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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on Superfund and Environmental Health, 
Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT: 

Wednesday, June 20, 2007: 

World Trade Center: 

Preliminary Observations on EPA's Second Program to Address Indoor 
Contamination: 

Statement of John B. Stephenson, Director: 
Natural Resources and Environment: 

GAO-07-806T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-806T, testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Superfund and Environmental Health, Committee on Environment and Public 
Works, U.S. Senate 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the World Trade Center 
(WTC) turned Lower Manhattan into a disaster site. As the towers 
collapsed, Lower Manhattan was blanketed with building debris and 
combustible materials. This complex mixture created a major concern: 
that thousands of residents and workers in the area would now be 
exposed to known hazards in the air and in the dust, such as asbestos, 
lead, glass fibers, and pulverized concrete. In May 2002, New York City 
formally requested federal assistance to address indoor contamination. 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted an indoor clean and 
test program from 2002 to 2003. Several years later, after obtaining 
the views of advisory groups, including its Inspector General and an 
expert panel, EPA announced a second test and clean program in December 
2006. Program implementation is to begin later in 2007, more than 5 
years after the disaster. 

GAO’s testimony, based on preliminary work evaluating EPA’s development 
of its second program, addresses (1) EPA’s actions to implement 
recommendations from the expert panel and its Inspector General, (2) 
the completeness of information EPA provided to the public in its 
second plan, and (3) EPA’s assessment of available resources to conduct 
the program. We discussed the issues we address in this statement with 
EPA. 

What GAO Found: 

EPA has taken some actions to incorporate recommendations from the 
Inspector General and expert panel members into its second program, but 
its decision not to incorporate other recommendations may limit the 
overall effectiveness of this program. For example, EPA’s second 
program incorporates recommendations to expand the list of contaminants 
it tests for, and to test for contaminants in dust as well as the air. 
However, it does not incorporate a recommendation to expand the 
boundaries of cleanup to better ensure that WTC contamination is 
addressed in all locations. EPA reported that it does not have a basis 
for expanding the boundaries because it cannot distinguish between 
normal urban dust and WTC dust. EPA did not begin examining methods for 
differentiating between normal urban dust and WTC dust until nearly 3 
years after the disaster, and therefore the process for finding 
distinctions was more difficult. In addition, EPA’s second program does 
not incorporate recommendations to sample heating, ventilation, and air 
conditioning (HVAC) systems. According to EPA’s plan, the agency chose 
to offer limited testing in a greater number of apartments and common 
areas rather than provide more comprehensive testing (such as in HVACs) 
in a smaller number of these areas. 

EPA’s second plan does not fully inform the public about the results of 
its first program. EPA concluded that a “very small” number of samples 
from its first program exceeded risk levels for airborne asbestos. 
However, EPA did not explain that this conclusion was to be expected 
because it took over 80 percent of the samples after residences were 
professionally cleaned. Without this additional information, residents 
who could have participated might have opted not to do so because of 
EPA’s conclusion. 

EPA did not assess the adequacy of available resources for the second 
program. EPA stated that it plans to spend $7 million on this program, 
which is not based on any assessment of costs, but is the funding 
remaining from the first program. Without careful planning for future 
disasters, timely decisions about data collection, and thorough 
communication of sampling results, an evaluation of the adequacy of 
cleanup efforts may be impossible. 

Figure: Aerial Image of North World Trade Center Tower on 9/11: 

[See PDF for Image] 

Source: NYPD Photo Unit. 

[End of figure] 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-806T]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact John B. Stephenson at 
(202) 512-3841 or stephensonj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the preliminary results of our 
ongoing work on the development of the Environmental Protection 
Agency's (EPA) second program to address World Trade Center (WTC) 
indoor contamination. As you know, the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
attack on the World Trade Center turned Lower Manhattan into a disaster 
site, on a scale the nation had never experienced. The World Trade 
Center was a complex of seven buildings on 16 acres surrounding a 5- 
acre plaza in Lower Manhattan. The twin towers were at the center of 
the complex. Each tower had 110 floors, with approximately 43,200 
square feet on each floor. As the towers collapsed, Lower Manhattan was 
blanketed in a mixture of building debris and combustible materials 
that coated building exteriors and streets, as well as the interiors of 
apartments and offices. This complex mixture gave rise to another major 
concern: that thousands of residents and workers in the area would now 
be exposed to known hazards in the air and in the dust, such as 
asbestos, lead, glass fibers, and pulverized concrete. 

On the day of the attacks, the President signed a major disaster 
declaration, which activated the Federal Response Plan. The Federal 
Response Plan, now replaced by the National Response Plan, established 
the process and structure for the federal government's assistance to 
state and local agencies when responding to any major disaster or 
emergency declared under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act).[Footnote 1] In May 2002, after 
numerous cleanup, dust collection, and air monitoring activities were 
conducted outdoors by EPA, other federal agencies, New York City and 
New York State, New York City formally requested federal assistance to 
clean and/or test residences in the vicinity of the WTC site for 
airborne asbestos.[Footnote 2] 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which administered the 
Federal Response Plan, provided such assistance, entering into 
interagency agreements with EPA in 2002 to develop EPA's first program. 
This program allowed residents of Lower Manhattan living south of Canal 
Street (representing over 20,000 residences) to elect to have their 
home professionally cleaned, followed by testing, or to have their home 
tested only. Approximately 20 percent of the eligible residences 
participated in the program. The majority of these residences were 
professionally cleaned before they were sampled for asbestos because 
their owners selected the clean and test option rather than the test 
only option.[Footnote 3] Even though samples were collected after 
cleaning in most cases, some residences (less than 1 percent) were 
still found to have unsafe levels of asbestos. 

EPA's first program was criticized by several entities; as a result, 
EPA developed a second program, which is the focus of our ongoing work 
and our testimony today.[Footnote 4] Let me provide some information on 
the events leading up to the second program. 

In August 2003, EPA's Inspector General made recommendations that 
addressed EPA's initial efforts to clean up indoor contamination 
following the towers' collapse, as well as recommendations that focused 
on EPA's future preparedness for large-scale disasters resulting in 
indoor contamination. The Inspector General reported that the effort to 
clean up indoor WTC contamination was inadequate for multiple reasons. 
For example, according to the Inspector General, the WTC cleanup did 
not require that entire buildings be systematically cleaned, including 
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems. As a result, 
the Inspector General concluded, the contaminants in uncleaned 
apartments and common areas could enter the air supply system and re- 
contaminate cleaned spaces. With regard to future preparedness, the 
Inspector General recommended, among other things, that EPA develop 
protocols for determining how indoor environmental contamination would 
be handled in the event of a future disaster. 

The White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) indicated in 
October 2003 that EPA would organize and lead an expert technical 
review panel to address the concerns of the Inspector General and 
others. In March 2004, EPA convened the WTC Expert Technical Review 
Panel, which met periodically through December 2005. The panel was 
composed of 20 individuals from academia and from city and federal 
health and science agencies, such as the Department of Labor's 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS). It also included two 
representatives from the Community-Labor Coalition (CLC), which is a 
network of community, tenant, labor, and environmental organizations 
formed after September 11, 2001, to advocate for appropriate health and 
safety efforts in the recovery from the WTC attack. The panel's overall 
task, as outlined by CEQ, was to advise EPA on efforts to protect New 
York City residents and workers potentially affected by the collapse of 
the World Trade Center. Specifically, the panel's goals were to help 
guide EPA in (1) identifying any remaining risks using exposure and 
health surveillance information; (2) identifying any unmet public 
health needs; and (3) determining steps to further minimize the risks. 
In addition, the panel was asked to provide advice for EPA's second 
program. Panel members, including the CLC representatives, submitted 
individual recommendations to EPA. 

After obtaining the views of advisory groups, including the Inspector 
General, the expert panel, and the CLC, EPA announced its plan for a 
second program in December 2006. This 2006 plan targets residents and 
building owners in the same portion of Lower Manhattan as EPA's first 
program. In the 2006 plan, EPA also provided the results of the 
sampling from its first program. The second program is set to begin 
later in 2007. As of May 10, 2007, EPA told us, 295 residents and 
building owners had enrolled in the second program, compared with 4,166 
eligible participants in the first program. Figure 1 shows the 
chronology of events preceding the second program. 

Figure 1: Timeline of EPA's WTC Indoor Contamination Activities: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of EPA data; photos top to bottom: top photo, NYPD 
Photo Unit; center photo, Federal Emergency Management Agency; bottom 
photo, Dr. Lung Chi Chen, New York University. 

[A] EPA's registration period ended in March 2007, but as of June 20, 
2007, EPA has not begun implementing the program. 

[End of figure] 

Our testimony, which is based on our ongoing work evaluating EPA's 
development of its second program, discusses (1) EPA's actions to 
implement recommendations from the expert panel and its Inspector 
General, (2) the completeness of information EPA provided to the public 
in its second plan, and (3) EPA's assessment of available resources to 
conduct the program. 

In summary, while we found that EPA has taken some actions to 
incorporate recommendations from the Inspector General and expert panel 
members into its second program, it decided 'not to incorporate other 
recommendations, which may limit the program's overall effectiveness. 
For example, EPA's second program incorporates recommendations to 
expand the number of contaminants tested, from asbestos only, to three 
additional contaminants and to test in dust as well as in the air. 
However, EPA's program does not incorporate a recommendation to expand 
the boundaries of cleanup to north of Canal Street and to Brooklyn. EPA 
reported that it was unable to develop a method for distinguishing 
between normal urban dust and WTC dust; therefore, the agency reported 
that it cannot assess the extent of WTC contamination, and has no basis 
for expanding the cleanup effort. EPA did not begin examining methods 
for differentiating between normal urban dust and WTC dust until May 
2004--nearly 3 years after the disaster--and therefore the process for 
differentiating was more difficult. In addition, EPA's second program 
does not incorporate recommendations to sample in HVACs or 
"inaccessible" locations within apartments and common areas, such as 
behind dishwashers. The agency chose to offer more limited testing in a 
greater number of apartments and common areas rather than to provide 
more comprehensive testing (such as in HVACs) in a smaller number of 
these areas. Testing in such a restricted manner make evaluating the 
adequacy of clean up efforts very difficult, and may discourage 
participation. Moreover, this program does not incorporate the 
recommendation to test workplaces because, according to EPA officials, 
other federal agencies have procedures to address worker safety. We 
discussed the issues we address in this statement with EPA. 

EPA did not provide sufficient information in its second plan to allow 
the public to make informed choices about their participation. 
Specifically, EPA did not fully disclose the limitations in the testing 
results from its first program. EPA concluded that a "very small" 
number of samples from its first program exceeded risk levels for 
airborne asbestos. However, EPA did not explain that this conclusion 
was to be expected because it took over 80 percent of the samples after 
residences were professionally cleaned. In addition, EPA did not fully 
explain that its conclusion was based on participation from only 20 
percent of the eligible residences. Without this additional 
information, residents who could have elected to participate might have 
been discouraged from doing so because of EPA's conclusion. 

EPA did not assess the adequacy of available resources to carry out its 
second program effectively. Instead of assessing the costs of carrying 
out its program and providing resources accordingly, EPA has simply 
identified how much money was left over from the first program. 
Further, the amount of funding provided for the second program seems 
inconsistent with the scale of second program activities. Specifically, 
the $7 million EPA plans to spend for the second program's testing and 
cleaning is less than 20 percent of the first program's funding, 
despite an increase in the number and type of contaminants being 
sampled. EPA indicated that if demand had exceeded available resources, 
EPA would have simply limited participation in the program. 

Background: 

After the collapse of the World Trade Center and the accompanying 
spread of dust resulting from the collapse, EPA, other federal 
agencies, and New York City and New York State public health and 
environmental authorities focused on numerous outdoor activities, 
including cleanup, dust collection, and air monitoring. In May 2002, 
New York City formally requested federal assistance to clean and test 
building interiors in the vicinity of the WTC site for airborne 
asbestos. Such assistance may be made available to state and local 
governments under the Stafford Act and the National Response Plan, 
which establishes the process and structure for the federal government 
to provide assistance to state and local agencies when responding to 
threats or acts of terrorism, major disasters, and other 
emergencies.[Footnote 5] FEMA, which coordinates the federal response 
to requests for assistance from state and local governments, entered 
into interagency agreements with EPA to develop and implement the first 
and second indoor cleanup programs for residents in Lower Manhattan. 

EPA Incorporated Some Recommendations, but Its Decision Not to Adopt 
Others May Limit the Second Program's Effectiveness: 

In response to recommendations from the Inspector General and expert 
panel members, EPA's second program incorporates some additional 
testing elements. For example, EPA is testing for a wider range of 
contaminants. In addition to asbestos, EPA will test for man-made 
vitreous fibers, which are in such materials as building and appliance 
insulation; lead; and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, a group of over 
100 different chemicals that are formed during the incomplete burning 
of coal, oil, gas, and garbage. EPA will also test dust as well as the 
air. In order to test the dust for these contaminants, EPA had to 
develop cleanup standards. However, EPA's second program does not 
incorporate the following other recommendations: (1) broadening the 
geographic scope of the testing effort, (2) testing HVACs and 
"inaccessible" locations, and (3) expanding the program to include 
workplaces.[Footnote 6] 

Broadening the geographic scope of testing. EPA did not expand the 
scope of testing north of Canal Street, as well as to Brooklyn, as 
advisory groups had recommended. EPA reported that it did not expand 
the scope of testing because it was not able to differentiate between 
normal urban dust and WTC dust, which would have enabled it to 
determine the geographic extent of WTC contamination. Some expert panel 
members had suggested that EPA investigate whether it was feasible to 
develop a method for distinguishing between normal urban dust and WTC 
dust. EPA ultimately agreed to do so. Beginning in 2004--almost 3 years 
after the disaster--EPA conducted this investigation. EPA officials 
told us that because so much time had passed since the terrorist 
attack, it was difficult to distinguish between WTC dust and urban 
dust. EPA ultimately abandoned this effort because peer reviewers 
questioned its methodology; EPA decided not to explore alternative 
methods that the peer reviewers had proposed. Instead, EPA will test 
only in an area where visible contamination has been confirmed by 
aerial photography conducted soon after the WTC attack. However, aerial 
photography does not reveal indoor contamination, and EPA officials 
told us that they knew that some WTC dust was found immediately after 
the terrorist attacks outside the area eligible for its first and 
second program, such as in Brooklyn. 

Testing HVACs and in inaccessible areas. In its November 2005 draft 
plan for the second program, EPA had proposed collecting samples from a 
number of locations in HVACs. In some buildings HVACs are shared, and 
in others each residence has its own system. In either case, 
contaminants in the HVAC could re-contaminate the residence unless the 
system is also professionally cleaned. However, EPA's second program 
will not provide for testing in HVACs unless tests in common areas 
reveal that standards for any of four contaminants have been exceeded. 
EPA explains in the second plan that it will not sample within HVACs 
because it chose to offer more limited testing in a greater number of 
apartments and common areas rather than provide more comprehensive 
testing in a smaller number of these areas. Similarly, EPA had proposed 
sampling for contaminants in "inaccessible" locations, such as behind 
dishwashers and rarely moved furniture within apartments and common 
areas. Again, because it was unable to differentiate between normal 
urban dust and WTC dust, EPA stated that it would not test in 
inaccessible locations in order to devote its resources to as many 
requests as possible. In fact, EPA only received 295 requests from 
residents and building owners to participate in the second program, 
compared with 4,166 eligible participants in the first 
program.[Footnote 7] 

Expanding the program to include workers/workplaces. According to EPA's 
second program plan, the plan is "the result of ongoing efforts to 
respond to concerns of residents and workers." Workers were concerned 
that workplaces in Lower Manhattan experienced the same contamination 
as residences. In its second program, EPA will test and clean common 
areas in commercial buildings, but will do so only if an individual 
property owner or manager requests the service. EPA stated that 
employees who believe their working conditions are unsafe as a result 
of WTC dust may file a complaint with OSHA or request an evaluation by 
HHS's National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health. Concerns 
remain, however, because these other agencies do not have the authority 
to conduct cleanup in response to contaminant levels that exceed 
standards. In addition, OSHA's standards are designed primarily to 
address airborne contamination, while EPA's test and clean program is 
designed to address contamination in building spaces, whether the 
contamination is airborne or in settled dust. Thus, OSHA can require 
individual employers to adopt work practices to reduce employee 
exposure to airborne contaminants, whereas EPA's test and clean program 
is designed to remove contaminants from affected spaces. 

EPA Did Not Provide the Public With Sufficient Information to Make 
Fully Informed Decisions: 

EPA did not provide sufficient information in its second plan so that 
the public could make informed choices about their participation. 
Specifically, EPA did not fully disclose the limitations in the testing 
results from its first program. While EPA stated that the number of 
samples in its first program exceeding risk levels for airborne 
asbestos was "very small," it did not fully explain that this 
conclusion was limited by the following factors. 

Participation. Participation in the program came from about 20 percent 
of the residences eligible for participation. In addition, 
participation was voluntary, which may suggest that the sample of 
apartments was not representative of all the residences eligible for 
the program. Those who chose to participate may not have been at 
greatest risk. 

Contaminants tested. EPA's cleanup decisions were based only on tests 
for asbestos, rather than other contaminants, and the decisions focused 
on airborne contamination rather than contamination in dust inside 
residences. 

Sampling protocol. EPA took over 80 percent of the samples after 
professional cleaning was complete. Therefore it is not surprising that 
EPA found few samples exceeding its asbestos standard. 

EPA also did not explain in its second program plan that its first 
program's test results excluded samples that were discarded because 
they were "not cleared"--that is, could not be analyzed because the 
filter had too many fibers to be analyzed under a microscope. However, 
EPA's final report on its first program stated that residences with 
more than one inconclusive result, such as filter overload, were 
encouraged to have their residences re-cleaned and re-tested. EPA did 
not explain the impact of excluding these samples or other data 
limitations from its conclusion that the number of samples exceeding 
asbestos standards was very small. Without providing complete 
explanations of the data, residents who could have elected to 
participate might have been discouraged from doing so. 

EPA Did Not Adequately Assess Resource Needs for the Second Program: 

EPA did not take steps to ensure that resources would be adequate to 
achieve the second program's objectives. Instead, EPA is implementing 
this program with the funding remaining after its first program-- 
approximately $7 million. EPA could not provide us with any basis for 
determining whether this funding level is appropriate. EPA officials 
told us that they were unable to determine the cost of the program 
without knowing the number of participants. However, we note that funds 
available for the second program are less than 20 percent of the first 
program's funding, despite an increase in the number and type of 
contaminants being sampled. 

Almost two-thirds of the panel members told us they did not believe the 
$7 million for the sampling and cleanup was sufficient. According to 
one of the expert panel's chairmen--a former EPA Assistant 
Administrator--the $7 million was sufficient for initial sampling in 
the second program, but not for sampling and cleanup. If demand had 
exceeded available resources, EPA would have simply limited 
participation by ranking program applicants on the basis of their 
proximity to the WTC site. 

Concluding Observations: 

Shortcomings in EPA's second program to test and clean residences for 
WTC contamination raise questions about the agency's preparedness for 
addressing indoor contamination resulting from future disasters. The 
effectiveness of this program may be limited because some important 
recommendations were not incorporated, and because program 
implementation will not begin until later this year--more than 5 years 
after the World Trade Center collapsed. Furthermore, owing to these 
factors, the majority of panel members do not support EPA's second 
program, noting that it was not responsive to the concerns of residents 
and workers harmed by the collapse of the WTC towers, it was 
scientifically and technically flawed, or it was unacceptable because 
it would not identify the extent of contamination. Some panel members 
questioned the value of participating in EPA's program, and even stated 
that they would discourage participation. 

Madam Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy 
to respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may 
have. 

Contacts and Acknowledgments: 

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this testimony. For further 
information about this testimony, please contact John B. Stephenson, 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment (202) 512-3841, or 
stephensonj@gao.gov. Key contributors to this testimony were Janice 
Ceperich, Katheryn Summers Hubbell, Karen Keegan, Omari Norman, Diane 
B. Raynes, Carol Herrnstadt Shulman, and Sandra Tasic. Additional 
assistance was provided by Katherine M. Raheb. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] 42 U.S.C. § 5121, et seq. The purpose of the Stafford Act is "to 
provide an orderly and continuing means of assistance by the Federal 
Government to State and local governments in carrying out their 
responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage which result 
from such disasters." 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b). 

[2] In addition to using asbestos as a trigger for cleanup, in a small 
subset of residences, EPA conducted sampling for dioxin, mercury, and 
22 metals to inform a study about the effectiveness of its cleaning 
techniques. 

[3] EPA regional officials overseeing the program told us they assumed 
that some residents elected to have testing only because they had their 
residences cleaned before EPA's program. 

[4] A lawsuit was filed in March 2004 that, among other things, 
challenged the adequacy of EPA's first test and clean program. The case 
is on appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 
Benzman v. Whitman, No. 04-1888 (S.D.N.Y. filed March 10, 2004), appeal 
docketed, Nos. 06-1166-cv, 06-1346-cv, 06-1454-cv (2nd Cir. March 10, 
2006). Pursuant to its long-standing policy of not addressing issues in 
ongoing litigation, GAO has not addressed EPA's first test and clean 
program. 

[5] The National Response Plan replaced the Federal Response Plan. The 
Federal Response Plan was in effect on September 11, 2001. 

[6] EPA's second program does allow commercial building owners to 
request testing and cleaning, but does not permit workers or employers 
to do so. 

[7] A total of 640 individual residents and building owners registered 
for the second program. Of this total, 295 eligible participants 
submitted the necessary access agreements.

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