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MILITARY BASE CLOSURES

Management Strategy
Needed to Mitigate
Challenges and Improve
Communication to Help
Ensure Timely
Implementation of Air
National Guard
Recommendations





Highlights of [GAO-07-641](#), a report to congressional committees

Why GAO Did This Study

The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendations affected 62 percent of the flying units in the Air National Guard (ANG) with 14 units losing their flying mission, and others converting from one type of aircraft to another, or increasing or decreasing assigned aircraft. To implement the recommendations, ANG must relocate hundreds of aircraft and retrain or recruit about 15,000 personnel by 2011. In this report, GAO addresses the status of efforts to implement the ANG BRAC actions. GAO's objectives were to determine (1) the process to provide replacement missions to units losing flying missions, (2) the progress and challenges in implementing the BRAC actions, and (3) changes to the cost and savings estimates. This report, prepared under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, is one in a series of reports related to 2005 BRAC recommendations. GAO conducted its work at the Air Force, ANG headquarters, and in 11 states affected by BRAC 2005.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that the Department of Defense develop a strategy to address challenges, enhance communication, and provide more transparent cost reporting. DOD partially concurred with the recommendations on strategy and communication, but did not concur with the recommendation on cost reporting.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-641.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact Brian Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov.

MILITARY BASE CLOSURES

Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations

What GAO Found

Through a consultative process that involved key stakeholders, the Air Force identified and ANG assigned 30 replacement missions for affected units that supported either the future force structure or the National Guard goal to maximize flying missions. On the basis of consultation with its major commands and the combatant commanders, the Air Force developed a prioritized list of potential mission areas for ANG, but let ANG, with input from state leadership, decide which missions to assign to specific units. ANG assigned affected units 23 missions from the prioritized list. ANG also assigned 7 new flying missions to affected units on the basis of its leadership goal to have at least 1 flying mission per state and to maximize the number of flying missions where possible.

ANG is making progress in planning to implement the BRAC recommendations, but lacks a strategy to address implementation challenges. Without such a strategy, several challenges could delay when some units are able to perform their new missions. ANG has developed programming plans for the BRAC-related actions affecting the ANG and a plan to move hundreds of aircraft. However, ANG faces challenges in managing the timing and sequencing of many actions required to implement BRAC, such as developing manning documents that provide the specific skill mixes required, and in ensuring there is sufficient space in Air Force schools to accommodate personnel requiring training. For example, ANG projects that about 3,000 personnel need to be trained for intelligence missions, but the school can currently accommodate only a portion of this requirement. ANG has worked with the Air Force to develop potential solutions, but these have yet to be fully implemented. There may also be delays in obtaining security clearances for personnel due to the lengthy clearance process. Further, bridge missions have not been identified for some units that will face a gap between old and new missions. ANG also faces possible delays in obtaining required funding for new equipment, construction, and training. Finally, some ANG units believe there has been insufficient communication with ANG headquarters about new mission requirements, which impacts their ability to recruit and train personnel.

GAO's analysis of current Air Force estimates indicates that there will be annual recurring costs of \$53 million rather than estimated \$26 million annual recurring savings for the ANG related actions. Further, the Air Force is not using BRAC funds for over \$300 million for military construction, training, and equipment to establish replacement missions for units losing their flying mission. However, because these costs are not included in the Air Force BRAC budget submission, Congress does not have full visibility over BRAC-related implementation costs.

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United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

May 16, 2007

Congressional Committees

On May 13, 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) made public its recommendations to realign and close bases, which it projected would yield nearly \$50 billion in net savings over 20 years. Although Air National Guard (ANG) units were affected by 37 of the 42 Air Force recommendations, these actions were aimed primarily at transforming ANG to better support the future force structure rather than producing significant savings. In July 2005, we reported that DOD's proposed recommendations affected 56 ANG installations with 22 units potentially losing their flying mission.¹ We also observed that the Air Force had not identified new missions for many of those units. Air Force officials said at the time that they planned to use positions in these units for emerging missions to support the future force structure in such areas such as homeland defense, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and intelligence, which they expected to further refine as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review. After performing its own analysis, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission² made substantial changes to the recommendations published in its September 8, 2005 report. The BRAC recommendations affected 56 (62 percent) of ANG flying units with 14 units losing their flying mission, 4 units reducing their flying mission, 5 units converting from one type of aircraft to another, 4 units associating³ with another unit, and 29 units receiving an increase in the number of aircraft assigned to them. The BRAC Commission estimated that the Air Force recommendations would result in an annual recurring savings of about \$1.1 billion and those affecting ANG would be about \$26 million of the Air Force projected annual recurring savings. The BRAC Commission

¹GAO, Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments, [GAO-05-785](#) (Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005).

²The BRAC legislation (Pub. L. No. 101-510, Title XXIX, as amended by Pub. L. No. 107-107, Title XXX) provides for an independent Commission to review the Secretary of Defense's realignment and closure recommendations and present its findings and conclusions on the Secretary's recommendations, along with its own recommendations to the President.

³In an associate unit, a unit from one component (i.e., active, guard, or reserve) of the Air Force operates and maintains equipment that it shares with a unit from another component. By sharing equipment, the Air Force seeks to train more people and make more efficient use of the equipment.

recommendations were accepted by the President and Congress and became effective on November 9, 2005.

Once the recommendations became effective, the Air Force became responsible for implementing recommendations affecting ANG. The Office of the Secretary of Defense required the Air Force to submit a detailed business plan for each recommendation that included a schedule for any personnel, equipment, or aircraft movements between installations and updated costs and savings estimates. All the plans affecting ANG were approved by the Chairman of the Infrastructure Steering Group between April and October 2006. In accordance with BRAC statutory authority, DOD must complete closure and realignment actions by September 15, 2011.⁴

This report is one in a series of reports that detail progress DOD has made in implementing the base closures and realignments included in the 2005 BRAC round. We performed our work under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative⁵ and are reporting the results to you in order to facilitate your oversight role of DOD's infrastructure and BRAC initiatives. In this report, we address the Air Force's efforts to implement the BRAC recommendations affecting ANG. Our specific objectives were to determine (1) the process the Air Force used to identify and assign new missions to ANG units who will lose flying missions as a result of BRAC 2005, (2) the progress the Air Force has made and the challenges it faces in implementing the BRAC recommendations, and (3) changes to the estimated cost and savings associated with implementation of recommendations affecting ANG since the BRAC recommendations became effective.

To accomplish these objectives, we performed our work at the Air Force headquarters, including the Total Force Integration office⁶ and the BRAC Project Management Office; and ANG Directorate of the National Guard Bureau,⁷ in Washington, D.C. We also interviewed ANG officials in

⁴Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 2904, as amended (1990).

⁵31 U.S.C. §717.

⁶The Air Force Total Force Integration Office (A8F) was previously known as the Future Total Force Office.

⁷The ANG Directorate of the National Guard Bureau is hereafter referred to as ANG headquarters.

11 states that were affected by the 2005 BRAC recommendations.⁸ During these meetings, we interviewed key officials involved in implementing the recommendations to understand the process used to identify and assign new missions to ANG units as well as the role that Air Force and ANG headquarters, the state adjutants general, and affected units played in the process and to identify the challenges the Air Force faces in implementing the recommendations. Finally, we analyzed the changes to the costs and savings estimates between the approved BRAC Commission recommendations and the business plans developed by the Air Force and approved by the Secretary of Defense. On the basis of our assessments, we believe the DOD data are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We conducted our work from September 2006 through March 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Further details on the scope and methodology are described in appendix I.

Results in Brief

Through an evolutionary and consultative process involving all key stakeholders, the Air Force identified and ANG headquarters assigned replacement missions for affected units that supported either the future force structure or the National Guard goal to maximize the number of ANG flying missions. On the basis of consultation with its major commands and the combatant commanders, the Air Force identified potential missions for ANG, which it then categorized into a prioritized list based on mission significance. The Air Force then let ANG headquarters, with input from state leadership, decide which of those missions to assign to specific units. Our analysis indicated that 23 of the 30 missions assigned were on the prioritized list. In addition to the prioritized list, ANG leadership sought to ensure that each state had at least one flying mission and to assign additional flying missions where possible. Our analysis shows that the remaining 7 missions assigned were new flying missions based on this premise. For example, Connecticut was assigned a new flying mission because it no longer had one, and additional flying missions were assigned in Missouri, Tennessee, Mississippi, and two in Ohio.

ANG is making progress toward implementing the 2005 BRAC recommendations, but some related challenges remain that could delay

⁸We visited state ANG and unit officials in Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. We also held video conferences with state ANG officials in Oklahoma and Ohio and received written responses to questions from state ANG officials in Mississippi.

when some units are able to be mission capable. The Air Force has developed business plans that have been approved by the Secretary of Defense, created 59 programming plans, developed a plan for the movement of aircraft, and assigned missions to all affected units. However, ANG headquarters faces challenges in managing the timing and sequencing of many actions required to implement the BRAC recommendations. First, ANG headquarters faces challenges in developing the large number of unit manning documents and requirements templates that provide the specific skill mixes required for replacement missions. ANG headquarters also does not know the specific skill sets needed for all missions because some of these missions are new and the skill sets are still being defined. Second, ANG headquarters faces challenges in ensuring that there is sufficient space in Air Force training schools for all the personnel requiring training. For example, ANG headquarters projects they need to train about 3,000 personnel for intelligence-related replacement missions, but the intelligence school currently cannot fully accommodate this requirement in a timely manner. The Air Force is working on potential solutions, such as increasing the number of instructors and shortening the required curriculum for one intelligence specialty, but these solutions have yet to be fully implemented and may add to ANG costs. Third, ANG officials are concerned there could be delays in obtaining security clearances for some of the personnel assigned new missions due to the time required to process a clearance application. Fourth, ANG headquarters has not identified bridge missions for all units that will face a delay between the removal of their old mission and the startup of their replacement mission. Fifth, ANG faces possible delays in obtaining required funding for new equipment, construction, and training due to residual impacts of the continuing resolutions for fiscal year 2007 and requirements that were not included in the budget. Finally, according to some state and ANG unit commanders,⁹ communication with ANG headquarters is limited and insufficient to meet the needs of the units, and they are not receiving key information—such as new mission requirements and the new personnel skill mix that each unit will require—which impacts units' ability to recruit and train personnel. These challenges generally affect both the implementation of the BRAC recommendations and the establishment of replacement missions.

⁹In conducting our work, we spoke with senior state and ANG unit commanders, including adjutants general and assistant adjutants general, as well as the wing commanders and some deputy wing commanders of affected units.

Without a strategy to deal with these related challenges, some units may face delays in when they are able to be mission capable.

In comparison to the BRAC Commission estimates, our analysis of current Air Force estimates indicates that no annual recurring savings will be achieved as a result of the recommendations related to ANG, ANG one-time implementation costs are projected to increase, and Congress has not been given full visibility over ANG BRAC-related implementation costs. Specifically, our analysis indicates that implementing the ANG related recommendations is expected to result in annual recurring costs of \$53 million dollars rather than annual recurring savings of \$26 million estimated by the BRAC Commission. The \$79 million per year difference occurred primarily due to language in the Commission's report that prevents ANG from reducing its current end strength in some states. Also, our analysis shows one-time implementation cost estimates are projected to increase \$68 million dollars (13.5 percent; from \$504 million to \$572 million) primarily due to additional military construction requirements and inflation.¹⁰ Further, the Air Force decided to fund over \$300 million to establish replacement missions for units that lost their flying missions outside the BRAC account and did not report these costs in their BRAC budget submission. Therefore, Congress does not have full visibility over ANG BRAC-related implementation costs.

We are making recommendations to ensure the challenges we identified are addressed, to improve communication between ANG headquarters and the affected units, and to increase cost transparency.

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with our recommendations regarding ensuring the challenges we identified are addressed and improving communication between ANG headquarters and the affected units and did not concur with our recommendation regarding increasing cost transparency. DOD does not believe these costs are BRAC-related because establishment of replacement missions was not part of the BRAC recommendations. Although the Commission did not direct specific replacement missions for the affected units, the BRAC Commission recommended that DOD provide replacement missions, retain all personnel in affected units, and where appropriate, retrain

¹⁰BRAC Commission estimates are expressed in constant-year 2005 dollars, whereas budgets are expressed in then-year or nominal dollars, which includes inflation. Over the 2006 through 2011 implementation period, the cumulative inflation is estimated to be about 15 percent. The actual impact of inflation depends on the year the costs are incurred.

personnel in skills relevant to the emerging mission. Therefore, we believe the costs to establish the new missions are BRAC-related and should be reported in the Air Force's annual BRAC budget submission. DOD's written comments are reprinted in appendix V. DOD also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into this report as appropriate.

Background

ANG is a reserve component of the United States Air Force. It performs both federal and state missions, consists of about 107,000 members, and makes up about 20 percent of the total Air Force. ANG provides 100 percent of the air sovereignty missions and plays a key role in the Air Force's Aerospace Expeditionary Force,¹¹ including 49 percent of theater airlifts and 45 percent of tanker missions. In their state role, ANG units report to the governor of their respective state or territory (Puerto Rico, Guam, Virgin Islands) or the commanding general of the District of Columbia National Guard and participate in emergency relief support during natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, and forest fires; search and rescue operations; support to civil authorities; maintenance of vital public services; and counter-drug operations. For example, ANG was involved in the relief effort following Hurricane Katrina in September 2005.

The Air Force, its major commands, and the National Guard Bureau each have a role in the management of ANG. The Air Force and its major commands play a key role in determining ANG's force structure, approving new missions, and equipping ANG to perform its missions. The National Guard Bureau administers the federal functions of ANG and works with the Air Force Air Staff to develop and coordinate programs that directly affect ANG. The Bureau also formulates and administers programs for training, development, and maintenance of ANG units. The National Guard Bureau also acts as the channel of communication between the Air Force and the 54 states and territories where National Guard units are located.¹²

¹¹The Air Force Aerospace Expeditionary Force (also referred to as the Air and Space Expeditionary Force) combines the active, reserve, and Guard into one component that trains, deploys, and operates together. This force is comprised of fighters, bombers, tankers, and tactical air lifters.

¹²10 U.S.C. § 10501.

Prior to this round of BRAC, ANG had 91 units with flying missions. As part of DOD's BRAC report, the Air Force proposed actions that would have affected 56 of these units with 22 units losing their flying mission. In July 2005, we reported that many of the personnel positions associated with the units losing a flying mission did not have a new mission identified. Air Force officials stated they planned to use these positions for emerging missions in such areas as homeland defense, UAVs, and intelligence, which they expect to further refine as part of the 2004 Quadrennial Defense Review. After examining these proposals, the BRAC Commission made substantial changes to the recommendations affecting ANG with 14 units losing their flying mission, other units reducing or converting aircraft, and others increasing the number of aircraft. Table 1 summarizes the BRAC Commission recommendations affecting ANG flying units.

Table 1: BRAC Commission Recommendation's Impact on ANG Flying Units and Personnel

Type of action	Number of	
	Units	Personnel ^a
Ceasing flying mission	14	6,000
Converting aircraft type ^b	5	1,000
Increasing assigned aircraft	29	3,900
Associating with another unit ^c	4	1,100
Reducing assigned aircraft	4	700
Total	56	12,700
ANG (end strength/flying units)	91	106,800
Percentage affected	62%	12%

Source: ANG.

^aRounded to the nearest 100.

^bUnits that lost one aircraft type and gained another due to BRAC recommendations.

^cUnits that lost their aircraft and are directed to share the aircraft of an active or reserve unit due to BRAC recommendations.

While the BRAC Commission directed the removal of aircraft from 14 units, it did not identify replacement missions for these units. Instead, the Commission recommended that the affected units would assume a new mission that would integrate the unit into the Future Total Force such as air mobility; engineering; flight training; or UAVs, if the state agreed to change the organization, composition, and location of the affected unit. Future Total Force transformational missions, also known as Total Force

Integration missions, are managed through a new directorate established by the Air Force in March 2005, called the Total Force Integration office.¹³ In addition, the Commission recommended that the loss of a flying unit not change the authorized end strength of ANG in each affected state.

The President and Congress approved the BRAC Commission recommendations, which became effective on November 9, 2005. Once the recommendations became effective, the Secretary of Defense designated one of the military services or defense agencies as the executive agent responsible for implementing each recommendation. The Air Force is the executive agent for the recommendations involving ANG.¹⁴ The Chairman of the Infrastructure Steering Group required the executive agent to submit detailed business plans to update estimated costs and savings and identify a schedule for implementing each recommendation. The Air Force BRAC Project Management office prepared the business plans for the recommendations affecting ANG. The business plans to implement ANG recommendations were approved between April and October 2006 by the Infrastructure Steering Group, an office chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics that oversees BRAC implementation.

While planning to implement the 2005 BRAC recommendations, ANG headquarters had to manage several other issues that affected its end strength. ANG headquarters identified that unit manning documents guardwide included about 3,500 positions more than permitted by authorized ANG end strength. ANG headquarters had to identify and remove these excess positions across various states and units. Furthermore, in December 2005, the Secretary of Defense directed ANG to eliminate about 14,000 positions between fiscal years 2007 and 2011.¹⁵ After several months of planning for these reductions, in May 2006, ANG reduced its budget in other areas by \$1.8 billion rather than reduce its end strength. As a result, the new mission plan for each state had to be altered and was not completed until October 2006.

¹³The directorate is staffed with representatives from stakeholder organizations including the Air Staff, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve Command, and several states.

¹⁴The Navy is the executive agent for one recommendation affecting ANG.

¹⁵Program Budget Decision 720.

Air Force Involved Key Stakeholders in the Process to Identify and Assign Replacement Missions

The Air Force and ANG headquarters identified and assigned new missions to units that will lose flying missions as a result of BRAC 2005 through an evolutionary and consultative process that involved key stakeholders such as its major commands and individual units. A best practice we have identified in previous work indicates that during major organizational transformations it is important to involve stakeholders to obtain their ideas and to gain their ownership of the transformation. Further, stakeholder involvement helps to increase stakeholder understanding and acceptance of organizational goals and objectives, and gain ownership for new policies and procedures. In addition to basing decisions on a prioritized list of possible missions, ANG headquarters also sought replacement missions that supported the future force structure of the Air Force and tried to maximize flying missions wherever possible.

The process to identify new relevant missions for ANG units took place in phases. In June 2005, the Air Force Total Force Integration office prioritized mission ideas provided by ANG using working groups that included staff at different levels as well as key stakeholders from all components of the Air Force, state adjutants general, and major commands. The Total Force Integration office developed a prioritized list of potential missions by grouping them into one of the following four bands:

- Band 1—the highest priority, missions the Air Force “must do” to satisfy congressional mandates and existing laws.
- Band 2—missions that are considered “mission critical” to the Air Force achieving its objectives.
- Band 3—missions that are “mission significant,” meaning that failing to perform the tasks could negatively affect overall effectiveness.
- Band 4—missions that are “mission enhancing,” meaning that they would be nice to do if resources are available.

The Air Force Total Force Integration office sent the banded mission list to ANG headquarters,¹⁶ which used the list to assign replacement missions to units based on a number of variables. These included the existing skill

¹⁶ANG headquarters also used the banded list to assign missions to units affected by other force structure changes that were occurring outside of BRAC.

sets in the affected units, recruiting trends in the affected unit's state, the states' expressed desires, and the mission requirements. According to ANG officials, they wanted to assign missions that were consistent with the preexisting mission or capitalize on the strengths of the states to minimize transition challenges. Subsequent to the development of the banded list, the Air Force identified some flying missions that could be assigned to ANG. According to ANG officials, these flying missions were assigned to units instead of other missions on the banded list. Most of the replacement missions ANG headquarters assigned were either in the top two bands or were flying missions. Our analysis indicated that 23 of the 30 missions assigned were on the banded list and the remaining 7 missions assigned were new flying missions, as shown in table 2.

Table 2: Priority Level of Replacement Missions for ANG Units

Source	Missions		Positions affected	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Replacement flying mission	7	23	1,875	29
Band I	12	40	3,410	53
Band II	6	20	472	7
Band III	1	3	65	1
Band IV	4	13	616	10
Total	30	100^a	6,438	100

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force and ANG data.

^aNumbers do not sum to 100 percent due to rounding.

As shown in table 2, about 83 percent of the missions assigned and 89 percent of their personnel were band I or II missions or a new flying mission (see app. II for the unit assignments and their respective priority level). Although the missions assigned in bands III and IV constitute 5 of the 30 missions assigned (about 16 percent), they require about 681 positions, which is approximately 11 percent of the total affected positions of all positions in replacement missions. The one band III replacement mission is an intelligence instructor mission assigned to the ANG unit at Ellington, Texas. Many new positions in ANG replacement missions are in the intelligence career field. Anticipating the increased intelligence training requirement, this mission is designed to augment the instructor staff at the Air Force intelligence training school at Goodfellow Air Force Base in Texas. The four band IV missions assigned consist of two engineering missions assigned to Mansfield, Ohio, and Willow Grove, Pennsylvania, an intelligence production mission assigned to Nashville,

Tennessee, and a classified mission assigned to Nashville. According to Air Force officials, ANG headquarters assigned the engineering missions to Ohio and Pennsylvania based on the ANG desire to distribute homeland defense assets regionally.

In phases subsequent to the development of the banded list, flying missions were assigned with direct involvement of senior leadership from the Air Force, the National Guard Bureau, and ANG. Throughout the process to replace missions for affected ANG units there was an effort to assign replacement flying missions to the greatest extent possible. According to ANG officials, if any flying missions became available, ANG headquarters would match those missions to units instead of other missions on the banded list. The replacement flying missions are the joint cargo aircraft,¹⁷ a B-2 association with an active wing, and an F-16 foreign military sales training mission. The joint cargo aircraft mission was assigned to ANG units at Bradley, Connecticut; Kellogg, Michigan; Mansfield, Ohio; Key Field, Mississippi; and Nashville, Tennessee. According to ANG officials, Bradley received the joint cargo aircraft mission because it was in the only state that did not have a flying mission, while units in Michigan, Ohio, Mississippi, and Tennessee were selected based on the ANG desire to distribute homeland defense assets regionally. Additionally, two¹⁸ of the five joint cargo aircraft mission assignments were made to units that currently fly the C-130, another airlift aircraft, and one assignment was made to a unit that currently flies the KC-135 tanker, which ANG headquarters officials believe will minimize transition costs. According to ANG officials, the Air Combat Command identified the potential for the ANG unit in St. Louis, Missouri, to associate with the B-2 mission at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri. The two bases are in the same state and it provides an opportunity for an ANG unit to associate with an active Air Force mission using an aircraft that is new for ANG and relevant for the future of the Air Force. Finally, the unit in Springfield, Ohio, was assigned an F-16 foreign military sales training mission because this unit currently is an F-16 training unit.

¹⁷The Joint Cargo Aircraft will be a new, small airlift aircraft the Air Force plans to acquire.

¹⁸Units assigned the joint cargo aircraft as a replacement mission that previously flew the C-130 are Mansfield, Ohio, and Nashville, Tennessee. The ANG unit at Key Field, Mississippi, previously flew the KC-135 air tanker and the ANG unit at Kellogg, Michigan, previously flew the A-10.

ANG Has Made Progress in Planning, but Faces Challenges That Are Likely to Delay When Units Are Able to Perform Their Missions

ANG headquarters has completed some key planning tasks for the implementation of the 2005 BRAC recommendations, but we believe that challenges remain that could delay when some units may be able to become mission capable.¹⁹ To date, ANG headquarters has completed programming plans, an aircraft movement schedule, and a state-by state new mission plan. However, ANG headquarters faces challenges in completing manning documents, potentially insufficient training school capacity, obtaining security clearances for many personnel in a prompt manner, ensuring that personnel at affected units have a mission to perform when their old mission is removed, and funding delays. Further, some ANG unit commanders state that communication with ANG headquarters is ad hoc and inadequate to meet their needs. These challenges generally affect both the implementation of the BRAC recommendations and the establishment of replacement missions. ANG officials have stated these challenges could delay when some units are mission capable. A strategy for managing these challenges and improved communication between ANG headquarters and affected ANG units will be required to help minimize delays.

Some Key Planning Tasks Completed

The Air Force has created a business plan for each recommendation that will be used as planning tools for BRAC implementation. These plans include a description of the actions required including an aircraft movement schedule, financial plans, and construction required for each recommendation. These plans have been approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and will be updated as implementation details change.

ANG headquarters completed 59 BRAC-related programming plans between December 2006 and January 2007. According to an ANG official, these plans provide guidance from the major commands to units on how to implement changes to unit structures and missions. Specifically, each plan identifies the key organizations involved, lists key milestones and

¹⁹ANG has planned for two phases of mission capability for units converting to a new mission: Initial Operational Capability, and Full Operational Capability. According to ANG officials, Initial Operational Capability is a variable term that can apply to any predetermined level of partial capability, depending on the unit and mission, while Full Operational Capability is achieved when unit commanders report that the unit is ready to perform its mission. ANG officials stated that the conversion process typically takes approximately 4 years to complete.

objectives for specific actions, and assigns primary responsibility to the offices that will assist with the implementation.

ANG headquarters has also completed a plan to manage the movement of hundreds of aircraft that will relocate into or out of 56 ANG units. This plan provides a schedule that identifies when aircraft will move around the country by fiscal quarter, through 2011. According to an ANG official, this movement schedule was in part designed to ensure that units losing their aircraft are not left without a mission by implementing a replacement mission before the aircraft depart, and to ensure that existing homeland defense missions are continued.²⁰

ANG headquarters has also produced a state-by-state new mission plan that identifies all the changes to ANG units that are occurring within each state. This plan includes BRAC actions, new missions assigned through the Total Force Integration process,²¹ the ANG headquarters review of each unit manning document (UMD) to remove excess personnel, and standardizing squadron size so that units conducting the same missions are uniform in size. Specifically, the new mission plan identifies the general number of people that will be assigned to each mission; unit commanders can use this information as a basic guide to plan for required internal manpower changes. For example, if the new mission plan identifies that one mission is ceasing and losing 150 positions and a new mission is starting in the same unit or state that requires 150 new positions, unit commanders can begin to approach the personnel in the ceasing mission to determine if they are willing and able to qualify for the new mission.

Challenges in Managing Many Sequential Implementation Actions and Communicating with Units

ANG headquarters may face challenges in managing the timing and sequencing of many actions required to implement the BRAC recommendations and to complete the conversion process for units taking on a new mission. First, ANG headquarters faces difficulties in completing the UMDs that units require to determine retraining or recruitment

²⁰One of the missions that ANG units perform is the homeland defense Air Sovereignty Alert mission, where fighter aircraft stationed around the country are always ready and available to intercept potentially hostile aircraft.

²¹In addition to the replacement missions assigned to the 14 units losing their flying mission, ANG also assigned new Total Force Integration missions to nearly every U.S. state and territory in a simultaneous process unrelated to BRAC.

requirements. Second, ANG may also have difficulty in securing training at technical and flight schools for all personnel in time to perform their new missions as scheduled. Third, there may be delays in getting security clearances for individuals who require one for their new mission. Fourth, there are some units that will require a temporary bridge mission to carry them over until their new mission is available. Fifth, delays in funding for equipment and facilities could delay when units are able to perform their replacement missions. Sixth, according to some ANG units, communication with ANG headquarters is limited and insufficient to meet the needs of the units, such as new mission requirements. Though ANG headquarters officials are aware of these challenges and developing some solutions at the working level, they lack an overarching strategy to manage and mitigate these implementation challenges and any potential domino effects and to communicate solutions to the affected units, which increases the risk that ANG headquarters will face delays in establishing replacement missions and could result in decreased readiness and potentially inefficiently utilized personnel.

Completing Manpower Documents

ANG headquarters is behind schedule in completing some UMDs and at the time we had completed our audit work an ANG official projected that they may not be able to meet current stated internal deadlines as a result. ANG headquarters must develop new UMDs for all converting ANG units, which includes units receiving a replacement mission, converting aircraft type, or forming an association with another unit. Additionally, UMD changes are required for units gaining or losing some aircraft or personnel. A UMD allows unit commanders to recruit and train new personnel or identify existing personnel who require training for a new mission.

According to an ANG official, they have to complete many UMDs this year, and over 100 in order to implement BRAC and replacement missions. Although, according to an ANG official, Air Force regulations require UMDs to be issued to units 6 months before the units are supposed to begin their assigned mission, ANG officials have stated that their goal is to get a UMD to units up to 1 year prior. An ANG official stated that they had hoped to complete all UMDs for units that are supposed to begin conversion by the first quarter of fiscal year 2008 by March 31, 2007, but at the time we had completed our audit work another ANG official stated that they may be unable to meet this deadline because of delays in major commands approving the draft UMDs.

According to ANG headquarters, all UMDs have to be approved by the major commands before they can be completed and issued.²² According to an ANG official, they have been waiting for approval for 2 to 3 months, and the process typically takes 30 days to complete. One ANG official stated that these delays may in part prevent ANG from meeting its March 31, 2007, UMD issuance deadline, which could cause delays at some affected units.

Though required issuance deadlines have not been missed, ANG headquarters faces challenges in completing the UMDs required for those units that are transforming in the coming year. For example, ANG headquarters has yet to complete the UMD for its Distributed Ground System, an intelligence mission assigned to Terre Haute, Indiana, though the Initial Operational Capability date for this unit is scheduled for the first quarter of fiscal year 2008. Of the 11 state ANG commanders we interviewed, none have a final UMD for their new missions. Missing internal deadlines for completing UMDs increases the risk that ANG headquarters will miss other deadlines or the Air Force requirement to issue UMDs 6 months prior to the start of new missions. These delays could affect the sequencing of other actions, which could in turn delay the establishment of replacement missions.

ANG officials stated that they are working on a solution that will provide unit commanders with information about their new manpower requirements through a document called a requirements template. According to ANG officials, the templates will inform each unit commander of the personnel requirements for their new mission, and would permit some initial actions, such as sending existing personnel to training. However, ANG officials stated these templates cannot be used as a funding authorization for recruiting new personnel. According to ANG documentation, all existing flying mission templates, including those for F-15, F-22, A-10, and C-5, have been completed, but they are still working to complete the templates for the joint cargo aircraft, the Component Numbered Air Force mission, support staff at all units including wing command elements and administrative personnel, and units that are associating with an active or reserve unit. According to ANG officials, templates for the support staff were to be done after those for existing flying missions in part to ensure that individuals requiring flight training or

²²Major commands identified by ANG headquarters include Air Force Air Combat Command and Air Mobility Command.

other lengthy technical training could have time to reserve seats in flight schools, while support personnel will likely not require further training. ANG unit commanders state that they require the templates for support missions so they can determine their new command structures. For example, Indiana ANG commanders stated that they will not know if the command staff for the fighter wing at Terre Haute will be responsible for commanding the new Distributed Ground System and Air Support Operations Squadron missions assigned to that unit, or if these will be assigned to a new command staff. ANG officials stated that they had hoped to have requirements templates issued to all units by December 31, 2006. However, as of February, 2007, ANG headquarters had not issued templates to some of the units we interviewed that were also assigned new missions, including Texas, Mississippi, and Ohio.

According to ANG officials, the challenge in completing the UMDs and requirements templates is due to the volume of work required. According to ANG officials, nearly every ANG unit will require a new or modified UMD as a result of BRAC, the Total Force Integration process, and standardizing unit sizes. Completing the UMDs for some units may be more difficult than for others. For example, completing the UMD for a unit that is increasing or decreasing its allotted number of aircraft by two or three is easier than completing a UMD for a unit that is taking on an entirely new mission or converting from one mission or aircraft to another. As a result of BRAC and the Total Force Integration process, ANG headquarters has to complete many complicated conversion UMDs, which is more time consuming; specifically, the ANG manpower office is typically only required to complete five unit conversion UMDs per year, but in order to implement the BRAC recommendations, it will have to complete hundreds of conversion UMDs. The Director, ANG, stated that ANG in general was not adequately structured to complete the volume of work required by BRAC. Recognizing that it does not have sufficient staff, according to state officials, the ANG manpower office requested assistance from the units. However, ANG headquarters is still expected to miss internal deadlines while receiving this support from the field. Without significant augmentation to the manpower office or some other change in the UMDs creation process, delays in meeting sequential deadlines may continue, which increases the risk that ANG headquarters will not be able to complete UMDs in the time frames required. An ANG official also indicated that ANG switched to a new manpower planning computer program at around the same time as BRAC implementation, which delayed initial manpower planning actions. Further, some of the replacement missions, such as the still to be acquired joint cargo aircraft, are new and thus still have undefined requirements.

Potential Training Capacity Shortfall

ANG will have to train many individuals to qualify to fly a new aircraft or to perform a new mission. According to ANG officials, these requirements will create a surge of personnel needing training for the coming years, and there may not be enough space in some training schools to accommodate this demand. ANG officials have identified shortfalls spanning from 2008 through 2012 for A-10 and F-15 pilot training schools.²³ For example, ANG officials stated that ANG typically requires only 8 seats in the initial qualification courses per year, but as a result of BRAC it will require 30 or more seats in initial qualification courses per year. Without adjustments, it will be difficult for some schools to incorporate the additional requirements; for example, the only A-10 school is currently operating at 100 percent capacity. An ANG official stated that without an increase in available school seats, some pilot training delays may stretch through 2014.

Some ANG pilots who need to qualify to fly a new aircraft as a result of the BRAC recommendations may face delays when they are qualified for their new mission. The projected shortfall may delay when some flying units will achieve mission capability, and impact ANG readiness. Specifically, the following units will be converting to an F-15 mission or increasing their number of F-15 aircraft within the BRAC implementation period: Great Falls, Montana; Portland, Oregon; New Orleans, Louisiana; Jacksonville, Florida; and Barnes, Massachusetts. Additionally, the following units will be converting to an A-10 mission or increasing their number of A-10 aircraft within this time period: Boise, Idaho; Fort Smith, Arkansas; Selfridge, Michigan; and Martin State, Maryland. Some solutions to mitigate the shortfall in space at flight schools have been discussed by ANG headquarters officials, but to date none have been implemented. Some potential solutions that ANG officials mentioned include increasing flight simulator training, sending pilots to training early to avoid later delays,²⁴ and establishing ANG-owned flight schools. According to ANG officials, this training shortfall could not only delay Initial and Full Operational Capability for some units, but could also have an impact on warfighting capabilities. ANG officials also identified that

²³Though these school shortfalls may not be caused by implementation of the BRAC recommendations, they may be exacerbated by the number of pilots converting to a new airframe as a result of the BRAC recommendations.

²⁴ANG officials stated that this solution may require pilots to temporarily relocate to another unit if their home unit does not yet have the new aircraft on the ground. This process results in increased costs for ANG.

converting units will face a period of time while their newly-trained personnel are gaining the on-the-job experience required before the units can achieve a Full Operational Capability. Without this on-the-job experience, newly converted units potentially face decreased readiness and capability.

An increase in personnel requiring training is projected for some nonflight technical schools as well. For example, ANG headquarters and Air Force officials have stated that some missions—such as the Predator UAV mission—will have a high demand for personnel trained in intelligence skills. ANG officials have estimated that the ANG is increasing the total number of intelligence-related positions by approximately 3,000 positions (200 percent) with an increase from 1,500 to 4,500. ANG and the Air Force realized that there would be a high demand for the limited number of seats at the Air Force intelligence training facility at Goodfellow Air Force Base in Texas. The Air Force and ANG headquarters developed two solutions to limit the impacts of this shortfall. First, ANG headquarters is increasing the number of instructors available to teach at the school by assigning a new intelligence training mission to the Texas ANG. However, Texas ANG officials stated that they did not know if they would be able to staff this mission on time since the mission requires trained intelligence instructors, and stated that late 2008 would be the earliest practical date that this mission could be fully operational. Second, the Air Force is decreasing the length of some courses. Specifically, ANG headquarters and the Air Force arranged to decrease the training course for personnel assigned to the UAV sensor operator specialty from 6 to 3 months because they recognized that these personnel did not initially require all the skills provided in the full-length course. Instead, ANG headquarters and the Air Force will allow personnel in these positions to delay part of their initial training until later in their careers, thus allowing them to report to their units faster while freeing up seats in the schools. According to ANG officials, these solutions should greatly reduce the strain on the intelligence training school and should increase the throughput capability, though the increased demand has yet to reach the school to test the efficacy of these solutions. If these solutions do not increase the capacity of the school to required levels, there could be personnel who are unable to attend training as scheduled, resulting in a potentially inefficient use of personnel and units that are unable to fully perform their mission due to insufficient numbers of trained personnel, which subsequently impacts unit readiness.

Lengthy Security Clearance
Process

All of the approximately 3,000 individuals who will be converting to a new intelligence mission, such as a Predator UAV mission, will require a

security clearance, as will some personnel in communications positions supporting an intelligence unit. According to ANG headquarters officials and some unit commanders, there is a concern that the length of time required to obtain a top secret clearance, estimated by ANG officials as 1-1 ½ years, could delay when some personnel are able to perform their mission. As we have previously reported, there are long-standing delays and other problems with DOD's personnel security clearance program, and this area remains on our high-risk list.²⁵ If affected units do not receive personnel requirements that state the number of personnel requiring a clearance for their new missions, some or all personnel may not have a clearance in time. As a result, some personnel may be unable to perform their mission until they obtain their clearance. For example, the unit commander at the Otis, Massachusetts, ANG base does not have a requirements template or a UMD for either of the two intelligence missions that were assigned to Otis. One mission has an initial operational capability date in the third quarter of fiscal year 2008; Massachusetts ANG officials estimate that it will take several years to establish the new mission, in part due to the time required to get personnel top secret security clearances.

Identifying Bridge Missions

ANG headquarters has not identified bridge missions for some units that will require one, which could leave personnel without a mission to perform and waste resources. Some units may face a period of time when they have no mission to perform because their original mission was removed and their new mission lacks required resources or is scheduled to begin later. In order to prevent the inefficient use of personnel who otherwise may have no mission to perform, these units will require ANG headquarters to assign them a bridge mission that would temporarily give personnel a mission to perform until they can transition to their new mission. ANG headquarters has planned for bridge missions for some locations, such as assigning C-21 light cargo aircraft to some locations awaiting the joint cargo aircraft. An ANG official has also stated that in some locations they may keep their currently assigned aircraft in place past the planned removal date in order to provide a mission for unit personnel. However, delaying the movement of aircraft may further delay implementation at other locations that are waiting to receive these aircraft. Alternatively, if the aircraft that are departing are destined to be retired, there will be additional costs to ANG to keep these aircraft in service.

²⁵GAO, *High-Risk Series: An Update*, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: January 2007).

ANG headquarters has not identified bridge missions for several units that will have a mission gap. For example, ANG headquarters timelines identify that Massachusetts loses its aircraft at Otis in the fourth quarter of 2008, and Massachusetts ANG officials stated that they will face a gap between missions and that they have not been given a bridge mission. If no bridge mission is identified, personnel may have no mission for almost 2 years until the new mission is established. According to Massachusetts state commanders, ANG headquarters has not given them any information about a potential bridge mission nor is one identified in an ANG headquarters BRAC implementation tracking database. Similarly, Ohio ANG officials expressed concern that the C-130s based at Mansfield are leaving in 2010 but that the replacement joint cargo aircraft mission has no solid implementation date since the aircraft is yet to be acquired. No bridge mission for Ohio has been identified by ANG headquarters, nor is one listed in an ANG headquarters BRAC implementation tracking database. The Director, ANG, estimates the deployment date for the joint cargo aircraft between 2012 and 2015. The DOD Budget Justification books state that requirements are still being defined and predict initial Air Force procurement in fiscal year 2010. Further, the Director, ANG, identified that there will be a gap at Syracuse, New York; Tucson, Arizona; Fargo, North Dakota; and Ellington, Texas, due to delays in procuring new UAVs. Without a bridge mission, personnel at these locations and any others that face a gap due to implementation delays will be unable to perform a mission, resulting in an inefficient use of personnel and a reduction in ANG readiness.

Delays in Funding

According to ANG documentation, there may be delays in funding for required training, equipment, and construction projects that may impact some units converting to a new mission in fiscal year 2008. Specifically, ANG has identified \$127 million in funding shortfalls in 2008 for personnel, equipment, construction, and operations and maintenance requirements to establish replacement missions. According to an Air Force official, these costs were not included in the budget due to internal Air Force prioritization and there are unfunded requirements every year. According to ANG, these unfunded requirements could result in delays in when some missions will be capable of converting and performing their missions. For example, according to an ANG official, residual impacts of the fiscal year 2007 continuing resolutions may limit the funding available for some

construction projects in fiscal year 2007.²⁶ For example, significant construction was planned for Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, and Barnes Air National Guard Base, Massachusetts, but funding delays due in part to impacts from the fiscal year 2007 continuing resolutions may postpone this construction.²⁷ Construction at Barnes is scheduled to begin in July 2007 and be completed by July 2009; construction at Elmendorf is scheduled to begin in July 2007 and be completed by August 2011. The schedule for construction at Elmendorf—which is already constrained by the short construction season in Alaska—leaves little margin for error if construction delays develop. An ANG official has stated that construction may not begin by the scheduled dates because of funding delays. If required construction activity at Barnes or Elmendorf is not completed as scheduled, these units may not receive their new aircraft as scheduled, which could delay other implementation actions.

Shortfalls in training funding may also delay implementation of some missions: Indiana ANG officials stated that they need to send approximately 100-200 people to training for one of their new missions that is scheduled to reach an Initial Operational Capability in the 1st quarter 2008, but so far they have only been able to send 2 people to training due to an insufficient training budget. Similarly, Texas ANG officials stated that they had their Initial Operational Capability date for their Predator mission postponed for almost 2 years because there was not adequate funding to send personnel to training. The Comptroller of ANG stated that the fiscal year 2007 continuing resolutions constituted a large reduction in available funds that will be hard to manage, and another ANG official stated that residual impacts from the continuing resolutions may cause a major slip in milestones. ANG officials have stated that they may need to take steps, such as obtaining a supplemental appropriation or reallocating funds internally, in order to ensure that required equipment, construction, and personnel funds are available in order to achieve fiscal year 2008 actions on schedule and to avoid potentially cascading implementation delays. For example, the Air Force has developed

²⁶DOD did not receive a permanent appropriation for military construction until Congress replaced the continuing resolutions with a permanent appropriation for fiscal year 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-05, February 15, 2007.

²⁷The ANG base at Kulis, Alaska, is required by BRAC to close; all personnel and aircraft from the 176th wing will relocate to the Air Force base at Elmendorf, which will require significant construction in order to accommodate the equipment. Barnes is directed to take the Air Sovereignty Alert mission from Otis, Massachusetts, which will require construction of an alert facility and other additional buildings.

Communication between ANG Headquarters and Units Has Been Inadequate

workaround solutions for some affected units, such as using temporary facilities in lieu of actual construction, but these solutions may be less efficient and more costly in the long term.

Communications at the headquarters level within ANG offices and between ANG headquarters and the Air Force appear to be regular and adequate, but it is inadequate between ANG headquarters and ANG units, according to units we visited. Specifically, ANG headquarters and Air Force officials stated that they work together to identify potential implementation challenges and create potential solutions. However, according to senior leadership at ANG units we spoke with, including adjutants general, assistant adjutants general, wing commanders, deputy wing commanders, and one chief executive officer, communication between the units in the field and ANG headquarters is ad hoc and the information they are provided by ANG headquarters is not adequate to meet their needs. For example, ANG headquarters developed an Internet-accessible database that would provide information and milestones to the units, but did not make this system available until 10 months after it was created. One state ANG official said information received is often due to their contacting or traveling to ANG headquarters rather than through headquarters-initiated communication. The Director, ANG, acknowledged that there are challenges in communicating with the units and that some unit commanders may not have the information that they feel they need to implement the BRAC recommendations and their new missions. To address this challenge, the Director, ANG, has started quarterly visits to affected units.

Unit commanders and state adjutants general want details of the skill mix required to perform their new missions as soon as possible so they can determine how to best fit individual guardsmen in the new missions and avoid retention problems. Several ANG units that we interviewed stated that they were able to get in contact with ANG headquarters offices, but that the information they received in response to questions was not sufficient to meet their requirements. One of the ANG units attributed the communications deficiencies to the high workload that ANG headquarters is undertaking. State- and unit-level ANG commanders identified the following examples of challenges in communicating with ANG headquarters:

- Texas ANG officials stated that they do not know how many jobs will accompany their Predator UAV mission, or if they will even be receiving any Predator aircraft as part of the mission or rather flying UAVs belonging to other units instead. This has led to retention issues among

guardsmen who fear losing their jobs, with 50 percent of their maintenance personnel planning to leave the unit.

- Virginia ANG officials stated that they find it difficult to communicate with ANG headquarters because they do not have a single point of contact at headquarters to approach with concerns.
- Missouri and Ohio ANG officials are concerned that there may not be funding available to send their guardsmen to required training and they cannot get assurances from ANG headquarters that there will be adequate funding or other solutions.
- South Carolina officials told us that they did not know the date of their expected Initial Operational Capability, and consequently cannot adequately plan for the transition even though they already have some new aircraft on the ground.
- Massachusetts and Texas ANG officials stated that they cannot get any information or assurances from ANG headquarters that there will be “bridge missions” for their personnel until the new mission arrives. Consequently, unit personnel may be underutilized.

Though ANG headquarters created an information-sharing system for the BRAC implementation process, it did not promptly make this system available to the units, which resulted in unit commanders not having important information about their unit conversions. ANG headquarters developed the computer-based information-sharing system in June 2006 to facilitate frequent communication and to provide updates on the status of implementation and requirements for each unit. However, ANG headquarters only provided access to this system on March 9, 2007, approximately 10 months after it was created.²⁸ The system, informally called “dashboard,” lists all actions related to BRAC and Total Force Integration by state and unit and provides dates for key implementation milestones and requirements for each unit. According to the Director, ANG, the release was delayed until the President’s budget was finalized.

²⁸The Air Force Total Force Integration office has a similar Web-based database that provides details for all the Total Force Integration missions that is accessible to the state leadership and unit commanders. However, one field commander that we spoke with stated that the system is of limited utility due to frequently changing information. Additionally, this system does not discuss any of the BRAC changes or how timing of all actions will occur.

Our prior work has identified that a best practice for organizations undergoing a major transformation includes establishing a communication strategy specific to the transformational action that communicates progress and expectations. Importantly, we have identified that such a strategy should include means for providing specific information to meet the needs of stakeholders, and that the strategy should identify the importance of communicating early and often to build trust with stakeholders. Furthermore, we have found that promoting two-way communication is important for major transformations to ensure the transformation's successful completion.²⁹

ANG headquarters has recently created a draft Strategic Communication Plan, but we found this plan to be general in scope and not specific to BRAC implementation. Specifically, this plan identifies key stakeholders and general tools for communicating information to the public and ANG stakeholders, but it focuses more on managing the ANG "brand" through specific talking points for use in external communications. Airmen, unit commanders, and state adjutants general are identified as being target audiences, but there is no specific discussion of how ANG headquarters will provide information to them. For example, although the purpose of the plan is to improve trust between all stakeholders by delivering consistent, frequent, and relevant communications, it does not identify exactly what specific tools ANG headquarters will use to communicate information to each affected unit. Instead, the plan generally discusses the use of news media and the ANG Web site to promote the ANG brand, messages, and initiatives. ANG headquarters also has a section in the instruction document they use to guide the unit conversion process that assigns responsibilities for communications during the unit conversion process to the communications and information directorate, but this section does not discuss communicating any information to the affected units.³⁰

²⁹GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational Transformations, [GAO-03-669](#) (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003).

³⁰Air National Guard Instruction 10-406, March 10, 2006.

No Annual Recurring Savings Will Be Achieved for ANG BRAC Recommendations and Congress Has Not Been Given Full Visibility over All BRAC-Related ANG Costs

Compared to cost estimates contained in the BRAC Commission's report, our analysis of the Air Force's current estimates to implement ANG-related BRAC actions indicates that there will be net annual recurring costs rather than net annual recurring savings, and one-time costs are projected to increase by \$68 million (13.5 percent). Furthermore, Congress has not been given full visibility over all BRAC-related implementation costs because some BRAC-related implementation costs funded outside of the BRAC account are not being reported as BRAC-related costs. Air Force budget submissions have not provided complete and transparent information on the costs to implement BRAC-related actions because the Air Force decided to fund some costs required to establish replacement missions outside of the BRAC account and did not report these costs in its annual BRAC budget.

Current Estimates Indicate Annual Recurring Costs Rather Than Annual Recurring Savings for ANG Recommendations

Although the BRAC Commission projected that the recommendations affecting ANG would result in estimated annual recurring savings of \$26 million, our analysis of current Air Force estimates indicates that there will be annual recurring costs of \$53 million instead (see app. III).³¹ However, Air Force officials still expect to realize annual recurring savings overall as a result of other BRAC actions affecting the active and reserve components.

The change in estimates occurred primarily due to language in the Commission's report that prevents the Air Force from reducing its current end strength in some states.³² For example, annual recurring savings decreased an estimated \$33 million from BRAC Commission projections in the recommendation to realign ANG units at Otis, Massachusetts; St. Louis, Missouri; and Atlantic City, New Jersey.³³ These projections were based on the elimination of about 240 positions. Furthermore, annual

³¹The estimates of the annual recurring savings associated with 24 of the 30 recommendations affecting ANG decreased by a total of \$114 million and the estimated annual recurring savings for 4 increased by a total of \$35 million.

³²The language affected Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.

³³The projected \$33 million decrease in annual recurring savings was primarily due to the elimination of personnel and facilities maintenance savings.

recurring savings decreased an estimated \$55 million in seven recommendations³⁴ from BRAC Commission projections. According to Air Force officials, these BRAC Commission projections were based on the assumption that additional positions would be eliminated in the seven recommendations to realign other ANG units. However, since no positions could be eliminated from those states as a result of BRAC—and, overall, ANG headquarters reassigned affected positions elsewhere rather than reducing end strength—those projected savings will not materialize. Thus, in preparing the business plans the Air Force had to reduce the projected savings for these recommendations.

In addition, our analysis revealed that the BRAC Commission's projected savings related to facilities maintenance are not likely to be realized. DOD facilities' maintenance costs³⁵ are partly tied to the number of personnel positions and the mission assigned at a particular facility. Since there will be no personnel eliminations and limited facility eliminations across ANG, the associated facility maintenance savings that would have occurred as a result of personnel eliminations will not be realized. Air Force BRAC project management officials concurred with our analysis. For example, savings estimates included in the BRAC Commission report in the recommendation affecting ANG units at Otis, St. Louis, and Atlantic City would have saved about \$11 million annually. In its updated estimates for this recommendation, the Air Force projects an annual cost of about \$1 million in facilities maintenance for these installations.

ANG One-Time Implementation Cost Estimates Have Increased

The estimated one-time costs to implement 2005 BRAC recommendations affecting ANG are also projected to increase. One-time implementation costs include military construction costs and other costs associated with moving personnel and equipment. In comparison to the BRAC Commission estimates, our analysis of current Air Force estimated implementation costs (see app. IV) indicates that one-time implementation cost estimates for recommendations affecting ANG have increased by a

³⁴These seven recommendations affected ANG units at (1) Great Falls, Montana; (2) Martin State, Maryland; (3) Andrews, Maryland; Will Rogers and Tinker, Oklahoma; and Randolph, Texas; (4) Mansfield, Ohio; (5) March, California; (6) co-located miscellaneous Air Force leased locations and National Guard headquarters leased locations; and (7) Boise, Idaho.

³⁵Facilities maintenance costs include sustainment, recapitalization, and base operating support costs.

net of \$68 million (13.5 percent) primarily due to updated construction requirements and inflation,³⁶ as seen in table 3.

Table 3: Changes in One-Time Implementation Costs

Dollars in millions

Cost	BRAC Commission estimate	Current Air Force estimate	Difference
Military construction	\$247	\$366	\$119
Other ^a	257	206	(51)
Total	\$504	\$572	\$68

Source: GAO Analysis of BRAC Commission and Air Force data.

^aOther includes costs associated with moving personnel and equipment.

Although updated site surveys that clarified requirements for mission changes resulted in decreased cost estimates for some activities, the survey process revealed an estimated \$119 million in additional military construction requirements, causing the overall estimate of one-time costs to increase.³⁷ For example, estimated military construction costs to close Kulis, Air Guard Station, Alaska, and transfer the mission to Elmendorf, Air Force Base, Alaska, increased by \$87 million. Air Force officials determined that there was inadequate utility capacity within the proposed development area to support new missions, and that an engineer training complex, an upgraded fuel cell maintenance hangar, and an upgraded helicopter maintenance hangar were required. Likewise, estimated military construction costs in the recommendation to realign ANG units at Otis, St. Louis, and Atlantic City increased by \$46 million after site surveys at those locations determined the existing squadron operations facilities were too small to support the new mission requirements, and the affected ANG units did not have facilities to meet the Air Sovereignty Alert mission requirement. In addition, other one-time cost estimates decreased by a net

³⁶BRAC Commission estimates are expressed in constant-year 2005 dollars, whereas budgets are expressed in then-year or nominal dollars, which include inflation. Over the 2006 through 2011 implementation period, the cumulative inflation is estimated to be about 15 percent. The actual impact of inflation depends on the year the costs are incurred.

³⁷There were 25 recommendations in which there was a change in estimated military construction costs. In 14 recommendations estimated military construction costs increased by a total of \$168 million and in 11 recommendations estimated military construction costs decreased by a total of \$49 million.

of \$51 million.³⁸ According to Air Force officials, these estimates decreased primarily due to the Commission language that retained personnel at the realigning bases. The greatest decreases were in training and civilian personnel severance and relocation costs that were not required because positions were not realigned. For example, estimated other one-time costs to realign Springfield Air Guard Station, Ohio, decreased by \$14 million.

Congress Has Not Been Given Full Visibility over All ANG BRAC-Related Implementation Costs

Congress has not been given full visibility over all ANG BRAC-related implementation costs because some BRAC-related implementation costs funded outside of the BRAC account are not being reported as BRAC-related costs. The Air Force is funding about \$309 million for military construction, equipment, and training to establish replacement missions for 14 ANG units who lost their flying missions outside the BRAC account, as shown in table 4.

Table 4: Estimates of One-Time Costs Being Funded Outside of the BRAC Account

Dollars in millions	
Category	Estimated cost ^a
Military construction	\$136
Equipment ^b	101
Training	68
Other	4
Total	\$309

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data.

^aAir Force officials stated that the process of developing these cost estimates is ongoing and may understate the ultimate actual costs.

^bWe did not include the equipment costs for three Predator replacement missions with a combined estimated equipment cost of about \$400 million because the equipment is an Air Force-controlled asset and not under the direct control of ANG. We also did not include military construction or equipment costs for five joint cargo aircraft missions because the Air Force cannot determine these costs until the aircraft is selected.

The Air Force estimates are based on combined costs to replace 30 missions for the 14 affected units. For example, the estimate of \$136 million for military construction includes about \$23 million for major

³⁸There were 31 recommendations in which there was a change in estimated one-time costs. In 19 recommendations, estimated other one-time costs decreased by a total of \$121 million and in 12 recommendations estimated other one-time costs increased by a total of \$70 million.

renovations and new facilities for the Predator mission at March Air Reserve Base in California. The projected cost of \$101 million for new equipment includes \$64 million for equipment associated with the Distributed Ground System missions assigned to units in Indiana, Kansas, and Massachusetts. The estimated training costs include \$27 million to recruit and train approximately 440 operations and maintenance personnel in a St. Louis ANG unit that will associate with the active B-2 wing at Whiteman Air Force Base.

None of these costs are reported in the section of the Air Force's BRAC budget submission that would identify one-time costs funded outside of the BRAC account. Air Force officials informed us that the BRAC Closure Executive Group decided to fund all costs to establish replacement missions for the units losing their flying mission outside of the BRAC account. Additionally, Air Force officials told us that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics decided not to report replacement mission costs as BRAC-related costs because the Commission did not direct a specific replacement mission for the affected units. Nevertheless, the BRAC Commission report recommended that personnel in affected units should remain in place, assume a new mission, and where appropriate be retrained in skills relevant to the emerging mission. Although the Commission did not direct specific replacement missions, the language in the report requires DOD to provide replacement missions. Therefore, any costs associated with establishing replacement missions are BRAC-related.

Conclusions

The successful implementation of the BRAC recommendations and establishment of new missions depend on the ability of ANG headquarters to execute hundreds of sequential actions in a very tight sequence with little room for delays. While ANG headquarters has developed various implementation plans, challenges remain that could delay when units are fully capable of performing their new mission. Furthermore, any delay or change in schedule could have a domino effect and impact other planned actions. The absence of a strategy that addresses mitigation of these and other challenges that may arise and is shared with all stakeholders increases the risk that delays will occur. Effective development of such a strategy for the BRAC implementation process would enable ANG headquarters to measure progress towards their goals; determine strategies and resources needed to effectively meet these goals; and identify strategies to meet goals that were not met due to implementation challenges. Further, improved communication between ANG headquarters and the affected units is essential to provide unit

commanders with timely information to ensure they can train and recruit personnel to perform their new missions as planned. The lack of a communication strategy, specific to the BRAC implementation, period that addresses how ANG headquarters will provide frequently changing information as required by the units to carry out BRAC implementation increases the risk that implementation actions may not occur as scheduled.

It is important for congressional decision makers to have complete information on the costs to implement BRAC-related actions as they deliberate the budget. The Air Force is providing incomplete cost information by not including the costs to establish replacement missions for units that lost their flying mission in its annual budget submission. Including these costs in the BRAC budget would provide Congress with more complete and transparent information to implement BRAC and assist it in evaluating BRAC budget appropriation requests.

Recommendations for Executive Action

In order to ensure management of BRAC implementation challenges, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief, National Guard Bureau, to task the Director, Air National Guard, with the following.

- Develop a mitigation strategy to be shared with key stakeholders that anticipates, identifies, and addresses related implementation challenges. At a minimum, this strategy should include time frames for actions and responsibilities for each challenge, and facilitate the ability of ANG headquarters officials to act to mitigate potential delays in interim milestones.
- Expand the Strategic Communication Plan to include how ANG headquarters will provide the affected ANG units with the information needed to implement the BRAC-related actions.

In order to provide more complete and transparent ANG BRAC cost information, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to report in the Air Force annual BRAC budget submission the costs and source of funding required to establish replacement missions for ANG units that will lose their flying missions as a result of BRAC 2005.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with two recommendations and did not concur with one recommendation. DOD's written comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix V. DOD also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into this report as appropriate


DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director, Air National Guard, to develop a mitigation strategy to be shared with key stakeholders that anticipates, identifies, and addresses related implementation challenges throughout the BRAC implementation process. DOD suggested that we modify the recommendation to reflect that the Director, Air National Guard, is normally tasked by the Chief, National Guard Bureau. We changed the recommendation to reflect DOD's position because it clarifies accountability and respects the chain of command while still implementing the substance of our recommendation. DOD also stated that mitigation plans cannot be released until they have been thoroughly vetted with all of the key stakeholders. At the same time, however, it is important to note that BRAC recommendations are required by law to be completed by September 15, 2011, and the limited time available coupled with the complexity of implementation actions led us to make this recommendation. Therefore, while we agree that the mitigation plans should be vetted with all of the key stakeholders, it will be important to do this in a timely manner. Further, we believe that affected state adjutants general are key stakeholders and as such should be included in the process to vet these plans.

DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation that the Director, Air National Guard, expand the Strategic Communication Plan to include how ANG headquarters will provide the affected ANG units with the information needed to implement the BRAC-related actions. DOD stated that it is incumbent upon ANG and all affected units to maximize established chains of leadership and communication to effectively manage and execute BRAC actions. We agree. Our report points out that units are using the existing established chains of leadership and communication to ANG headquarters but the communication from ANG headquarters is nonetheless ad hoc and not adequate to meet their needs. Further, the Director, ANG, acknowledges that there are challenges in communicating with the units and that some unit commanders may not have the information that they feel they need to implement the BRAC recommendations and their new missions.

DOD did not concur with our recommendation that the Air Force provide more complete and transparent cost information by including in its annual BRAC budget submission the costs required to establish replacement missions for ANG units that will lose their flying mission as a result of BRAC 2005. DOD does not believe these costs are BRAC-related because establishment of replacement missions was not part of the BRAC recommendations. Although the Commission did not direct specific replacement missions for the affected units, the BRAC Commission recommended that DOD provide replacement missions, retain all personnel in affected units, and where appropriate retrain personnel in skills relevant to the emerging mission. Therefore, we believe the costs to establish the new missions are BRAC-related and should be reported in the Air Force's annual BRAC budget submission. DOD also stated that BRAC funds cannot be used to establish these missions and that the costs in question have been appropriately programmed and budgeted in the Air Force's regular military construction account. In making our recommendation, it was not our intent to prescribe which funds should be used to establish replacement missions but rather to recommend that DOD provide more complete and transparent cost reporting about these BRAC related costs. DOD said it was willing to caveat the BRAC budget documentation to annotate these costs. As a result, we modified our recommendation to include that DOD identify the source of funding for these costs in its BRAC budget documentation. Further, we continue to believe that the annual BRAC budget documentation would be the most complete and transparent place for DOD to report the costs to establish replacement missions because this documentation is used in evaluating BRAC implementation costs.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense and the Air Force; the Director, National Guard; the Director, ANG; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at <http://www.gao.gov>.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Additional contacts and staff acknowledgements are provided in appendix VI.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Brian Lepore". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, stylized initial "B".

Brian Lepore, Acting Director
Defense Capabilities and Management

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The Honorable John McCain
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Ranking Member
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Committee on Appropriations
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The Honorable Henry A. Waxman
Chairman
The Honorable Tom Davis
Ranking Member
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
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Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

We performed our work at the Air Force Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Office, Air National Guard (ANG) headquarters, and in various states which had ANG units affected by the BRAC 2005 recommendations. We selected states to visit that had BRAC actions scheduled early in the 6-year implementation period and also had units that were going to lose, reduce, convert, or increase their flying mission or associate with another unit as a result of the 2005 BRAC recommendations. We visited state ANG and unit officials in Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. We also held video conferences with state ANG officials in Oklahoma and Ohio and received written responses to questions from state ANG officials in Mississippi. At all states except Indiana and Virginia we spoke with either the adjutant general, assistant adjutant general, or both; at every unit we spoke with the wing commanders or the deputy wing commanders of affected units. In Indiana, we spoke with the wing commanders and the deputy wing commanders, and in Virginia we spoke with the Virginia ANG chief executive officer.

To assess the process the Air Force used to assign new missions to units that lost their flying mission, we interviewed all stakeholders to the process. These stakeholders included officials in the Total Force Integration Office, Headquarters Air Force; the Office of Transformation, ANG, and the aforementioned state ANG officials to determine how new flying missions were assigned to ANG units. In addition, we compared the banded list of potential missions developed by Air Force headquarters to the missions assigned by ANG headquarters to the affected units.

To determine the progress that ANG headquarters has made in implementing the 2005 BRAC recommendations, we reviewed the BRAC business plans, the ANG aircraft movement plan, and the new mission plan by state for ANG units affected by BRAC. We interviewed officials in ANG headquarters, including the Director, ANG, and interviewed or obtained written responses from ANG officials in 11 states regarding these plans and to identify any challenges the Air Force faces in implementing the BRAC recommendations. We reviewed Air Force Instructions and Policy documents regarding Unit Manning Documents (UMD) and interviewed ANG headquarters manpower officials to obtain information on their plan for developing the unit manning documents and requirements templates for the affected units. We also reviewed documentation pertaining to the training requirements for new missions and for pilots converting to a new aircraft, and compared these requirements to the allocation of seats in pilot training schools for ANG for fiscal years 2008 through 2012 to determine the likelihood of adequate pilot training seats being available.

We interviewed officials in the Air Force Office of Total Force Integration and ANG training officials on their plans to address and mitigate these training shortfalls, and spoke with ANG officials in Texas about the training mission assigned to Ellington. To determine the impact of funding delays, we spoke with ANG officials including the Comptroller of ANG, and reviewed ANG documentation pertaining to funding delays. To assess the degree to which the states were aware of 2005 BRAC-related changes that were required for their units, we conducted interviews or field visits with or obtained written responses from senior ANG leadership and wing commanders from 11 states that had units that were impacted by BRAC. We asked these officials their perspective on communications with ANG headquarters, and to describe any challenges that they faced in BRAC implementation. We also met with ANG headquarters officials that were responsible for communicating 2005 BRAC changes with the states, including the A/8 Office of Transformation and the A/1 Manpower Office. We were briefed on the internal interface system called “dashboard” that ANG headquarters had developed for an eventual “roll out” to the states and units that would provide the affected units with transformation updates, and reviewed the information available on this system.

To assess changes to projected costs and savings, we compared DOD’s current estimates to the estimates in the BRAC 2005 Commission report. BRAC Commission estimates are based on DOD’s quantitative model, known as the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA). DOD has used the COBRA model in each of the previous BRAC rounds and, over time, has improved upon its design to provide better estimating capability. In our past and current reviews of the COBRA model, we found it to be a generally reasonable estimator for comparing potential costs and savings among various BRAC options. Air Force estimates did not segregate the ANG-related costs and annual recurring savings of the Air Force recommendations. Therefore, ANG officials provided us with the current estimated implementation costs from a Web-based tool, BRAC Management Tool (BMT). On the basis of that information, we were able to extract the estimated ANG related costs and savings of the BRAC 2005 Commission report, as well as the current estimated annual recurring costs. The Air Force BRAC Project Management Office identified a number of issues with our results. After reviewing their issues, we updated the data accordingly and satisfied their concerns. To determine the reasons why DOD’s current estimates changed compared to the Commission’s estimates, we interviewed officials at the Air Force BRAC Project Management Office, ANG headquarters, and reviewed explanations documented in the Air Force business plans and decision memorandums. Finally, to identify costs being funded outside of the

BRAC account, we reviewed Air Force budget submissions for fiscal years 2007 and 2008, as well as obtained data from the Air Force Total Force Integration office on the estimated funding for equipment, military construction, and training to establish the cost of replacement missions for units that lost their flying mission due to the BRAC recommendations. We assessed the reliability of the Air Force Total Force Integration and BRAC Management Tool data by interviewing knowledgeable officials and determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

We conducted our work from September 2006 through March 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

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Appendix II: Replacement Missions Assigned to Units That Lost Their Flying Mission as a Result of BRAC 2005

Replacement missions					
Affected units	Band 1	Band 2	Band 3	Band 4	Flying mission
March, CA	Predator	Joint Space Operations Center ^a			
Bradley, CT	Component Numbered Air Force (CNAF) ^b				Joint Cargo Aircraft ^c
Capital, IL	CNAF				
Terre Haute, IN	Distributed Ground System (DGS) ^d	Air Support Operations Squadron (ASOS) ^e			
McConnell, KS	DGS	ASOS			
Otis, MA	DGS, CNAF				
Kellogg, MI	CNAF				Joint Cargo Aircraft
St Louis, MO	CNAF				B2 Association with Whiteman AFB ^f
Key Field, MS	CNAF				Joint Cargo Aircraft
Mansfield, OH				Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineers (Red Horse) ^g	Joint Cargo Aircraft
Springfield, OH		Measurement & Signatures Intelligence ^h			F-16 training unit ⁱ
Willow Grove, PA	CNAF	ASOS		Red Horse	
Nashville, TN				Classified, Intelligence Production	Joint Cargo Aircraft
Ellington, TX	Predator	ASOS	Intelligence Training ^j		
Total	12	6	1	4	7

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force and ANG data.

^aA Joint Space Operations Center integrates various joint-space capabilities to provide shared situational awareness to commanders and troops on the ground.

^bA Component Numbered Air Force is a combination of up to three separate missions, including an Air Operations Center (AOC, which includes Operations, Planning, Strategy, Intelligence, and Surveillance and Reconnaissance components), an Air Mobility Division (AMD), and an Air Force Forces group (AFFOR).

**Appendix II: Replacement Missions Assigned
to Units That Lost Their Flying Mission as a
Result of BRAC 2005**

^eThe Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) will be a new, small, tactical airlift aircraft that has not yet been procured by the Air Force. According to senior ANG leadership, the JCA may not be ready for deployment until between 2012 to 2015.

^fA Distributed Ground System processes intelligence information.

^gAn Air Support Operations Squadron provides support to ground forces by facilitating Air Force air strikes.

^hANG personnel will operate B-2s at Whiteman in conjunction with active-duty Air Force personnel.

ⁱA Red Horse, Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineers, supports contingency and special operations missions with mobile, self-sufficient civil engineers.

^jMeasurement & Signatures Intelligence units employ a variety of intelligence gathering techniques including advanced radar, electro-optical/ infrared, and materials sensing.

^kThe Foreign Military Sales—F-16s unit is a school for foreign countries that acquire F-16s and require training. The FMS school at Springfield will train Dutch pilots.

^lThis intelligence training unit will provide additional intelligence instructors for the school at Goodfellow, Texas.

Appendix III: Comparison of Estimated Annual Recurring Savings between the 2005 BRAC Commission Report and Current Air Force Estimates, for ANG–Related Recommendations

Dollars in millions

Recommendations affecting ANG units	BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings) / costs	Current estimated savings	Difference
Otis, MA, St. Louis, MO, and Atlantic City, NJ	\$(27.875)	\$5.399	\$33.274
Great Falls, MT	0.050	12.735	12.685
Martin State, MD	(8.597)	0.117	8.714
Andrews, MD, Will Rogers and Tinker, OK, and Randolph, TX	(6.339)	0.505	6.844
Mansfield, OH	(6.708)	0.107	6.815
March, CA	(4.045)	2.749	6.794
Co-Locate Miscellaneous Air Force Leased Locations & National Guard Headquarters Leased Locations ^a	17.008	23.461	6.453
Boise, ID	(6.291)	0.000	6.291
Grand Forks, ND	17.177	20.905	3.728
Richmond, VA and Des Moines, IA	(4.923)	(1.642)	3.281
Springfield, OH	(2.524)	0.005	2.529
Nashville, TN	(0.880)	1.568	2.448
Capital, IL and Hulman, IN	(2.003)	0.070	2.073
Niagara Falls, NY	(0.258)	1.504	1.762
Kulis and Elmendorf, AK	(10.779)	(9.059)	1.720
Kellogg, MI	(1.480)	0.042	1.522
Mountain Home, ID, Nellis, NV, and Elmendorf, AK	9.072	10.547	1.475
Portland, OR	(7.004)	(5.658)	1.346
Hector, ND	(1.016)	0.023	1.039
Key Field, MS	(0.939)	0.010	0.949
Fairchild, WA	(0.925)	(0.153)	0.772
Bradley, CT, Barnes, MA, Selfridge, MI, Shaw, SC, and Martin State, MD	(0.508)	0.237	0.745

Appendix III: Comparison of Estimated Annual Recurring Savings between the 2005 BRAC Commission Report and Current Air Force Estimates, for ANG-Related Recommendations

Dollars in millions

Recommendations affecting ANG units	BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings) / costs	Current estimated savings	Difference
Ellington, TX	(0.327)	(0.090)	0.237
New Orleans, LA—F100 Engine Centralized Intermediate Repair Facilities	0.140	0.151	0.011
Willow Grove and Cambria, PA ^a	(14.923)	(14.923)	0.000
Robins, GA	0.000	0.000	0.000
Lackland, TX	(2.902)	(3.640)	(0.738)
Selfridge, MI and Beale, CA	12.808	4.536	(8.272)
Fort Smith, AR and Luke, AZ	12.674	3.613	(9.061)
Cannon, NM	16.425	0.000	(16.425)
Total	\$(25.892)	\$53.119	\$79.011

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data (as of Nov. 24, 2006).

^aNon-Air Force recommendations that affected the Air National Guard.

Appendix IV: Current One-Time Cost Estimates for BRAC Recommendations Affecting ANG

Dollars in millions

Recommendations affecting ANG units	Military construction	Other costs ^a	Total one-time implementation costs
Kulis And Elmendorf, AK	174.569	7.249	181.818
Otis, MA, St. Louis, MO, and Atlantic City, NJ	66.340	27.718	94.058
Co-Locate Miscellaneous Air Force Leased Locations & National Guard Headquarters Leased Locations ^b	55.320	3.431	58.751
Bradley, CT, Barnes, MA, Selfridge, MI, Shaw, SC, and Martin State, MD	11.931	23.456	35.387
Capital, IL, and Hulman, IN	6.104	9.750	15.854
March, CA	0.000	15.821	15.821
Andrews, MD, Will Rogers and Tinker, OK, and Randolph, TX	5.014	10.542	15.556
Mansfield, OH	3.479	10.885	14.364
Selfridge, MI, and Beale, CA	4.360	9.196	13.556
Grand Forks, ND	5.232	6.207	11.439
Fairchild, WA	6.104	4.091	10.195
Richmond, VA and Des Moines, IA	0.061	9.935	9.996
Hector, ND	0.000	8.950	8.950
Ellington, TX	2.884	5.544	8.428
Lackland, TX	7.303	1.056	8.359
Great Falls, MT	0.000	7.999	7.999
Program Management, Various Locations ^c	0.000	7.730	7.730
New Orleans, LA F100 Engine Centralized Intermediate Repair Facilities	7.185	0.004	7.189
Portland, OR	1.299	5.648	6.947
Mountain Home, ID, Nellis, NV, and Elmendorf, AK	0.000	4.763	4.763
Kellogg, MI	2.066	2.682	4.748
Niagara Falls, NY	0.000	4.430	4.430
Cannon, NM	0.000	3.918	3.918
Robins, GA	2.812	0.721	3.533
Martin State, MD	2.344	0.938	3.282
Key Field, MS	1.255	1.968	3.223
Springfield, OH	0.000	3.120	3.120
Willow Grove and Cambria, PA ^b	0.000	2.495	2.495
Boise, ID	0.000	2.053	2.053
Nashville, TN	0.000	1.979	1.979
Fort Smith, AR And Luke, AZ	0.000	1.660	1.660
Total	\$365.662	\$205.939	\$571.601

**Appendix IV: Current One-Time Cost Estimates
for BRAC Recommendations Affecting ANG**

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data (as of Nov. 24, 2006).

^a Other costs include costs associated with moving personnel and equipment.

^b Non-Air Force recommendations that affected the Air National Guard.

^c Our analysis indicated that Program Management Costs (if any) were included in each recommendation. On the basis of the information we received from Air Force officials, Program Management Costs were calculated separately for the current estimates of one-time costs.

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

MAY 04 2007

Mr. Brian J. Lepore
Acting Director
Defense Capabilities and Management
U.S. Government Accountability Office
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548

Dear Mr. Lepore:

This letter is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft report, "MILITARY BASE CLOSURES: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations," dated April 4, 2007, (GAO Code 350913/GAO-07-641).

The Department partially agrees with two of the draft report recommendations concerning development of a mitigation strategy for implementation challenges and expansion of existing communications, building on the existing business plan process. However, the Department strongly disagrees with GAO's recommendation to "report" new mission cost in its annual Base Realignment and Closure budget because the Department's annual BRAC budget properly includes only BRAC-related costs. Elsewhere in its draft report, GAO characterizes new mission costs as "BRAC-related" costs that should be part of the BRAC budget submission. The Department disagrees with this characterization. Establishment of replacement missions, as directed by the Commission, are not part of these recommendations and, therefore, not actions necessary for implementation. BRAC funds cannot be used for these purposes.

The costs in question have been appropriately programmed and budgeted in the Air Force's regular military construction account to support these independent actions. As the Department indicated in its oral comments, we have no issue with identifying the cost associated with new mission requirements and making sure Congress has visibility on these costs. However, we must do so in a way that does not give the impression that they are "BRAC-related costs". The Department is willing to caveat the BRAC budget documentation to annotate these costs and state they are reflected elsewhere in our budget documentation.



2

The Department's comments regarding the specific recommendations in the report are outlined in the enclosure. The Department appreciates the work performed by the GAO in this regard and appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report.

Sincerely,



Philip W. Grone
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Installations and Environment)

Enclosure:
As stated

**GAO DRAFT REPORT – DATED APRIL 4, 2007
GAO CODE 350913/GAO-07-641**

**“MILITARY BASE CLOSURES: Management Strategy Needed to
Mitigate Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure
Timely Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations”**

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS
TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS**

RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director, Air National Guard (ANG) to develop a mitigation strategy to be shared with key stakeholders that anticipates, identifies, and addresses related implementation challenges throughout the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) implementation process. At a minimum, this strategy should include timeframes for actions, responsibilities for each challenge, and facilitate the ability of ANG headquarters officials to act to mitigate potential delays in interim milestones.

DOD RESPONSE: DoD partially concurs with the GAO recommendation. As part of the National Guard Bureau (NGB), the ANG Directorate would normally be tasked by the Secretary of Defense through the Chief, National Guard Bureau as the agency head. Therefore, we believe the appropriate recommendation should read as follows:

“The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief, National Guard Bureau to task the Director, Air National Guard (ANG) to develop a mitigation strategy to be shared with key stakeholders that anticipates, identifies, and addresses related implementation challenges throughout the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) implementation process.”

The Department will develop a mitigation strategy that expands stakeholder participation, building on the business plan process. However, implementation planning is a dynamic process; one which often involves working with each state separately to develop and refine tailored courses of action. In many cases these plans cannot be released until they have been thoroughly vetted with all of the key stakeholders. An unintended consequence of this process is that it may lead some to conclude that it is delayed when it is not. We agree that once a plan is developed and coordinated, the information should be made available to all affected parties.

RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director, Air National Guard to expand the Strategic Communication Plan to include how ANG headquarters will provide the affected units with the information needed to implement the BRAC related actions.

DOD RESPONSE: DoD partially concurs with the GAO recommendation. Communication is critical to the successful accomplishment of tasks and achievement of goals. It is incumbent upon the ANG and all effected units to maximize established chains of leadership and communication to effectively manage and execute BRAC actions.

Enclosure pg. 1

RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to “report” in its annual BRAC budget submission the costs required to establish replacement missions for units that will lose their flying mission as a result of BRAC 2005.

DOD RESPONSE: The DoD non-concurs with the GAO recommendation to “report” new mission cost in its annual BRAC budget because the Department’s annual BRAC budget properly includes only BRAC-related costs. Elsewhere in the report GAO characterizes new mission costs as “BRAC-related” costs that should be considered part of the BRAC budget submission. The Department disagrees with this characterization. BRAC 2005 funds are only available to fund actions necessary to implement the BRAC 2005 recommendations. Establishment of replacement missions is not part of the recommendation and, therefore, not actions necessary to implement the recommendation. BRAC funds cannot be used for these purposes. The costs in question have been appropriately programmed and budgeted in the Air Force’s regular military construction account to support these independent actions. As the Department indicated in its oral comments, we have no issue with identifying the cost associated with new mission requirements and ensuring Congress has visibility of these costs. However, we must do so in a way that does not give the impression that they are “BRAC-related costs”. The Department is willing to caveat the BRAC budget documentation to annotate these costs and state they are reflected elsewhere in our budget documentation.

Enclosure pg. 2

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Brian Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov

Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Michael Kennedy, Assistant Director; Ronald Bergman; Susan Ditto; James P. Klein; Ron La Due Lake; James Madar; Julie Matta; and Charles Perdue made key contributions to this report.

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