Summary

Many federal organizations are involved in developing technologies to better detect explosives and narcotics being smuggled aboard commercial aircraft or through U.S. ports of entry. For example, the Federal Aviation Administration is the lead agency responsible for developing explosives detection technologies for civil aviation security, while the Office of National Drug Control Policy is coordinating federal counterdrug technology efforts. The U.S. Customs Service and the Defense Department are also involved in deploying technologies at U.S. ports of entry. However, GAO found that these organization have yet to agree on standards for explosives detection systems, profiling and targeting systems, and deploying canine teams at airports. In addition, they have not agreed on how to resolve issues related to a joint-use strategy and liability. Moreover, key decisionmakers are not receiving periodic reports on efforts by the various government entities to develop and field explosives and narcotics detection technologies.

GAO noted that: (1) numerous federal organizations are involved in developing technologies for detecting explosives and narcotics; (2) the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is the key agency responsible for developing explosives detection technologies for civil aviation security; (3) in response to the explosion of TWA Flight 800, the President established the White House Commission on Aviation Security and Safety to recommend ways of improving security against terrorism; (4) the Commission's recommendations included assigning a new role to the U.S. Customs Service in screening outbound, international cargo for explosives; (5) in September 1996, Congress gave the Secretary of Treasury authority to develop governmentwide standards for canine teams; (6) regarding narcotics detection, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) is responsible for coordinating federal counterdrug technology efforts and assessing and recommending detection technologies; (7) Customs, with technology development support and funding from the Department of Defense, ultimately decides which technologies will be developed and deployed at U.S. ports of entry; (8) Customs has not deployed some technologies because it did not believe that they were affordable, safe, or operationally suitable for its needs; (9) in addition, Customs and ONDCP have differing views regarding the types of detection technologies needed along the Southwest border; (10) joint technology development is important because the types of technologies used to detect explosives and narcotics are similar; (11) the developers of narcotics detection technologies have not always participated in committees that oversee the development of explosives detection technologies; (12) in the future, Customs plans to participate in these committees; (13) at the direction of Congress, an interagency working group on counterterrorism plans to spend $19 million to develop a system for detecting explosives that Customs may possibly use in a seaport environment to detect drugs; (14) despite efforts to strengthen development of explosives and narcotics technologies, GAO found that the cognizant agencies have not yet agreed to formal understandings on how to establish standards for explosives detection systems, profiling and targeting systems, and deploying canine teams at airports; (15) in addition, they have not agreed on how to resolve issues related to a joint-use strategy and liability; and (16) furthermore, key decisionmakers are not receiving periodic comprehensive reports on the aggregated efforts of the various government entities to develop and field explosives and narcotics detection technologies.