Summary

At the time GAO issued its report in May 1996 (GAO/NSIAD-96-99), the State Department was attempting to make its visa-issuing process more efficient and less vulnerable to fraud by (1) issuing visas that were machine readable, (2) expanding automated name-check capability to all posts, (3) forming "lookout" committees to identify suspected terrorists and others ineligible for visas, and (4) strengthening compliance with management controls. Since then, the State Department's efforts to combat visa fraud at diplomatic posts by introducing a machine-readable visa system have been hampered by technical problems, a lack of cooperation from other government agencies, and weak management controls at many U.S. embassies.

GAO noted that: (1) at the time of GAO's review, State's strategy for reducing the potential for visa fraud was to: (a) issue visas that are machine readable; (b) expand automated name-check capability to all posts; (c) form so-called "lookout" committees to identify suspected terrorists and others ineligible for visas; and (d) strengthen compliance with management controls; (2) after assessing State's progress on these key initiatives, GAO found mixed results; (3) while the automation initiative had progressed after some delay, operational problems at some locations diminished the effectiveness of these efforts; (4) these include: (a) technical problems that limited the availability and usefulness of the automated data base; (b) inadequate cooperation by some key U.S. agencies in State's lookout committees; and (c) lack of compliance with management control procedures; and (5) while State has continued to move forward in automating its visa-issuance process, a recent report by State's Inspector General concluded that many problems still exist.