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#### UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

LOGISTICS AND COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

**SEPTEMBER 30, 1980** 

B-200228

The Honorable James M. Hanley Chairman, Subcommittee on Investigations Committee on Post Office and Civil Service House of Representatives



The Honorable Herbert E. Harris II Chairman, Subcommittee on Human Resources Committee on Post Office and Civil Service House of Representatives

> Subject: /Information on Military, Civilian, and Contract Employees Who Provide Physical Security at Military Installations (LCD-80-112)

In a February 6, 1980, letter, you requested our views on 10 questions relating to the above subject. Since we were already reviewing the physical security at U.S. military bases, we incorporated your questions into our broader assignment. Accordingly, we pursued your interest areas at the Department of Defense and service headquarters, selected major commands, and military installations. We will issue an overall report to the Congress later this year.

This report covers data we gathered on people involved in law enforcement functions as well as physical security. This is because their duties are sometimes interchangeable, and we felt your interests went beyond physical security in its strictest definition.

As requested by your office, we did not obtain written agency comments, but we discussed the report with Defense and service officials and have incorporated their views.

Answers to your specific questions follow.

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WHAT CRITERIA ARE USED TO DETER-MINE THE PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF OUR MILITARY INSTALLATIONS?

(Clear-cut criteria for determining security personnel requirements for military installations do not always exist.) In some cases, requirements relate to specific sensitive assets. In other cases, requirements evolve from local conditions, such as geography, local threats, past incidents, base layout (in terms of area or number of entry points), base population, and mix of assets. Some criteria are placed on installations by Defense and service headquarters. Otherwise, installation commanders establish requirements based on their assessments of local needs.

In discussing this question with the services, officials frequently referred to their personnel determination process or standards as criteria. However, in attempting to get more information on the basis for standards or requirements, we became involved in many details and unknowns. Therefore, a generalized discussion of the nature of the criteria within each service's security personnel requirements process follows.

The Air Force uses a functional approach to establish criteria for physical security and law enforcement personnel. Criteria are divided into (1) weapons systems security for protection of priority assets and (2) resource protection for nonpriority assets. For weapons systems, the Air Force's Office of Security Police has set security criteria for aircraft, missiles, and nuclear storage areas. One example of the criteria is that after dark there should be a dedicated guard for each B-52 aircraft. Another example is that for every 10 Minuteman missles there has to be a response team of 10 security police. For resource protection for nonpriority assets, an Air Force security management engineering team translates workload data and staffing standards for functions, such as pass and registration, installation patrols, and entry control, into staffing requirements.

The Army's military police performs law enforcement and limited physical security functions. Other military people perform physical security as an ancillary duty. The criteria for the number of military police are prescribed by the Army based on authorizations for units that have specific functions. For instance, units may be required for police and law enforcement, traffic control, traffic investigation,

security inspections, and other functions. The unit size is based on criteria, such as base population and workload. For example, one vehicle registration team is authorized for each increment of 2,000 base personnel; the size of the investigation unit is determined by the number of cases processed and the time it takes to process each case. Criteria for assigning military people to perform physical security as an ancillary duty (such as infantrymen guarding motor pools) is a local commander's prerogative.

The Navy and Marine Corps have little criteria directly related to determining the number of security people needed. The Navy has provided general guidance to Navy and Marine commanders on how security programs should be conducted, but the criteria for establishing numbers of security people are based largely on commanders' evaluation of what is needed. A July 9, 1980, naval audit service report concluded that "each command's security department has its own unique arrangement of personnel, equipment, and services." A system is slowly being developed to establish criteria at shore bases.

## WHAT CRITERIA ARE USED TO DETERMINE WHETHER SECURITY SHOULD BE PROVIDED BY MILITARY OR NONMILITARY PERSONNEL?

(Some criteria exist within Defense for determining whether military or nonmilitary people should be used for security duties, but local commanders generally decide what types of people to use.) (Defense's policy requires military people to protect nuclear assets.) Otherwise, the choice is up to the individual services and/or installation commanders. However, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 now requires case-by-case determinations of whether guard and protective services will be provided in house (military or civil service) or by contract. 1/

Under OMB Circular A-76, the services can use military people for individual and unit training, for rotation, to maintain or strengthen mobilization readiness, and for other conditions. Although most services have issued broad guidance on the types of people to use for physical security, local

<sup>1/</sup>In a recent report (LCD-80-92, Sept. 5, 1980), we recommended that the Secretary of Defense coordinate the Department's support service cost reduction programs, which include commercial—and industrial—type activities, under OMB Circular A-76. Included in support services are base security forces.

commanders generally decide the types of people to use. Examples of the services' broad guidance follow.

- --The Air Force requires that the security of resources essential to national defense, such as strategic and tactical aircraft, will be performed by military people.
- --The Army states that military police will not be authorized as interior guards for nonsensitive installations or activities, but may be authorized (1) for police duties, (2) as entrance gate guards, (3) to control traffic, and (4) to perform physical security for overall protection of a base.
- --Navy policy is to employ civilian guards in all positions which do not require military personnel by reason of law, tasks, training, degree of security, location, hours of employment, or interservice and public relations. The Navy further states that contract guards will only be used in special circumstances.

To illustrate how the application of the service and OMB Circular A-76 criteria has been a local prerogative, Fort Bragg converted from military people to contract people to guard an ammunition storage point because use of military people "precludes them from full-time participation in MOS [military occupational speciality] and unit training." At Camp Pendleton (Marine Corps), the Commanding General approved continued use of Marines for vehicle registration/pass services because "procurement of this service from a commercial source would disrupt the program.

# CAN ADDITIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS BE ASSUMED BY NONMILITARY PERSONNEL, THUS FREEING MILITARY PERSONNEL?

At the locations we visited, many similar security functions are performed by different types of people--military, civil service, and contractors. Obviously the performance of these tasks do not require military skills and could be done by nonmilitary people. However, these conditions do not necessarily suggest that all security related functions should be done by nonmilitary people. As mentioned before, OMB Circular A-76 allows the use of military people when they are subject to deployment in a direct combat support role, where the activity is needed to provide a rotation base for overseas

assignments and other conditions. Such judgments are to be made before conducting a comparative cost analysis.

To illustrate that different types of people are performing similar functions, the following chart shows the type of people who provide dedicated guard protection at ammunition/explosive storage areas at six of the installations we visited.

		Type of	rsonnel	
			Civil	
Locations		Military	service	Contract
Canaveral Air Force				
Station, Fla.				X
Fort Belvoir (South area),	۷a.	X	X	
Fort Bragg, N.C.		###*		X
Marine Corps Air Station,				
Cherry Point, N.C.		X	_	-
Marine Corps Base,				
Camp Pendleton, Calif.		X	•••	<del></del>
Naval Air Station, Oceana,	۷a.	X	X	_

We noted similar mixes in personnel types performing gate and perimeter security, base police-type patrol duties, and other functions. In discussing this topic in its October 1979 report, the Defense Audit Service said that:

"the duties of security guards do not, in our opinion normally require a military background. Civilianization of security police forces would make a significant number of servicemen available for combat functions."

Defense officials did not concur with the report's recommendation to establish a policy for civilianization of security forces. They agreed that a civilianization program would be beneficial at some locations, but not universally. They also referred to Defense requirements that military personnel be used in positions which require military incumbency for reasons of combat readiness or security.

Our general view is that nonmilitary people have the skills needed for some security positions, but other criteria (such as in OMB Circular A-76) have to be considered before decisions are made to use them.

## HOW MANY STAFF-YEARS OF PHYSICAL SECURITY ARE PROVIDED BY MILITARY PERSONNEL IN DOD? WHAT IS THE COST?

Each military service provided us with their total authorized positions for people who work full time in security. Using fiscal year 1980 Defense costs for military people, we estimated the total personnel cost to be \$1.7 billion annually, as shown below.

	Average annual cost	Total positions authorized	Annual cost
Army	\$19,853	24,739	\$ 491,143,000
Navy	21,137	7,431	157,070,000
Air Force	22,674	34,718	787,196,000
Marine Corps	18,321	14,435	264,464,000
Total		81,323	\$ 1,699,873,000

Actually, the total authorized positions understate the number of military people involved in security because many military people perform security functions on a part-time basis. As an example, Camp Pendleton Marine Corps Base has 213 military police that perform security functions and are included in the above chart. However, there are 672 Marines serving as interior guards on a part-time basis that are not included in the above chart.

#### HOW MANY STAFF-YEARS OF PHYSICAL SECURITY ARE PROVIDED BY CIVILIAN FEDERAL EMPLOYEES? WHAT IS THE COST?

There are more than 2,600 civilian staff-years authorized for security duties at Army and Air Force installations. There are many civilian Federal employees providing security functions at Navy installations; however, the Navy did not have this information. Using Defense's costs for civilian positions, we estimated the annual cost to be \$63.6 million, excluding the Navy.

	Average annual cost	Total positions authorized	Total annual cost
Army	\$23,362	1,117	\$26,095,000
Navy	25,592	(a)	(a)
Air Force	24,493	1,531	37,499,000
Marine Corps	24,143	Table departs and departs	
Total		2,648	\$63,594,000

a/Unknown.

HOW MANY STAFF YEARS OF PHYSICAL SECURITY ARE PROVIDED BY CONTRACT EMPLOYEES? WHAT IS THE COST?

A Defense report that contains information for guard services provided by contractors shows that, for fiscal year 1979, the annual contract costs are about \$38 million, as shown below.

	No. of contracts	Annual <u>cost</u>
Army	134	\$20,471,000
Navy	79	13,895,000
Air Force	28	3,890,000
Marine Corps		· NOTES THE COMMISSION
Total	241	\$38,256,000

Although we did not perform an extensive analysis of the Defense information, we did note that one contract, valued at over \$5 million, was omitted.

The \$38 million annual cost does not lend itself to calculations of staff-years because most contracts require performance of tasks. Therefore, the contractor estimates and provides the personnel.

# HOW DO THE THREE METHODS OF DELIVERY VARY IN TERMS OF QUALITY OF SERVICE, TRAINING FOR EMPLOYEES, AND ACCOUNTABILITY?

It is inherently difficult to express an overall opinion of the quality, training, and accountability of military versus civil service versus contract security personnel. We discussed this point with Defense and service headquarters officials and field installation personnel. Their views varied among locations.

Not everyone agreed. However, the following table summarizes the most frequent favorable (+) and unfavorable (-) quality and accountability aspects of the three types of people as expressed to us during our review.

Element	Military	Civil service	Contract
Labor problems/unionizations	+		-
Turnover rates		+	, <b>+</b>
Training costs (due to turnover)	-	+	+
Ability to acquire personnel	+	-	+
Maturity/judgment	-	+	+
Ability to remove	+		+
Need for assignment to CONUS duty	+	N/A	N/A
Need to use in-house resources for absences	-	-	+
Personnel ceiling constraints	-	-	+
Ability to dictate working hours	s +	-	+
Physical ability/agility	+	_	_

To obtain an overall assessment of variances in training for the three methods of delivery, an exhaustive analysis would have to be performed in view of the many different functions and training each type of personnel would be involved in. We did, however, select three locations which used different personnel types to guard ammunition/explosives storage areas and discussed their training.

Fort Bragg's storage area is guarded by contractor personnel. Training, which is provided by the contractor, is geared toward containment of incidents and not toward apprehension. Besides initial on-the-job training by supervisors, weekly training is held covering such subjects as purposes and principles of Bragg's system of security, functions and duties of individual guards, guard orders and authority, use and safe practices of fire arms, and communication. Special instructions are issued for each guard post describing detailed procedures to follow in the event of alarms, power failures, or other problems.

Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station's ordnance is guarded by infantrymen--some permanently assigned and others temporarily assigned for 6 to 12 months. Besides their regular unit training, they are initially trained on guard orders and use of weapons in a 3-hour classroom course. Weekly training is also provided in 2-hour classroom sessions on subjects, such as ordnance orders, conduct, general military orders, weapons safety, and use of deadly force. Written operating procedures are also provided on assigned duties of particular posts. Their basic emphasis is on containment of incidents--relying on station military police for apprehension.

Fort Belvoir's northside storage point is protected by civil service personnel, whose primary roles relate to personnel and vehicle entry control and periodic area patrol. Some minimum requirements, such as weapon familiarity, must be met for employment eligibility. Their training basically consists of supervisory instruction specifically related to their duties. Additional training in subjects, such as hand-cuffing, is sometimes received when they choose to attend classes given by Belvoir's military police. Otherwise, they operate under documented standard operating procedures and guard orders which cover post functions and responsibilities.

In our opinion, the training of all three types is similar. They are trained on weapons, specific post orders, and

some additional, more generalized subjects. The only differences observed were in the approaches and formality of the training.

ARE COST COMPARISONS CONSISTENTLY PERFORMED TO JUSTIFY THE CHOICE FOR THE METHOD OF DELIVERY?

Prior to the 1979 revision of OMB Circular A-76, cost comparisons were not required to justify the choice for the method of delivery. The revised OMB circular does not require cost comparisons if the commander believes military people are needed for such reasons as individual and unit training, rotation, or to maintain or strengthen mobilization readiness.

Since the revised OMB circular was not in effect until October 1, 1979, we believe it is too early to determine if the required cost comparisons are being consistently performed.

HOW DOES THE CONTRACTING OF NONSECURITY FUNCTIONS ON INSTALLATIONS AFFECT SECURITY? EXAMPLE?

We found no problems in contracting for nonsecurity functions (such as grass cutting, building maintenance, or other vendors) that would adversely affect installation security. Most activities have specific procedures to ensure no problems occur. For instance, depending on the sensitivity of the area where these individuals may go, procedures range from individual escorts, assurances that individuals have proper clearances or authority, assignment and required display of temporary badges which restrict movement into sensitive areas, to armed guard surveillance in some cases.

IS SECURITY COVERAGE A LINE ITEM IN THE BUDGET AND/OR APPROPRIATION FOR DEFENSE OR OTHER AGENCIES?

Under current budget and appropriation processes, security coverage is not a separate line item for Defense or any of the services. The budget costs of law enforcement and physical security are covered by broad functions. For instance, the costs of military personnel involved in security are included in the military personnel appropriation, the costs of security upgrade programs for particular assets

or locations are included in the military construction appropriation (sometimes broken down by individual projects), and the costs of contracting for security personnel are normally included in the operation and maintenance appropriation.

R. W. Gutmann

Director

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