clips, the private company paying
and what the kick-back was to the warden for providing the
female prisoners. So suffice it to say, some people have
criticized and said, ``Well, they are not really making a
profit.'' Well, it depends. I mean, what is a profit? Profit at
the end of the day is money left on the table, and there is no
money left on the table because everybody else has taken it? I
do not know.
On the decentralization question, it is a national policy,
as Harry said. It is a big country. It is hard to implement any
national policy entirely. There is lots of leeway for people to
do things. There was probably not a written national policy for
torture, but I would not say that torture is the result of
decentralization of the Laogai system.
Mr. Wu. The financial system in the prison camps is divided
into different time periods. For 30-some years, under the Mao
time period, it was entirely what was called a ``planned
economy'' system.
At that time, everything was planned by the government, the
local government, the provincial government, and whatever the
profit, it was given back to the government as planned. The
policemen made a fixed salary. They did not receive any bonus,
just their salary. I was in a prison camp at that time, and in
the prison camp there was no bonus for the prisoners at all.
Prisoners simply had to work. Most of the work was primitive
labor. There was no cost, so you could never figure out the
output.
After Deng Xiaoping came into power, there was a new time
period of probably 10 to 15 years, under which a new system was
implemented, called the ``market economy'' system. Each prison
camp enterprise became an independent financial unit that made
money. Police were given a salary and benefits, and the
maintenance of the facility was funded by its production
profits.
If production was going well, the police could make a lot
of money. They therefore wanted to encourage prisoners to work
hard. They gave the prisoners a kind of bonus, a small amount
of money.
So, for example, there was a prison in Anhui Province. It
was a pretty old industrial factory, making textile products,
with very old machines. They could not renovate the machines,
and the quality of their products was pretty bad. They could
not earn much money, and then they went bankrupt. The local
government said, ``You do not have money, and I am not going to
pay your salary.''
Some police in the prison camps were pretty wealthy because
their products are produced for export, for the market, and
they sold very well. They made a lot of money--double, maybe
triple their monthly salary.
This one, a textile prison camp, had no money, so the
police had no money each month. They were suffering. Then they
had a new order. They said, ``We will now gather 1,500
prisoners, and another 500 prisoners, and another 500 police
families together in a big meeting and say, ``We have a new
policy. Everybody listen. I do not care who you are, whether
you are a policeman or you are a prisoner. If you can offer me
an opportunity to make money, I will take it. I will follow
you.'' Then one person says, ``I can do it. I can offer you an
opportunity.'' Then she offers something.
The next day, this prisoner was taken out of her cell, and
she was assigned to be a manager of the company, and then taken
out of her prison uniform and accompanied by policemen out of
the camp, in search of opportunities to make money. But the
prison authorities were corrupt and the warden committed
suicide because he violated the law.
This caused big problems, because the whole security system
is unstable. Some of the prison camps made huge amounts of
money, and some of them suffered.
Then Jiang Zemin came up with a new policy. Under this new
policy, every warden, every police car over there, was given a
certain payment. Under the so-called 3-3-4 system, 30 percent
of the profit is given to the central government, 30 percent is
given to the local government, and 40 percent remains in the
prison for the benefit of the policemen. So if you earn more,
it is to your benefit under this new system.
Mr. Dorman. Good. Thank you very much. I would like to
recognize Dr. Kate Kaup, the Commission's Special Advisor on
Minority Affairs.
Kate.
Ms. Kaup. Thank you. I would like to follow up on a few
questions that have already been raised, specifically on the
conflict between implementation and existing laws and
regulations. Clearly, implementation is a problem throughout
China in a variety of policy arenas. But are there written
regulations on the books for health and safety conditions in
the Laogai system? Are there any kind of restrictions on the
number of hours that prisoners are forced to work? Has the
Chinese Government shown any willingness at all to discuss
this, either with the United States or domestically?
Mr. Wu. Oh, yes, they have a policy. Eight hours a day, six
days a week. They can even enroll in a university and get a
degree. Yes.
Ms. Kaup. And are any of these regulations new or have they
all been on the books for years?
Mr. Wu. Just like the Chinese Constitution, all the time
they had the articles there for the freedom of speech, the
freedom of religion.
Mr. Dorman. Thank you. Finally, I would like to recognize
Adam Bobrow, a Senior Counsel on the Commission.
Mr. Bobrow. Thank you, David. Thank you to all the
panelists.
Just a quick initial question for Mr. Wu. You mentioned
that other countries where China might export some of these
products have no laws on the books to prevent the import, or to
make illegal the import, of prison labor product? That is true?
Mr. Wu. Yes.
Mr. Bobrow. So the United States is the only country that
does.
Mr. Wu. The only country. The British have a regulation.
This is my favorite country because I am an American citizen.
But some countries go pretty far. We even find Japanese
companies that directly cooperate with prison camps in joint
ventures, making tea. They do not care.
Mr. Bobrow. In that light, I guess the problem is--and you
can correct me if I am wrong--there is no way to tell the
difference at the border between products made in prison and
products not made in prison. Obviously, there is a serious
amount of intermingling.
Mr. Fiedler. They especially intermingled after Harry
revealed the Shanghai Hand Tools factory exporting wrenches and
stuff. The problem is not the evidence. The problem is not that
they are intermingling. The problem is the will to develop a
solution. So for instance, if we find evidence that the Chinese
are intermingling, and therefore you cannot tell, what do you
do? Let them continue to intermingle and con you? Or do you
say, ``Tell you what, you cannot send us any hand tools at all
because we cannot tell? We will get our hand tools from
somewhere else.'' Then you have created an enormous amount of
internal pressure among the legitimate hand tool manufacturers
in China. They say, ``Hey, wait a second, government. Just for
a couple of prison hand tools, you are going to mess up the
entire hand tool industry in China? '' Now, does somebody think
that is unfair? We are not putting anybody in jail here, we are
just not letting them sell us any hand tools.
So, we have sat back for, now, 13 years, and allowed the
Chinese Government and the Chinese prison system to con us,
based on our sort of silly standard. Oh, they are mixing them
up. The head of Asbury Graphite in New Jersey, in 1995,
admitted on national television that the graphite he was buying
was made in a forced labor camp. He admitted it on camera, the
7 o'clock NBC national news. Nothing ever happened to him.
Graphite continued to come in because the U.S. Customs Service
said, but we cannot tell the difference. It does not have a
brand on it. Like, an apple does not have a brand on it either.
So we said, ``Oh, can you do some forensic tests on it? ''
They use a certain kind of graphite, by the way. The reason
that they are getting it is because it is the only place in the
country that produces this kind of graphite.
There was testimony about brake rotors in a civil court
case in Southern California where the person who imported them
said, ``We did it.'' Nothing happened. We caught Columbus
McKinnon, an upstate New York-based company, making chain
hoists. We had photographs of the chairman of their board
standing next to prisoners.
The Customs Service investigated for two and a half years,
referred it to a U.S. Attorney for prosecution, and the
prosecutor turned it down because of the U.S. evidentiary
problem. The Chinese Government built a new chain hoist factory
in Zhejiang Province. The two places where you get chain hoists
in China are two forced labor camps. So you think that it would
occur to us, as a matter of policy, to say, ``Well, I will tell
you what. We do not like your chain hoists. We will get them
from Czechoslovakia, or somewhere, because you are mixing and
matching, throwing `Double Pigeon' labels on it.'' I am
offended. I really am offended by our lack of creativity. And I
do not mistake it as a lack of creativity. I tag it as a lack
of will on the part of our government to do anything about this
problem. Sorry for the outburst.
Mr. Wu. Can I add something?
Mr. Dorman. Yes.
Mr. Wu. It is a very difficult job for the Customs Service.
I will give you a couple of examples. One is that of Diamond
brand hand tools, wrenches. We found them in Texas. I went to
China. I have all the photographs documenting the Zhejiang
Province No. 2 Prison where they made the wrenches.
But later it was difficult, because Diamond brand wrenches
are very well-known around the world. I found these wrenches in
London, in Toulouse, in Hong Kong, everywhere, because the
brand name, just like McDonald's, like Gucci's, is very well-
known. Then the Chinese Government merged another two
legitimate factories that produced the wrenches under the one
brand, Diamond. It was a prisoner product. So you could not
figure out that this one is made by prisoners, and this one is
made by a legitimate factory. I can take you there and you can
see it. It is a legitimate factory. That is one case.
In a second case, I found boots, rubber boots, in Wal-Mart.
It was a big shock. In Wal-Mart, K-Mart, and Home Depot. Also,
I went inside China. I posed as a businessman. I went in front
of the prison camp, I went to the sales department, I bought
the boots, and I brought them back here. They were the same as
the boots you could find in K-Mart, Wal-Mart, and Home Depot.
But what can we do? Shall I name Wal-Mart? What is the
evidence? Wal-Mart can deny it and say, ``We do not know.''
They came from a trading company located in Los Angeles. The
source was different, but the product was exactly the same. I
can show you which Wal-Mart I bought them from, and which
prison camp in China that I bought them from. How can we take
these people to court? I do not know. I am scared to death to
do it.
The other thing today, let me say it this way: the warden,
the prison authorities, they are not able to choose
professional workers or skilled laborers, because they are
dealing with prisoners. They are dealing with peasants, maybe a
teacher, maybe an old man. They have no choice. They do not
hire people or interview people.
So we have to be very clear. Most of this labor today in
prison camps is primitive labor. They do not really make a lot
of products. This is a very special situation today where
people really do not need skills, and do not even need a
facility. For example, they can just sit with a small bench and
assemble artificial flowers. They do not need any skills. They
do not need any knowledge. They can assemble toys, assemble
Christmas lights, do processing work.
Many today, in Guangdong and Fujian Provinces, are
prisoners right now. But they are only doing a part of the
processing, such as 1,500 prisoners in one prison camp,
Jieyang. What are they doing? The design and cutting is done
outside the prison camp. They only put a button on. You never
know what is going on.
So the major problem is ``what is the Laogai? '' Forced
labor is a national policy. If this country can use these
products, they will definitely continue with forced labor. It
is their policy.
Mr. Dorman. Good. Thank you.
I have just a few more questions to begin the second round.
Back to a theme from the first round of questions, and like
then, I am looking for comments and insights based on your deep
experience. One thing that the Commission has been watching
closely is the Chinese Government's commitment to open an
International Committee of the Red Cross office in Beijing.
What is your sense of the impact this office will have when
it opens? Will the ICRC find a more responsive Chinese
Government in terms of prison visits and adding some
transparency to this problem?
Mr. Fiedler. Hopefully. I have great respect for the
International Red Cross and I have little respect for the
Chinese
Government. So, it means it is all really up to the Chinese
Government. You can have a very good International Red Cross
representative there, and yet an uncooperative Chinese
Government, and you are not going to accomplish much.
Now, the fact that the Red Cross opens up an office, to
some degree, confers legitimacy on the Chinese Government.
Right? I mean, it makes everybody think wishfully that the
situation is changing. I do not believe that the only criteria
that we ought to set out for judgment on improvements in the
Chinese system, even a major one, should be the presence of the
International Red Cross.
I think there are a lot of criteria, such as the existence
of forced labor, the continued existence of torture, the
continued lack of due process, the continued persecution of
Catholics, Falun Gong, Protestants, or whatever. There are lots
of other criteria that ought to be addressed as true measures
of progress.
Mr. Xu. I would like to comment on this ICRC office. I
think it is a very good move. In opening this office, it will
definitely monitor and put pressure on the Communist regime,
and watch their behavior. Also, one suggestion. When you are
dealing with the Communists, it is good to know, what is
Chinese Communism?
Recently, I read a series of articles from the Epoch Times.
It is an editorial: Nine commentaries on Chinese Communism. It
is very good and will tell you the nature of Chinese Communism.
When you deal with them, it is better to look at that.
Mr. Dorman. Good. Thank you.
Another short question regarding current procedures
regarding U.S. Customs. What is the procedure right now, if
any, for providing information to U.S. Customs on prison labor
products entering the United States? Is there a procedure?
Mr. Fiedler. Procedure? Like, a formal, you fill-out-a-form
procedure?
Mr. Dorman. Telephone number to call?
Mr. Fiedler. No, I do not believe so. I mean, in fairness
to the Customs Service, they will take information any way you
can give it to them: call them up, write it down, give them
photographs. But the problem is not so much how it comes. The
problem is that I do not think the Customs Service has actively
solicited the information. I do not think that they are
interested.
I do not think, by the way--to be critical of Congress and
the President--I do not know that there is any internal
bureaucratic or political pressure for them to do so. So they
are sitting back there saying, we will keep our heads down, and
nobody is making any noise. Harry Wu has not gone into China
again, because if he does he will do another 15 years. So,
there is no pressure.
Mr. Dorman. Good. Thank you.
One final question, a quick question. I looked over your
written testimony, and you point to the importance of current,
accurate
information on such practices. I have looked through Mr. Xu's
written statement. Of course, I have Mr. Wu's Laogai Research
Foundation handbook in front of me.
Certainly without revealing sources or methods, can you
give us a brief account of whether this information is current
or not, or any other distinguishing features, that would be
important, I think, for any government agency to take action.
I am thinking in very general terms. Is most of this
information based on first-person accounts of people who have
been imprisoned in these sorts of facilities? What other
sources do you use?
Mr. Fiedler. Generally speaking, his information is largely
on first person account as former prisoners, and family members
of prisoners. Our information is based on a number of things,
such as first person accounts, statistical information, Chinese
documents, commercial data bases where the Chinese list these
prisons, their addresses, their names, a lot of historical
data. We have to be very careful. You will see some camps still
listed in the handbook, and we say they are no longer camps,
that they shut this place down. But we leave it in for
historical purposes. I am sure that there are problems. We do
not phone them up and poll them all, although that is not
entirely a bad idea, if your Chinese language skills are good
enough. We can scam them. We used to scam them inside China all
the time. It is dangerous work. But there are a variety of
sources for information.
Mr. Wu. I want to briefly talk about the rubber boots case.
This prison camp produces 8 million pairs of rubber boots every
year. According to government documents, they are mostly for
export, including to the United States and Japan.
A couple of years ago, there was a deputy chief from a
particular prison camp who defected. He escaped to Russia. I
met him in Vladivostok. I interviewed him and collected all the
information, written and by videotape. I turned it over to the
Customs Service. In the Custom Service, there was a man named
David Banner who interviewed this man in Moscow. Since then,
nothing has happened. Unfortunately, the man was later forced
by Chinese agents to return to China, and has now disappeared.
The Falun Gong has offered lots of information,
particularly regarding Christmas lights. Is Customs going to
take care of it? This has been witnessed. A location has been
established. The Customs Service says, let us talk to the
Chinese authorities. I remember there was a bill passed by the
House--John Foarde maybe knows about this--for $2 million for
the Customs Service officials to stay in Beijing to take care
of things. What have they done this year? I just want to know.
They spend our money sitting in Beijing. What are they doing?
I really care about the Memorandum Of Understanding. For
example, according to the MOU, if America requests it, the
Chinese have to, within a certain time period, respond and
allow the Americans to visit the camps and investigate. But
this never happens.
Mr. Fiedler. By the way, I said in my written testimony,
but did not say in my oral testimony, we should abrogate the
MOU. It is meaningless. Once we abrogate the MOU, we can work
on that. Why should anyone expect the Chinese Government to
incriminate itself?
I mean, it wants to keep its system going. We are asking,
with a straight face, ``you give us the evidence so that we can
criticize you or we can take action against you,'' I mean, it
is nonsensical.
Mr. Xu. To Mr. Dorman's question, mainly, our data was from
personal accounts, Falun Gong practitioners that have been
rescued to Western countries. They tell us their stories. There
are between 200,000 and 1 million Falun Gong practitioners that
have been sent to labor camps, and a lot of them, through the
Internet, and also the telephone, release this information on
their personal experiences to the outside.
Mr. Dorman. Well, good.
As always, the 90 minutes has flown by. We have more
questions, but perhaps we can continue the conversation offline
in the future.
I, for one, have found this conversation very, very useful,
and certainly am deeply appreciative of the fact that you have
all come here and testified, and am particularly happy to see
such a distinguished panel.
So on behalf of our Chairman Senator Chuck Hagel, and our
Co-Chairman Congressman Jim Leach, I will bring this roundtable
to a close. And again, thanks to our three witnesses for
testifying today and sharing their deep experience and
knowledge on this subject. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m. the roundtable was concluded.]
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
----------
Prepared Statement of Harry Wu
JUNE 22, 2005
While economic reforms have been implemented in China, political
reforms have not been correspondingly carried out, and the Laogai
system remains a critical factor in the Communist Party's ability to
maintain political control. Efforts by the Laogai Research Foundation
and other human rights groups to focus international attention on this
system have resulted in the Chinese government dropping the term
``laogai'' (reform through labor) from its official documents and
replacing it with the word ``prison.'' This, as well as other
pronouncements by the Chinese government in recent years, was designed
to create the impression abroad that the Chinese system is similar to
penal systems found in the West. However, as Chinese
authorities emphasize, the function of reform through labor remains
unchanged. Severe violations of human rights continue to take place in
the Laogai system. The Laogai, just as the Gulag, is an obstruction to
freedom and democracy. The Laogai is incompatible with freedom and
democracy.
The Laogai is not a dying institution as some have suggested. It is
true that the composition of the camps has changed. In the past, the
majority of criminals were jailed for political reasons, and the
majority of today's inmates are incarcerated for more common crimes.
Nevertheless, this does not indicate a fundamental change in the nature
of the Laogai. To the contrary, the Chinese government's dependence on
the Laogai as its primary tool of suppression is as strong now as it
was in the days of Chairman Mao Zedong's rule.
The Laojiao (re-education through labor) component of the Laogai
was revived by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s, providing the
Communist government with the right to arrest and detain dissenters
without a formal charge or trial for a period of three years. Laojiao
has since developed into one of the most commonly used tools for
punishing and suppressing political and religious dissent, and is
currently being used to suppress the Falun Gong movement.
In recent years, Chinese authorities have sent thousands of Falun
Gong practitioners to the Laogai, where many of them have faced and
continue to face torture, beatings, starvation, and forced labor under
terrible conditions. Meanwhile, petitioners who have traveled en masse
to Beijing and other cities to air their grievances about the
destruction of their homes, unemployment, or unfair treatment have been
imprisoned in the Laogai. These petitioners have usually done nothing
illegal, and the police officers who detain them are often given
monetary rewards based on the number of people they detain.
China has used lethal injection in its implementation of the death
sentence since the late 1990s. This method of execution often takes
place in hospitals. The Chinese government proclaims that this is a
``civilized, progressive and humane'' way to execute criminals.
However, with no checks and no transparency in the legal system, we
have enough reason to believe that this method is abused and that
lethal injection is often unjustly used toward the end of harvesting
prisoners' organs. It is also very difficult for the outside world to
learn about and therefore condemn executions that take place quietly in
a hospital.
The slogan for the Laogai remains ``Reform first, production
second.'' Millions of Chinese in the camps still face the daily
``reform'' components and political indoctrination, or brainwashing.
Mental and physical abuse is common. The Chinese government, meanwhile,
continues to refuse the International Committee of the Red Cross access
to the Laogai.
Regarding the ``production'' aspect of the above slogan, the dual
penal and commercial role of the Laogai is affirmed by China's Ministry
of Justice. In its 1988 Criminal Reform Handbook, the ministry states
that the Laogai ``organizes criminals in labor and production, thus
creating wealth for society.'' It has developed into diverse forms and
plays an important role not only in the judicial but also in the
economic arena. Our research and analysis shows that, as an institution
within the Chinese communist regime, the Laogai has benefited
tremendously from the opening of China to international commerce.
International trade provides the camps access to hard currency as they
export their products--everything from socks to diesel engines, raw
cotton to processed graphite. By trafficking its forced labor products
in the international marketplace, the Laogai system has grown bigger
and stronger. This material reinforcement of the Laogai is happening
despite the fact that the nature and scope of the system's abuses are
becoming increasingly apparent to the world community.
Due to strong resistance from Western nations against forced labor
products, in 1991 China's State Council re-emphasized the ban on the
export of ``forced labor products'' and stipulated that no prison is
allowed to cooperate or establish joint ventures with foreign
investors. However, the State Council's move was merely a superficial
one, and prisoners today still produce forced labor products in great
numbers. The Chinese government grants special privileges to
enterprises using labor camps and prisons, to encourage and attract
foreign investment and export. Prisoners are forced to manufacture
products without any payment, and are often forced to work more than 10
hours a day and sometimes even overnight. Those who cannot fulfill
their tasks are beaten and tortured. The forced labor products these
prisoners produce are exported throughout China and the world.
Dictatorships throughout history have used mechanisms of fear and
control to maintain the absolute power of their regime and annihilate
political dissent. Hitler built the concentration camps of the 20th
century not only to terminate the Jews but also to destroy his
political opposition. Lenin began building labor camps right after the
Russian Revolution to punish the anti-Bolshevik ``unreliable elements''
in 1918. His heir Stalin threw tens of thousands of Russians of
different nationalities into the Gulag after the Great Purge that took
place in the 1930s. Labor camps also played a significant role in the
Soviet Union's industrialization at that time. Gulag prisoners were
used as a source of infinite manpower to excavate the natural resources
throughout the vast nation.
The Laogai, modeled after its Soviet counterpart, the Gulag, was
established under Mao Zedong to serve as an instrument of political
control for the newly empowered Chinese Communist Party. A combination
of forced labor and regimented thought reform were to be the methods of
reforming ``counterrevolutionaries'' and ``reactionaries'' from the
former Chiang Kaishek regime into ``new socialist beings.'' People were
thrown into camps not because they were criminals but because they had
been categorized into ``bad'' classes, as landlords, rich peasants,
counterrevolutionaries, ``evil'' elements, rightists, etc. People were
labeled as ``criminals'' because they or their parents belonged to
these classes.
An examination of the Laogai in both theory and practice reveals a
system that is fundamentally different than other systems of crime and
punishment. Regardless of any reduction of the ratio of political
prisoners to other prisoners in recent years or of the claims of the
Chinese government regarding improvements in the conditions in the
Laogai and in the Chinese judicial system, the theories that form the
basis of the Chinese system pre-determine certain conclusions regarding
its function, its methodology and its ideology.
In the fifty years since the creation of the Laogai, little of its
organizational structure has changed. The Laogai system, despite minor
modifications in regulations, is still governed by the same directives
that were issued under Mao. These policies have led to three distinct
categories of incarceration: Convict Labor-Reform (Laogai), Reeducation
through Labor (Laojiao), and Forced Job Placement (Jiuye).
Today, more than a quarter century after Mao's death, the Laogai
system still thrives, and an untold number of prisoners continue to
suffer behind the high walls and the barbed wire fences of more than
1,000 Laogai camps. A majority of the inmates currently in the Laogai
are incarcerated for reasons that have little to do with politics or
class background; however, the Laogai still serves its political
purpose. Individuals deemed to be threats to China's one-party system
may be held for ``crimes against state or public security'' or
``revealing state secrets,'' or for offenses that have the ring of more
common crimes, such as hooliganism or arson, that actually mask
politically motivated incarceration. Additionally, the general lack of
due process in the Chinese legal system victimizes countless
individuals. Well-documented reports of several human rights
organizations have revealed a system where individuals are often
convicted and sentenced with no trial at all. Even when an individual
is able to secure their right to trial, they are often refused the
right to adequately defend themselves, or they are convicted through
``evidence'' that was extracted through torture.
The Criminal Procedure Law of 1979, along with the Revised Criminal
Procedure Law of 1997, have proven inadequate both in content and
implementation. The ``legal reform'' that came about in 1978 and became
more agitated in the 1990s did indeed bring some changes to the
judicial field. The procuratorate, arbitration, notarization, and
attorney systems were revised. Hundreds of laws and regulations were
reviewed and reformed, and new laws were promulgated. Theoretically,
there are now more managerial mechanisms in the judiciary than before,
since the National People's Congress set up a supervisory organ to
carry out supervision in the judicial area. However, everything must
still follow the main principle of acting ``in favor of the leading
role of the Communist Party.'' The fact that in the year 2001 China had
more judges (130,000) and prosecutors (159,638) than lawyers (100,198)
reflects the phenomenon of the unbalanced public and private legal
situation in the country.
The recent ``legal reform'' launched and touted by Chinese
authorities has received a wide range of international assistance from
European countries and the United States. This assistance has provided
many public servants, such as prosecutors, public security officers,
and wardens, the opportunity to go abroad to learn from Western
countries' legal systems. Yet these better trained legal servants lack
both the ability and the will to help their poor and underprivileged
Chinese compatriots when they return to China.
HISTORY OF THE LAOGAI
The initial conception of the Laogai was not a Chinese innovation,
but was actually passed down to China from the Soviet Union, where the
Soviet Communists had already formed the Gulag, the predecessor of the
Laogai. This cooperation originated in a defense treaty signed by the
Soviet Union and China in 1950 whereby the Soviet government agreed to
lend aid to China and to assist in the development of certain basic
institutions of society, including the Chinese penal system, to be
modeled directly after the Gulag. This tutelage led to the early years
of the Laogai, and to a blending of the tenets of both the Chinese and
the Soviet philosophies of reform through labor to form what is known
today as the Laogai.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Leong, Albert. Gulag and Laogai. Eugene: University of Oregon
Press, 1999.
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During the early years of the Laogai, many prisons dedicated much
of their labor force to massive state-run reconstruction projects that
would have been impossible to undertake through the labor of the
Chinese people at large. So it was that millions of Chinese prisoners
came to labor on the massive irrigation, mining and dam building
projects that were carried out during the Great Leap Forward at the end
of the 1950s. The most infamous of these projects took place in the
more remote provinces, such as Gansu, Guizhou, Xinjiang and Tibet. In
numerous camps in these areas, prisoners were forced to work at
projects to reclaim wastelands and to
unearth dangerous mines. Due to the treacherous conditions and the
famine that resulted from the disastrous policies of the Great Leap
forward, hundreds of thousands perished in China's prisons during this
time.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Jasper Becker. Hungry Ghosts: Mao's Secret Famine. New York:
Henry Holt and Co. 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the earlier years of the Laogai's existence, the proportions
of political prisoners confined in its facilities were greater than
they are today. Due to the massive and unending political campaigns of
the 1950s and 1960s, there remained a constant influx of
counterrevolutionaries who were forced to join common criminals serving
time in the camps. During the 1950s, it is estimated that up to ninety
percent of those serving sentences in the Laogai were initially
arrested for political reasons. This number declined slowly but
steadily during the sixties and seventies, but due to continuing purges
and to the horrors of the Cultural Revolution, it was not until the
1980s that the ratio dropped down to approximately ten percent. Public
Security Bureau documents state that in 1985, 10 percent of those
detained in Labor Reform Prisons (excluding Laojiao and Jiuye) were
counterrevolutionaries and 1.8 percent were historical
counterrevolutionaries.\3\ These numbers may have changed slightly
since 1985, but it is impossible to calculate a precise estimation with
a lack of official documents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Hongda Harry Wu. Laogai: The Chinese Gulag. Boulder: Westview
Press, 1992.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because the reasoning for China's opening was motivated more by a
desire to improve economic development than to achieve any development
in the political system, the majority of laws written as a result of
the opening related to economics and business and not to crime and
punishment. There were, however, a small number of laws relevant to the
prison system that emerged at this time. Among these, the Criminal Law
of the PRC was among the most important. Signed into law in 1979, this
law included guidelines on Laogai ideology, crime and punishment, the
death penalty, and three different categories of political offenses.
These categories include the following: crimes of counterrevolution,
crimes of endangering public security, and crimes of disrupting the
order of social administration. The law defines ``counterrevolutionary
crimes'' as the following:
``All acts endangering the People's Republic of China
committed with the goal of over-throwing the political power of
the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system.''
When Deng Xiaoping came to power following Mao's death and hundreds
of thousands of so-called counterrevolutionaries were rehabilitated,
many thought the years of horror had passed. Although the era heralded
by Deng the pragmatist brought an end to mass purges, statements of
Deng Xiaoping also justified the suppression of political dissidents,
such as the following:
``Under the present conditions, using the suppressive force
of our Nation to attack and disintegrate all types of
counterrevolutionary bad elements, anti-party anti-socialist
elements and serious criminal offenders in order to preserve
public security is entirely in accord with the demands of the
people and with the demands of socialist modernization
construction.'' \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Deng Xiaoping Xuanji (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping).
Beijing: People's Press, March 30, 1979, pp. 87, 155, 333.
The CCP, to this day, has also proven no more tolerant of dissent.
Beginning with the brutal crackdown on those who participated in the
Democracy Wall Movement of 1979, Deng set the rules for Chinese
political life in the post-Mao era. Eventually, under Deng's
leadership, Chinese authorities amended the Chinese constitution to
abolish earlier guarantees of the rights to speak out freely, hold
debates and put up wall posters. Authorities often do not think twice
about suspending the legal guarantees that remain enshrined in the
nation's constitution and laws. Against a backdrop of modernization and
reform in Chinese corporate law, dissidents are still detained
illegally, deprived of legal representation, tortured, and forced to
labor and have their sentences extended for political reasons. In
short, they remain the victims of a regime that does not respect the
rule of law.
Thus even as China moves toward further economic integration with
the international community, the Chinese prison camp system retains its
political function. According to the Chinese government document
``Criminal Reform Handbook'' (approved by the Laogai Bureau of the
Ministry of Justice in 1988):
``The nature of the prison as a tool of the dictatorship of
classes is determined by the nature of state power. The nature
of our Laogai facilities, which are a tool of the people's
democratic dictatorship for punishing and reforming criminals,
is inevitably determined by the nature of our socialist state,
which exercises `The People's Democratic Dictatorship.' The
fundamental task of our Laogai facilities is punishing and
reforming criminals. To define their functions concretely, they
fulfill tasks in the following three fields: 1. Punishing
criminals and putting them under surveillance. 2. Reforming
criminals. 3. Organizing criminals in labor and production,
thus creating wealth for society. Our Laogai facilities are
both facilities of dictatorship and special enterprises.''
Several more legal reforms came in the 1990s, the most significant
of these being the revised Criminal Code of 1997 and the Criminal
Procedure Code of 1997. These two revised codes brought changes to
certain provisions from the 1979 versions, although such alterations in
language resulted in little progress in practice. For example, in the
new law, the section from the 1979 law that was entitled
``counterrevolutionary crimes'' was renamed ``crimes against state
security,'' and the previously stated definition of
counterrevolutionary laws was deleted from the provisions. However, the
laundry list of political crimes remains within the law with few
changes from its previous version. Far from indicating that activities
previously considered ``counterrevolutionary crimes'' are now legal,
this omission expands the scope of punishable acts to all those which
fit the vague, undefined notion of ``endangering state security.''
Additionally, both the 1979 and 1997 versions of the Criminal Procedure
Code included provisions for protection of rights to due process and to
appeal in what appears on paper to be a law-abiding system of crime and
punishment.\5\ Reports of human rights groups, governments and
multilateral organizations everywhere document China's continuing
failure to protect rights of due process for its citizens. In recent
years, many reports have even stated that circumstances have
deteriorated during the last few years as China has carried out
crackdowns on groups such as Falun Gong, the China Democracy Party, and
Internet authors who Communist authorities feel pose a threat to their
power. Communist authorities have also recently cracked down on the
large numbers of petitioners who have flocked to Beijing to seek
justice for the loss of property due to construction projects, as well
as for unfair employment practices and other grievances.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. Opening to Reform? An
Analysis of China's Revised Criminal Procedure Law. New York: Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, 1996.
\6\ See 2003 and 2004 reports from the U.S. State Department,
Amnesty International, Human Rights in China, the Laogai Research
Foundation and the Guancha web site, www.guancha.org in Chinese,
www.cicus.org in English, published by the China Information Center.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite recent societal advances in the People's Republic of China,
the most troubling aspects of the Communist Party's leadership, such as
the Laogai, still remain. With its roots in Mao's leadership, today's
Chinese communist system is characterized by a massive bureaucracy that
oversees the public ownership of the principal means of production,
despite widely touted economic reforms. The Communist Party economic
theory, whether espoused by Mao or Deng, posits that human beings are
key instruments of production. While Deng loosened state control over
certain aspects of Chinese people's private lives, he and his
successors have continued to deny the Chinese people fundamental
political rights such as the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and
association.
The underlying rationale for China's forced labor camps remains
political necessity. The primary purpose of the Laogai is not simply to
maintain order in society or to punish criminals in accordance with the
law, but to protect and consolidate the dictatorship of the Chinese
Communist Party.
THOUGHT REFORM
Perhaps the most unique aspect of the Laogai is the focus on
thought reform (sixiang gaizao)Mirroring the enormous efforts of large-
scale thought manipulation of the Chinese population following the
Communist takeover, thought reform has been an intrinsic part of the
Laogai since its establishment. In October 1951, Premier Zhou Enlai
stated at a national conferences to central government officials: ``Our
thoughts have been either bandaged by feudalism or enslaved by
imperialism . . . in order to serve the demands of our new China, we
need to reform our thoughts constantly . . . thought reform is
inevitable, if an intellectual wants to serve the new China and the
people.'' On September 29 of that same year, Zhou had already given a
five hour-long speech at Beijing University (Beida) with the topic
``Regarding the reform of the intellectuals.'' Premier Zhou used his
personal experience to persuade the students and teachers at Beida of
the importance of correcting one's mistakes and reforming one's
thoughts, stating that this was the only way to adjust an intellectual
to suit to the socialist new China. After Zhou's speech, a movement of
thought reform spread out among colleges and universities throughout
the nation. Mao Zedong praised this campaign as a ``new phenomenon,
worthy of being celebrated.'' Mao emphasized that: ``Thought reform,
especially the thought reform of the intellectuals, is one of the most
important conditions necessary to achieve real democratic reform and
the step-by-step industrialization of our nation.'' \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ See Xiao Shu, ``Tianma de zhongjie-zhishi fenzi sixiang gaizao
yundong shuiwei'' (The end of a heavenly horse--Some details about the
thought reform movement of the intellectuals), http://www.boxun.com/
hero/xiaoshu/4_1.shtml.
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The tendency of Chinese authorities to emphasize the struggle of
the majority to eliminate a tiny minority of enemies of the people
remains prominent. The ongoing campaign against Falun Gong
practitioners and members of various house churches in China
illustrates this pattern. Struggles of this kind will drag on for
months with hundreds and sometimes thousands arrested and sent to be
re-educated. Meanwhile, the campaign will go on, reporting that while
the masses continue their struggle, many individuals among the minority
of enemies have been successfully reeducated, but the struggle must
continue to eliminate the ``tiny, tiny recalcitrant minority'' of
enemies that threaten the good of the people and the motherland.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Amnesty International, No One is Safe: Power, Repression, and
Abuse of Power in the 1990s. New York: Amnesty International, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nowhere is this struggle more prominent than in the Laogai. While
the intense political study sessions of the Maoist era are a thing of
the past, prisoners must still repeatedly confess their crimes and
provide self-criticisms, as the Chinese legal system still lacks a
presumption of innocence. Prisoners are still stripped of their
personal identity and reduced to accepting only the identity they can
be offered through the Communist authorities. All criminals must
renounce any political and religious beliefs that the state considers
subversive. The Catholic priests, Falun Gong followers, and democracy
activists trapped in the Laogai today must all confess their ``crimes''
against the nation, recant their beliefs, and undergo special
reeducation classes, which according to recent reports may incorporate
torture. Group humiliation is also a well-known tenet of Laogai thought
reform patterns. Prisoners are turned against one another and are
forced to criticize and sometimes even physically beat one another in
struggle sessions. This again reinforces the isolation of the prisoner
and the feeling that they will not become part of the group until they
submit to the authorities and allow themselves to be ``re-educated.''
\9\ Even more common in contemporary China, however, is the melding of
reform and labor to produce the desired results: the Chinese Communist
Party squeezes out every available ounce of labor from its prisoners to
prove that they are but tools at the mercy of the state.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Robert J. Lifton. Thought Reform and the Psychology of
Totalism. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989. To
read more about thought reform in the Laogai, see also the eight
volumes of the Laogai Research Foundation's Black Series, a Chinese-
language series of political prisoners' autobiographies--information on
this series can be found on the Foundation's web site, www.laogai.org.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMPONENTS OF THE LAOGAI
The Laogai Research Foundation has gathered evidence on the main
components of the Laogai as defined by Chinese law, policies, and
practices. The legal definition of the Laogai entails six main
components: prisons (jianyu), reform-through-labor detachments (laodong
gaizao dui or laogaidui), reeducation-through-labor facilities (laodong
jiaoyangsuo or laojiaosuo), detention centers (kanshousuo), juvenile
offender facilities (shaoguansuo) and the practice of forced-job-
placement (giangzhi jiuye or liuchang jiuye)In general, prisons and
laogai detachments house ``convicts,'' prisoners who have received
formal sentencing by the courts (due process and judicial independence
in China notwithstanding)The distinction in the terms ``prison'' and
``laogaidui'' originated in a 1994 Prison Law in which China's prison
system was renamed, altering the term from ``Laogai'' (reform through
labor) to ``prison.'' An article in the January 7, 1995 edition of the
government-sanctioned Being Legal Daily (Fazhi ribao) revealed the
reasoning behind this superficial change:
``Our renaming of the Laogai is what our associating with the
international community calls for, and it is favorable in our
international human rights struggle. Henceforth, the word
``Laogai'' will no longer exist, but the function, character
and tasks of our prison administration will remain unchanged.''
Reeducation-through-labor facilities, or laojiaosuo, house
prisoners who receive ``administrative discipline'' and sentencing of
up to three years by police or the courts with no formal trial.
Detention centers are for ``convicts'' sentenced to short-term (usually
less than two years') imprisonment by a court, those awaiting
sentencing, and prisoners who are awaiting execution. Juvenile offender
facilities are for adolescent ``convicts'' or reeducation-through-labor
detainees. Finally, forced-job-placement personnel are subject to
indefinite assigned labor at forced labor facilities as directed by the
courts or the Laogai Department following the completion of their
sentences. These prisoners are deemed ``not fully reformed'' and are
therefore denied their freedom even after the completion of their
sentences. This kind of extended imprisonment was widely practiced
through the 1990s.\10\ Today qiangzhi jiuye has been largely abolished,
but is still practiced in some regions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ See Cheng Zhonghe, Forty Years in China's Inferno. Washington,
D.C.: Laogai Research Foundation's Black Series, 2002. The author spent
ten years in prison after he had already fully served his 20-year
sentence. See also Palden Gyatso, Fire Under the Snow, The Harvill
Press, 1997. Palden Gyatso, a Tibetan monk, stayed in prison for forced
job placement for ten years after he had already fully served his 15-
year sentence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Chinese Communist Party utilizes numerous forms of imprisonment
under China's Public Security Bureau (PSB), the Ministry of Justice,
and the People's Liberation Army. However, whether individuals are
thrown into a prison (jianyu), a reeducation-through-labor camp
(laojiao suo), a juvenile offender facility (shaoguan suo), a county
detention center (kanshou suo), or are those inmates who have finished
their sentences but are forced to remain in the camps as forced job
placement (qiangzhi jiuye or liuchang jiuye) workers, all are equally
deprived of their freedom. Whatever the Communist Party may wish to
call them, they remain under de-facto imprisonment. Furthermore, it is
only with rare exception that these prisoners--regardless of the
pretext for their incarceration--are not forced to labor against their
will. When it appears in this Handbook, the term Laogai is used to
refer to all forms of imprisonment used by the Chinese Communist Party.
The CCP maintains control over all of these entities, and depends upon
each of them to sustain its power.
LAOGAI: REFORM THROUGH LABOR
Only criminals who have been arrested and sentenced are confined to
the Laogai prisons. All prisons include factories, workshops, mines or
farms in which all prisoners are forced to labor. Each prison also has
an alternate production unit name. It is very hard to say how many
labor reform camps there are in each province or autonomous region with
any certainty because of the secrecy with which the Chinese Communist
Party enshrouds these camps. Never has the Chinese government allowed
the Red Cross or any other international body to inspect conditions in
the Laogai.
According to testimony gathered by the Laogai Research Foundation,
conditions vary from camp to camp and from year to year depending on
the shift of ever-changing political campaigns. Certain basic tenets
remain the same, however, as all prisoners are forced to labor, undergo
thought reform and submit to prison authorities. Appalling conditions
for laborers persist in many camps. LRF researchers have confirmed
sites where prisoners mine asbestos and other toxic chemicals with no
protective gear, work with batteries and battery acid with no
protection for their hands, tan hides while standing naked in vats
filled three feet deep with chemicals used for the softening of animal
skins, and work in improperly run mining facilities where explosions
and other accidents are a common occurrence. Political prisoners are
commonly housed together with other prisoners, although there are
numerous reports of the solitary confinement of political prisoners.
Laogai prisoners are often forced to work extremely long hours,
deprived of sleep and forced to take on a highly intensive workload.
For instance, in 2001, prisoners at the Beijing Xin'an Female Labor
Camp near Beijing were forced to work from 5 a.m. until 2 or 3 a.m. the
next day to make toy rabbits.\11\ In another instance, some 10,000
detainees at the Lanzhou Dashaping Detention Center and the Lanzhou No.
1 Detention Center were forced to use their hands to peel the shells
off melon seeds. While working outside, many of these detainees
suffered frostbite, cracked and bleeding hands, damage to their teeth
and the loss of fingernails. They were forced to squat on their heels
to do this work continuously for more than 10 hours, with no pay. In
2001, a Falun Gong practitioner and prisoner at the Lanzhou No. 1
Detention Center was unable to finish his work quota because of the
physical ailments he suffered as a result of the work, and was thereby
tortured by prison inmates at the orders of a prison official. After
suffering severe injury to his abdomen as a result of this torture, he
died at the beginning of January 2002.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ ``Investigation Reveals Production of Laogai Goods for
Export,'' World Organization to Investigate the Persecution of the
Falun Gong, reprinted in the Laogai Research Foundation's Laogai
Report, 2003 Vol. I 1 No.4.
\12\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reports of torture are common and include beatings with fists and
cattle prods, exposure to extreme cold and extreme heat, sleep
deprivation, shackling and starvation. Members of China's Uighur
minority, among others, are frequent victims of torture in Chinese
prisons. A 31-year-old activist from China's Uighur minority was
tortured to death in the Chapchal Prison in Xinjiang Province in
October 2000.\13\ According to the Tibet Information Network, during
the 1990s, nuns imprisoned in the Laogai in Tibet had a one in twenty
chance of being raped or killed while in prison.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Agence France Presse``Uighur Tortured to Death in Chinese
Prison,'' October 24, 2000.
\14\ Steven Marshall. Hostile Elements: A Study of Political
Imprisonment in Tibet in 1987-1998, London: Tibet Information Network,
1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1994, the CCP responded to increasing international attention to
the Laogai camps by officially changing the name of the camps from
Laogai (reform through labor) to ``Jianyu,'' the Chinese term for
prison. But as stated previously, this small change in semantics does
nothing to change the essential nature of the camps, which continue on,
in every other respect, just as they had prior to the change.
``REEDUCATION-THROUGH-LABOR'' (LAODONG JIAOYANG)
Laodong jiaoyang, commonly abbreviated as ``Laojiao,'' serves as
one of the most useful tools for the Chinese Communist Party in its
constant efforts to silence critics and punish political prisoners
without having to bother with legal proceedings. According to the 1957
law which created Laojiao, it is an administrative measure of reform
through forced labor designed to ``reform idle, able-bodied people who
violate law and discipline and who do no decent work into new people,
earning their own living; it is also made in order to further
strengthen social order and enhance socialist construction.'' \15\ A
1982 Chinese State Council circular to the Public Security Bureau
titled ``Measures for Reeducation through Labor'' similarly refers to
Laojiao as an ``administrative action for carrying out strict education
and reform.'' This allows the Public Security Bureau to detain and
sentence individuals for up to three years without any legal
proceedings. A variety of agencies and individuals, from family members
to employers to the police, can recommend, through a petition process,
individuals to reeducation. Most often, local police determine a
reeducation term.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Law passed by the 78th meeting of the Standing Committee of
the People's Congress on August 1, 1957. Promulgated by the State
Council on August 3, 1957.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Laojiao camps are not included in any official accounting of the
number of prisoners in the Laogai system. By the same logic, those in
Laojiao camps are not considered convicted prisoners and, as such, are
not covered under the international treaties for treatment of
prisoners, nor are the goods they are forced to manufacture covered by
the bilateral agreements between the United States and Chinese
governments banning trade in forced labor products.
Reports by several other human rights organizations, including
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and LRF also document the
continued use of the Laojiao system to arbitrarily detain both penal
and political criminals alike.
Evidence indicates a recent increase in the construction of Laojiao
facilities, suggesting that the system has proven itself an effective
muzzle for many individuals deemed hostile by the Chinese government.
According to a 1997 report by the U.N.'s Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, published after the Group's trip to China that year, there
are 230,000 persons in 280 Laojiao camps throughout the country. The
figure represents more than a 50 percent increase over four years. At
the end of 1993, the reeducation through labor population figure was
150,000. A 1996 report issued by the Chinese Ministry of Public
Security and obtained by a Taiwanese publication, indicates that as of
September 24, 1996, there were a total of 1.78 million persons in
Laojiao.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Li Zijing, Cheng Ming Monthly, November 1996, pp. 14-16.
Excerpted in the January 1997 issue of Inside China Mainland.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
JIUYE: FORCED JOB PLACEMENT
One of the most blatant human rights abuses of the CCP is
``Jiuye.'' According to Chinese government regulations and criminal
theory, a prisoner who is deemed to be ``not well reformed'' or a
recidivist may be forced to remain indefinitely in the Laogai camp in
which they completed their sentence. Chinese law stipulates that the
following individuals should be subject to Jiuye:
``Criminals who are not well reformed should usually undergo
forced job placement in the camp. They include: important
counterrevolutionaries . . . who show no evident signs of
repentance during their terms and may revert to crimes after
completing their terms, and assaulting the socialist system,
vilifying the Party's line, principles, and policies . . .
seriously violate reform regimen . . . those who consistently
refuse to labor, or deliberately sabotage production and do not
correct themselves despite repeated admonitions.'' \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Decisions on handling fugitive and recidivist criminals and
reeducation-through-labor personnel'' adopted by the 19th session of
the 5th Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, June 10,
1981.
Forced Job Placement is an applied system without clear judicial
regulations. There is no strict definition of the targeted groups or
individuals--it is a prolonged laogai system. Hundreds of thousands of
``criminals'' have been detained indefinitely in laogai farms, mines or
factories to produce wealth for the state. Hundreds of accounts of the
implementation of these inhumane regulations can be read in the memoirs
of Laogai prisoners.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Many autobiographies have been written by former Laogai
inmates--see the eight-volume Black Series of the Laogai Research
Foundation, Washington, D.C. 2001-2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
JUVENILE OFFENDER CAMPS
In accordance with Communist regulations, juvenile offender camps
are organized on provincial, municipal, and autonomous regional levels.
Statistics show that there are now a total number of approximately 50-
80 such camps, with a total prisoner population of approximately
200,000-300,000. These numbers do not include those juveniles who have
been sent to Laojiao and prison facilities.
All juvenile offenders are forced to labor like other prisoners and
are organized along the same lines as their older counterparts.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Hongda Harry Wu. Laogai: The Chinese Gulag.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE LAOGAI ECONOMY AND FORCED LABOR IN CHINA'S LAOGAI SYSTEM
The Laogai remains the most extensive and secretive network of
forced labor camps operated by any country in the world. The slogan for
the Laogai remains ``Reform first, production second.'' Millions of
Chinese in the camps still face the daily ``reform'' components and
political indoctrination, or brainwashing. Mental and physical abuse is
common. The Chinese government, meanwhile, continues to refuse the
International Committee of the Red Cross access to the Laogai.
Regarding the ``production'' aspect of the above slogan, the dual
penal and commercial role of the Laogai is affirmed by China's Ministry
of Justice. In its 1988 Criminal Reform Handbook, the ministry states
that the Laogai ``organizes criminals in labor and production, thus
creating wealth for society.'' It has developed into diverse forms and
plays an important role not only in the judicial but also in the
economic arena. Our research and analysis shows that, as an institution
within the Chinese communist regime, the Laogai has benefited
tremendously from the opening of China to international commerce.
International trade provides the camps access to hard currency as they
export their products- everything from socks to diesel engines, raw
cotton to processed graphite. By trafficking its forced labor products
in the international marketplace, the Laogai system has grown bigger
and stronger. This material reinforcement of the Laogai is happening
despite the fact that the nature and scope of the system's abuses are
becoming increasingly apparent to the world community.
Due to strong resistance from Western nations against forced labor
products, in 1991 China's State Council re-emphasized the ban on the
export of ``forced labor products'' and stipulated that no prison is
allowed to cooperate or establish joint ventures with foreign
investors. However, the State Council's move was merely a superficial
one, and prisoners today still produce forced labor products in great
numbers. The Chinese government grants special privileges to
enterprises using labor camps and prisons, to encourage and attract
foreign investment and export. Prisoners are forced to manufacture
products without any payment, and are often forced to work more than 10
hours a day and sometimes even overnight. Those who cannot fulfill
their tasks are beaten and tortured. The forced labor products these
prisoners produce are exported throughout China and the world.
Today, more than a quarter century after Mao's death, the Laogai
system still thrives, and an untold number of prisoners continue to
suffer behind the high walls and the barbed wire fences of more than
1,000 Laogai camps. A majority of the inmates currently in the Laogai
are incarcerated for reasons that have little to do with politics or
class background; however, the Laogai still serves its political
purpose. Individuals deemed to be threats to China's one-party system
may be held for ``crimes against state or public security'' or
``revealing state secrets,'' or for offenses that have the ring of more
common crimes, such as hooliganism or arson, that actually mask
politically motivated incarceration. Additionally, the general lack of
due process in the Chinese legal system victimizes countless
individuals. Well-documented reports of several human rights
organizations have revealed a system where individuals are often
convicted and sentenced with no trial at all. Even when an individual
is able to secure their right to trial, they are often refused the
right to adequately defend themselves, or they are convicted through
``evidence'' that was extracted through torture.
During the early years of the Laogai, many prisons dedicated much
of their labor force to massive state-run reconstruction projects that
would have been impossible to undertake through the labor of the
Chinese people at large. So it was that millions of Chinese prisoners
came to labor on the massive irrigation, mining and dam building
projects that were carried out during the Great Leap Forward at the end
of the 1950s. The most infamous of these projects took place in the
more remote provinces, such as Gansu, Guizhou, Xinjiang and Tibet. In
numerous camps in these areas, prisoners were forced to work at
projects to reclaim wastelands and to unearth dangerous mines. Due to
the treacherous conditions and the famine that
resulted from the disastrous policies of the Great Leap forward,
hundreds of thousands perished in China's prisons during this time.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Jasper Becker. Hungry Ghosts: Mao's Secret Famine. New York:
Henry Holt and Co. 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Laogai Economy
Besides being an important part of China's public security and a
tool of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Laogai camps are also
an integral part of China's national economy. Chinese authorities see
the Laogai as a source of endless cost-free labor and are continuously
studying the application of forced labor in increasing productivity and
profits. Since the establishment of Deng Xiaoping's expansion and
reform of China's export economy, the Communist Party has sought to use
these state organs of repression to turn a profit. The use of forced
labor in China is simply seen as another input into the economic
equations of the Communist State. The deliberate application of forced
labor by the Chinese government has spawned an entirely new field in
China's economy: the economics of slavery.
The millions in the Chinese Laogai constitute the world's largest
forced labor population. While those in the Laogai face political
indoctrination and physical and mental deprivation as part of the
``reform'' regimen, they are simultaneously forced to labor and face
production quotas in their ``labor'' evaluation. The universal slogan
in the Laogai is ``Reform First, Production Second.''
However, in recent years, the economic goals of the Laogai have
come to supersede even the political aims. Production seems to have
taken the place of reform as the ultimate goal. Laogai officials are
more concerned with meeting production quotas and turning a profit for
the Communist Party and for personal gain than with actually reforming
the criminals serving time in the Laogai.
In an opening essay of an official Chinese government document
entitled, ``On the Present Conditions of Laogai Economics,'' the
integration of the Laogai as one segment of the central government's
economic program is laid out accordingly:
``In our nation, the Laogai economy is a branch of the
economy of specific
nature. Laogai economics has the dual characteristics of the
management of economic administration and the study of reform
through labor. In viewing the socialist ownership of means of
production under the control of the whole people it is a
component of the socialist national economy . . . Among Laogai
products, some are indispensable goods in the national plan and
the people's lives, some are used in national defense
industries; some special products which are made with Laogai
characteristics are welcomed by society; some have already been
named as national or provincial superior products; [and] some
have reached world-class, advanced levels. Some of the products
are even exported to various parts of the world, not only
earning large amounts of foreign currency, but also winning
praise for the state.'' \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Gu Jianguo, Laogai Jingji Xue (Laogai Economics). China
Railways Publishers: 1990.
Chinese authorities carefully monitor labor production in the
Laogai system to reward the most productive facilities and ``correct''
the poor performance of less productive facilities. Laogai enterprises
participate in national evaluations to confirm that forced labor has
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
reached certain standards. As stated in a 1991 Asia Watch report:
``The use of forced labor is a central government policy, not
one developed on an ad-hoc basis by labor reform units in the
coastal provinces where a large portion of the goods are
produced.'' \22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Prison Labor in China. News from Asia Watch report. April 19,
1991.
In a bulletin entitled The Demands of the Country's Condition--
Strength and Realities, the CCP expounded upon the need for the Laogai
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
camps to be productive:
``Due to our national condition and strength, the country
cannot provide to the Laogai Departments all the expenses they
require. Because of this, it is extremely necessary that Laogai
Departments, while not influencing the reform of criminals
[i.e. not sacrificing the reform aspect of the Laogai system],
strengthen production and management administration, and
mobilize and expand prisoners' enthusiasm to labor and produce,
thus creating more wealth for the state through reform-through-
labor.'' \23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ The Laogai Research Foundation, June 30, 1999.
The actual scope of the ``Laogai economy'' as a component of the
overall Chinese economy is difficult to quantify using open sources. As
the Laogai became a major issue in world condemnation of the Chinese
dictatorship's disregard for basic human rights, documentation of the
Laogai became scarce. The Chinese government considers information
relating to the camps to be ``state secrets.''
The Chinese government refuses access to the Laogai by the
International Committee of the Red Cross to inspect conditions of
political prisoners. Authorities also deny the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection the right to inspect Laogai facilities suspected of
importing their products to the United States, despite a binding
bilateral agreement to allow visits to the Laogai for such purposes.
The Chinese government rebuffs any attempts by foreign organizations or
governments to independently inspect or study the dual political and
economic role of the Laogai. For instance, in June 2004, China finally
agreed to allow the first visit by U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture
Theo van Boven after about a decade of discussions, but then postponed
the visit at the last minute, prompting criticism from human rights
groups and others.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Agence France Presse, ``Bush asked to pressure China to allow
U.N. probe on torture,'' October 5, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Laogai administrators must adhere to the traditional emphasis on
reform of prisoners in order to mold them into ``new socialist
persons'' while reaching certain productivity and profit levels. The
removal of direct government support for the Laogai pushes the drive
for increased production and income for individual enterprises. This
causes, however, a contradiction between the traditional role of the
Laogai camps as centers of reform and the necessary role of the Laogai
as producer in the ``socialist market economy with Chinese
characteristics.'' In China's attempts to modernize the Laogai economy
and to make products and production suitable for international
progress, the aspect of ``reform'' has often taken a back seat to
production, and even more than that, to profit.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given that the end result of the emphasis on production is for the
Laogai enterprise to look for the greatest source of income available
in the marketplace, it follows for those Laogai enterprises that have
the highest quality production to make the ensuing move on to
international markets through exports. Despite denials by Chinese
government officials, Laogai products have time and time again been
found to be available on the international market. In reality, the
Chinese government constantly encourages the export of Laogai goods, as
can be seen in the following excerpts from Chinese government
documents:
``Laogai units, which develop foreign-oriented economies, not
only create large amounts of foreign currency for the state and
increase state revenues; the Laogai units themselves develop.''
\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Laogai units which develop foreign-oriented economics push
their products into the international market [where they] not
only win praise for the state, but also increase the foreign
currency revenue of the state and accelerate the economic
construction of the state. Because of this, the development of
the Laogai economy itself or the development of the national
economy as a whole is absolutely essential.''
``To vigorously develop foreign-oriented economics whenever
it is possible and permissible is an important path to further
strengthening the Laogai economy, to accelerate technological
progress, to arm the Laogai management detachments, to fully
utilize the initiative and creativity of cadre guards,
employees and technical personnel, and to improve
qualifications of all categories of personnel to enhance the
impact and role of the Laogai economy.'' \27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Ibid.
As a result of these policies, goods made by Chinese prisoners have
time and time again found their way into U.Sand world markets. And
countless unknowing consumers have purchased goods produced in China's
forced labor camps.
Most Laogai camps have two names: a public name (usually an
enterprise name), and an internal administrative name. Yinying Coal
Mine in Shanxi Province, for example, is the public name for the
Yangquan No. 1 Prison. In carrying out the dual political and economic
functions directed by Chinese Communist forced labor theory, individual
Laogai facilities operate under distinct names for each of their
identities. Laogai facilities may operate under multiple enterprise
names in order to publicize their production and participate in the
commercial arena, as well as to avoid detection by international
observers. Furthermore, Laogai facilities may also operate under
multiple internal names as designated by the Judicial Department in the
course of implementing the ``reform'' of prisoners and central
government edicts. For example, the Laogai with the commercial name
Qingdao Shengjian Machine Works has two internal names: Lanxi Prison
and Prov. No. 2 Prison.
Forced Labor
The grueling, punitive forced labor component of the Laogai, aside
from presenting a cruel means of physical punishment for prisoners,
also provides a number of financial benefits for the Chinese
government. Since the establishment of Deng Xiaoping's ``open'' China
and the formation of China's ``socialist market economy,'' the Chinese
government has sought to operate the Laogai at a profit. Goods made in
the Laogai have become a part of China's domestic economy, and to an
extent, Laogai-made goods are also filtering into foreign markets,
including the United States.
The theoretical basis of the Chinese Communist ideas regarding
reform through labor have their roots in the writings of Marx and
Engels as they were interpreted by the Soviets and then reinterpreted
by Mao Zedong. Fundamentally, these theories promote the idea of
criminals as exploiters who do not possess the ideology of the
proletariat. In order to be stripped of their ``parasitical'' ideology,
they must be taught to work, like the members of the proletariat, and
then therefore take on their revolutionary ideology.\28\ As the Laogai
became an institution of Chinese society, labor and production remained
integrally tied to the function of ``reforming'' criminals. In the
following directive, the Chinese Communist Party defends forced labor
by prisoners:
\28\ Harold Tanner. China Information, ``China's Gulag
Reconsidered: Labor Reform in the 1980s and 1990s,'' Vol. 9, No. 2/3,
Winter, 1994-1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Our Laogai facilities force prisoners to labor. It is
determined by the nature of criminal punishment in our country,
by the dictatorial functions of our facilities and their aim of
reforming prisoners into new, socialist people. Our Laogai
facilities are both special schools for Laogai prisoners and
special state-owned enterprises.'' \29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Approved by the Laogai Bureau of the Ministry of Justice.
Shaanxi People's Publishing House, 1988, pp. 132-133.
According to Communist theory, the ultimate goal of forced labor is
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
two-fold, production and reform:
``Laogai production serves as a means for reforming prisoners
and bears the political obligation of punishing and reforming
prisoners; it also serves as an economic unit producing goods
for society and bears the economic obligation set by guidelines
of the state. These dual obligations and dual accomplishments
(the reforming of prisoners into new men and the production of
material goods) must be advanced and practiced throughout the
entire process of Laogai production.'' \30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Gu Jianguo. Laogai Jingji Xue (Laogai Economics). China
Railways Publishers, 1990, p. 31.
Mao Zedong explains the role of forced labor in the Laogai in the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
following statement:
``Towards enemies, the people's democratic dictatorship uses
the method of dictatorship . . . [that] compels them to engage
in labor, and, through such labor, be transformed into new
men.'' \31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Mao Zedong Xuanji (Selected Works of Mao Zedong), Vol. 4,
Beijing, People's Press, March 30, 1979, p. 371.
As a result, the Laogai forces its prisoners to plant, harvest,
engineer, manufacture, and process all types of products for sale in
the domestic and international markets. The theory behind the Laogai is
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
clear:
``Except for those who must be exterminated physically due to
political considerations, human beings must be utilized as a
productive force with submissiveness as the prerequisite.
Laogai units force prisoners to labor. The Laogai's
fundamental policy is, `Forced labor is the means, while
thought reform is the basic aim.'' \32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Laodong Gaizao Faxue, Beijing University Press, 1991.
According to Article 74 of the The Law of Reform through Labor
(zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong gaizao liaoli, 1954), the financial
sources of the labor camps are as follows: (1) the national budget
appropriation; and (2) the revenue of reform-through-labor
institutions. Article 8 of the Prison Law enacted in 1990 includes a
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
regulation about the structure of prisons:
``The state ensures the necessary structure of reforming the
criminals in prison. All of the prison's budget for the
people's police, the costs of reform, the living costs of the
criminals, and establishment and other special costs should be
included in the state's budget plan. The state guarantees the
production equipment and cost, which is necessary for the
prisoners' labor.'' \33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ See the Prison Law of the People's Republic of China, http://
www.xsjjy.com/flk/jyf.htm.
Since the market economy has largely taken over the planned economy
in China, the importance of ``labor reform'' has shifted. Forced labor
is no longer the means but in terms of the economic aspects is now the
goal in the Laogai system. The state's appropriations to the prisons
are insufficient, so that local prisons now have to manage their
finances on their own. There is an system of self-reliance in place in
the Chinese prison system that puts prison authorities under pressure
to produce, be self-sufficient and hold the prison compound financially
intact. The author Qu Mo wrote an article in which he suggested that
prisons and enterprises should be separated. The Beijing author first
criticized the current situation in Chinese prisons, and then talked
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
about prison reform:
``In the long-term range of implementation, organizing the
prison inmates to work becomes a means of production. `Create
economic profit' becomes the end goal of labor reform. Even the
income and living standard of the warden are directly connected
to the prisoners' productivity. `Reform' has taken a step back
and `create and gain' has been pushed to the front. This kind
of upside-down management has is greatly in error. Prison
authorities exert the greatest efforts in making use of the
prisoners' manpower, instead of caring for their reform and
education.''
``Judicial authorities have also taken notice of this
situation. From September 1 (2003) prison reform has been
started at six trial locations--in Heilongjiang, Shanxi,
Shaanxi, and Hubei provinces, as well as in Shanghai and
Chongqing. According to a People's Daily report, the final goal
of prison reform is to separate the function of law
implementation and enterprise management.'' \34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ See Qu Mo, ``Gaobie `jianqi heyi' tizhi'' (Farewell to the
combined system of `prison and
enterprise'), original Chinese text, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/
chinese/china_news/newsid 3143000/31434901.stm.
Liu Shi'en, a professor at the Central Legal Police Academy, also
showed great concern about the unreasonable economic rules in prison in
his article ``Some Thoughts on Prison Production after the Separation
of Prison and Enterprise'' (Jianqi fenkai hou jianyu shengcha dingwei
de sikao) \35\ on the web site of the Ministry of Justice. In this
article, Professor Liu suggested strongly that prisons and enterprises
should be separated. He stated that prison enterprises are incompatible
with the market economy, as the market competition principles of prison
enterprises alienate the principle of reforming and educating the
prisoner. Also, he argued that prisoners, who lack professional
training and on average have a low degree of education, are not ideal
workers in terms of productivity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ See Liu hi'en's article: http://www.legalinfo.gov.cn/moj/
zgsfzz/2004-07/26/content_119995. htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After making a case that prisons and enterprises should be
separated, Liu offered some thoughts as to how prison production could
be better developed, as follows: (1) There should be more investment
from the state and other enterprises or financing initiatives from
society; (2) prison production should be limited to certain fields of
processing, because this does not require much equipment and the
management is simpler; (3) the state should offer low interest rate
credit to prisons in terms of capital assets and circulating funds; (4)
favorable tax regulations should be implemented for prisons; and (5)
the government should buy back prison products.
According to Liu, with all of these measures and state support, the
prison would develop a more healthy system of production and labor.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Ibid.
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______
Prepared Statement of Jeffrey L. Fiedler
JUNE 22, 2005
The United States negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding on
Prison Labor in 1992 (MOU) with the People's Republic of China during
the Bush Administration. The Clinton Administration then negotiated a
Statement of Cooperation in 1994 (SOC). The texts of these documents
are attached.
These agreements have not stopped the illegal trade in forced labor
products from China. In my view, the motives of successive U.S.
administrations have been more political than aimed at stopping the
illegal trade. Specifically, the first Bush Administration was seeking
to defuse the issue of Laogai products within the context of the debate
about continuing China's Most Favored Nation trading status. The
Chinese government also shared the concern and thus agreed to negotiate
an agreement when it would have otherwise ignored U.S. entreaties on
the subject. It is more than a little interesting to note that the MOU
and SOC fail to use the term ``forced labor'' but rather use ``prison
labor.'' Words are important. The result of this was to leave the
impression that the Chinese Laogai is similar to the U.S. prison
system, an argument that was made repeatedly during the MFN debate.
Nothing, of course, could be further from the truth.
Revelations of continued forced labor product exports by the Laogai
Research Foundation in the years after the MOU was signed, Chinese
government stonewalling implementation of the agreement, and the fact
that implementation was a ``must do'' condition for the renewal of MFN
forced the Clinton Administration to take action. Unfortunately, the
action was more cosmetic than substantive. The SOC was signed just
prior to the President's decision to renew China's MFN status. The fact
that they had signed the SOC was presented as evidence that the Chinese
were ``cooperating.'' This struck us as cynical at the time, and
history has proven us correct.
The most fundamental, and fatal flaw in both the MOU and SOC is
that U.S. efforts to use them to enforce our laws is dependent upon the
willingness of the Chinese government to provide evidence incriminating
themselves. No one in America would be expected to do so, and the
Chinese communists who want to profit from this trade certainly will
not.
The reality is that U.S. attorneys are unwilling (and to a great
extent, unable) to prosecute cases against American citizens based upon
evidence gathered in China. The only exception to this is when another
American citizen witness is willing to come forward to provide
irrefutable eyewitness evidence. The Chinese Laogai camps and trading
companies simply continue to do business only being forced to go a
little further underground.
Current U.S. law concerning forced labor products is directed at
punishing U.S. importers who ``knowingly'' import these products. While
this is certainly justifiable, the real goal should be to end forced
labor in China. To this end, our law should be designed primarily to
punish the mainland Chinese companies which engage in this illegal
trade. Under current law they escape punishment almost entirely. We
must create a series of significant disincentives in our law which
would have the effect of forcing the Chinese government to end the
illegal trade. Such laws would be compatible with WTO rules.
By no means should we change the rules of evidence for prosecuting
American citizens suspected of committing a crime. These thresholds
should remain high. But, when it comes to providing the Chinese the
right to send their products into the United States we should apply
different standards, ones which recognize the reality of how easy it is
for the communist government in China to circumvent and manipulate our
legal system.
Representatives of the Customs Service and State Department have
repeatedly testified before Congress about the problems of obtaining
Chinese compliance with the MOU and SOC. The GAO published a report in
1995 detailing specific problems. Nothing has changed in the last
decade. The agreements are effectively useless.
We propose that the United States abrogate the MOU and SOC and the
Congress enact new laws which would:
1. Provide the Customs Service the administrative authority,
based upon solid intelligence information, to ban entire
categories of products from China if it is found that forced
labor products of the same type are being sent into the United
States. For example, if China is found to be sending in brake
rotors from a Laogai camp, Customs would have the authority to
ban all brake rotor imports from China for a set period of
time. We suggest that a three year ban would be an appropriate
period to create a strong disincentive. This would also take
care of the current problem of the Chinese mixing Laogai
products with legitimately produced products as a way of hiding
the former.
2. Provide the Customs Service the administrative authority,
based upon solid intelligence information, to ban all imports
from the Chinese state trading company which cooperates in the
illegal importation of forced labor products. For example, if
MinMetals is sending in the brake rotors it can no longer do
any import business with the United States. We have similar
laws and regulations in effect for weapons proliferators. The
Chinese company known as NORINCO is currently under U.S.
sanctions which prevent it from exporting products to the
United States and ban their subsidiaries from operating here.
3. Provide the State Department and/or the U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services the authority to revoke the business
visa of any PRC national working in the United States for a
company or any of its subsidiaries which has been found by the
Customs Service to be involved in the illegal trade in forced
labor products. The State Department should further be required
to deny the visa application of any PRC national from the
company sent to replace the ones required to leave the United
States. This would have the net effect of banning the company
from operating a business in the United States.
4. Include in the legislation a ban on U.S. companies from
doing business (buying, selling or establishing joint ventures)
in China with any company or its subsidiaries or parents which
has been found by the U.S. Customs Service to be dealing in
forced labor products.
5. The Customs Service should institute a financial reward
system for anyone who reports information to it regarding the
export of Laogai products to the United States. Payment of the
reward would be forthcoming only after the information is
corroborated by other sources. It is my expectation that
business people of all nationalities would provide information
concerning their competitor's illegal practices. More than the
money involved, such informants would likely have to be
convinced that the U.S. government is serious about ending
forced labor in China rather than simply appearing to be going
through the
motions.
Some would object by saying we would be punishing legitimate
companies in China. This is true, but the Chinese have historically
used ``legitimate'' companies to traffic in forced labor products and,
we believe it is the only way to create the incentive inside China to
abide by our laws. It also is narrowly focused on those products which
on a case by case basis are found to be made by forced labor.
My proposal shifts the negotiating power to the United States in
dealing with this problem, and replaces an empty diplomatic agreement
with real tools of enforcement directed at the source of the illegal
trade. It removes from the process dependence on the Chinese government
for information implicating itself, and it provides the means to combat
Chinese evasions which the United States is currently powerless to
combat. It also potentially creates substantial pressure on the Chinese
government to end the practice of forced labor itself, especially if
the United States were to enlist other of China's trading partners in
this effort.
Thank you.
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON PROHIBITING IMPORT AND EXPORT TRADE
IN PRISON LABOR PRODUCTS
The Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the
Parties),
Considering that the Chinese Government has noted and respects
United States laws and regulations that prohibit the import of prison
labor products, has consistently paid great attention to the question
of prohibition of the export of prison labor products, has explained to
the United States its policy on this question, and on October 10, 1991,
reiterated its regulations regarding prohibition of the export of
prison labor products;
Considering that the Government of the United States has explained
to the Chinese Government U.S. laws and regulations prohibiting the
import of prison labor products and the policy of the United States on
this issue; and
Noting that both Governments express appreciation for each other's
concerns and previous efforts to resolve this issue,
Having reached the following understanding on the question of
prohibiting import and export trade between the two countries that
violates the relevant laws and regulations of either the United States
or China concerning products produced by prison or penal labor (herein
referred to as prison labor products).
The Parties agree:
1. Upon the request of one Party, and based on specific
information provided by that Party, the other Party will
promptly investigate companies, enterprises or units suspected
of violating relevant regulations and laws, and will
immediately report the results of such investigations to the
other.
2. Upon the request of one Party, responsible officials or
experts of relevant departments of both Parties will meet under
mutually convenient circumstances to exchange information on
the enforcement of relevant laws and regulations and to examine
and report on compliance with relevant regulations and laws by
their respective companies, enterprises, or units.
3. Upon request, each Party will furnish to the other Party
available evidence and information regarding suspected
violations of relevant laws and regulations in a form
admissible in judicial or administrative proceedings of the
other Party. Moreover, at the request of one Party, the other
Party will preserve the confidentiality of the furnished
evidence, except when used in judicial or administrative
proceedings.
4. In order to resolve specific outstanding cases related to
the subject matter of this Memorandum of Understanding, each
Party will, upon request of the other Party, promptly arrange
and facilitate visits by responsible officials of the other
Party's diplomatic mission to its respective companies,
enterprises or units.
This Memorandum of Understanding will enter into force upon
signature.
DONE at Washington, in duplicate, this seventh day of August, 1992,
in the English and the Chinese languages, both texts being equally
authentic.
For the Government of the United States of America:
For the Government of the People's Republic of China:
STATEMENT OF COOPERATION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON PROHIBITING
IMPORT AND EXPORT TRADE IN PRISON LABOR PRODUCTS
1. Summary: The statement of cooperation on implementation of the
prison labor MOU was signed at 09:00 LT in Beijing March 14, 1994.
Ministry of Justice Reform Through Labor Bureau Director-General Wang
Mingdi signed for the Chinese side, Econ Mincouns Szymanski signed for
the U.S. side. This message contains the final text of the document as
signed and a background document distributed at Secretary Christopher's
press conference where the signing of the document was announced. End
Summary.
2. Final text of the statement of cooperation on implementation of
the prison labor MOU, signed at 09:00 LT in Beijing March 14, 1994
follows:
BEGIN TEXT
As the Chinese government acknowledges and respects United States
laws concerning the prohibition of the import of prison labor products,
and the United States government recognizes and respects Chinese legal
regulations concerning the prohibition of the export of prison labor
products;
As China and the United States take note and appreciate the good
intentions and efforts made by both sides in implementing the
``Memorandum of Understanding'' signed in August 1992;
The Chinese government and the United States government agree that
conducting investigations of suspected exports of prison labor products
destined for the United States requires cooperation between both sides
in order to assure the enforcement of the relevant laws of both
countries. Both sides agree that they should stipulate clear guidelines
and procedures for the conduct of these investigations. Therefore, both
sides agree to the establishment of specialized procedures and
guidelines according to the following provisions:
First, when one side provides the other side a request, based on
specific information, to conduct investigations of suspected exports of
prison labor products destined for the United States, the receiving
side will provide the requesting side a comprehensive investigative
report within 60 days of the receipt of said written request. At the
same time, the requesting side will provide a concluding evaluation of
the receiving side's investigative report within 60 days of receipt of
the report.
Second, if the United States government, in order to resolve
specific outstanding cases, requests a visit to a suspected facility,
the Chinese government will, in conformity with Chinese laws and
regulations and in accordance with the MOU,
arrange for responsible United States diplomatic mission officials to
visit the suspected facility within 60 days of the receipt of a written
request.
Third, the United States government will submit a report indicating
the results of the visit to the Chinese government within 60 days of a
visit by diplomatic officials to a suspected facility.
Fourth, in cases where the U.S. Government presents new or
previously unknown information on suspected exports of prison labor
products destined for the United States regarding a suspected facility
that was already visited, the Chinese government will organize new
investigations and notify the U.S. side. If necessary, it can also be
arranged for the U.S. side to again visit that suspected facility.
Fifth, when the Chinese government organizes the investigation of a
suspected facility and the U.S. side is allowed to visit the suspected
facility, the U.S. side will provide related information conducive to
the investigation. In order to accomplish the purpose of the visit, the
Chinese side will, in accordance with its laws and regulations, provide
an opportunity to consult relevant records and materials onsite and
arrange visits to necessary areas of the facility. The U.S. side agrees
to protect relevant proprietary information of customers of the
facility consistent with the relevant terms of the prison labor MOU.
Sixth, both sides agree that arrangements for U.S. diplomats to
visit suspected facilities, in principle, will proceed after the visit
to a previous suspected facility is completely ended and a report
indicating the results of the visit is submitted.
Both sides further agree to continue to strengthen already
established effective contacts between the concerned ministries of the
Chinese government and the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and to arrange
meetings to discuss specific details when necessary to further the
implementation of the MOU in accordance with the points noted above.
_______________________________________________________________________
Done at Beijing, in duplicate, this Thirteenth day of March, 1 992,
in the English and the Chinese languages, both texts being equally
authentic.
Representative of the Chinese side: Wang Mingdi
Representative of the United States side: Christopher J. Szymanski
3. The statement of cooperation was signed, for the Chinese side by
Ministry of Justice Reform Through Labor Bureau Director-General Wang
Mingdi and for the U.S. side by Econ Mincouns Christopher J. Szymanski.
Prepared Statement of Gregory Xu
JUNE 22, 2005
Mr. Chairman, members of this Commission, ladies and gentlemen:
Thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak on the plight of
Falun Gong practitioners in China.
We are grateful for the support this Congress has shown us during
this difficult time. We are, however, sad to report that in the past
six years, the persecution of Falun Gong in China has gone into a
covert one but continued to worsen. Over the years, between 200,000 and
1 million have been reportedly sent to forced labor camps without
trials. The persecution methods used in such camps are extremely cruel,
encompassing a wide variety of brutal tortures; and yet the Chinese
government has imposed strict blockades in an attempt to conceal
information and absolve its responsibility. The labor camps in China
have the authority to imprison Falun Gong practitioners for as long as
three years without any due process and can arbitrarily extend the
terms of imprisonment at will.
I. THE LATEST CASUALTY OF LABOR CAMP
Most recently, Falun Dafa Information Center(FDI) has learned that
Ms. Gao Rongrong, whose face was grossly disfigured as a result of
torture in Longshan Forced Labor Camp, was tortured to death on June
16, 2005. Ms. Gao went through nearly two years of incarceration,
brainwashing, and torture for her beliefs in Falun Gong. Her case even
involved directives from Luo Gan, one of the standing members on
China's Politburo.
Ms. Gao, an accountant at the Luxun College of Fine Arts in
Shenyang City, was stripped of her job in 1999, soon after Falun Gong
met with suppression. Ms. Gao then lodged legal appeals with
authorities in Beijing, calling for an end to the wrongful persecution.
Authorities then, acting outside the law, detained Ms. Gao. In July
2003, Ms. Gao was sent to Longshan Forced Labor Camp. On May 7, 2004,
at approximately 3 pm, Tang Yubao, the deputy head of the No. 2 Prison
Brigade along with team leader Jiang Zhaohua, summoned Ms. Gao to the
office and began to torture her with an electric baton. The torture
continued for about 7 hours, and the inmates in the labor camp said
that Ms. Gao sustained multiple burns to her face, head, and neck. Ms.
Gao's face was covered with blisters and her hair was matted with pus
and blood. So severe were the injuries that Ms. Gao's face was
disfigured and had difficulty of seeing things.
In a desperate attempt to escape her torturers, Ms. Gao later
jumped from the 2nd floor office window of the facility, sustaining
multiple fractures. Subsequent hospitalization allowed those close to
Ms. Gao to take photos of the injuries to her face and body. The
shocking photos made their way overseas, where rights activists
publicized them widely. Details of her case were submitted to related
government offices in the United States and other nations, and were
also presented to the United Nations.
While hospitalized, Gao was under constant surveillance from the
Chinese police. Authorities declared she would be returned to captivity
upon release from the hospital. On October 5, 2004, however, Ms. Gao--
having recovered sufficiently to be moved--was able to leave the
hospital with the help of a small group of friends, thus avoiding
abduction by police and the possibility of further torture.
During Ms. Gao's short escape between October 5, 2004 and March 6,
2005, Falun Gong practitioners in the United States contacted the U.S.
Department of State for rescuing Ms. Gao. Politburo Standing Committee
Member Personally Oversaw Gao's Case.
As international pressure mounted concerning Gao's case, one of
China's highest-ranking officials stepped in: Politburo Standing
Committee member Luo Gan. Luo proceeded to order the Liaoning Province
Chinese Communist Party Political Judiciary Committee, the
Procuratorate, the Department of Justice, and the Police Department to
conceal any and all information about Ms. Gao's case.
After Ms. Gao's escape, Shenyang City Police Department (State
Security Division) began tapping the phones of all Falun Gong
practitioners in the region, hoping to discover who had helped
publicize Ms. Gao's case and secure her escape. A manhunt ensued, as
all individuals believed to have facilitated Ms. Gao's hospital escape
were ordered rounded up. One such individual who was abducted, Mr. Feng
Gang had to be admitted to Masanjia Hospital after thirteen days of
hunger strike protesting his unlawful abduction. Another individual,
Mr. Sun Shiyou, is reported to have been severely tortured by
authorities, including having his genitals shocked by electric batons.
Mr. Sun's family members were also abducted.
On March 6, 2005, Ms. Gao was located by police and again abducted.
Neither her location nor her condition was revealed to family members
until June 12; they learned she was being held at Medical University
Hospital in Shenyang City. According to Ms. Gao's family, by the time
they reached the hospital on June 12, Ms. Gao had lost consciousness,
her organs were atrophying, and she was hooked up to a respirator. They
say she was little more than ``skin and bones.'' Ms. Gao died four days
later. Chinese police are now pressuring Ms. Gao's family to cremate
her body quickly, trying to eliminate the evidence of torture.
It was reported that Public Security Bureau agents closely guarded
the room in which Ms. Gao was held at the hospital. The agents intended
to prevent news of her condition and maltreatment from reaching the
outside world; this fits a pattern of complicity that reaches to the
highest levels of China's regime.
II. FORCED LABOR IN CHINA'S LABOR CAMPS
Ms. Gao's death is part of a disturbing pattern of systematic
rights violations, systematic cover up, and zero accountability. And
Ms. Gao is just the latest victim of China's forced labor camp system.
The re-education-through-labor system has become a very effective tool
of control and suppression in the past fifty years for the Chinese
Communist Party's (CCP).
According to WOIPFG (World Organization to Investigate the
Persecution of Falun Gong), there are two direct purposes behind
China's system of ``re-education-through-labor,'' firstly to create a
reliable and cheap labor force through forced labor, and second to
brainwash prisoners. This is the so-called ``reform one's mind through
labor.'' This not only violates the basic human rights of the
detainees, but also encourages the prison and labor camp systems to
persecute the detainees because of the huge profit in products made
through forced labor. In addition, it shakes the stability of
international labor and trade markets when these cheap products are
dumped on the international market. Many consumers buy the products,
totally unaware of the reasons behind the cheap price.
Since China's former president Jiang Zemin launched the persecution
of Falun Gong in 1999, according to incomplete statistics, more than
180 forced labor camps in China have directly participated in the
persecution through illegal forced labor of over 200,000 Falun Gong
practitioners. In addition to forced brainwashing and torture, China's
labor camps also force a large number of Falun Gong practitioners to
work as slave labors. Falun Gong practitioners have been made to work
overtime shifts, subjective to punishment or deprivation of food or
sleep if assigned quotas are not met, and tortured if they refuse to
cooperate. They are often arbitrarily detained beyond their release
dates because of the huge profits that camps stand to gain as a result
of free labor. Practitioners are forced to work more than 10 hours a
day, sometimes even continuously overnight. Because of the terrible
working conditions and highly labor-intensive work, Falun Gong
practitioners have all suffered various degrees of damage, both
mentally and physically. Some have become disabled or even died. About
30 percent of all the death cases of Falun Gong practitioners resulted
from torture in labor camps. Sixty-nine labor camps have directly
caused the deaths of Falun Gong practitioners, including elderly people
in their 60s and an 8-month-old infant. Even women, children, or
disabled practitioners were not spared.
For example, Qiqiha'er Shuanghe Female Labor Camp is a processing
site that has no government approved certificate for producing
agricultural chemicals. Falun Gong practitioners are, however, forced
to pack very toxic pesticide powders with no protective worksuits at
all, which have caused serious physical harm to the practitioners. Many
practitioners have had bleeding noses, others feel sick, vomit, have
had severe coughs (there was blood in their phlegm) and abnormal
bleeding; still others have nearly gone blind because the labor camp is
filled with choking toxic pesticide dust. The victims are forced to
continue their work even when they show symptoms of being poisoned. On
the packages, it is clearly stated that in producing the pesticides
there must be protective facilities and workers must take showers after
work. However, there are no shower facilities in the chemical factory.
In the hot summer, when the chemical dust and sweat mixed together, it
would irritate the skin; as the sweat dried out, one could attain
tinea-type skin ulcers. The victims would feel itchy and painful. The
police would often forbid practitioners to wash, and therefore these
practitioners have to go to bed with chemical dust all over their
bodies.
At one time, Falun Gong practitioners Zhang Guiqin, Qi Baiqin, Lin
Xiumei and Jiang Yuehong refused to work to protest the persecution,
but they were tortured for doing so. They were forced to `sit on iron
chairs,' a form of torture where their hands were handcuffed from
behind their back, their feet were put into two square holes and they
were sandwiched between the back of the iron chair and an iron slab in
front of their chest. They were tortured until their feet were swollen,
their skin torn and flesh gaping or they lost consciousness.
Afterwards, six Falun Gong practitioners, headed by Gao Shanshan,
jointly urged the authorities to stop the persecution. The labor camp
confined Gao Shanshan into a solitary compartment at once and illegally
extended her term in the labor camp for an additional two months to
make this 20-year old practitioner suffer mentally.
Zhang Zhijie, the team leader of the prison guards at the Shuanghe
Female Labor Camp, and guard Chen Jianhua illegally extended most
practitioners' terms of detention for another year so that they could
maintain a high employment and high bonuses.
Because it was illegal to produce agricultural chemicals, when the
authorities came to inspect the camp, production would stop
immediately. Falun Gong practitioners were also forced to pack
sanitized chopsticks in their dormitories where they did not have even
basic disinfected facilities, not to mention proper workshops.
For another example, Shandong No.1 Female Labor Camp, located at 20
Jiangshuiquan Road, Jinan City, is commonly known as Jinan Female Labor
Camp. Since October 2000, however, the number of detainees increased
sharply to more than 700 people. More than 95 percent of them were
Falun Dafa practitioners who had been illegally kidnapped and detained
there. According to WOIPFG, the labor camp signed business deals with
Jinan Tianyi Printing Co., Ltd. and several other companies, and turned
the labor camp into handwork workshops for these enterprises, in order
to increase profit from foreign investment so that the labor camp staff
could get more bonuses. The labor camp forced the detainees to do
excessive amounts of labor work. As a result, detainees (including
elderly ladies over 60 years old) had to work 13 to 14 hours a day and
sometimes even overnight without pay. Due to working overtime for long
periods of time, a lot of detainees had difficulty standing, and it was
very common for someone to faint in the workshop. Those who refused to
work would be put into a ``confined solitary compartment'' which was
totally dark. The practitioners confined there were not allowed to go
to sleep, to wash their faces or brush their teeth. They were also not
allowed to come out of the compartment to go to toilet and were forced
to stand continuously for more than 20 days until they became
unconscious. These people would then have such swollen feet so that
they could not wear shoes and could not walk.
III. WHY ARE CHINA'S PRODUCTS SO CHEAP
Because of the strong resistance from western democratic countries
against ``forced labor products,'' in 1991 China's State Council re-
emphasized the ban on the export of ``forced labor products'' and
stipulated that no prison is allowed to cooperate or establish joint
ventures with foreign investment. In reality, however, the Chinese
government has granted numerous preferential policies to enterprises
under labor camps and prisons, to encourage and attract foreign
investment and export. In the document [2001] No.56 from the State
Bureau of Taxation under China's Ministry of Finance, it is clearly
stated that if the property rights of a company are solely owned by a
prison or forced labor camp system, the company is exempt from
corporate income tax and the land inquisition levy.
FDI and WOIPFG has collected ample evidence that shows China's
labor camps have cooperated companies to force Falun Gong practitioners
to manufacture forced labor products without any payment during their
detention. Products from these labor camps are exported to more than 30
countries and regions, including the United States, Canada, Australia,
France, Germany, New Zealand, Southeast Asia, etc.
The forced labor system not only violates the basic human rights of
the detainees, but also encourages abuse and torture as camps raise
their quotas in pursuit of even more profit. Meanwhile, the camps use
part of the profits to construct more forced labor facilities. In
addition, the products produced through forced labor are competitive
and highly attractive in international markets because of their extreme
low cost. As a result, this has led some foreign companies not aware of
a product's background to participate in joint venture production,
importing and selling the forced-labor-produced items. This not only
violates the laws of their own countries and international laws, as
many countries forbid the importation and selling of products
manufactured through forced labor, but also shakes the stability of
international labor and trade markets, threatening some of their
homeland companies that share the same market sectors.
A good example is the lobbying campaign initiated by the six
largest U.S. textile and fabric trade organizations during their summit
in Washington, D.C., on June 10, 2003. On July 2, 2003, the American
Textile Manufacturers Institute (ATMI) published a shocking report
stating that with the quota removal for Chinese textile products, more
than 1,300 textile plants in the U.S. would have to close by early
2004, resulting in the loss of over 630,000 jobs. The U.S. textile and
apparel market would be under China's control if protective measures
were not implemented in a timely manner. Ample evidence indicates that
some textile manufacturers such as the Shanghai Three-Gun Group Co.,
Ltd. the Shandong Leader Handicraft Articles Co., Ltd., and Henan
Rebecca Hair Products Inc., China, collaborate with ``re-education-
through-labor'' camps or detention centers to force Falun Gong
practitioners into unpaid hard labor during their detention. The
unlawfully detained practitioners are forced to endure more than 10
hours of hard labor per day or even overnight shifts in addition to
their regular hours. Those products are produced at the cost that their
competitors can not match.
III.1. BEIJING XIN'AN FEMALE LABOR CAMP
According to WOIPFG, Beijing Xin'an Female Labor Camp, located in
Nanyuan, Daxing Country, Beijing, does handwork for several companies
for their export products. Beijing Mickey Toys Co., Ltd, a joint
venture specializing in design, manufacture, sales and export of soft
toys, is one such company. In February 2001, nearly 1000 illegally
detained Falun Gong practitioners were forced to make toys with no pay.
This forced labor produced 100,000 toy rabbits for Beijing Mickey Toys
Co., Ltd subcontracted by Nestle.
Ms. Jennifer Zeng is a Falun Gong practitioner currently living in
Australia. She was detained in Xin'an Labor Camp and was one of the
practitioners forced to make Nestle toy rabbits. She described her
experience as follows. ``In the labor camp, we were forced to do all
kinds of heavy labor work, including planting grass and trees, clearing
garbage, digging cellars for storing vegetables in winter, knitting
sweaters, knitting cushions, making toys, producing disposable
syringes, wrapping sanitized chopsticks and so on. Most of the products
were for export. In particular, the sweaters we knitted were large
sizes only suitable for foreigners who are big in build. In February
2001, we received an order for 100,000 toy rabbits. According to the
police, the toys were being made for Nestle to be used in their
promotions. The rabbits were about 30 cm. long, brown in color, with a
long neck, wearing a large bright red collar made from fleecy material,
with two black whiskers on each side of the face, about 5-6 cm long.
Some of the rabbits wore cowboy vests, some wore dustcoats, and some
had one eye patched up like a pirate. There were English letters on
their chests, with their fists clenched, thumbs up. There were three
toes on their feet, canary yellow in color. Their tails were white in
color and very short.''
Falun Gong practitioners are forced to work for extremely long
hours without pay in Xin'an labor camp. Ms. Zeng recalls, ``It would go
through over 30 processing lines to make a rabbit like this, and it
would take over 10 hours to make one. But the processing fee for each
rabbit was only 30 cents (equivalent to Au$0.06, US$0.04). The
processing fees were paid to the labor camp. We didn't get anything.
Usually we began work after getting up at 5 o'clock in the morning, and
worked until 2 or 3 o'clock in the morning the next day. Sometimes we
had to work overtime, otherwise we could not finish the job. At the
busiest time, I did not dare to wash my hands after going to the
toilet, in order to save a few minutes. At night, sometimes I was so
exhausted that I could not even count clearly from 1 to 9. Yet I still
had to force my eyes open to knit sweaters. The pattern of the sweater
was quite complicated; sometimes we finally finished the knitting after
much effort only to discover the next morning it had been knitted
completely wrongly. So, we had to unpick the stitches and redo it. Long
hours of highly intensive workload and severe lack of sleep made me
feel, for a very long period of time, that the only thing I needed in
my life was sleep.''
The picture to the left is a photo of the toy rabbits manufactured
for Nestle taken from Mickey Toys Co. Ltd. It's clear that they are the
same as Jennifer described.
The Sydney Morning Herald and Geneva Le Temps, both reported on
this case. On December 28, 2001, the Sydney Morning Herald published an
article by Kelly Burke: ``Cute toy rabbits belie ordeal of Chinese
labor camps.'' Nestle released a statement to the Herald, confirming
that the company placed an order with an established Beijing-based toy
manufacturer, Beijing Mickey Toys Co. Ltd. for 110,000 plush rabbits
for a Nesquik promotion early that year.
III.2. LANZHOU DASHAPING DETENTION CENTER AND LANZHOU NO.1 DETENTION
CENTRE
Lanzhou Zhenglin Nongken Food Ltd, established in 1988 in Gansu by
Taiwanese businessman Lin Ken, is one of the earliest Taiwan-financed
enterprises in Gansu. From 1992, the company embarked on a joint
venture with Lanzhou Dashaping Detention Center and Lanzhou No.1
Detention Centre (also known as Xiguoyuan Detention Centre). According
to WOIPFG, some 10,000 detainees (including dozens of illegally
detained Falun Gong practitioners) were forced to use their hands to
peel the shells off melon seeds, and were engaged in intensive physical
labor work. Those detainees were forced to crack the seeds of a large
variety of melon between their teeth, and then peel the husk off with
their bare hands to remove the kernels. In winter, they had to do this
work outside in the freezing cold. Many of them suffered frostbite and
the skin on their hands split, with pus and blood from the wounds
oozing onto the melon seeds. In the summer, the cracking and extracting
of kernels from shells continued unabated. Many had their teeth cracked
and damaged from cracking melon seeds, and even lost their fingernails
in the process of extracting the kernels from their shells. The
detainees were forced to squat on their heels to do the work from early
morning till evening for more than ten hours continuously, with no pay.
In order for Zhenglin Nongken Food Ltd and Xiguoyuan Detention
Centre to make a huge profit, the detainees were given high quotas for
their work. The detention center staff tortured the detainees at will.
Furthermore, there was corruption and economic crimes. In 1998, a
division chief of Dashaping Detention Center committed suicide with a
gun when he was found embezzling money of melon seed process fees.
In April 2001, 57 year-old Falun Gong practitioner Wan Guifu was
illegally sent to Lanzhou No. 1 Detention Center. Wan Guifu was forced
to crack melon seeds with his teeth and extract the kernels with his
fingers. His lips were badly swollen and the fingernails of both his
hands fell off. His fingers were bleeding and oozing pus. Because he
was unable to finish his quota, Wan Guifu was tortured by inmates of
Cell No. 9, after secret instructions from the captain of the 4th crew
of Lanzhou No. 1 Detention Center. Wan suffered severe injury to his
abdomen. On December 29, 2001, he was sent to the Lanzhou Dashaping
Labor Camp Hospital but died three days later. The doctors extracted a
lot of fluid from Wan Guifu's abdominal cavity, a direct result of the
severe torture. According to confirmation by people (names omitted) who
were detained at Lanzhou Dashaping Detention Center for a long period,
the death rate of detainees at the center was very high, but because of
the blockade of information, details of the death cases are usually not
reported.
These unpaid manual labor provided huge profits for Zhenglin
Nongken Food Ltd. In just a few years, Zhenglin Nongken Food Ltd became
the biggest production base in China in roasted seeds and nuts. Its
main product line, ``Zhenglin handpicked melon seeds'' (shelled by
detainees), is sold in more than 30 countries including the United
States, Canada, Australia, France, New Zealand, and Southeast Asian
countries. At present, Zhenglin Nongken Food Ltd has subsidiary
companies overseas in the United States, Canada, Singapore, and
Malaysia. In Australia, they have an import business liaison person.
III.3. SHANGDONG PROVINCE NO. 1 WOMEN'S FORCED LABOR CAMP
Shangdong Province No. 1 Women's Forced Labor Camp, also called the
Jinan Women's Forced Labor Camp, is located at 20 Jiangshuiquan Road,
Jinan City, Shandong Province. It is the manufacturing site for
Shandong Leader Handicraft Articles Co., Ltd.
The detainees are forced to make products without pay. Soon after
October 2000, the number of detainees suddenly increased from 200 to
700, with approximately 95 percent of the new detainees being Falun
Gong practitioners. In order to earn foreign exchange and more bonuses,
the camp often forced practitioners to work extra hours to sew bedding.
The over-60-year-old women were also forced to suffer through their
exhaustion, working overnight in order to complete the tasks. The
detainees often fall in a dead faint on the floor because of the long-
term overtime and work overload. Those who refused to work were locked
up in a dark, ``strictly monitored'' room. Rest, sleep, washing, and
using the toilet outside were all denied. Detainees were forced to keep
standing for over 20 days until they finally fainted. Their legs and
feet became so badly swollen that they could not wear shoes and could
not even walk. They were seriously debilitated, physically and
mentally. The main products include handmade bedding and domestic
accessories under the brand name of ``Lijie.''
Within the first six months of 2002, this forced labor camp made
570,000 yuan (US$70,000) from its production. Within two years, it
built an office building over a dozen stories high, a reception
building, and a big stockroom facility. The products it manufactured
were sold to the U.S, Canada, Chile, Argentina, European Union, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Australia, Japan, Korea,
Singapore and over 30 other countries. It is claimed that Shandong
Leader Handicraft Articles Co., Ltd., is a major enterprise for earning
foreign revenue. Its annual turnover is 70 million yuan (US$8.5
million) and annual export is over US$10 million.
III.4. SHANGHAI QINGSONG WOMEN'S FORCED LABOR CAMP
Chinese citizen Li Ying lived in Shanghai City and graduated from
Shanghai Tongji University in 1992 with a major in Business Management.
She worked in the Shanghai Zhonglu Management Consulting Company. On
October 16, 2001, she was detained for practicing Falun Gong and
sentenced to two years' forced labor in the Shanghai Qingsong Women's
Forced Labor Camp. As a result of the persistent appeals of her fiance,
Australian citizen Li Qizhong, and the rescue effort of fellow
practitioners all over the world, she was released on October 15 and
arrived in Australia on November 29, 2003.
Li Ying was forced to do hard labor during the time she was
detained in Shanghai Qingsong Women's Forced Labor Camp, making
products for many Chinese companies and factories. Aside for the plush
toys exported to Italy, she had to make products for the ``Three-Gun''
brand of underwear. According to her testimony, all the ``Three-Gun''
underwear marked with ``examined by # 16'' are made by detainees of
Shanghai Qingsong Women's Forced Labor Camp. The detainees have to get
up at 5 a.m. and work from 7 a.m. until 11 p.m. or 12 midnight. These
long hours of labor result in badly blistered hands and fingers, while
the wage is just 3 yuan (US$0.35) a day. The detainees have to pay a
boarding fee of 75 yuan (US$9) per month, which is deducted from their
meager wages.
Three-Gun Group Co., Ltd., is authorized to import and export. Its
main product is the ``Three-Gun'' brand of underwear, which is sold to
over 70 countries and regions. The Three-Gun Group is also a partner of
the world-renown Dow Corning and Dupont companies, from which it
imports technology.
III.5. HENAN PROVINCE'S NO. 3 LABOR CAMP AND THE SHIBALIHE FEMALE LABOR
CAMP IN ZHENZHOU CITY
Competition within the hair products industry is very intense since
it is a highly specialized industry with minimal barriers in terms of
capital, technology, and marketing. Furthermore, since the price of
human hair raw materials and labor constitute a significant percentage
of the overall product cost, companies fight for raw material resources
and cheap labor. As a result, the detainees in nearby labor camps,
jails, and detention centers have become the slave laborers for making
low-cost hair products. Analysis of the situation reveals that this is
one of the main reasons labor camps became the productionsites for
Henan Rebecca Hair Products and other Henan hair products
manufacturers.
To make products for the Henan Province hair products, over 800
detainees (including illegally detained Falun Gong practitioners) in
Henan Province's No. 3 Labor Camp and the Shibalihe Female Labor Camp
in Zhenzhou City have been pushed to work day and night by guards who
threaten them with torture, punishment, and humiliation. They work
extra hours to bring in foreign exchange income and more profit for the
labor camps and Henan Rebecca Hair Products Inc. To increase profits,
Henan Province's No. 3 Labor Camp even ``buys'' Falun Gong
practitioners as slaves from other places for 800 yuan (US$100) each.
When the labor camp was short of funds and was about to be shut down,
many Falun Gong practitioners were abducted and incarcerated in this
camp where they were forced to make hair products, thus reviving the
labor camp's business.
According to a witness, ``Henan Province's No. 3 Labor Camp was
awarded the `National Civilized Work Unit' citation from the Central
Politics and Law Committee `610 Office' and the Labor Camp Bureau, for
persecuting Falun Gong. At the time the award was put up, three
detainees fainted from exhaustion. Qu Shuangcai, Director of the No. 3
Labor Camp, brutally persecuted Falun Gong practitioners and was
favored by his superiors. In May 2003, he was transferred to the
Shibalihe Female Labor Camp in Zhenzhou City and promoted to director
of that labor camp. Right away, he signed a contract with Henan Rebecca
Hair Products, Inc. He also instituted the use of straightjacket
restraints for torturing practitioners. Within several months of his
arrival, three female Falun Gong practitioners were tortured to
death.''
With the help of free labor from Henan labor camps, in the first 10
months of 2002, the hair product export of Henan Province reached
US$138.86 million, which made it a big industry with over 1 billion
yuan (US$125 million) in revenue, and Henan became the largest hair
product manufacturer in the world. The hair product industry has had a
consecutive annual growth rate of nearly 30 percent, and Henan's hair
products have a market share of one fourth of the world's total. Owning
five labor camps/hair product factories, Henan Rebecca Hair Products
Inc. has been the world's leading producer of human hair weaves.
According to sources, the U.S. is the largest distribution and
consumer market of hair products in the world. Rebecca accounts a
significant market share in the United States. Statistics show that the
U.S. has a need for 15 million human hair weavings, 10 million of which
come from Xuchang, Henan.
III.6. OTHER EXPORT PRODUCTS MADE IN LABOR CAMPS
Numerous other products made in China's labor camps by Falun Gong
practitioners are finally exported to the United States and other
countries.
Mr. Sam Lu is now an Atlanta resident. He was put in a jail in
Guangdong Province for almost two months in 2001. According to his own
testimony, Sam was forced to work on export products such as toys and
shopping bags without pay. He still remembers one of the shopping bags
was printed with ``National Gallery of Art.'' Sam was put into a cell
only about 300 sq. feet in size, with 20 prisoners and one toilet
inside. They slept and worked in the cell.
Sometimes they were forced to work until 2 am to keep up with the
schedule. Only two meals a day were provided. The police used a wire
whip to beat prisoners if they did not do a good job or could not keep
up with the schedule.
The same kind of tragedy is happening to Sam's wife Xuefei Zhou,
who was sentenced to forced labor camp for three years without any
trial and without a lawyer only because she handed out flyers in the
street to clarify to the truth about Falun Gong. Xuefei was forced to
do embroidery work for export. The hard work, malnutrition and torture
made my wife almost lose her eyesight.
III.7. U.S. CITIZEN DR. CHARLES LEE IS FORCED TO MAKE CHRISTMAS LIGHTS
TO BE EXPORTED TO THE UNITED STATES
U.S. citizen Dr. Charles Lee was arrested upon arriving at
Guangzhou Airport on January 22, 2003. He was rushed through a one-day
show trial on March 21, 2003, and sentenced to a 3-year prison term for
his ``intention'' of exposing human rights violations against Falun
Gong practitioners by the Chinese government. He has not committed any
crime, nor did he intend to. His only intent was to expose to the
Chinese people the reality of the nature of the persecution that the
Chinese government has concealed from them.
According to the information from Friends of Charles Lee,
throughout one and half years of detention, Dr. Lee has suffered both
physical and mental abuses: he has been beaten, force-fed, deprived of
sleep, handcuffed for days at a time, and forced to watch anti-Falun
Gong brainwashing videos. These tactics are employed to try to break
his spirit, and cause him abandon his belief in Falun Gong. It is
evident that the persecution of Dr. Lee directly targets his belief in
Falun Gong.
Starting from June 2004 to late 2004, Dr. Lee was forced to make
Christmas lights daily. At times he was forced to work 10-12 hours per
day and 7 days a week. These Christmas lights are to be exported to the
United States.
IV. THE INFORMATION CONCEALING AND MEDIA COVERAGE
How much does the world know about what happens in China's labor
camps? Will people still buy China's exports if we know it is made in
China's labor camps by Falun Gong practitioners?
Unfortunately, Ms. Gao Rongrong's death highlights the systematic
cover up and the fear of Chinese Communist Party for people to know the
truth. Afraid of the publicity of Ms. Gao's disfigure, Shenyang City
Police Department (State Security Division) began tapping the phone
lines of all Falun Gong practitioners in the region, and a manhunt
ensued, resulting in re-arrest of Ms. Gao and several abducts and
subsequent tortures to related Falun Gong practitioners.
Ever since Chinese Communist Party launched the persecution toward
Falun Gong in July 1999, the communist regime has utilized its state
run media to orchestrate a hate campaign toward Falun Gong, without
allowing practitioners any voice. Chinese government penalizes severely
for anybody who dares to challenge its information blockade. Mr. Liu
Chengjun, male, from Jilin Province, was involved in the incident of
broadcasting Falun Gong truth programs through the Changchun Cable TV
System on March 5, 2002. To revenge, Chinese authorities ordered a mass
arrest in Changchun soon after. The police shot Mr. Liu at his legs to
arrest him. On September 20, 2002, Changchun City Intermediate People's
Court sentenced him to 13 years in prison. On December 26, 2003, Liu
Chengjun left this world after enduring 21 months of prison torture.
Chinese Internet market is fast-growing, yet, China is believed to
extend greater censorship over the net than any other country in the
world. In China, all 110,000 net cafes in the country have to use
software to control access to websites considered harmful or
subversive. A net police force monitors websites and e-mails, and
controls on gateways connecting the country to the global internet are
designed to prevent access to critical information. It has been
reported that Cisco Systems has sold several thousand routers--costing
more than US$20,000 each--to enable China to build an online spying
system and the firm's engineers have helped set it to spot
``subversive'' key-words in messages. The system also enables police to
know who has looked at banned sites or sent ``dangerous'' e-mails.
Cisco is not only concerned by a code of ethics, but also violates the
Global Internet Freedom Act, passed by the House of Representatives of
U.S. in July 2003, aims to combat online censorship imposed by
repressive regimes such as China.
Not content with controlling Chinese language media in China,
China's communist regime is doing its utmost to influence the world
media. On January 21, 2005, AP's Beijing Bureau released a story
``Chinese Government Shows off Repentant Falun Gong Followers,'' which
echoed the CCP's official portrayal of the January 2001 Tiananmen
Square self-immolation tragedy, though numerous reports by independent
media and human rights bodies worldwide have questioned and repudiated
claims by the Chinese Communist regime linking Falun Gong to the
immolations. The Falun Dafa Information Center anticipated Beijing's
propaganda shenanigans, and thus sent a media advisory to the AP and
others detailing concerns. That was before the AP's story ran. And yet
the AP's piece went beyond merely failing to present or engage Falun
Gong's concerns to doing exactly what the advisory cautioned against.
With WTO accession, China is under pressure to open up its massive
media market. At the meantime, it is also seeking for vehicles to
disseminate its own message across, not only to the overseas Chinese,
but also to the world at large. For examples, when the AOL Time Warner
and Rupert Murdoch's Phoenix Satellite Television Holdings were allowed
to broadcast their programs in China, they were asked, in return, to
carry news and propaganda of the state-owned China Central Television
(CCTV) on the cable networks of AOL Time Warner and Rupert Murdoch's
Fox. Furthermore, the broadcasting has to be managed to steering clear
of issues that Chinese authority would deem offensive, such as the
persecution against Falun Gong practice group, for the penalty could be
cancellation of broadcast privileges. Former employees, rights
organization and the free press have criticized the Murdoch empire for
its failure to raise sensitive issues in China. Maybe Murdoch has
learned how to bow to Beijing from the hard lesson of Star-TV
discontinuing the BBC's World Service when Murdoch owned that company
and talked volubly about how dictatorships would crumble under the
weight of global communications.
In their efforts to conquer the world's most populous and
potentially lucrative Internet market, some multinational firms are
making compromises that limit the right of Chinese Internet users to
freedom of information. In October 2004, U.S.-based Google admits to
removing eight news sources, apparently deemed subversive, from its
Chinese site. As recently as the search kingpin went public in August
2004, its founders vowed to hold the customer experience sacrosanct.
According to Business Week (October 11, 2004), Google offers China
users an uncharacteristic lack of disclosure on the removed content,
aside from the censorship itself. On November 29, 2004, Reporters
Without Borders condemned the action of the Chinese authorities in
blocking access to Google's news website (Google News), starting a few
weeks after the launch of an expurgated Chinese-language version of
Google News. The press freedom organization said in a statement ``China
is censoring Google News to force Internet users to use the Chinese
version of the site which has been purged of the most critical news
reports. [. . .] By agreeing to launch a news service that excludes
publications disliked by the government, Google has let itself be used
by Beijing.''
Google's archrival Yahoo! has been censoring its Chinese-language
search-engine for several years as directed by the Chinese government.
For example, the top
results of a search for ``Falun Gong'' produces only sites critical of
the Chinese meditation practice in line with the regime's position. The
same search using a non-censored search-engine turns up material
supporting Falun Gong and about the
government's repression of its followers. Meanwhile, other search-
engines not conformed to the censorship, such as Altavista, have
already been blocked inside China.
``With the cooperation of companies such as Cisco, Sun
Microsystems, Yahoo!, and Google, Chinese authorities used American
technology to monitor, sanitize, and ultimately isolate the Chinese
web, creating the world's greatest Red Internet.'' (Quoted from Can
FDI(Foreign Direct Investment) Save the Shaking Chinese Economy? by Li
Li and Ching-hsi Chang, 2004.)
The latest episode of China's control in the world media is CCP's
coercion toward Eutelsat to take NTDTV off the air, so Chinese people
will lose the only open window to access the uncensored TV programs.
V. THE LASTING AND FAR REACHING IMPACTS
The crackdown on Falun Gong over the past six years in the People's
Republic of China has led to the unjust imprisonment of thousands of
innocent practitioners, has subjected them to severe forms of mental
and physical abuse, and has caused their families and loved ones
countless hours of emotional agony. Consequently, in the wake of this
savagery, many children have lost either one or both parents and
sometimes even their caregivers. According to the 2005 report of GMR
(Global Mission to Rescue Persecuted Falun Gong Practitioners, five
children were killed in
police custody; 18 children lost both of their parents during the
persecution; 102 children lost one of their parents; 43 children are
directly targeted, tortured, or thrown into prisons and labor camps
because of their or their parents' belief in Falun Gong; 39 children
are forced to separate from their parents because their parents are
detained. In addition, hundreds of thousands of children have been
forced to slander Falun Gong or, upon refusal, be expelled from school.
Moreover, many young ones are discriminated as their parents are
practicing Falun Gong. This data, however, only represented the
information investigated and confirmed by GMR.
For example, Zhuangzhuang Pan is a five-year-old boy from
Shuangyashan City, Heilongjiang Province. Zhuangzhuang's father Xingfu
Pan, former Associate Director of Telecommunications Bureau Exchange
Center in the city of Shuangyashan, Heilongjiang Province, was
persecuted to death on Jan. 31, 2005 because he practiced Falun Gong;
and his mother Li Zhang is serving a 9-year sentence in Harbin City
Women's Prison. In addition, both Zhuangzhuang's uncle and aunt are in
forced labor camps. Zhuangzhuang and his 64-year-old grandmother now
depend on each other with no financial income.
In May, 2001, Xingfu Pan was arrested by Shuangyashan Patrol Team
and was incarcerated in the Shuangyashan Detention Center. On March 7,
2002, Pan was unlawfully sentenced to 5 years in prison with no
evidence. During his periods of incarceration, Pan was forced to do
lots of heavy labor work in addition to endure various brutal tortures.
After years of forced labor as well as various mental and physical
tortures, Pan's health deteriorated dramatically. On June 18, 2004, he
was diagnosed as having pleurisy and lung tissue damage. He was too
weak to use the toilet on his own. On Jan. 31, 2005, Mr. Pan Xingfu
died, leaving his sixty four-year-old mother, his five-year-old son and
his imprisoned wife behind.
In early morning of May 2, 2002, Zhuangzhuang's grandmother was
also arrested at home, and frightened Zhuangzhuang was left alone at
home. To protest the unlawful detention, Zhuangzhuang's grandmother
went on a hunger strike. As punishment, the 62-year-old lady was locked
in an iron chair and violently force-fed with extremely salty corn
gruel. Her shirt was soaked with blood from her mouth. Finally, after
15 days on hunger strike, she was released.
Seeing so many relatives being brutally taken away, little
Zhuangzhuang was traumatized by these episodes. Since then, he would be
in constant fear of the police taking his grandmother away again
whenever he heard any loud voices.
In fact, over the past six years, millions of Falun Gong
practitioners have been locked up in labor camps, brainwashing centers
where they are forced to ``transform,'' or renounce their belief in the
principles of Falun Gong--Truth, Compassion and Tolerance. They are
made to choose between spiritual death and physical death: If they
refuse to renounce their practice, the efforts to facilitate
``transformation'' are intensified and many die as a result of
beatings, torture, and starvation, among other methods. Their children,
unfortunately, have to witness these fatal struggles.
All Chinese people have, in actuality, been pushed into
compromising their consciences in order show an attitude of support for
this persecution. Through the state-controlled propaganda machine, even
foreign governments and corporations doing business in China are forced
to choose between conscience and personal interest when faced with the
persecution of Falun Gong. The campaign to annihilate Falun Gong
practitioners permeates all levels of society. Children are the most
deeply affected, as their pure hearts are so easily damaged or warped
by brainwashing and propaganda. The abuse and trauma they suffer is
something that will affect them for the rest of their lives.
VI. CONCLUSION
Due to censorship and the tight control on information related to
Falun Gong in China, what is reported here represents perhaps only a
tiny tip of the iceberg. I hope that this testimony will help you
understand the severity and scope of the ruthless campaign of
persecution against Falun Gong practitioners in China. It is my hope
that this Congress will continue and double its efforts to rescue and
help these innocent people and their children, and help bring an end to
this human rights atrocity in China.
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