Summary
From fiscal years 1997 through 1999, 42 executive branch positions at 31 executive branch agencies--including all 14 Cabinet secretaries, four deputy or under secretaries, and 24 other high-ranking officials (mainly heads of agencies)--had security protection. Personnel from 27 different agencies protected them: 36 officials by their own agencies or departments and six from other agencies or departments, such as the Secret Service and the Marshals Service. Protective personnel increased 73 percent from fiscal year 1997 through 1999. Funding rose from $19.1 million in 1997 to $28.5 million in 1999, largely due to increased travel. Only the Secret Service and State Department have specific statutory authority to protect executive branch officials. Agencies reported that their officials received different levels and frequency of protection and that protection was needed to respond to possible and actual threats. Most agencies favored establishing a repository of protective intelligence to facilitate sharing of threat information about their officials. Also, agencies reported that their protective personnel received different amounts of protection training and from different sources. Field staff received less training than did the agencies' full-time personnel based in Washington. Most agencies favored establishing a standardized protection training program. Most agencies opposed centralizing security protection under one agency. No single agency or official is responsible for handling issues relating to routine protection of executive branch officials. This fragmentation has serious implications because 14 of the protected officials are in the line of presidential succession. Moreover, the lack of thorough threat assessments documenting the level of protection needed makes it difficult to determine the basis for and reasonableness of protection being given. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see: Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch Officials by Bernard L. Ungar, Director of Government Business Operations and Robert H. Hast, Assistant Comptroller General for Special Investigations, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight, Senate Committee on the Judiciary. GAO/T-GGD/OSI-00-177, July 27 (10 pages).
GAO noted that: (1) from fiscal years 1997 through 1999, agency security officials said that security protection was provided to officials holding 42 executive branch positions at 31 executive branch agencies; (2) the 42 officials were protected by personnel from 27 different agencies; (3) agencies reported that the number of full-time protective personnel increased by 73 percent from fiscal years 1997 through 1999; (4) the 27 agencies also reported spending a total of at least $73.7 million to protect those officials during that 3-year period; (5) only two agencies--the Secret Service and the Department of State--had specific authority to protect executive branch officials; (6) the other agencies relied on a variety of other authorities in providing protection to officials; (7) according to agencies with security protection as one of their primary missions, threat assessments form the basis for determining the need and scope of protection; (8) however, nearly three-fourths of the agencies that provided protection said they had not prepared detailed, written threat analyses justifying their decisions to apply certain levels of protection and expend resources; (9) most agencies favored establishing a central repository of protective intelligence to facilitate sharing of threat information about their officials; (10) security officials said the implications of establishing a central repository of protective intelligence to facilitate sharing of such information among agencies would involve a number of issues; (11) protective personnel from the agencies with security protection as one of their primary missions reported having more training than those employed by the other agencies; (12) most agencies favored establishing a standardized protection training program so that different agencies' protective personnel would be trained in the same procedures and would react in a similar manner in case of an emergency; (13) security officials at most of the agencies in GAO's review said they opposed centralizing security under one agency because it would be more effective to use the agencies' own personnel; (14) the implications of centralizing security protection governmentwide involves many issues; (15) GAO found that no single agency or official was responsible for handling issues relating to the routine protection of executive branch officials; and (16) this fragmentation of protective responsibilities among multiple executive branch agencies has implications regarding the functioning of government, in part, because 14 of the protected officials are in the line of presidential succession.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change
from "In process" to "Implemented" or "Not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director:
Team:
Phone:
No director on record
No team on record
No phone on record
Matters for Congressional Consideration
Recommendation: Once the Director, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), has submitted his recommendations to Congress, Congress should consider enacting legislation that would provide whatever agency or agencies that provide protection with specific statutory authority to effectively carry out these responsibilities. In addition, should it be determined that centralized protection training, threat assessment, or protection services are appropriate, Congress should consider making the resources available to the appropriate agency or agencies that are designated to provide these services and provide any needed legislative changes.
Status: Implemented
Comments: In December 2000, Congress enacted the Presidential Threat Protection Act (P.L. 106-544), which authorized the establishment of the National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) as a unit within the U.S. Secret Service to facilitate information sharing among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies with protective responsibilities. NTAC activities may include training, consultation on complex threat assessment cases or plans, threat assessment research and prevention of targeted violence, programs to promote standardization of threat assessment and investigations involving threats, and other activities necessary to implement a comprehensive threat assessment capability. No further action is anticipated.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Recommendation: The Director, OMB, in consultation with the President, should designate an appropriate official or group to assess security protection issues for top-level federal officials. At a minimum, this assessment should include such issues as (1) how agencies can best obtain protective intelligence from governmentwide sources needed to prepare thorough threat assessments, including an assessment of whether a central protective intelligence repository should be established and, if so, who should administer it.
Agency Affected: Executive Office of the President: Office of Management and Budget
Status: Implemented
Comments: After Congress established the National Threat Assessment Center, the Secret Service implemented a program to share intelligence on a government-wide basis and to prepare more uniform threat assessments.
Recommendation: The Director, OMB, in consultation with the President, should designate an appropriate official or group to assess security protection issues for top-level federal officials. At a minimum, this assessment should include such issues as how best to ensure that a clear linkage exists between the documented threat assessments and the need for and level of protection for the routine protection of top executive branch officials.
Agency Affected: Executive Office of the President: Office of Management and Budget
Status: Implemented
Comments: The Secret Service has taken the lead on executive protection after the National Threat Assessment Center was established. Through the Center and the Secret Service's Regional Information Sharing System, along with quarterly seminars sponsored by the Secret Service, agencies are better able to link threat assessments with protection levels given to top-level officials.
Recommendation: The Director, OMB, in consultation with the President, should designate an appropriate official or to assess security protection issues for top-level federal officials. At a minimum, this assessment should include such issues as what training should be provided to federal protective personnel, to what extent the training should be standardized, and who should provide it.
Agency Affected: Executive Office of the President: Office of Management and Budget
Status: Implemented
Comments: The Secret Service now provides training on executive protection on a quarterly basis to interested agencies.
Recommendation: The Director, OMB, in consultation with the President, should designate an appropriate official or group to assess security protection issues for top-level federal officials. At a minimum, this assessment should include such issues as whether security protection should be centralized under one agency or, if not, whether any changes in the way protection is being provided should be made.
Agency Affected: Executive Office of the President: Office of Management and Budget
Status: Not Implemented
Comments: No further action is anticipated on this recommendation.
Recommendation: The Director, OMB, in consultation with the President, should designate an appropriate official or group to assess security protection issues for top-level federal officials. At a minimum, this assessment should include such issues as whether agencies or offices of Inspectors General should be provided with specific statutory authority to provide protection, and whether the Marshals Service should continue to renew its deputation of agencies' protective personnel.
Agency Affected: Executive Office of the President: Office of Management and Budget
Status: Not Implemented
Comments: No further action is anticipated.
Recommendation: The Director, OMB, in consultation with the President, should designate an appropriate official or group to assess security protection issues for top-level federal officials. At a minimum, this assessment should include such issues as whether the administration should adopt a policy regarding the routine protection of top executive branch officials.
Agency Affected: Executive Office of the President: Office of Management and Budget
Status: Not Implemented
Comments: No further action is anticipated.
Recommendation: The Director, OMB, in consultation with the President, should designate an appropriate official or group to assess security protection issues for top-level federal officials. At a minimum, this assessment should include such issues as whether an official or group should be designated to oversee security protection issues for top executive branch officials on an ongoing basis.
Agency Affected: Executive Office of the President: Office of Management and Budget
Status: Not Implemented
Comments: No further action is anticipated.
Recommendation: To ensure that the benefits of this assessment are realized, the Director, OMB, should direct the individual or group conducting the assessment to produce an action plan that identifies any issues requiring congressional action.
Agency Affected: Executive Office of the President: Office of Management and Budget
Status: Implemented
Comments: With the establishment of the National Threat Assessment Center and the Regional Information Sharing System, the Secret Service has implemented most of the actions recommended in GAO's report. No further action is anticipated.
