Summary

The trend in terrorism against U.S. targets, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, is toward large-scale incidents for maximum destruction, terror, and media impact--such as the 1995 terrorist plot to blow up 12 U.S. airliners in one day, mainly in the Pacific region. Among the most important safeguards in the United States and other countries against such attacks are airport checkpoints where passengers and carry-on items are screened for dangerous items, such as guns and explosives. However, U.S. screeners, generally contractor employees hired by air carriers, have historically had difficulty in detecting dangerous items. Long-standing problems reduce screeners' accuracy, most notably (1) the rapid turnover of screener personnel--often above 100 percent a year at large airports and, in a recent case, more than 400 percent a year--leaving few experienced screeners to staff checkpoints and (2) human factors, such as the effect of repetitive tasks, that have long affected screeners' hiring, training, and working environment. A key factor in turnover is the low wages that screeners receive. Often they are paid at or close to minimum wage and can earn more at airport fast-food restaurants. Although FAA has established performance improvement goals for screeners and begun efforts to improve screener performance, it has not completed a plan to tie those efforts to achievement of the goals and has not adequately measured its progress in achieving the goals. The screening procedures of the countries GAO visited--Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom--are similar to U.S. procedures, e.g., metal detectors at checkpoints. Some aspects differ. Notably, turnover is less, at about 50 percent a year, in the other countries; wages are higher; and performance may be better.

GAO noted that: (1) long-standing problems combine to reduce screeners' effectiveness in detecting dangerous objects, most notably: (a) the rapid turnover of screener personnel--often above 100 percent a year at large airports and, in at least one recent instance, above 400 percent a year; and (b) human factors conditions that have for years affected screeners' hiring, training, and working environment; (2) a key factor in the rapid turnover is the low wages screeners receive; (3) screeners are often paid the minimum wage or close to it and can often earn more at airport fast-food restaurants; (4) FAA is pursuing several initiatives to improve the hiring, training, and testing of screeners, to increase their alertness and more closely monitor their performance, and to certify the security companies that air carriers retain to staff screening checkpoints; (5) however, most of these efforts are behind schedule; (6) FAA has established performance improvement goals for screeners, but it has not: (a) completed an integrated plan to tie its various efforts to improve screeners' performance to the achievement of its goals; and (b) adequately measured its progress in achieving its goals for improving screeners' performance; (7) passenger screening procedures in the countries GAO visited are similar to those in the United States; (8) passengers walk through metal detectors at airport checkpoints and have their carry-on baggage scanned by X-ray machines or physically searched by screeners; (9) but there are also some differences; (10) for example, in most countries, screeners must undergo more extensive training, screeners receive higher wages and better benefits, and screening responsibility rests with the government or the airport, not with the air carriers as it does in the United States; (11) among the five countries GAO visited--Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom--the turnover rate for screeners was lower--about 50 percent a year or less--and in a joint test conducted by FAA and one of these countries, screeners' performance was higher; (12) however, the feasibility of applying these countries' practices to screening operations in the United States cannot be readily determined; and (13) given the uncertainty and the fact that FAA has already begun several efforts to improve screeners' performance, GAO is not making recommendations to revise current screening practices in the United States.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Implemented" or "Not implemented" based on our follow up work.

Recommendations for Executive Action