Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear

NSIAD-99-110 May 21, 1999
Full Report (PDF, 52 pages)  

Summary

The Defense Department (DOD) recently approved the creation of 10 National Guard response teams to help state and local authorities deal with terrorists attacks involving weapons of mass destruction. GAO found differing views on the role and the use of these response teams and how they will fit into state and federal plans to respond to weapons of mass destruction. Army officials believe that the teams can be a valuable asset to federal authorities. They also believe that the teams will be a critical part of the state and local response. However, officials with the FBI and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which are responsible for managing the federal response to terrorist attacks, do not see a role for the teams in the federal response. Instead, they foresee the National Guard providing its traditional assistance in emergencies. Differing views also exist at the state level. Many state, local, and federal groups can do the work that the teams would perform. For example, more than 600 state and local hazardous materials teams in the United States deal with incidents involving highly toxic industrial chemicals and other hazardous materials. GAO's discussions with state, local, and federal officials and its own analysis found several concerns that could affect the teams' abilities to meet their mission and responsibilities. These concerns centered on recruiting and retention, training, and operational issues. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see: Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear, by Mark E. Gebicke, Director of National Security Preparedness Issues, before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans' Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184, June 23 (10 pages).

GAO noted that: (1) GAO had previously reported that the many and increasing number of participants and programs in the evolving terrorism area across the federal government pose a difficult management and coordination challenge to avoid program duplication, fragmentation, and gaps; (2) while the Department of Defense has defined the specific mission for the RAID teams, the plans for the teams and their implementation continue to evolve; (3) GAO found that there are differing views on the role and use of RAID teams and how they will fit into state and federal plans to respond to weapons of mass destruction; (4) Army officials believe the teams can be a valuable asset to federal authorities, if needed, as part of the federal response plan; (5) they also believe that the teams will be a critical and integral part of the state and local response to such weapons; (6) officials with the two agencies responsible for managing the federal response to terrorist incidents--the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)--do not see a role for the RAID teams in the federal response; (7) instead, they see the National Guard, whether in state or federal status, providing its traditional assistance in emergencies; (8) differing views also exist at the state level; (9) officials in states without a RAID team do not see how the teams can benefit their states' response capabilities because of the time it takes the RAID teams to respond; (10) however, one state official does see the RAID team bringing some expertise that could be useful; (11) there are numerous local, state, and federal organizations that can perform similar functions to the RAID teams; (12) in addition, there are numerous military and federal civilian organizations that can help local incident commanders deal with weapons of mass destruction incidents by providing advice, technical experts, and equipment; (13) GAO's discussions with local, state, and federal officials surfaced a number of concerns, such as recruiting and retention, training, and operational issues, that could impact the teams' abilities to meet their mission and responsibilities; and (14) these issues further point to the need for a more focused and coordinated approach to the U.S. response to attacks involving weapons of mass destruction--an approach that capitalizes on existing capabilities, minimizes unnecessary duplication of activities and programs, and focuses funding on the highest priority requirements.