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The costs of providing grant-aid training to foreign students under the Military Assistance Program have been understated, and the method of reporting costs has been inconsistent. Findings/Conclusions: The fiscal year 1976 program provided training to 6,280 students from 43 countries at a recorded cost of about \$23 million. New costing procedures, which will more accurately account for training costs, are to become effective in fiscal year 1978; but costs will continue to be understated because the new procedures do not provide for accounting for all related costs. Recommendations: To improve cost controls, reduce costs, and make the program more effective, the Secretaries of Defense and State should: (1) record all costs of training foreign military personnel, including salaries and allowances of military personnel engaged in their training; (2) have recipient countries assume responsibility for paying transportation and living allowances to their trainees except when justified for specific economic or political reasons; (3) stress the need for foreign nationals to better use English language training facilities; and (4) discontinue U.S. maintenance and operation of the Army and Air Force Canal Zone military assistance schools through internationalization or closure, with the merging of essential programs with U.S. military programs in the United States as soon as practicable. (Author/SC)

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# REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL  
OF THE UNITED STATES

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## Cost Of Training Granted To Foreign Students Under The Military Assistance Program

Departments of Defense and State

This report examines the grant-aid training program provided annually to over 6,000 students from 43 countries. It recommends that the Secretaries of State and Defense identify and record all program costs and close or internationalize the Army and Air Force military assistance schools in the Canal Zone. It seeks to make the program more effective at less cost to the U.S. Government.



**COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES**  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

B-163582

To the President of the Senate and the  
Speaker of the House of Representatives

This report examines the management of the grant-aid military training program provided annually to over 6,000 students from about 43 countries. It discusses ways to reduce costs and to make the program more effective through increased financial contributions by the recipient countries.

The review was made to see if program management had improved since our 1971 review. Our review was made pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

Copies of this report are being sent to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretary of State; and the Secretary of Defense.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "James B. Atchefs".

Comptroller General  
of the United States

COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S  
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

COST OF TRAINING GRANTED TO  
FOREIGN STUDENTS UNDER THE  
MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM  
Departments of Defense  
and State

D I G E S T

The U.S. provides military education and training to foreign students under a variety of programs, such as the International Military Education and Training Program under the Foreign Assistance Act (grant assistance), the Arms Export Control Act (sales program), and personnel exchange programs with military forces of other countries.

This report discusses certain costs and management aspects of that training provided under provisions of the International Military Education and Training Program, formerly the Military Assistance Program. GAO recognizes that political advantages accrue to the U.S. in providing training to foreign students, but this aspect was not specifically covered in this report.

The fiscal year 1976 program provided training to 6,280 students from 43 countries at a recorded cost of about \$23 million. The costs of providing this grant-aid training have been understated and the method of reporting costs has been inconsistent.

New costing procedures, which will more accurately account for training costs, are to become effective in fiscal year 1978; but costs will continue to be understated because the new procedures do not provide for accounting for all related costs.

The Foreign Assistance Act provides that funds made available for the grant-aid training program cannot be used to reimburse other Defense appropriations for

salaries and allowances of military personnel used as instructors.

In GAO's view, however, salaries and allowances should be recorded as a training cost so that the Congress will know the total cost of training foreign military students. (See p. 7.)

In support of the program, the Department of Defense says that it

- develops the capabilities of friendly countries to use their own resources and U.S.-originated weapons systems for defense;
- transmits professionalism, U.S. military skills, and doctrine; and
- helps accomplish U.S. political purposes by developing channels of communication with foreign military leaders.

GAO found the last objective to be particularly applicable to training assistance provided to Latin America and some small countries. Training to these countries is provided primarily for political reasons and the influence the U.S. derives from such programs.

To improve cost controls, reduce costs, and make the program more effective, the Secretaries of Defense and State should:

- Record all costs of training foreign military personnel, including salaries and allowances of military personnel engaged in their training. (See p. 10.)
- Have recipient countries assume responsibility for paying transportation and living allowances to their trainees except when justified for specific economic or political reasons. (See p. 10.)

--Stress the need for foreign nationals to better use English language training facilities. (See p. 19.)

--Discontinue U.S. maintenance and operation of the Army and Air Force Canal Zone military assistance schools through internationalization or closure with the merging of essential programs with U.S. military programs in the U.S. as soon as practicable. (See p. 19.)

Transportation and living allowances provided to foreign military students were estimated to be from \$9 to \$11 million in fiscal year 1975. Defense has negotiated some agreements for foreign governments to assume these costs, but greater efforts should be made to have all these costs paid by the recipient countries.

This would give the countries a greater financial stake in the success of the training program and should improve selection procedures and use of trainees. At the same time U.S. costs would be reduced and other priority training needs could be satisfied. (See p. 8.)

About \$2.3 million, or about 9 percent of the 1975 grant-aid training funds, was spent on English language training and about \$1.7 million of other grant-aid funds was spent for English language laboratories, training aids, and publications.

According to Defense, most countries receiving grant-aid military training are capable of teaching English to their students. Many countries, however, do not allow their students enough time to study English and have allowed language laboratories to fall into disrepair. (See p. 11.)

Student training is provided jointly to foreign and U.S. military personnel in the U.S. and is also provided to Latin American students in the Canal Zone. The Canal Zone

training is in Spanish and costs approximately \$7.2 million, including military salaries and allowances of \$4 million, which is not charged to the program.

The Army and Air Force courses of instruction in the Canal Zone and those in the U.S. are generally similar, although some of the equipment used in the U.S. is more advanced. The students in the Canal Zone courses could be generally absorbed into the U.S. courses of instruction without additional instructors or expense.

The following benefits would result from closing the Canal Zone schools. (See pp. 6, 7, 13, and 18.)

- Exposure of more Latin American participants to the U.S. way of life.
- More emphasis by recipient countries on English language training before their students attend courses in the U.S.
- Reassignment of 300 military personnel now working in the Canal Zone schools.
- Better use of existing facilities in the U.S., through use of unused classroom spaces by Latin American students.
- Some cost savings. As noted, total direct costs of the schools are about \$7.2 million.

Notwithstanding the benefits of closing schools and shifting much of the training to the U.S., there is merit in internationalizing the Canal Zone schools.

The Department of State said that it will investigate jointly with the Department of Defense the feasibility of establishing multilateral sponsorship of the Canal Zone schools before considering their closure.

Defense stated that training at the Canal Zone schools should continue, but it has

taken limited action toward internationalizing the Army school. (See pp. 42, 47, and 48.)

Both Departments expressed concern that assuming more training costs by some participating countries will make the program too expensive, and that consequently the countries will look elsewhere for training or needs will go unfilled.

The State Department said it does not oppose full costs of the grant training program being recorded, as long as these costs are not charged to the program.



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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

We have reviewed grant-aid training of foreign military personnel, provided under the Foreign Assistance Act. Our review covered (1) certain aspects of training furnished to the military forces of Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Spain, Tunisia, Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, and Colombia and (2) several military schools in the United States and the Canal Zone. The scope of our review is described in chapter 5.

In fiscal year 1976, grant-aid training was separated from the Military Assistance Program of the Foreign Assistance Act and provided in accordance with a new section of the act--the International Military Education and Training Program. The fiscal year 1976 program provided training to about 6,280 students from 43 countries at a cost of about \$23 million.

Our 1971 report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (B-163582, Feb. 16, 1971) concluded that improvements were needed in program management. We recommended that the Secretaries of State and Defense direct their staffs jointly to examine the training program in each country periodically, determine whether the training is warranted, and identify the staffing needed to effectively manage the program.

We have found that management of most areas described in our 1971 report had improved. Generally, the Department of Defense had:

- Acted to see that qualified candidates for training courses were nominated, screened, and tested before departure.
- Helped identify each country's military requirements and resources so that approved training was related to equipment acquired from the United States, was of high priority, and did not duplicate military training available through the country's own resources.
- Taken or was taking steps leading to host countries gradually paying more of their military training costs.

However, other areas of concern require management attention.

### CHANGE IN PROGRAM EMPHASIS

Since our 1971 review, the sale of training has increased. The changing political situation at home and abroad has affected the stated program emphasis, the type of training that can be provided, and the manner of program funding.

The training program previously emphasized assisting the forward defense countries on the periphery of the Communist world and developing military forces able to defeat subversion and maintain law and order essential to political, economic, and social progress for the lesser developed countries.

In its 1977 congressional presentation, Defense stated that the training program transmits professionalism and U.S. military skills and doctrine, and helps accomplish U.S. political purposes by developing channels of communication with and influencing foreign military leaders. Defense also believes that the program maximizes the capabilities of friendly foreign countries to use their own resources and U.S.-originated weapons systems and assume more responsibility for their defense.

We found that training assistance to many countries, particularly those in Latin America and other smaller countries, is provided primarily for political reasons and the influence we derive from such programs.

Foreign military personnel attend classes with U.S. personnel at various U.S. military installations in the United States and work with U.S. personnel overseas and in the United States to learn specific skills or techniques. The two main differences in training provided to foreign and U.S. personnel are (1) foreign military personnel are often trained at U.S. expense in English language comprehension and (2) the United States maintains and operates special schools in the Canal Zone for Latin American students. Instruction at the Canal Zone schools is in Spanish, but the material is basically similar to that used at the military service schools in the United States.

## PROGRAM RESPONSIBILITIES

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, provides that the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of the Military Assistance and International Military Education and Training Programs. The act also provides that the Secretary of Defense shall be primarily responsible for the actual implementation of the approved programs. The Under Secretary for Security Assistance carries out the State Department's responsibility with the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs providing the personnel and expertise.

The Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency is correspondingly responsible for implementing the security assistance programs carried out by U.S. military groups, missions, or representatives under the U.S. Ambassador's direction.

To formulate annual programs and to resolve major policy issues that arise within a program year, State's Under Secretary for Security Assistance serves as Chairman of the Security Assistance Program Review Committee.

### Security Assistance Program Review Committee

The Committee was organized in 1971 to advise and assist the Secretary of State with the Security Assistance Program, specifically the funding of the Military Assistance Program, Foreign Military Sales credits, and Security Supporting Assistance. The Committee hears the issues related to security assistance programs by regions and countries.

Membership includes representatives from State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Agency for International Development, the National Security Council, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Office of Management and Budget, Treasury, and the Central Intelligence Agency. A working group, chaired by the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs and including representatives from the above agencies, clarifies issues and develops agendas for the Committee.

## CHAPTER 2

### PROGRAM COSTS

The level of the grant-aid training program, as provided for under the Foreign Assistance Act, has ranged from \$31 million in fiscal year 1972 to \$23 million in 1976. The program has financed training of foreign military personnel from about 45 countries at any one time.

The yearly costs of grant-aid training do not accurately portray all costs of the program because some costs are not included. Also, because of inconsistencies in costing procedures, totals for different years cannot be compared. Some training is reflected in Defense appropriations, and no uniform procedures have been established for charging Foreign Assistance Act funds the appropriate value of training provided by Defense installations or personnel.

The training program can be made less costly to the United States if recipient countries assume full responsibility for paying trainee transportation and living allowances. Defense has begun actions along these lines in some countries. We believe that with few exceptions such a policy should be applied to all countries to give them sufficient financial stakes in the program. With the recipient country assuming these costs, it should have a greater incentive to improve its selection of courses and individuals, and its subsequent use of the military trainees. In Thailand, which has begun to assume these costs, we found this to be the case in selecting training courses.

#### COSTS NOT FULLY CHARGED OR REPORTED

Defense has been providing training in military service schools to grant-aid and foreign military sales program students without charging for all costs incurred. In addition, Defense has not adequately identified training costs at the Canal Zone schools nor recorded certain other related costs, such as training costs.

#### Training course costs understated or not charged

Course costs for training provided under the foreign military sales program and the grant-aid program are established in basically the same manner. The grant-aid program,

however, excludes the cost of military salaries and allowances and an asset-use charge for installed U.S. facilities and equipment. In May 1976 Defense deferred until October 1977 the application of a new pricing policy for the grant-aid training program that would have increased course costs. The pricing policy was applied to the sale of training in January 1976.

Although we did not make specific tests of these costs during this review, several of our recent reports showed that all costs of providing training were not included in the establishment of course costs, and thus not charged to the sales and grant-aid programs.

In a report dated December 1, 1975 (B-159835), we stated that Air Force courses primarily involving flight training did not include aircraft depreciation costs and used inaccurate or dated rates in its computations. In a report dated July 15, 1976 (B-165731, see app. III), we noted that the Marine Corps was not charging for training provided under both the grant-aid and sales programs. In response to the latter report, Defense stated, in an August 17, 1976, letter, and the Navy, in an October 5, 1976, letter (see app. IV), that every reasonable effort will be made to collect from the recipient country on all open foreign military sales cases. Also, they will determine what action, if any, is required on sales cases that are closed. They noted that every appropriate measure is being taken to recover all future military education and training costs authorized under the grant-aid and foreign military sales programs.

In a comprehensive report on the pricing of training (FGMSD-76-91, Dec. 14, 1976), we discussed the effectiveness of the Defense policy guidance issued in November 1975 and revised in September 1976. This guidance provides for including many indirect base operations costs that were formerly excluded in computing course costs but still fails to include all appropriate costs. Defense stated in September 1976 that certain costs are being excluded (reducing tuition prices by 20 to 30 percent) to recognize the military and political benefits the United States gains from such training. In April 1977 Defense, however, modified its pricing policy. Effective with the start of fiscal year 1978, most costs excluded by the September policy guidance were again to be included in determining the cost of providing training.

The new pricing policy has not yet been applied to the grant-aid training program. In our report on Defense action to reduce charges for foreign military training (FGMSD-77-17, Feb. 23, 1977), we noted that for the grant-aid program, the

military tuition rates were still based on the old military services pricing system. Under this system the Army used an additive pricing system; the Air Force charged only the variable cost of training; and the Navy recovered essentially the full cost of training. We estimated that for fiscal year 1975, the Army failed to charge \$5.8 million in costs to the grant-aid program.

Defense stated its budget requests were based on the old course costs and that application of the new pricing policy would increase course costs and thus reduce the level of training. However, Defense said the new pricing policy will be applied to grant-aid training in fiscal year 1978.

#### Canal Zone schools cost

The military services are reimbursed from the grant-aid training appropriations for operating and maintaining schools for training Latin Americans in the Canal Zone. These costs are not specifically identified in the annual presentation to the Congress.

For fiscal year 1975, the Army, Air Force, and Navy determined reimbursable operation and maintenance costs for their respective schools in the Canal Zone to be \$2,246,000, \$944,000, and \$38,500, respectively--or a total of about \$3.2 million. In accordance with existing regulations, they excluded military pay and allowances from the amounts to be reimbursed.

Reimbursable costs, generally determined by dividing total programmed costs of the schools by anticipated student weeks of foreign students to be trained, are established from 18 to 24 months in advance of the budget year. Because of changes in actual costs from those programmed, however, over or under reimbursements can occur. For example, in December 1975 the Army estimated that an expected decrease in its students could result in a nonrecoverable cost of \$500,000 during fiscal year 1976. The Air Force anticipated a shortfall of \$400,000. The drop in student enrollment was primarily attributable to the loss of Chilean students because of sanctions imposed by the Congress on assistance to Chile. To cover the fiscal year 1976 shortfall, Defense stated that \$900,000 will be made available from the grant-aid operation and maintenance funds.

#### Support and other related costs

Before 1973 the training program included the cost of military assistance advisory groups and command training support. These costs consisted of half the permanent change-



of-station expense of military training personnel, military station allowances, certain salaries and allowances, contractual services, indirect expenses of subordinate commands and activities, and Department of State administrative and operating support of the overseas training personnel. In 1973 these costs amounted to \$8.3 million but were not included in the training program costs.

In 1975 U.S. personnel training costs of \$95,000 were similarly excluded from the training program. These costs consist of language training, travel, orientation, and other costs related to overseas advisory personnel. According to Defense officials, these costs are not now included in the grant-aid training program because they are not directly attributable to training.

#### Salaries and allowances of military training personnel

The Foreign Assistance Act states that salaries and allowances of advisory personnel and other military personnel will not be charged to the grant-aid training program although such personnel are directly engaged in training foreign military students. Thus, the total cost of furnishing the training is much greater than the costs recorded for the program.

For instance, personnel from the 7th Special Forces in the Canal Zone were being assigned on a temporary duty basis to Latin American countries to train, assist, and advise host country military forces with no salary or allowance costs being shown in the training program. Also, more than 300 military personnel in the Canal Zone provide full-time training to foreign military students; annual pay and allowances of those personnel are estimated at \$4 million.

Although we have not determined the exact amount for salaries and allowances, it is large. For instance, as previously noted, the recorded cost of training at the Canal Zone schools for fiscal year 1975 was \$3.2 million, and the unrecorded training costs of military salaries and allowances at the schools was about \$4 million. Other costs, such as retirement contributions, were not covered in arriving at this amount. To give the Congress a better idea of what the program costs, we believe the salaries and allowances of military personnel directly engaged in training foreign military personnel should be recorded as a program cost.

Defense felt it was unnecessary to record military salaries and allowances of training personnel. The State Department said in November 1976 that it does not oppose the full costs of the grant-aid training program being recorded, including the military personnel costs for Armed Forces members assigned directly to training functions, without affecting the existing exclusion of these costs from reimbursement to the military departments from the International Military Education and Training Program funds.

#### NEED FOR RECIPIENT COUNTRIES TO PAY MORE

We estimated foreign military student transportation and living allowances for fiscal year 1975 to be from \$9 million to \$11 million, from about \$26 million total. Although Defense has initiated actions to have recipient countries pay these costs, only a few countries have agreed to do so. Cost-sharing gives the recipient country a financial stake in the program's success, which should increase the program's effectiveness and reduce costs to the U.S. Government.

Of the countries we visited, cost-sharing agreements have been reached only with Korea and Thailand. The Korean Government began paying for its trainees' international travel in fiscal year 1974 and funded all trainee transportation costs in 1976. In fiscal year 1977 the United States will stop paying living allowances to Korean trainees, as their costs will be completely assumed by the Korean Government.

The Thai Government began assuming transoceanic transportation costs in fiscal year 1976 and will assume all transportation costs in 1977. It has agreed to assume 50 percent of the students' living allowances in July 1977 and 100 percent the following year.

The prospects of reduced or discontinued grant-aid funds appeared to be the prime reason for concluding these agreements. We saw some indication that cost-sharing is a financial incentive for host country governments to better use the training assistance by more carefully selecting training courses and candidates. For example, with the advent of cost-sharing in fiscal year 1976, the Thai Government reconsidered training priorities and reduced its original requirements for several U.S.-based training courses.

Early in 1976 a Defense official associated with the training program said that foreign countries should be required to pay students' per diem, travel, and other allowances. He

also said these foreign countries would probably more carefully consider who is trained and how trainees are used.

In November 1976 State and Defense, however, said that while they actively encourage cost-sharing arrangements, completely terminating these allowances would hurt poorer countries. State further said that these agreements should be worked out case by case depending on U.S. Government interests as well as the ability and willingness of the foreign governments to pay. (Also see ch. 4.)

#### Lack of adequate consideration of allowances paid by recipient countries

According to Defense regulations, living allowances (per diem) should not be paid to trainees whose countries pay all their allowances. In the countries visited, extra pay or allowances paid to trainees by their governments were not taken into consideration by the United States. Colombia pays its trainees substantially more than the U.S. scale, but no reduction is made in the living allowances paid by the United States. For instance, a major with three dependents and 17 years of service will receive an additional \$1,700 a month while participating in training in the United States. In Tunisia the additional payment ranges from \$2.50 to \$7.50 a day.

We recognize, however, that information on actual allowances or extra pay provided by the foreign government is not always released to the U.S. officials. Also, the extra payments are often justified by the foreign governments on the basis of raising the lower pay of their military trainees to equal that of U.S. military personnel so they can enjoy equivalent living conditions and social life while training in the United States.

#### CONCLUSIONS

The cost of the grant-aid training program has been understated, and the methods of reporting have been inconsistent. The actions the Navy planned, as reported in October 1976, will help to correct this situation, as will the new Defense costing guidance when implemented for the grant-aid program in fiscal year 1978. The Defense guidance provides for including many indirect base operations costs that were formerly excluded in computing course costs but still fails to include all appropriate costs. In addition, the cost of grant-aid training will still be greatly understated since no procedures have been established to record U.S. military personnel costs for training foreign military students.

Grant-aid training funds are used annually in reimbursing the military services for operating Canal Zone schools to train foreign military personnel. These costs, which totaled about \$3.2 million in fiscal year 1975, are not separately identified in the annual presentation to the Congress. Consequently, the Congress lacks the information necessary to evaluate the costs and the methods used to reimburse the services.

The Department of State, however, stated in November 1976 that in preparing the congressional presentation documents for the fiscal year 1978 Security Assistance Program, it will consider the proposal that the full costs of operating the Canal Zone schools be reported, without affecting existing funding arrangements. Defense stated, after its November 18, 1976, letter, that it has no objections if the State Department wishes to separately identify Canal Zone school costs.

Defense's cost-sharing agreements should (1) result in lower costs to the United States, thus making more funds available for priority training needs, and (2) make the training program more effective since the recipient country will have a greater financial stake in its success.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretaries of State and Defense:

- Record all costs of training foreign military personnel under the grant-aid training program. The salaries and allowances of military personnel directly engaged in the training program should be recorded as a program cost and reported annually to the Congress in order that it may fully understand all costs involved in training foreign military personnel.
- Report the full costs of operating the Canal Zone schools in the annual presentation to the Congress as long as the schools are continued under U.S. supervision and control.
- Have the recipient countries assume responsibility for paying all trainee transportation and living allowances unless justified for specific economic or political reasons. The progress made should be shown on a country-by-country basis in the annual congressional presentation.

### CHAPTER 3

#### ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING

#### AND THE CANAL ZONE SCHOOLS

Foreign military personnel are often given English language training at considerable U.S. expense before receiving military training in the United States. In Latin America, the United States maintains and operates schools for training foreign military personnel in the Canal Zone, and instruction is given in Spanish.

About \$2.3 million, or about 9 percent, of the 1975 grant-aid training funds was spent on English language training and about \$1.7 million of other grant-aid funds was spent for English language laboratories, training aids, and publications. We believe the expenditure of grant-aid training funds for this purpose could be greatly reduced if recipient countries better used their incountry training facilities.

Many courses taught in the Canal Zone Army and Air Force schools are comparable or similar to those offered at military service schools in the United States. Eliminating the Canal Zone schools would release about 300 military personnel for other duties. Training foreign military personnel in the United States instead of the Canal Zone would more effectively influence personnel to the U.S. way of life (a basic training goal).

#### FOREIGN COUNTRIES NEED TO GIVE GREATER ATTENTION TO ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING

According to Defense, most countries receiving grant-aid military training are capable of teaching English to their students. They have received language laboratories from the United States, have had instructors trained in the United States, and some of them have been provided with resident U.S. English language instructors under the grant-aid program or various Defense programs.

Some of these countries effectively used the resources provided and no longer depend on U.S. grant assistance. Other countries continue to rely on U.S. assistance for teaching students English in the United States before they attend military courses in the United States.

For example, Spain has gradually phased out English language training under the grant-aid program and compelled its military services to emphasize enlarging, modernizing, and updating its own English language training facilities. The Spanish Navy includes English at its naval academy and naval war college as part of the curriculum. It provides additional compensation for other students receiving passing scores on the English language comprehension-level test.

In Tunisia, on the other hand, students enroll in language classes late, many are often absent, and one language school has no commissioned officer in charge of the program. As a result, about 22 percent of the U.S. training funds for Tunisia are used for English language instruction.

Defense personnel stated that some Latin American countries do not devote enough resources to keep facilities operational, do not allow students adequate time to learn English, and do not train and maintain a staff of qualified instructors. This probably stems mainly from the countries relying on sending students to the Canal Zone schools which give instruction in Spanish.

Brazil is a notable exception, having excellent English language facilities and an incountry training program. It sends only a few students to the Canal Zone schools each year. Defense believes the low use of the Canal Zone schools results from the greater capability of Brazilian military training facilities and the Portuguese language of the Brazilians. The Army, however, believes that Brazil prefers to send as many students as possible to the United States, because the Brazilian military students prefer the prestige of graduating from a U.S. Army service school in the United States. The Army also said that Brazilian Army personnel prefer the challenge of the English language to the Spanish language.

Appendix I contains information, provided by Defense or obtained during our incountry visits, on the English language training capabilities of some Latin American countries.

#### Defense and State reasons for continuing language training

In November 1976 the Defense and State Departments advocated continuing English language training to grant-aid trainees. Defense stated English language training should continue for countries which historically have shown a need for this instruction so their trainees could absorb the sophisticated material offered in the U.S. service schools.

The State Department wanted to continue language training to support foreign policy objectives. It stated that training opportunities should not be circumscribed by the candidates' prior competence in English or the willingness of the foreign government to purchase preliminary English language training. It further said this is particularly true of cases in which relatively small training grants constitute a principal avenue for contacts with the future military leaders of nonaligned countries and in which emerging requirements for a country's self-defense are being supported by authorized programs of U.S. materiel assistance. However, State said the proportion of grant training funds devoted to English language training should be reduced as much as practicable.

We do not believe grant English language training should be continued based on historical needs. Where countries have the language training capabilities but have not properly used and maintained the facilities, we believe grant language training should generally be discontinued and the countries urged to properly use their English language training facilities. There may be some justification for providing language training to selected individuals for political reasons or to newly emerging countries that lack adequate language facilities.

#### CANAL ZONE SCHOOLS NO LONGER NEEDED

We believe there is no longer a need for the Army and Air Force Canal Zone schools to train Latin American personnel because the personnel now can be trained at service schools in the United States or by the larger South American countries. (See p. 14 for our comments on the Navy school.) In addition, incountry facilities could also be established. Eliminating the Canal Zone schools would free about 300 U.S. military personnel for other duties. Closing the Canal Zone schools would result in more Latin American military personnel being trained in the United States and being exposed to the U.S. way of life, an important objective of the training program.

The U.S. balance of payments and local economy will also benefit from money trainees spend in the United States. Such spending, particularly among officers, probably far exceeds any allowances paid to the trainees by the U.S. military services. Also, foreign grant-aid students generally are programmed to use existing spaces, primarily established for U.S. service personnel for their courses. They share in prorating expenses, which benefits the Defense Department through reimbursements from grant-aid funds.

For those personnel not qualifying for training in the United States because of language requirements, the larger countries of the region that are friendly to or aligned with the United States can probably provide the training. This will help foster inter-American defense cooperation.

Latin American personnel can be trained in the United States

The U.S. Army School of the Americas, U.S. Air Force Inter-American Air Forces Academy, and U.S. Navy Small Craft Inspection and Technical Team are the three military assistance service schools that train Latin Americans in the Canal Zone. This program evolved from the need to train students on U.S. equipment. Through December 1975 the Army school had graduated about 33,500 students since its founding in 1946; the Air Force school about 13,000 students since 1943; and the Navy School about 800 students since 1963. Some Latin American military and civilian personnel are also trained in the Canal Zone at the Defense Mapping Agency Inter-American Geodetic Survey School and the Naval Communications Station, Balboa.

We visited the three Canal Zone schools and nine schools at eight locations in the United States and compared the content of many courses offered in the Canal Zone and the United States. We also determined whether the U.S. schools can absorb the Canal Zone students without adding personnel.

Our comparison showed that Canal Zone naval courses are directed toward personnel having little or no previous experience in nautical matters, whereas U.S. personnel generally have had basic nautical fundamentals. In fiscal year 1976, 138 students were programmed for the Canal Zone Navy School.

However, much of the Army and Air Force training provided at the Canal Zone schools is similar to that taught at service schools in the United States. Also, the Canal Zone students could generally be absorbed in existing facilities without adding training personnel. The major difference was that equipment used for training in the Canal Zone was generally older and in some cases obsolete to U.S. forces. Training in most of this older and obsolete equipment is available in the training facilities of the larger Latin American countries. (See app. II.)



Training available from other  
countries and the Inter-American  
Defense College

While the United States provides much training for Latin Americans, the more advanced Latin American countries, Canada, and some European and Asian countries also provide Latin Americans military training at little or no cost. According to an official of the School of the Americas, most training offered in the Canal Zone schools is available at the training facilities of the more advanced Latin American countries, such as Brazil, Argentina, and Peru.

Also, Defense stated in 1974 that the task of building the Brazilian armed forces into a viable, self-sustaining institution has been accomplished and that the services are basically capable of developing, managing, training, and conducting operations without outside advice. In fiscal year 1975 Brazil provided training to several Latin American countries in such fields as command and general staff, engineering, Army command and staff, oceanography, and submarine operations. Brazil also maintains training missions in Bolivia and Paraguay.

During our visit to Bolivia, we noted that Bolivian Air Force mechanics had received training in Argentina and Venezuela on the F-86 aircraft. This training was not available through the United States because the F-86 is no longer in the U.S. Air Force inventory.

To meet the increased training requirements associated with the introduction of new Air Force equipment, Honduras sent personnel to military training programs in 12 countries during 1974.

Training is also provided by a regional organization, the Inter-American Defense College, located in Washington, D.C. The college, established in 1962, is part of the Inter-American Defense Board and is financed by the funds of the Organization of American States through the Board and by the individual countries who send faculty members and students. The United States is one of the 19 member nations of the Inter-American Defense Board and the Inter-American Defense College.

State and Defense views on the need  
for the Canal Zone schools

A State Department official stated in January 1976 that the training in the Canal Zone does not expose the personnel to the U.S. way of life; and accordingly the schools in the Canal Zone should be closed and the personnel trained in the United States. He further stated, in effect, that training should be directed toward selected promising officers, because there is more value in exposing people to the U.S. way of life who may later play a significant part in their armed forces or government.

In November 1976 the State Department somewhat modified its position. It stated that since it is clearly in the interest of the United States to foster inter-American defense cooperation, there are apparently significant advantages in maintaining Spanish language training courses which will bring together representatives of the Latin American armed forces without a prior requirement for facility in English. State also said, however, it will investigate jointly with Defense the feasibility of establishing multilateral sponsorship for the Canal Zone schools before considering our suggestion for closing them.

In February 1976, a Defense official said that internationalizing the Canal Zone schools was being considered. In November 1976 Defense said it had recently sent letters to the participating members seeking their views on creating a permanent advisory commission in inter-American Army educational matters. If the plan is adopted, the commission will be staffed by about six people whose expenses would be defrayed by the countries using the Army school. Defense noted this, in effect, is the first step toward complete internationalization. A Defense official also said a similar commission was established at the Air Force school in the Canal Zone a few years ago, but the participating countries do not fund the commission.

In addition, Defense advanced several reasons for not closing the Canal Zone schools.

--Most students now being trained in the Canal Zone would no longer be trained by the United States because of increased costs and the language problem of training in the United States. Defense thus believes opportunities to favorably influence the students toward the United States would be lost. It believes that the military is the most important

political institution for stability and Western political orientation of the region.

- Training in the United States is generally similar to that in the Canal Zone but there are important differences. Courses in the United States usually require higher student prerequisites in mathematics, mechanics, and electronics; and training in the United States is geared to more sophisticated equipment.
- The smaller Latin American countries cannot afford to develop their own career and specialized schools or buy more expensive equipment.
- There is no assurance that other Latin American countries friendly to the United States will provide the training now offered in the Canal Zone.

We believe the reasons for continuing the schools are not persuasive enough. Training assistance to Latin America is provided primarily for political reasons and for the influence we derive from such programs, rather than to accomplish specific military objectives. Where specific military objectives or requirements exist, they can be accomplished by training in the United States or by friendly foreign governments. For example, in World War II the United States trained Mexican pilots and Brazilian Army personnel in the United States, supporting the U.S. war effort in the Philippines and Italy.

Also, training of Latin American students in the United States has increased, while in the Canal Zone it has decreased. In fiscal year 1975 of the 3,760 Latin American students trained under the grant-aid program, 899 were trained in the United States and 2,861 in the Canal Zone. For fiscal year 1977 the number of students programed for training in the United States is 1,308, and for the Canal Zone 1,600.

Many lower ranking military personnel now trained in the Canal Zone, however, will probably not be trained in the United States if the Canal Zone schools are closed because the recipient countries probably will not want to invest the necessary time and funds in teaching them English. But, as previously noted, an Army official said most training offered in the Canal Zone schools is available at the training facilities of the more advanced Latin American countries. Training

which these countries currently provide to others in Latin America indicates they are willing to help develop hemispheric defense.

Training at U.S. service schools may present some problems, as pointed out by Defense, but we do not believe they are insurmountable. In the United States the military services train many personnel from other countries who do not have English as their native language or sophisticated equipment in their countries.

## CONCLUSIONS

Training for foreign military personnel under the grant-aid program is similar to that for U.S. service personnel except for English language training and instruction in Spanish at the Canal Zone schools.

A large part of training funds is being provided to teach foreign students English although with few exceptions, as Defense stated, foreign countries have sufficient incountry English language training resources to train prospective military students. The State and Defense Departments wish to continue English instruction, but State said the proportion of grant training funds devoted to English language training should be reduced as much as practicable.

We do not believe language training should generally be continued to trainees of countries that have the capability to teach English but have not properly used or maintained their language facilities. In some cases, however, the United States may need to continue language training to selected individuals for political reasons or to newly emerging countries lacking adequate training facilities. The United States probably should also provide language training for highly technical or specialized terms used in pilot and other hazardous types of training.

We do not believe the Army and Air Force schools in the Canal Zone should be continued by the United States. Training now provided in the Army and Air Force Canal Zone schools can be provided in the United States, by other countries, or through regional Latin American organizations. Closing the special military assistance schools in the Canal Zone would benefit the United States because (1) more Latin American personnel could be trained in the United States, which would better acquaint them with the U.S. way of life, (2) recipient countries would have a greater incentive to improve their

English language training programs, and (3) considerable funds would be saved through maximizing the use of existing facilities in the United States and reassigning about 300 military personnel now used in these schools.

Defense does not agree that the schools should be closed (see the preceding section) but has initiated actions which it considers a first step toward internationalizing them. The State Department said it will investigate jointly with the Department of Defense the feasibility of establishing multilateral sponsorship for the Canal Zone schools before considering our suggestion for closing them.

While we believe greater benefits would result to the United States by closing the schools and shifting as much training to the United States as possible, we also see merit in internationalizing the Canal Zone schools.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretaries of State and Defense:

- Stress the need for foreign countries to better use their incountry English language training facilities. Where countries have the language training capabilities but have not properly used and maintained the facilities, we believe grant language training should generally be discontinued. This should provide an incentive to host countries to improve incountry programs of language training.
- Complete their investigation of internationalization of the schools as soon as possible to see if the countries using the schools are willing to fund their operations under a regional international organization, such as the Inter-American Defense Board or the Organization of American States. If no satisfactory responses and arrangements are concluded in a reasonable period of time, we recommend that the Secretaries close the School of the Americas and the Inter-American Air Forces Academy as soon as practicable.

## CHAPTER 4

### USE OF TRAINED PERSONNEL

The monitoring of military assistance trained personnel by the U.S. incountry military groups varies from country to country and by military service. Assignment records are often incomplete or nonexistent, and generally no established procedures exist for the United States to verify assignment data. Some recipient countries or military services do not respond to U.S. requests for assignment data, and visits are not always permitted to military units to verify that personnel are properly assigned. Nevertheless, where we were able to verify assignments, those trained generally were being assigned to jobs in which they could use the skills required.

#### LIMITED VERIFICATION OF USE

The Foreign Assistance Act contains a provision on the use of Defense-supplied services but does not state specifically how U.S. officials should insure the proper use of such assistance. Defense implementing regulations require periodic reviews of posttraining assignments and assurances that personnel are properly and effectively used. The regulations state that periodic reports from the recipient governments will normally satisfy this requirement.

In the countries visited, the training officers generally lacked information on posttraining assignments. Where records were available, they were often limited or did not contain complete information on present assignments. Frequently, the available information was not verified by inspection visits.

For example, no utilization records were maintained of Army enlisted trainees in Honduras, Navy trainees in Colombia, and Air Force and Navy trainees in Bolivia. In Tunisia, the government did not supply posttraining assignment information to the military group until a followup request was made by the Ambassador as a result of our visit. In Thailand, the government has not fully responded to a military group request for the current position and status of many former military assistance trainees. In Ecuador, the military group maintains records of former trainees but generally cannot verify the information because of political sensitivity in visiting Ecuador's military units.

The Defense Department said monitoring returned trainees is difficult due to limited access to recipient countries' records, but it wishes to continue the practice to the extent possible. According to Defense, monitoring enables its staff to evaluate the training program results and to determine future requirements. When military groups do verify training assignment data, it is generally done informally by telephoning appropriate military commands or during visits to host country military installations on other matters.

The State Department, however, said the formal monitoring requirement should be discontinued because it may be perceived as an unwarranted infringement on the sovereignty of the foreign governments. State also said continuing to reduce the grant-aid training related to U.S.-supplied equipment and increasing foreign government reimbursement for the majority of training in operating and maintaining U.S. equipment will reduce the importance to the United States of such monitoring endeavors. The State Department further said that in those cases in which related operation and maintenance training is provided on a grant basis, it will seriously consider whether the participating government's payment of transportation and living expenses (and/or English language training when required) will provide a meaningful additional incentive for the foreign governments to insure appropriate use of the skills acquired.

#### INTERVIEWS WITH FORMER TRAINEES

To determine whether foreign military students were using the skills they were taught and whether the training has been useful, we interviewed 137 former trainees in Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, Korea, and Honduras and several students attending the School of the Americas in the Canal Zone. We were not given permission to interview former military assistance trainees in Thailand, Indonesia, or Tunisia; in Ecuador and Honduras we were able to interview personnel only in the capital cities.

Most trainees we interviewed had been assigned to areas in which they could use at least some of the skills they had learned. Also, most of them praised the training they received. The Latin American students said they benefited from the training in the United States because, among other things, it gave them the opportunity to meet students from other parts of the world and to learn more about the United States. Defense, however, had different results in an informal luncheon survey taken in November 1976. Thirty-seven students from the command and general staff course in the Canal Zone on an orientation

tour in the United States said they preferred training in the Canal Zone to that given in the United States primarily because it was cheaper and in Spanish.

### CONCLUSION

Knowledge and verification of the assignment of former military assistance trainees depends greatly on each military group and the cooperation extended by the recipient country and military service. Where cooperation was extended, we learned that former trainees generally were assigned to jobs in which they could use their acquired skills.



## CHAPTER 5

### SCOPE OF REVIEW

We reviewed the objectives of the grant-aid training program, control exercised by the Department of State over the program, and the program's implementation by the Department of Defense, including programing, selecting, and using trained students. We examined the types of training costs incurred and cost-sharing agreements reached with participating countries.

The Army, Navy, and Air Force schools maintained and operated in the Canal Zone to train Latin American military personnel were reviewed to determine whether (1) the grant-aid training program was reimbursing the U.S. military services for all operating and administrative costs and (2) the students could be effectively trained in the United States at a savings to the U.S. Government. The political implication of maintaining the schools in the Canal Zone was also considered. In October 1975 a political officer of the U.S. Embassy in Panama said the schools had not been considered in the negotiations at that time, but could be affected if the schools are located in areas that Panama wants.

Our review was made at the Departments of Defense and State in Washington, D.C.; in Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Spain, Tunisia, Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, and Colombia; and at several military schools in the United States and the Canal Zone.

ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING CAPABILITIES  
OF SOME LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

BRAZIL

The Brazilian Army operates a language institute similar to the Defense Department's Language Institute at Monterey, California. English, French, Italian, and German are taught regularly to members of the Brazilian Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines and to other Latin American students. The student body ranges from senior officers and civilians assigned to diplomatic missions abroad to junior officers designated to complete training courses in the United States and elsewhere.

The English language staff consists of three fluent Brazilian Army officers and a U.S. native English speaker. Because of their excellent training facilities, Brazilian Army personnel have been exempt from meeting minimum English comprehension-level requirements for entry into courses in the United States.

MEXICO

Since 1965, Mexico has been exempt from English language proficiency tests administered by U.S. supervisory personnel for entry into U.S. schools. Mexico insisted on complete independence in selecting military assistance students and in assigning them after training. Consequently, this has been purely a Mexican military function.

English is mandatory for all military students at the service academies. U.S. military English language instructors are assigned to the Military Staff College, Engineering School, and Naval Academy. A Defense report shows some problems with the training facilities, but there was no indication of the impact of these problems on the overall English language training program.

NICARAGUA

All cadets are required to take English language instruction throughout their schooling, and future graduating classes will be bilingual. Also, prospective candidates for U.S. schooling are enrolled in full- or part-time classes about a year in advance with the expectation that they will attain the comprehension score required for direct entry into U.S. service schools.

PANAMA

The national guard, which is the military service of the country, has the laboratory equipment but, as of February 1976, has not emphasized using the language facility. Personnel are allowed to use the language laboratory in the capital city at their own discretion if their geographical assignments and available free time permit it.

PERU

The Peruvian Army has facilities available to provide English language training to meet Defense Department objectives. However, the Army is reluctant to remove officers and enlisted personnel from their primary duties to study English full time. This problem is common to all services but is particularly critical within the Army, which has relatively few bilingual junior officers and enlisted personnel. To offset problems in meeting minimum English requirements, technical training is programmed for the Canal Zone. Also, such high-cost U.S. courses as helicopter training are programmed with an English language phase.

BOLIVIA

The military services are reluctant to hire qualified instructors, send personnel to instructor courses, or allow sufficient time for students to study English. The language training facilities are old and in disrepair, and there is a lack of training aids and material.

The Bolivian Army has initiated plans for requiring English language comprehension at certain military ranks and has begun an intensive program of English language instruction. At the time of our review, however, only 4 hours a week were allotted for students to study English, although plans call for increasing the study time and comprehension level.

COMPARISON OF ARMY AND AIR FORCE TRAINING PROVIDED  
IN THE CANAL ZONE AND IN THE UNITED STATES

ARMY

The Army school in the Canal Zone programed 36 courses for fiscal year 1976 for about 1,373 students. School officials told us that the courses have similar objectives, prerequisites, and content to those of some U.S. courses. Two courses--jungle operations (3 weeks) and officer combat arms orientation (5 weeks)--were specifically developed for the Canal Zone.

We selected 14 Canal Zone courses programed for fiscal year 1976 with 516 students and compared them with courses offered at six Army schools in the United States. Ten of the Canal Zone courses were essentially similar to existing courses taught in the United States. A summary of our comparison of the schools we visited in the United States follows.

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

We compared the command and general staff course taught in the Canal Zone with the course of instruction offered by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, a facility of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth. The courses have the same general objective of preparing selected officers for duty as commanders and general staff officers.

The course at Fort Leavenworth lasts for 40 weeks; during fiscal year 1976, it had 1,104 students, including 94 officers from 49 foreign countries. The Canal Zone course lasts for 42 weeks and includes a trip to the United States. It had 36 students, including 5 Americans, in fiscal year 1976.

Although the official position appears to be that Fort Leavenworth would not favor absorbing 35 to 40 additional Latin American students, some high-ranking officials felt that this could be done at little additional expense. The only apparent additional expense would be to replace a part-time typist in the office of the Director of Allied Personnel with a full-time one.

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

The U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance Special Forces School at Fort Bragg is capable of teaching four courses now provided at the School of the Americas in the Canal Zone--small unit warfare, internal security operations, irregular warfare operations, and basic officer preparation. In fiscal year 1975, 314 students attended these courses in the Canal Zone. At the time of our review, 182 students were programed for these courses for fiscal year 1976.

In comparing Canal Zone courses to certain courses provided at Fort Bragg, we found the subject material was not the same in all cases. When the subject material was different, however, it was covered or could be covered in other courses at Fort Bragg. Only 2 of the 73 subjects covered in the above courses could not be provided at Fort Bragg; one related to police activities and the other to tropical survival training.

The Canal Zone instruction is directed primarily to students with little military experience, while those attending the school at Fort Bragg are already completed basic training.

Fort Lee, Virginia

We compared three courses provided at the School of the Americas with the courses offered at the U.S. Army Logistics Management Center and the U.S. Army Quartermaster School at Fort Lee. Although the courses were not completely alike, much of the instruction provided in the Canal Zone can be provided at the Fort Lee schools. In fiscal year 1975, 73 students attended these courses in the Canal Zone, and at the time of our review, 44 students were programed for these courses in fiscal year 1976.

A comparison of the Canal Zone's logistic management course with that of the Logistics Management Center showed that 37 of the 53 subjects taught in the Canal Zone were also taught at the Center. We did not determine how many of the 16 other subjects might be found in other courses of instruction, but we believe that many of them would be. For instance, the subject, "The Federal Catalog System in the Department of Defense," taught at the Canal Zone and not in the particular course compared at the Center, should be offered in one of the military courses in the United States.

At the Quartermaster School, the scope of the two Canal Zone courses, officers general supply and noncommissioned officers general supply, was compared to supply management courses offered at the Quartermaster School. School officials believed that the courses at both schools could not be considered similar but that, except for the counterinsurgency requirement, all requirements could be satisfied at the r school. This could be done by taking subjects given in other courses and fitting them into the course given at the present time. In essence, new courses would have to be established to meet requirements.

#### Fort Benning, Georgia

At the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, we compared four courses offered in the Canal Zone with those offered at the Infantry School. The combat arms and unit staff officer courses and the basic infantry officer courses were similar. However for the latter course, the counterinsurgency operations taught in the Canal Zone were not taught at the Infantry School, and airborne training would have to be taken separately. Officials at the Infantry School stated they could absorb the 42 Canal Zone students programed for training in fiscal year 1976 into their courses without requiring any additional instructors or facilities.

The Canal Zone basic officers qualifications and non-commissioned officers leadership courses were not considered comparable to courses offered at the Infantry School. Courses at the Infantry School contained some similar subject areas to those of the Canal Zone courses. The two Canal Zone courses programed a total of 160 students for fiscal year 1976.

#### Fort Gordon, Georgia

We compared two courses for enlisted men--advanced radio repair and communications chief--taught in the Canal Zone with courses offered at the U.S. Army Signal School at Fort Gordon. In fiscal year 1976 the Canal Zone school programed 52 students for these courses.

The Signal School officials stated that the equipment used in the Canal Zone courses is primarily first-generation equipment, which is no longer in the U.S. Army inventory. Instruction on it has been discontinued at the Signal School. The officials believe that adding courses at their school, providing first-generation equipment to match that used by Latin American countries, or providing instruction in Spanish for Latin Americans would not be economically

feasible. We agree. Because of the current efforts by Latin American countries to modernize their forces, there will soon be little need for instruction on older equipment. The need that does exist could be carried out by previously trained Latin American instructors in their own or other countries.

The Defense Department stated, however, that it is mandatory to conduct training in the Canal Zone schools because the first-generation equipment possessed by the Latin American countries is no longer available in the United States and this situation will not change much in the foreseeable future.

We do not believe that training is mandatory in the Canal Zone. An official of the School of the Americas stated most of the training offered in the Canal Zone schools is available at the training facilities of the more advanced countries of Latin America, such as Brazil, Argentina, and Peru.

Defense has also recognized in the congressional presentation the desire of the major countries of Latin America to modernize their forces. For instance, Defense said, Ecuador is modernizing its armed forces, Brazil is determined to modernize its armed forces and prefers U.S. equipment, and Peru has undertaken a long-term effort to modernize its armed forces.

#### AIR FORCE

The Air Force programed 22 courses for fiscal year 1976 for about 350 Canal Zone students. Except for five courses that have no U.S. counterparts, school officials in the Canal Zone said their courses have objectives, prerequisites, and course content similar to those in the United States.

We selected 11 Canal Zone courses with 219 students programed in fiscal year 1976 for comparison with courses at two Air Force schools in the United States. The Canal Zone and U.S. courses were similar except that the Canal Zone courses lasted 16 weeks while those in the United States ranged from 10 to 21 weeks. A summary of our comparison follows.

#### Chanute Air Force Base, Illinois

We compared six courses taught in the Canal Zone at the Inter-American Air Forces Academy with courses of a similar description taught at the U.S. Air Force School of Applied Aerospace Sciences at Chanute Air Force Base. The courses,

aircraft propeller repairman, avionics instrument system, aircraft electrical repairman, jet engine mechanic, aircraft maintenance supervisor, and airframe repairman, are generally similar. The differences that exist, such as the emphasis in one course on teaching officers as opposed to noncommissioned officers and the length of courses, do not appear great.

Chanute officials said the 123 Canal Zone students programed for the courses during fiscal year 1976 could be absorbed at their school at little, if any, additional cost.

#### Sheppard Air Force Base, Texas

We compared five courses taught at the Air Force school in the Canal Zone with those of a similar description taught at Sheppard Air Force Base. The courses, aircraft propeller repairman, helicopter mechanic, aircraft maintenance specialist (reciprocating), aircraft maintenance specialist (jet), and reciprocating engine mechanic, were basically the same.

Sheppard school officials stated that they had sufficient space with existing facilities and instructors to absorb the 96 Canal Zone students programed in fiscal year 1976.





## UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

INTERNATIONAL DIVISION

JUL 15 1976

8-165731

Lieutenant General H. M. Fish  
Director, Defense Security Assistance  
Agency and Deputy Assistant  
Secretary (ISA), Security Assistance

Dear General Fish:

During our review of military education and training we found that, before January 1, 1976, the Marine Corps did not bill foreign recipients for all training provided under Foreign Military Sales contracts nor assign dollar values to training provided as grant aid under the Military Assistance Program. Thus,

- the United States was not paid for Marine Corps training provided under sales contracts nor was
- training provided under the grant aid program charged to the grant aid appropriation.

The information provided herein is being provided to you in order that you may take timely corrective action. It will also be included in an overall report on the sale of training to foreign governments that has been requested by the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee.

Our review was made at Marine Corps Headquarters and at the Navy's Office of Comptroller in Washington, D.C., where we analyzed Defense regulations, interviewed cognizant officials, and reviewed training documents.

TRAINING PROVIDED UNDER THE  
FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ACT

Training may be provided to foreign nations under authority granted in the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 (22 U.S.C. 2761), provided that the foreign governments agree to pay not less than the value of the service.

B-165731

Department of Defense Form 1513 is used as the formal contract for sales of defense services to foreign governments, and all sales are subject to the following contract actual conditions.

- Prices of items shall be at their total cost to the U.S. Government.
- The U.S. Government will attempt to notify the foreign government of price increases which will affect the total estimated contract price by more than 10 percent, but failure to so advise does not alter the foreign government's obligation to reimburse the U.S. Government for the total cost incurred.
- The foreign government agrees to reimburse the U.S. Government if the final cost exceeds the amount estimated in the sales agreement.

#### Billing for training

Effective January 1, 1976, the Marine Corps began charging for training authorized by the Foreign Military Sales Act. However, acting under guidance provided by the Department of Defense/Comptroller, dated December 18, 1975, the Marine Corps does not plan to bill for training provided before January 1, 1976.

The requirement of the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 that a country pay "not less than the value thereof" for defense services provided under the act would seem to support some charge commensurate with the value of the service to the foreign government. This view is reinforced by the Report of the Senate Appropriations Committee on the 1976 Defense Appropriations bill. In discussing pilot training programs, the Committee stated that:

"The Committee will object strongly to any country's receiving a 'free ride' under a FMS case. All foreign customers must bear their proportionate share of fixed costs to train pilots. Collecting only the added costs but excluding a realistic share of the training base is simply not acceptable."

B-165731

In addition, section 205 of the proposed International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, (H.R. 13680), would amend the Foreign Military Sales Act to specifically require the payment of the "full cost" to the U.S. Government of furnishing a defense service, including a fair share of all indirect costs.

Although all the sales contracts we reviewed contain provisions similar to those stated above in support of retroactive recovery of the cost of training services, we noted that several contracts expressly stated that certain training courses would be provided on a "no-charge" basis. The right of the United States to recover training costs on closed contracts specifying "no-charge" is somewhat questionable as a matter of contract law. We recommend you consider all contracts, although open contracts, and particularly those that do not specify "no-charge" services, represent the strongest cases.

The full value of courses provided by the Marine Corps can be determined only by detailed analyses of each year. However, using course costs developed by the Marine Corps for the second half of fiscal year 1976, we estimate the value of such training between July and December 1975 to be \$252,305. As shown in the enclosure, most of this training was authorized during fiscal year 1976 and prior years under "open-end" sales cases which, we believe, will allow retroactive billing for the full value of such services. Five sales cases, which could not be identified by the Marine Corps or Navy, should be identified and the foreign countries billed as appropriate.

Reason advanced for not charging  
and our evaluation

Marine Corps and Defense officials had several reasons for not previously charging for Marine Corps courses and for not wishing to make retroactive billings under sales cases.

Their rationale for not having charged for training was that (1) spaces were available so no significant costs were incurred by the attendance of a few foreign nationals, (2) the administrative burden outweighed the costs to be recovered, and (3) some countries might not send their students if there was a charge, and thus a chance to influence these personnel would be lost.

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We believe the reasons advanced could be equally applied by all the services, but, as previously noted, they are contrary to congressional direction authorizing such training.

Department of Defense and Marine Corps officials generally oppose retroactive billing on the basis of upsetting the foreign governments' budgetary processes and the political sensitivities involved. We believe that, since the training benefitted mostly students from more affluent countries and since the retroactive billings for any one country do not seem overly burdensome, there should be no major obstacle to requesting payment for the value of services provided.

#### Recommendation

We recommend that the Marine Corps attempt to recover from recipient countries for all training provided without charge under sales cases during the last 3 fiscal years. In instances where the sales case is closed and the recipient country advances sufficient reasons for contesting the billings, the Marine Corps may decide whether further action is warranted. On all open sales cases, every reasonable effort should be made to collect for the services provided.

#### TRAINING PROVIDED UNDER THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT

The granting of training services is authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The value of training services provided under this act, exclusive of military pay and allowances, is reimbursed to the military services through funds authorized and appropriated for such purposes by Congress.

The Marine Corps has not been reimbursed for any such training it has provided. From course prices developed by the Marine Corps for fiscal year 1976, we estimate the value of its grant aid training during fiscal year 1975 to be \$464,000.


#### Recommendations

We recommend that measures be taken to insure that in the future, the Marine Corps will charge Foreign Assistance Act appropriations for training services authorized by the act.

B-165731

We also recommend that the Marine Corps be instructed to review its records and report to the Congress all such training provided but not so charged.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Louis W. Hunter".

Louis W. Hunter  
Associate Director

Enclosure

ATTACHMENT

MARINE CORPS TRAINING BEGINS DURING  
JULY 1, 1975 TO DECEMBER 31, 1975

Course Number	Course Title	Country	Student Spaces	Estimated Value @ 1976 prices	Sales Case Identifier	Status of Sales Case Authorizing Training			
						No Identifier	Open for Fiscal Year 1976	Specifically No Charge	Prior Year Sales Case
P132802	Advanced Communications Officers	Venezuela	2	\$ 63,984		\$	\$	\$	\$63,984 a/
P143901	Basic Auto Mechanics Enlisted	Saudi Arabia	2	3,064	SR/TAE				1,064
P121802	Combat Engineer Course	Israel	1	1,665		1,665			
P171801	Command and Staff College	Australia	1	14,276	AT/TBA		14,276		
		Canada	1	14,276					
		Israel	1	14,276	IS/TAG				14,276
		Norway	1	14,276	NO/TVA		14,276		
		Saudi Arabia	1	14,276	SR/TAL			14,276	
P171802	Amphibious Warfare School	Spain	1	14,276					
		Sweden	1	14,276					
		United Kingdom	1	14,276					
		Greece	1	11,564	GR/TAT			11,564	
		Kuwait	2	23,128	KU/TAB			23,128	
Total			19	\$222,305		\$58,769	\$96,372	\$25,840	\$81,324

\* Marine Corps officials said this is a fiscal year 1975 sales case but did not have the sales case identified.



**OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY  
AND  
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY (SECURITY ASSISTANCE), OASD/ISA  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301**

17 AUG 1976

In reply refer to:  
I-8323/76

Mr. Louis W. Hunter  
Associate Director, International Division  
United States General Accounting Office  
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Hunter:

This responds to your letter B-165731 of July 15, 1976, regarding recovery of Marine Corps training costs for foreign military students.

The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management) has been requested to have the Marine Corps: (a) make every reasonable effort to collect from the recipient countries on all open sales cases; (b) determine whether further action is warranted where the sales cases are closed; (c) collect all future International Military Education and Training (IMET) costs authorized under the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976; and (d) report to me all foreign military training previously provided but not reimbursed by the recipient government or foreign assistance appropriation.

Please include this information in your report to the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee.

Sincerely,

H. M. FISH  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency  
and  
Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA), Security Assistance





DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
(FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT)  
WASHINGTON DC 20350

5 OCT 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY

Subj: Recovery of Training Costs

Your memorandum of August 17, 1976, forwarded a copy of the General Accounting Office letter report to DSAA on recovery of Marine Corps Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Grant Aid program training costs.


In the GAO report it was recommended that the Marine Corps attempt to recover from recipient countries for all training provided without charge under sales cases during the last 3 fiscal years; that measures be taken to insure the Marine Corps will charge Foreign Assistance Act Appropriations for training services authorized by the act; and that the Marine Corps review its records and report to the Congress all such training provided but not so charged.

[See GAO note.]

The Marine Corps has reviewed its records and the attached listing indicates Marine Corps Training not charged to recipient country or to Foreign Assistance Act Appropriations for FY 1974, 1975, 1976 and 1977. Please be assured that the Department of the Navy will make every reasonable effort to collect from the recipient country on all open sales cases and will determine what action, if any, is required on sales cases that are closed.

Additionally, appropriate measures are being taken to insure that all future military education and training costs authorized under the International Security Assistance and Army Export Control Act of 1976 are recovered.

As always, my staff and I are available to provide any further assistance you might require in this matter.

  
G. D. PENISTEN  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
(FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT)

GAO note: The attached listing is not included in appendix.





## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 8, 1976

Mr. J. K. Fasick:  
Director  
International Division  
U. S. General Accounting Office  
Washington, D. C. 20548


Dear Mr. Fasick:

I am replying to your letter of August 17, 1976, which forwarded copies of the draft report: "Military Assistance Training Can Be Made More Effective At Less Cost."

The enclosed comments were prepared by the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs.

We appreciate having had the opportunity to review and comment on the draft report. If I may be of further assistance, I trust you will let me know.

Sincerely,

  
Daniel L. Williamson  
Deputy Assistant Secretary  
for Budget and Finance

Enclosure: As stated

- GAO notes:
1. References in appendixes V and VI may not correspond to the pages and sections cited. Pertinent information provided by the agencies has been incorporated in the final report as appropriate.
  2. Deleted comments relate to suggested changes that have been made and matters revised or omitted in the final report.

**GAO DRAFT REPORT: MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING CAN BE MADE  
MORE EFFECTIVE AT LESS COST**

The International Military Education and Training Program offers substantial benefits to the foreign policy of the United States. The program's educational and training activities are designed to encourage mutually-beneficial relations and increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of the goals of international peace and security. The Department of State considers that the benefits that the United States derives from the training of future foreign military leaders would be reduced markedly by adoption of the cost effectiveness considerations addressed in the GAO draft report.

The Congress has specified that training should be provided whenever feasible on a reimbursable basis. The way the costs of providing such training are computed for pricing purposes, however, clearly has a direct relationship to the amount of training sold through our FMS program. If the cost of United States training escalates to unrealistic levels, foreign governments may decide to look elsewhere for their military training. Alternatively they may attempt to shortcut training requirements so that their forces are not competent to operate or maintain US-origin equipment. In either case, the U.S. would lose.

Program Responsibilities:

[See GAO note 2, p. 39.]

Training Program Costs (P. 6ff):

[See GAO note 2, p. 39.]

The Department considers that the effectiveness of the IMETP in accomplishing the goals established by statute cannot be measured in strict cost accounting terms alone. The Congress has recognized and accepted this principle. For example, FAA Section 632(d) provides for exclusion of the costs of salaries of members of the Armed Forces of the United States from those expenses which shall be reimbursed from Foreign Assistance Act appropriations. The differential between IMETP training costs and the costs charged for the same course when sold under FMS has been sharply increased by the revised FMS pricing policy, and is causing misunderstandings with foreign governments. The Department therefore strongly recommends that FMS costs for attendance by foreign students at U.S. Service schools should be limited to those 'incremental' costs directly incurred by the addition of foreign students.

#### Recommendations Regarding Training Program Costs (P. 15)

We have no particular problem with the proposal that the full costs of the grant training program be recorded, including the military personnel costs for members of the Armed Forces assigned directly to IMETP functions, without prejudice to the existing exclusion of these costs from reimbursement to the military departments from IMETP funds.

In preparing the Congressional Presentation Documents for the Fiscal Year 1978 security assistance program, we will take into consideration the proposal that the full costs of operating the Canal Zone Schools be reported, without prejudice to the existing funding arrangements.

We do not agree that transportation and living allowances for foreign trainees should be discontinued for all countries or in all cases. We do not find persuasive the stated argument that payment of these charges by foreign governments would have beneficial impact by increasing the "stake" of these governments in the success of the program. On the contrary, we believe that requesting payment would tend to exclude participation by many poorer countries. While we do not exclude arrangements for payment of transportation and living costs as already concluded with some governments, we believe these should be worked out on a case-by-case basis, depending on USG interests as well as the ability and willingness of the foreign government to pay.

Recommendations Regarding English Language Training and the Canal Zone Schools (P. 25)

While we agree that the proportion of grant training funds devoted to English language training should be reduced to the practical minimum, we do not agree with the general recommendation for termination of English language training under IMETP except for limited, highly technical training. The United States seeks to support its foreign policy objectives through the provision of grant training, and the offer of training opportunities should not be circumscribed by the individual candidate's prior competence in English or the willingness of the foreign government to purchase preliminary English language training. This is particularly true in those cases where relatively small IMETP grants constitute a principal avenue for contacts with the future military leadership of non-aligned countries, and in cases where emerging requirements for a foreign country's self-defense are being supported by authorized programs of material assistance under MAP.


The Department will investigate jointly with the Department of Defense the feasibility of establishing multilateral sponsorship for the Canal Zone schools prior to addressing the recommendation for closing these schools. Within the community of the Americas, English, French, and Portuguese are minority languages. Since it is in the clear interest of the United States to foster inter-American defense cooperation, it appears that there are significant advantages in maintaining Spanish language training courses which will bring together representatives of the Latin American armed forces to learn U.S. military doctrine and the operation and maintenance of US-origin equipment without a prior requirement for facility in English.

Recommendation Regarding the Utilization of Trained Personnel (P. 30)

[See GAO note 2, p. 39.]

We believe that the continuing reduction in the amount of 'related' training provided on a grant basis, and increasing reimbursement by foreign governments for the majority of training in the operation and maintenance of U.S.-origin equipment will serve to reduce the importance to the USA of such monitoring endeavors. We do not believe that the task of monitoring the assignments of former MAP trainees has in any

country occupied so much as one man year, so we doubt there is any basis for the projected personnel reductions. In those cases where 'related' O&M training is provided on a grant basis, we will give serious consideration to whether the payment by the sending government of transportation and living expenses (and/or English language training where required) will provide a meaningful additional incentive for the foreign government to ensure appropriate utilization of the skills acquired.

  
George S. Vest  
Director  
Bureau of Politico-Military  
Affairs

November 2, 1976



DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY  
AND  
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY (SECURITY ASSISTANCE), OASD/ISA  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

18 NOV 1976

In reply  
refer to: I-9346/76

Mr. J. Kenneth Fasick  
Director, International Division  
U.S. General Accounting Office  
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Fasick:

This is in reply to your letter of 17 August 1976 to Secretary Rumsfeld regarding GAO's draft report entitled "Military Assistance Training Can be Made More Effective at Less Cost" (OSD Case #4238-B).

We appreciate the opportunity to review this draft report and recommend that you give full consideration to DOD's comments. If you are unable to accommodate all our comments, request that they be appended to the final report and be referred to when applicable.

We noted that the report only addresses the issue of cost effectiveness and fails to consider the foreign policy and national security goals of the U.S. that are inherent in the foreign military training program. Although the political and military advantages the U.S. derives from the program are significant, there is no indication that they received any consideration. The goals of the report as indicated in the recommendation section of the digest, are to "... improve cost controls, reduce cost, and increase program effectiveness . . . ." The recommendations, however, only pertain to the first two goals but not the third one. Furthermore, any cost saving achieved should be applied to increased quotas which allow more foreign students to participate in the program since the foreign military training program is part of the U.S. foreign policy and is very effective in promoting pro-U.S. orientation and furthering U.S. objectives to standardize training and equipment among our friends and allies. Further and more detailed comments are contained in the enclosure.

Sincerely,

Attachment  
a/s

Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency  
Deputy Assistant Secretary (Security Assistance)

## DOD COMMENTS

GAO DRAFT REPORT "MILITARY ASSISTANCE  
TRAINING CAN BE MADE MORE EFFECTIVE  
AT LESS COST"GENERAL COMMENTS

The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 provides, among other things, that education and training activities shall be designed to:

- a. Encourage effective and mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries.
- b. Improve the ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their resources, including defense articles and services obtained by them from the United States, with maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to greater self-reliance by such countries.

The GAO draft report fails to give adequate consideration to the worldwide purpose and mission outlined above. Implementation of the report recommendations could contravene this legal mandate and have a detrimental impact on the basic thrust of the grant training program. As an example, the report recommends that recipient countries should pay for all transportation costs required to bring their students to the United States for training. If followed, this procedure would impede on-going relationships with small but highly important countries such as Ghana, Senegal, Nepal, and Afghanistan and virtually all Latin American countries.

Throughout the report the assumption is implied that the U.S. has complete control over the type, level, and location of the training requested by each foreign country. This is not the case since each country determines what its training needs are and where it will send its personnel to obtain the training. It is a fallacy to assume, for example, that if you did not have the Canal Zone schools the countries in Latin America would utilize U.S. military schools.

The report's findings and conclusions are broad and often unsubstantiated. For example, the conclusion that \$4 million would be saved by closing the Canal Zone military assistance schools and reassigning the personnel is not factually justified. Although \$4 million is the estimated pay and allowances of personnel assigned to the schools, their reassignment would not necessarily save any money.

[See GAO note 2, p. 39.]

On page 6, para 1, change \$27 million to read \$23 million and delete "(exclusive of the 5th quarter)." The approved and funded FY 76 IMETP did contain training which started during the period July-September 1976.

RECOMMENDATIONS (Pages 15 and 16)

Recommendation #1:

The Foreign Military Assistance act of 1961, Public Law 87-195, dated September 4, 1961, as amended, Section 632(d), precludes the charging of the salaries of members of the Armed Forces of the United States to the Grant Aid appropriation. Under current DOD policy, all training courses offered to foreign students are priced on a Grant Aid and a sales basis. Since the sales price includes the salaries and allowances of military personnel directly engaged in the training program, total cost information is available.

Recommendation #2:

With enactment of the separate appropriation for the IMETP, all costs of the Canal Zone schools are being charged to the new appropriation. The annual presentation to the Congress will therefore reflect these costs.

Recommendation #3

As mentioned in the report, DOD actively supports cost-sharing agreements. Countries that are financially able are encouraged to pay transportation and living allowances; however, the complete termination of these allowances would be detrimental to the poorer IMETP countries. IMETP programs are established at a dollar level to meet a country's valid training requirements which cannot be met through FMS sales. Forcing countries to pay transportation and allowances effectively reduces the program level and would result in fewer personnel being trained. The "package" approach of being able to finance all IMETP costs should be retained for operational flexibility. DOD should not stop paying transportation and living costs but rather should continue to encourage those countries financially able to share these costs and adjust training levels accordingly.

TREATY NEGOTIATIONS

[See GAO note 2, p. 39.]

RECOMMENDATIONS (Pages 25 and 26)

Recommendation #1

This recommendation was made even though the report itself states that some in-country programs do not produce qualified English speaking students. It is difficult under the best of circumstances for a student to comprehend



training taught in an acquired language. The task becomes increasingly difficult if the student has not received adequate English language training. Because of the sophisticated material offered in our Service schools and the nature of the tightly packaged programs designed to meet the needs of our rapidly changing armed forces, crash courses in English are not viable. Experience has shown that most of the courses are too fast for even the R3S3 level English-qualified student. DOD non-concurs with the recommendation. If a student is eliminated from training for language deficiency there is not only a waste of available funds but also a waste of the training space for the initial course and possibly the sequential training slots. Therefore, IMETP funds should continue to be utilized to provide English language training for countries which historically have shown a need for this instruction.

**Recommendation #2:**

We do not agree with the recommendation to close the Canal Zone Military Schools. Since there is no replacement for these schools the preponderance of the students now attending the CZMS would simply go elsewhere for two primary reasons: costs and language. During a recent USARSA CONUS orientation tour, a survey was taken of the 37 students, ranking from a Major to Colonel and representing every LATAM military establishment that sends students to the Canal Zone for training. The unanimous result was expressed by one senior officer, "We far prefer to attend USARSA in lieu of Fort Leavenworth for two reasons: first the language difficulty, even in our ranks and second, the feeling of paternalism that exists in the Stateside military schools. At USARSA we are comfortable in our own language, the courses are designed for Latin America -- we study problems that are indigenous of our experiences rather than the armored corps (of which we have none) in the attack."

We agree that one of the benefits of the training program is to acquaint Latin American personnel with the U.S. way of life. Although this cannot be accomplished as effectively in the Canal Zone, benefits are still derived in this area. Moreover, the fact that the schools develop a spirit of Latin American cooperation and comradeship offsets any loss of exposure to the U.S. way of life.

The report stated that courses offered in CONUS were similar to those provided in the Canal Zone. This is true in a general sense but there are significant differences. For example, CONUS courses are designed to provide training on equipment in the USAF inventory and the maintenance systems used. IAAFA courses are geared to the less-sophisticated needs of Latin American Air Forces. In addition, CONUS courses usually require significantly higher prerequisites in the areas of math, mechanics, and electronics than IAAFA courses. The students are also better able to absorb course material as it is presented in their native language.

The report assumes that should the Canal Zone Military Schools (CZMS) be closed, the other countries from the region will obtain their training from the U.S. or other Latin American countries. This kind of assumption is questionable when necessary consideration is given to the growing presence

and influence of Cuba and the USSR in the region. The report also fails to consider that the military is the single most important political institution for stability and Western political orientation in the region. Further, CZMS provide a regional military presence not dedicated to the defense of the Panama Canal and provides the U.S. an opportunity to favorably influence the students toward the U.S. The CZMS also provide effective support of U.S. goals in Latin America, and the unique, professional, and technical instruction provided by the schools strengthens the military capabilities of the countries in the region, enhances their capability for self-defense, and contributes to the collective defense of the Western Hemisphere. In many cases, the smaller countries of the region utilize CZMS because they cannot afford to develop their own career and specialized schools or purchase more expensive training.

DOD has initiated action calling for the creation of a permanent advisory commission in inter-American Army educational matters. This in effect amounts to the first step toward complete internationalization.

#### RECOMMENDATION (Page 30)

We agree with the report's conclusion that monitoring of returned trainees is difficult due to limited access to the records of recipient countries. However, we feel that continued monitoring, to the extent possible, is necessary to evaluate the results of the IMET program and determine future training requirements.

#### APPENDIX I (Page 32)

Brazil: Brazil has not sent students to the CZMS for many years because (1) its military school system is more than capable of conducting the training, and (2) their language is Portuguese, not Spanish. These reasons have no relationship to English language training. Brazilian students go to the CONUS schools both for added knowledge and to exchange military doctrine.

#### APPENDIX II (Page 41)

The facts of the matter are that most Latin American countries do not possess the same generation equipment as the Armed Forces of the U.S. Furthermore, there is no indication that this situation will change appreciably in the foreseeable future. Since it is not possible to conduct training in the U.S. school systems for this first-generation equipment, it is mandatory that we continue to operate CZMS.

**PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE**  
**FOR ADMINISTERING ACTIVITIES**  
**DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT**

**Tenure of Office**  
**From**                      **To**

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:**

Harold Brown	Jan. 1977	Present
Donald Rumsfeld	Nov. 1975	Jan. 1977
James R. Schlesinger	July 1973	Nov. 1975
William R. Clements, Jr. (acting)	May 1973	June 1973
Elliot L. Richardson	Jan. 1973	May 1973
Melvin R. Laird	Jan. 1969	Jan. 1973

**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

**SECRETARY OF STATE**

Cyrus R. Vance	Jan. 1977	Present
Henry A. Kissinger	Sept. 1973	Jan. 1977
William P. Rogers	Jan. 1969	Sept. 1973