Summary

The Department of Energy's (DOE) facilities, particularly its nuclear weapons design laboratories, have long been viewed by DOE and the FBI as targets of espionage and other threats. Recent revelations of the possible loss of nuclear weapons design and other classified material to foreign countries has renewed concerns about the effectiveness of security arrangements at DOE facilities. During the past 20 years, GAO has repeatedly cited weaknesses in DOE security. This testimony provides an overview of GAO's work in the following five areas: security problems in controlling foreign visitors, protecting classified and sensitive information, maintaining physical security over facilities and property, ensuring the trustworthiness of employees, and accounting for nuclear materials.

GAO noted that: (1) GAO's work has identified security-related problems with controlling foreign visitors, protecting classified and sensitive information, maintaining physical security over facilities and property, ensuring the trustworthiness of employees, and accounting for nuclear materials; (2) these problems include: (a) ineffective controls over foreign visitors to DOE's most sensitive facilities; (b) weaknesses in efforts to control and protect classified and sensitive information; (c) lax physical security controls, such as security personnel and fences, to protect facilities and property; (d) ineffective management of personnel security clearance programs; and (e) weaknesses in DOE's ability to track and control nuclear materials; (3) the recent revelations about espionage bring to light how ingrained security problems are at DOE; (4) although each individual security problem is a concern, when these problems are looked at collectively over time, a more serious situation becomes apparent; (5) while a number of investigations are under way to determine the status of these security problems, GAO has found that DOE has often agreed to take corrective action but the implementation has not been successful and the problems reoccur; (6) there are two overall systemic causes for this situation; (7) DOE managers and contractors have shown a lack of attention and priority to security matters; (8) there is a serious lack of accountability at DOE; (9) efforts to address security problems have languished for years without resolution or repercussions to those organizations responsible; (10) security in today's environment is even more challenging, given the greater openness that now exists at DOE's facilities and the international cooperation associated with some of DOE's research; (11) even when more stringent security measures were in place than there are today, problems have arisen and secrets can be, and were, lost; and (12) consequently, continual vigilance, as well as more sophisticated security strategies, will be needed to meet the threats that exist today.