Summary

During the last decade, concerns about the possible use of chemical and biological weapons in both military and civilian settings have led Congress to boost funding for new and expanded initiatives to counter these threats. For example, the Chemical and Biological Defense Program appropriation has more than doubled from $388 million in fiscal year 1996 to $791 million. This testimony discusses whether a framework exists to monitor and evaluate the impact of increased funding on protecting soldiers from the effects of chemical and biological weapons.

GAO noted that: (1) congressional reports and administrative guidance indicate that DOD programs such as the Chemical and Biological Defense Program should follow the Results Act's outcome-oriented principles, including the establishment of general goals (quantifiable, measurable, outcome-oriented performance goals) and related measures; (2) moreover, research organizations such as the Research Roundtable, the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine have concluded that both applied and basic research programs supported by the federal government could be evaluated meaningfully in accordance with the Results Act framework; (3) DOD's Chemical and Biological Defense Program in general, and its research and development (R&D) activities in particular, have not incorporated key Results Act principles; (4) program goals are vague and unmeasurable and the performance measures emphasize activities rather than impacts; (5) in the absence of explicit and measurable goals, it is difficult to assess the impact of the program on warfighters' ability to survive, fight, and win in a chemical and biological environment; (6) Chemical and Biological Defense Program R&D organizations have incorporated Results Act principles inconsistently; (7) only one of three DOD organizations that engage in R&D activities in support of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program has adopted the Results Act planning and evaluation tools; and (8) the remaining two cited either the utilization of equivalent planning tools or the unique challenges of evaluating R&D activities as reasons for not adopting the Results Act processes.