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Report to Secretary, Department of Defense; Secretary, Department of State; by J. Kenneth Fasick, Director, International Div.

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Since 1974, there has been a trend toward increasing U.S. foreign military sales (FMS) to African nations which until recently have been lightly armed with unsophisticated weapons. Military sales to five African nations -- Morocco, Ethiopia, Zaire, Kenya, and Nigeria -- were reviewed. Morocco, Ethiopia, and Zaire have been the largest African purchasers of U.S. military equipment and services. Kenya has recently agreed to a large sale, but Nigeria, which has the largest military force in sub-Saharan Africa, currently procures few U.S. military items. Findings/Conclusions: The United States views the FMS program as an important way to further its political and military interests, and FMS will continue to be an important tool of U.S. foreign policy. Presidential notifications of proposed foreign military sales have not given the Congress complete information; descriptions on prior notifications have lacked specific data on the types of weapons, ammunition, and personal services included in sales. With the elimination of grant aid, credit has been an important element in facilitating certain U.S. sales in Africa, and the U.S. credit policy helps friendly nations to purchase military items. U.S. unilateral arms control initiatives in Africa are unlikely to halt the flow of arms to African nations. Moreover, refusal to sell arms could adversely affect U.S. interests and could counter foreign policy objectives by encouraging nations to seek more arms from the Soviets. Recommendations: Notification to congressional committees about proposed sales of military equipment and services should contain: detailed descriptions of support weapons and levels of future munitions support, the number of U.S. personnel programmed to support the proposed sales, information on U.S. equipment and ammunition that can be used with foreign-made military items and the buyers' foreign-made military equipment that could be supported by the proposed sales, and the U.S. military survey team results and actions the U.S. Government will undertake to

carry out the teams' recommendations. (RRS)

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REPORT BY THE U.S.

General Accounting Office

Military Sales--An Increasing U.S. Role In Africa

This report to the Departments of State and Defense reviews military sales to Morocco, Ethiopia, Zaire, Kenya, and Nigeria. The first three have been the largest purchasers of U.S. military equipment and services. Kenya has recently concluded a large sale, and Nigeria currently procures few U.S. military items.

U.S. credit policies facilitate military sales to African nations. However, if the United States unilaterally halted arms transfers, Africa could turn to other suppliers; therefore any reduction in such arms transfers will require international agreement.

The Congress has not been adequately informed about some key aspects of Foreign Military Sales programs in Africa. GAO recommended that notifications to congressional committees about proposed sales of military equipment and services contain more detailed descriptions of support weapons and future munitions support that may be required in major cases.



ID-77-61

APRIL 4, 1978



UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

INTERNATIONAL DIVISION

B-165731

To the Honorable Secretary of State
and the Honorable Secretary of Defense

We have reviewed military sales to five African nations --Morocco, Ethiopia, Zaire, Kenya, and Nigeria. The first three nations have been the largest African purchasers of U.S. military equipment and services. Kenya has recently agreed to a large sale. Nigeria, although it has the largest military force in sub-Saharan Africa, currently procures few U.S. military items.

FINDINGS

The Congress has not been adequately informed about some key aspects of Foreign Military Sales programs in Africa. For example:

- Executive branch notifications on proposed sales do not clearly describe the nature and extent of U.S. equipment transfers and manpower commitments. (See p. 13.)
- Military survey teams have helped these nations to determine their equipment and service needs and the Departments of State and Defense have used the resulting studies as program "blueprints," but the Congress has not always been advised of these long-range plans. (See p. 16.)
- The granting of credit has been an important element in facilitating certain U.S. military sales. (See p. 21.)

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that notifications to congressional committees about proposed sales of military equipment and services contain:

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
- Detailed descriptions of support weapons and levels of future munitions support that may be required in major weapons cases.
- The number of U.S. personnel programed to support the proposed sales.
- Information on (1) U.S. equipment and ammunition that can be used with foreign-made military items and (2) the buyers foreign-made military equipment that can be supported by U.S. sales.
- The U.S. military survey team results and actions the U.S. Government will undertake to carry out the teams' recommendations. (See pp. 18 and 19.)

Formal responses to our report generally agreed with our recommendations. These are discussed in the report where appropriate as are specific plans to implement the recommendations.

Section 236 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 requires the head of a Federal agency to submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to the House Committee on Government Operations and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs not later than 60 days after the date of the report and to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report.

We are sending copies of this report to the Director, Office of Management and Budget, and to the chairmen of selected congressional committees and subcommittees. We wish to acknowledge the cooperation given to our representatives during our review.

Sincerely yours,


J. K. Fasick
Director

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The United States is one of
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ABBREVIATIONS

FMS

Foreign military sales

GAO

General Accounting Office

MAP

Military Assistance Program

TOW

Tube-launched, optically guided
wire missile

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Since 1974 there has been a trend toward increasing U.S. foreign military sales (FMS) to African nations, which until recently have been lightly armed with unsophisticated weapons. Concern has grown about this expanding U.S. role as a supplier of defense items to African nations.

This report addresses foreign military sales to Morocco, Ethiopia, and Zaire, which have been the largest African purchasers of U.S. military equipment and services; Kenya, which has recently agreed to large sales; and Nigeria, which currently procures few U.S. military items, although it has the largest military force in sub-Sahara Africa.

U.S. military sales and assistance programs and management have been the subject of five GAO reports to the Congress since 1975.

--Assessment of Overseas Efforts of the U.S. Security Assistance Program, Oct. 31, 1975 (ID-76-1).

--Foreign Military Sales---A Growing Concern, June 1, 1976 (ID-76-51).

--Two Coproduction Programs--F-5E Aircraft in Taiwan and M-16 Rifle in the Philippines, June 6, 1977 (ID-76-84).

--FMS, A Potential Drain on the U.S. Defense Posture, July 25, 1977 (LCD-76-455).

--Perspectives on Military Sales to Saudi Arabia, Oct. 26, 1977 (ID-77-19A).

HISTORY OF FOREIGN MILITARY SALES TO AFRICA

FMS agreements with Africa totaled \$328 million in fiscal year 1975, \$413 million in 1976, \$149 million in 1977, and are estimated at \$191 million in 1978, compared with a total \$126 million for all prior years. To put these figures in perspective, it should be noted that 92 percent of the agreements in 1975 was with Morocco and 80 percent in 1976 was with three countries (Morocco 30 percent; Kenya 16 percent; and Ethiopia, which was shifting from grant aid to FMS,

34 percent). In fiscal year 1977 62 percent of the FMS agreements was with Sudan, 24 percent with Morocco, and 14 percent between Ethiopia, Zaire, Kenya and Nigeria. The United States has since ended security assistance to Ethiopia. Recent FMS agreements with Africa have not only increased in volume but have also involved more advanced equipment and new customer countries.

The following table shows the value of FMS agreements and military assistance program (MAP) materials and training in Africa since 1971.

<u>Country</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u> (note a)	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u> (est.)
----- (millions) -----								
Morocco:								
MAP	.7	.8	.1	.6	.9	.9	.8	1.2
FMS	2.3	7.5	2.4	8.3	299.8	124.8	35.7	40.0
Ethiopia: (note b)								
MAP	11.8	10.6	9.4	11.7	13.0	7.7	2.8	-
FMS	-	-	-	7.4	22.1	139.8	.2	-
Kenya:								
MAP	-	-	-	-	.04	1.1	.2	.3
FMS	-	-	-	-	-	66.9	2.8	2.5
Zaire:								
MAP	.4	.3	.3	.4	.3	0.5	2.4	2.5
FMS	16.3	.3	.7	1.4	1.7	10.0	12.2	15.0
Nigeria:								
MAP	.2	.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
FMS	-	2.4	.6	4.4	2.8	1.9	4.1	50.0
Total for 5 countries:								
MAP	13.1	11.8	9.8	12.7	14.24	10.2	6.2	4.0
FMS	18.6	10.2	3.7	21.5	326.4	343.4	55.0	107.5
Total for Africa:								
MAP	18.5	14.1	12.1	14.8	16.5	11.0	6.9	5.5
FMS	19.2	13.0	7.4	22.8	327.5	412.9	149.3	111.7

a/ Includes transition quarter, July 1 to Sept. 30, 1976.

b/ FMS and MAP to Ethiopia terminated in June 1977.

Source: Department of Defense

Historically, U.S. military support of African nations had been achieved through nonreimbursable military assistance grant aid. Ethiopia was the largest MAP recipient and received some \$193 million in equipment and services since 1953, primarily in return for U.S. naval communications facilities at Kagnew. Other nations, including Morocco and Zaire, received U.S. grant aid since the late 1950s and early 1960s. However, because of congressional desire to eliminate grant military assistance and to encourage military self-sufficiency, most MAP grant aid has been phased out and foreign military sales have increased.

New customers

Major first-time FMS agreements were signed with Kenya and Egypt in 1976 and with Sudan in 1977. At the time of our review, the United States was also considering sales to Chad and Cameroon. According to the State Department, the administration had also agreed in principle to provide defensive arms to Somalia, but this decision was placed in abeyance with the outbreak of hostilities in the Horn of Africa. These actions reflect growing U.S. interest in Africa, mounting perceptions of threat by certain African nations, and realignment of American and Soviet influence patterns in Africa. FMS programs in Africa in 1977 are shown on the map on the following page.


More advanced weapons and equipment are being sold

The United States has been selling more advanced equipment to some African nations, generally in response to similar capabilities maintained by their neighboring nations.

Before 1975, Morocco procured about \$77 million in military equipment through sales and assistance, including F-5A aircraft, wheeled vehicles, small arms, and communications equipment. In 1975 and 1976, it signed FMS agreements for more than \$400 million to re-equip, expand and modernize its military forces. With these sales, the United States introduced the Chapparral, Dragon, and TOW missile systems in Africa. Subsequent purchase agreements have been made for the Sidewinder missile, and credits are proposed for an advanced radar system.

Ethiopia's major weapon procurements prior to fiscal year 1976 included F-5A and F-5B aircraft (earlier versions

MILITARY SALES TO
AFRICAN NATIONS
FISCAL YEAR 1977



of today's F-5E and F-5F aircraft), cargo aircraft, and older model F-86 aircraft. In 1975 and 1976, Ethiopia ordered \$160 million in U.S. equipment and services through FMS, including the more advanced F-5E aircraft and TOW missiles.

Zaire's program plans showed a similar trend toward more sophisticated equipment when it obtained cargo aircraft, vehicles, and small weapons valued at less than \$50 million. In July 1977, Zaire embarked on a reorganization program emphasizing military fundamentals rather than expensive sophisticated equipment and current and proposed FMS credits are in the \$20 million to \$30 million a year range. The Department of Defense anticipates that the items will include medical, communications, and transportation equipment, clothing, small arms ammunition, and wheeled vehicles, but no tanks or artillery.

Kenya's first purchase of U.S. military equipment in 1976--12 F-5 aircraft--will greatly enhance its jet fighter capability. Defense believes this capability will still be modest compared to that of Kenya's neighbors.

Nigeria has purchased no major equipment from the United States, because, according to Defense, it has no confidence in the United States as a supplier, due in part to Defense's complex and lengthy review system. It currently buys only U.S. military training under FMS agreements and buys aircraft and minor support items commercially. In mid-1977, however, Nigeria indicated an interest in acquiring seven CH-47 transport helicopters.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

We made our review at (1) the Departments of State and Defense and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in Washington, (2) Headquarters, U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany, and (3) American Embassies and Department of Defense management groups in Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, France, and the United Kingdom. We also discussed program implementation and prospects with national officials in Kenya, Morocco, and Nigeria. At the request of the State Department, we did not make our planned in-country visits to Ethiopia and Zaire because the security situation in Ethiopia was questionable and Zaire was in the midst of repelling an incursion into its Shaba province.

CHAPTER 2

FMS TO AFRICA--AN INCREASING U.S. ROLE

The United States has traditionally viewed sales of its military equipment and services abroad as a positive means of furthering U.S. interests. In 1975, U.S. military sales to Africa were increased to balance growing Soviet influence and to further U.S. political and military interests. At the same time, African nations, faced with growing perceived threats and backed in part with Arab funding, have been seeking more military equipment and services.

African nations receive military support from multiple suppliers. This fact, combined with the national priorities of certain countries, limits U.S. influence.

WHY FMS HAS INCREASED

Some African nations have become concerned over the increased military capabilities of their neighbors. Somalia and Uganda, with Soviet support, have accumulated military equipment superior to that of neighboring Kenya; Algeria and Angola have better military positions than neighboring Morocco and Zaire. Faced with perceived military threats, these neighboring nations are seeking a military balance.

At the same time, some African nations have improved their economic positions and are spending more on military items. For example, Morocco and Kenya until recently concentrated on economic development and spent few resources on their military forces. From 1964 to 1973, however, Kenya's annual economic growth rate averaged 6 percent. Morocco's economic growth in 1976 was 10 percent, and it now has one of the highest per capita incomes in Africa. These growth rates provide more reasonable bases for procuring military items. Also, increasing funds accumulated by the Arab oil states have been made available to help Morocco, Sudan, and Somalia purchase new military equipment. The United States has a favorable military sales reputation and has been requested to sell needed military items. Additionally, many African nations see U.S. support as a political deterrent to the Soviet support received by their neighboring countries.

U.S. interests in Africa, in addition to balancing Soviet influence, are varied. Africa is a continent of

vast resources and provides the United States with cobalt, manganese, oil, platinum, and other materials. U.S. investment in sub-Saharan Africa in the past two decades has more than quadrupled to \$1.5 billion and trade has grown at an even faster rate. With its 49 separate national governments, Africa plays an ever-increasing role in international politics.

U.S. INTERESTS IN THE FIVE NATIONS REVIEWED

Morocco

U.S. military interest in Morocco is to maintain a friendly government's control of the southern shore of the Strait of Gibraltar. The 12-mile strait between Spain and Morocco is the entrance of the Mediterranean and the access to Europe's southern flank.

U.S. business investment in Morocco is about \$100 million, and reciprocal trade between the two countries totaled about \$312 million in 1976. Morocco has the world's largest phosphate reserves, an ingredient in commercial fertilizer. Some U.S. sources believe that Morocco's phosphate could be vital at the end of this century when most known U.S. reserves may be depleted.

Morocco's location and culture make it a member of both the African and Middle East communities. Although it is more ideologically aligned with the Middle East, Morocco established its role among African nations by offering military assistance to Zaire in the spring of 1977. Morocco has supported the United States on important international matters. Morocco's military threat comes from Algeria and from an Algerian-backed group which is trying to set up an independent state in the former Spanish Sahara, a territory divided between Morocco and Mauritania following the Spanish withdrawal in March 1976.

According to the U.S. Ambassador in Morocco, foreign military sales have an important role in fostering U.S. interests. Because of Morocco's Middle East ties, U.S. officials incountry believe any reductions in such sales to Morocco could affect U.S. relationships with other Arab nations in the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia.

Nigeria

Nigeria's high-quality oil, 45 percent of which was exported to the United States in 1975, represents the second

largest source of U.S. oil imports (17 percent). U.S. private investment in Nigeria totals about \$800 million.

Nigeria has the largest population and military force in sub-Sahara Africa, and external threat by neighboring states is remote. It has a leadership role in Africa, is a member of several international organizations, and is bidding for a seat on the U.N. Security Council. Nigeria's stance on international issues has not always paralleled the U.S. position, but the United States believes it is important to make its views known to Nigeria and, hopefully, to influence this growing African power to consider U.S. views. For example, the United States reportedly encouraged Nigeria to act as an intermediary during the conflict in Zaire.

A number of nations supply military equipment to Nigeria, including Russia, Great Britain, and West Germany, on a cash basis. U.S. military sales to Nigeria, primarily training, was less than \$5 million in fiscal years 1975-77.

Kenya

U.S. interests in Kenya are varied, but limited. Militarily, U.S. Naval craft are allowed port calls at Mombasa, providing the U.S. Navy with a refueling and liberty capability unique on the East African coast. Economically, direct U.S. business investments in Kenya total \$150 million. The country's projected growth should increase this business investment and U.S. annual trade, which is now about \$78 million. Kenya has no important mineral resources.

Politically, Kenya is nonaligned but leans toward the West, and has been cited as a model of economic development for other African nations. Because of this and its potential role as a progressive leader on the continent, the United States is interested in fostering good relationships and in preserving Kenya's national integrity. In the past, Kenya concentrated on economic development and did little to modernize its military forces. Its neighbors, Ethiopia, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda, possess greater amounts of military hardware, however, and Kenya believes it now needs military equipment, particularly in light of Ugandan and Somali claims on Kenyan land.

Kenya's purchase of 12 U.S. F-5 aircraft is only part of its projected multimillion dollar modernization

program. Great Britain, France, Canada, and West Germany are also participating in its military development. Kenya also expressed a desire for another type of U.S. aircraft but the Department of Defense convinced it that the F-5, an interceptor aircraft, was more suitable to its needs.

Ethiopia

Since Emperor Haile Selassie was ousted in 1974 by a revolutionary military regime, U.S. relations with Ethiopia have become increasingly uncertain. U.S. interests traditionally centered around Ethiopia's strategic Horn of Africa/Red Sea location, ports, airfields, and the U.S. Naval communications base at Kagnew. However, recent studies by both the Ford and Carter administrations conclude that previous assumptions about the importance of U.S. interests in Ethiopia are no longer valid.

Currently, the United States has little economic or resource interest in Ethiopia, and Ethiopian political support appears to be a remote possibility at this time.

On April 30, 1977, the U.S. Embassy in Addis Ababa was formally notified that Ethiopia considered the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and the 1953 agreement covering the Kagnew communications facility at Asmara terminated effective April 23. In April, the U.S. Government had advised Ethiopia of its desire to negotiate the orderly termination of the Kagnew agreement and the reduction, as required by congressional legislation, of the Military Assistance Advisory Group. On April 23, the Ethiopian Government ordered the closure of the Military Group, U.S. Information Service, Kagnew station, Naval Medical Research Unit, and U.S. Consulate General in Asmara and expelled all associated personnel. Subsequently, it ordered the closure of the Defense Attache Office and a 50 percent reduction of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Addis Ababa. On May 7 the United States suspended all security assistance to Ethiopia and on June 25 formally terminated this assistance.

Zaire

Zaire is one of Africa's largest and most populous countries. U.S. interest there is largely keyed to its potential as a regional power and as a repository of mineral wealth. Strategically, Zaire is important because of its central location, although an official at the U.S. European Command indicated that Zaire's military importance

to the United States was limited. For example, the United States has overflight, landing, and Naval fueling rights but seldom uses them. Overflight rights could be important, however, in crisis situations in Southern or Eastern Africa.

Zaire produces manganese, tantalum, cobalt, and copper, which are important to the U.S. industrial base. About 50 percent of U.S. cobalt requirements are imported from Zaire. U.S. investment in Zaire is about \$250 million.

Politically, Zaire is a longstanding U.S. friend; ties with President Mobutu date back more than 10 years. The U.S. Government believes that Zaire has the potential to become an African regional power and would like to maintain its influence in Zaire.

Zaire is militarily threatened by its own expatriots and by Cuban and Soviet-backed Angola. Public dissatisfaction in Zaire with the government's handling of the economy poses a potential internal threat as well.

LIMITATION ON FMS IN ACHIEVING U.S. OBJECTIVES

Sales relationships are not permanent

A change in Ethiopia's Government and policies resulted in the termination of its 20-year military relationship with the United States. U.S. military sales relations with Libya, once a major African buyer of U.S. military items, ended in the early 1970s following a change in Libya's government. The United States continues diplomatic and curtailed economic-commercial relations with Libya. The Soviet Union's relationships with Egypt and Somalia also ended in the 1970s. Future government changes in Africa will probably result in similar experiences.

Risks associated with FMS agreements

Arms sales provide potential political, economical, and military benefits but also have potential risks, such as (1) alienation of neighboring nations, (2) ties with undesirable regimes, (3) conflicts with U.S. human rights concerns, and (4) arms control problems, including fueling of arms races, discouraging cooperative regional security arrangements, and creating an undesirable image of U.S. policy.

U.S. foreign military sales to one country often inhibits good relations with a neighboring nation. For example, U.S. support of Morocco has not helped U.S. relations with Algeria and support of Ethiopia affected U.S. relations with Somalia. These military sales also carry the impression of U.S. political commitment, with the result that the United States enjoys many of the benefits that would accrue because of an alliance without the corresponding binding commitment. In effect, the recipient is tied to a considerable degree to the United States (for military sales for instance) with only a limited commitment from it. In some instances, foreign military sales associate the United States with regimes it does not support. In Zaire and Ethiopia, the regimes in power have been criticized for inhumane treatment and repressive methods, U.S. military support of these leaders when the United States is also encouraging recognition of human rights, affects U.S. credibility. Also, continuing military sales weaken the credibility of stated U.S. positions on controlling transfers of military material.

Since achieving independence, most African nations have taken a nonaligned political position and are not looking for bilateral ties. Therefore, U.S. military sales form only part of the total military support to any one nation.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

FMS programs in Africa are in various stages of development. The program to modernize the army in Morocco and the F-5 aircraft program in Kenya are estimated for completion in the 1980s. Programs in Zaire will continue for an unspecified period. U.S. commitments for spare parts and additional ammunition can continue several years beyond program completions. Morocco and Kenya have already identified needs for additional new equipment. New programs proposed and considered in Cameroon, Chad, Sudan, and Somalia are likely to be followed by more FMS requests. At the time of our review, Somalia was interested in obtaining U.S. arms, but the Department of Defense said it has no current plans to sell arms to that country.

CONCLUSION

The United States views the FMS program as an important way to further its political and military interests, and FMS will continue to be an important tool in U.S. foreign policy. The United States sells to African nations

because these nations perceive military threats and because the United States desire to balance growing Soviet influence and to maintain specific interests, as exemplified in the five countries we reviewed. U.S. military sales to African nations will probably continue and, perhaps, increase.

CHAPTER 3

CONGRESS NEEDS MORE INFORMATION

ON FMS PROGRAMS IN AFRICA

The Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended in 1974, required the President, prior to signing contractual letters of offer and acceptance to notify the Congress of any sale of defense articles or services for \$25 million or more. However, notifications to the Congress do not always contain complete information about the equipment and personnel services included in proposed sales. For example, in some cases, notifications did not contain information on (1) selling U.S. missiles for foreign-made aircraft, (2) providing U.S. military assistance training through Navy operations funds, and (3) providing survey teams to determine recipient nation equipment requirements.

FMS NOTIFICATIONS DO NOT GIVE THE FULL STORY

To increase control over military sales, the Foreign Military Sales Act was amended again in 1976 to require that the Congress be notified and given a description of foreign military sales for \$7 million or more. We found in reviewing FMS agreements with Africa that notifications to the Congress did not always identify weapons and services included in the sale or identify similar items which had been offered to the country during prior sales.

For example, in March 1975, the Congress was notified that Defense intended to sell Vulcan anti-aircraft guns costing over \$60 million to Morocco. The notification letter described 80 anti-aircraft guns, follow-on support, and spare parts but did not mention that Defense was also offering for sale at the same time 59 M-60 and 6 .50-caliber machineguns, 18 90mm recoilless rifles, 1.56 million rounds of 20mm ammunition, and the services of two U.S. technicians. Also not mentioned in the letter was an offer made in the fall of 1974 offer to sell the Moroccans 20 anti-aircraft guns, although the Moroccans did not accept the offer until February 21, 1975. Defense said this offer of 20 anti-aircraft guns and related items costing over \$18 million was omitted from the March 1975 notification letter because the guns had been offered for sale before January 1975, the effective date for notifications to the Congress under section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act.

Defense's notification to the Congress of the F-5 aircraft sale to Kenya did not include the contracted services of a mobile training team and a technical assistance field team--diversions of U.S. Air Force personnel for significant periods of time. At the request of the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, subsequent to notification of a sale to Kenya, Defense stated that Kenya had requested personnel to carry out the terms of the proposed sale.

The 1976 legislative requirements reducing the notification level from \$25 million to \$7 million should improve congressional oversight. For example, TOW missiles and 155mm howitzers were sold to Morocco in 1975 without the Congress being notified because the sales fell below the \$25 million required reporting level. Under the new legislation, both sales would be reported because they were major defense items valued above \$7 million. However, given the limited information presented in prior notifications, it is doubtful whether TOW and 155mm howitzer notifications alone would have provided the Congress with sufficient information. For instance, in addition to TOW launchers and missiles, the TOW sale included M113 armored personnel carriers and .50-caliber machineguns. The 155mm howitzer sale included .50-caliber machineguns and ammunition.

Concerning the overseas assignment of U.S. personnel, the Congress was not notified of mobile training teams included for the sales of missiles, 155mm howitzers, and M48 tanks to Morocco because these sales were either below \$25 million or were not being considered at the time the Congress was notified of the equipment sale.

Using U.S. missiles on French aircraft

In 1977, the United States agreed to sell Morocco certain missiles to augment its existing stock. Defense explained in the notification that the missiles would be used on U.S. aircraft and would help to maintain Morocco's military capability. However, according to a U.S. military official in Morocco, the number of missiles are excessive for the 22 Moroccan-held F-5s and Morocco plans to use some of them on French Mirage F-1 aircraft. Neither the State nor Defense Departments agree that the missiles are excessive to Morocco's needs. Morocco has purchased 25 French F-1s with an option for 25 more. According to the U.S. official, the U.S. missiles and French F-1 aircraft

are compatible with a minor conversion kit. Defense advised us that the Moroccans did indicate a desire to purchase U.S. missiles for use on the French F-1 aircraft but were discouraged when informed of the costly and complex compatibility testing that would be required.

A U.S. Military Group section manager stated he had no guidance on appropriate munitions support levels. He recognizes that the Moroccans have no system for determining their requirements but if a request appears reasonable the United States concurs. In the missile sale, U.S. officials incountry recognized the amount was excessive for Moroccan-held U.S. aircraft but not for total Moroccan-owned U.S. F-5s and French F-1s. We did not determine Morocco's intention concerning the use of the missiles.

Control of FMS items through munitions

We were told that the United States can exercise control over FMS equipment by controlling the munitions provided for any given item. Of major importance is the amount of war-reserve materials (the necessary munitions to support activity in a war) sold in support of a weapon system. Usually measured in numbers of days, the amount of war reserve materials provides an indication of how long a country could sustain combat without resupply. These materials are in addition to normal day-to-day peacetime resupply requirements. The sustained use of such equipment in wartime could be limited through munitions control.

Military commanders incountry were unable to provide us with approved Defense policy guidance on the amount of war-reserve material that could be sold in support of a weapons system. We found that spare parts generally were included in the FMS case for the equipment but that in some instances the munitions to support a system were not included. For example, in the program to modernize the Moroccan army, munitions for the tanks and howitzers were presented in a separate case from the equipment end-items. Also, the 1977 sale of missiles for the F-5 aircraft were not included in the sales case for the aircraft.

Inasmuch as the United States incurs a commitment to the purchasing country to sell munitions to support a weapons system, it follows that agreement on the level of support should be part of the sale.

U.S. Navy funds used for
security assistance training

In Morocco, the U.S. Navy has been providing military assistance-type training at the Kenitra electronics communication school in return for rent-free use of the facilities.

The training school was started in 1965 and instructs Moroccan military personnel in communications, electronics, and power equipment maintenance. It also teaches English so the students can understand classroom training and use U.S. technical manuals. The school is paid for by U.S. Navy operations and maintenance funds at an estimated annual cost of \$700,000.

U.S. SURVEY TEAMS' LONG-RANGE
PLANS ARE NOT ALWAYS PROVIDED

The State Department, when considering some FMS programs will ask Defense to send a survey team to identify the country's needs. At other times, a country may ask that a U.S. team be sent to evaluate how it can best use a U.S. weapons system or to assess its need for military items.

Neither State nor Defense believes that sending these teams represents a commitment to sell arms and training to the country, but according to State, a team is not sent until there is at least the presumption that establishment of a military supply relationship may be appropriate. These agencies also view survey team recommendations as a limiting factor to sales rather than as providing a basis for extensive arms requests. Our review showed that U.S. survey teams were sent on a reimbursable basis to Morocco and Zaire and that the visits were followed by FMS requests and long-range procurement plans.

Morocco

In the early 1970s, a survey team was sent to identify equipment needs for Morocco's mechanized brigades. Defense instructed the team to accept Morocco's threat assessment because, considering Algeria's overwhelming national advantage, a U.S. assessment would have made a case for arms purchases beyond Moroccan resources. Following the study, the United States agreed to provide Morocco with military equipment for a number of brigades. The team's report stated that the cost and availability data furnished for U.S. equipment was for planning purposes and did not

represent a commitment to Morocco. However, Defense documents showed that Morocco would probably perceive a U.S. commitment just by the fact that the U.S. survey team was sent there. After equipment purchases had been agreed upon, another survey team was sent to evaluate Moroccan training requirements for operating and maintaining the equipment.

Our review showed that the Congress was not advised of the results of the U.S. survey team report on Morocco.

Zaire

U.S. participation in Zaire's military modernization program is directed at strengthening Zaire's basic ground forces. The U.S. program followed a survey team's visit to Zaire to determine requirements for a strengthened military force and a viable deterrent to an Angolan threat. The first of two teams relied on Zaire's threat assessment, but, after the Angolan civil war, it revisited Zaire to evaluate its prior findings on the basis of a more obvious threat.

The second survey team recommended a two-stage modernization program. The final U.S. package to Zaire was developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff based on the second survey report and a U.S. perception of threat to Zaire. The report --which Zaire officials read--noted that some recommendations were for planning purposes only. However, according to a State official, President Mobutu at that time believed the United States was making a long-term commitment. Since July 1977, the Government of Zaire has abandoned its long-range ambitious plans to upgrade its military in favor of a fundamentally different, shorter term approach emphasizing basic defense and logistics capabilities. Expectations of U.S. military assistance were modified, according to the State Department.

CONCLUSIONS

Presidential notifications of proposed foreign military sales have not given the Congress complete information. Although reduced reporting ceilings should increase the number of notifications to the Congress, descriptions on prior notifications have lacked specific data on the types of weapons, ammunition, and personnel services included in sales.

Increased adaptability between U.S. and foreign-made munitions and equipment provides another arms transfer consideration for U.S. officials. The sale to Morocco of

missiles which could be used on French F-1s is an example of the way U.S. control over Morocco's use of the missiles could be limited. The use of aircraft, tanks, and other highly visible weapons can be readily observed, but the use of ammunition and missiles with these weapons cannot. In addition, there are no known U.S. restrictions against nations stockpiling U.S. munitions nor are there restrictions on providing U.S. munitions for foreign-made arms.

As an element of control over use of FMS items, the munitions to support a system should be included as part of the initial sales package.

The Kenitra electronics communications school in Morocco has been operated with U.S. Navy operations funds as payment for use of the facilities when, in fact, it is a military assistance program benefitting the Moroccan military.

State and Defense consider military survey teams as ways to provide technical assistance without a U.S. commitment. However, in Morocco and Zaire, agreements to provide military equipment followed the surveys. The Congress was not notified of the team's recommendations for Morocco and, thus, may not have been aware of that country's long-range development plans and the implication for future U.S. sales.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that in future notifications of proposed sales of Defense items or services the Secretaries of State and Defense provide the appropriate congressional committees with:

- Detailed descriptions of support weapons and levels of future munitions support that may be required in major weapons cases. Such munitions information would be most useful if measured in estimated days of sustained combat the munitions would permit. These descriptions should be valuable to the Congress in controlling the capabilities of fighter aircraft and tanks sold to African nations.
- The number of U.S. personnel programed to support the proposed sales. Although section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act requires that the President, when requested by the cognizant committees, provide a detailed description of the proposed sale items and

the number of U.S. personnel required to support the items, we believe the information should be submitted in all cases at the time of the proposed sales.

--Information on proposed sales of equipment and ammunition that can be used with foreign-made military items and the buyers' foreign-made military equipment that could be supported by the proposed sales.

--U.S. military survey teams' results and actions the U.S. Government will undertake to carry out the teams' recommendations.

We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense take steps to fund and control the Kenitra electronics communications school in Morocco through military assistance instead of the U.S. Navy, if the school continues to operate.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

The Department of State agreed that notifications to the Congress should be comprehensively written to assist in understanding the ramifications of FMS sales and should include the number of U.S. personnel needed to support proposed sales. It said that when purchasers indicate that ancillary weapons and ammunition are also desired, notifications will include this information.

When it is the buyer's clear intention to use U.S. equipment and munitions with foreign-made military items, State agreed to include this fact in the notifications but pointed out that U.S. equipment is not normally adaptable to foreign military equipment. State believes it is almost impossible to determine how standard ammunition will be used, since foreign countries frequently retain both U.S and foreign-made equipment in their inventories.

State agreed to inform the appropriate congressional committees of recommendations adopted as a result of survey reports of defense needs by U.S. Government teams, and it will brief the committees following approval of such reports within the Executive Branch. Also, when asked to do so by the appropriate committee chairman, State will grant access to survey reports to fully cleared congressional staff members.

We believe that State's agreement to provide comprehensive written information at the time a notification of a proposed sale is sent to the Congress and access to the results of U.S. Government surveys of foreign nations' defense needs will help to improve congressional oversight of the FMS program.

CHAPTER 4

FAVORABLE U.S. CREDIT POLICIES

FACILITATE FMS TO AFRICA

The U.S. Government provides credit to help the less developed countries make the transition from grant aid to foreign military sales. Credit terms generally include the U.S. Government's costs of financing plus one-eighth of 1 percent for administrative charges. Credit granted to African nations is increasing, and, under authority of the Arms Export Control Act, the President has waived the \$40 million credit ceiling for Africa every year since 1974. In fiscal years 1975 and 1976, about 25 percent of the FMS programs for Africa were financed or guaranteed by the U.S. Government.

U.S. CREDIT PROGRAM

Sections 23 and 24 of the Arms Export Control Act authorize the President to finance or to guarantee financing of U.S. defense articles and services for friendly foreign countries and international organizations.

Credit extended to African nations averaged \$6 million a year between fiscal years 1955-74. During the 3-year period 1975 to 1977, credit totaled more than \$280 million. It is estimated that credit for fiscal year 1978 will be over \$120 million. The following table shows credit granted through fiscal year 1977 and estimated for 1978.

	<u>Fiscal year</u>				
	<u>1955 to</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>Total</u>
	<u>1974</u>	<u>and 1976</u>		<u>(est.)</u>	
	----- (millions) -----				
Morocco	\$ 72.5	\$ 44.0	\$30.0	\$45.0	\$191.5
Kenya	-	35.0	15.0	15.0	65.0
Zaire	25.0	32.5	28.0	30.0	115.5
Ethiopia	11.0	25.0	a/	a/	36.0
Nigeria	0.3	-	-	-	0.3
Total	<u>\$108.8</u>	<u>\$136.5</u>	<u>\$73.0</u>	<u>\$90.0</u>	<u>\$408.3</u>
Total for Africa	\$121.4	\$172.0	\$108.5	\$122.5	\$524.4

a/ Program terminated.

Source: Department of Defense

Credit has been used or proposed to purchase track and wheeled vehicles, artillery and communications equipment, F-5 aircraft, and an air defense radar system. In Zaire, credit may have been used for resupply and spare parts.

Credit sources

The United States provides two types of credit assistance--direct credit loans provided by the Department of Defense and loans guaranteed by Defense and provided by the Federal Financing Bank. No loans from non-Government lenders for FMS purchases are now guaranteed by the United States; since January 1975 all such loans have been made by the Federal Financing Bank. The Arms Export Control Act explicitly prohibits the Export-Import Bank from financing sales of defense articles and services to any less developed country, but the Bank's policy is to deny financing for defense articles and services to all countries, not just to less developed countries. FMS direct credit is authorized by the Congress and funds are appropriated annually; Government policy generally confines this financing to eligible, economically less developed countries.

Terms are generally attractive

Defense-guaranteed loans have a floating interest rate. This means the purchaser is charged the prime rate at the time funds are disbursed, plus one-quarter of 1 percent.

FMS direct credit is provided at the cost of the money to the U.S. Government. In selected instances, concessionary financing is extended (money loaned at a rate lower than the United States pays for it.) As of June 30, 1976, FMS credit is repayable up to 12 years after the articles are delivered or services rendered.

According to U.S. officials, U.S. credit terms are generally considered more attractive than those offered by other Western nations. Great Britain and France, for example, have agreed to extend credit to Kenya at a minimum of 7-1/2 and 9 percent, respectively, for a period of only 7 years. Canada reportedly requires 9 percent over a 10-year repayment period. U.S. Embassy officials project that U.S. interest rates will be between 7 and 8 percent over 12 years. U.S. officials in Kenya, France, and the United Kingdom told us that other nations extend

less credit than the United States and most of them sell primarily for cash.

The Defense Department believes that the Soviets base the type and sophistication of equipment it sells on political gains and consequences, equipment availability, and production schedules. Soviet arms are reportedly priced lower than Western equipment and payment is generally spread over 8 to 10 years, including a grace period of 1 to 3 years, at 2 to 2-1/2 percent interest. The Soviet Union reportedly has been willing to accept payment in commodities or local currency and often reduces or postpones payments for recipients unable to meet them.

CREDIT PROVIDED FOR VARIOUS REASONS

Under criteria established by State, Defense, and the Treasury in accordance with legislated authority, credit or guaranty assistance should be extended only for sales to countries which have demonstrable financial needs and there is reasonable expectation of repayment. Congressional limitations on credit stipulate that credit sales to Africa shall not exceed \$40 million annually, excluding training, and that credit funds will not be authorized for the sale of sophisticated weapons to less developed countries. Under the Arms Export Control Act, the President may waive these limitations in the interest of national security.

In fiscal years 1975 and 1976, Morocco, backed by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, signed agreements with the United States for nearly \$380 million in cash for U.S. weapons, including advanced missile systems. This is more than eight times the amount of U.S. credit extended to Morocco during the same period. Morocco purchased French F-1 fighter aircraft, but U.S. officials in Morocco did not know whether this involved cash or credit. The \$45 million in U.S. credit proposed for Morocco in fiscal year 1978 is for an air defense radar system. A U.S. military official in Morocco commented that extending credit to Morocco demonstrated U.S. goodwill and he believes Morocco's economy is sound and the credit is a good investment.

As of October 1977, the United States had extended \$50 million in credit to Kenya for a \$250 million multilateral assistance program to modernize Kenya's military forces. According to U.S. Embassy officials, using cash

for this would have adversely affected Kenya's future economic development while long-term financing should minimize the impact.

Zaire faces substantial financial problems. U.S. credit of about \$85 million, some still unused, has been extended to Zaire over a number of years to modernize its military forces. This has been complemented by sales and assistance from France and Belgium.

Multiyear funding of aircraft for Kenya

In its annual presentation to the Congress, State proposes credit for FMS customers. Although State is restricted from committing U.S. financing beyond a 1-year period, 12 F-5 aircraft for Kenya were financed over several years contingent on congressional appropriation of funds.

In fiscal year 1975, the Congress approved \$5 million in credit which was to help Kenya pay for 12 used F-5s from Iran. Iran refused to sell its F-5s, and State attempted to persuade Kenya to purchase U.S. ground equipment with the approved credits. Kenya insisted on its need for F-5s, and State told Kenya it would seek the necessary funding for new F-5 aircraft. However, State and Embassy officials cautioned Kenya that multiyear financing could not be guaranteed.

The Congress approved \$5 million in FMS credits to Kenya for fiscal year 1975, \$30 million for 1976, \$15 million in 1977, and State requested \$15 million for 1978. This will total \$65 million in credits--the original amount needed to purchase the new aircraft.

\$40 million credit ceiling exceeded annually since 1974

The \$40 million annual ceiling on credit sales to Africa was waived in 1975, 1976, and 1977 because of (1) congressional elimination of grant assistance, (2) higher costs for military articles, and (3) increased military interest among African nations. This trend is expected to continue. In 1978, for example, State's proposed credits of \$45 million for Morocco exceed the ceiling for the whole continent. Total proposed credits for Africa in 1978 total over \$120 million, more than three times the legislated ceiling.

Credit for Zaire

As of April 1977, news sources reported that Zaire's estimated foreign debt was between \$2 billion and \$3 billion, some \$500 million of it with U.S. sources. Less than a year earlier, Zaire had agreed to an International Monetary Fund stabilization program, reportedly because of its economic state and pressures from outside creditors. A published interview with President Mobutu indicates that any progress made by the stabilization program was set back by the spring 1977 conflict in Shaba Province.

The United States provides Zaire with a mix of economic assistance, security supporting assistance, and military credits. As of July 1977, Zaire had unused U.S. military credits of about \$25 million. Although a major purpose of U.S. credit is to help economically less developed countries make the transition from military grant aid to FMS, there also should be a reasonable expectation of repayment by the country. Zaire's current financial position may affect its repayment capability. A State official acknowledged that this was a problem and that future U.S. agreements with Zaire might have to include grant aid. The U.S. survey team that evaluated Zaire's military modernization needs in 1976 suggested that, as one funding alternative, Zaire be granted a "waiver of liability" similar to that granted to Israel. The State Department informed us that this alternative is not being given serious consideration.

CONCLUSIONS

The U.S. credit policy helps friendly nations to purchase military items. With the elimination of grant aid, credit has been an important element in facilitating certain U.S. sales in Africa. Before military sales to Africa increased in 1975, the longstanding congressional credit ceiling of \$40 million for Africa appeared to be enough, but since that time, the ceiling has been waived annually.

The question of a credit ceiling involves the basis for providing credit, and section 34 of the Arms Export Control act authorizes the President to ascertain this. In certain circumstances, credit has been provided for goodwill purposes as well as for demonstrated financial need.

CHAPTER 5

STREAMLINING OVERSEAS MANAGEMENT

Kenya, the U.S. Air Force manages a \$68 million F-5 aircraft sale and a \$200,000 grant training program through the U.S. Embassy's political section. Beginning in 1978, a mobile training team and a temporary assistance field team will give the Kenyans specialized technical assistance. In 1975, the Embassy assumed that, in light of the new Arms Export Control Act, a three-man liaison office would be established at no cost to Kenya. However, since such an office would be essentially dealing only with F-5 programs, the Defense Security Assistance Agency decided that Kenya should fund it as part of the temporary assistance field team. Embassy management costs equal to 75 percent of one staff year are not reported as program management costs.

In Nigeria, the training program is managed by one U.S. military officer attached to the Embassy's Defense Attache, and he is supported by two secretaries. As program coordinator, he matches Nigerian training requirements with available U.S. training courses. He believes his major role is to eliminate potential administrative problems.

At the time of our review in April 1977, the U.S. overseas management group in Morocco had 17 U.S. military personnel, 3 U.S. civilians, and 4 local nationals. The group included a program manager's office, Air Force and Army program sections, a joint plans and training section, and an administration and services section. About 5 percent of the group's time was spent in serving as liaison between U.S. commercial military vendors and Moroccan military officials.

EXCESS STAFFING IN MOROCCO

The MAAG in Morocco seemed to be overstaffed, compared with U.S. management operations in other countries.

For fiscal year 1977, the management group was authorized 19 U.S. military personnel. At the time of our review, a U.S. Air Force Colonel had overall responsibility for implementing U.S. programs in Morocco.

The Air Force program was being administered by one U.S. officer and two enlisted men and the Army program by four U.S. officers and three enlisted men. Both program staffs included personnel skilled in such areas as logistics and maintenance, and the Army personnel were also skilled in communications and in operating specific types of military equipment.

The joint plans and training section was implementing the U.S. grant training program and helping Morocco to develop incountry training programs. The section consisted of one officer, two enlisted men, and a U.S. civilian advisor for English-language training.

An eight-member administration section, representing one-third of the U.S. overseas team in Morocco, handles translation/interpretation, budget and accounting, personnel, transportation, mail distribution, Government-leased housing, and other matters. A U.S. military officer had section responsibility and was assisted by two enlisted men, one U.S. civilian secretary/translator, and four local nationals (three serving as chauffeurs).

Our observations on management operations

Five of the seven permanently assigned staff of the Army section performed advisory functions. These positions included a wheel and track vehicle mechanic, chief supply sergeant, tank unit commander, armor crewman, and communication electronics system officer. Two of the advisory positions were being eliminated in fiscal year 1978, and one position was to be filled by a Chapparal/Vulcan system technician for systems programed for delivery in 1978. In 1976, two Army section members worked full time with the M-48 mobile training team in training Moroccans on the U.S. tank.

The work of at least one of the three staff members of the Air Force section was advisory in nature. An enlisted logistician gives technical assistance to Moroccan air force units on maintenance procedures and techniques.

A 1975 Department of State Inspector General's report recommended that, because of their specific skills, at least seven members of the management group would be more properly assigned temporarily--as in Kenya's program.

Although State and Defense concurred with the recommendation, no action was taken, and some of the positions identified above were still part of the management group at the time of our review.

It appeared to us that the training section was also excessively staffed. The grant training program, estimated at \$835,000 in fiscal year 1977 and \$1.2 million in 1978, was managed by three military personnel. In contrast, the training program for Nigeria, \$1.5 million in 1977 and \$2 million in 1978, is being managed by one military officer and a part-time secretary.

Some U.S. officials in Morocco agreed that the management group's staff was excessive. An Embassy official believed the work could be accomplished by "five or so staff members." One section chief said his staff was too large and most of its administration work could be done in Washington, D.C., where there would be better access to U.S. logistics personnel.

CONCLUSION

The military management group staff levels in Morocco appear to be excessive when compared to other management operations. When management services are required, they may best be performed in the United States or by assigning temporary personnel overseas for specific periods.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense:

- Reduce the management staff in Morocco to the level required for the scope and needs of the Foreign Military Sales program. This would be in consonance with what we believe to be congressional intent to phase down these groups consistent with U.S. national security interests.
- Study the feasibility of performing necessary management services in the United States or by assigning management personnel overseas on a temporary basis.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

The Department of Defense stated that the personnel authorization for the Morocco U.S. Liaison Office has been reduced and that action is underway to focus its efforts on the primary function of security assistance management.

We believe that Defense's efforts to reduce the number of personnel engaged in managing the Moroccan security assistance program is a necessary step and consistent with the intent of Congress. We also believe that Defense should ascertain whether such management services could be better provided in the United States or by assigning personnel overseas on a temporary basis.

CHAPTER 6

HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING

The 1976 Arms Export Control Act states that it is U.S. policy to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and that, except under special circumstances, no security assistance, including military sales, may be provided to any country whose government engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. Gross violations are defined as torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged detention without charges or trial; and other flagrant denials of the right of life, liberty, or personal security.

To implement the 1976 legislation, the Congress created a position of coordinator for human rights issues within the Department of State and directed State, as part of its annual security assistance program proposals, to provide individual country reports on human rights practices.

IMPLEMENTATION AND PROBLEMS

All diplomatic posts have been given the Department of State's interpretation of the legislative intent and overall guidance on how the country reports should be prepared and what they should contain. We noted that, in one message, State stressed that the report should be as candid as possible but at the same time should protect legitimate U.S. security interests. We were unable to determine whether the caveat in this message affected the frankness of the reports. The human rights reports provided to the Congress generally have accurately transmitted data submitted by the U.S. Embassies.

Embassy officials in Nigeria, Kenya, and Morocco told us that State's general guidance allowed considerable flexibility to gather information based on the particular circumstances in country. However, in preparing reports, Embassy officials may be constrained by the same governmental structure and practices which limit the rights of the countries' citizens. For example, the Nigerian Government is run by the military, has no parliament or assembly, and is very reserved in dealings with U.S. Embassy officials and unwilling to discuss human rights. For this reason, the reports reflect day-to-day media reports and Embassy

officials' observations. The State Department believes Nigeria has no serious human rights problem and that the Embassy has not been "unusually limited" in its ability to appraise the human rights situation.

U.S. officials in Kenya and Morocco have discussed human rights with national officials and have presented government officials with pertinent sections of the 1976 Arms Export Control Act. In Kenya, Embassy officials have also talked with former prisoners and opposition party members about human rights.

The Deputy Coordinator for Human Rights recognizes that certain governments are reluctant to provide human rights information, thus making it difficult to learn who is responsible for violations or whether the government condones or approves the violations. Terms used in the legislation create another problem because they contain no measurable standards for defining gross violations, consistent patterns, and flagrant patterns.

CONDITIONS IN FIVE AFRICAN COUNTRIES

We learned from Embassy sources in Kenya, Morocco, and Nigeria that these countries' constitutions recognize and usually respect the ordinary citizen's individual human rights and freedoms. Political figures or activities perceived as threats to national security or to the Heads of State are dealt with severely.

Zaire and Ethiopia, according to human rights reports, appear to be violating the rights of both average citizens and political opponents. In Zaire, reported allegations include massive exploitation, a corrupt judicial system, lack of free expression, brutal treatment of suspected and convicted criminals, and detention of prisoners without trial.

According to Amnesty International, human rights in Ethiopia are deteriorating. Since 1974, the military regime has developed a consistent pattern of widespread violations. In Eritrea, starvation has been used as a weapon, villages have been bombed, and hostages have been shot. In Addis Ababa, some political opponents are detained without trial and summarily executed.

The United States recognized these violations in Ethiopia and Zaire but did not reduce FMS programs. The violations contributed to the termination of U.S. military assistance to Ethiopia, but Zaire continues to receive U.S.-financed military items.

CHAPTER 7

PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROLS IN AFRICA

In recent years, worldwide military sales have exceeded \$20 billion annually, with the United States accounting for about half of these sales. Since the United States is the number one supplier, U.S. policymakers and others believe it has an obligation to take the lead in controlling arms transfers, particularly to underdeveloped nations. However, attempts to curtail U.S. military sales to Africa are complicated because:

1. The United States is but one of many suppliers and arms reductions will probably require international agreement.
2. African nations want arms sales continued, at least until some military "balance" is achieved. A U.S. unilateral decision to reduce arms transfers would have a minimal effect on arms procurements in Africa and could adversely affect U.S. interests.
3. A U.S. unilateral decision today would not reduce U.S. arms commitments in the pipeline through the early 1980s.

THE UNITED STATES IS ONE OF MANY SUPPLIERS

In 1975, U.S. military sales agreements with African nations totaled over \$320 million. Other free world nations concluded over \$1 billion in agreements.

If the United States unilaterally halted arms transfers, Africa could turn to other suppliers for the same type of equipment; therefore, any reduction in arms transfers to Africa will require international agreement.

The United Kingdom and France have strong economic motivations to continue arms sales because their defense industries reportedly depend on such sales. According to U.S. officials in these countries, sales to Africa are a small part of total French and British arms exports but their arms control actions would depend in part on U.S. actions. In the past, U.S. dominance of the NATO armaments and military equipment market has been identified as a

factor in French and British transfers to the third world. An increase in U.S. military purchases from the United Kingdom, France, and other NATO nations might be an incentive for these nations to curtail their sales to third world nations. U.S. officials believe that the United Kingdom and France would not agree to multilateral constraint without Soviet Union participation.

According to one U.S. official, the Soviet Union provides arms as a matter of convenience because it is constantly upgrading its equipment and has excess military equipment to dispose of. Thus, arms have proved a handy tool for the Soviet Union to use to gain influence in the third world. The official said that another reason for Soviet military assistance is its limited capability for offering economic assistance.

AFRICA WANTS ARMS SALES TO CONTINUE

According to the Defense Department, suppliers must recognize that arms buyers have interests to protect and the arbitrary denial of conventional arms can cost the suppliers a lot of goodwill. Understandably, buyers resist controls over weapons they see as essential to their security. Until they obtain some feeling of military balance, most African nations would probably resist arms control measures. As part of our review in Morocco, Kenya, and Nigeria, we discussed arms control with U.S. and national officials.

Kenya and Morocco perceive external military threats and are purchasing military items to upgrade their military forces and achieve arms balance with their neighbors. Government officials in both countries told us that, once this "balance" is achieved, their countries would be willing to participate in arms control measures if they were applied equitably to all arms buyers by all supplier nations. These officials recognize that fulfilling their current defense needs detracts from their economic development efforts.

On the other hand, according to U.S. officials, Nigeria believes that it has money to pay for arms because of its oil resources and that it should be free to buy from any supplier. One U.S. official stated that Nigeria would probably view any multilateral arms control action as offensive to its drive for status. However, Nigeria perceives no external threat and it has the largest military force in sub-Sahara Africa.

Nigeria depends on many suppliers for arms, and U.S. officials believe that it would not be concerned if the United States took unilateral action because it is not procuring major items from the United States. Kenya and Morocco, however, are more dependent on the United States for important segments of their military development and would probably view unilateral action as U.S. abandonment.

Acceptable alternatives to arms sales are limited. Increased economic assistance might be more socially acceptable, but, since most arms sales to Africa are for cash, economic assistance would not be a comparable financial tradeoff. It could even have the reverse effect, by making more funds available to African nations to purchase military items from other nations.

U.S. FUTURE COMMITMENTS

Although efforts may be made to reduce the level of U.S. arms transfers, a reduction will not occur overnight. Based on sales to date, the United States is committed to providing equipment and supplies to Africa through the 1980s and follow-on support for arms already transferred. The United States has agreed to help Zaire's military with deliveries continuing into 1978.

In Kenya, the current U.S. program is to provide 12 F-5 aircraft and related ammunition and other support. Morocco has ordered various types of conventional aircraft bombs, and the United States is now providing it with various types of missiles; Vulcan gun systems; howitzers; and M-48 tanks, mortar, and related ammunition. Scheduled delivery and related training will continue through 1980. Both Kenya and Morocco have arranged for U.S. follow-on support.

CONCLUSION

U.S. unilateral arms control initiatives in Africa are unlikely to halt the flow of arms to African nations. Moreover, refusal to sell arms could adversely affect U.S. interests and could counter foreign policy objectives by encouraging nations to seek more arms from the Soviets. Successful arms control for the African continent will probably require agreement among all sellers, including the Soviet Union, and finding alternatives acceptable to African buyers. Because of present commitments and projected deliveries over the next few years, a substantial U.S. involvement in African arms supply will continue through at least 1980.