Summary

The training and equipment that the Defense Department is providing to cities through the Domestic Preparedness Program have clearly increased cities' awareness of and should better prepare them to deal with a terrorist attack involving chemical or biological weapons. In designing the training and equipment program, DOD chose 120 cities solely on the basis of population. The decision resulted in 14 clusters of 44 cities within 30 miles of at least one other city selected. By dealing directly with cities, DOD did not build upon the states' existing emergency management and training structure. Had it used existing structures, such as counties, response regions, mutual aid agreements, or other similar arrangements that reflect how emergency response is actually organized, DOD could have consolidated training and equipment purchases to cover more jurisdictions in fewer locations than now planned, at less cost. DOD's loan of equipment in support of the training program has frustrated and confused local officials. DOD has established a five-year renewable loan agreement to govern the provision of about $300,000 worth of equipment to each city. This agreement restricts the use of the equipment to training and requires the cities to maintain, repair, and replace the equipment, even though DOD program officials intended the loans to be permanent and will allow the use of equipment for operational purposes. The interagency coordination process provided a valuable information-sharing forum but was of limited success in helping steer the design and development of the program. Local officials in most of the cities GAO visited raised concerns that many training, equipment, and consequence management programs are evidence of a fragmented and possibly wasteful federal approach toward combating terrorism.

GAO noted that: (1) the training and equipment that the Department of Defense (DOD) is providing to cities through the Domestic Preparedness Program have clearly increased cities' awareness of and should better prepare them to deal with a potential chemical or biological terrorist incident; (2) local officials in the seven cities GAO visited praised the training program's content, instructors, and materials as well as DOD's willingness to modify the program based on suggestions from local officials; (3) they also credited the program with bringing local, state, and federal regional emergency response agencies together into a closer working relationship; (4) in designing the training and equipment program, DOD selected 120 cities based solely on city population; (5) this decision resulted in 14 clusters of 44 cities within 30 miles of at least one other city selected; (6) by dealing with cities, DOD did not build upon the states' existing emergency management and training structures; (7) had it used existing structures that reflect how emergency response is actually organized, DOD could have consolidated training and equipment purchases to cover more jurisdictions in fewer locations than presently planned, at less cost; (8) DOD's loan of equipment in support of the training program has caused frustration and confusion among local officials; (9) the legislation authorized DOD to lend equipment to local jurisdictions, and DOD established a 5-year renewable loan agreement to govern the provision of about $300,000 worth of equipment to each city; (10) this agreement restricts the use of the equipment to training rather than operational purposes and requires the cities to repair, maintain, and replace the equipment; (11) cities were concerned about the lack of federal sustainment money to maintain, repair, and replace the equipment; (12) the program has raised expectations among some local officials that the federal government may provide additional funding for operational equipment; (13) the interagency coordination process provided a valuable information-sharing forum but was of limited success in helping steer the design and development of the program; (14) federal agencies' individual efforts to enhance consequence management of possible incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism are not guided by an overarching strategy for achieving a defined end state; and (15) local officials in most of the cities raised the issue that the many WMD training, equipment, and consequence management programs are evidence of a fragmented and wasteful federal approach toward combating terrorism.