Summary
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the global war on terrorism have triggered the largest activation of National Guard forces since World War II. As of June 2004, over one-half of the National Guard's 457,000 personnel had been activated for overseas warfighting or domestic homeland security missions in federal and state active duty roles. In addition to increased usage, the Guard has also experienced long deployments and high demand for personnel with specific skills, such as military police. The high pace of operations and the Guard's expanded role since September 11 have raised concerns about whether the Guard is capable of successfully performing its multiple missions within existing and expected resource levels, especially given the challenges it faces in meeting future requirements. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which the Guard is: (1) adapting to meet warfighting requirements in the post-September 11 security environment and (2) supporting immediate and emerging homeland security needs.
The Army and the Air National Guard have begun adapting their forces to meet new warfighting requirements since the September 11 attacks, but some measures taken to meet short-term requirements have degraded the readiness of nondeployed units, particularly in the Army National Guard. To deploy ready units for overseas missions, the Army National Guard has had to transfer equipment and personnel from nondeploying units. Between September 11, 2001, and July 2004, the Army National Guard had performed over 74,000 personnel transfers. Similarly, as of May 2004, the Army National Guard had transferred over 35,000 equipment items to prepare deploying units, leaving nondeployed Army National Guard units short one-third of the critical equipment they need for war. The Army has developed plans, such as the Army Campaign Plan, to restructure its forces to better prepare them for future missions. However, it has not finalized detailed plans identifying equipment needs and costs for restructuring Guard units. Moreover, the Army is still structured and funded according to a resourcing plan that does not provide Guard units all the personnel and equipment they need to deploy in wartime, so the Army National Guard will be challenged to continue to provide ready units for operations expected in the next 3 to 5 years. The Air National Guard is also adapting to meet new warfighting requirements, but it has not been as negatively affected as the Army National Guard because it has not been required to sustain the same high level of operations. In addition, the Air National Guard generally maintains fully manned and equipped units. While the Army and the Air National Guard have, thus far, also supported the nation's homeland security needs, the Guard's preparedness to perform homeland security missions that may be needed in the future is unknown because requirements and readiness standards and measures have not been defined. Without this information, policy makers are not in the best position to manage the risks to the nation's homeland security by targeting investments to the highest priority needs and ensuring that the investments are having the desired effect. Since September 11, the Guard has been performing several unanticipated homeland missions, such as flying patrols over U.S. cities and guarding critical infrastructure. However, states have concerns about the preparedness and availability of Guard forces for domestic needs and natural disasters while overseas deployments continue at a high pace. The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to publish a comprehensive strategy for homeland security missions that DOD will lead. However, DOD has not reached agreement with multiple federal and state authorities on the Guard's role in such missions. Also, the National Guard Bureau has proposed initiatives to strengthen the Guard's homeland security capabilities. However, many of these initiatives are at an early stage and will require coordination and approval from other stakeholders, such as DOD and the states. In the absence of clear homeland security requirements, the Guard's preparedness to perform missions at home cannot be measured to determine whether it needs additional assets or training.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change
from "In process" to "Implemented" or "Not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director:
Team:
Phone:
Janet A. St. Laurent
Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management
(202) 512-4402
Recommendations for Executive Action
Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a strategy that addresses the Army National Guard's needs for the global war on terrorism, including the Army National Guard's anticipated role, missions, and requirements for personnel and equipment in both the near and long term. The near-term portion of the strategy should address the current decline in readiness for overseas missions and the Army National Guard's plans to provide the ready forces needed for the global war on terrorism over the next 3 to 5 years. Specifically it should include an analysis of how support for current operations will affect the readiness of nondeployed Army National Guard forces for future overseas and domestic missions.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: In process
Comments: DOD agreed with the recommendation. In its response, DOD said that it has developed a plan (the Army Campaign plan) that addresses the Guard's needs for its anticipated operational role in prolonged overseas conflict. It agreed that analysis should continue to identify readiness impacts to the current force, both deployed and non-deployed, and that measures should be identified to minimize negative impacts in the near term for the non-deployed force. In March 2006, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs directed the Army to provide a plan for how it will structure and resource its reserve components to fulfill their new roles and missions.
Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a strategy that addresses the Army National Guard's needs for the global war on terrorism, including the Army National Guard's anticipated role, missions, and requirements for personnel and equipment in both the near and long term. The near-term portion of the strategy should address the current decline in readiness for overseas missions and the Army National Guard's plans to provide the ready forces needed for the global war on terrorism over the next 3 to 5 years. Specifically it should include a plan to manage the risk associated with the declining readiness of nondeployed Army National Guard forces, including identifying funding for any personnel and equipment required to mitigate unacceptable levels of risk.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: In process
Comments: DOD agreed with the recommendation. In its comments, the Army said it has included a strategy for Army National Guard modularity and restructuring in its campaign plan. However, the Army's plans for implementing its modular force initiatives are not yet detailed enough to ensure that the recommendation will be implemented. The Army is continuing to implement aspects of the modular initiatives and has begun efforts to develop metrics for its readiness for homeland security missions.
Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a strategy that addresses the Army National Guard's needs for the global war on terrorism, including the Army National Guard's anticipated role, missions, and requirements for personnel and equipment in both the near and long term. The long-term portion of the strategy should detail how the Army plans to restructure and provide the Guard resources--personnel, equipment, and training--consistent with its 21st century role, including how the Army National Guard will be restructured to support future missions and ensure operational compatibility with active forces.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: In process
Comments: DOD agreed with the recommendation and said the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness and the Under Secretary for Policy will take the lead for specific actions in the recommendation. While no one plan has been developed that provides details on how the Army plans to restructure and equip Army National Guard forces, the Army has set goals for equipping all forces to the same readiness levels and has budgeted for increased funding levels for the Army National Guard in the Department's Future Years Defense Plan.
Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a strategy that addresses the Army National Guard's needs for the global war on terrorism, including the Army National Guard's anticipated role, missions, and requirements for personnel and equipment in both the near and long term. The long-term portion of the strategy should detail how the Army plans to restructure and provide the Guard resources--personnel, equipment, and training--consistent with its 21st century role, including the time frames for implementing restructuring actions, the resources needed to achieve compatibility with active forces and the appropriate level of readiness for their missions.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: In process
Comments: The Department of Defense partially addressed the role of the Guard in the Quadrennial Defense Review, and the Army Campaign Plan sets out goals for equipping Army National Guard forces. In addition, the Army's budget plans include increased equipping levels for Army National Guard forces. However, DOD has not developed a plan to manage risks to Army National Guard forces as they continue to support the Global War on Terrorism while changing to new modular force roles and cyclical deployment cycles.
Recommendation: As DOD completes its homeland defense strategy and the Northern Command refines its concept and operational plans for homeland defense and support to civil authorities and defines requirements, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy and for Personnel and Readiness, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander of the U.S. Northern Command, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, the Chiefs of the Army and the Air Force, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and appropriate officials in the Department of Homeland Security, to establish the full range of the National Guard's homeland missions, including those led by DOD and those conducted in support of civilian authorities.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: In process
Comments: In June 2005, the Department of Defense published a strategy for homeland defense and civil support that recognizes the important role of the National Guard in these federal missions. However, the strategy does not detail specific requirements for forces and equipment for these missions. Northern Command, which is charged with developing requirements for DOD's homeland security role, has not planned for how the National Guard will be used for homeland defense and homeland security missions or the equipment it will require.
Recommendation: As DOD completes its homeland defense strategy and the Northern Command refines its concept and operational plans for homeland defense and support to civil authorities and defines requirements, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy and for Personnel and Readiness, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander of the U.S. Northern Command, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, the Chiefs of the Army and the Air Force, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and appropriate officials in the Department of Homeland Security, to identify the National Guard's capabilities to perform these missions and any shortfalls in personnel, equipment, and training needed to perform these missions successfully.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: In process
Comments: In June 2005, the Department of Defense published a strategy for homeland defense and civil support that recognizes the important role of the National Guard in these federal missions. However, the strategy does not detail specific requirements for forces and equipment for these missions. Northern Command, which is charged with developing requirements for DOD's homeland security role, has not planned for how the National Guard will be used for homeland defense and homeland security missions or the equipment it will require.
Recommendation: As DOD completes its homeland defense strategy and the Northern Command refines its concept and operational plans for homeland defense and support to civil authorities and defines requirements, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy and for Personnel and Readiness, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander of the U.S. Northern Command, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, the Chiefs of the Army and the Air Force, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and appropriate officials in the Department of Homeland Security, to develop a plan that addresses any shortfalls of personnel, equipment, and training, assigns responsibility for actions, establishes time frames for implementing the plan, and identifies required funding.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: In process
Comments: In June 2005, the Department of Defense published a strategy for homeland defense and civil support that recognizes the important role of the National Guard in these federal missions. However, the strategy does not detail specific requirements for forces and equipment for these missions. Northern Command, which is charged with developing requirements for DOD's homeland security role, has not planned for how the National Guard will be used for homeland defense and homeland security missions or the equipment it will require.
Recommendation: As DOD completes its homeland defense strategy and the Northern Command refines its concept and operational plans for homeland defense and support to civil authorities and defines requirements, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy and for Personnel and Readiness, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander of the U.S. Northern Command, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, the Chiefs of the Army and the Air Force, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and appropriate officials in the Department of Homeland Security, to establish readiness standards and measures for the Guard's homeland security missions so that the readiness for these missions can be systematically measured and accurately reported.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: In process
Comments: In June 2005, the Department of Defense published a strategy for homeland defense and civil support that recognizes the important role of the National Guard in these federal missions. However, the strategy does not detail specific requirements for forces and equipment for these missions. Northern Command, which is charged with developing requirements for DOD's homeland security role, has not planned for how the National Guard will be used for homeland defense and homeland security missions or the equipment it will require.
